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Versions: (draft-baker-opsawg-firewalls) 00 01

Operations Area Working Group                                   F. Baker
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status: BCP                                          P. Hoffman
Expires: April 21, 2013                                   VPN Consortium
                                                        October 18, 2012

                   On Firewalls in Internet Security


   This document discusses the most important operational and security
   implications of using modern firewalls in networks.  It makes
   recommendations for operators of firewalls, as well as for firewall

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Modern Firewall Features That Should Not Be Confused
           with Firewalling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  High-Level Firewall Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  The End-to-End Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Building a Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Firewalling Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Blocking Traffic Unless It Is Explicitly Allowed . . . . .  7
     3.2.  Typical Firewall Categories  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.3.  Newer categories of firewalling  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Recommendations for Operators  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Recommendations for Firewall Vendors . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Appendix A.  IPv4 NATs Are Not Security Devices  . . . . . . . . . 10
   Appendix B.  Origin Reputation and Firewalls . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

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1.  Introduction

   In this document, a firewall is defined as a device or software that
   imposes a policy whose effect is "a stated type of packets may or may
   not pass from A to B".  All modern firewalls allow an administrator
   to change the policies in the firewall, although the ease of
   administration for making those changes, and the granularity of the
   policies, vary widely between firewalls and vendors.

   Given this definition, it is easy to see that there is a perimeter
   (the position between A and B) in which the specific security policy
   applies.  In typical deployed networks, there are usually some easy-
   to-define perimeters.  If two or more networks that are connected by
   a single device, the perimeter is inside the device.  If that device
   is a firewall, it can impose a security policy at the shared
   perimeters of those networks.

   Many firewalls also employ some perimeters that are not as easy to
   define.  Some of these perimeters in modern firewalls include:

   o  An application-layer gateway (ALG) in front of a server creates a
      perimeter between that server and the network it is connected to.
      The ALG blocks some of the flows in the application protocol based
      on policies such as "do not all traffic from this network" and "do
      not allow the client to send a message of this type".

   o  Routing domains that are controlled with role-based administration
      create perimeters in a routed network.  Role-based administration
      makes rules such as "Domain X cannot see Domain Y in its routing
      table"; this prevents any host in Domain X from sending traffic to
      any host in Domain Y.

   o  [[[ MORE HERE with other interesting perimeters ]]]

   Modern firewalls apply perimeters at three layers:

      Layer 3: Most firewalls can filter based on source and destination
      IPv4 addresses.  Many (but, frustratingly, not all) firewalls can
      filter based on IPv6 addresses.

      Layer 4: Most firewalls can filter based on TCP and UDP ports.
      Many (but, frustratingly, not all) firewalls can also filter based
      on transports other than TCP and UDP.

      Layer 7: Modern firewalls can filter based on the application
      protocol contents, such as to allow or block certain types of
      protocol-defined messages, or based on the contents of those

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   Note that many firewall devices can only create policies at one or
   two of the layers.

   Hardware-based firewalls by their nature inspect traffic flowing
   through them, sometimes using proprietary mechanisms to make traffic
   analysis as fast as possible on the given hardware.  Some firewalls
   use network visibility protocols such as NetFlow and sFlow to help
   capture and analyze traffic. [[ References needed ]]

1.1.  Modern Firewall Features That Should Not Be Confused with

   There are a few features that appear in any firewall devices that
   have become associated with firewalls but in fact are not used for
   firewalling.  Those non-firewalling features include:

      Network Address Translation (NAT) [RFC2993], which is not used for
      security policy

      IPsec [RFC4301], which is used for virtual private networks
      (VPNs).  Although the core IPsec protocol has firewalling in it,
      when IPsec appears in a firewall device, it is normally only
      associated with the application of authenticated encryption and
      integrity protection of traffic.

      "SSL VPN" is a set of technologies that rely on tunneling traffic
      through the TLS [RFC5246] protocol running on port 443.  Some
      firewalls offer SSL VPNs as an alternative to IPsec.

      Traffic prioritization is a feature common in firewalls, but does
      not meet the definition of firewalling at all.

1.2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   Some terms which have specific meanings in this document (such as
   "firewall") are defined earlier in this section.

2.  High-Level Firewall Concepts

2.1.  The End-to-End Principle

   One common complaint about firewalls in general is that they violate
   the End-to-End Principle [EndToEnd].  The End-to-End Principle is

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   often incorrectly stated as requiring that "application specific
   functions ought to reside in the end hosts of a network rather than
   in intermediary nodes, provided they can be implemented 'completely
   and correctly' in the end hosts" or that "there should be no state in
   the network."

   What it actually says is heavily nuanced, and is a line of reasoning
   applicable when considering any two communication layers.  The
   document says that it "presents a design principle that helps guide
   placement of functions among the modules of a distributed computer
   system.  The principle, called the end-to-end argument, suggests that
   functions placed at low levels of a system may be redundant or of
   little value when compared with the cost of providing them at that
   low level."

   In other words, the End-to-End Argument is not a prohibition against
   lower layer retries of transmissions, which can be important in
   certain LAN technologies, nor of the maintenance of state, nor of
   consistent policies imposed for security reasons.  It is, however, a
   plea for simplicity.  Any behavior of a lower communication layer,
   whether found in the same system as the higher layer (and especially
   application) functionality or in a different one, that from the
   perspective of a higher layer introduces inconsistency, complexity,
   or coupling extracts a cost.  That cost may be in user satisfaction,
   difficulty of management or fault diagnosis, difficulty of future
   innovation, reduced performance, or other forms.  Such costs need to
   be clearly and honestly weighed against the benefits expected, and
   used only if the benefit outweighs the cost.

   From that perspective, introduction of a policy that prevents
   communication under an understood set of circumstances, whether it is
   to prevent access to pornographic sites or prevents traffic that can
   be characterized as an attack, does not fail the end to end argument;
   there are any number of possible sites on the network that are
   inaccessible at any given time, and the presence of such a policy is
   easily explained and understood.

   What does fail the end-to-end argument is behavior that is
   intermittent, difficult to explain, or unpredictable.  If I can
   sometimes reach a site and not at other times, or reach it using this
   host or application but not another, I wonder why that is true, and
   may not even know where to look for the issue.

2.2.  Building a Communication

   Any communication requires at least three components:

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   o  a sender, someone or some thing that sends a message,

   o  a receiver, someone or some thing that receives the message, and

   o  a channel, which is a medium by which the message is communicated.

   In the Internet, the IP network is the channel; it may traverse
   something as simple as a directly connected cable or as complex as a
   sequence of ISPs, but it is the means of communication.  In normal
   communications, a sender sends a message via the channel to the
   receiver, who is willing to receive and operate on it.  In contrast,
   attacks are a form of harassment.  A receiver exists, but is
   unwilling to receive the message, has no application to operate on
   it, or is by policy unwilling to.  Attacks on infrastructure occur
   when message volume overwhelms infrastructure or uses infrastructure
   but has no obvious receiver.

   By that line of reasoning, a firewall primarily protects
   infrastructure, by preventing traffic that would attack it from it.
   The best prophylactic might use a procedure for the dissemination of
   flow specification rules from [RFC5575] to drop traffic sent by an
   unauthorized or inappropriate sender or which has no host or
   application willing to receive it as close as possible to the sender.

   In other words, as discussed in Section 1, a firewall compares to the
   human skin, and has as its primary purpose the prophylactic defense
   of a network.  By extension, the firewall also protects a set of
   hosts and applications, and the bandwidth that serves them, as part
   of a strategy of defense in depth.  A firewall is not itself a
   security strategy; the analogy to the skin would say that a body
   protected only by the skin has an immune system deficiency and cannot
   be expected to long survive.  That said, every security solution has
   a set of vulnerabilities; the vulnerabilities of a layered defense is
   the intersection of the vulnerabilities of the various layers (e.g.,
   a successful attack has to thread each layer of defense).

3.  Firewalling Strategies

   There is a great deal of tension in firewall policies between two
   primary goals of networking: the security goal of "block traffic
   unless it is explicitly allowed" and the networking goal of "trust
   hosts with new protocols".  The two inherently cannot coexist easily
   in a set of policies for a firewall.

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3.1.  Blocking Traffic Unless It Is Explicitly Allowed

   The security goal of "block traffic unless it is explicitly allowed"
   prevents useful new applications.  This problem has been seen
   repeatedly over the past decade: a new and useful application
   protocol is deployed, but it cannot get wide adoption because it is
   blocked by firewalls.  The result has been a tendency to try to run
   new protocols over established applications, particularly over HTTP
   [RFC3205].  The result is protocols that do not work as well they
   might if they were designed from scratch.

   Worse, the same goal prevents the deployment of useful transports
   other than TCP, UDP, and ICMP.  A conservative firewall that only
   knows those three transports will block new transports such as SCTP
   [RFC4960]; this in turn causes the Internet to not be able to grow in
   a healthy fashion.  Many firewalls will also block TCP and UDP
   options they don't understand, and this has the same unfortunate

   [[[ MORE HERE about forcing more costly and error-prone layer 7
   inspection ]]]

3.2.  Typical Firewall Categories

   Most IPv4 firewalls have pre-configured security policies that fall
   into one of the following categories:

      I: Block all outside-initiated traffic, allow all inside-initiated

      II: Same as I, but allow outside-initiated traffic to some
      specific inside hosts.  The specified hosts are often added by IP
      address (or sometimes by DNS host name), and the host may be
      limited to particular transport and application protocols.  For
      example, a rule might allow traffic destined to on
      TCP ports 80 and 443.

      III: Same as I or II, but allow some outside-initiated traffic
      over some protocols to all hosts.  For example, a firewall
      protecting a farm of web servers might want to allow traffic using
      TCP ports 80 and 443 to all addresses protected by the firewall so
      that new servers can be deployed without having to update the
      firewall rules.

   Firewalls that understand IPv6 may have a fourth category:

      IV: Allow nearly all outside-initiated traffic. [[[ MORE HERE
      about why this is considered a good idea by some and a bad idea by

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      others ]]]]

3.3.  Newer categories of firewalling

   [[[ MORE HERE on blocking traffic based on dynamic origin reputation
   such as the long-expired vyncke-advanced-ipv6-security ]]]

4.  Recommendations for Operators

   [[[ MORE HERE with the following outline ]]]

   Firewalling strategies
      None. This is really the operator's choice.
      Be aware that deep packet inspection causes varying amounts of
         delay in firewalls, particularly for long-lived flows
   Don't enforce protocol semantics in the firewall
      Applications are easier to change than firewalls
   Avoid using application-layer gateways for firewalling
      Use the security in the applications servers instead
      Servers are easier to change than firewalls
      However, ALGs are useful for IPv4-IPv6 conversion and proxying
         in some protocols
   Allow fragments
      Except in specific protocols where layer 7 content filtering is
         deemed crucial
   Document your intended firewall strategy and settings
      Be sure that other operators of the firewall are able to see it
   Don't rely on a NAT for security (see Appendix A)
   If using IPsec or SSL VPN, test whether the filtering rules for the
      rest of the firewall apply

5.  Recommendations for Firewall Vendors

   [[[ MORE HERE with the following outline ]]]

   Make a set of NAT-like rules for IPv6 easily choosable
   Interface for pinholing of IPv4 NATs needs clearly identify security
   Follow the BEHAVE RFC rules for binding timeouts on NATs
   Keep a summary log of non-normal events to aid reviewing
   Make leaving notes about the firewalling rules easy and useful
   Implement draft-ietf-pcp-base and probably the follow-on protocols
      from that WG

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6.  IANA Considerations


7.  Security Considerations

   This document is all about security considerations.  It introduces no
   new ones.

8.  Acknowledgements

   Warren Kumari commented on this document.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

9.2.  Informative References

              Saltzer, JH., Reed, DP., and DD. Clark, "End-to-end
              arguments in system design", ACM Transactions on Computer
              Systems (TOCS) v.2 n.4, p277-288, Nov 1984.

   [RFC2993]  Hain, T., "Architectural Implications of NAT", RFC 2993,
              November 2000.

   [RFC3205]  Moore, K., "On the use of HTTP as a Substrate", BCP 56,
              RFC 3205, February 2002.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
              RFC 4960, September 2007.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC5575]  Marques, P., Sheth, N., Raszuk, R., Greene, B., Mauch, J.,
              and D. McPherson, "Dissemination of Flow Specification
              Rules", RFC 5575, August 2009.

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Appendix A.  IPv4 NATs Are Not Security Devices

   Their security is a side-effect of their design. [[[ MORE HERE about
   the history and why some operators mistake the security policy of
   NATs with firewalls. ]]]

   [[[ MORE HERE about how pinholes mess badly that security policy. ]]]

   [[[ MORE HERE about PCP and how to integrate it with a firewall
   security policy. ]]]

   Recommendations for deploying NATs in firewalls include:

   o  NATs should only be used when more IPv4 addresses are needed

   o  Operators should not pinhole to addresses that are unpredictably
      assigned by DHCP

Appendix B.  Origin Reputation and Firewalls

   [[[ MORE HERE with the following outline ]]]

   Letting someone else curate your security policy
   Different types of reputation for different layers
      Check logs to be sure updates are happening
      Check vendors' policies

Authors' Addresses

   Fred Baker
   Cisco Systems

   Email: fred@cisco.com

   Paul Hoffman
   VPN Consortium

   Email: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org

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