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Versions: (draft-kwatsen-netconf-zerotouch) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

NETCONF Working Group                                          K. Watsen
Internet-Draft                                          Juniper Networks
Intended status: Standards Track                          M. Abrahamsson
Expires: March 17, 2019                                        T-Systems
                                                               I. Farrer
                                                     Deutsche Telekom AG
                                                      September 13, 2018


             Zero Touch Provisioning for Networking Devices
                    draft-ietf-netconf-zerotouch-25

Abstract

   This draft presents a technique to securely provision a networking
   device when it is booting in a factory-default state.  Variations in
   the solution enables it to be used on both public and private
   networks.  The provisioning steps are able to update the boot image,
   commit an initial configuration, and execute arbitrary scripts to
   address auxiliary needs.  The updated device is subsequently able to
   establish secure connections with other systems.  For instance, a
   device may establish NETCONF (RFC 6241) and/or RESTCONF (RFC 8040)
   connections with deployment-specific network management systems.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

   This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced
   with finalized values at the time of publication.  This note
   summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed.  No other RFC
   Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.

   Artwork in the IANA Considerations section contains placeholder
   values for DHCP options pending IANA assignment.  Please apply the
   following replacements:

   o  "TBD1" --> the assigned value for id-ct-zerotouchInformationXML

   o  "TBD2" --> the assigned value for id-ct-zerotouchInformationJSON

   Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
   progress.  Please apply the following replacements:

   o  "XXXX" --> the assigned numerical RFC value for this draft

   Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of
   publication of this draft.  Please apply the following replacement:

   o  "2018-09-13" --> the publication date of this draft



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   The following one Appendix section is to be removed prior to
   publication:

   o  Appendix A.  Change Log

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 17, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.1.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.3.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.4.  Tree Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   2.  Types of Bootstrapping Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.1.  Redirect Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.2.  Onboarding Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   3.  Artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9



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     3.1.  Zero Touch Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.2.  Owner Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.3.  Ownership Voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.4.  Artifact Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.5.  Artifact Groupings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   4.  Sources of Bootstrapping Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.1.  Removable Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.2.  DNS Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.3.  DHCP Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.4.  Bootstrap Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   5.  Device Details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.1.  Initial State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.2.  Boot Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.3.  Processing a Source of Bootstrapping Data . . . . . . . .  21
     5.4.  Validating Signed Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     5.5.  Processing Redirect Information . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     5.6.  Processing Onboarding Information . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   6.  The Zero Touch Information Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     6.1.  Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     6.2.  Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     6.3.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   7.  The Zero Touch Bootstrap Server API . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     7.1.  API Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     7.2.  Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
     7.3.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   8.  DHCP Zero Touch Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     8.1.  DHCPv4 Zero Touch Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     8.2.  DHCPv6 Zero Touch Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
     8.3.  Common Field Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     9.1.  Clock Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     9.2.  Use of IDevID Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     9.3.  Immutable Storage for Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     9.4.  Secure Storage for Long-lived Private Keys  . . . . . . .  54
     9.5.  Blindly Authenticating a Bootstrap Server . . . . . . . .  55
     9.6.  Disclosing Information to Untrusted Servers . . . . . . .  55
     9.7.  Sequencing Sources of Bootstrapping Data  . . . . . . . .  56
     9.8.  Safety of Private Keys used for Trust . . . . . . . . . .  56
     9.9.  Infinite Redirection Loops and Sequences  . . . . . . . .  57
     9.10. Increased Reliance on Manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . .  57
     9.11. Concerns with Trusted Bootstrap Servers . . . . . . . . .  58
     9.12. Validity Period for Zero Touch Information  . . . . . . .  58
     9.13. The "ietf-zerotouch-information" YANG Module  . . . . . .  59
     9.14. The "ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server" YANG Module . . . .  60
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     10.1.  The IETF XML Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     10.2.  The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     10.3.  The SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry  .  61



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     10.4.  The BOOTP Manufacturer Extensions and DHCP Options
            Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
   Appendix A.  The Zero Touch Device Data Model . . . . . . . . . .  66
     A.1.  Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
     A.2.  Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
     A.3.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
   Appendix B.  Promoting a Connection from Untrusted to Trusted . .  70
   Appendix C.  Workflow Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
     C.1.  Enrollment and Ordering Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
     C.2.  Owner Stages the Network for Bootstrap  . . . . . . . . .  74
     C.3.  Device Powers On  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
   Appendix D.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
     D.1.  ID to 00  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
     D.2.  00 to 01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
     D.3.  01 to 02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
     D.4.  02 to 03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
     D.5.  03 to 04  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
     D.6.  04 to 05  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
     D.7.  05 to 06  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
     D.8.  06 to 07  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
     D.9.  07 to 08  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
     D.10. 08 to 09  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
     D.11. 09 to 10  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
     D.12. 10 to 11  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
     D.13. 11 to 12  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
     D.14. 12 to 13  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
     D.15. 13 to 14  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
     D.16. 14 to 15  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
     D.17. 15 to 16  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
     D.18. 16 to 17  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
     D.19. 17 to 18  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
     D.20. 18 to 19  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
     D.21. 19 to 20  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
     D.22. 20 to 21  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
     D.23. 21 to 22  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
     D.24. 22 to 23  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
     D.25. 23 to 24  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
     D.26. 24 to 25  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88








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1.  Introduction

   A fundamental business requirement for any network operator is to
   reduce costs where possible.  For network operators, deploying
   devices to many locations can be a significant cost, as sending
   trained specialists to each site for installations is both cost
   prohibitive and does not scale.

   This document defines Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP), a
   bootstrapping strategy enabling devices to securely obtain
   bootstrapping data with no installer action beyond physical placement
   and connecting network and power cables.  As such, SZTP enables non-
   technical personnel to bring up devices in remote locations without
   the need for any operator input.

   The SZTP solution includes updating the boot image, committing an
   initial configuration, and executing arbitrary scripts to address
   auxiliary needs.  The updated device is subsequently able to
   establish secure connections with other systems.  For instance, a
   devices may establish NETCONF [RFC8040] and/or RESTCONF [RFC6241]
   connections with deployment-specific network management systems.

   This document primarily regards physical devices, where the setting
   of the device's initial state, described in Section 5.1, occurs
   during the device's manufacturing process.  The SZTP solution may be
   extended to support virtual machines or other such logical
   constructs, but details for how this can be accomplished is left for
   future work.

1.1.  Use Cases

   o  Device connecting to a remotely administered network

         This use-case involves scenarios, such as a remote branch
         office or convenience store, whereby a device connects as an
         access gateway to an ISP's network.  Assuming it is not
         possible to customize the ISP's network to provide any
         bootstrapping support, and with no other nearby device to
         leverage, the device has no recourse but to reach out to an
         Internet-based bootstrap server to bootstrap from.

   o  Device connecting to a locally administered network

         This use-case covers all other scenarios and differs only in
         that the device may additionally leverage nearby devices, which
         may direct it to use a local service to bootstrap from.  If no
         such information is available, or the device is unable to use
         the information provided, it can then reach out to the network



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         just as it would for the remotely administered network use-
         case.

   Conceptual workflows for how SZTP might be deployed are provided in
   Appendix C.

1.2.  Terminology

   This document uses the following terms (sorted by name):

   Artifact:  The term "artifact" is used throughout to represent any of
       the three artifacts defined in Section 3 (zero touch information,
       ownership voucher, and owner certificate).  These artifacts
       collectively provide all the bootstrapping data a device may use.

   Bootstrapping Data:  The term "bootstrapping data" is used throughout
       this document to refer to the collection of data that a device
       may obtain during the bootstrapping process.  Specifically, it
       refers to the three artifacts zero touch information, owner
       certificate, and ownership voucher, as described in Section 3.

   Bootstrap Server:  The term "bootstrap server" is used within this
       document to mean any RESTCONF server implementing the YANG module
       defined in Section 7.3.

   Device:  The term "device" is used throughout this document to refer
       to a network element that needs to be bootstrapped.  See
       Section 5 for more information about devices.

   Manufacturer:  The term "manufacturer" is used herein to refer to the
       manufacturer of a device or a delegate of the manufacturer.

   Network Management System (NMS):  The acronym "NMS" is used
       throughout this document to refer to the deployment specific
       management system that the bootstrapping process is responsible
       for introducing devices to.  From a device's perspective, when
       the bootstrapping process has completed, the NMS is a NETCONF or
       RESTCONF client.

   Onboarding Information:  The term "onboarding information" is used
       herein to refer to one of the two types of "zero touch
       information" defined in this document, the other being "redirect
       information".  Onboarding information is formally defined by the
       "onboarding-information" YANG-data structure in Section 6.3.

   Onboarding Server:  The term "onboarding server" is used herein to
       refer to a bootstrap server that only returns onboarding
       information.



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   Owner:  The term "owner" is used throughout this document to refer to
       the person or organization that purchased or otherwise owns a
       device.

   Owner Certificate:  The term "owner certificate" is used in this
       document to represent an X.509 certificate that binds an owner
       identity to a public key, which a device can use to validate a
       signature over the zero touch information artifact.  The owner
       certificate may be communicated along with its chain of
       intermediate certificates leading up to a known trust anchor.
       The owner certificate is one of the three bootstrapping artifacts
       described in Section 3.

   Ownership Voucher:  The term "ownership voucher" is used in this
       document to represent the voucher artifact defined in [RFC8366].
       The ownership voucher is used to assign a device to an owner.
       The ownership voucher is one of the three bootstrapping artifacts
       described in Section 3.

   Redirect Information:  The term "redirect information" is used herein
       to refer to one of the two types of "zero touch information"
       defined in this document, the other being "onboarding
       information".  Redirect information is formally defined by the
       "redirect-information" YANG-data structure in Section 6.3.

   Redirect Server:  The term "redirect server" is used to refer to a
       bootstrap server that only returns redirect information.  A
       redirect server is particularly useful when hosted by a
       manufacturer, as a well-known (e.g., Internet-based) resource to
       redirect devices to deployment-specific bootstrap servers.

   Signed Data:  The term "signed data" is used throughout to mean zero
       touch information that has been signed, specifically by a private
       key possessed by a device's owner.

   Unsigned Data:  The term "unsigned data" is used throughout to mean
       zero touch information that has not been signed.

   Zero Touch Information:  The term "zero touch information" is used
       herein to refer either redirect information or onboarding
       information.  Zero touch information is one of the three
       bootstrapping artifacts described in Section 3.

1.3.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP



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   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.4.  Tree Diagrams

   Tree diagrams used in this document follow the notation defined in
   [RFC8340].

2.  Types of Bootstrapping Information

   This document defines two types of information that devices can
   access during the bootstrapping process.  These information types are
   described in this section.  Examples are provided in Section 6.2

2.1.  Redirect Information

   Redirect information redirects a device to another bootstrap server.
   Redirect information encodes a list of bootstrap servers, each
   specifying the bootstrap server's hostname (or IP address), an
   optional port, and an optional trust anchor certificate that the
   device can use to authenticate the bootstrap server with.

   Redirect information is YANG modeled data formally defined by the
   "redirect-information" container in the YANG module presented in
   Section 6.3.  This container has the tree diagram shown below.

   +--:(redirect-information)
      +-- redirect-information
         +-- bootstrap-server* [address]
            +-- address         inet:host
            +-- port?           inet:port-number
            +-- trust-anchor?   cms

   Redirect information may be trusted or untrusted.  The redirect
   information is trusted whenever it is obtained via a secure
   connection to a trusted bootstrap server, or whenever it is signed by
   the device's owner.  In all other cases, the redirect information is
   untrusted.

   Trusted redirect information is useful for enabling a device to
   establish a secure connection to a specified bootstrap server, which
   is possible when the redirect information includes the bootstrap
   server's trust anchor certificate.

   Untrusted redirect information is useful for directing a device to a
   bootstrap server where signed data has been staged for it to obtain.
   Note that, when the redirect information is untrusted, devices
   discard any potentially included trust anchor certificates.



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   How devices process redirect information is described in Section 5.5.

2.2.  Onboarding Information

   Onboarding information provides data necessary for a device to
   bootstrap itself and establish secure connections with other systems.
   As defined in this document, onboarding information can specify
   details about the boot image a device must be running, specify an
   initial configuration the device must commit, and specify scripts
   that the device must successfully execute.

   Onboarding information is YANG modeled data formally defined by the
   "onboarding-information" container in the YANG module presented in
   Section 6.3.  This container has the tree diagram shown below.

   +--:(onboarding-information)
      +-- onboarding-information
         +-- boot-image
         |  +-- os-name?              string
         |  +-- os-version?           string
         |  +-- download-uri*         inet:uri
         |  +-- image-verification* [hash-algorithm]
         |     +-- hash-algorithm    identityref
         |     +-- hash-value        yang:hex-string
         +-- configuration-handling?      enumeration
         +-- pre-configuration-script?    script
         +-- configuration?               binary
         +-- post-configuration-script?   script

   Onboarding information must be trusted for it to be of any use to a
   device.  There is no option for a device to process untrusted
   onboarding information.

   Onboarding information is trusted whenever it is obtained via a
   secure connection to a trusted bootstrap server, or whenever it is
   signed by the device's owner.  In all other cases, the onboarding
   information is untrusted.

   How devices process onboarding information is described in
   Section 5.6.

3.  Artifacts

   This document defines three artifacts that can be made available to
   devices while they are bootstrapping.  Each source of bootstrapping
   data specifies how it provides the artifacts defined in this section
   (see Section 4).




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3.1.  Zero Touch Information

   The zero touch information artifact encodes the essential
   bootstrapping data for the device.  This artifact is used to encode
   the redirect information and onboarding information types discussed
   in Section 2.

   The zero touch information artifact is a CMS structure, as described
   in [RFC5652], encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
   as specified in ITU-T X.690 [ITU.X690.2015].  The CMS structure MUST
   contain content conforming to the YANG module specified in
   Section 6.3.

   The zero touch information CMS structure may encode signed or
   unsigned bootstrapping data.  When the bootstrapping data is signed,
   it may also be encrypted but, from a terminology perspective, it is
   still "signed data" Section 1.2.

   When the zero touch information artifact is unsigned, as it might be
   when communicated over trusted channels, the CMS structure's top-most
   content type MUST be one of the OIDs described in Section 10.3, or
   the OID id-data (1.2.840.113549.1.7.1), in which case the encoding
   (JSON, XML, etc.)  SHOULD be communicated externally.  In either
   case, the associated content is an octet string containing
   "zerotouch-information" data in the expected encoding.

   When the zero touch information artifact is signed, as it might be
   when communicated over untrusted channels, the CMS structure's top-
   most content type MUST be the OID id-signedData
   (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2), and its inner eContentType MUST be one of the
   OIDs described in Section 10.3, or the OID id-data
   (1.2.840.113549.1.7.1), in which case the encoding (JSON, XML, etc.)
   SHOULD be communicated externally.  In either case, the associated
   content or eContent is an octet string containing "zerotouch-
   information" data in the expected encoding.

   When the zero touch information artifact is signed and encrypted, as
   it might be when communicated over untrusted channels and privacy is
   important, the CMS structure's top-most content type MUST be the OID
   id-envelopedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.3), and the
   encryptedContentInfo's content type MUST be the OID id-signedData
   (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2), whose eContentType MUST be one of the OIDs
   described in Section 10.3, or the OID id-data (1.2.840.113549.1.7.1),
   in which case the encoding (JSON, XML, etc.)  SHOULD be communicated
   externally.  In either case, the associated content or eContent is an
   octet string containing "zerotouch-information" data in the expected
   encoding.




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3.2.  Owner Certificate

   The owner certificate artifact is an X.509 certificate [RFC5280] that
   is used to identify an "owner" (e.g., an organization).  The owner
   certificate can be signed by any certificate authority (CA).  The
   owner certificate either MUST have no Key Usage specified or the Key
   Usage MUST at least set the "digitalSignature" bit.  The values for
   the owner certificate's "subject" and/or "subjectAltName" are not
   constrained by this document.

   The owner certificate is used by a device to verify the signature
   over the zero touch information artifact (Section 3.1) that the
   device should have also received, as described in Section 3.5.  In
   particular, the device verifies the signature using the public key in
   the owner certificate over the content contained within the zero
   touch information artifact.

   The owner certificate artifact is formally a CMS structure, as
   specified by [RFC5652], encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding
   rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690 [ITU.X690.2015].

   The owner certificate CMS structure MUST contain the owner
   certificate itself, as well as all intermediate certificates leading
   to the "pinned-domain-cert" certificate specified in the ownership
   voucher.  The owner certificate artifact MAY optionally include the
   "pinned-domain-cert" as well.

   In order to support devices deployed on private networks, the owner
   certificate CMS structure MAY also contain suitably fresh, as
   determined by local policy, revocation objects (e.g., CRLs).  Having
   these revocation objects stapled to the owner certificate may obviate
   the need for the device to have to download them dynamically using
   the CRL distribution point or an OCSP responder specified in the
   associated certificates.

   When unencrypted, the owner certificate artifact's CMS structure's
   top-most content type MUST be the OID id-signedData
   (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2).  The inner SignedData structure is the
   degenerate form, whereby there are no signers, that is commonly used
   to disseminate certificates and revocation objects.

   When encrypted, the owner certificate artifact's CMS structure's top-
   most content type MUST be the OID id-envelopedData
   (1.2.840.113549.1.7.3), and the encryptedContentInfo's content type
   MUST be the OID id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2), whereby the
   inner SignedData structure is the degenerate form that has no signers
   commonly used to disseminate certificates and revocation objects.




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3.3.  Ownership Voucher

   The ownership voucher artifact is used to securely identify a
   device's owner, as it is known to the manufacturer.  The ownership
   voucher is signed by the device's manufacturer.

   The ownership voucher is used to verify the owner certificate
   (Section 3.2) that the device should have also received, as described
   in Section 3.5.  In particular, the device verifies that the owner
   certificate has a chain of trust leading to the trusted certificate
   included in the ownership voucher ("pinned-domain-cert").  Note that
   this relationship holds even when the owner certificate is a self-
   signed certificate, and hence also the pinned-domain-cert.

   When unencrypted, the ownership voucher artifact is as defined in
   [RFC8366].  As described, it is a CMS structure whose top-most
   content type MUST be the OID id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2),
   whose eContentType MUST be OID id-ct-animaJSONVoucher
   (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1), or the OID id-data (1.2.840.113549.1.7.1),
   in which case the encoding (JSON, XML, etc.)  SHOULD be communicated
   externally.  In either case, the associated content is an octet
   string containing ietf-voucher data in the expected encoding.

   When encrypted, the ownership voucher artifact's CMS structure's top-
   most content type MUST be the OID id-envelopedData
   (1.2.840.113549.1.7.3), and the encryptedContentInfo's content type
   MUST be the OID id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2), whose
   eContentType MUST be OID id-ct-animaJSONVoucher
   (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1), or the OID id-data (1.2.840.113549.1.7.1),
   in which case the encoding (JSON, XML, etc.)  SHOULD be communicated
   externally.  In either case, the associated content is an octet
   string containing ietf-voucher data in the expected encoding.

3.4.  Artifact Encryption

   Each of the three artifacts MAY be individually encrypted.
   Encryption may be important in some environments where the content is
   considered sensitive.

   Each of the three artifacts are encrypted in the same way, by the
   unencrypted form being encapsulated inside a CMS EnvelopedData type.

   As a consequence, both the zero touch information and ownership
   voucher artifacts are signed and then encrypted, never encrypted and
   then signed.

   This sequencing has the advantage of shrouding the signer's
   certificate, and ensuring that the owner knows the content being



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   signed.  This sequencing further enables the owner to inspect an
   unencrypted voucher obtained from a manufacturer and then encrypt the
   voucher later themselves, perhaps while also stapling in current
   revocation objects, when ready to place the artifact in an unsafe
   location.

   When encrypted, the CMS MUST be encrypted using a secure device
   identity certificate for the device.  This certificate MAY be the
   same as the TLS-level client certificate the device uses when
   connecting to bootstrap servers.  The owner must possess the device's
   identity certificate at the time of encrypting the data.  How the
   owner comes to posses the device's identity certificate for this
   purpose is outside the scope of this document.

3.5.  Artifact Groupings

   The previous sections discussed the bootstrapping artifacts, but only
   certain groupings of these artifacts make sense to return in the
   various bootstrapping situations described in this document.  These
   groupings are:

      Unsigned Data:  This artifact grouping is useful for cases when
         transport level security can be used to convey trust (e.g.,
         HTTPS), or when the zero touch information can be processed in
         a provisional manner (i.e.  unsigned redirect information).

      Signed Data, without revocations:  This artifact grouping is
         useful when signed data is needed (i.e., because the data is
         obtained from an untrusted source and it cannot be processed
         provisionally) and either revocations are not needed or the
         revocations can be obtained dynamically.

      Signed Data, with revocations:  This artifact grouping is useful
         when signed data is needed (i.e., because the data is obtained
         from an untrusted source and it cannot be processed
         provisionally), and revocations are needed, and the revocations
         cannot be obtained dynamically.

   The presence of each artifact, and any distinguishing
   characteristics, are identified for each artifact grouping in the
   table below ("yes/no" regards if the artifact is present in the
   artifact grouping):









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   +---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+
   | Artifact            | Zero Touch    | Ownership    | Owner        |
   | Grouping            | Information   | Voucher      | Certificate  |
   +=====================+===============+==============+==============+
   | Unsigned Data       | Yes, no sig   | No           | No           |
   +---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+
   | Signed Data,        | Yes, with sig | Yes, without | Yes, without |
   | without revocations |               | revocations  | revocations  |
   +---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+
   | Signed Data,        | Yes, with sig | Yes, with    | Yes, with    |
   | with revocations    |               | revocations  | revocations  |
   +---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+

4.  Sources of Bootstrapping Data

   This section defines some sources for bootstrapping data that a
   device can access.  The list of sources defined here is not meant to
   be exhaustive.  It is left to future documents to define additional
   sources for obtaining bootstrapping data.

   For each source of bootstrapping data defined in this section,
   details are given for how the three artifacts listed in Section 3 are
   provided.

4.1.  Removable Storage

   A directly attached removable storage device (e.g., a USB flash
   drive) MAY be used as a source of zero touch bootstrapping data.

   Use of a removable storage device is compelling, as it does not
   require any external infrastructure to work.  It is notable that the
   raw boot image file can also be located on the removable storage
   device, enabling a removable storage device to be a fully self-
   standing bootstrapping solution.

   To use a removable storage device as a source of bootstrapping data,
   a device need only detect if the removable storage device is plugged
   in and mount its filesystem.

   A removable storage device is an untrusted source of bootstrapping
   data.  This means that the information stored on the removable
   storage device either MUST be signed or MUST be information that can
   be processed provisionally (e.g., unsigned redirect information).

   From an artifact perspective, since a removable storage device
   presents itself as a filesystem, the bootstrapping artifacts need to
   be presented as files.  The three artifacts defined in Section 3 are
   mapped to files below.



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   Artifact to File Mapping:

      Zero Touch Information:  Mapped to a file containing the binary
         artifact described in Section 3.1 (e.g., zerotouch-
         information.cms).

      Owner Certificate:  Mapped to a file containing the binary
         artifact described in Section 3.2 (e.g., owner-
         certificate.cms).

      Ownership Voucher:  Mapped to a file containing the binary
         artifact described in Section 3.3 (e.g., ownership-voucher.cms
         or ownership-voucher.vcj).

   The format of the removable storage device's filesystem and the
   naming of the files are outside the scope of this document.  However,
   in order to facilitate interoperability, it is RECOMMENDED devices
   support open and/or standards based filesystems.  It is also
   RECOMMENDED that devices assume a file naming convention that enables
   more than one instance of bootstrapping data (i.e., for different
   devices) to exist on a removable storage device.  The file naming
   convention SHOULD additionally be unique to the manufacturer, in
   order to enable bootstrapping data from multiple manufacturers to
   exist on a removable storage device.

4.2.  DNS Server

   A DNS server MAY be used as a source of zero touch bootstrapping
   data.

   Using a DNS server may be a compelling option for deployments having
   existing DNS infrastructure, as it enables a touchless bootstrapping
   option that does not entail utilizing an Internet based resource
   hosted by a 3rd-party.

   To use a DNS server as a source of bootstrapping data, a device MAY
   perform a multicast DNS [RFC6762] query searching for the service
   "_zerotouch._tcp.local.".  Alternatively the device MAY perform DNS-
   SD [RFC6763] via normal DNS operation, using the domain returned to
   it from the DHCP server; for example, searching for the service
   "_zerotouch._tcp.example.com".

   Unsigned DNS records (e.g., not using DNSSEC as described in
   [RFC6698]) are an untrusted source of bootstrapping data.  This means
   that the information stored in the DNS records either MUST be signed,
   or MUST be information that can be processed provisionally (e.g.,
   unsigned redirect information).




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   From an artifact perspective, since a DNS server presents resource
   records (Section 3.2.1 of [RFC1035]), the bootstrapping artifacts
   need to be presented as resource records.  The three artifacts
   defined in Section 3 are mapped to resource records below.

   Artifact to Resource Record Mapping:

      Zero Touch Information:  Mapped to a TXT record called "zt-info"
         containing the base64-encoding of the binary artifact described
         in Section 3.1.

      Owner Certificate:  Mapped to a TXT record called "zt-cert"
         containing the base64-encoding of the binary artifact described
         in Section 3.2.

      Ownership Voucher:  Mapped to a TXT record called "zt-voucher"
         containing the base64-encoding of the binary artifact described
         in Section 3.3.

   TXT records have an upper size limit of 65535 bytes (Section 3.2.1 in
   RFC1035), since "RDLENGTH" is a 16-bit field.  Please see
   Section 3.1.3 in RFC4408 for how a TXT record can achieve this size.
   Due to this size limitation, some zero touch information artifacts
   may not fit.  In particular, onboarding information could hit this
   upper bound, depending on the size of the included configuration and
   scripts.

4.3.  DHCP Server

   A DHCP server MAY be used as a source of zero touch bootstrapping
   data.

   Using a DHCP server may be a compelling option for deployments having
   existing DHCP infrastructure, as it enables a touchless bootstrapping
   option that does not entail utilizing an Internet based resource
   hosted by a 3rd-party.

   A DHCP server is an untrusted source of bootstrapping data.  Thus the
   information stored on the DHCP server either MUST be signed, or it
   MUST be information that can be processed provisionally (e.g.,
   unsigned redirect information).

   However, unlike other sources of bootstrapping data described in this
   document, the DHCP protocol (especially DHCP for IPv4) is very
   limited in the amount of data that can be conveyed, to the extent
   that signed data cannot be communicated.  This means that only
   unsigned redirect information can be conveyed via DHCP.




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   Since the redirect information is unsigned, it SHOULD NOT include the
   optional trust anchor certificate, as it takes up space in the DHCP
   message, and the device would have to discard it anyway.  For this
   reason, the DHCP options defined in Section 8 do not enable the trust
   anchor certificate to be encoded.

   From an artifact perspective, the three artifacts defined in
   Section 3 are mapped to the DHCP fields specified in Section 8 as
   follows:

      Zero Touch Information:  This artifact is not supported directly.
         Instead, the essence of unsigned redirect information is mapped
         to the DHCP options described in Section 8.

      Owner Certificate:  Not supported.  There is not enough space in
         the DHCP packet to hold an owner certificate artifact.

      Ownership Voucher:  Not supported.  There is not enough space in
         the DHCP packet to hold an ownership voucher artifact.

4.4.  Bootstrap Server

   A bootstrap server MAY be used as a source of zero touch
   bootstrapping data.  A bootstrap server is defined as a RESTCONF
   [RFC8040] server implementing the YANG module provided in Section 7.

   Using a bootstrap server as a source of bootstrapping data is a
   compelling option as it MAY use transport-level security, obviating
   the need for signed data, which may be easier to deploy in some
   situations.

   Unlike any other source of bootstrapping data described in this
   document, a bootstrap server is not only a source of data, but it can
   also receive data from devices using the YANG-defined "report-
   progress" RPC defined in the YANG module (Section 7.3).  The "report-
   progress" RPC enables visibility into the bootstrapping process
   (e.g., warnings and errors), and provides potentially useful
   information upon completion (e.g., the device's SSH host-keys).

   A bootstrap server may be a trusted or an untrusted source of
   bootstrapping data, depending on if the device learned about the
   bootstrap server's trust anchor from a trusted source.  When a
   bootstrap server is trusted, the zero touch information returned from
   it MAY be signed.  When the bootstrap server is untrusted, the zero
   touch information either MUST be signed or MUST be information that
   can be processed provisionally (e.g., unsigned redirect information).





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   From an artifact perspective, since a bootstrap server presents data
   conforming to a YANG data model, the bootstrapping artifacts need to
   be mapped to YANG nodes.  The three artifacts defined in Section 3
   are mapped to "output" nodes of the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC
   defined in Section 7.3 below.

   Artifact to Bootstrap Server Mapping:

      Zero Touch Information:  Mapped to the "zerotouch-information"
         leaf in the output of the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC.

      Owner Certificate:  Mapped to the "owner-certificate" leaf in the
         output of the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC.

      Ownership Voucher:  Mapped to the "ownership-voucher" leaf in the
         output of the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC.

   Zero touch bootstrap servers have only two endpoints, one for the
   "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC and one for the "report-progress" RPC.
   These RPCs use the authenticated RESTCONF username to isolate the
   execution of the RPC from other devices.

5.  Device Details

   Devices supporting the bootstrapping strategy described in this
   document MUST have the preconfigured state and bootstrapping logic
   described in the following sections.

5.1.  Initial State






















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   +-------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                           <device>                          |
   |                                                             |
   | +---------------------------------------------------------+ |
   | |                   <read/write storage>                  | |
   | |                                                         | |
   | | 1. flag to enable zerotouch bootstrapping set to "true" | |
   | +---------------------------------------------------------+ |
   |                                                             |
   | +---------------------------------------------------------+ |
   | |                   <read-only storage>                   | |
   | |                                                         | |
   | | 2. TLS client cert & related intermediate certificates  | |
   | | 3. list of trusted well-known bootstrap servers         | |
   | | 4. list of trust anchor certs for bootstrap servers     | |
   | | 5. list of trust anchor certs for ownership vouchers    | |
   | +---------------------------------------------------------+ |
   |                                                             |
   |   +-----------------------------------------------------+   |
   |   |                 <secure storage>                    |   |
   |   |                                                     |   |
   |   |  6. private key for TLS client certificate          |   |
   |   |  7. private key for decrypting zerotouch artifacts  |   |
   |   +-----------------------------------------------------+   |
   |                                                             |
   +-------------------------------------------------------------+

   Each numbered item below corresponds to a numbered item in the
   diagram above.

   1.  Devices MUST have a configurable variable that is used to enable/
       disable zerotouch bootstrapping.  This variable MUST be enabled
       by default in order for zerotouch bootstrapping to run when the
       device first powers on.  Because it is a goal that the
       configuration installed by the bootstrapping process disables
       zerotouch bootstrapping, and because the configuration may be
       merged into the existing configuration, using a configuration
       node that relies on presence is NOT RECOMMENDED, as it cannot be
       removed by the merging process.

   2.  Devices that support loading bootstrapping data from bootstrap
       servers (see Section 4.4) SHOULD possess a TLS-level client
       certificate and any intermediate certificates leading to the
       certificate's well-known trust-anchor.  The well-known trust
       anchor certificate may be an intermediate certificate or a self-
       signed root certificate.  To support devices not having a client
       certificate, devices MAY, alternatively or in addition to,
       identify and authenticate themselves to the bootstrap server



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       using an HTTP authentication scheme, as allowed by Section 2.5 in
       [RFC8040]; however, this document does not define a mechanism for
       operator input enabling, for example, the entering of a password.

   3.  Devices that support loading bootstrapping data from well-known
       bootstrap servers MUST possess a list of the well-known bootstrap
       servers.  Consistent with redirect information (Section 2.1, each
       bootstrap server can be identified by its hostname or IP address,
       and an optional port.

   4.  Devices that support loading bootstrapping data from well-known
       bootstrap servers MUST also possess a list of trust anchor
       certificates that can be used to authenticate the well-known
       bootstrap servers.  For each trust anchor certificate, if it is
       not itself a self-signed root certificate, the device SHOULD also
       possess the chain of intermediate certificates leading up to and
       including the self-signed root certificate.

   5.  Devices that support loading signed data (see Section 1.2) MUST
       possess the trust anchor certificates for validating ownership
       vouchers.  For each trust anchor certificate, if it is not itself
       a self-signed root certificate, the device SHOULD also possess
       the chain of intermediate certificates leading up to and
       including the self-signed root certificate.

   6.  Devices that support using a TLS-level client certificate to
       identify and authenticate themselves to a bootstrap server MUST
       possess the private key that corresponds to the public key
       encoded in the TLS-level client certificate.  This private key
       SHOULD be securely stored, ideally in a cryptographic processor
       (e.g., a TPM).

   7.  Devices that support decrypting zerotouch artifacts MUST posses
       the private key that corresponds to the public key encoded in the
       secure device identity certificate used when encrypting the
       artifacts.  This private key SHOULD be securely stored, ideally
       in a cryptographic processor (e.g., a TPM).  This private key MAY
       be the same as the one associated to the TLS-level client
       certificate used when connecting to bootstrap servers.

   A YANG module representing this data is provided in Appendix A.

5.2.  Boot Sequence

   A device claiming to support the bootstrapping strategy defined in
   this document MUST support the boot sequence described in this
   section.




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       Power On
           |
           v                                No
    1. Zerotouch bootstrapping configured ------> Boot normally
           |
           | Yes
           v
    2. For each supported source of bootstrapping data,
       try to load bootstrapping data from the source
           |
           |
           v                               Yes
    3. Able to bootstrap from any source? -----> Run with new config
           |
           | No
           v
    4. Loop and/or wait for manual provisioning.


   Each numbered item below corresponds to a numbered item in the
   diagram above.

   1.  When the device powers on, it first checks to see if zerotouch
       bootstrapping is configured, as is expected to be the case for
       the device's preconfigured initial state.  If zerotouch
       bootstrapping is not configured, then the device boots normally.

   2.  The device iterates over its list of sources for bootstrapping
       data (Section 4).  Details for how to processes a source of
       bootstrapping data are provided in Section 5.3.

   3.  If the device is able to bootstrap itself from any of the sources
       of bootstrapping data, it runs with the new bootstrapped
       configuration.

   4.  Otherwise the device MAY loop back through the list of
       bootstrapping sources again and/or wait for manual provisioning.

5.3.  Processing a Source of Bootstrapping Data

   This section describes a recursive algorithm that devices can use to,
   ultimately, obtain onboarding information.  The algorithm is
   recursive because sources of bootstrapping data may return redirect
   information, which causes the algorithm to run again, for the newly
   discovered sources of bootstrapping data.  An expression that
   captures all possible successful sequences of bootstrapping data is
   zero or more redirect information responses, followed by one
   onboarding information response.



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   An important aspect of the algorithm is knowing when data needs to be
   signed or not.  The following figure provides a summary of options:

                                    Untrusted Source  Trusted Source
       Kind of Bootstrapping Data     Can Provide?     Can Provide?

       Unsigned Redirect Info     :       Yes+             Yes
       Signed Redirect Info       :       Yes              Yes*
       Unsigned Onboarding Info   :        No              Yes
       Signed Onboarding Info     :       Yes              Yes*

       The '+' above denotes that the source redirected to MUST
       return signed data, or more unsigned redirect information.

       The '*' above denotes that, while possible, it is generally
       unnecessary for a trusted source to return signed data.

   The recursive algorithm uses a conceptual global-scoped variable
   called "trust-state".  The trust-state variable is initialized to
   FALSE.  The ultimate goal of this algorithm is for the device to
   process onboarding information (Section 2.2) while the trust-state
   variable is TRUE.

   If the source of bootstrapping data (Section 4) is a bootstrap server
   (Section 4.4), and the device is able to authenticate the bootstrap
   server using X.509 certificate path validation ([RFC6125], Section 6)
   to one of the device's preconfigured trust anchors, or to a trust
   anchor that it learned from a previous step, then the device MUST set
   trust-state to TRUE.

   When establishing a connection to a bootstrap server, whether trusted
   or untrusted, the device MUST identify and authenticate itself to the
   bootstrap server using a TLS-level client certificate and/or an HTTP
   authentication scheme, per Section 2.5 in [RFC8040].  If both
   authentication mechanisms are used, they MUST both identify the same
   serial number.

   When sending a client certificate, the device MUST also send all of
   the intermediate certificates leading up to, and optionally
   including, the client certificate's well-known trust anchor
   certificate.

   For any source of bootstrapping data (e.g., Section 4), if any
   artifact obtained is encrypted, the device MUST first decrypt it
   using the private key associated with the device certificate used to
   encrypt the artifact.





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   If the zero touch information artifact is signed, and the device is
   able to validate the signed data using the algorithm described in
   Section 5.4, then the device MUST set trust-state to TRUE; otherwise,
   if the device is unable to validate the signed data, the device MUST
   set trust-state to FALSE.  Note, this is worded to cover the special
   case when signed data is returned even from a trusted bootstrap
   server.

   If the zero touch information artifact contains onboarding
   information, and trust-state is FALSE, the device MUST exit the
   recursive algorithm (as this is not allowed, see the figure above),
   returning to the bootstrapping sequence described in Section 5.2.
   Otherwise, the device MUST attempt to process the onboarding
   information as described in Section 5.6.  In either case, success or
   failure, the device MUST exit the recursive algorithm, returning to
   the bootstrapping sequence described in Section 5.2, the only
   difference being in how it responds to the "Able to bootstrap from
   any source?" conditional described in the figure in the section.

   If the zero touch information artifact contains redirect information,
   the device MUST, within limits of how many recursive loops the device
   allows, process the redirect information as described in Section 5.5.
   This is the recursion step, it will cause the device to reenter this
   algorithm, but this time the data source will definitely be a
   bootstrap server, as that is all redirect information is able to
   redirect a device to.

5.4.  Validating Signed Data

   Whenever a device is presented signed data, it MUST validate the
   signed data as described in this section.  This includes the case
   where the signed data is provided by a trusted source.

   Whenever there is signed data, the device MUST also be provided an
   ownership voucher and an owner certificate.  How all the needed
   artifacts are provided for each source of bootstrapping data is
   described in Section 4.

   In order to validate signed data, the device MUST first authenticate
   the ownership voucher by validating its signature to one of its
   preconfigured trust anchors (see Section 5.1), which may entail using
   additional intermediate certificates attached to the ownership
   voucher.  If the device has an accurate clock, it MUST verify that
   the ownership voucher was created in the past (i.e., "created-on" <
   now) and, if the "expires-on" leaf is present, the device MUST verify
   that the ownership voucher has not yet expired (i.e., now < "expires-
   on").  The device MUST verify that the ownership voucher's
   "assertion" value is acceptable (e.g., some devices may only accept



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   the assertion value "verified").  The device MUST verify that the
   ownership voucher specifies the device's serial number in the
   "serial-number" leaf.  If the "idevid-issuer" leaf is present, the
   device MUST verify that the value is set correctly.  If the
   authentication of the ownership voucher is successful, the device
   extracts the "pinned-domain-cert" node, an X.509 certificate, that is
   needed to verify the owner certificate in the next step.

   The device MUST next authenticate the owner certificate by performing
   X.509 certificate path verification to the trusted certificate
   extracted from the ownership voucher's "pinned-domain-cert" node.
   This verification may entail using additional intermediate
   certificates attached to the owner certificate artifact.  If the
   ownership voucher's "domain-cert-revocation-checks" node's value is
   set to "true", the device MUST verify the revocation status of the
   certificate chain used to sign the owner certificate and, if
   suitably-fresh revocation status is unattainable or if it is
   determined that a certificate has been revoked, the device MUST NOT
   validate the owner certificate.

   Finally the device MUST verify the zero touch information artifact
   was signed by the validated owner certificate.

   If any of these steps fail, the device MUST invalidate the signed
   data and not perform any subsequent steps.

5.5.  Processing Redirect Information

   In order to process redirect information (Section 2.1), the device
   MUST follow the steps presented in this section.

   Processing redirect information is straightforward, the device
   sequentially steps through the list of provided bootstrap servers
   until it can find one it can bootstrap from.

   If a hostname is provided, and the hostname's DNS resolution is to
   more than one IP address, the device MUST attempt to connect to all
   of the DNS resolved addresses at least once, before moving on to the
   next bootstrap server.  If the device is able to obtain bootstrapping
   data from any of the DNS resolved addresses, it MUST immediately
   process that data, without attempting to connect to any of the other
   DNS resolved addresses.

   If the redirect information is trusted (e.g., trust-state is TRUE),
   and the bootstrap server entry contains a trust anchor certificate,
   then the device MUST authenticate the specified bootstrap server's
   TLS server certificate using X.509 certificate path validation
   ([RFC6125], Section 6) to the specified trust anchor.  If the



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   bootstrap server entry does not contain a trust anchor certificate
   device, the device MUST establish a provisional connection to the
   bootstrap server (i.e., by blindly accepting its server certificate),
   and set trust-state to FALSE.

   If the redirect information is untrusted (e.g., trust-state is
   FALSE), the device MUST discard any trust anchors provided by the
   redirect information and establish a provisional connection to the
   bootstrap server (i.e., by blindly accepting its TLS server
   certificate).

5.6.  Processing Onboarding Information

   In order to process onboarding information (Section 2.2), the device
   MUST follow the steps presented in this section.

   When processing onboarding information, the device MUST first process
   the boot image information (if any), then execute the pre-
   configuration script (if any), then commit the initial configuration
   (if any), and then execute the post-configuration script (if any), in
   that order.

   When the onboarding information is obtained from a trusted bootstrap
   server, the device MUST send the "bootstrap-initiated" progress
   report, and send either a terminating "boot-image-installed-
   rebooting", "bootstrap-complete", or error specific progress report.
   If the bootstrap server's "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC-reply's
   "reporting-level" node is set to "verbose", the device MUST
   additionally send all appropriate non-terminating progress reports
   (e.g., initiated, warning, complete, etc.).  Regardless the
   reporting-level indicated by the bootstrap server, the device MAY
   send progress reports beyond the mandatory ones specified for the
   given reporting level.

   When the onboarding information is obtained from an untrusted
   bootstrap server, the device MUST NOT send any progress reports to
   the bootstrap server.

   If the device encounters an error at any step, it MUST stop
   processing the onboarding information and return to the bootstrapping
   sequence described in Section 5.2.  In the context of a recursive
   algorithm, the device MUST return to the enclosing loop, not back to
   the very beginning.  Some state MAY be retained from the
   bootstrapping process (e.g., updated boot image, logs, remnants from
   a script, etc.).  However, the retained state MUST NOT be active in
   any way (e.g., no new configuration or running of software), and MUST
   NOT hinder the ability for the device to continue the bootstrapping




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   sequence (i.e., process onboarding information from another bootstrap
   server).

   At this point, the specific ordered sequence of actions the device
   MUST perform is described.

   If the onboarding information is obtained from a trusted bootstrap
   server, the device MUST send a "bootstrap-initiated" progress report.
   It is an error if the device does not receive back the "204 No
   Content" HTTP status line.  If an error occurs, the device MUST try
   to send a "bootstrap-error" progress report before exiting.

   The device MUST parse the provided onboarding information document,
   to extract values used in subsequent steps.  Whether using a stream-
   based parser or not, if there is an error when parsing the onboarding
   information, and the device is connected to a trusted bootstrap
   server, the device MUST try to send a "parsing-error" progress report
   before exiting.

   If boot image criteria are specified, the device MUST first determine
   if the boot image it is running satisfies the specified boot image
   criteria.  If the device is already running the specified boot image,
   then it skips the remainder of this step.  If the device is not
   running the specified boot image, then it MUST download, verify, and
   install, in that order, the specified boot image, and then reboot.
   If connected to a trusted bootstrap server, the device MAY try to
   send a "boot-image-mismatch" progress report.  To download the boot
   image, the device MUST only use the URIs supplied by the onboarding
   information.  To verify the boot image, the device MUST either use
   one of the verification fingerprints supplied by the onboarding
   information, or use a cryptographic signature embedded into the boot
   image itself using a mechanism not described by this document.
   Before rebooting, if connected to a trusted bootstrap server, the
   device MUST try to send a "boot-image-installed-rebooting" progress
   report.  Upon rebooting, the bootstrapping process runs again, which
   will eventually come to this step again, but then the device will be
   running the specified boot image, and thus will move to processing
   the next step.  If an error occurs at any step while the device is
   connected to a trusted bootstrap server (i.e., before the reboot),
   the device MUST try to send a "boot-image-error" progress report
   before exiting.

   If a pre-configuration script has been specified, the device MUST
   execute the script, capture any output emitted from the script, and
   check if the script had any warnings or errors.  If an error occurs
   while the device is connected to a trusted bootstrap server, the
   device MUST try to send a "pre-script-error" progress report before
   exiting.



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   If an initial configuration has been specified, the device MUST
   atomically commit the provided initial configuration, using the
   approach specified by the "configuration-handling" leaf.  If an error
   occurs while the device is connected to a trusted bootstrap server,
   the device MUST try to send a "config-error" progress report before
   exiting.

   If a post-configuration script has been specified, the device MUST
   execute the script, capture any output emitted from the script, and
   check if the script had any warnings or errors.  If an error occurs
   while the device is connected to a trusted bootstrap server, the
   device MUST try to send a "post-script-error" progress report before
   exiting.

   If the onboarding information was obtained from a trusted bootstrap
   server, and the result of the bootstrapping process did not disable
   the "flag to enable zerotouch bootstrapping" described in
   Section 5.1, the device SHOULD send an "bootstrap-warning" progress
   report.

   If the onboarding information was obtained from a trusted bootstrap
   server, the device MUST send a "bootstrap-complete" progress report.
   It is an error if the device does not receive back the "204 No
   Content" HTTP status line.  If an error occurs, the device MUST try
   to send a "bootstrap-error" progress report before exiting.

   At this point, the device has completely processed the bootstrapping
   data.

   The device is now running its initial configuration.  Notably, if
   NETCONF Call Home or RESTCONF Call Home [RFC8071] is configured, the
   device initiates trying to establish the call home connections at
   this time.

   Implementation Notes:

      Implementations may vary in how to ensure no unwanted state is
      retained when an error occurs.

      Following are some guidelines for if the implementation chooses to
      undo previous steps:

      *  When an error occurs, the device must roll out of the current
         step and any previous steps.

      *  Most steps are atomic.  For instance, when a commit fails, it
         is expected to have no impact on the configuration.  Similarly,




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         if the error occurs when executing a script, the script will
         gracefully exit.

      *  In case the error occurs after the initial configuration was
         committed, the device must restore the configuration to the
         configuration that existed prior to the configuration being
         committed.

      *  In case the error occurs after a script had executed
         successfully, it may be helpful for the implementation to
         define scripts as being able to take a conceptual input
         parameter indicating that the script should remove its
         previously set state.

6.  The Zero Touch Information Data Model

   This section defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module that is used to
   define the data model for the zero touch information artifact
   described in Section 3.1.  This data model uses the "yang-data"
   extension statement defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-data-ext].
   Examples illustrating this data model are provided in Section 6.2.

6.1.  Data Model Overview

   The following tree diagram provides an overview of the data model for
   the zero touch information artifact.

























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   module: ietf-zerotouch-information

     yang-data zerotouch-information:
       +-- (information-type)
          +--:(redirect-information)
          |  +-- redirect-information
          |     +-- bootstrap-server* [address]
          |        +-- address         inet:host
          |        +-- port?           inet:port-number
          |        +-- trust-anchor?   cms
          +--:(onboarding-information)
             +-- onboarding-information
                +-- boot-image
                |  +-- os-name?              string
                |  +-- os-version?           string
                |  +-- download-uri*         inet:uri
                |  +-- image-verification* [hash-algorithm]
                |     +-- hash-algorithm    identityref
                |     +-- hash-value        yang:hex-string
                +-- configuration-handling?      enumeration
                +-- pre-configuration-script?    script
                +-- configuration?               binary
                +-- post-configuration-script?   script

6.2.  Example Usage

   The following example illustrates how redirect information
   (Section 2.1) can be encoded using JSON.























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   {
     "ietf-zerotouch-information:redirect-information" : {
       "bootstrap-server" : [
         {
           "address" : "phs1.example.com",
           "port" : 8443,
           "trust-anchor" : "base64encodedvalue=="
         },
         {
           "address" : "phs2.example.com",
           "port" : 8443,
           "trust-anchor" : "base64encodedvalue=="
         },
         {
           "address" : "phs3.example.com",
           "port" : 8443,
           "trust-anchor" : "base64encodedvalue=="
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   The following example illustrates how onboarding information
   (Section 2.2) can be encoded using JSON.


   [Note: '\' line wrapping for formatting only]

   {
     "ietf-zerotouch-information:onboarding-information" : {
       "boot-image" : {
         "os-name" : "VendorOS",
         "os-version" : "17.2R1.6",
         "download-uri" : [ "http://some/path/to/raw/file" ],
         "image-verification" : [
           {
             "hash-algorithm" : "ietf-zerotouch-information:sha-256",
             "hash-value" : "ba:ec:cf:a5:67:82:b4:10:77:c6:67:a6:22:ab:\
   7d:50:04:a7:8b:8f:0e:db:02:8b:f4:75:55:fb:c1:13:b2:33"
           }
         ]
       },
       "configuration-handling" : "merge",
       "pre-configuration-script" : "base64encodedvalue==",
       "configuration" : "base64encodedvalue==",
       "post-configuration-script" : "base64encodedvalue=="
     }
   }



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6.3.  YANG Module

   The zero touch information data model is defined by the YANG module
   presented in this section.

   This module uses data types defined in [RFC5280], [RFC5652],
   [RFC6234], and [RFC6991], an extension statement from
   [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-data-ext], and an encoding defined in
   [ITU.X690.2015].

   <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-zerotouch-information@2018-09-13.yang"
   module ietf-zerotouch-information {
     yang-version 1.1;
     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-information";
     prefix zti;

     import ietf-yang-types {
       prefix yang;
       reference "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
     }
     import ietf-inet-types {
       prefix inet;
       reference "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
     }
     import ietf-yang-data-ext {
       prefix yd;
       reference "I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-data-ext: YANG Data Extensions";
     }

     organization
       "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

     contact
       "WG Web:   http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf
        WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
        Author:   Kent Watsen <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";

     description
      "This module defines the data model for the Zero Touch
       Information artifact defined in RFC XXXX: Zero Touch
       Provisioning for Networking Devices.

       The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
       'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY',
       and 'OPTIONAL' in the module text are to be interpreted as
       described in RFC 2119.

       Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as



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       authors of the code. All rights reserved.

       Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
       without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
       to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
       set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
       Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)

       This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the
       RFC itself for full legal notices.";

     revision 2018-09-13 {
       description
         "Initial version";
       reference
         "RFC XXXX: Zero Touch Provisioning for Networking Devices";
     }

     // identities

     identity hash-algorithm {
       description
         "A base identity for hash algorithm verification";
     }

     identity sha-256 {
       base "hash-algorithm";
       description "The SHA-256 algorithm.";
       reference "RFC 6234: US Secure Hash Algorithms.";
     }

     // typedefs

     typedef cms {
       type binary;
       description
         "A ContentInfo structure, as specified in RFC 5652,
          encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
          as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 5652:
            Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER).";
     }



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     // yang-data

     yd:yang-data "zerotouch-information" {
       choice information-type {
         mandatory true;
         description
           "This choice statement ensures the response contains
            redirect-information or onboarding-information.";
         container redirect-information {
           description
             "Redirect information is described in Section 2.1 in
              RFC XXXX.  Its purpose is to redirect a device to
              another bootstrap server.";
           reference
             "RFC XXXX: Zero Touch Provisioning for Networking Devices";
           list bootstrap-server {
             key "address";
             min-elements 1;
             description
               "A bootstrap server entry.";
             leaf address {
               type inet:host;
               mandatory true;
               description
                "The IP address or hostname of the bootstrap server the
                 device should redirect to.";
             }
             leaf port {
               type inet:port-number;
               default "443";
               description
                "The port number the bootstrap server listens on.  If no
                 port is specified, the IANA-assigned port for 'https'
                 (443) is used.";
             }
             leaf trust-anchor {
               type cms;
               description
                 "A CMS structure that MUST contain the chain of
                  X.509 certificates needed to authenticate the TLS
                  certificate presented by this bootstrap server.

                  The CMS MUST only contain a single chain of
                  certificates.  The bootstrap server MUST only
                  authenticate to last intermediate CA certificate
                  listed in the chain.

                  In all cases, the chain MUST include a self-signed



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                  root certificate.  In the case where the root
                  certificate is itself the issuer of the bootstrap
                  server's TLS certificate, only one certificate
                  is present.

                  If needed by the device, this CMS structure MAY
                  also contain suitably fresh revocation objects
                  with which the device can verify the revocation
                  status of the certificates.

                  This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData
                  structure that is commonly used to disseminate X.509
                  certificates and revocation objects (RFC 5280).";
               reference
                 "RFC 5280:
                    Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
                    and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.";
             }
           }
         }
         container onboarding-information {
           description
             "Onboarding information is described in Section 2.2 in
              RFC XXXX.  Its purpose is to provide the device everything
              it needs to bootstrap itself.";
           reference
             "RFC XXXX: Zero Touch Provisioning for Networking Devices";
           container boot-image {
             description
               "Specifies criteria for the boot image the device MUST
                be running, as well as information enabling the device
                to install the required boot image.";
             leaf os-name {
               type string;
               description
                 "The name of the operating system software the device
                  MUST be running in order to not require a software
                  image upgrade (ex. VendorOS).";
             }
             leaf os-version {
               type string;
               description
                 "The version of the operating system software the
                  device MUST be running in order to not require a
                  software image upgrade (ex. 17.3R2.1).";
             }
             leaf-list download-uri {
               type inet:uri;



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               ordered-by user;
               description
                 "An ordered list of URIs to where the same boot image
                  file may be obtained.  How the URI schemes (http, ftp,
                  etc.) a device supports are known is vendor specific.
                  If a secure scheme (e.g., https) is provided, a device
                  MAY establish an untrusted connection to the remote
                  server, by blindly accepting the server's end-entity
                  certificate, to obtain the boot image.";
             }
             list image-verification {
               must '../download-uri' {
                 description
                   "Download URIs must be provided if an image is to
                    be verified.";
               }
               key hash-algorithm;
               description
                 "A list of hash values that a device can use to verify
                  boot image files with.";
               leaf hash-algorithm {
                 type identityref {
                   base "hash-algorithm";
                 }
                 description
                   "Identifies the hash algorithm used.";
               }
               leaf hash-value {
                 type yang:hex-string;
                 mandatory true;
                 description
                   "The hex-encoded value of the specified hash
                    algorithm over the contents of the boot image
                    file.";
               }
             }
           }
           leaf configuration-handling {
             type enumeration {
               enum "merge" {
                 description
                   "Merge configuration into the running datastore.";
               }
               enum "replace" {
                 description
                   "Replace the existing running datastore with the
                    passed configuration.";
               }



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             }
             must '../configuration';
             description
               "This enumeration indicates how the server should process
                the provided configuration.";
           }
           leaf pre-configuration-script {
             type script;
             description
               "A script that, when present, is executed before the
                configuration has been processed.";
           }
           leaf configuration {
             type binary;
             must '../configuration-handling';
             description
               "Any configuration known to the device.  The use of
                the 'binary' type enables e.g., XML-content to be
                embedded into a JSON document.  The exact encoding
                of the content, as with the scripts, is vendor
                specific.";
           }
           leaf post-configuration-script {
             type script;
             description
               "A script that, when present, is executed after the
                configuration has been processed.";
           }
         }
       }
     }

     typedef script {
       type binary;
       description
         "A device specific script that enables the execution of
          commands to perform actions not possible thru configuration
          alone.

          No attempt is made to standardize the contents, running
          context, or programming language of the script, other than
          that it can indicate if any warnings or errors occurred and
          can emit output.  The contents of the script are considered
          specific to the vendor, product line, and/or model of the
          device.

          If the script execution indicates that an warning occurred,
          then the device MUST assume that the script had a soft error



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          that the script believes will not affect manageability.

          If the script execution indicates that an error occurred,
          the device MUST assume the script had a hard error that the
          script believes will affect manageability.  In this case,
          the script is required to gracefully exit, removing any
          state that might hinder the device's ability to continue
          the bootstrapping sequence (e.g., process onboarding
          information obtained from another bootstrap server).";
     }
   }
   <CODE ENDS>

7.  The Zero Touch Bootstrap Server API

   This section defines the API for bootstrap servers.  The API is
   defined as that produced by a RESTCONF [RFC8040] server that supports
   the YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module defined in this section.

7.1.  API Overview

   The following tree diagram provides an overview for the bootstrap
   server RESTCONF API.

   module: ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server

     rpcs:
       +---x get-bootstrapping-data
       |  +---w input
       |  |  +---w untrusted-connection?   empty
       |  |  +---w hw-model?               string
       |  |  +---w os-name?                string
       |  |  +---w os-version?             string
       |  |  +---w nonce?                  binary
       |  +--ro output
       |     +--ro reporting-level?         enumeration
       |     +--ro zerotouch-information    cms
       |     +--ro owner-certificate?       cms
       |     +--ro ownership-voucher?       cms
       +---x report-progress
          +---w input
             +---w progress-type         enumeration
             +---w message?              string
             +---w ssh-host-keys
             |  +---w ssh-host-key*   binary
             +---w trust-anchor-certs
                +---w trust-anchor-cert*   cms




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7.2.  Example Usage

   This section presents three examples illustrating the bootstrap
   server's API.  Two examples are provided for the "get-bootstrapping-
   data" RPC (once to an untrusted bootstrap server, and again to a
   trusted bootstrap server), and one example for the "report-progress"
   RPC.

   The following example illustrates a device using the API to fetch its
   bootstrapping data from a untrusted bootstrap server.  In this
   example, the device sends the "untrusted-connection" input parameter
   and receives signed data in the response.

   REQUEST
   -------
   ['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]

   POST /restconf/operations/ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server:get-boot\
   strapping-data HTTP/1.1
   HOST: example.com
   Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

   <input
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
     <untrusted-connection/>
   </input>


   RESPONSE
   --------

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:02:40 GMT
   Server: example-server
   Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

   <output
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
     <zerotouch-information>base64encodedvalue==</zerotouch-information>
     <owner-certificate>base64encodedvalue==</owner-certificate>
     <ownership-voucher>base64encodedvalue==</ownership-voucher>
   </output>

   The following example illustrates a device using the API to fetch its
   bootstrapping data from a trusted bootstrap server.  In this example,
   the device sends addition input parameters to the bootstrap server,
   which it may use when formulating its response to the device.




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   REQUEST
   -------
   ['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]

   POST /restconf/operations/ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server:get-boot\
   strapping-data HTTP/1.1
   HOST: example.com
   Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

   <input
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
     <hw-model>model-x</hw-model>
     <os-name>vendor-os</os-name>
     <os-version>17.3R2.1</os-version>
     <nonce>base64encodedvalue==</nonce>
   </input>

   RESPONSE
   --------

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:02:40 GMT
   Server: example-server
   Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

   <output
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
     <reporting-level>verbose</reporting-level>
     <zerotouch-information>base64encodedvalue==</zerotouch-information>
   </output>


   The following example illustrates a device using the API to post a
   progress report to a bootstrap server.  Illustrated below is the
   "bootstrap-complete" message, but the device may send other progress
   reports to the server while bootstrapping.  In this example, the
   device is sending both its SSH host keys and a TLS server
   certificate, which the bootstrap server may, for example, pass to an
   NMS, as discussed in Appendix C.3.












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   REQUEST
   -------
   ['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]

   POST /restconf/operations/ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server:report-\
   progress HTTP/1.1
   HOST: example.com
   Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

   <input xmlns=
     "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
     <progress-type>bootstrap-complete</progress-type>
     <message>example message</message>
     <ssh-host-keys>
       <ssh-host-key>base64encodedvalue==</ssh-host-key>
       <ssh-host-key>base64encodedvalue2=</ssh-host-key>
     </ssh-host-keys>
     <trust-anchor-certs>
       <trust-anchor-cert>base64encodedvalue==</trust-anchor-cert>
     </trust-anchor-certs>
   </input>

   RESPONSE
   --------

   HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
   Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:02:40 GMT
   Server: example-server

7.3.  YANG Module

   The bootstrap server's device-facing API is normatively defined by
   the YANG module defined in this section.

   This module uses data types defined in [RFC4253], [RFC5652],
   [RFC5280], [RFC6960], and [RFC8366], uses an encoding defined in
   [ITU.X690.2015], and makes a reference to [RFC6187].

   <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server@2018-09-13.yang"
   module ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server {
     yang-version 1.1;
     namespace
       "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server";
     prefix ztbs;

     organization
       "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";




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     contact
       "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
        WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
        Author:   Kent Watsen <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";

     description
      "This module defines an interface for bootstrap servers, as
       defined by RFC XXXX: Zero Touch Provisioning for Networking
       Devices.

       The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
       'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY',
       and 'OPTIONAL' in the module text are to be interpreted as
       described in RFC 2119.

       Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
       authors of the code. All rights reserved.

       Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
       without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
       to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
       set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
       Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)

       This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the
       RFC itself for full legal notices.";

     revision 2018-09-13 {
       description
         "Initial version";
       reference
         "RFC XXXX: Zero Touch Provisioning for Networking Devices";
     }

     // typedefs

     typedef cms {
       type binary;
       description
         "A CMS structure, as specified in RFC 5652, encoded using
          ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
          ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 5652:
            Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),



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            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER).";
     }

     // RPCs

     rpc get-bootstrapping-data {
       description
         "This RPC enables a device, as identified by the RESTCONF
          username, to obtain bootstrapping data that has been made
          available for it.";
       input {
         leaf untrusted-connection {
           type empty;
           description
             "This optional input parameter enables a device to
              communicate to the bootstrap server that it is unable to
              authenticate the bootstrap server's TLS certificate.  In
              such circumstances, the device likely does not send any
              of the other input parameters, except for the 'nonce'
              parameter.  Upon receiving this input parameter, the
              bootstrap server should only return unsigned redirect
              information or signed data of any type.";
         }
         leaf hw-model {
           type string;
           description
             "This optional input parameter enables a device to
              communicate to the bootstrap server its vendor specific
              hardware model number.  This parameter may be needed,
              for instance, when a device's IDevID certificate does
              not include the 'hardwareModelName' value in its
              subjectAltName field, as is allowed by 802.1AR-2009.";
           reference
             "IEEE 802.1AR-2009: IEEE Standard for Local and
                metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity";
         }
         leaf os-name {
           type string;
           description
             "This optional input parameter enables a device to
              communicate to the bootstrap server the name of its
              operating system.  This parameter may be useful if
              the device, as identified by its serial number, can
              run more than one type of operating system (e.g.,
              on a white-box system.";
         }
         leaf os-version {



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           type string;
           description
             "This optional input parameter enables a device to
              communicate to the bootstrap server the version of its
              operating system.  This parameter may be used by a
              bootstrap server to return an operating system specific
              response to the device, thus negating the need for a
              potentially expensive boot-image update.";
         }
         leaf nonce {
           type binary {
             length "8..32";
           }
           description
             "This optional input parameter enables a device to
              communicate to the bootstrap server a nonce value.
              This may be especially useful for devices lacking
              an accurate clock, as then the bootstrap server
              can dynamically obtain from the manufacturer a
              voucher with the nonce value in it, as described
              in RFC 8366.";
           reference
             "RFC 8366:
                A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols";
         }
       }
       output {
         leaf reporting-level {
           type enumeration {
             enum standard {
               description
                 "Send just the progress reports required by RFC XXXX.";
             }
             enum verbose {
               description
                 "Send additional progress reports that might help
                  troubleshooting an SZTP bootstrapping issue.";
             }
           }
           default standard;
           description
             "Specifies the reporting level for progress reports the
              bootstrap server would like to receive when processing
              onboarding information.  Progress reports are not sent
              when processing redirect information, or when the
              bootstrap server is untrusted (e.g., device sent the
              '<untrusted-connection>' input parameter).";
         }



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         leaf zerotouch-information {
           type cms;
           mandatory true;
           description
             "A zero touch information artifact, as described in
              Section 3.1 of RFC XXXX.";
           reference
             "RFC XXXX:
                 Zero Touch Provisioning for Networking Devices";
         }
         leaf owner-certificate {
           type cms;
           must '../ownership-voucher' {
             description
               "An ownership voucher must be present whenever an owner
                certificate is presented.";
           }
           description
             "An owner certificate artifact, as described in Section
              3.2 of RFC XXXX.  This leaf is optional because it is
              only needed when the zero touch information artifact
              is signed.";
           reference
             "RFC XXXX:
                 Zero Touch Provisioning for Networking Devices";
         }
         leaf ownership-voucher {
           type cms;
           must '../owner-certificate' {
             description
               "An owner certificate must be present whenever an
                ownership voucher is presented.";
           }
           description
             "An ownership voucher artifact, as described by Section
              3.3 of RFC XXXX.  This leaf is optional because it is
              only needed when the zero touch information artifact
              is signed.";
           reference
             "RFC XXXX:
                 Zero Touch Provisioning for Networking Devices";
         }
       }
     }

     rpc report-progress {
       description
         "This RPC enables a device, as identified by the RESTCONF



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          username, to report its bootstrapping progress to the
          bootstrap server.  This RPC is expected to be used when
          the device obtains onboarding-information from a trusted
          bootstap server.";
       input {
         leaf progress-type {
           type enumeration {
             enum "bootstrap-initiated" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device just used the
                  'get-bootstrapping-data' RPC.  The 'message' node
                  below MAY contain any additional information that
                  the manufacturer thinks might be useful.";
             }
             enum "parsing-initiated" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device is about to start parsing
                  the onboarding information.  This progress type is
                  only for when parsing is implemented as a distinct
                  step.";
             }
             enum "parsing-warning" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device had a non-fatal error when
                  parsing the response from the bootstrap server.  The
                  'message' node below SHOULD indicate the specific
                  warning that occurred.";
             }
             enum "parsing-error" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device encountered a fatal error
                  when parsing the response from the bootstrap server.
                  For instance, this could be due to malformed encoding,
                  the device expecting signed data when only unsigned
                  data is provided, the ownership voucher not listing
                  the device's serial number, or because the signature
                  didn't match.  The 'message' node below SHOULD
                  indicate the specific error.  This progress type
                  also indicates that the device has abandoned trying
                  to bootstrap off this bootstrap server.";
             }
             enum "parsing-complete" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device successfully completed
                  parsing the onboarding information.  This progress
                  type is only for when parsing is implemented as a
                  distinct step.";
             }



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             enum "boot-image-initiated" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device is about to start
                  processing the boot-image information.";
             }
             enum "boot-image-warning" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device encountered a non-fatal
                  error condition when trying to install a boot-image.
                  A possible reason might include a need to reformat a
                  partition causing loss of data.  The 'message' node
                  below SHOULD indicate any warning messages that were
                  generated.";
             }
             enum "boot-image-error" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device encountered an error when
                  trying to install a boot-image, which could be for
                  reasons such as a file server being unreachable,
                  file not found, signature mismatch, etc.  The
                  'message' node SHOULD indicate the specific error
                  that occurred.  This progress type also indicates
                  that the device has abandoned trying to bootstrap
                  off this bootstrap server.";
             }
             enum "boot-image-mismatch" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device that has determined that
                  it is not running the correct boot image.  This
                  message SHOULD precipitate trying to download
                  a boot image.";
             }
             enum "boot-image-installed-rebooting" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device successfully installed
                  a new boot image and is about to reboot.  After
                  sending this progress type, the device is not
                  expected to access the bootstrap server again.";
             }
             enum "boot-image-complete" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device believes that it is
                  running the correct boot-image.";
             }
             enum "pre-script-initiated" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device is about to execute the
                  'pre-configuration-script'.";



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             }
             enum "pre-script-warning" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device obtained a warning from the
                  'pre-configuration-script' when it was executed.  The
                  'message' node below SHOULD capture any output the
                  script produces.";
             }
             enum "pre-script-error" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device obtained an error from the
                  'pre-configuration-script' when it was executed. The
                  'message' node below SHOULD capture any output the
                  script produces.  This progress type also indicates
                  that the device has abandoned trying to bootstrap
                  off this bootstrap server.";
             }
             enum "pre-script-complete" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device successfully executed the
                  'pre-configuration-script'.";
             }
             enum "config-initiated" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device is about to commit the
                  initial configuration.";
             }
             enum "config-warning" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device obtained warning messages
                  when it committed the initial configuration.  The
                  'message' node below SHOULD indicate any warning
                  messages that were generated.";
             }
             enum "config-error" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device obtained error messages
                  when it committed the initial configuration.  The
                  'message' node below SHOULD indicate the error
                  messages that were generated.  This progress type
                  also indicates that the device has abandoned trying
                  to bootstrap off this bootstrap server.";
             }
             enum "config-complete" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device successfully committed
                  the initial configuration.";
             }



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             enum "post-script-initiated" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device is about to execute the
                  'post-configuration-script'.";
             }
             enum "post-script-warning" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device obtained a warning from the
                  'post-configuration-script' when it was executed. The
                  'message' node below SHOULD capture any output the
                  script produces.";
             }
             enum "post-script-error" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device obtained an error from the
                  'post-configuration-script' when it was executed. The
                  'message' node below SHOULD capture any output the
                  script produces.  This progress type also indicates
                  that the device has abandoned trying to bootstrap
                  off this bootstrap server.";
             }
             enum "post-script-complete" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device successfully executed the
                  'post-configuration-script'.";
             }
             enum "bootstrap-warning" {
              description
                "Indicates that a warning condition occurred for which
                 there no other 'progress-type' enumeration is deemed
                 suitable.  The 'message' node below SHOULD describe
                 the warning.";
             }
             enum "bootstrap-error" {
              description
                "Indicates that an error condition occurred for which
                 there no other 'progress-type' enumeration is deemed
                 suitable.  The 'message' node below SHOULD describe
                 the error.  This progress type also indicates that
                 the device has abandoned trying to bootstrap off
                 this bootstrap server.";
             }
             enum "bootstrap-complete" {
               description
                 "Indicates that the device successfully processed
                  all 'onboarding-information' provided, and that it
                  is ready to be managed.  The 'message' node below
                  MAY contain any additional information that the



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                  manufacturer thinks might be useful.  After sending
                  this progress type, the device is not expected to
                  access the bootstrap server again.";
             }
             enum "informational" {
               description
                 "Indicates any additional information not captured
                  by any of the other progress types. For instance,
                  a message indicating that the device is about to
                  reboot after having installed a boot-image could
                  be provided.  The 'message' node below SHOULD
                  contain information that the manufacturer thinks
                  might be useful.";
             }
           }
           mandatory true;
           description
             "The type of progress report provided.";
         }
         leaf message {
           type string;
           description
             "An optional arbitrary value.";
         }
         container ssh-host-keys {
           when "../progress-type = 'bootstrap-complete'" {
             description
               "SSH host keys are only sent when the progress type
                is 'bootstrap-complete'.";
           }
           description
             "A list of trust anchor certificates an NMS may use to
              authenticate subsequent SSH-based connections to this
              device (e.g., netconf-ssh, netconf-ch-ssh).";
           leaf-list ssh-host-key {
             type binary;
             description
               "The binary public key data for this SSH key, as
                specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.:

                  string    certificate or public key format
                            identifier
                  byte[n]   key/certificate data.";
             reference
               "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
                          Protocol";
           }
         }



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         container trust-anchor-certs {
           when "../progress-type = 'bootstrap-complete'" {
             description
               "Trust anchors are only sent when the progress type
                is 'bootstrap-complete'.";
           }
           description
             "A list of trust anchor certificates an NMS may use to
              authenticate subsequent certificate-based connections
              to this device (e.g., restconf-tls, netconf-tls, or
              even netconf-ssh with X.509 support from RFC 6187).
              In practice, trust anchors for IDevID certificates do
              not need to be conveyed using this mechanism.";
           reference
             "RFC 6187:
                X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell Authentication.";
           leaf-list trust-anchor-cert {
             type cms;
             description
              "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
               signed-data content type, as described by Section 5 in
               RFC 5652.

               The CMS MUST contain the chain of X.509 certificates
               needed to authenticate the certificate presented by
               the device.

               The CMS MUST contain only a single chain of
               certificates.  The device's end-entity certificate
               MUST only authenticate to last intermediate CA
               certificate listed in the chain.

               In all cases, the chain MUST include a self-signed
               root certificate.  In the case where the root
               certificate is itself the issuer of the device's
               end-entity certificate, only one certificate is
               present.

               This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData
               structure that is commonly used to disseminate X.509
               certificates and revocation objects (RFC 5280).";
             reference
               "RFC 5280:
                  Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
                  Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
                  Profile.
                RFC 5652:
                  Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";



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           }
         }
       }
     }
   }
   <CODE ENDS>

8.  DHCP Zero Touch Options

   This section defines two DHCP options, one for DHCPv4 and one for
   DHCPv6.  These two options are semantically the same, though
   syntactically different.

8.1.  DHCPv4 Zero Touch Option

   The DHCPv4 Zero Touch Option is used to provision the client with one
   or more URIs for bootstrap servers that can be contacted to attempt
   further configuration.

      DHCPv4 Zero Touch Redirect Option

       0                             1
       0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0  1  2  3  4  5
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |   option-code (143)   |     option-length     |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      .                                               .
      .    bootstrap-server-list (variable length)    .
      .                                               .
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

      o option-code: OPTION_V4_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT (143)
      o option-length: The option length in octets.
      o bootstrap-server-list: A list of servers for the
         client to attempt contacting, in order to obtain
         further bootstrapping data, in the format shown
         in [common-field-encoding].

   DHCPv4 Client Behavior

   Clients MAY request the OPTION_V4_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT by including its
   option code in the Parameter Request List (55) in DHCP request
   messages.

   On receipt of a DHCPv4 Reply message which contains the
   OPTION_V4_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT, the client processes the response
   according to Section 5.5, with the understanding that the "address"
   and "port" values are encoded in the URIs.



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   Any invalid URI entries received in the uri-data field are ignored by
   the client.  If OPTION_V4_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT does not contain at
   least one valid URI entry in the uri-data field, then the client MUST
   discard the option.

   As the list of URIs may exceed the maximum allowed length of a single
   DHCPv4 option (255 octets), the client MUST implement [RFC3396],
   allowing the URI list to be split across a number of
   OPTION_V4_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT option instances.

   DHCPv4 Server Behavior

   The DHCPv4 server MAY include a single instance of Option
   OPTION_V4_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT in DHCP messages it sends.  Servers MUST
   NOT send more than one instance of the OPTION_V4_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT
   option.

   As the list of URIs may exceed the maximum allowed length of a single
   DHCPv4 option (255 octets), the server MUST implement [RFC3396],
   allowing the URI list to be split across a number of
   OPTION_V4_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT option instances.

8.2.  DHCPv6 Zero Touch Option

   The DHCPv6 Zero Touch Option is used to provision the client with one
   or more URIs for bootstrap servers that can be contacted to attempt
   further configuration.

      DHCPv6 Zero Touch Redirect Option

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |       option-code (136)       |          option-length        |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      .           bootstrap-server-list (variable length)             .
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      o option-code: OPTION_V6_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT (136)
      o option-length: The option length in octets.
      o bootstrap-server-list: A list of servers for the client to
        attempt contacting, in order to obtain further bootstrapping
        data, in the format shown in [common-field-encoding].

   DHCPv6 Client Behavior

   Clients MAY request the OPTION_V6_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT option, as
   defined in [RFC3315], Sections 17.1.1, 18.1.1, 18.1.3, 18.1.4,



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   18.1.5, and 22.7.   As a convenience to the reader, we mention here
   that the client includes requested option codes in the Option Request
   Option.

   On receipt of a DHCPv6 Reply message which contains the
   OPTION_V6_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT, the client processes the response
   according to Section 5.5, with the understanding that the "address"
   and "port" values are encoded in the URIs.

   Any invalid URI entries received in the uri-data field are ignored by
   the client.  If OPTION_V6_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT does not contain at
   least one valid URI entry in the uri-data field, then the client MUST
   discard the option.

   DHCPv6 Server Behavior

   Sections 17.2.2 and 18.2 of [RFC3315] govern server operation
   in regard to option assignment.  As a convenience to the reader,
   we mention here that the server will send a particular option code
   only if configured with specific values for that option code and if
   the client requested it.

   Option OPTION_V6_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT is a singleton.  Servers MUST NOT
   send more than one instance of the OPTION_V6_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT
   option.

8.3.  Common Field Encoding

   Both of the DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 options defined in this section encode
   a list of bootstrap server URIs.  The "URI" structure is an option
   that can contain multiple URIs (see [RFC7227], Section 5.7).

     bootstrap-server-list:

     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-...-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       uri-length              |          URI                  |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-...-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     o uri-length: 2 octets long, specifies the length of the URI data.

     o URI: URI of zerotouch bootstrap server, using the HTTPS URI
       scheme defined in Section 2.7.2 of RFC7230.  URI MUST be in
       form "https://<ip-address-or-hostname>[:<port>]".








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9.  Security Considerations

9.1.  Clock Sensitivity

   The solution in this document relies on TLS certificates, owner
   certificates, and ownership vouchers, all of which require an
   accurate clock in order to be processed correctly (e.g., to test
   validity dates and revocation status).  Implementations SHOULD ensure
   devices have an accurate clock when shipped from manufacturing
   facilities, and take steps to prevent clock tampering.

   If it is not possible to ensure clock accuracy, it is RECOMMENDED
   that implementations disable the aspects of the solution having clock
   sensitivity.  In particular, such implementations should assume that
   TLS certificates, ownership vouchers, and owner certificates never
   expire and are not revokable.  From an ownership voucher perspective,
   manufacturers SHOULD issue a single ownership voucher for the
   lifetime of such devices.

   Implementations SHOULD NOT rely on NTP for time, as NTP is not a
   secure protocol.

9.2.  Use of IDevID Certificates

   IDevID certificates, as defined in [Std-802.1AR-2009], are
   RECOMMENDED, both for the TLS-level client certificate used by
   devices when connecting to a bootstrap server, as well as for the
   device identity certificate used by owners when encrypting the zero
   touch artifacts.

9.3.  Immutable Storage for Trust Anchors

   Devices MUST ensure that all their trust anchor certificates,
   including those for connecting to bootstrap servers and verifying
   ownership vouchers, are protected from external modification.

   It may be necessary to update these certificates over time (e.g., the
   manufacturer wants to delegate trust to a new CA).  It is therefore
   expected that devices MAY update these trust anchors when needed
   through a verifiable process, such as a software upgrade using signed
   software images.

9.4.  Secure Storage for Long-lived Private Keys

   Manufacturer-generated device identifiers may have very long
   lifetimes.  For instance, [Std-802.1AR-2009] recommends using the
   "notAfter" value 99991231235959Z in IDevID certificates.  Given the
   long-lived nature of these private keys, it is paramount that they



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   are stored so as to resist discovery, such as in a secure
   cryptographic processor (e.g., a TPM).

9.5.  Blindly Authenticating a Bootstrap Server

   This document allows a device to blindly authenticate a bootstrap
   server's TLS certificate.  It does so to allow for cases where the
   redirect information may be obtained in an unsecured manner, which is
   desirable to support in some cases.

   To compensate for this, this document requires that devices, when
   connected to an untrusted bootstrap server, assert that data
   downloaded from the server is signed.

9.6.  Disclosing Information to Untrusted Servers

   This document allows devices to establish connections to untrusted
   bootstrap servers.  However, since the bootstrap server is untrusted,
   it may be under the control of an adversary, and therefore devices
   SHOULD be cautious about the data they send to the bootstrap server
   in such cases.

   Devices send different data to bootstrap servers at each of the
   protocol layers TCP, TLS, HTTP, and RESTCONF.

   At the TCP protocol layer, devices may relay their IP address,
   subject to network translations.  Disclosure of this information is
   not considered a security risk.

   At the TLS protocol layer, devices may use a client certificate to
   identify and authenticate themselves to untrusted bootstrap servers.
   At a minimum, the client certificate must disclose the device's
   serial number, and may disclose additional information such as the
   device's manufacturer, hardware model, public key, etc.  Knowledge of
   this information may provide an adversary with details needed to
   launch an attack.  It is RECOMMENDED that secrecy of the network
   constituency is not relied on for security.

   At the HTTP protocol layer, devices may use an HTTP authentication
   scheme to identify and authenticate themselves to untrusted bootstrap
   servers.  At a minimum, the authentication scheme must disclose the
   device's serial number and, concerningly, may, depending on the
   authentication mechanism used, reveal a secret that is only supposed
   to be known to the device (e.g., a password).  Devices SHOULD NOT use
   an HTTP authentication scheme (e.g., HTTP Basic) with an untrusted
   bootstrap server that reveals a secret that is only supposed to be
   known to the device.




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   At the RESTCONF protocol layer, devices use the "get-bootstrapping-
   data" RPC, but not the "report-progress" RPC, when connected to an
   untrusted bootstrap server.  The "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC allows
   additional input parameters to be passed to the bootstrap server
   (e.g., "os-name", "os-version", "hw-model").  It is RECOMMENDED that
   devices only pass the "untrusted-connection" input parameter to an
   untrusted bootstrap server.  While it is okay for a bootstrap server
   to immediately return signed onboarding information, it is
   RECOMMENDED that bootstrap servers instead promote the untrusted
   connection to a trusted connection, as described in Appendix B, thus
   enabling the device to use the "report-progress" RPC while processing
   the onboarding information.

9.7.  Sequencing Sources of Bootstrapping Data

   For devices supporting more than one source for bootstrapping data,
   no particular sequencing order has to be observed for security
   reasons, as the solution for each source is considered equally
   secure.  However, from a privacy perspective, it is RECOMMENDED that
   devices access local sources before accessing remote sources.

9.8.  Safety of Private Keys used for Trust

   The solution presented in this document enables bootstrapping data to
   be trusted in two ways, either through transport level security or
   through the signing of artifacts.

   When transport level security (i.e., a trusted bootstrap server) is
   used, the private key for the end-entity certificate must be online
   in order to establish the TLS connection.

   When artifacts are signed, the signing key is required to be online
   only when the bootstrap server is returning a dynamically generated
   signed-data response.  For instance, a bootstrap server, upon
   receiving the "untrusted-connection" input parameter to the "get-
   bootstrapping-data" RPC, may dynamically generate a response that is
   signed.

   Bootstrap server administrators are RECOMMENDED to follow best
   practice to protect the private key used for any online operation.
   Use of an hardware security module (HSM) is RECOMMENDED.  If an HSM
   is not used, frequent private key refreshes are RECOMMENDED.

   For best security, it is RECOMMENDED that owners only provide
   bootstrapping data that has been signed, using a private key that is
   not accessible to a network of questionable integrity, and encrypted,
   using the device's public key from its secure device identity
   certificate.



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9.9.  Infinite Redirection Loops and Sequences

   The recursive algorithm described in this document enables redirect
   information to lead to more redirect information, which may cause a
   device to redirect forever.

   Whilst a trusted bootstrap server may be misconfigured to cause a
   device to return to it again ad infitum, the greater concern is that
   any untrusted source of bootstrapping data could be used by an
   adversary to purposely cause this.

   Infinite redirections are most easily constructed via loops, where
   some bootstrap server redirects back to a previously visited
   bootstrap server.  Infinite redirections can also be created without
   a loop by an adversary dynamically instantiated bootstrap servers on
   the fly.

   Implementations SHOULD limit the maximum number of recursive
   redirects allowed; no more than a half dozen seems reasonable.

9.10.  Increased Reliance on Manufacturers

   The zero touch bootstrapping protocol presented in this document
   shifts some control of initial configuration away from the rightful
   owner of the device and towards the manufacturer and its delegates.

   The manufacturer maintains the list of well-known bootstrap servers
   its devices will trust.  By design, if no bootstrapping data is found
   via other methods first, the device will try to reach out to the
   well-known bootstrap servers.  There is no mechanism to prevent this
   from occurring other than by using an external firewall to block such
   connections.  Concerns related to trusted bootstrap servers are
   discussed in Section 9.11.

   Similarly, the manufacturer maintains the list of voucher signing
   authorities its devices will trust.  The voucher signing authorities
   issue the vouchers that enable a device to trust an owner's domain
   certificate.  It is vital that manufacturers ensure the integrity of
   these voucher signing authorities, so as to avoid incorrect
   assignments.

   Operators should be aware that this system assumes that they trust
   all the pre-configured bootstrap servers and voucher signing
   authorities designated by the manufacturers.







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9.11.  Concerns with Trusted Bootstrap Servers

   Trusted bootstrap servers, whether well-known or discovered, have the
   potential to cause problems, such as the following.

   o  A trusted bootstrap server that has been compromised may be
      modified to return unsigned data of any sort.  For instance, a
      bootstrap server that is only suppose to return redirect
      information might be modified to return onboarding information.
      Similarly, a bootstrap server that is only supposed to return
      signed data, may be modified to return unsigned data.  In both
      cases, the device will accept the response, unaware that it wasn't
      supposed to be any different.  It is RECOMMENDED that maintainers
      of trusted bootstrap servers ensure that their systems are not
      easily compromised and, in case of compromise, have mechanisms in
      place to detect and remediate the compromise as expediently as
      possible.

   o  A trusted bootstrap server hosting either unsigned or signed but
      not encrypted data may disclose information to unwanted parties
      (e.g., an administrator of the bootstrap server).  This is a
      privacy issue only, but could reveal information that might be
      used in a subsequent attack.  Disclosure of redirect information
      has limited exposure (it is just a list of bootstrap servers),
      whereas disclosure of onboarding information could be highly
      revealing (e.g., network topology, firewall policies, etc.).  It
      is RECOMMENDED that operators encrypt the bootstrapping data when
      its contents are considered sensitive, even to the administrators
      of a bootstrap server.

9.12.  Validity Period for Zero Touch Information

   Zero touch information does not specify a validity period.  For
   instance, neither redirect information nor onboarding information
   enable "not-before" or "not-after" values to be specified, and
   neither artifact alone can be revoked.

   For unsigned data provided by an untrusted source of bootstrapping
   data, it is not meaningful to discuss its validity period when the
   information itself has no authenticity and may have come from
   anywhere.

   For unsigned data provided by a trusted source of bootstrapping data
   (i.e., a bootstrap server), the availability of the data is the only
   measure of it being current.  Since the untrusted data comes from a
   trusted source, its current availability is meaningful and, since
   bootstrap servers use TLS, the contents of the exchange cannot be
   modified or replayed.



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   For signed data, whether provided by an untrusted or trusted source
   of bootstrapping data, the validity is constrained by the validity of
   the both the ownership voucher and owner certificate used to
   authenticate it.

   The ownership voucher's validity is primarily constrained by the
   ownership voucher's "created-on" and "expires-on" nodes.  While
   [RFC8366] recommends short-lived vouchers (see Section 6.1), the
   "expires-on" node may be set to any point in the future, or omitted
   altogether to indicate that the voucher never expires.  The ownership
   voucher's validity is secondarily constrained by the manufacturer's
   PKI used to sign the voucher; whilst an ownership voucher cannot be
   revoked directly, the PKI used to sign it may be.

   The owner certificate's validity is primarily constrained by the
   X.509's validity field, the "notBefore" and "notAfter" values, as
   specified by the certificate authority that signed it.  The owner
   certificate's validity is secondarily constrained by the validity of
   the PKI used to sign the voucher.  Owner certificates may be revoked
   directly.

   For owners that wish to have maximum flexibility in their ability to
   specify and constrain the validity of signed data, it is RECOMMENDED
   that a unique owner certificate is created for each signed artifact.
   Not only does this enable a validity period to be specified, for each
   artifact, but it also enables to the validity of each artifact to be
   revoke.

9.13.  The "ietf-zerotouch-information" YANG Module

   The ietf-zerotouch-information module defined in this document
   defines a data structure that is always wrapped by a CMS structure.
   When accessed by a secure mechanism (e.g., protected by TLS), then
   the CMS structure may be unsigned.  However, when accessed by an
   insecure mechanism (e.g., removable storage device), then the CMS
   structure must be signed, in order for the device to trust it.

   Implementations should be aware that signed bootstrapping data only
   protects the data from modification, the contents are still visible
   to others.  This doesn't affect security so much as privacy.  That
   the contents may be read by unintended parties when accessed by
   insecure mechanisms is considered next.

   The ietf-zerotouch-information module defines a top-level "choice"
   statement that declares the contents are either "redirect-
   information" or "onboarding-information".  Each of these two cases
   are now considered.




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   When the content of the CMS structure is redirect-information, an
   observer can learn about the bootstrap servers the device is being
   directed to, their IP addresses or hostnames, ports, and trust anchor
   certificates.  Knowledge of this information could provide an
   observer some insight into a network's inner structure.

   When the content of the CMS structure is onboarding-information, an
   observer could learn considerable information about how the device is
   to be provisioned.  This information includes the operating system
   version, initial configuration, and script contents.  This
   information should be considered sensitive and precautions should be
   taken to protect it (e.g., encrypt artifact with device public key).

9.14.  The "ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server" YANG Module

   The ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server module defined in this document
   specifies an API for a RESTCONF [RFC8040].  The lowest RESTCONF layer
   is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS
   [RFC8446].

   The NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means
   to restrict access for particular users to a preconfigured subset of
   all available protocol operations and content.

   This module presents no data nodes (only RPCs).  There is no need to
   discuss the sensitivity of data nodes.

   This module defines two RPC operations that may be considered
   sensitive in some network environments.  These are the operations and
   their sensitivity/vulnerability:

   get-bootstrapping-data:  This RPC is used by devices to obtain their
       bootstrapping data.  By design, each device, as identified by its
       authentication credentials (e.g. client certificate), can only
       obtain its own data.  NACM is not needed to further constrain
       access to this RPC.

   report-progress:  This RPC is used by devices to report their
       bootstrapping progress.  By design, each device, as identified by
       its authentication credentials (e.g. client certificate), can
       only report data for itself.  NACM is not needed to further
       constrain access to this RPC.

10.  IANA Considerations







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10.1.  The IETF XML Registry

   This document registers two URIs in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688].
   Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registrations are
   requested:

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-information
   Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
   XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server
   Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
   XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

10.2.  The YANG Module Names Registry

   This document registers two YANG modules in the YANG Module Names
   registry [RFC6020].  Following the format defined in [RFC6020], the
   the following registrations are requested:

   name:      ietf-zerotouch-information
   namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-information
   prefix:    zti
   reference: RFC XXXX

   name:      ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server
   namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-\
              server  (note: '\' used for formatting reasons only)
   prefix:    ztbs
   reference: RFC XXXX

10.3.  The SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry

   IANA is kindly requested to add two entries in the "SMI Security for
   S/MIME CMS Content Type" registry (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1), with
   values as follows:


   Decimal  Description                             References
   -------  --------------------------------------  ----------
   TBD1      id-ct-zerotouchInformationXML          [RFCXXXX]
   TBD2      id-ct-zerotouchInformationJSON         [RFCXXXX]

   id-ct-zerotouchInformationXML indicates that the "zerotouch-
   information" is encoded using XML.  id-ct-zerotouchInformationJSON
   indicates that the "zerotouch-information" is encoded using JSON.





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10.4.  The BOOTP Manufacturer Extensions and DHCP Options Registry

   IANA is kindly requested to make permanent the following early code
   point allocation in the "BOOTP Manufacturer Extensions and DHCP
   Options" registry maintained at http://www.iana.org/assignments/
   bootp-dhcp-parameters:

   Tag: 143
   Name: OPTION_V4_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT
   Data Length: N
   Meaning: This option provides a list of URIs
            for zerotouch bootstrap servers
   Reference: [RFCXXXX]

   And the following early code point allocation in the "Dynamic Host
   Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)" registry maintained at
   http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters:

   Value: 136
   Description: OPTION_V6_ZEROTOUCH_REDIRECT
   Reference: [RFCXXXX]

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-data-ext]
              Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "YANG Data
              Extensions", draft-ietf-netmod-yang-data-ext-01 (work in
              progress), March 2018.

   [ITU.X690.2015]
              International Telecommunication Union, "Information
              Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
              Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
              Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
              X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1, August 2015,
              <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.




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   [RFC3315]  Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,
              C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
              for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July
              2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>.

   [RFC3396]  Lemon, T. and S. Cheshire, "Encoding Long Options in the
              Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4)", RFC 3396,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3396, November 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3396>.

   [RFC4253]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253,
              January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4253>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC6020]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
              the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
              2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.

   [RFC6762]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.

   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.

   [RFC6991]  Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
              RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.




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   [RFC7227]  Hankins, D., Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Jiang, S., and
              S. Krishnan, "Guidelines for Creating New DHCPv6 Options",
              BCP 187, RFC 7227, DOI 10.17487/RFC7227, May 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7227>.

   [RFC7950]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
              RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.

   [RFC8040]  Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
              Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8366]  Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
              "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
              RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>.

   [Std-802.1AR-2009]
              IEEE SA-Standards Board, "IEEE Standard for Local and
              metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity",
              December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]
              Watsen, K., "Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography",
              draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-00 (work in progress),
              June 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors]
              Watsen, K., "YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors",
              draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors-00 (work in progress),
              June 2018.

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.

   [RFC6187]  Igoe, K. and D. Stebila, "X.509v3 Certificates for Secure
              Shell Authentication", RFC 6187, DOI 10.17487/RFC6187,
              March 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6187>.




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   [RFC6234]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
              2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.

   [RFC8071]  Watsen, K., "NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home",
              RFC 8071, DOI 10.17487/RFC8071, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8071>.

   [RFC8340]  Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
              BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.

   [RFC8341]  Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
              Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.














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Appendix A.  The Zero Touch Device Data Model

   This section defines a non-normative data model that enables the
   configuration of zerotouch bootstrapping and discovery of what
   parameters are used by a device's bootstrapping logic.

A.1.  Data Model Overview

   The following tree diagram provides an overview for the zerotouch
   device data model.

   module: example-zerotouch-device
     +--rw zerotouch
        +--rw enabled?                                boolean
        +--ro idevid-certificate?
        |       ct:end-entity-cert-cms {bootstrap-servers}?
        +--ro bootstrap-servers {bootstrap-servers}?
        |  +--ro bootstrap-server* [address]
        |     +--ro address    inet:host
        |     +--ro port?      inet:port-number
        +--ro bootstrap-server-pinned-certificates?
        |       ta:pinned-certificates-ref {bootstrap-servers}?
        +--ro voucher-pinned-certificates?
                ta:pinned-certificates-ref {signed-data}?

   In the above diagram, notice that there is only one configurable node
   "enabled".  The expectation is that this node would be set to "true"
   in device's factory default configuration and that it would either be
   set to "false" or deleted when the zerotouch bootstrapping is longer
   needed.

A.2.  Example Usage

   Following is an instance example for this data model.

















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   [Note: '\' line wrapping for formatting only]

   <zerotouch
     xmlns="https://example.com/zerotouch-device">
     <enabled>true</enabled>
     <idevid-certificate>base64encodedvalue==</idevid-certificate>
     <bootstrap-servers>
       <bootstrap-server>
         <address>phs1.example.com</address>
         <port>8443</port>
       </bootstrap-server>
       <bootstrap-server>
         <address>phs2.example.com</address>
         <port>8443</port>
       </bootstrap-server>
       <bootstrap-server>
         <address>phs3.example.com</address>
         <port>8443</port>
       </bootstrap-server>
     </bootstrap-servers>
     <bootstrap-server-pinned-certificates>manufacturers-root-ca-certs<\
   /bootstrap-server-pinned-certificates>
     <voucher-pinned-certificates>manufacturers-root-ca-certs</voucher-\
   pinned-certificates>
   </zerotouch>

A.3.  YANG Module

   The device model is defined by the YANG module defined in this
   section.

   This module uses data types defined in [RFC6991],
   [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], and
   [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors].

   module example-zerotouch-device {
     yang-version 1.1;
     namespace "https://example.com/zerotouch-device";
     prefix ztd;

     import ietf-inet-types {
       prefix inet;
       reference "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
     }

     import ietf-crypto-types {
       prefix ct;
       revision-date 2018-06-04;



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       description
        "This revision is defined in the -00 version of
         draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types";
       reference
        "draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types:
           Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
     }

     import ietf-trust-anchors {
       prefix ta;
       revision-date 2018-06-04;
       description
        "This revision is defined in -00 version of
         draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors.";
       reference
        "draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors:
           YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
     }

     organization
       "Example Corporation";

     contact
       "Author: Bootstrap Admin <mailto:admin@example.com>";

     description
       "This module defines a data model to enable zerotouch
        bootstrapping and discover what parameters are used.
        This module assumes the use of an IDevID certificate,
        as opposed to any other client certificate, or the
        use of an HTTP-based client authentication scheme.";

     revision 2018-09-13 {
       description
         "Initial version";
       reference
         "RFC XXXX: Zero Touch Provisioning for Networking Devices";
     }

     // features

     feature bootstrap-servers {
       description
         "The device supports bootstrapping off bootstrap servers.";
     }

     feature signed-data {
       description



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         "The device supports bootstrapping off signed data.";
     }

     // protocol accessible nodes

     container zerotouch {
       description
         "Top-level container for zerotouch data model.";
       leaf enabled {
         type boolean;
         default false;
         description
           "The 'enabled' leaf controls if zerotouch bootstrapping is
            enabled or disabled.  The default is 'false' so that, when
            not enabled, which is most of the time, no configuration
            is needed.";
       }
       leaf idevid-certificate {
         if-feature bootstrap-servers;
         type ct:end-entity-cert-cms;
         config false;
         description
           "This CMS structure contains the IEEE 802.1AR-2009
            IDevID certificate itself, and all intermediate
            certificates leading up to, and optionally including,
            the manufacturer's well-known trust anchor certificate
            for IDevID certificates.  The well-known trust anchor
            does not have to be a self-signed certificate.";
         reference
           "IEEE 802.1AR-2009:
              IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
              networks - Secure Device Identity.";
       }
       container bootstrap-servers {
         if-feature bootstrap-servers;
         config false;
         description
           "List of bootstrap servers this device will attempt
            to reach out to when bootstrapping.";
         list bootstrap-server {
           key "address";
           description
             "A bootstrap server entry.";
           leaf address {
             type inet:host;
             mandatory true;
             description
               "The IP address or hostname of the bootstrap server the



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                device should redirect to.";
           }
           leaf port {
             type inet:port-number;
             default "443";
             description
               "The port number the bootstrap server listens on.  If no
                port is specified, the IANA-assigned port for 'https'
                (443) is used.";
           }
         }
       }
       leaf bootstrap-server-pinned-certificates {
         if-feature bootstrap-servers;
         type ta:pinned-certificates-ref;
         config false;
         description
           "A reference to a list of pinned certificate authority (CA)
            certificates that the device uses to validate bootstrap
            servers with.";
       }
       leaf voucher-pinned-certificates {
         if-feature signed-data;
         type ta:pinned-certificates-ref;
         config false;
         description
           "A reference to a list of pinned certificate authority (CA)
            certificates that the device uses to validate ownership
            vouchers with.";
       }
     }
   }


Appendix B.  Promoting a Connection from Untrusted to Trusted

   The following diagram illustrates a sequence of bootstrapping
   activities that promote an untrusted connection to a bootstrap server
   to a trusted connection to the same bootstrap server.  This enables a
   device to limit the amount of information it might disclose to an
   adversary hosting an untrusted bootstrap server.










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                                                         +----------+
                                                         |Deployment|
                                                         | Specific |
   +------+                                              |Bootstrap |
   |Device|                                              |  Server  |
   +------+                                              +----------+
      |                                                        |
      | 1. "HTTPS" Request ("untrusted-connection", nonce)     |
      |------------------------------------------------------->|
      | 2. "HTTPS" Response (signed redirect information)      |
      |<-------------------------------------------------------|
      |                                                        |
      |                                                        |
      | 3. HTTPS Request (os-name=xyz, os-version=123, etc.)   |
      |------------------------------------------------------->|
      | 4. HTTPS Response (unsigned onboarding information     |
      |<-------------------------------------------------------|
      |                                                        |

   The interactions in the above diagram are described below.

   1.  The device initiates an untrusted connection to a bootstrap
       server, as is indicated by putting "HTTPS" in double quotes
       above.  It is still an HTTPS connection, but the device is unable
       to authenticate the bootstrap server's TLS certificate.  Because
       the device is unable to trust the bootstrap server, it sends the
       "untrusted-connection" input parameter, and optionally also the
       "nonce" input parameter, in the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC.
       The "untrusted-connection" parameter informs the bootstrap server
       that the device does not trust it and may be holding back some
       additional input parameters from the server (e.g., other input
       parameters, progress reports, etc.).  The "nonce" input parameter
       enables the bootstrap server to dynamically obtain an ownership
       voucher from a MASA, which may be important for devices that do
       not have a reliable clock.

   2.  The bootstrap server, seeing the "untrusted-connection" input
       parameter, knows that it can either send unsigned redirect
       information or signed data of any type.  But, in this case, the
       bootstrap server has the ability to sign data and chooses to
       respond with signed redirect information, not signed onboarding
       information as might be expected, securely redirecting the device
       back to it again.  Not displayed but, if the "nonce" input
       parameter was passed, the bootstrap server could dynamically
       connect to a download a voucher from the MASA having the nonce
       value in it.  Details regarding a protocol enabling this
       integration is outside the scope of this document.




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   3.  Upon validating the signed redirect information, the device
       establishes a secure connection to the bootstrap server.
       Unbeknownst to the device, it is the same bootstrap server it was
       connected to previously but, because the device is able to
       authenticate the bootstrap server this time, it sends its normal
       "get-bootstrapping-data" request (i.e., with additional input
       parameters) as well as its progress reports (not depicted).

   4.  This time, because the "untrusted-connection" parameter was not
       passed, having access to all of the device's input parameters,
       the bootstrap server returns, in this example, unsigned
       onboarding information to the device.

Appendix C.  Workflow Overview

   The zero touch solution presented in this document is conceptualized
   to be composed of the non-normative workflows described in this
   section.  Implementation details are expected to vary.  Each diagram
   is followed by a detailed description of the steps presented in the
   diagram, with further explanation on how implementations may vary.

C.1.  Enrollment and Ordering Devices

   The following diagram illustrates key interactions that may occur
   from when a prospective owner enrolls in a manufacturer's zero touch
   program to when the manufacturer ships devices for an order placed by
   the prospective owner.
























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                                  +-----------+
   +------------+                 |Prospective|                    +---+
   |Manufacturer|                 |   Owner   |                    |NMS|
   +------------+                 +-----------+                    +---+
         |                              |                            |
         |                              |                            |
         |  1. initiate enrollment      |                            |
         #<-----------------------------|                            |
         #                              |                            |
         #                              |                            |
         #     IDevID trust anchor      |                            |
         #----------------------------->#  set IDevID trust anchor   |
         #                              #--------------------------->|
         #                              |                            |
         #     bootstrap server         |                            |
         #     account credentials      |                            |
         #----------------------------->#  set credentials           |
         |                              #--------------------------->|
         |                              |                            |
         |                              |                            |
         |  2. set owner certificate trust anchor                    |
         |<----------------------------------------------------------|
         |                              |                            |
         |                              |                            |
         |  3. place device order       |                            |
         |<-----------------------------#  model devices             |
         |                              #--------------------------->|
         |                              |                            |
         |  4. ship devices and send    |                            |
         |     device identifiers and   |                            |
         |     ownership vouchers       |                            |
         |----------------------------->#  set device identifiers    |
         |                              #  and ownership vouchers    |
         |                              #--------------------------->|
         |                              |                            |

   Each numbered item below corresponds to a numbered item in the
   diagram above.

   1.  A prospective owner of a manufacturer's devices initiates an
       enrollment process with the manufacturer.  This process includes
       the following:

       *  Regardless how the prospective owner intends to bootstrap
          their devices, they will always obtain from the manufacturer
          the trust anchor certificate for the IDevID certificates.
          This certificate will is installed on the prospective owner's




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          NMS so that the NMS can authenticate the IDevID certificates
          when they are presented to subsequent steps.

       *  If the manufacturer hosts an Internet based bootstrap server
          (e.g., a redirect server) such as described in Section 4.4,
          then credentials necessary to configure the bootstrap server
          would be provided to the prospective owner.  If the bootstrap
          server is configurable through an API (outside the scope of
          this document), then the credentials might be installed on the
          prospective owner's NMS so that the NMS can subsequently
          configure the manufacturer-hosted bootstrap server directly.

   2.  If the manufacturer's devices are able to validate signed data
       (Section 5.4), and assuming that the prospective owner's NMS is
       able to prepare and sign the bootstrapping data itself, the
       prospective owner's NMS might set a trust anchor certificate onto
       the manufacturer's bootstrap server, using the credentials
       provided in the previous step.  This certificate is the trust
       anchor certificate that the prospective owner would like the
       manufacturer to place into the ownership vouchers it generates,
       thereby enabling devices to trust the owner's owner certificate.
       How this trust anchor certificate is used to enable devices to
       validate signed bootstrapping data is described in Section 5.4.

   3.  Some time later, the prospective owner places an order with the
       manufacturer, perhaps with a special flag checked for zero touch
       handling.  At this time, or perhaps before placing the order, the
       owner may model the devices in their NMS, creating virtual
       objects for the devices with no real-world device associations.
       For instance the model can be used to simulate the device's
       location in the network and the configuration it should have when
       fully operational.

   4.  When the manufacturer fulfills the order, shipping the devices to
       their intended locations, they may notify the owner of the
       devices' serial numbers and shipping destinations, which the
       owner may use to stage the network for when the devices power on.
       Additionally, the manufacturer may send one or more ownership
       vouchers, cryptographically assigning ownership of those devices
       to the owner.  The owner may set this information on their NMS,
       perhaps binding specific modeled devices to the serial numbers
       and ownership vouchers.

C.2.  Owner Stages the Network for Bootstrap

   The following diagram illustrates how an owner might stage the
   network for bootstrapping devices.




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               +----------+ +------------+
               |Deployment| |Manufacturer| +------+ +------+
               | Specific | |   Hosted   | | Local| | Local| +---------+
         +---+ |Bootstrap | | Bootstrap  | |  DNS | | DHCP | |Removable|
         |NMS| |  Server  | |   Server   | |Server| |Server| | Storage |
         +---+ +----------+ +------------+ +------+ +------+ +---------+
           |        |             |            |        |         |
   1.      |        |             |            |        |         |
   activate|        |             |            |        |         |
   modeled |        |             |            |        |         |
   device  |        |             |            |        |         |
   ------->|        |             |            |        |         |
           | 2. (optional)        |            |        |         |
           |    configure         |            |        |         |
           |    bootstrap         |            |        |         |
           |    server            |            |        |         |
           |------->|             |            |        |         |
           |        |             |            |        |         |
           | 3. (optional) configure           |        |         |
           |    bootstrap server  |            |        |         |
           |--------------------->|            |        |         |
           |        |             |            |        |         |
           |        |             |            |        |         |
           | 4. (optional) configure DNS server|        |         |
           |---------------------------------->|        |         |
           |        |             |            |        |         |
           |        |             |            |        |         |
           | 5. (optional) configure DHCP server        |         |
           |------------------------------------------->|         |
           |        |             |            |        |         |
           |        |             |            |        |         |
           | 6. (optional) store bootstrapping artifacts on media |
           |----------------------------------------------------->|
           |        |             |            |        |         |
           |        |             |            |        |         |

   Each numbered item below corresponds to a numbered item in the
   diagram above.

   1.  Having previously modeled the devices, including setting their
       fully operational configurations and associating device serial
       numbers and (optionally) ownership vouchers, the owner might
       "activate" one or more modeled devices.  That is, the owner tells
       the NMS to perform the steps necessary to prepare for when the
       real-world devices power up and initiate the bootstrapping
       process.  Note that, in some deployments, this step might be
       combined with the last step from the previous workflow.  Here it




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       is depicted that an NMS performs the steps, but they may be
       performed manually or through some other mechanism.

   2.  If it is desired to use a deployment specific bootstrap server,
       it must be configured to provide the bootstrapping data for the
       specific devices.  Configuring the bootstrap server may occur via
       a programmatic API not defined by this document.  Illustrated
       here as an external component, the bootstrap server may be
       implemented as an internal component of the NMS itself.

   3.  If it is desired to use a manufacturer hosted bootstrap server,
       it must be configured to provide the bootstrapping data for the
       specific devices.  The configuration must be either redirect or
       onboarding information.  That is, either the manufacturer hosted
       bootstrap server will redirect the device to another bootstrap
       server, or provide the device with the onboarding information
       itself.  The types of bootstrapping data the manufacturer hosted
       bootstrap server supports may vary by implementation; some
       implementations may only support redirect information, or only
       support onboarding information, or support both redirect and
       onboarding information.  Configuring the bootstrap server may
       occur via a programmatic API not defined by this document.

   4.  If it is desired to use a DNS server to supply bootstrapping
       data, a DNS server needs to be configured.  If multicast DNS-SD
       is desired, then the server must reside on the local network,
       otherwise the DNS server may reside on a remote network.  Please
       see Section 4.2 for more information about how to configure DNS
       servers.  Configuring the DNS server may occur via a programmatic
       API not defined by this document.

   5.  If it is desired to use a DHCP server to supply bootstrapping
       data, a DHCP server needs to be configured.  The DHCP server may
       be accessed directly or via a DHCP relay.  Please see Section 4.3
       for more information about how to configure DHCP servers.
       Configuring the DHCP server may occur via a programmatic API not
       defined by this document.

   6.  If it is desired to use a removable storage device (e.g., USB
       flash drive) to supply bootstrapping data, the data would need to
       be placed onto it.  Please see Section 4.1 for more information
       about how to configure a removable storage device.

C.3.  Device Powers On

   The following diagram illustrates the sequence of activities that
   occur when a device powers on.




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                                                     +----------+
                                      +-----------+  |Deployment|
                                      | Source of |  | Specific |
   +------+                           | Bootstrap |  |Bootstrap |  +---+
   |Device|                           |   Data    |  |  Server  |  |NMS|
   +------+                           +-----------+  +----------+  +---+
      |                                     |              |         |
      |                                     |              |         |
      | 1. if zerotouch bootstrap service   |              |         |
      |    is not enabled, then exit.       |              |         |
      |                                     |              |         |
      | 2. for each source supported, check |              |         |
      |    for bootstrapping data.          |              |         |
      |------------------------------------>|              |         |
      |                                     |              |         |
      | 3. if onboarding information found, |              |         |
      |    initialize self and, only if     |              |         |
      |    source is a trusted bootstrap    |              |         |
      |    server, send progress reports.   |              |         |
      |------------------------------------>#              |         |
      |                                     # webhook      |         |
      |                                     #----------------------->|
      |                                                    |         |
      | 4. else if redirect-information found, for each    |         |
      |    bootstrap server specified, check for data.     |         |
      |-+------------------------------------------------->|         |
      | |                                                  |         |
      | | if more redirect-information is found, recurse   |         |
      | | (not depicted), else if onboarding-information   |         |
      | | found, initialize self and post progress reports |         |
      | +------------------------------------------------->#         |
      |                                                    # webhook |
      |                                                    #-------->|
      |
      | 5. retry sources and/or wait for manual provisioning.
      |

   The interactions in the above diagram are described below.

   1.  Upon power being applied, the device checks to see if zerotouch
       bootstrapping is configured, such as must be the case when
       running its "factory default" configuration.  If zerotouch
       bootstrapping is not configured, then the bootstrapping logic
       exits and none of the following interactions occur.

   2.  For each source of bootstrapping data the device supports,
       preferably in order of closeness to the device (e.g., removable




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       storage before Internet based servers), the device checks to see
       if there is any bootstrapping data for it there.

   3.  If onboarding information is found, the device initializes itself
       accordingly (e.g., installing a boot-image and committing an
       initial configuration).  If the source is a bootstrap server, and
       the bootstrap server can be trusted (i.e., TLS-level
       authentication), the device also sends progress reports to the
       bootstrap server.

       *  The contents of the initial configuration should configure an
          administrator account on the device (e.g., username, ssh-rsa
          key, etc.), and should configure the device either to listen
          for NETCONF or RESTCONF connections or to initiate call home
          connections [RFC8071], and should disable the zerotouch
          bootstrapping service (e.g., the "enabled" leaf in data model
          presented in Appendix A).

       *  If the bootstrap server supports forwarding device progress
          reports to external systems (e.g., via a webhook), a
          "bootstrap-complete" progress report (Section 7.3) informs the
          external system to know when it can, for instance, initiate a
          connection to the device.  To support this scenario further,
          the "bootstrap-complete" progress report may also relay the
          device's SSH host keys and/or TLS certificates, with which the
          external system can use to authenticate subsequent connections
          to the device.

       If the device successfully completes the bootstrapping process,
       it exits the bootstrapping logic without considering any
       additional sources of bootstrapping data.

   4.  Otherwise, if redirect information is found, the device iterates
       through the list of specified bootstrap servers, checking to see
       if it has bootstrapping data for the device.  If the bootstrap
       server returns more redirect information, then the device
       processes it recursively.  Otherwise, if the bootstrap server
       returns onboarding information, the device processes it following
       the description provided in (3) above.

   5.  After having tried all supported sources of bootstrapping data,
       the device may retry again all the sources and/or provide
       manageability interfaces for manual configuration (e.g., CLI,
       HTTP, NETCONF, etc.).  If manual configuration is allowed, and
       such configuration is provided, the configuration should also
       disable the zerotouch bootstrapping service, as the need for
       bootstrapping would no longer be present.




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Appendix D.  Change Log

D.1.  ID to 00

   o  Major structural update; the essence is the same.  Most every
      section was rewritten to some degree.

   o  Added a Use Cases section

   o  Added diagrams for "Actors and Roles" and "NMS Precondition"
      sections, and greatly improved the "Device Boot Sequence" diagram

   o  Removed support for physical presence or any ability for
      configlets to not be signed.

   o  Defined the Zero Touch Information DHCP option

   o  Added an ability for devices to also download images from
      configuration servers

   o  Added an ability for configlets to be encrypted

   o  Now configuration servers only have to support HTTP/S - no other
      schemes possible

D.2.  00 to 01

   o  Added boot-image and validate-owner annotations to the "Actors and
      Roles" diagram.

   o  Fixed 2nd paragraph in section 7.1 to reflect current use of
      anyxml.

   o  Added encrypted and signed-encrypted examples

   o  Replaced YANG module with XSD schema

   o  Added IANA request for the Zero Touch Information DHCP Option

   o  Added IANA request for media types for boot-image and
      configuration

D.3.  01 to 02

   o  Replaced the need for a configuration signer with the ability for
      each NMS to be able to sign its own configurations, using
      manufacturer signed ownership vouchers and owner certificates.




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   o  Renamed configuration server to bootstrap server, a more
      representative name given the information devices download from
      it.

   o  Replaced the concept of a configlet by defining a southbound
      interface for the bootstrap server using YANG.

   o  Removed the IANA request for the boot-image and configuration
      media types

D.4.  02 to 03

   o  Minor update, mostly just to add an Editor's Note to show how this
      draft might integrate with the draft-pritikin-anima-bootstrapping-
      keyinfra.

D.5.  03 to 04

   o  Major update formally introducing unsigned data and support for
      Internet-based redirect servers.

   o  Added many terms to Terminology section.

   o  Added all new "Guiding Principles" section.

   o  Added all new "Sources for Bootstrapping Data" section.

   o  Rewrote the "Interactions" section and renamed it "Workflow
      Overview".

D.6.  04 to 05

   o  Semi-major update, refactoring the document into more logical
      parts

   o  Created new section for information types

   o  Added support for DNS servers

   o  Now allows provisional TLS connections

   o  Bootstrapping data now supports scripts

   o  Device Details section overhauled

   o  Security Considerations expanded

   o  Filled in enumerations for notification types



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D.7.  05 to 06

   o  Minor update

   o  Added many Normative and Informative references.

   o  Added new section Other Considerations.

D.8.  06 to 07

   o  Minor update

   o  Added an Editorial Note section for RFC Editor.

   o  Updated the IANA Considerations section.

D.9.  07 to 08

   o  Minor update

   o  Updated to reflect review from Michael Richardson.

D.10.  08 to 09

   o  Added in missing "Signature" artifact example.

   o  Added recommendation for manufacturers to use interoperable
      formats and file naming conventions for removable storage devices.

   o  Added configuration-handling leaf to guide if config should be
      merged, replaced, or processed like an edit-config/yang-patch
      document.

   o  Added a pre-configuration script, in addition to the post-
      configuration script from -05 (issue #15).

D.11.  09 to 10

   o  Factored ownership voucher and voucher revocation to a separate
      document: draft-kwatsen-netconf-voucher. (issue #11)

   o  Removed <configuration-handling> options "edit-config" and "yang-
      patch". (issue #12)

   o  Defined how a signature over signed-data returned from a bootstrap
      server is processed. (issue #13)





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   o  Added recommendation for removable storage devices to use open/
      standard file systems when possible.  (issue #14)

   o  Replaced notifications "script-[warning/error]" with "[pre/post]-
      script-[warning/error]". (goes with issue #15)

   o  switched owner-certificate to be encoded using the PKCS #7 format.
      (issue #16)

   o  Replaced md5/sha1 with sha256 inside a choice statement, for
      future extensibility. (issue #17)

   o  A ton of editorial changes, as I went thru the entire draft with a
      fine-toothed comb.

D.12.  10 to 11

   o  fixed yang validation issues found by IETFYANGPageCompilation.
      note: these issues were NOT found by pyang --ietf or by the
      submission-time validator...

   o  fixed a typo in the yang module, someone the config false
      statement was removed.

D.13.  11 to 12

   o  fixed typo that prevented Appendix B from loading the examples
      correctly.

   o  fixed more yang validation issues found by
      IETFYANGPageCompilation.  note: again, these issues were NOT found
      by pyang --ietf or by the submission-time validator...

   o  updated a few of the notification enumerations to be more
      consistent with the other enumerations (following the warning/
      error pattern).

   o  updated the information-type artifact to state how it is encoded,
      matching the language that was in Appendix B.

D.14.  12 to 13

   o  defined a standalone artifact to encode the old information-type
      into a PKCS #7 structure.

   o  standalone information artifact hardcodes JSON encoding (to match
      the voucher draft).




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   o  combined the information and signature PKCS #7 structures into a
      single PKCS #7 structure.

   o  moved the certificate-revocations into the owner-certificate's
      PKCS #7 structure.

   o  eliminated support for voucher-revocations, to reflect the
      voucher-draft's switch from revocations to renewals.

D.15.  13 to 14

   o  Renamed "bootstrap information" to "onboarding information".

   o  Rewrote DHCP sections to address the packet-size limitation issue,
      as discussed in Chicago.

   o  Added Ian as an author for his text-contributions to the DHCP
      sections.

   o  Removed the Guiding Principles section.

D.16.  14 to 15

   o  Renamed action "notification" to "update-progress" and, likewise
      "notification-type" to "update-type".

   o  Updated examples to use "base64encodedvalue==" for binary values.

   o  Greatly simplified the "Artifact Groupings" section, and moved it
      as a subsection to the "Artifacts" section.

   o  Moved the "Workflow Overview" section to the Appendix.

   o  Renamed "bootstrap information" to "update information".

   o  Removed "Other Considerations" section.

   o  Tons of editorial updates.

D.17.  15 to 16

   o  tweaked language to refer to "initial state" rather than "factory
      default configuration", so as accommodate white-box scenarios.

   o  added a paragraph to Intro regarding how the solution primarily
      regards physical machines, but could be extended to VMs by a
      future document.




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   o  added a pointer to the Workflow Overview section (recently moved
      to the Appendix) to the Intro.

   o  added a note that, in order to simplify the verification process,
      the "Zerotouch Information" PKCS #7 structure MUST also contain
      the signing X.509 certificate.

   o  noted that the owner certificate's must either have no Key Usage
      or the Key Usage must set the "digitalSignature" bit.

   o  noted that the owner certificate's subject and subjectAltName
      values are not constrained.

   o  moved/consolidated some text from the Artifacts section down to
      the Device Details section.

   o  tightened up some ambiguous language, for instance, by referring
      to specific leaf names in the Voucher artifact.

   o  reverted a previously overzealous s/unique-id/serial-number/
      change.

   o  modified language for when ZTP runs from when factory-default
      config is running to when ZTP is configured, which the factory-
      defaults should set .

D.18.  16 to 17

   o  Added an example for how to promote an untrusted connection to a
      trusted connection.

   o  Added a "query parameters" section defining some parameters
      enabling scenarios raised in last call.

   o  Added a "Disclosing Information to Untrusted Servers" section to
      the Security Considerations.

D.19.  17 to 18

   o  Added Security Considerations for each YANG module.

   o  Reverted back to the device always sending its DevID cert.

   o  Moved data tree to "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC.

   o  Moved the "update-progress" action to a "report-progress" RPC.





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   o  Added an "untrusted-connection" parameter to "get-bootstrapping-
      data" RPC.

   o  Added the "ietf-zerotouch-device" module.

   o  Lots of small updates.

D.20.  18 to 19

   o  Fixed "must" expressions, by converting "choice" to a "list" of
      "image-verification", each of which now points to a base identity
      called "hash-algorithm".  There's just one algorithm currently
      defined (sha-256).  Wish there was a standard crypto module that
      could identify such identities.

D.21.  19 to 20

   o  Now references I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams.

   o  Fixed tree-diagrams in Section 2 to always reflect current YANG
      (now they are now dynamically generated).

   o  The "redirect-information" container's "trust-anchor" is now a CMS
      structure that can contain a chain of certificates, rather than a
      single certificate.

   o  The "onboarding-information" container's support for image
      verification reworked to be extensible.

   o  Added a reference to the "Device Details" section to the new
      example-zerotouch-device module.

   o  Clarified that the device must always pass its IDevID certificate,
      even for untrusted bootstrap servers.

   o  Fixed the description statement for the "script" typedef to refer
      to the [pre/post]-script-[warning/error] enums, rather than the
      legacy script-[warning/error] enums.

   o  For the get-bootstrapping-data RPC's input, removed the "remote-
      id" and "circuit-id" fields, and added a "hw-model" field.

   o  Improved DHCP error handling text.

   o  Added MUST requirement for DHCPv6 client and server implementing
      [RFC3396] to handle URI lists longer than 255 octets.





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   o  Changed the "configuration" value in onboarding-information to be
      type "binary" instead of "anydata".

   o  Moved everything from PKCS#7 to CMS (this shows up as a big
      change).

   o  Added the early code point allocation assignments for the DHCP
      Options in the IANA Considerations section, and updated the RFC
      Editor note accordingly.

   o  Added RFC Editor request to replace the assigned values for the
      CMS content types.

   o  Relaxed auth requirements from device needing to always send
      IDevID cert to device needing to always send authentication
      credentials, as this better matches what RFC 8040 Section 2.5
      says.

   o  Moved normative module "ietf-zerotouch-device" to non-normative
      module "example-zerotouch-device".

   o  Updated Title, Abstract, and Introduction per discussion on list.

D.22.  20 to 21

   o  Now any of the three artifact can be encrypted.

   o  Fixed some line-too-long issues.

D.23.  21 to 22

   o  Removed specifics around how scripts indicate warnings or errors
      and how scripts emit output.

   o  Moved the Zero Touch Device Data Model section to the Appendix.

   o  Modified the YANG module in the Zero Touch Device Data Model
      section to reflect the latest trust-anchors and keystore drafts.

   o  Modified types in other YANG modules to more closely emulate what
      is in draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types.

D.24.  22 to 23

   o  Rewrote section 5.6 (processing onboboarding information) to be
      clearer about error handling and retained state.  Specifically:





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      *  Clarified that a script, upon having an error, must gracefully
         exit, cleaning up any state that might hinder subsequent
         executions.

      *  Added ability for scripts to be executed again with a flag
         enabling them to clean up state from a previous execution.

      *  Clarified that the conifguration commit is atomic.

      *  Clarified that any error encountered after committing the
         configuration (e.g., in the "post-configuration-script") must
         rollback the configuration to the previous configuration.

      *  Clarified that failure to successfully deliver the "bootstrap-
         initiated" and "bootstrap-complete" progress types must be
         treated as an error.

      *  Clarified that "return to bootstrapping sequence" is to be
         interpreted in the recursive context.  Meaning that the device
         rolls-back one loop, rather than start over from scratch.

   o  Changed how a device verifies a boot-image from just "MUST match
      one of the supplied fingerprints" to also allow for the
      verification to use an cryptographic signature embedded into the
      image itself.

   o  Added more "progress-type" enums for visibility reasons, enabling
      more strongly-typed debug information to be sent to the bootstrap
      server.

   o  Added Security Considerations based on early SecDir review.

   o  Added recommendation for device to send warning if the initial
      config does not disable the bootstrapping process.

D.25.  23 to 24

   o  Follow-ups from SecDir and Shepherd.

   o  Added "boot-image-complete" enumeration.

D.26.  24 to 25

   o  Removed remaining old "bootstrapping information" term usage.

   o  Fixed DHCP Option length definition.

   o  Added reference to RFC 6187.



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Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
   on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Michael Behringer,
   Dean Bogdanovic, Martin Bjorklund, Joe Clarke, Toerless Eckert,
   Stephen Farrell, Stephen Hanna, Wes Hardaker, David Harrington, Radek
   Krejci, David Mandelberg, Russ Mundy, Reinaldo Penno, Randy Presuhn,
   Max Pritikin, Michael Richardson, Phil Shafer, Juergen Schoenwaelder.

   Special thanks goes to Steve Hanna, Russ Mundy, and Wes Hardaker for
   brainstorming the original I-D's solution during the IETF 87 meeting
   in Berlin.

Authors' Addresses

   Kent Watsen
   Juniper Networks

   EMail: kwatsen@juniper.net


   Mikael Abrahamsson
   T-Systems

   EMail: mikael.abrahamsson@t-systems.se


   Ian Farrer
   Deutsche Telekom AG

   EMail: ian.farrer@telekom.de




















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