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Versions: (draft-bradley-oauth-open-redirector) 00

OAuth Working Group                                      J. Bradley, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                             Ping Identity
Intended status: Best Current Practice                          A. Sanso
Expires: August 7, 2016                                    Adobe Systems
                                                           H. Tschofenig
                                                       February 04, 2016


         OAuth 2.0 Security: Closing Open Redirectors in OAuth
              draft-ietf-oauth-closing-redirectors-00.txt

Abstract

   This document gives additional security considerations for OAuth,
   beyond those in the OAuth 2.0 specification and in the OAuth 2.0
   Threat Model and Security Considerations.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 7, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Authorization Server Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Abuse: The Authorization Server As Open Redirector  . . .   3
     2.2.  Security Compromise: The Authorization Server As Open
           Redirector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Mitigation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   This document gives additional security considerations for OAuth,
   beyond those in the OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749] and in the
   OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations [RFC6819].  In
   particular focuses its attention on the risk of abuse the
   Authorization Server (AS) (Section 1.2) as an open redirector.

   It contains the following content:

   o  Describes the Authorization Server Error Response as defined in
      [RFC6749].
   o  Describes the risk of abuse the Authorization Server as an open
      redirector.
   o  Gives some mitigation details on how to hinder the risk of open
      redirector in the ?AS?.

1.1.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
   are case sensitive.

1.2.  Terminology

   Authorization Server (AS)
      The server issuing access tokens to the client after successfully
      authenticating the resource owner and obtaining authorization.

   Redirection endpoint



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      Used by the authorization server to return responses containing
      authorization credentials to the client via the resource owner
      user-agent.

2.  Authorization Server Error Response

   The OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749] defines the Error Response
   associated with the Authorization Code Grant flow and the Implicit
   Grant flow.  Both flows use a redirection endpoint where the resource
   owner's user agent is directed after the resource owner has completed
   interacting with the authorization server.  The redirection endpoint
   is also used in the error response scenario.  As per RFC6749
   Section 4.1.2.1 and 4.2.2.1 [RFC6749] if the resource owner denies
   the access request or if the request fails for reasons other than a
   missing or invalid redirection URI, the ?AS? redirects the user-agent
   by sending the following HTTP response:

   HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: https://client.example.com/
   cb?error=access_denied

2.1.  Abuse: The Authorization Server As Open Redirector

   As described in [RFC6819] an attacker could utilize a user's trust in
   an ?AS? to launch a phishing attack.  The attack described here
   though is not mitigated using the countermeasures listed in
   [RFC6819].  In this scenario the attacker:

   o  Performs a client registration as per the core specification
      [RFC6749].  The provided redirection URI is a malicious one e.g.
      https://attacker.com (namely the one where the victim's user agent
      will land without any validation)


   o  Prepare a forged URI using the assumption that the ?AS? complies
      with the OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749].  In particular with
      the ?AS?  Error Response described in the previous section (
      Section 2 ).  As an example he can use a wrong or not existing
      scope e.g.

      https://AUTHORIZATION_SERVER/authorize?response_type=code&client_i
      d=s6BhdRkqt3&state=xyz&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fattacker%2Ecom&s
      cope=INVALID_SCOPE


   o  Attempt the pishing attack trying to have the victim clicking the
      forged URI prepared on the previous step.  Should the attack
      succeeds the victim's user agent is redirected to
      https://attacker.com (all with any user interaction) The HTTP



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      referer header will be set to the AS domain perhaps allowing
      manipulation of the user.

2.2.  Security Compromise: The Authorization Server As Open Redirector

   The attacker can use a redirect error redirection to intercept
   redirect based protocol messages via the Referer header and URI
   fragment.  In this scenario the attacker:

   o  Performs a registration of a malicious client as per the core
      specification [RFC6749].  The provided redirection URI is a
      malicious one e.g.  https://attacker.com (This URI will capture
      the fragment and referer header sent as part of the error)


   o  Creates a invalid Authentication request URI for the malicious
      client.  As an example he can use a wrong or not existing scope
      e.g.

      https://AUTHORIZATION_SERVER/authorize?response_type=code&client_i
      d=malicious_client&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fattacker%2Ecom&scope
      =INVALID_SCOPE


   o  If the AS supports sticky grants (not re-prompting for consent
      based on a previous grant) a valid authentication request for the
      user may also be used to trigger a 30x redirect.


   o  Performs a OAuth Authorization request using the invalid
      Authorization request as the redirect_uri.  This works if the AS
      is pattern matching redirect_uri and has a public client that
      shares the same domain as the AS.

   (line breaks for display only)

   https://AUTHORIZATION_SERVER/authorize?response_type=token
   &client_id=good-client&scope=VALID_SCOPE
   &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2AUTHORIZATION_SERVER%Fauthorize
   %3Fresponse_type%3Dcode
   %26client_id%3Dattacker-client-id
   %26scope%3DINVALID_SCOPE
   %26redirect_uri%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fattacker.com

                                 Figure 1

   o  Receive the response redirected to https://attacker.Com




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   The legitimate OAuth Authorization response will include an access
   token in the URI fragment.

   Most web browsers will append the fragment to the URI sent in the
   location header of a 302 response if no fragment is included in the
   location URI.

   If the Authorization request is code instead of token, the same
   technique is used, but the code is leaked by the browser in the
   referer header rather than the fragment.

   This causes the access token from a successful authorization to be
   leaked across the redirect to the malicious client.  This is due to
   browser behaviour and not because the AS has included any information
   in the redirect URI other than the error code.

   Protocols other than OAuth may be particularly vulnerable to this if
   they are only verifying the domain of the redirect.  Performing exact
   redirect URI matching in OAuth will protect the AS, but not other
   protocols.

   It should be noted that a legitimate OAuth client registered with a
   AS might be compromised and used as a redirect target by an attacker,
   perhaps without the knowledge of the client site.  This increases a
   the attack surface for a ?AS?.

2.3.  Mitigation

   In order to defend against the attacks described in Section 2.1 and
   Section 2.2 the ?AS? can either:

   o  Respond with an HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code.


   o  Perform a redirect to an intermediate URI under the control of the
      AS to clear referer information in the browser that may contain
      security token information.  This page SHOULD provide notice to
      the resource owner that an error occurred, and request permission
      to redirect them to an external site.

      If redirected, a fragment "#" MUST be appended to the error
      redirect URI.  This prevents the browser from reattaching the
      fragment from a previous URI to the new location URI.

      Some

   When redirecting via 30x a Content Security Policy header SHOULD be
   added:



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   Content-Security-Policy: referrer origin;

                                 Figure 2

   When redirecting via a form post the following tag SHOULD be
   included:

   <meta name="referrer" content="origin"/>

                                 Figure 3

   Only newer browsers support these headders, so users with older
   browsers will be vulnerable to leaking referer information unless a
   intermediate redirect is used.s

3.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank all the people that partecipated to the
   discussion, namely Bill Burke, Hans Zandbelt, Justin P.  Richer, Phil
   Hunt, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Sergey Beryozkin.

4.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

   [RFC6819]  Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
              Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.

Appendix A.  Document History

   [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]

   -01

   o  Added information on HTTP headders to include to set referrer to
      origin

   -00




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   o  Wrote the first draft.

   o  Changed Document name to conform to WG naming convention

   o  Added Section on redirect leaking security information

   o  Added Terminology section

   o  fixed file name

   o  cleaned up mitigations a bit

Authors' Addresses

   John Bradley (editor)
   Ping Identity

   Phone: +1 202-630-5272
   Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
   URI:   http://www.thread-safe.com/


   Antonio Sanso
   Adobe Systems

   Email: asanso@adobe.com


   Hannes Tschofenig

   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
   URI:   http://www.tschofenig.priv.at



















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