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Versions: (draft-campbell-oauth-resource-indicators) 00

OAuth Working Group                                          B. Campbell
Internet-Draft                                                J. Bradley
Intended status: Standards Track                           Ping Identity
Expires: February 4, 2019                                  H. Tschofenig
                                                             Arm Limited
                                                          August 3, 2018


                   Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0
                draft-ietf-oauth-resource-indicators-00

Abstract

   This straw-man specification defines an extension to The OAuth 2.0
   Authorization Framework that enables the client and authorization
   server to more explicitly to communicate about the protected
   resource(s) to be accessed.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 4, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of




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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Resource Parameter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  OAuth Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.1.  Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  OAuth Extensions Error Registration . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.1.  Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix B.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   Several years of deployment and implementation experience with OAuth
   2.0 [RFC6749] has uncovered a need, in some circumstances, for the
   client to explicitly signal to the authorization sever where it
   intends to use the access token it is requesting.

   Knowing which resource server will process the access token enables
   the authorization server to construct the token as necessary for that
   entity.  Properly encrypting the token (or content within the token)
   to a particular resource server, for example, requires knowing which
   resource server will receive and decrypt the token.  Furthermore,
   various resource servers oftentimes have different requirements with
   respect to the data contained in, or referenced by, the token and
   knowing the resource server where the client intends to use the s
   token allows the the authorization server to mint the token
   accordingly.

   Specific knowledge of the intended recipient(s) of the access token
   also helps facilitate improved security characteristics of the token
   itself.  Bearer tokens, currently the only defined type of OAuth
   access token, allow any party in possession of a token to get access
   to the associated resources.  To prevent misuse, two important
   security assumptions must hold: bearer tokens must be protected from
   disclosure in storage and in transit and the access token must only
   be valid for use at a specific resource server and for a specific



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   scope.  When the authorization server is informed of the resource
   server that will process the access token, it can restrict the
   intended audience of that token such that it cannot be used at other
   resource servers.  Section 5.2 of OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework:
   Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750] prescribes including the token's
   intended recipients within the token to prevent token redirect.

   Scope, from Section 3.3 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], sometimes is
   overloaded to convey the location or identity of the resource server,
   however, doing so isn't always feasible or desirable.  Scope is
   typically about what access is being requested rather than where that
   access will be redeemed (e.g. "email", "user:follow", "user_photos",
   and "channels:read" are a small sample of scope values in use).

   A means for the client to signal to the authorization sever where it
   intends to use the access token it's requesting is important and
   useful.  A number of implementations and deployments of OAuth 2.0
   have already employed proprietary parameters toward that end.  This
   specification aims to provide a standardized and interoperable
   alternative to the proprietary approaches going forward.

1.1.  Requirements Notation and Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
   2119 [RFC2119].

1.2.  Terminology

   This specification uses the terms "access token", "refresh token",
   "authorization server", "resource server", "authorization endpoint",
   "authorization request", "authorization response", "token endpoint",
   "grant type", "access token request", "access token response", and
   "client" defined by The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749].

2.  Resource Parameter

   The client may indicate the resource server(s) for which it is
   requesting an access token by including the following parameter in
   the request.

   resource
      OPTIONAL.  The value of the "resource" parameter indicates a
      resource server where the requested access token will be used.  It
      MUST be an absolute URI, as specified by Section 4.3 of[RFC3986],
      and MUST NOT include a query or fragment component.  If the
      authorization server fails to parse the provided value or does not



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      consider the resource server acceptable, it MUST reject the
      request and provide an error response with the error code
      "invalid_resource".  Multiple "resource" parameters may be used to
      indicate that the issued token is intended to be used at multiple
      resource servers.

   When an access token will be returned from the authorization
   endpoint, the "resource" parameter is used in the authorization
   request to the authorization endpoint as defined in Section 4.2.1 of
   OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].  An example of an authorization request where
   the client tells the authorization server that it wants a token for
   use at "https://rs.example.com/" is shown in Figure 1 below.

     GET /as/authorization.oauth2?response_type=token
        &client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=laeb
        &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
        &resource=https%3A%2F%2Frs.example.com%2F HTTP/1.1
     Host: authorization-server.example.com

                   Figure 1: Protected Resource Request

   When the access token is returned from the token endpoint, the
   request parameter is included in the token request to the token
   endpoint.  Sections 4.1.1, 4.3.1, 4.4.2, 4.5 and 6 of OAuth 2.0
   [RFC6749] define requests to the token endpoint with different grant
   types.  An example of a token request, using a refresh token, where
   the client tells the authorization server that it wants a token for
   use at "https://rs.example.com/" is shown in Figure 2 below.

     POST /as/token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
     Host: authorization-server.example.com
     Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzpoc3FFelFsVW9IQUU5cHg0RlNyNHlJ
     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

     grant_type=refresh_token
     &refresh_token=4LTC8lb0acc6Oy4esc1Nk9BWC0imAwH
     &resource=https%3A%2F%2Frs.example.com%2F

                   Figure 2: Protected Resource Request

   The "resource" parameter indicates the physical location of resource
   server, typically as an https URL, where the client intends to use
   the requested access token.  This enables the authorization server to
   apply policy as appropriate for the resource, such as determining the
   type and content of the token to be issued, if and how the token is
   to be encrypted, and applying appropriate audience restrictions to
   the token.




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   The client SHOULD provide the most specific URI that it can for the
   set of resources or API it intends to access.  In practice a client
   will know a base URI for the resource server application that it
   interacts with, which is appropriate to use as the value of the
   "resource" parameter.  The client SHOULD use the base URI for the API
   unless specific knowledge of resource server dictates the client use
   a shorter path.  For example, the value "https://rs.example.com/"
   would be used for a resource server that is the exclusive application
   on that host, however, if the resource server is one of many
   applications on that host, something like "https://rs.example.com/
   application/" would be used.  Another example, for an API like SCIM
   [RFC7644] that has multiple endpoints such as
   "https://rs.example.com/scim/Users", "https://rs.example.com/scim/
   Groups", and "https://rs.example.com/scim/Schemas" The client should
   use "https://rs.example.com/scim/" as the resource so that the issued
   access token is valid for all the endpoints of the SCIM API.

   The authorization server SHOULD audience restrict the access token to
   the resource server(s) indicated by the "resource" parameter.
   Audience restrictions can be communicated in JSON Web Tokens
   [RFC7519] with the "aud" claim and the top-level member of the same
   name provides the audience restriction information in a Token
   Introspection [RFC7662] response.  The authorization server may use
   the exact "resource" value as the audience or it may map from that
   value to a more general URI or abstract identifier for the resource
   server.

   The requested resource pertains to the access token that is the
   expected result of the request and not to the underlying access
   granted by the resource owner.

3.  IANA Considerations

3.1.  OAuth Parameters Registration

   This specification registers the following value in the IANA "OAuth
   Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by
   [RFC6749].

3.1.1.  Registry Contents

   o  Parameter name: resource
   o  Parameter usage location: authorization request, token request
   o  Change controller: IESG
   o  Specification document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]






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3.2.  OAuth Extensions Error Registration

   This specification registers the following error in the IANA "OAuth
   Extensions Error Registry" [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by
   [RFC6749].

3.2.1.  Registry Contents

   o  Error name: invalid_resource
   o  Error usage location: implicit grant error response, token error
      response
   o  Related protocol extension: resource parameter
   o  Change controller: IESG
   o  Specification document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]

4.  Security Considerations

   An access token that is audience restricted to a resource server,
   which obtains the token legitimately, cannot be used to access
   resources on behalf of the resource owner at other resource servers.
   The "resource" parameter enables a client to indicate the resource
   server where the requested access token will be used, which in turn
   enables the authorization server to apply the appropriate audience
   restrictions to the token.

   Some Resource servers may host user content or be multi-tenant.  In
   order to avoid attacks that might confuse a client into sending a AT
   to a user controlled resource it is important to use the a specific
   resource URI including path and not use just a host with no path.
   This will cause any AT issued for accessing the user controlled
   resource to have a invalid audience if replayed against the
   legitimate resource API.

   Although multiple occurrences of the "resource" parameter may be
   included in a request, using only a single "resource" parameter is
   encouraged.  A bearer token that has multiple intended recipients
   (audiences) can be used by any one of those recipients at any other.
   Thus, a high degree of trust between the involved parties is needed
   when using access tokens with multiple audiences.  Furthermore an
   authorization server may be unwilling or unable to fulfill a token
   request with multiple resources.

   [[TODO: I continue to question the value of allowing multiple
   resources vs the functional and security complexity that comes with
   doing so.  Writing the preceding paragraph just underscores that
   concern.  So just noting it here.]]





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5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
              IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

5.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.draft-tschofenig-oauth-audience]
              Tschofenig, H., "OAuth 2.0: Audience Information", draft-
              tschofenig-oauth-audience (work in progress), February
              2013.

   [RFC6750]  Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
              Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
              and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
              Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
              September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.

   [RFC7662]  Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
              RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.





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Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   The following individuals contributed to discussions relating to and
   giving rise to this draft specification:

   George Fletcher, Hans Zandbelt, Justin Richer, Michael Jones, Nat
   Sakimura, Phil Hunt, Sergey Beryozkin, and Anthony "no go" Nadalin.

Appendix B.  Document History

   [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]

   -00

   o  First version of the working group document.  A replica of draft-
      campbell-oauth-resource-indicators-02.

Authors' Addresses

   Brian Campbell
   Ping Identity

   Email: brian.d.campbell@gmail.com


   John Bradley
   Ping Identity

   Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com


   Hannes Tschofenig
   Arm Limited

   Email: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
















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