[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: (draft-reilly-ntp-bcp) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13

Internet Engineering Task Force                           D. Reilly, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                Orolia USA
Intended status: Best Current Practice                          H. Stenn
Expires: September 27, 2019                      Network Time Foundation
                                                               D. Sibold
                                                                     PTB
                                                          March 26, 2019


              Network Time Protocol Best Current Practices
                         draft-ietf-ntp-bcp-13

Abstract

   The Network Time Protocol (NTP) is one of the oldest protocols on the
   Internet and has been widely used since its initial publication.
   This document is a collection of Best Practices for general operation
   of NTP servers and clients on the Internet.  It includes
   recommendations for stable, accurate and secure operation of NTP
   infrastructure.  This document is targeted at NTP version 4 as
   described in RFC 5905.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 27, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents



Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019               [Page 1]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  General Network Security Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  BCP 38  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  NTP Configuration Best Practices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Keeping NTP up to date  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Use enough time sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Use a diversity of Reference Clocks . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.4.  Control Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.5.  Monitoring  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.6.  Using Pool Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.7.  Leap Second Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.7.1.  Leap Smearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  NTP Security Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Pre-Shared Key Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Autokey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Network Time Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.4.  External Security Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  NTP Security Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  Minimizing Information Leakage  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  Avoiding Daemon Restart Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.3.  Detection of Attacks Through Monitoring . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.4.  Kiss-o'-Death Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.5.  Broadcast Mode Should Only Be Used On Trusted Networks  .  15
     5.6.  Symmetric Mode Should Only Be Used With Trusted Peers . .  15
   6.  NTP in Embedded Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.1.  Updating Embedded Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.2.  Server configuration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  NTP over Anycast  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     11.3.  URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   Appendix A.  Best Practices specific to the Network         Time
                Foundation implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     A.1.  Use enough time sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     A.2.  NTP Control and Facility Messages . . . . . . . . . . . .  22



Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019               [Page 2]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


     A.3.  Monitoring  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     A.4.  Leap Second File  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     A.5.  Leap Smearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     A.6.  Configuring ntpd  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     A.7.  Pre-Shared Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24

1.  Introduction

   NTP version 4 (NTPv4) has been widely used since its publication as
   [RFC5905].  This document is a collection of best practices for the
   operation of NTP clients and servers.

   The recommendations in this document are intended to help operators
   distribute time on their networks more accurately and more securely.
   It is intended to apply generally to a broad range of networks.  Some
   specific networks may have higher accuracy requirements that require
   additional techniques beyond what is documented here.

   Among the best practices covered are recommendations for general
   network security, time protocol specific security, and NTP server and
   client configuration.  NTP operation in embedded devices is also
   covered.

   This document also contains information for protocol implementors who
   want to develop their own implementations that are compliant to RFC
   5905.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  General Network Security Best Practices

2.1.  BCP 38

   Many network attacks rely on modifying the IP source address of a
   packet to point to a different IP address than the computer which
   originated it.  UDP-based protocols such as NTP are generally more
   susceptible to spoofing attacks than connection-oriented protocols.
   NTP control messages can generate a lot of data in response to a
   small query, which makes it attractive as a vector for distributed
   denial-of-service attacks.  (NTP Control messages are discussed
   further in Section 3.4).  One documented instance of such an attack



Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019               [Page 3]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   can be found here [1], and further discussion in [IMC14] and
   [NDSS14].

   BCP 38 [RFC2827] was published in 2000 to to provide some level of
   remediation against address-spoofing attacks.  BCP 38 calls for
   filtering outgoing and incoming traffic to make sure that the source
   and destination IP addresses are consistent with the expected flow of
   traffic on each network interface.  It is RECOMMENDED that ISP's and
   large corporate networks implement ingress and egress filtering.
   More information is available at the BCP38 Info Web page [2] .

3.  NTP Configuration Best Practices

   This section provides Best Practices for NTP configuration and
   operation.  Application of these best practices that are specific to
   the Network Time Foundation implementation, including example
   configuration directives valid at the time of this writing, are
   compiled in Appendix A.

3.1.  Keeping NTP up to date

   There are multiple versions of the NTP protocol in use, and multiple
   implementations, on many different platforms.  The practices in this
   document are meant to apply generally to any implementation of
   [RFC5905].  NTP users should select an implementation that is
   actively maintained.  Users should keep up to date on any known
   attacks on their selected implementation, and deploy updates
   containing security fixes as soon as practical.

3.2.  Use enough time sources

   An NTP implementation that is compliant with [RFC5905] takes the
   available sources of time and submits this timing data to
   sophisticated intersection, clustering, and combining algorithms to
   get the best estimate of the correct time.  The description of these
   algorithms is beyond the scope of this document.  Interested readers
   should read [RFC5905] or the detailed description of NTP in
   [MILLS2006].

   o  If there is only 1 source of time, the answer is obvious.  It may
      not be a good source of time, but it's the only source of time
      that can be considered.  Any issue with the time at the source
      will be passed on to the client.

   o  If there are 2 sources of time and they agree well enough, then
      the best time can be calculated easily.  But if one source fails,
      then the solution degrades to the single-source solution outlined
      above.  And if the two sources don't agree, it will be difficult



Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019               [Page 4]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


      to know which one is correct without making use of information
      from outside of the protocol.

   o  If there are 3 sources of time, there is more data available to
      converge on the best calculated time, and this time is more likely
      to be accurate.  And the loss of one of the sources (by becoming
      unreachable or unusable) can be tolerated.  But at that point, the
      solution degrades to the 2 source solution.

   o  4 or more sources of time is better, as long as the sources are
      diverse (Section 3.3).  If one of these sources develops a problem
      there are still at least 3 other time sources.

   This analysis assumes that a majority of the servers used in the
   solution are honest, even if some may be inaccurate.  Operators
   should be aware of the possibility that if an attacker is in control
   of the network, the time coming from all servers could be
   compromised.

   Operators who are concerned with maintaining accurate time SHOULD use
   at least 4 independent, diverse sources of time.  Four sources will
   provide sufficient backup in case one source goes down.  If four
   sources are not available, operators MAY use fewer sources, subject
   to the risks outlined above.

   But even with 4 or more sources of time, systemic problems can
   happen.  One example involves the leap smearing concept detailed in
   Section 3.7.1.  For several hours before and after the June 2015 leap
   second, several operators configured their NTP servers with leap
   smearing while others did not.  Many NTP end nodes could not
   determine an accurate time source because 2 of their 4 sources of
   time gave them consistent UTC/POSIX time, while the other 2 gave them
   consistent leap-smeared time.  This is just one of many potential
   causes of disagreement among time sources.

   Operators are advised to monitor all time sources that are in use.
   If time sources do not generally agree, operators are encouraged to
   investigate the cause of this and either correct the problems or stop
   using defective servers.  See Section 3.5 for more information.

3.3.  Use a diversity of Reference Clocks

   When using servers with attached hardware reference clocks, it is
   suggested that different types of reference clocks be used.  Having a
   diversity of sources with independent implementations means that any
   one issue is less likely to cause a service interruption.





Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019               [Page 5]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   Are all clocks on a network from the same vendor?  They may have the
   same bugs.  Even devices from different vendors may not be truly
   independent if they share common elements.  Are they using the same
   base chipset?  Are they all running the same version of firmware?
   Chipset and firmware bugs can happen, but they can be more difficult
   to diagnose than application software bugs.  When having the correct
   time is of critical importance, it's ultimately up to operators to
   ensure that their sources are sufficiently independent, even if they
   are not under the operator's control.

   A systemic problem with time from any satellite navigation service is
   possible and has happened.  Sunspot activity can render satellite or
   radio-based time source unusable.  Depending on the application
   requirements, operators may need to consider backup scenarios in the
   rare circumstance when the satellite system is faulty or unavailable.

3.4.  Control Messages

   Some implementations of NTPv4 provide the NTP Control Messages (also
   known as Mode 6 messages) that were originally specified in
   Appendix B of [RFC1305] which defined NTPv3.  These messages were
   never included the NTPv4 specification, but they are still used.  At
   the time of this writing, work is being done to formally document the
   structure of these control messages in [I-D.ietf-ntp-mode-6-cmds].

   The NTP Control Messages are designed to permit monitoring and
   optionally authenticated control of NTP and its configuration.  Used
   properly, these facilities provide vital debugging and performance
   information and control.  But these facilities can be a vector for
   amplification attacks when abused.  For this reason, it is
   RECOMMENDED that publicly-facing NTP servers should block NTP Control
   Message queries from outside their organization.

   The ability to use NTP Control Messages beyond their basic monitoring
   capabilities SHOULD be limited to authenticated sessions that provide
   a 'controlkey'.  It can also be limited through mechanisms outside of
   the NTP specification, such as Access Control Lists, that only allow
   access from approved IP addresses.

   The NTP Control Messages responses are much larger than the
   corresponding queries.  Thus, they can be abused in high-bandwidth
   DDoS attacks.  Section 2.1 gives more information on how to provide
   protection for this abuse by implementing BCP 38.








Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019               [Page 6]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


3.5.  Monitoring

   Operators SHOULD use their NTP implementation's remote monitoring
   capabilities to quickly identify servers which are out of sync, and
   ensure correctness of the service.  Operators SHOULD also monitor
   system logs for messages so problems and abuse attempts can be
   quickly identified.

   If a system starts to receive NTP Reply packets from a remote time
   server that do not correspond to any requests sent by the system,
   that can be an indication that an attacker is forging that system's
   IP address in requests to the remote time server.  The goal of this
   attack is to adversely impact the availability of time to the
   targeted system whose address is being forged.  Based on these forged
   packets, the remote time server might decide to throttle or rate
   limit packets, or even stop sending packets to the targeted system.

   If a system is a broadcast client and its system log shows that it is
   receiving early time messages from its server, that is an indication
   that somebody may be forging packets from a broadcast server.
   (Broadcast client and server modes are defined in Section 3 of
   [RFC5905])

   If a server's system log shows messages that indicates it is
   receiving NTP timestamps that are much earlier than the current
   system time, then either the system clock is unusually fast or
   somebody is trying to launch a replay attack against that server.

3.6.  Using Pool Servers

   It only takes a small amount of bandwidth and system resources to
   synchronize one NTP client, but NTP servers that can service tens of
   thousands of clients take more resources to run.  Network operators
   and advanced users who want to synchronize their computers MUST only
   synchronize to servers that they have permission to use.

   The NTP Pool Project is a group of volunteers who have donated their
   computing and bandwidth resources to freely distribute time from
   primary time sources to others on the Internet.  The time is
   generally of good quality but comes with no guarantee whatsoever.  If
   you are interested in using this pool, please review their
   instructions at http://www.pool.ntp.org/en/use.html [3].

   Vendors can obtain their own subdomain that is part of the NTP Pool
   Project.  This offers vendors the ability to safely make use of the
   time distributed by the pool for their devices.  Details are
   available at http://www.pool.ntp.org/en/vendors.html [4] .




Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019               [Page 7]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   If there is a need to synchronize many computers, an operator may
   want to run local NTP servers that are synchronized to the NTP Pool
   Project.  NTP users on that operator's networks can then be
   synchronized to local NTP servers.

3.7.  Leap Second Handling

   UTC is kept in agreement with the astronomical time UT1 [5] to within
   +/- 0.9 seconds by the insertion (or possibly a deletion) of a leap
   second.  UTC is an atomic time scale whereas UT1 is based on the
   rotational rate of the earth.  Leap seconds are not introduced at a
   fixed rate.  They are announced by the International Earth Rotation
   and Reference Systems Service (IERS) in its Bulletin C [6] when
   necessary to keep UTC and UT1 aligned.

   NTP time is based on the UTC timescale, and the protocol has the
   capability to broadcast leap second information.  Some Global
   Navigation Satellite Systems (like GPS) or radio transmitters (like
   DCF77) broadcast leap second information.  If an NTP client is synced
   to an NTP server that provides leap second notification, the client
   will get advance notification of impending leap seconds
   automatically.

   Since the length of the UT1 day is generally slowly increasing [7],
   all leap seconds that have been introduced since the practice started
   in 1972 have been positive leap seconds, where a second is added to
   UTC.  NTP also supports a negative leap second, where a second is
   removed from UTC, if that ever becomes necessary.

   While earlier versions of NTP contained some ambiguity regarding when
   a leap second that is broadcast by a server should be applied by a
   client, RFC 5905 is clear that leap seconds are only applied on the
   last day of a month.  However, because some older clients may apply
   it at the end of the current day, it is RECOMMENDED that NTP servers
   wait until the last day of the month before broadcasting leap
   seconds.  Doing this will prevent older clients from applying a leap
   second at the wrong time.  When implementing this recommendation,
   operators should ensure that clients are not configured to use
   polling intervals greater than 24 hours, so the leap second
   notification is not missed.

   In circumstances where an NTP server is not receiving leap second
   information from an automated source, certain organizations maintain
   files which are updated every time a new leap second is announced:

   NIST: ftp://time.nist.gov/pub/leap-seconds.list





Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019               [Page 8]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   US Navy (maintains GPS Time): ftp://tycho.usno.navy.mil/pub/ntp/leap-
   seconds.list

   IERS (announces leap seconds):
   https://hpiers.obspm.fr/iers/bul/bulc/ntp/leap-seconds.list

3.7.1.  Leap Smearing

   Some NTP installations make use of a technique called Leap Smearing.
   With this method, instead of introducing an extra second (or
   eliminating a second) on a leap second event, NTP time will be slewed
   in small increments over a comparably large window of time (called
   the smear interval) around the leap second event.  The smear interval
   should be large enough to make the rate that the time is slewed
   small, so that clients will follow the smeared time without
   objecting.  Periods ranging from 2 to 24 hours have been used
   successfully.  During the adjustment window, all the NTP clients'
   times may be offset from UTC by as much as a full second, depending
   on the implementation.  But at least all clients will generally agree
   on what time they think it is.

   The purpose of Leap Smearing is to enable systems that don't deal
   with the leap second event properly to function consistently, at the
   expense of fidelity to UTC during the smear window.  During a
   standard leap second event, that minute will have 61 (or possibly 59)
   seconds in it, and some applications (and even some OS's) are known
   to have problems with that.

   Operators who have legal obligations or other strong requirements to
   be synchronized with UTC or civil time SHOULD NOT use leap smearing,
   because the distributed time cannot be guaranteed to be traceable to
   UTC during the smear interval.

   Clients that are connected to leap smearing servers MUST NOT apply
   the standard NTP leap second handling.  These clients must never have
   a leap second file loaded, and the smearing servers must never
   advertise to clients that a leap second is pending.

   Any use of leap smearing servers should be limited to within a
   single, well-controlled environment.  Leap Smearing MUST NOT be used
   for public-facing NTP servers, as they will disagree with non-
   smearing servers (as well as UTC) during the leap smear interval, and
   there is no standardized way for a client to detect that a server is
   using leap smearing.  However, be aware that some public-facing
   servers may be configured this way anyway in spite of this guidance.

   System Administrators are advised to be aware of impending leap
   seconds and how the servers (inside and outside their organization)



Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019               [Page 9]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   they are using deal with them.  Individual clients MUST NOT be
   configured to use a mixture of smeared and non-smeared servers.  If a
   client uses smeared servers, the servers it uses must all have the
   same leap smear configuration.

4.  NTP Security Mechanisms

   In the standard configuration NTP packets are exchanged unprotected
   between client and server.  An adversary that is able to become a
   Man-In-The-Middle is therefore able to drop, replay or modify the
   content of the NTP packet, which leads to degradation of the time
   synchronization or the transmission of false time information.  A
   threat analysis for time synchronization protocols is given in
   [RFC7384].  NTP provides two internal security mechanisms to protect
   authenticity and integrity of the NTP packets.  Both measures protect
   the NTP packet by means of a Message Authentication Code (MAC).
   Neither of them encrypts the NTP's payload, because this payload
   information is not considered to be confidential.

4.1.  Pre-Shared Key Approach

   This approach applies a symmetric key for the calculation of the MAC,
   which protects authenticity and integrity of the exchanged packets
   for an association.  NTP does not provide a mechanism for the
   exchange of the keys between the associated nodes.  Therefore, for
   each association, keys MUST be exchanged securely by external means,
   and they MUST be protected from disclosure.  It is RECOMMENDED that
   each association be protected by its own unique key.  It is
   RECOMMENDED that participants agree to refresh keys periodically.
   However, NTP does not provide a mechanism to assist in doing so.
   Each communication partner will need to keep track of its keys in its
   own local key storage.

   [RFC5905] specifies using the MD5 hash algorithm for calculation of
   the MAC, but other algorithms may be supported as well.  The MD5 hash
   is now considered to be too weak and unsuitable for cryptographic
   usage.  [RFC6151] has more information on the algorithm's weaknesses.
   Implementations will soon be available based on AES-128-CMAC
   [I-D.ietf-ntp-mac], and users SHOULD use that when it is available.

   Some implementations store the key in clear text.  Therefore it MUST
   only be readable by the NTP process.

   An NTP client has to be able to link a key to a particular server in
   order to establish a protected association.  This linkage is
   implementation specific.  Once applied, a key will be trusted until
   the link is removed.




Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 10]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


4.2.  Autokey

   [RFC5906] specifies the Autokey protocol.  It was published in 2010
   to provide automated key management and authentication of NTP
   servers.  However, security researchers have identified
   vulnerabilities [8] in the Autokey protocol.

   Autokey SHOULD NOT be used.

4.3.  Network Time Security

   Work is in progress on an enhanced replacement for Autokey.  Refer to
   [I-D.ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp] for more information.

4.4.  External Security Protocols

   If applicable, external security protocols such as IPsec and MACsec
   can be applied to enhance integrity and authenticity protection of
   NTP time synchronization packets.  Usage of such external security
   protocols can decrease time synchronization performance [RFC7384].
   Therefore, operators are advised to carefully evaluate if the
   decreased time synchronization performance meets their specific
   timing requirements.

   Note that none of the security measures described in Section 4 can
   prevent packet delay manipulation attacks on NTP.  Such delay attacks
   can target time synchronization packets sent as clear-text or even
   within an encrypted tunnel.  These attacks are described further in
   Section 3.2.6 of [RFC7384].

5.  NTP Security Best Practices

   This section lists some general NTP security practices, but these
   issues may (or may not) have been mitigated in particular versions of
   particular implementations.  Contact the maintainers of the relevant
   implementation for more information.

5.1.  Minimizing Information Leakage

   The base NTP packet leaks important information (including reference
   ID and reference time) that may be used in attacks [NDSS16],
   [CVE-2015-8138], [CVE-2016-1548].  A remote attacker can learn this
   information by sending mode 3 queries to a target system and
   inspecting the fields in the mode 4 response packet.  NTP control
   queries also leak important information (including reference ID,
   expected origin timestamp, etc.) that may be used in attacks
   [CVE-2015-8139].  A remote attacker can learn this information by




Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 11]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   sending control queries to a target system and inspecting the leaked
   information in the response.

   As such, mechanisms outside of the NTP protocol, such as Access
   Control Lists, SHOULD be used to limit the exposure of this
   information to allowed IP addresses, and keep it from remote
   attackers not on the list.  Hosts SHOULD only respond to NTP control
   queries from authorized parties.

   An NTP client that does not provide time on the network can
   additionally log and drop incoming mode 3 timing queries from
   unexpected sources.  Note well that the easiest way to monitor the
   status of an NTP instance is to send it a mode 3 query, so it may not
   be desirable to drop all mode 3 queries.  As an alternative,
   operators SHOULD either filter mode 3 queries from outside their
   networks, or make sure mode 3 queries are allowed only from trusted
   systems or networks.

   A "leaf-node host" is a host that is using NTP solely for the purpose
   of adjusting its own system time.  Such a host is not expected to
   provide time to other hosts, and relies exclusively on NTP's basic
   mode to take time from a set of servers.  (That is, the host sends
   mode 3 queries to its servers and receives mode 4 responses from
   these servers containing timing information.)  To minimize
   information leakage, leaf-node hosts SHOULD drop all incoming NTP
   packets except mode 4 response packets that come from known sources.
   An exception to this can be made if a leaf-node host is being
   actively monitored, in which case incoming packets from the
   monitoring server can be allowed.

   Please refer to [I-D.ietf-ntp-data-minimization] for more
   information.

5.2.  Avoiding Daemon Restart Attacks

   [RFC5905] says NTP clients should not accept time shifts greater than
   the panic threshold.  Specifically, RFC 5905 says "PANIC means the
   offset is greater than the panic threshold PANICT (1000 s) and SHOULD
   cause the program to exit with a diagnostic message to the system
   log."

   However, this behavior can be exploited by attackers as described in
   [NDSS16], when the following two conditions hold:

   1.  The operating system automatically restarts the NTP client when
       it quits.  (Modern *NIX operating systems are replacing
       traditional init systems with process supervisors, such as
       systemd, which can be configured to automatically restart any



Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 12]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


       daemons that quit.  This behavior is the default in CoreOS and
       Arch Linux.  As of the time of this writing, it appears likely to
       become the default behavior in other systems as they migrate
       legacy init scripts to process supervisors such as systemd.)

   2.  The NTP client is configured to ignore the panic threshold on all
       restarts.

   In such cases, if the attacker can send the target an offset that
   exceeds the panic threshold, the client will quit.  Then, when it
   restarts, it ignores the panic threshold and accepts the attacker's
   large offset.

   Operators need to be aware that when operating with the above two
   conditions, the panic threshold offers no protection from attacks.
   The natural solution is not to run hosts with these conditions.
   Specifically, operators SHOULD NOT ignore the panic threshold in all
   cold-start situations unless sufficient oversight and checking is in
   place to make sure that this type of attack cannot happen.

   As an alternative, the following steps MAY be taken by operators to
   mitigate the risk of attack:

   o  Monitor the NTP system log to detect when the NTP daemon has quit
      due to a panic event, as this could be a sign of an attack.

   o  Request manual intervention when a timestep larger than the panic
      threshold is detected.

   o  Configure the ntp client to only ignore the panic threshold in a
      cold start situation.

   o  Increase the minimum number of servers required before the NTP
      client adjusts the system clock.  This will make the NTP client
      wait until enough trusted sources of time agree before declaring
      the time to be correct.

   In addition, the following steps SHOULD be taken by those who
   implement the NTP protocol:

   o  Prevent the NTP daemon from taking time steps that set the clock
      to a time earlier than the compile date of the NTP daemon.

   o  Prevent the NTP daemon from putting 'INIT' in the reference ID of
      its NTP packets upon initializing.  This will make it more
      difficult for attackers to know when the daemon reboots.





Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 13]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


5.3.  Detection of Attacks Through Monitoring

   Operators SHOULD monitor their NTP instances to detect attacks.  Many
   known attacks on NTP have particular signatures.  Common attack
   signatures include:

   1.  Bogus packets - A packet whose origin timestamp does not match
       the value that expected by the client.

   2.  Zero origin packet - A packet with an origin timestamp set to
       zero [CVE-2015-8138].

   3.  A packet with an invalid cryptographic MAC [CCR16].

   The observation of many such packets could indicate that the client
   is under attack.

5.4.  Kiss-o'-Death Packets

   The "Kiss-o'-Death" (KoD) packet includes a rate management mechanism
   where a server can tell a misbehaving client to reduce its query
   rate.  KoD packets in general (and the RATE packet in particular) are
   defined in Section 7.4 of [RFC5905].  It is RECOMMENDED that all NTP
   devices respect these packets and back off when asked to do so by a
   server.  It is even more important for an embedded device, which may
   not have an exposed control interface for NTP.

   That said, a client MUST only accept a KoD packet if it has a valid
   origin timestamp.  Once a RATE packet is accepted, the client should
   increase its poll interval value (thus decreasing its polling rate)
   up to a reasonable maximum.  This maximum can vary by implementation
   but should not exceed a poll interval value of 13 (2 hours).  The
   mechanism to determine how much to increase the poll interval value
   is undefined in [RFC5905].  If the client uses the poll interval
   value sent by the server in the RATE packet, it MUST NOT simply
   accept any value.  Using large interval values may open a vector for
   a denial-of-service attack that causes the client to stop querying
   its server [NDSS16].

   The KoD rate management mechanism relies on clients behaving properly
   in order to be effective.  Some clients ignore the RATE packet
   entirely, and other poorly-implemented clients might unintentionally
   increase their poll rate and simulate a denial of service attack.
   Server administrators are advised to be prepared for this and take
   measures outside of the NTP protocol to drop packets from misbehaving
   clients when these clients are detected.





Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 14]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   Kiss-o'-Death (KoD) packets can be used in denial of service attacks.
   Thus, the observation of even just one RATE packet with a high poll
   value could be sign that the client is under attack.  And KoD packets
   are commonly accepted even when not cryptographically authenticated,
   which increases the risk of denial of service attacks.

5.5.  Broadcast Mode Should Only Be Used On Trusted Networks

   Per [RFC5905], NTP's broadcast mode is authenticated using symmetric
   key cryptography.  The broadcast server and all its broadcast clients
   share a symmetric cryptographic key, and the broadcast server uses
   this key to append a message authentication code (MAC) to the
   broadcast packets it sends.

   Importantly, all broadcast clients that listen to this server have to
   know the cryptographic key.  This mean that any client can use this
   key to send valid broadcast messages that look like they come from
   the broadcast server.  Thus, a rogue broadcast client can use its
   knowledge of this key to attack the other broadcast clients.

   For this reason, an NTP broadcast server and all its clients have to
   trust each other.  Broadcast mode SHOULD only be run from within a
   trusted network.

5.6.  Symmetric Mode Should Only Be Used With Trusted Peers

   In symmetric mode, two peers Alice and Bob can both push and pull
   synchronization to and from each other using either ephemeral
   symmetric passive (mode 2) or persistent symmetric active (NTP mode
   1) packets.  The persistent association is preconfigured and
   initiated at the active peer but not preconfigured at the passive
   peer (Bob).  Upon receipt of a mode 1 NTP packet from Alice, Bob
   mobilizes a new ephemeral association if he does not have one
   already.  This is a security risk for Bob because an arbitrary
   attacker can attempt to change Bob's time by asking Bob to become its
   symmetric passive peer.

   For this reason, a host SHOULD only allow symmetric passive
   associations to be established with trusted peers.  Specifically, a
   host SHOULD require each of its symmetric passive association to be
   cryptographically authenticated.  Each symmetric passive association
   SHOULD be authenticated under a different cryptographic key.

6.  NTP in Embedded Devices

   As computing becomes more ubiquitous, there will be many small
   embedded devices that require accurate time.  These devices may not
   have a persistent battery-backed clock, so using NTP to set the



Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 15]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   correct time on power-up may be critical for proper operation.  These
   devices may not have a traditional user interface, but if they
   connect to the Internet they will be subject to the same security
   threats as traditional deployments.

6.1.  Updating Embedded Devices

   Vendors of embedded devices are advised to pay attention to the
   current state of protocol security issues and bugs in their chosen
   implementation, because their customers don't have the ability to
   update their NTP implementation on their own.  Those devices may have
   a single firmware upgrade, provided by the manufacturer, that updates
   all capabilities at once.  This means that the vendor assumes the
   responsibility of making sure their devices have an up-to-date and
   secure NTP implementation.

   Vendors of embedded devices SHOULD include the ability to update the
   list of NTP servers used by the device.

   There is a catalog of NTP server abuse incidents, some of which
   involve embedded devices, on the Wikipedia page for NTP Server Misuse
   and Abuse [9].

6.2.  Server configuration

   Vendors of embedded devices with preconfigured NTP servers need to
   carefully consider which servers to use.  There are several public-
   facing NTP servers available, but they may not be prepared to service
   requests from thousands of new devices on the Internet.  Vendors MUST
   only preconfigure NTP servers that they have permission to use.

   Vendors are encouraged to invest resources into providing their own
   time servers for their devices to connect to.  This may be done
   through the NTP Pool Project, as documented in Section 3.6.

   Vendors should read [RFC4085], which advises against embedding
   globally-routable IP addresses in products, and offers several better
   alternatives.

7.  NTP over Anycast

   Anycast is described in BCP 126 [RFC4786].  (Also see [RFC7094]).
   With anycast, a single IP address is assigned to multiple servers,
   and routers direct packets to the closest active server.

   Anycast is often used for Internet services at known IP addresses,
   such as DNS.  Anycast can also be used in large organizations to
   simplify configuration of many NTP clients.  Each client can be



Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 16]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   configured with the same NTP server IP address, and a pool of anycast
   servers can be deployed to service those requests.  New servers can
   be added to or taken from the pool, and other than a temporary loss
   of service while a server is taken down, these additions can be
   transparent to the clients.

   Note well that using a single anycast address for NTP presents its
   own potential issues.  It means each client will likely use a single
   time server source.  A key element of a robust NTP deployment is each
   client using multiple sources of time.  With multiple time sources, a
   client will analyze the various time sources, selecting good ones,
   and disregarding poor ones.  If a single Anycast address is used,
   this analysis will not happen.  This can be mitigated by creating
   multiple, separate anycast pools so clients can have multiple sources
   of time while still gaining the configuration benefits of the anycast
   pools.

   If clients are connected to an NTP server via anycast, the client
   does not know which particular server they are connected to.  As
   anycast servers enter and leave the network, or the network topology
   changes, the server a particular client is connected to may change.
   This may cause a small shift in time from the perspective of the
   client when the server it is connected to changes.  In extreme cases
   where the network topology is changing rapidly, this could cause the
   server seen by a client to rapidly change as well, which can lead to
   larger time inaccuracies.  It is RECOMMENDED that network operators
   only deploy anycast NTP in environments where operators know these
   small shifts can be tolerated by the applications running on the
   clients being synchronized in this manner.

   Configuration of an anycast interface is independent of NTP.  Clients
   will always connect to the closest server, even if that server is
   having NTP issues.  It is RECOMMENDED that anycast NTP
   implementations have an independent method of monitoring the
   performance of NTP on a server.  If the server is not performing to
   specification, it should remove itself from the Anycast network.  It
   is also RECOMMENDED that each Anycast NTP server have an alternative
   method of access, such as an alternate Unicast IP address, so its
   performance can be checked independently of the anycast routing
   scheme.

   One useful application in large networks is to use a hybrid unicast/
   anycast approach.  Stratum 1 NTP servers can be deployed with unicast
   interfaces at several sites.  Each site may have several Stratum 2
   servers with two ethernet interfaces, or a single interface which can
   support multiple addresses.  One interface has a unique unicast IP
   address.  The second has an anycast IP interface (with a shared IP
   address per location).  The unicast interfaces can be used to obtain



Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 17]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   time from the Stratum 1 servers globally (and perhaps peer with the
   other Stratum 2 servers at their site).  Clients at each site can be
   configured to use the shared anycast address for their site,
   simplifying their configuration.  Keeping the anycast routing
   restricted on a per-site basis will minimize the disruption at the
   client if its closest anycast server changes.  Each Stratum 2 server
   can be uniquely identified on their unicast interface, to make
   monitoring easier.

8.  Acknowledgments

   The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of Sue Graves,
   Samuel Weiler, Lisa Perdue, Karen O'Donoghue, David Malone, Sharon
   Goldberg, Martin Burnicki, Miroslav Lichvar, Daniel Fox Franke,
   Robert Nagy, and Brian Haberman.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

10.  Security Considerations

   Time is a fundamental component of security on the internet.  The
   absence of a reliable source of current time subverts many common web
   authentication schemes, e.g., by allowing the use of expired
   credentials or by allowing for replay of messages only intended to be
   processed once.

   Much of this document directly addresses how to secure NTP servers.
   In particular, see Section 2, Section 4, and Section 5.

   There are several general threats to time synchronization protocols
   which are discussed in [RFC7384].

   [I-D.ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp] specifies the Network Time Security
   (NTS) mechanism and applies it to NTP.  Readers are encouraged to
   check the status of the draft, and make use of the methods it
   describes.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.




Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 18]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827,
              May 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827>.

   [RFC4085]  Plonka, D., "Embedding Globally-Routable Internet
              Addresses Considered Harmful", BCP 105, RFC 4085,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4085, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4085>.

   [RFC4786]  Abley, J. and K. Lindqvist, "Operation of Anycast
              Services", BCP 126, RFC 4786, DOI 10.17487/RFC4786,
              December 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4786>.

   [RFC5905]  Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
              "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
              Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [CCR16]    Malhotra, A. and S. Goldberg, "Attacking NTP's
              Authenticated Broadcast Mode", SIGCOMM Computer
              Communications Review (CCR) , 2016.

   [CVE-2015-8138]
              Van Gundy, M. and J. Gardner, "NETWORK TIME PROTOCOL
              ORIGIN TIMESTAMP CHECK IMPERSONATION VULNERABILITY", 2016,
              <http://www.talosintel.com/reports/TALOS-2016-0077>.

   [CVE-2015-8139]
              Van Gundy, M., "NETWORK TIME PROTOCOL NTPQ AND NTPDC
              ORIGIN TIMESTAMP DISCLOSURE VULNERABILITY", 2016,
              <http://www.talosintel.com/reports/TALOS-2016-0078>.

   [CVE-2016-1548]
              Gardner, J. and M. Lichvar, "Xleave Pivot: NTP Basic Mode
              to Interleaved", 2016,
              <http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/04/
              vulnerability-spotlight-further-ntpd_27.html>.







Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 19]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   [I-D.ietf-ntp-data-minimization]
              Franke, D. and A. Malhotra, "NTP Client Data
              Minimization", draft-ietf-ntp-data-minimization-04 (work
              in progress), March 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-ntp-mac]
              Malhotra, A. and S. Goldberg, "Message Authentication Code
              for the Network Time Protocol", draft-ietf-ntp-mac-06
              (work in progress), January 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-ntp-mode-6-cmds]
              Haberman, B., "Control Messages Protocol for Use with
              Network Time Protocol Version 4", draft-ietf-ntp-mode-
              6-cmds-06 (work in progress), September 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp]
              Franke, D., Sibold, D., Teichel, K., Dansarie, M., and R.
              Sundblad, "Network Time Security for the Network Time
              Protocol", draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp-17 (work in
              progress), February 2019.

   [IMC14]    Czyz, J., Kallitsis, M., Gharaibeh, M., Papadopoulos, C.,
              Bailey, M., and M. Karir, "Taming the 800 Pound Gorilla:
              The Rise and Decline of NTP DDoS Attacks", Internet
              Measurement Conference , 2014.

   [MILLS2006]
              Mills, D., "Computer network time synchronization: the
              Network Time Protocol", CRC Press , 2006.

   [NDSS14]   Rossow, C., "Amplification Hell: Revisiting Network
              Protocols for DDoS Abuse", NDSS'14, San Diego, CA. , 2014.

   [NDSS16]   Malhotra, A., Cohen, I., Brakke, E., and S. Goldberg,
              "Attacking the Network Time Protocol", NDSS'16, San Diego,
              CA. , 2016, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1020.pdf>.

   [RFC1305]  Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3)
              Specification, Implementation and Analysis", RFC 1305,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1305, March 1992,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1305>.

   [RFC5906]  Haberman, B., Ed. and D. Mills, "Network Time Protocol
              Version 4: Autokey Specification", RFC 5906,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5906, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5906>.





Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 20]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   [RFC6151]  Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
              for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
              RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>.

   [RFC7094]  McPherson, D., Oran, D., Thaler, D., and E. Osterweil,
              "Architectural Considerations of IP Anycast", RFC 7094,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7094, January 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7094>.

   [RFC7384]  Mizrahi, T., "Security Requirements of Time Protocols in
              Packet Switched Networks", RFC 7384, DOI 10.17487/RFC7384,
              October 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7384>.

11.3.  URIs

   [1] https://blog.cloudflare.com/technical-details-behind-a-400gbps-
       ntp-amplification-ddos-attack/

   [2] bcp38.info">http://www.bcp38.info

   [3] http://www.pool.ntp.org/en/use.html

   [4] http://www.pool.ntp.org/en/vendors.html

   [5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_time#Mean_solar_time

   [6] https://www.iers.org/IERS/EN/Publications/Bulletins/
       bulletins.html

   [7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_time#Mean_solar_time

   [8] https://lists.ntp.org/pipermail/ntpwg/2011-August/001714.html

   [9] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP_server_misuse_and_abuse

   [10] http://www.ntp.org/downloads.html

   [11] http://bk1.ntp.org/ntp-stable/README.leapsmear?PAGE=anno

   [12] https://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Support/ConfiguringNTP

Appendix A.  Best Practices specific to the Network Time Foundation
             implementation

   The Network Time Foundation (NTF) provides a widely used
   implementation of NTP, known as ntpd [10].  It is an evolution of the
   first NTP implementations developed by David Mills at the University



Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 21]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   of Delaware.  This appendix contains additional recommendations
   specific to this implementation that are valid at the time of this
   writing.

A.1.  Use enough time sources

   In addition to the recommendation given in Section 3.2 the ntpd
   implementation provides the 'pool' directive.  Starting with ntp-
   4.2.6, using this directive in the ntp.conf file will spin up enough
   associations to provide robust time service, and will disconnect poor
   servers and add in new servers as-needed.  The 'minclock' and
   'maxclock' options of the 'tos' command may be used to override the
   default values of how many servers are discovered through the 'pool'
   directive.

A.2.  NTP Control and Facility Messages

   In addition to NTP Control Messages the ntpd implementation also
   offers the Mode 7 commands for monitoring and configuration.

   If Mode 7 has been explicitly enabled to be used for more than basic
   monitoring it should be limited to authenticated sessions that
   provide a 'requestkey'.

   As mentioned above, there are two general ways to use Mode 6 and Mode
   7 requests.  One way is to query ntpd for information, and this mode
   can be disabled with:

   restrict ... noquery

   The second way to use Mode 6 and Mode 7 requests is to modify ntpd's
   behavior.  Modification of ntpd's configuration requires an
   authenticated session by default.  If no authentication keys have
   been specified no modifications can be made.  For additional
   protection, the ability to perform these modifications can be
   controlled with:

   restrict ... nomodify

   Users can prevent their NTP servers from considering query/
   configuration traffic by default by adding the following to their
   ntp.conf file:

   restrict default -4 nomodify notrap nopeer noquery

   restrict default -6 nomodify notrap nopeer noquery

   restrict source nomodify notrap noquery



Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 22]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


A.3.  Monitoring

   The ntpd implementation allows remote monitoring.  Access to this
   service is generally controlled by the "noquery" directive in NTP's
   configuration file (ntp.conf) via a "restrict" statement.  The syntax
   reads:

   restrict address mask address_mask noquery

   If a system is using broadcast mode and is running ntp-4.2.8p6 or
   later, use the 4th field of the ntp.keys file to specify the IPs of
   machines that are allowed to serve time to the group.

A.4.  Leap Second File

   The use of leap second files requires ntpd 4.2.6 or later.  After
   fetching the leap seconds file onto the server, add this line to
   ntpd.conf to apply and use the file, substituting the proper path:

   leapfile "/path/to/leap-file"

   There may need to restart ntpd to apply this change.

   ntpd servers with a manually configured leap second file will ignore
   leap second information broadcast from upstream NTP servers until the
   leap second file expires.  If no valid leap second file is available
   then a leap second notification from an attached reference clock is
   always accepted by ntpd.

   If no valid leap second file is available, a leap second notification
   may be accepted from upstream NTP servers.  As of ntp-4.2.6, a
   majority of servers must provide the notification before it is
   accepted.  Before 4.2.6, a leap second notification would be accepted
   if a single upstream server of a group of configured servers provided
   a leap second notification.  This would lead to misbehavior if single
   NTP servers sent an invalid leap second warning, e.g. due to a faulty
   GPS receiver in one server, but this behavior was once chosen because
   in the "early days" there was a greater chance that leap second
   information would be available from a very limited number of sources.

A.5.  Leap Smearing

   Leap Smearing was introduced in ntpd versions 4.2.8.p3 and 4.3.47, in
   response to client requests.  Support for leap smearing is not
   configured by default and must be added at compile time.  In
   addition, no leap smearing will occur unless a leap smear interval is
   specified in ntpd.conf .  For more information, refer to
   http://bk.ntp.org/ntp-stable/README.leapsmear?PAGE=anno [11].



Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 23]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


A.6.  Configuring ntpd

   See https://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Support/ConfiguringNTP [12] for
   additional information on configuring ntpd.

A.7.  Pre-Shared Keys

   Each communication partner must add the key information to their key
   file in the form:

   keyid type key

   where "keyid" is a number between 1 and 65534, inclusive, "type" is
   an ASCII character which defines the key format, and "key" is the key
   itself.

   An ntpd client establishes a protected association by appending the
   option "key keyid" to the server statement in ntp.conf:

   server address key keyid

   substituting the server address in the "address" field and the
   numerical keyid to use with that server in the "keyid" field.

   A key is deemed trusted when its keyid is added to the list of
   trusted keys by the "trustedkey" statement in ntp.conf.

   trustedkey keyid_1 keyid_2 ... keyid_n

   Starting with ntp-4.2.8p7 the ntp.keys file accepts an optional 4th
   column, a comma-separated list of IPs that are allowed to serve time.
   Use this feature.  Note, however, that an adversarial client that
   knows the symmetric broadcast key could still easily spoof its source
   IP to an IP that is allowed to serve time.  (This is easy to do
   because the origin timestamp on broadcast mode packets is not
   validated by the client.  By contrast, client/server and symmetric
   modes do require origin timestamp validation, making it more
   difficult to spoof packets [CCR16]).

Authors' Addresses

   Denis Reilly (editor)
   Orolia USA
   1565 Jefferson Road, Suite 460
   Rochester, NY  14623
   US

   Email: denis.reilly@orolia.com



Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 24]


Internet-Draft          Network Time Protocol BCP             March 2019


   Harlan Stenn
   Network Time Foundation
   P.O. Box 918
   Talent, OR  97540
   US

   Email: stenn@nwtime.org


   Dieter Sibold
   Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt
   Bundesallee 100
   Braunschweig  D-38116
   Germany

   Phone: +49-(0)531-592-8420
   Fax:   +49-531-592-698420
   Email: dieter.sibold@ptb.de

































Reilly, et al.         Expires September 27, 2019              [Page 25]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129c, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/