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Network Working Group E. Hammer-Lahav, Ed.
Internet-Draft Yahoo!
Intended status: Standards Track D. Recordon
Expires: December 13, 2010 Facebook
D. Hardt
Microsoft
June 11, 2010
The OAuth 2.0 Protocol
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-07
Abstract
This specification describes the OAuth 2.0 protocol. OAuth provides
a method for making authenticated HTTP requests using a token - an
string used to denote an access grant with specific scope, duration,
and other attributes. Tokens are issued to third-party clients by an
authorization server with the approval of the resource owner. OAuth
defines multiple flows for obtaining a token to support a wide range
of client types and user experience.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 13, 2010.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Client Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1. Web Server Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2. User-Agent Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3. Username and Password Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4. Client Credentials Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5. Assertion Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6. Native Application Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3. Client Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Establishing Resource Owner Authorization . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1. Verification Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1.1. End-User Authorization Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.2. Resource Owner Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3. Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Obtaining an Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1. Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1.1. Verification Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1.2. Resource Owner Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1.3. Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1.4. Refresh Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1.5. Access Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.1.6. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6. Accessing a Protected Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.1. The Authorization Request Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2. URI Query Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.3. Form-Encoded Body Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7. Identifying a Protected Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.1. The WWW-Authenticate Response Header . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix C. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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1. Introduction
With the increasing use of distributed web services and cloud
computing, third-party applications require access to server-hosted
resources. These resources are usually protected and require
authentication using the resource owner's credentials (typically a
username and password). In the traditional client-server
authentication model, a client accessing a protected resource on a
server presents the resource owner's credentials in order to
authenticate and gain access.
Resource owners should not be required to share their credentials
when granting third-party applications access to their protected
resources. They should also have the ability to restrict access to a
limited subset of the resources they control, to limit access
duration, or to limit access to the HTTP methods supported by these
resources.
OAuth provides a method for making authenticated HTTP requests using
a token - an identifier used to denote an access grant with specific
scope, duration, and other attributes. Tokens are issued to third-
party clients by an authorization server with the approval of the
resource owner. Instead of sharing their credentials with the
client, resource owners grant access by authenticating directly with
the authorization server which in turn issues a token to the client.
The client uses the token to authenticate with the resource server
and gain access.
For example, a web user (resource owner) can grant a printing service
(client) access to her protected photos stored at a photo sharing
service (resource server), without sharing her username and password
with the printing service. Instead, she authenticates directly with
the photo sharing service (authorization server) which issues the
printing service delegation-specific credentials (token).
This specification defines the use of OAuth over HTTP [RFC2616] (or
HTTP over TLS as defined by [RFC2818]). Other specifications may
extend it for use with other transport protocols.
1.1. Terminology
resource server
An HTTP [RFC2616] server capable of accepting authenticated
resource requests using the OAuth protocol.
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protected resource
An access-restricted resource which can be obtained from a
resource server using an OAuth-authenticated request.
client
An HTTP client capable of making authenticated requests for
protected resources using the OAuth protocol.
resource owner
An entity capable of granting access to a protected resource.
end-user
A human resource owner.
token
A string representing an access grant issued to the client.
The string is usually opaque to the client and can self-contain
the authorization information in a verifiable manner (i.e.
signed), or denotes an identifier used to retrieve the
authorization information.
access token
A token used by the client to make authenticated requests on
behalf of the resource owner. Access tokens represent a
specific scope, duration, and other access attributes granted
by the resource owner and enforced by the resource and
authorization servers.
refresh token
A token used by the client to replace an expired access token
with a new access token without having to involve the resource
owner. A refresh token is used when the access token is valid
for a shorter time period than the duration of the access grant
granted by the resource owner.
authorization server
An HTTP server capable of issuing tokens after successfully
authenticating the resource owner and obtaining authorization.
The authorization server may be the same server as the resource
server, or a separate entity.
end-user authorization endpoint
The authorization server's HTTP endpoint capable of
authenticating the end-user and obtaining authorization.
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token endpoint
The authorization server's HTTP endpoint capable of issuing
tokens and refreshing expired tokens.
client identifier
An unique identifier issued to the client to identify itself to
the authorization server. Client identifiers may have a
matching secret.
1.2. Overview
Clients interact with a protected resource, first by requesting
access (which is granted in the form of an access token) from the
authorization server, and then by authenticating with the resource
server by presenting the access token. Figure 1 demonstrates the
flow between the client and authorization server (A, B), and the flow
between the client and resource server (C, D), when the client is
acting autonomously (the client is also the resource owner).
+--------+ +---------------+
| |--(A)------ Credentials --------->| Authorization |
| | | Server |
| |<-(B)------ Access Token ---------| |
| | (w/ Optional Refresh Token) +---------------+
| Client |
| | HTTP Request +---------------+
| |--(C)--- with Access Token ------>| Resource |
| | | Server |
| |<-(D)------ HTTP Response --------| |
+--------+ +---------------+
Figure 1: Generic Client-Server Flow
Access token strings can use any internal structure agreed upon
between the authorization server and the resource server, but their
structure is opaque to the client. Since the access token provides
the client access to the protected resource for the life of the
access token (or until revoked), the authorization server should
issue access tokens which expire within an appropriate time, usually
much shorter than the duration of the access grant.
When an access token expires, the client can request a new access
token from the authorization server by presenting its credentials
again (Figure 1), or by using the refresh token (if issued with the
access token) as shown in Figure 2. Once an expired access token has
been replaced with a new access token (A, B), the client uses the new
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access token as before (C, D).
+--------+ +---------------+
| |--(A)------ Refresh Token ------->| Authorization |
| | | Server |
| |<-(B)------ Access Token ---------| |
| | +---------------+
| Client |
| | HTTP Request +---------------+
| |--(C)--- with Access Token ------>| Resource |
| | | Server |
| |<-(D)----- HTTP Response ---------| |
+--------+ +---------------+
Figure 2: Refreshing an Access Token
This specification defines a number of authorization flows to support
different client types and scenarios. These authorization flows can
be separated into three groups: user delegation flows, direct
credentials flows, and autonomous flows.
Additional authorization flows may be defined by other specifications
to cover different scenarios and client types.
User delegation flows are used to grant client access to protected
resources by the end-user without sharing the end-user credentials
(e.g. a username and password) with the client. Instead, the end-
user authenticates directly with the authorization server, and grants
client access to its protected resources. The user delegation flows
defined by this specifications are:
o Web Server Flow - This flow is optimized for clients that are part
of a web server application, accessible via HTTP requests. This
flow is described in Section 2.1.
o User-Agent Flow - This flow is designed for clients running inside
a user-agent (typically a web browser). This flow is described in
Section 2.2.
Direct credentials flows enable clients to obtain an access token
with a single request using the client credentials or end-user
credentials without seeking additional resource owner authorization.
The direct credentials flows defined by this specification are:
o Username and Password Flow - This flow is used in cases where the
end-user trusts the client to handle its credentials but it is
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still undesirable for the client to store the end-user's username
and password. This flow is only suitable when there is a high
degree of trust between the end-user and the client. This flow is
described in Section 2.3.
o Client Credentials Flow - The client uses its credentials to
obtain an access token. This flow is described in Section 2.4.
Autonomous flows enable clients to utilize existing trust
relationships or different authorization constructs to obtain an
access token. They provide a bridge between OAuth and other trust
frameworks. The autonomous authorization flow defined by this
specifications is:
o Assertion Flow - The client presents an assertion such as a SAML
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] assertion to the authorization server in
exchange for an access token. This flow is described in
Section 2.5.
The sizes of tokens and other values received from the authorization
server, are left undefined by this specification. Clients should
avoid making assumptions about value sizes. Servers should document
the expected size of any value they issue.
1.3. Example
[[ Todo ]]
1.4. Notational Conventions
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
This document uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging]. Additionally, the realm and auth-
param rules are included from [RFC2617].
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
are case sensitive.
2. Client Flows
2.1. Web Server Flow
The web server flow is a user delegation flow suitable for clients
capable of interacting with the end-user's user-agent (typically a
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web browser) and capable of receiving incoming requests from the
authorization server (capable of acting as an HTTP server).
+----------+ Client Identifier +---------------+
| -+----(A)-- & Redirect URI ------->| |
| End-user | | Authorization |
| at |<---(B)-- User authenticates --->| Server |
| Browser | | |
| -+----(C)-- Verification Code ----<| |
+-|----|---+ +---------------+
| | ^ v
(A) (C) | |
| | | |
^ v | |
+---------+ | |
| |>---(D)-- Client Credentials, --------' |
| Web | Verification Code, |
| Client | & Redirect URI |
| | |
| |<---(E)------- Access Token -----------------'
+---------+ (w/ Optional Refresh Token)
Figure 3: Web Server Flow
The web server flow illustrated in Figure 3 includes the following
steps:
(A) The web client initiates the flow by redirecting the end-user's
user-agent to the end-user authorization endpoint as described
in Section 4.1.1 using client type "web_server". The client
includes its client identifier, requested scope, local state,
and a redirect URI to which the authorization server will send
the end-user back once authorization is granted (or denied).
(B) The authorization server authenticates the end-user (via the
user-agent) and establishes whether the end-user grants or
denies the client's access request.
(C) Assuming the end-user granted access, the authorization server
redirects the user-agent back to the client to the redirection
URI provided earlier. The authorization includes a verification
code for the client to use to obtain an access token.
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(D) The client requests an access token from the authorization
server by authenticating and including the verification code
received in the previous step as described in Section 5.1.
(E) The authorization server validates the client credentials and
the verification code and responds back with the access token.
2.2. User-Agent Flow
The user-agent flow is a user delegation flow suitable for client
applications residing in a user-agent, typically implemented in a
browser using a scripting language such as JavaScript. These clients
cannot keep client secrets confidential and the authentication of the
client is based on the user-agent's same-origin policy.
Unlike other flows in which the client makes separate authorization
and access token requests, the client received the access token as a
result of the authorization request in the form of an HTTP
redirection. The client requests the authorization server to
redirect the user-agent to another web server or local resource
accessible to the browser which is capable of extracting the access
token from the response and passing it to the client.
This user-agent flow does not utilize the client secret since the
client executables reside on the end-user's computer or device which
makes the client secret accessible and exploitable. Because the
access token is encoded into the redirection URI, it may be exposed
to the end-user and other applications residing on the computer or
device.
+----------+ Client Identifier +----------------+
| |>---(A)-- & Redirection URI --->| |
| | | |
End <--+ - - - +----(B)-- User authenticates -->| Authorization |
User | | | Server |
| |<---(C)-- Redirect URI --------<| |
| Client | with Access Token | |
| in | (w/ Optional Refresh Token) +----------------+
| Browser | in Fragment
| | +----------------+
| |>---(D)-- Redirect URI -------->| |
| | without Fragment | Web Server |
| | | with Client |
| (F) |<---(E)-- Web Page with -------<| Resource |
| Access | Script | |
| Token | +----------------+
+----------+
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Figure 4: User-Agent Flow
The user-agent flow illustrated in Figure 4 includes the following
steps:
(A) The client sends the user-agent to the end-user authorization
endpoint as described in Section 4.1.1 using client type
"user-agent". The client includes its client identifier,
requested scope, local state, and a redirect URI to which the
authorization server will send the end-user back once
authorization is granted (or denied).
(B) The authorization server authenticates the end-user (via the
user-agent) and establishes whether the end-user grants or
denies the client's access request.
(C) Assuming the end-user granted access, the authorization server
redirects the user-agent to the redirection URI provided
earlier. The redirection URI includes the access token (and an
optional verification code) in the URI fragment.
(D) The user-agent follows the redirection instructions by making an
HTTP "GET" request to the web server which does not include the
fragment. The user-agent retains the fragment information
locally. The user-agent MUST NOT include the fragment component
with the request.
(E) The web server returns a web page (typically an HTML page with
an embedded script) capable of accessing the full redirection
URI including the fragment retained by the user-agent, and
extracting the access token (and other parameters) contained in
the fragment.
(F) The user-agent executes the script provided by the web server
which extracts the access token and passes it to the client. If
a verification code was issued, the client can pass it to a web
server component to obtain another access token for additional
server-based protected resources interaction.
2.3. Username and Password Flow
The username and password flow is suitable for clients capable of
asking end-users for their usernames and passwords. It is also used
to migrate existing clients using direct authentication schemes such
as HTTP Basic or Digest authentication to OAuth by converting the
end-user credentials stored with tokens.
However, unlike the HTTP Basic authentication scheme defined in
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[RFC2617], the end-user's credentials are used in a single request
and are exchanged for an access token and refresh token which
eliminates the client need to store them for future use.
The methods through which the client prompts end users for their
usernames and passwords is beyond the scope of this specification.
The client MUST discard the usernames and passwords once an access
token has been obtained.
This flow is suitable in cases where the end-user already has a trust
relationship with the client, such as its computer operating system
or highly privileged applications. Authorization servers should take
special care when enabling the username and password flow, and only
when other delegation flows are not viable.
End-user
v
:
(A)
:
v
+--------+ +---------------+
| | Client Credentials | |
| |>--(B)--- & User Credentials ---->| Authorization |
| Client | | Server |
| |<--(C)---- Access Token ---------<| |
| | (w/ Optional Refresh Token) | |
+--------+ +---------------+
Figure 5: Username and Password Flow
The username and password flow illustrated in Figure 5 includes the
following steps:
(A) The end-user provides the client with its username and password.
(B) The client requests an access token from the authorization
server by authenticating and including the end-user's username
and password, and desired scope as described in Section 5.1.
(C) The authorization server validates the end-user credentials and
the client credentials and issues an access token.
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2.4. Client Credentials Flow
The client credentials flow is used when the client acts on behalf of
itself (the client is the resource owner), or when the client
credentials are used to obtain an access token representing a
previously established access authorization. The client secret is
assumed to be high-entropy since it is not designed to be memorized
by an end-user.
+--------+ +---------------+
| | | |
| |>--(A)--- Client Credentials ---->| Authorization |
| Client | | Server |
| |<--(B)---- Access Token ---------<| |
| | (w/ Optional Refresh Token) | |
+--------+ +---------------+
Figure 6: Client Credentials Flow
The client credential flow illustrated in Figure 6 includes the
following steps:
(A) The client requests an access token from the authorization
server by authenticating and including the desired scope as
described in Section 5.1. No additional authorization grant
information is needed.
(B) The authorization server validates the client credentials and
issues an access token.
2.5. Assertion Flow
The assertion flow is used when a client wishes to exchange an
existing security token or assertion for an access token. This flow
is suitable when the client is the resource owner or is acting on
behalf of the resource owner (based on the content of the assertion
used).
The assertion flow requires the client to obtain a assertion (such as
a SAML [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] assertion) from an assertion issuer
or to self-issue an assertion prior to initiating the flow. The
assertion format, the process by which the assertion is obtained, and
the method of validating the assertion are defined by the assertion
issuer and the authorization server, and are beyond the scope of this
specification.
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+--------+ +---------------+
| | | |
| |>--(A)------ Assertion ---------->| Authorization |
| Client | | Server |
| |<--(B)---- Access Token ---------<| |
| | | |
+--------+ +---------------+
Figure 7: Assertion Flow
The assertion flow illustrated in Figure 7 includes the following
steps:
(A) The client requests an access token from the authorization
server by authenticating and including the assertion, assertion
type, and desired scope as described in Section 5.1.
(B) The authorization server validates the assertion and issues an
access token.
2.6. Native Application Considerations
Native application are clients running as native code on the end-
user's computer or device (i.e. executing outside a browser or as a
desktop program). These clients are often capable of interacting
with (or embedding) the end-user's user-agent but are incapable of
receiving callback requests from the server (incapable of acting as
an HTTP server).
Native application clients can utilize many of the flows defined in
this specification with little or no changes. For example:
o Launch an external user-agent and have it redirect back to the
client using a custom URI scheme. This works with the web server
flow and user-agent flow.
o Launch an external user-agent and poll for changes to the window
title. This works with the web server flow with a server-hosted
custom redirect result page that puts the verification code in the
title.
o Use an embedded user-agent and obtain the redirection URI. This
works with the web server flow and user-agent flow.
o Use the username and password flow and prompt the end-users for
their credentials. This is generally discouraged as it hands the
end-user's password directly to the 3rd party and may not work
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with some authentication schemes.
When choosing between launching an external browser and an embedded
user-agent, developers should consider the following:
o External user-agents may improve completion rate as the end-user
may already be logged-in and not have to re-authenticate.
o Embedded user-agents often offer a better end-user flow, as they
remove the need to switch context and open new windows.
o Embedded user-agents are less secure because users are
authenticating in unidentified window without access to the
protections offered by many user-agents.
3. Client Credentials
When requesting access from the authorization server, the client
identifies itself using a set of client credentials. The client
credentials include a client identifier and an OPTIONAL symmetric
shared secret. The means through which the client obtains these
credentials are beyond the scope of this specification, but usually
involve registration with the authorization server.
The client identifier is used by the authorization server to
establish the identity of the client for the purpose of presenting
information to the resource owner prior to granting access, as well
as for providing different service levels to different clients. They
can also be used to block unauthorized clients from requesting
access.
Due to the nature of some clients, authorization servers SHOULD NOT
make assumptions about the confidentiality of client credentials
without establishing trust with the client operator. Authorization
servers SHOULD NOT issue client secrets to clients incapable of
keeping their secrets confidential.
3.1. Client Authentication
The token endpoint requires the client to authenticate itself to the
authorization server. This is done by including the client
identifier (and optional secret) in the request. The client
identifier and secret are included in the request using two request
parameters: "client_id" and "client_secret".
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For example (line breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
type=web_server&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&
client_secret=gX1fBat3bV&code=i1WsRn1uB1&
redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
The client MAY include the client credentials using an HTTP
authentication scheme which supports authenticating using a username
and password, instead of using the "client_id" and "client_secret"
request parameters. Including the client credentials using an HTTP
authentication scheme fulfills the requirements of including the
parameters as defined by the various flows.
The client MUST NOT include the client credentials using more than
one mechanism. If more than one mechanism is used, regardless if the
credentials are identical, the server MUST reply with an HTTP 400
status code (Bad Request) and include the "multiple-credentials"
error message.
The authorization server MUST accept the client credentials using
both the request parameters, and the HTTP Basic authentication scheme
as defined in [RFC2617]. The authorization server MAY support
additional HTTP authentication schemes.
For example (line breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
type=web_server&code=i1WsRn1uB1&
redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
4. Establishing Resource Owner Authorization
Before the client can obtain an access token, it must first attain
authorization from the resource owner. The methods through which the
client attains authorization are codified in the various
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authorization flows defined in Section 5, and depends on the client
type and its trust relationship with the resource owner.
Resource owner authorization can be expressed in multiple ways: a
verification code obtained through direct interaction with an end-
user, the resource owner credentials (or the client credentials when
the client is also the resource owner) obtained through a trust
relationship with the resource owner, or an assertion obtained
through means beyond the scope of this specification.
4.1. Verification Code
When an end-user is involved, the client attains authorization in the
form of a verification code by sending the end-user to the
authorization server to review and grant the request. The client
sends the end-user by directing the end-user's user-agent to the
authorization server's end-user authorization endpoint.
4.1.1. End-User Authorization Endpoint
When directed to the end-user authorization endpoint, the end-user
first authenticates with the authorization server, and then grants or
denies the access request. The way in which the authorization server
authenticates the end-user (e.g. username and password login, OpenID,
session cookies) and in which the authorization server obtains the
end-user's authorization, including whether it uses a secure channel
such as TLS, is beyond the scope of this specification. However, the
authorization server MUST first verify the identity of the end-user.
The location of the end-user authorization endpoint can be found in
the service documentation, or can be obtained by using [[ OAuth
Discovery ]]. The end-user authorization endpoint URI MAY include a
query component as defined by [RFC3986] section 3, which must be
retained when adding additional query parameters.
Since requests to the end-user authorization endpoint result in user
authentication and the transmission of sensitive information, the
authorization server SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer
mechanism such as TLS when sending requests to the end-user
authorization endpoint.
In order to direct the end-user's user-agent to the authorization
server, the client constructs the request URI by adding the following
parameters to the end-user authorization endpoint URI query component
using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format as defined by
[W3C.REC-html401-19991224]:
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type
REQUIRED. The client type (user-agent or web server).
Determines how the authorization server delivers the
authorization response back to the client. The parameter value
MUST be set to "web_server" or "user_agent".
client_id
REQUIRED. The client identifier as described in Section 3.
redirect_uri
REQUIRED, unless a redirection URI has been established between
the client and authorization server via other means. An
absolute URI to which the authorization server will redirect
the user-agent to when the end-user authorization step is
completed. The authorization server SHOULD require the client
to pre-register their redirection URI. Authorization servers
MAY restrict the redirection URI to not include a query
component as defined by [RFC3986] section 3.
state
OPTIONAL. An opaque value used by the client to maintain state
between the request and callback. The authorization server
includes this value when redirecting the user-agent back to the
client.
scope
OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request expressed as a list
of space-delimited strings. The value of the "scope" parameter
is defined by the authorization server. If the value contains
multiple space-delimited strings, their order does not matter,
and each string adds an additional access range to the
requested scope.
The client directs the end-user to the constructed URI using an HTTP
redirection response, or by other means available to it via the end-
user's user-agent. The request MUST use the HTTP "GET" method.
For example, the client directs the end-user's user-agent to make the
following HTTPS request (line breaks are for display purposes only):
GET /authorize?type=web_server&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&redirect_uri=
https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
If the client has previously registered a redirection URI with the
authorization server, the authorization server MUST verify that the
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redirection URI received matches the registered URI associated with
the client identifier. [[ provide guidance on how to perform matching
]]
The authorization server authenticates the end-user and obtains an
authorization decision (by asking the end-user or by establishing
approval via other means). When a decision has been established, the
authorization server directs the end-user's user-agent to the
provided client redirection URI using an HTTP redirection response,
or by other means available to it via the end-user's user-agent.
4.1.1.1. Authorization Server Response
If the end-user grants the access request, the authorization server
issues an access token, a verification code, or both, and delivers
them to the client by adding the following parameters to the
redirection URI:
code
REQUIRED if the client type is "web_server", otherwise
OPTIONAL. The verification code generated by the authorization
server. The verification code SHOULD expire shortly after it
is issued and allowed for a single use. The verification code
is bound to the client identifier and redirection URI.
access_token
REQUIRED if the client type is "user_agent", otherwise MUST NOT
be included. The access token.
expires_in
OPTIONAL. The duration in seconds of the access token lifetime
if an access token is included.
state
REQUIRED if the "state" parameter was present in the client
authorization request. Set to the exact value received from
the client.
If the end-user denies the access request, the authorization server
informs the client by adding the following parameters to the
redirection URI:
error
REQUIRED. The parameter value MUST be set to "user_denied".
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state
REQUIRED if the "state" parameter was present in the client
authorization request. Set to the exact value received from
the client.
The method in which the authorization server adds the parameter to
the redirection URI is determined by the client type provided by the
client in the authorization request using the "type" parameter.
If the client type is "web_server", the authorization server adds the
parameters to the redirection URI query component using the
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format as defined by
[W3C.REC-html401-19991224].
For example, the authorization server redirects the end-user's user-
agent by sending the following HTTP response:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.com/cb?code=i1WsRn1uB1
If the client type is "user_agent", the authorization server adds the
parameters to the redirection URI fragment component using the
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format as defined by
[W3C.REC-html401-19991224]. [[ replace form-encoded with JSON? ]]
For example, the authorization server redirects the end-user's user-
agent by sending the following HTTP response:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://example.com/rd#access_token=FJQbwq9&expires_in=3600
4.2. Resource Owner Credentials
While OAuth seeks to eliminate the need for resource owners to share
their credentials with the client, possesion of the resource owner
credentials constitute an authorization grant (if supported by the
authorization server). Resource owner credentials should only be
used when there is a high degree of trust between the resource owner
the client.
In cases where the client is also the resource owner, the client
credentials can be used to obtain an access token provisioned for
accessing the client's protected resources.
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4.3. Assertion
Assertions enable the client to utilize existing trust relationships
or different authorization constructs to obtain an access token.
They provide a bridge between OAuth and other trust frameworks. The
authorization grant represented by an assertion depends on the
assertion type, its content, and how it was issued, which are beyond
the scope of this specification.
5. Obtaining an Access Token
The client obtains an access token by authenticating with the
authorization server and presenting its authorization grant.
In many cases it is desirable to issue access tokens with a shorter
lifetime than the duration of the authorization grant. However, it
may be undesirable to require the resource owner to authorize the
request again. Instead, the authorization server issues a refresh
token in addition to the access token. When the access token
expires, the client can request a new access token without involving
the resource owner as long as the authorization grant is still valid.
The token refresh method is described in Section 5.1.4.
5.1. Token Endpoint
After obtaining authorization from the resource owner, clients
request an access token from the authorization server's token
endpoint. When requesting an access token, the client authenticates
with the authorization server and includes the authorization grant
(in the form of a verification code, resource owner credentials, an
assertion, or a refresh token).
The location of the token endpoint can be found in the service
documentation, or can be obtained by using [[ OAuth Discovery ]].
The token endpoint URI MAY include a query component, which must be
retained when adding additional query parameters.
Since requests to the token endpoint result in the transmission of
plain text credentials in the HTTP request and response, the
authorization server MUST require the use of a transport-layer
mechanism when sending requests to the token endpoints. Servers MUST
support TLS 1.2 as defined in [RFC5246] and MAY support addition
mechanisms with equivalent protections.
The client obtains an access token by constructing a token request.
The client constructs the request URI by:
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o Adding its client credentials to the request as described in
Section 3.1. For example, if the client uses a set of basic
client credentials, it adds the "client_id" and "client_secret"
parameters to the request (or uses the HTTP Basic authentication
scheme).
o Adding the authorization grand in the form of a verification code,
resource owner credentials, an assertion, or refresh token. If
the client is acting on behalf of itself (the client is also the
resource owner), no additional information is needed. The
authorization grant is added to the request URI query component
using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format as described
below.
5.1.1. Verification Code
The client includes the verification code using following parameters:
code
REQUIRED. The verification code received from the
authorization server.
redirect_uri
REQUIRED. The redirection URI used in the initial request.
For example, the client makes the following HTTPS request (line
breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&
client_secret=gX1fBat3bV&code=i1WsRn1uB1&
redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
The authorization server MUST verify that the verification code,
client identity, client secret, and redirection URI are all valid and
match its stored association. If the request is valid, the
authorization server issues a successful response as described in
Section 5.1.5.
5.1.2. Resource Owner Credentials
The client includes the resource owner credentials using the
following parameters: [[ add internationalization consideration for
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username and password ]]
username
REQUIRED. The end-user's username.
password
REQUIRED. The end-user's password.
scope
OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request expressed as a list
of space-delimited strings. The value of the "scope" parameter
is defined by the authorization server. If the value contains
multiple space-delimited strings, their order does not matter,
and each string adds an additional access range to the
requested scope.
For example, the client makes the following HTTPS request (line
breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&client_secret=
47HDu8s&username=johndoe&password=A3ddj3w
The authorization server MUST validate the client credentials and
end-user credentials and if valid issues an access token response as
described in Section 5.1.5.
If the client is acting on behalf of itself (the client is also the
resource owner), the client authentication alone suffice and the
"username" and "password" parameters MUST NOT be used.
5.1.3. Assertion
The client includes the assertion using the following parameters:
assertion_type
REQUIRED. The format of the assertion as defined by the
authorization server. The value MUST be an absolute URI.
assertion
REQUIRED. The assertion.
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scope
OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request expressed as a list
of space-delimited strings. The value of the "scope" parameter
is defined by the authorization server. If the value contains
multiple space-delimited strings, their order does not matter,
and each string adds an additional access range to the
requested scope.
For example, the client makes the following HTTPS request (line
breaks are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&client_secret=diejdsks&
assertion_type=urn%3Aoasis%3Anames%sAtc%3ASAML%3A2.0%3Aassertion&
assertion=PHNhbWxwOl...[ommited for brevity]...ZT4%3D
The authorization server MUST validate the assertion and if valid
issues an access token response as described in Section 5.1.5. The
authorization server SHOULD NOT issue a refresh token.
Authorization servers SHOULD issue access tokens with a limited
lifetime and require clients to refresh them by requesting a new
access token using the same assertion if it is still valid.
Otherwise the client MUST obtain a new valid assertion.
5.1.4. Refresh Token
Token refresh is used when the lifetime of an access token is shorter
than the lifetime of the authorization grant. It enables the client
to obtain a new access token without having to go through the
authorization flow again or involve the resource owner.
The client includes the refresh token using the following parameters:
refresh_token
REQUIRED. The refresh token associated with the access token
to be refreshed.
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For example, the client makes the following HTTPS request (line break
are for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&client_secret=8eSEIpnqmM
&refresh_token=n4E9O119d
The authorization server MUST verify the client credentials, the
validity of the refresh token, and that the resource owner's
authorization is still valid. If the request is valid, the
authorization server issues an access token response as described in
Section 5.1.5. The authorization server MAY issue a new refresh
token in which case the client MUST NOT use the previous refresh
token and replace it with the newly issued refresh token.
5.1.5. Access Token Response
After receiving and verifying a valid and authorized access token
request from the client, the authorization server issues the access
token and optional refresh token, and constructs the response by
adding the following parameters to the entity body of the HTTP
response with a 200 status code (OK):
The token response contains the following parameters:
access_token
REQUIRED. The access token issued by the authorization server.
expires_in
OPTIONAL. The duration in seconds of the access token
lifetime.
refresh_token
OPTIONAL. The refresh token used to obtain new access tokens
using the same end-user access grant as described in
Section 5.1.4.
scope
OPTIONAL. The scope of the access token as a list of space-
delimited strings. The value of the "scope" parameter is
defined by the authorization server. If the value contains
multiple space-delimited strings, their order does not matter,
and each string adds an additional access range to the
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requested scope.
The parameters are including in the entity body of the HTTP response
using the "application/json" media type as defined by [RFC4627]. The
parameters are serialized into a JSON structure by adding each
parameter at the highest structure level. Parameter names and string
values are included as JSON strings. Numerical values are included
as JSON numbers.
The authorization server MUST include the HTTP "Cache-Control"
response header field with a value of "no-store" in any response
containing tokens, secrets, or other sensitive information.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"access_token":"SlAV32hkKG",
"expires_in":3600,
"refresh_token":"8xLOxBtZp8"
}
5.1.6. Error Response
If the token request is invalid or unauthorized, the authorization
server constructs the response by adding the following parameter to
the entity body of the HTTP response with a a 400 status code (Bad
Request) using the "application/json" media type:
error
REQUIRED. The error code as described in Section 5.1.6.1.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"error":"incorrect_client_credentials"
}
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5.1.6.1. Error Codes
[[ expalain each error code: ]]
o "redirect_uri_mismatch"
o "bad_verification_code"
o "incorrect_client_credentials"
o "unauthorized_client'" - The client is not permitted to use this
authorization grant type.
o "invalid_assertion"
o "unknown_format"
o "authorization_expired"
6. Accessing a Protected Resource
Clients access protected resources by presenting an access token to
the resource server.
For example:
GET /resource HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Token token="vF9dft4qmT"
Access tokens act as bearer tokens, where the token string acts as a
shared symmetric secret. This requires treating the access token
with the same care as other secrets (e.g. end-user passwords).
Access tokens SHOULD NOT be sent in the clear over an insecure
channel.
However, when it is necessary to transmit bearer tokens in the clear
without a secure channel, authorization servers SHOULD issue access
tokens with limited scope and lifetime to reduce the potential risk
from a compromised access token.
Clients SHOULD NOT make authenticated requests with an access token
to unfamiliar resource servers, especially when using bearer tokens,
regardless of the presence of a secure channel.
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The methods used by the resource server to validate the access token
are beyond the scope of this specification, but generally involve an
interaction or coordination between the resource server and
authorization server.
The resource server MUST validate the access token and ensure it has
not expired and that its scope covers the requested resource. If the
token expired or is invalid, the resource server MUST reply with an
HTTP 401 status code (Unauthorized) and include the HTTP
"WWW-Authenticate" response header as described in Section 7.1.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Token realm='Service', error='token_expired'
Clients make authenticated token requests using the "Authorization"
request header field as described in Section 6.1. Alternatively,
clients MAY include the access token using the HTTP request URI in
the query component as described in Section 6.2, or in the HTTP body
when using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content type as
described in Section 6.3.
Clients SHOULD only use the request URI or body when the
"Authorization" request header field is not available, and MUST NOT
use more than one method in each request. [[ specify error ]]
6.1. The Authorization Request Header
The "Authorization" request header field is used by clients to make
authenticated token requests. The client uses the "token" attribute
to include the access token in the request.
The "Authorization" header field uses the framework defined by
[RFC2617] as follows:
credentials = "Token" RWS access-token [ CS 1#auth-param ]
access-token = "token" "=" <"> token <">
CS = OWS "," OWS
6.2. URI Query Parameter
When including the access token in the HTTP request URI, the client
adds the access token to the request URI query component as defined
by [RFC3986] using the "oauth_token" parameter.
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For example, the client makes the following HTTPS request:
GET /resource?oauth_token=vF9dft4qmT HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
The HTTP request URI query can include other request-specific
parameters, in which case, the "oauth_token" parameters SHOULD be
appended following the request-specific parameters, properly
separated by an "&" character (ASCII code 38).
The resource server MUST validate the access token and ensure it has
not expired and its scope includes the requested resource. If the
resource expired or is not valid, the resource server MUST reply with
an HTTP 401 status code (Unauthorized) and include the HTTP
"WWW-Authenticate" response header as described in Section 7.1.
6.3. Form-Encoded Body Parameter
When including the access token in the HTTP request entity-body, the
client adds the access token to the request body using the
"oauth_token" parameter. The client can use this method only if the
following REQUIRED conditions are met:
o The entity-body is single-part.
o The entity-body follows the encoding requirements of the
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content-type as defined by
[W3C.REC-html401-19991224].
o The HTTP request entity-header includes the "Content-Type" header
field set to "application/x-www-form-urlencoded".
o The HTTP request method is "POST", "PUT", or "DELETE".
The entity-body can include other request-specific parameters, in
which case, the "oauth_token" parameters SHOULD be appended following
the request-specific parameters, properly separated by an "&"
character (ASCII code 38).
For example, the client makes the following HTTPS request:
POST /resource HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
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oauth_token=vF9dft4qmT
The resource server MUST validate the access token and ensure it has
not expired and its scope includes the requested resource. If the
resource expired or is not valid, the resource server MUST reply with
an HTTP 401 status code (Unauthorized) and include the HTTP
"WWW-Authenticate" response header as described in Section 7.1.
7. Identifying a Protected Resource
Clients access protected resources after locating the appropriate
end-user authorization endpoint and token endpoint and obtaining an
access token. In many cases, interacting with a protected resource
requires prior knowledge of the protected resource properties and
methods, as well as its authentication requirements (i.e.
establishing client identity, locating the end-user authorization and
token endpoints).
However, there are cases in which clients are unfamiliar with the
protected resource, including whether the resource requires
authentication. When clients attempt to access an unfamiliar
protected resource without an access token, the resource server
denies the request and informs the client of the required credentials
using an HTTP authentication challenge.
In addition, when receiving an invalid authenticated request, the
resource server issues an authentication challenge including the
error type and message.
7.1. The WWW-Authenticate Response Header
A resource server receiving a request for a protected resource
without a valid access token MUST respond with a 401 (Unauthorized)
or 403 (Forbidden) HTTP status code, and include at least one "Token"
"WWW-Authenticate" response header field challenge.
The "WWW-Authenticate" header field uses the framework defined by
[RFC2617] as follows:
challenge = "Token" RWS token-challenge
token-challenge = realm
[ CS error ]
[ CS 1#auth-param ]
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error = "error" "=" <"> token <">
The "realm" attribute is used to provide the protected resources
partition as defined by [RFC2617].
The "error" attribute is used to inform the client the reason why an
access request was declined. [[ Add list of error codes ]]
8. Security Considerations
[[ Todo ]]
9. IANA Considerations
[[ Not Yet ]]
Appendix A. Contributors
The following people contributed to preliminary versions of this
document: Blaine Cook (BT), Brian Eaton (Google), Yaron Goland
(Microsoft), Brent Goldman (Facebook), Raffi Krikorian (Twitter),
Luke Shepard (Facebook), and Allen Tom (Yahoo!). The content and
concepts within are a product of the OAuth community, WRAP community,
and the OAuth Working Group.
The OAuth Working Group has dozens of very active contributors who
proposed ideas and wording for this document, including: [[ If your
name is missing or you think someone should be added here, please
send Eran a note - don't be shy ]]
Michael Adams, Andrew Arnott, Dirk Balfanz, Brian Campbell, Leah
Culver, Igor Faynberg, George Fletcher, Evan Gilbert, Justin Hart,
John Kemp, Torsten Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, James Manger, Chuck
Mortimore, Justin Richer, Peter Saint-Andre, Nat Sakimura, Rob Sayre,
Marius Scurtescu, Justin Smith, and Franklin Tse.
Appendix B. Acknowledgements
[[ Add OAuth 1.0a authors + WG contributors ]]
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Appendix C. Document History
[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-07
o Major rewrite of entire document structure.
o Removed device profile.
o Added verification code support to user-agent flow.
o Removed multiple formats support, leaving JSON as the only format.
o Changed assertion "assertion_format" parameter to
"assertion_type".
o Removed "type" parameter from token endpoint.
-06
o Editorial changes, corrections, clarifications, etc.
o Removed conformance section.
o Moved authors section to contributors appendix.
o Added section on native applications.
o Changed error response to use the requested format. Added support
for HTTP "Accept" header.
o Flipped the order of the web server and user-agent flows.
o Renamed assertion flow "format" parameter name to
"assertion_format" to resolve conflict.
o Removed the term identifier from token definitions. Added a
cryptographic token definition.
o Added figure titles.
o Added server response 401 when client tried to authenticate using
multiple credentials.
o Clarified support for TLS alternatives, and added requirement for
TLS 1.2 support for token endpoint.
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o Removed all signature and cryptography.
o Removed all discovery.
o Updated HTML4 reference.
-05
o Corrected device example.
o Added client credentials parameters to the assertion flow as
OPTIONAL.
o Added the ability to send client credentials using an HTTP
authentication scheme.
o Initial text for the "WWW-Authenticate" header (also added scope
support).
o Change authorization endpoint to end-user endpoint.
o In the device flow, change the "user_uri" parameter to
"verification_uri" to avoid confusion with the end-user endpoint.
o Add "format" request parameter and support for XML and form-
encoded responses.
-04
o Changed all token endpoints to use "POST"
o Clarified the authorization server's ability to issue a new
refresh token when refreshing a token.
o Changed the flow categories to clarify the autonomous group.
o Changed client credentials language not to always be server-
issued.
o Added a "scope" response parameter.
o Fixed typos.
o Fixed broken document structure.
-03
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o Fixed typo in JSON error examples.
o Fixed general typos.
o Moved all flows sections up one level.
-02
o Removed restriction on "redirect_uri" including a query.
o Added "scope" parameter.
o Initial proposal for a JSON-based token response format.
-01
o Editorial changes based on feedback from Brian Eaton, Bill Keenan,
and Chuck Mortimore.
o Changed device flow "type" parameter values and switch to use only
the token endpoint.
-00
o Initial draft based on a combination of WRAP and OAuth 1.0a.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging]
Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Nielsen, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., Berners-Lee, T., and J. Reschke,
"HTTP/1.1, part 1: URIs, Connections, and Message
Parsing", draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-09 (work in
progress), March 2010.
[NIST FIPS-180-3]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard (SHS). FIPS PUB 180-3, October 2008".
[RFC2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
Hammer-Lahav, et al. Expires December 13, 2010 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 June 2010
February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC3023] Murata, M., St. Laurent, S., and D. Kohn, "XML Media
Types", RFC 3023, January 2001.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[W3C.REC-html401-19991224]
Hors, A., Raggett, D., and I. Jacobs, "HTML 4.01
Specification", World Wide Web Consortium
Recommendation REC-html401-19991224, December 1999,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224>.
10.2. Informative References
[I-D.hammer-oauth]
Hammer-Lahav, E., "The OAuth 1.0 Protocol",
draft-hammer-oauth-10 (work in progress), February 2010.
Hammer-Lahav, et al. Expires December 13, 2010 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 June 2010
[I-D.hardt-oauth]
Hardt, D., Tom, A., Eaton, B., and Y. Goland, "OAuth Web
Resource Authorization Profiles", draft-hardt-oauth-01
(work in progress), January 2010.
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-
2.0-os, March 2005.
Authors' Addresses
Eran Hammer-Lahav (editor)
Yahoo!
Email: eran@hueniverse.com
URI: http://hueniverse.com
David Recordon
Facebook
Email: davidrecordon@facebook.com
URI: http://www.davidrecordon.com/
Dick Hardt
Microsoft
Email: dick.hardt@gmail.com
URI: http://dickhardt.org/
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Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.123, available from
https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/