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OPSEC                                                            M. Kaeo
Internet-Draft                                Double Shot Security, Inc.
Expires: January 18, 2006                                  July 17, 2005


                 Operational Security Current Practices
                 draft-ietf-opsec-current-practices-02

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 18, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

   This document is a survey of the current practices used in today's
   large ISP operational networks to secure layer 2 and layer 3
   infrastructure devices.  The information listed here is the result of
   information gathered from people directly responsible for defining
   and implementing secure infrastructures in Internet Service Provider
   environments.






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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.3.  Attack Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.4.  Operational Security Impact from Threats . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.5.  Document Layout  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     1.6.  Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   2.  Protected Operational Functions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     2.1.  Device Physical Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     2.2.  Device In-Band Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     2.3.  Device Out-of-Band Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     2.4.  Data Path  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     2.5.  Routing Control Plane  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     2.6.  Software Upgrades and Configuration Integrity /
           Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     2.7.  Logging Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     2.8.  Filtering Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     2.9.  Denial of Service Tracking / Tracing . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   3.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
   4.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
   Appendix B.  Protocol Specific Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
     B.1.  Layer 2 Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
     B.2.  IPv4 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
     B.3.  IPv6 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 39






















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1.  Introduction

   Security practices are well understood by the network operators who
   have for many years gone through the growing pains of securing their
   network infrastructures.  However, there does not exist a written
   document that enumerates these security practices.  Network attacks
   are continually increasing and although it is not necessarily the
   role of an ISP to act as the Internet police, each ISP has to ensure
   that certain security practices are followed to ensure that their
   network is operationally available for their customers.  This
   document is the result of a survey conducted to find out what current
   security practices are being deployed to secure network
   infrastructures.

1.1.  Scope

   The scope for this survey is restricted to security practices that
   mitigate exposure to risks with the potential to adversely impact
   network availability and reliability.  Securing the actual data
   traffic is outside the scope of the conducted survey.  This document
   focuses solely on documenting currently deployed security mechanisms
   for layer 2 and layer 3 network infrastructure devices.  Although
   primarily focused on IPv4, many of the same practices can apply to
   IPv6 networks.  Both IPv4 and IPv6 network infrastructures are taken
   into account in this survey.

1.2.  Threat Model

   A threat is a potential for a security violation, which exists when
   there is a circumstance, capability, action, or event that could
   breach security and cause harm [RFC2828].Every operational network is
   subject to a multitude of threat actions, or attacks, i.e. an assault
   on system security that derives from an intelligent act that is a
   deliberate attempt to evade security services and violate the
   security policy of a system [RFC2828].  All of the threats in any
   network infrastructure is an instantiation or combination of the
   following:

   Reconnaissance: An attack whereby information is gathered to
   ascertain the network topology or specific device information which
   can be further used to exploit known vulnerabilities

   Man-In-The-Middle: An attack where a malicious user impersonates
   either the sender or recipient of a communication stream.

   Protocol Vulnerability Exploitation: An attack which takes advantage
   of known protocol deficiencies to cause inappropriate behavior.




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   Message Insertion: This can be a valid message (which could be a
   reply attack,, which is a scenario where a message is captured and
   resent at later time).  A message can also be inserted with any of
   the fields in the message being OspoofedO, such as IP addresses, port
   numbers, header fields or even packet content.  Flooding is also part
   of this threat instantiation.

   Message Diversion/Deletion: An attack where legitimate messages are
   removed before they can reach the desired recipient or are re-
   directed to a network segment that is normally not part of the data
   path.

   Message Modification: This is a subset of a message insertion attack
   where a previous message has been captured and modified before being
   retransmitted.  The message can be captured by using a man-in-the-
   middle attack or message diversion.

   Note that sometimes Denial of service attacks are listed as separate
   categories.  A denial of service is a consequence of an attack and
   can be the result of too much traffic (i.e. flooding), or exploting
   protocol expoitation or inserting/deleting/diverting/midifying
   messages.

1.3.  Attack Sources

   These attacks can be sourced in a variety of ways:


   Active vs passive attacks

      An active attack involves writing data to the network.  It is
      common practice in active attacks to disguise one's address and
      conceal the identity of the traffic sender.  A passive attack
      involves only reading information off the network.  This is
      possible if the attacker has control of a host in the
      communications path between two victim machines or has compromised
      the routing infrastructure to specifically arrange that traffic
      pass through a compromised machine.  In general, the goal of a
      passive attack is to obtain information that the sender and
      receiver would prefer to remain private.  [RFC3552]


   On-path vs off-path attacks

      In order for a datagram to be transmitted from one host to
      another, it generally must traverse some set of intermediate links
      and routers.  Such routers are naturally able to read, modify, or
      remove any datagram transmitted along that path.  This makes it



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      much easier to mount a wide variety of attacks if you are on-path.
      Off-path hosts can transmit arbitrary datagrams that appear to
      come from any hosts but cannot necessarily receive datagrams
      intended for other hosts.  Thus, if an attack depends on being
      able to receive data, off-path hosts must first subvert the
      topology in order to place themselves on-path.  This is by no
      means impossible but is not necessarily trivial.  [RFC3552]


   Insider or outsider attacks

      An "insider attack" is one which is initiated from inside a given
      security perimeter, by an entity that is authorized to access
      system resources but uses them in a way not approved by those who
      granted the authorization.  An "outside attack" is initiated from
      outside the perimeter, by an unauthorized or illegitimate user of
      the system.


   Deliberate attacks vs unintentional events

      A deliberate attack is one where a miscreant intentionally
      performs an assault on system security.  However, there are also
      instances where unintentional events cause the same harm yet are
      performed without malice in mind.  Configuration errors and
      software bugs can be as devastating to network availability as any
      deliberate attack on the network infrastructure.

   The attack source can be a combination of any of the above, all of
   which need to be considered when trying to ascertain what impact any
   attack can have on the availability and reliability of the network.
   It is nearly impossible to stop insider attacks or unintentional
   events.  However, if appropriate monitoring mechanisms are in place,
   these attacks can be as easily detected and mitigated as with any
   other attack source.  Any of the specific attacks discussed further
   in this document will elaborate on attacks which are sourced by an
   "outsider" and are deliberate attacks.  Some further elaboration will
   be given to the feasibility of passive vs active and on-path vs off-
   path attacks to show the motivation behind deploying certain security
   features.

1.4.  Operational Security Impact from Threats

   The main concern for any of the potential attack scenarios is the
   impact and harm it can cause to the network infrastructure.  The
   threat consequences are the security violations which results from a
   threat action, i.e. an attack.  These are typically classified as
   follows:



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   (Unauthorized) Disclosure

      A circumstance or event whereby an entity gains access to data for
      which the entity is not authorized.


   Deception

      A circumstance or event that may result in an authorized entity
      receiving false data and believing it to be true.


   Disruption

      A circumstance or event that interrupts or prevents the correct
      operation of system services and functions.  A broad variety of
      attacks, collectively called denial of service attacks, threaten
      the availability of systems and bandwidth to legitimate users.
      Many such attacks are designed to consume machine resources,
      making it difficult or impossible to serve legitimate users.
      Other attacks cause the target machine to crash, completely
      denying service to users.


   Usurpation

      A circumstance or event that results in control of system services
      or functions by an unauthorized entity.  Most network
      infrastructure systems are only intended to be completely
      accessible to certain authorized individuals.  Should an
      unauthorized person gain access to critical layer 2 / layer 3
      infrastructure devices or services, they could cause great harm to
      the reliability and availability of the network.

   A complete description of threat actions that can cause these threat
   consequences can be found in [RFC2828].  Typically, a number of
   different network attacks are used in combination to cause one or
   more of the above mentioned threat consequences.  An example would be
   a malicious user who has the capability to eavesdrop on traffic.
   First, he may listen in on traffic for a while to do some
   reconnaissance work and ascertain which IP addresses belonged to
   specific devices such as routers.  Were this miscreant to obtain
   information such as a router password sent in cleartext, he can then
   proceed to compromise the actual router.  From there, the miscreant
   can launch various active attacks such as sending bogus routing
   updates to redirect traffic or capture additional traffic to
   compromise other network devices.




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1.5.  Document Layout

   This document is a survey of current operational practices that
   mitigate the risk of being susceptible to any threat actions.  As
   such, the main focus is on the currently deployed security practices
   used to detect and/or mitigate attacks.  The top-level categories in
   this document are based on operational functions for ISPs and
   generally relate to what is to be protected.  This is followed by a
   description of which attacks are possible and the security practices
   currently deployed which will provide the necessary security services
   to help mitigate these attacks.  These security services are
   classified as:


   o  User Authentication

   o  User Authorization

   o  Data Origin Authentication

   o  Access Control

   o  Data Integrity

   o  Data Confidentiality

   o  Auditing / Logging

   o  DoS Mitigation

   In many instances, a specific protocol currently deployed will offer
   a combination of these services.  For example, AAA can offer user
   authentication, user authorization and audit / logging services while
   SSH can provide data origin authentication, data integrity and data
   confidentiality.  The services offered are more important than the
   actual protocol used.  Each section ends with an additional
   considerations section which explains why specific protocols may or
   may not be used and also gives some information regarding
   capabilities which are not possible today due to bugs or lack of ease
   of use.

1.6.  Definitions

   RFC 2119 Keywords







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      The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
      NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL"
      in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

      The use of the RFC 2119 keywords is an attempt, by the editor, to
      assign the correct requirement levels ("MUST", "SHOULD",
      "MAY"...).  It must be noted that different organizations,
      operational environments, policies and legal environments will
      generate different requirement levels.










































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2.  Protected Operational Functions

2.1.  Device Physical Access

   Device physical access pertains to protecting the physical location
   of the layer 2 or layer 3 network infrastructure device.  Although it
   is important to have contingency plans for natural disasters such as
   earthquakes and floods which can cause damage to networking devices,
   this is out-of-scope for this document.  Here we concern ourselves
   with protecting access to the physical location and how a device can
   be further protected from unauthorized access if the physical
   location has been compromised, i.e protecting the console access.

2.1.1.  Threats / Attacks

   If any intruder gets physical access to a layer 2 or layer 3 device,
   the entire network infrastructure can be under the control of the
   intruder.  At a minimum, the intruder can take the compromised device
   out-of-service, causing network disruption, the extent of which
   depends on the network topology.  A worse scenario is where the
   intruder can use this device to crack the console password and have
   complete control of the device, perhaps without anyone detecting such
   a compromise, or to attach another network device onto a port and
   siphon off data with which the intruder can ascertain the network
   topology and take control of the entire network.

   The threat of gaining physical access can be realized in a variety of
   ways even if critical devices are under high-security.  There still
   occur cases where attackers have impersonated maintenance workers to
   gain physical access to critical devices that have caused major
   outages and privacy compromises.  Insider attacks from authorized
   personnel also pose a real threat and must be adequately recognized
   and dealt with.

2.1.2.  Security Practices

   For physical device security, equipment is kept in highly restrictive
   environments.  Only authorized users with card key badges have access
   to any of the physical locations that contain critical network
   infrastructure devices.  These card-key systems keep track of who
   accessed which location and at what time.

   All console access is always password protected and the login time is
   set to time out after a specified amount of inactivity - typically
   between 3-10 minutes.  Individual users are authentication to get
   basic access.  For privileged (i.e. enable) access, a second
   authentication step needs to be completed.  Typically all console
   access is provided via an out-of-band (OOB) management infrastructure



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   which is discussed in the section on OOB management.

2.1.3.  Security Services

   The following security services are offered through the use of the
   practices described in the previous section:


   o  User Authentication - All individuals who have access to the
      physical facility are authenticated.  Console access is
      authenticated.

   o  User Authorization - An authenticated individual has implicit
      authorization to perform commands on the device.  Console access
      is usually granted via at least two privilege levels:
      authorization for performing a basic set of commands vs
      authorization for performing all commands.

   o  Data Origin Authentication - Not applicable

   o  Access Control - Not applicable

   o  Data Integrity - Not applicable

   o  Data Confidentiality - Not applicable

   o  Auditing / Logging - All access to the physical locations of the
      infrastructure equipment is logged via electronic card-key
      systems.  All console access is logged (refer to the OOB
      management section for more details)

   o  DoS Mitigation - Not applicable

2.1.4.  Additional Considerations

   Physical security is relevant to operational security practices as
   described in this document mostly from a console access perspective.
   Most ISPs provide console access via an OOB management infrastructure
   which is discussed in the OOB management section of this document.

   The physical and logical authentication and logging systems should be
   run independently of each other and reside in different physical
   locations.

   Social engineering plays a big role in many physical access
   compromises.  Most ISPs have set up training classes and awareness
   programs to educate company personnel to deny physical access to
   people who are not properly authenticated or authorized to have



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   physical access to critical infrastructure devices.

2.2.  Device In-Band Management

   In-band management is generally considered to be device access where
   the control traffic takes the same data path as the data which
   traverses the network.  In many environments, device management for
   layer 2 and layer 3 infrastructure devices is deployed as part of an
   out-of-band management infrastructure although there are some
   instances where it is deployed in-band as well.  Presently, the
   mechanisms used for in-band management are via virtual terminal
   access (i.e.  Telnet or SSH), SNMP, or HTTP.  In all large ISPs that
   were interviewed, HTTP management is never used and is explicitly
   disabled.  Note that file transfer protocols (TFTP, FTP, SCP) will be
   covered in the 'Software Upgrades and Configuration Integrity/
   Validation' section.

2.2.1.  Threats / Attacks

   For in-band device management, passive attacks are possible if
   someone has the capability to intercept data between the management
   device and the managed device.  The threat is possible if a single
   infrastructure device is somehow compromised and can act as a network
   sniffer or if it is possible to insert a new device which acts as a
   network sniffer.

   Active attacks are possible for both on-path and off-path scenarios.
   For on-path active attacks, the situation is the same as for a
   passive attack, where either a device has to already be compromised
   or a device can be inserted into the path.  For off-path active
   attacks, the attack is generally limited to message insertion or
   modification.

2.2.1.1.  Confidentiality Violations

   Confidentiality violations can occur when a miscreant intercepts
   confidential data that has been sent in cleartext.  This includes
   interception of usernames and passwords with which an intruder can
   obtain unauthorized access to network devices.  It can also include
   other information such as logging or configuration information if an
   administrator is remotely viewing local logfiles or configuration
   information.

2.2.1.2.  Offline Cryptographic Attacks

   If username/password information was encrypted but the cryptographic
   mechanism used made it easy to capture data and break the encryption
   key, the device management traffic could be compromised.  The traffic



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   would need to be captured either by eavesdropping on the network or
   by being able to divert traffic to a malicious user.

2.2.1.3.  Replay Attacks

   For a replay attack to be successful, in-band management traffic
   would need to first be captured either on-path or diverted to an
   attacker to later be replayed to the intended recipient.

2.2.1.4.  Message Insertion/Deletion/Modification

   Data can be manipulated by someone in control of intermediary hosts.
   Forging data is also possible with IP spoofing, where a remote host
   sends out packets which appear to come from another, trusted host.

2.2.1.5.  Man-In-The-Middle

   A man-in-the-middle attack attacks the identity of a communicating
   peer rather than the data stream itself.  The attacker intercepts
   traffic that is sent from an in-band management system to the
   networking infrastructure device and traffic that is sent from the
   network infrastructure device to the in-band management system.

2.2.2.  Security Practices

   All in-band management access to layer 2 and layer 3 devices is
   authenticated.  The user authentication and authorization is
   typically controlled by a AAA server (i.e.  RADIUS and/or TACACS+).
   Credentials used to determine the identity of the user vary from
   static username/password to one-time username/password scheme such as
   Secure-ID.  Static username/passwords are expired after a specified
   period of time, usually 30 days.  Every authenticated entity via AAA
   is an individual user for greater granularity of control.  In some
   deployments, The AAA servers used for in-band management
   authentication/authorization/accounting are on separate out-of-band
   networks to provide a demarcation for any other authentication
   functions.

   For backup purposes, there is often a single local database entry for
   authentication which is known to a very limited set of key personnel.
   It is usually the highest privilege level username/password
   combination, which in most cases is the same across all devices.
   This local device password is routinely regenerated once every 2-3
   months and is also regenerated immediately after an employee who had
   access to that password leaves the company or is no longer authorized
   to have knowledge of that password.

   Each individual user in the AAA database is configured with specific



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   authorization capability.  Specific commands are either individually
   denied or permitted depending on the capability of the device to be
   accessed.  Multiple privilege levels are deployed.  Most individuals
   are authorized with basic authorization to perform a minimal set of
   commands while a subset of individuals are authorized to perform more
   privileged commands.

   SSH is always used for virtual terminal access to provide for an
   encrypted communication channel.  There are exceptions due to
   equipment limitations which are described in the additional
   considerations section.

   If SNMP is used for in-band management, it is for read queries only
   and restricted to specific hosts.  The community strings are
   carefully chosen to be difficult to crack and there are procedures in
   place to change these community strings between 30-90 days.  If
   systems support two SNMP community strings, the old string is
   replaced by first configuring a second newer community string and
   then migrating over from the currently used string to the newer one.
   Most large ISPs have multiple SNMP systems accessing their routers so
   it takes more then one maintenance period to get all the strings
   fixed in all the right systems.  SNMP RW is not used and disabled by
   configuration.

   Access control is strictly enforced for infrastructure devices by
   using stringent filtering rules.  A limited set of IP addresses are
   allowed to initiate connections to the infrastructure devices and are
   specific to the services which they are to limited to (i.e.  SSH and
   SNMP).

   All in-band device management access is audited and any violations
   trigger alarms which initiate automated email, pager and/or telephone
   notifications.  AAA servers keeps track of the authenticated entity
   as well as all the commands that were carried out on a specific
   device.  Additionally, the device itself logs any access control
   violations (i.e. if an SSH request comes in from an IP address which
   is not explicitly permitted, that event is logged so that the
   offending IP address can be tracked down and investigations made as
   to why it was trying to access a particular infrastructure device)

2.2.3.  Security Services

   The following security services are offered through the use of the
   practices described in the previous section:


   o  User Authentication - All individuals are authenticated via AAA
      services.



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   o  User Authorization - All individuals are authorized via AAA
      services to perform specific operations once successfully
      authenticated.

   o  Data Origin Authentication - Management traffic is strictly
      filtered to allow only specific IP addresses to have access to the
      infrastructure devices.  This does not alleviate risk from spoofed
      traffic.  Using SSH for device access ensures that noone can spoof
      the traffic during the SSH session.

   o  Access Control - In-band management traffic is filtered to allow
      only specific IP addresses to have access to the infrastructure
      devices.

   o  Data Integrity - Using SSH provides data integrity and ensures
      that noone has altered the management data in transit.

   o  Data Confidentiality - Using SSH provides data confidentiality.

   o  Auditing / Logging - Using AAA provides an audit trail for who
      accessed which device and which operations were performed.

   o  DoS Mitigation - Using packet filters to allow only specific IP
      addresses to have access to the infrastructure devices.  This
      limits but does not prevent spoofed DoS attacks directed at an
      infrastructure device.  Often OOB management is used to lower that
      risk.

2.2.4.  Additional Considerations

   Password selection for any in-band device management protocol used is
   critical to ensure that the passwords are hard to guess or break
   using a brute-force attack.

   IPsec is considered too difficult to deploy and the common protocol
   to provide for confidential in-band management access is SSH.  There
   are exceptions for using SSH due to equipment limitations since SSH
   may not be supported on legacy equipment.  Also, in the case where
   the SSH key is stored on a route processor card, a re-keying of SSH
   would be required whenever the route processor card needs to be
   swapped.  Some providers feel that this operational impact exceeds
   the security necessary and instead use Telnet from trusted inside
   hosts (called 'jumphosts') to manage those devices.  An individual
   would first SSH to the jumphost and then Telnet from the jumphost to
   the actual infrastructure device.  All authentication and
   authorization is still carried out using AAA servers.

   In instances where Telnet access is used, the logs on the AAA servers



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   are more verbose and more attention is paid to them to detect any
   abnormal behavior.  The jumphosts themselves are carefully controlled
   machines and usually have limited access.  Note that Telent is NEVER
   allowed to an infrastructure device except from specific jumphosts;
   i.e. packet filters are used to ensure that Telnet is only allowed
   from specific IP addresses.

   With thousands of devices to manage, some ISPs have created automated
   mechanisms to authenticate to devices.  Kerberos is used to automate
   the authentication process.  An individual would first log in to a
   Kerberized UNIX server using SSH and generate a Kerberos 'ticket'.
   This 'ticket' is generally set to have a lifespan of 10 hours and is
   used to automatically authenticate the individual to the
   infrastructure devices.

   In instances where SNMP is used, some legacy devices only support
   SNMPv1 which then requires the provider to mandate its use across all
   infrastructure devices for operational simplicity.  SNMPv2 is
   primarily deployed since it is easier to set up than v3.

2.3.  Device Out-of-Band Management

   Out-of-band management is generally considered to be device access
   where the control traffic takes a separate path as the data which
   traverses the network.  Console access is always architected via an
   OOB network.  SNMP management is also usually carried out via that
   same OOB network infrastructure.

2.3.1.  Threats / Attacks

   For OOB device management, passive attacks are possible if someone
   has the capability to intercept data between the management device
   and the managed device.  The threat is possible if a single
   infrastructure device is somehow compromised and can act as a network
   sniffer or if it is possible to insert a new device which acts as a
   network sniffer.

   Active attacks are possible for both on-path and off-path scenarios.
   For on-path active attacks, the situation is the same as for a
   passive attack, where either a device has to already be compromised
   or a device can be inserted into the path.  For off-path active
   attacks, the attack is generally limited to message insertion or
   modification.

2.3.1.1.  Confidentiality Violations

   Confidentiality violations can occur when a miscreant intercepts any
   of the OOB management data that has been sent in cleartext.  This



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   includes interception of usernames and passwords with which an
   intruder can obtain unauthorized access to network devices.  It can
   also include other information such as logging or configuration
   information if an administrator is remotely viewing local logfiles or
   configuration information.

2.3.1.2.  Offline Cryptographic Attacks

   If username/password information was encrypted but the cryptographic
   mechanism used made it easy to capture data and break the encryption
   key, the OOB management traffic could be compromised.  The traffic
   would need to be captured either by eavesdropping on the network or
   by being able to divert traffic to a malicious user.

2.3.1.3.  Replay Attacks

   For a replay attack to be successful, the OOB management traffic
   would need to first be captured either on-path or diverted to an
   attacker to later be replayed to the intended recipient.

2.3.1.4.  Message Insertion/Deletion/Modification

   Data can be manipulated by someone in control of intermediary hosts.
   Forging data is also possible with IP spoofing, where a remote host
   sends out packets which appear to come from another, trusted host.

2.3.1.5.  Man-In-The-Middle

   A man-in-the-middle attack attacks the identity of a communicating
   peer rather than the data stream itself.  The attacker intercepts
   traffic that is sent from an OOB management system to the networking
   infrastructure device and traffic that is sent from the network
   infrastructure device to the OOB management system.

2.3.2.  Security Practices

   OOB is done via a terminal server at each location.  SSH access is
   used to get to the terminal server from where sessions to the devices
   are initiated.  Dial-in access is deployed as a backup if the network
   is not available.

   All OOB management access to layer 2 and layer 3 devices is
   authenticated.  The user authentication and authorization is
   typically controlled by a AAA server (i.e.  RADIUS and/or TACACS+).
   Credentials used to determine the identity of the user vary from
   static username/password to one-time username/password scheme such as
   Secure-ID.  Static username/passwords are expired after a specified
   period of time, usually 30 days.  Every authenticated entity via AAA



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   is an individual user for greater granularity of control.  Note that
   often the AAA server used for OOB management authentication is a
   separate physical device from the AAA server used for in-band
   management user authentication.

   For backup purposes, there is often a single local database entry for
   authentication which is known to a very limited set of key personnel.
   It is usually the highest privilege level username/password
   combination, which in most cases is the same across all devices.
   This local device password is routinely regenerated once every 2-3
   months and is also regenerated immediately after an employee who had
   access to that password leaves the company or is no longer authorized
   to have knowledge of that password.

   Each individual user in the AAA database is configured with specific
   authorization capability.  Specific commands are either individually
   denied or permitted depending on the capability of the device to be
   accessed.  Multiple privilege levels are deployed.  Most individuals
   are authorized with basic authorization to perform a minimal set of
   commands while a subset of individuals are authorized to perform more
   privileged commands.

   Some OOB management functions are performed using command line
   interface (CLI) scripting.  In these scenarios, a dedicated user is
   used for the identity in scripts that perform CLI scripting.  Once
   authenticated, these scripts control which commands are legitimate
   depending on authorization rights of the authenticated individual.

   SSH is always used for virtual terminal access to provide for an
   encrypted communication channel.  There are exceptions due to
   equipment limitations which are described in the additional
   considerations section.

   If SNMP is used for OOB management, it is for read queries only and
   restricted to specific hosts.  The community strings are carefully
   chosen to be difficult to crack and there are procedures in place to
   change these community strings between 30-90 days.  If systems
   support two SNMP strings, a second new string is set and then migrate
   over from the 1st to the 2nd.  Most large ISPs have multiple SNMP
   systems accessing their routers so it takes more then one maintenance
   period to get all the strings fixed in all the right systems.  SNMP
   RW is not used and disabled by configuration.

   Access control is strictly enforced for infrastructure devices by
   using stringent filtering rules.  A limited set of IP addresses are
   allowed to initiate connections to the infrastructure devices and are
   specific to the services which they are to limited to (i.e.  SSH and
   SNMP).



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   All OOB device management access is audited.  The AAA server keeps
   track of the authenticated entity as well as all the commands that
   were carried out on a specific device.  Additionally, the device
   itself logs any access control violations (i.e. if an SSH request
   comes in from an IP address which is not explicitly permitted, that
   event is logged so that the offending IP address can be tracked down
   and investigations made as to why it was trying to access a
   particular infrastructure device)

2.3.3.  Security Services

   The security services offered for device OOB management are nearly
   identical to those of device in-band management.  Due to the critical
   nature of controlling and limiting device access, many ISPs feel that
   physically separating the management traffic from the normal customer
   data traffic will provide an added level of risk mitigation and limit
   the potential attack vectors.  For OOB management, the security
   services offered through the use of the practices described in the
   previous section are:


   o  User Authentication - All individuals are authenticated via AAA
      services.

   o  User Authorization - All individuals are authorized via AAA
      services to perform specific operations once successfully
      authenticated.

   o  Data Origin Authentication - Management traffic is strictly
      filtered to allow only specific IP addresses to have access to the
      infrastructure devices.  This does not alleviate risk from spoofed
      traffic.  Using SSH for device access ensures that noone can spoof
      the traffic during the SSH session.

   o  Access Control - In-band management traffic is filtered to allow
      only specific IP addresses to have access to the infrastructure
      devices.

   o  Data Integrity - Using SSH provides data integrity and ensures
      that noone has altered the management data in transit.

   o  Data Confidentiality - Using SSH provides data confidentiality.

   o  Auditing / Logging - Using AAA provides an audit trail for who
      accessed which device and which operations were performed.

   o  DoS Mitigation - Using packet filters to allow only specific IP
      addresses to have access to the infrastructure devices.  This



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      limits but does not prevent spoofed DoS attacks directed at an
      infrastructure device.  However, the risk is lowered by using a
      separate physical network for management purposes.

2.3.4.  Additional Considerations

   Password selection for any OOB device management protocol used is
   critical to ensure that the passwords are hard to guess or break
   using a brute-force attack.

   IPsec is considered too difficult to deploy and the common protocol
   to provide for confidential OOB management access is SSH.  There are
   exceptions for using SSH due to equipment limitations since SSH may
   not be supported on legacy equipment.  Also, in the case where the
   SSH key is stored on a route processor card, a re-keying of SSH would
   be required whenever the route processor card needs to be swapped.
   Some providers feel that this operational impact exceeds the security
   necessary and instead use Telnet from trusted inside hosts (called
   'jumphosts') to manage those device.  An individual would first SSH
   to the jumphost and then Telnet from the jumphost to the terminal
   server before logging in to the device console.  All authentication
   and authorization is still carried out using AAA servers.

   In instances where Telnet access is used, the logs on the AAA servers
   are more verbose and more attention is paid to them to detect any
   abnormal behavior.  The jumphosts themselves are carefully controlled
   machines and usually have limited access.  Note that Telent is NEVER
   allowed to an infrastructure device except from specific jumphosts;
   i.e. packet filters are used at the console server and/or
   infrastructure device to ensure that Telnet is only allowed from
   specific IP addresses.

   In instances where SNMP is used, some legacy devices only support
   SNMPv1 which then requires the provider to mandate its use across all
   infrastructure devices for operational simplicity.  SNMPv2 is
   primarily deployed since it is easier to set up than v3.

2.4.  Data Path

   This section refers to how traffic is handled which traverses the
   network infrastructure device.  The primary goal of ISPs is to
   forward customer traffic.  However, due to the large amount of
   malicious traffic that can cause DoS attacks and render the network
   unavailable, specific measures are sometimes deployed to ensure the
   availability to forward legitimate customer traffic.






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2.4.1.  Threats / Attacks

   Any data traffic can potentially be attack traffic and the challenge
   is to detect and potentially stop forwarding any of the malicious
   traffic.  The deliberately sourced attack traffic can consist of
   packets with spoofed source and/or destination addresses or any other
   malformed packet which mangle any portion of a header field to cause
   protocol-related security issues (such as resetting connections,
   causing unwelcome ICPM redirects, creating unwelcome IP options or
   packet fragmentations).

2.4.2.  Security Practices

   Filtering and rate limiting are the primary mechanism to provide risk
   mitigation of malicious traffic rendering the ISP services
   unavailable.  However, filtering and rate limiting of data path
   traffic is deployed in a variety of ways depending on how automated
   the process is and what the capabilities and performance limitations
   of existing deployed hardware are.

   The ISPs which do not have performance issues with their equipment
   follow BCP38 [BCP38] guidelines.  Null routes and black-hole
   filtering are used to deter any detected malicious traffic streams.
   Most ISPs consider layer 4 filtering useful but it is only
   implemented if there is no performance limitations on the devices.
   Netflow is used for tracking traffic flows but there is some concern
   whether sampling is good enough to detect malicious behavior.

   Unicast RPF is not consistently implemented.  Some ISPs are in
   process of doing so while other ISPs think that the perceived benefit
   of knowing that spoofed traffic comes from legitimate addresses are
   not worth the operational complexity.  Some providers have a policy
   of implementing uRPF at link speeds of DS3 and below.

2.4.3.  Security Services


   o  User Authentication - Not applicable

   o  User Authorization - Not applicable

   o  Data Origin Authentication - When IP address filtering per BCP38
      and uRPF are deployed at network edges it can ensure that any
      spoofed traffic comes from at least a legitimate IP address and
      can be tracked.

   o  Access Control - IP address filtering and layer 4 filtering is
      used to deny forbidden protocols and limit traffic destined for



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      infrastructure device itself.

   o  Data Integrity - Not applicable

   o  Data Confidentiality - Not applicable

   o  Auditing / Logging - Filtering exceptions are logged for potential
      attack traffic.

   o  DoS Mitigation - Black-hole triggered filtering and rate-limiting
      are used to limit the risk of DoS attacks.

2.4.4.  Additional Considerations

   For layer 2 devices, MAC address filtering and authentication is not
   used.  This is due to the problems it can cause when troubleshooting
   networking issues.  Port security becomes unmanageable at a large
   scale where 1000s of switches are deployed.

   Rate limiting is used by some ISPs although other ISPs believe it is
   not really useful since attackers are not well behaved and it doesn't
   provide any operational benefit over the complexity.  Rate limiting
   may be improved by developing flow-based rate-limiting capabilities
   with filtering hooks.  This would improve the performance as well as
   the granularity over current capabilities.

   Lack of consistency regarding the ability to filter, especially with
   respect to performance issues cause some ISPs to not implement BCP38
   guidelines for ingress filtering.  One such example is at edge boxes
   where you have up to 1000 T1's connecting into a router with an OC-12
   uplink.  Some deployed devices experience a large performance impact
   with filtering which is unacceptable for passing customer traffic
   through.  Where performance is not an issue, the ISPs make a tradeoff
   between management versus risk.

2.5.  Routing Control Plane

   The routing control plane deals with all the traffic which is part of
   establishing and maintaining routing protocol information.

2.5.1.  Threats / Attacks

   Attacks on the routing control plane can be both from passive or
   active sources.  Passive attacks are possible if someone has the
   capability to intercept data between the communicating routing peers.
   This can be accomplished if a single routing peer is somehow
   compromised and can act as a network sniffer or if it is possible to
   insert a new device which acts as a network sniffer.



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   Active attacks are possible for both on-path and off-path scenarios.
   For on-path active attacks, the situation is the same as for a
   passive attack, where either a device has to already be compromised
   or a device can be inserted into the path.  This may lead to an
   attacker impersonating a legitimate routing peer and exchanging
   routing information.  Unintentional active attacks are more common
   due to configuration errors, which cause legitimate routing peers to
   feed invalid routing information to other neighboring peers.

   For off-path active attacks, the attacks are generally limited to
   message insertion or modification which can divert traffic to
   illegitimate destinations and cause traffic to never reach its
   intended destination.

2.5.2.  Confidentiality Violations

   Confidentiality violations can occur when a miscreant intercepts any
   of the routing update traffic.  This is becoming more of a concern
   because many ISPs are classifying addressing schemes and network
   topologies as private and proprietary information.  It is also a
   concern because the routing protocol packets contain information that
   may show ways in which routing sessions could be spoofed or hijacked.
   This in turn could lead into a man-in-the-middle attack where the
   miscreants can insert themselves into the traffic path or divert the
   traffic path and violate the confidentiality of user data.

2.5.3.  Offline Cryptographic Attacks

   If any cryptographic mechanism was used to provide for data integrity
   and confidentiality, an offline cryptographic attack could
   potentially compromise the data.  The traffic would need to be
   captured either by eavesdropping on the network or by being able to
   divert traffic to a malicious user.  Note that by using
   cryptographically protected routing information, the latter would
   require the cryptographic key to already be compromised anyway so
   this attack is only feasible if a device was able eavesdrop and
   capture the cryptographically protected routing information.

2.5.4.  Replay Attacks

   For a replay attack to be successful, the routing control plane
   traffic would need to first be captured either on-path or diverted to
   an attacker to later be replayed to the intended recipient.

2.5.5.  Message Insertion/Deletion/Modification

   Routing control plane traffic can be manipulated by someone in
   control of intermediate hosts.  In addition, traffic can be injected



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   by forging IP addresses, where a remote router sends out packets
   which appear to come from another, trusted router.  If enough traffic
   is injected to be processed by limited memory routers it can cause a
   DoS attack.

2.5.6.  Man-In-The-Middle

   A man-in-the-middle attack attacks the identity of a communicating
   peer rather than the data stream itself.  The attacker intercepts
   traffic that is sent from one routing peer to the other and
   communicates on behalf of one of the peers.  This can lead to
   diversion of the user traffic to either an unauthorized receiving
   party or cause legitimate traffic to never reach its intended
   destination.

2.5.7.  Security Practices

   Securing the routing control plane takes many features which are
   generally deployed as a system.  MD5 authentication is used by some
   ISPs to validate the sending peer and to ensure that the data in
   transit has not been altered.  Some ISPs only deploy MD-5
   authentication at customer's request.  Additional sanity checks to
   ensure with reasonable certainty that the received routing update was
   originated by a valid routing peer include route filters and the BTSH
   feature [BTSH].  Note that validating whether a legitimate peer has
   the authority to send the contents of the routing update is a
   difficult problem that needs yet to be resolved.

   In the case of BGP routing, a variety of policies are deployed to
   limit the propagation of invalid routing information.  These include:
   incoming and outgoing prefix filters for BGP customers, incoming and
   outgoing prefix filters for peers and upstream neighbors, incoming
   AS-PATH filter for BGP customers, outgoing AS-PATH filter towards
   peers and upstream neighbors, route dampening and rejecting selected
   attributes and communities.  Consistency between these policies
   varies greatly although there is a trend to start depending on AS-
   PATH filters because they are much more manageable than the large
   numbers of prefix filters that would need to be maintained.  Many
   ISPs also do not propagate interface IP addresses to further reduce
   attack vectors on routers and connected customers.

2.5.8.  Security Services


   o  User Authentication - Not applicable

   o  User Authorization - Not applicable




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   o  Data Origin Authentication - By using MD5 authentication and/or
      the TTL-hack a routing peer can be reasonably certain that traffic
      originated from a valid peer.

   o  Access Control - Route filters, AS-PATH filters and prefix limits
      are used to control access to specific parts of the network.

   o  Data Integrity - By using MD5 authentication a peer can be
      reasonably certain that the data has not been modified in transit
      but there is no mechanism to prove the validity of the routing
      information itself.

   o  Data Confidentiality - Not implemented

   o  Auditing / Logging - Filter exceptions are logged.

   o  DoS Mitigation - Many DoS attacks are mitigated using a
      combination of techniques including: MD5 authentication, the BTSH
      feature, filtering routing advertisements to bogons and filtering
      routing advertisements to one's own network.

2.5.9.  Additional Considerations

   So far the primary concern to secure the routing control plane has
   been to validate the sending peer and to ensure that the data in
   transit has not been altered.  Although MD-5 routing protocol
   extensions have been implemented which can provide both services,
   they are not consistently deployed amongst ISPs.  Two major
   deployment concerns have been implementation issues where both
   software bugs and the lack of graceful re-keying options have caused
   significant network down times.  Also, some ISPs express concern that
   deploying MD5 authentication will itself be a worse DoS attack victim
   and prefer to use a combination of other risk mitigation mechanisms
   such as BTSH and route filters.

   Route filters are used to limit what routes are believed from a valid
   peer.  Packet filters are used to limit which systems can appear as a
   valid peer.  Due to the operational constraints of maintaining large
   prefix filter lists, many ISPs are starting to depend on BGP AS-PATh
   filters to/from their peers and upstream neighbors.

   IPsec is not deployed since the operational management aspects of
   ensuring interoperability and reliable configurations is too complex
   and time consuming to be operationally viable.  There is also limited
   concern to the confidentiality of the routing information.  The
   integrity and validity of the updates are of much greater concern.

   There is concern for manual or automated actions which introduce new



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   routes and can affect the entire routing domain.

2.6.  Software Upgrades and Configuration Integrity / Validation

   Software upgrades and configuration changes are usually performed as
   part of either in-band or OOB management functions.  However, there
   are additional considerations to be taken into account which are
   enumerated in this section.

2.6.1.  Threats / Attacks

   Attacks performed on system software and configurations can be both
   from passive or active sources.  Passive attacks are possible if
   someone has the capability to intercept data between the network
   infrastructure device and the system which is downloading or
   uploading the software or configuration information.  This can be
   accomplished if a single infrastructure device is somehow compromised
   and can act as a network sniffer or if it is possible to insert a new
   device which acts as a network sniffer.

   Active attacks are possible for both on-path and off-path scenarios.
   For on-path active attacks, the situation is the same as for a
   passive attack, where either a device has to already be compromised
   or a device can be inserted into the path.  For off-path active
   attacks, the attacks are generally limited to message insertion or
   modification where the attacker may wish to load illegal software or
   configuration files to an infrastructure device.

2.6.2.  Confidentiality Violations

   Confidentiality violations can occur when a miscreant intercepts any
   of the software image or configuration information.  The software
   image may give an indication of exploits which the device is
   vulnerable to while the configuration information can inadvertently
   lead attackers to identify critical infrastructure IP addresses and
   passwords.

2.6.3.  Offline Cryptographic Attacks

   If any cryptographic mechanism was used to provide for data integrity
   and confidentiality, an offline cryptographic attack could
   potentially compromise the data.  The traffic would need to be
   captured either by eavesdropping on the network or by being able to
   divert traffic to a malicious user.

2.6.4.  Replay Attacks

   For a replay attack to be successful, the software image or



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   configuration file would need to first be captured either on-path or
   diverted to an attacker to later be replayed to the intended
   recipient.

2.6.5.  Message Insertion/Deletion/Modification

   Software images and configuration files can be manipulated by someone
   in control of intermediate hosts.  By forging an IP address and
   impersonating a valid host which can download software images or
   configuration files, invalid files can be downloaded to an
   infrastructure device.  An invalid software image or configuration
   file can cause a device to hang and become inoperable.  Spoofed
   configuration files can be hard to detect, especially when the only
   added command is to allow a miscreant access to that device by
   entering a filter allowing a specific host access and configuring a
   local username/password database entry for authentication to that
   device.

2.6.6.  Man-In-The-Middle

   A man-in-the-middle attack attacks the identity of a communicating
   peer rather than the data stream itself.  The attacker intercepts
   traffic that is sent between the infrastructure device and the host
   used to upload/download the system image or configuration file.  He/
   she can then act on behalf of one or both of these systems.

   If an attacker obtained a copy of the software image being deployed,
   he could potentially exploit a known vulnerability and gain access to
   the system.  From a captured configuration file, he could obtain
   confidential network topology information or even more damaging
   information if any of the passwords in the configuration file were
   not encrypted.

2.6.7.  Security Practices

   Images and configurations are stored on specific hosts which have
   limited access.  All access and activity relating to these hosts are
   authenticated and logged via AAA services.  When uploaded/downloading
   any system software or configuration files, either TFTP, FTP or SCP
   can be used.  Where possible, SCP is used to secure the data transfer
   and FTP is generally never used.  All TFTP and SCP access is
   username/password authenticated and in most environments scripts are
   used for maintaining a large number of routers.  To ensure the
   integrity of the configurations, every hour the configuration files
   are polled and compared to the previously polled version to find
   discrepancies.  In at least one environment these tools are
   Kerberized to take advantage of automated authentication (not
   confidentiality).



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   Filters are used to limit access to uploading/downloading
   configuration files and system images to specific IP addresses and
   protocols.

   The software images perform CRC-checks but many ISPs expressed
   interest in having software image integrity validation based on the
   MD5 algorithm for enhanced security.  The system binaries use the MD5
   algorithm to validate integrity.

   In all configuration files, the passwords are stored in an obfuscated
   format.  This includes passwords for user authentication, MD5 shared
   secrets, AAA server shared secrets, NTP shared secrets, etc.  For
   older software which may not support this functionality,
   configuration files are stored with passwords in readable format. [is
   this true? are configuration files then protected? if passwords in
   readable format, is the thought that an OOB management network with
   SCP will be enough protection? ]

   Automated security validation is performed on infrastructure devices
   using nmap and nessus to ensure valid configuration against many of
   the well-known attacks.

2.6.8.  Security Services


   o  User Authentication - All users are authenticated before being
      able to download/upload any system images or configuration files.

   o  User Authorization - All authenticated users are granted specific
      privileges to download or upload system images and/or
      configuration files.

   o  Data Origin Authentication - Filters are used to limit access to
      uploading/downloading configuration files and system images to
      specific IP addresses.

   o  Access Control - Filters are used to limit access to uploading/
      downloading configuration files and system images to specific IP
      addresses and protocols.

   o  Data Integrity - All systems use either a CRC-check or MD5
      authentication to ensure data integrity.

   o  Data Confidentiality - If the SCP protocol is used then there is
      confidentiality of the downloaded/uploaded configuration files and
      system images.





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   o  Auditing / Logging - All access and activity relating to
      downloading/uploading system images and configuration files are
      logged via AAA services and filter exception rules.

   o  DoS Mitigation - TBD

2.6.9.  Additional Considerations

   Where the MD5 algorithm is not used to perform data integrity
   checking of software images and configuration files, ISPs have
   expressed an interest in having this functionality.  IPsec is
   considered too cumbersome and operationally difficult to use for data
   integrity and confidentiality.

2.7.  Logging Considerations

   Although logging is part of all the previous sections, it is
   important enough to be covered as a separate item.  The main issues
   revolve around what gets logged, how long are logs kept and what
   mechanisms are used to secure the logged information while it is in
   transit and while it is stored.

2.7.1.  Threats / Attacks

   Attacks on the logged data can be both from passive or active
   sources.  Passive attacks are possible if someone has the capability
   to intercept data between the recipient logging server and the device
   the logged data originated from.  This can be accomplished if a
   single infrastructure device is somehow compromised and can act as a
   network sniffer or if it is possible to insert a new device which
   acts as a network sniffer.

   Active attacks are possible for both on-path and off-path scenarios.
   For on-path active attacks, the situation is the same as for a
   passive attack, where either a device has to already be compromised
   or a device can be inserted into the path.  For off-path active
   attacks, the attacks are generally limited to message insertion or
   modification which can alter the logged data to keep any compromise
   from being detected or to destroy any evidence which could be used
   for criminal prosecution.

2.7.1.1.  Confidentiality Violations

   Confidentiality violations can occur when a miscreant intercepts any
   of the logging data which is in transit on the network.  This could
   lead to privacy violations if some of the logged data has not been
   sanitized to disallow any data that could be a violation of privacy
   to be included in the logged data.



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2.7.1.2.  Offline Cryptographic Attacks

   If any cryptographic mechanism was used to provide for data integrity
   and confidentiality, an offline cryptographic attack could
   potentially compromise the data.  The traffic would need to be
   captured either by eavesdropping on the network or by being able to
   divert traffic to a malicious user.

2.7.1.3.  Replay Attacks

   For a replay attack to be successful, the logging data would need to
   first be captured either on-path or diverted to an attacker and later
   replayed to the recipient. [is reply handled by syslog protocol?]

2.7.1.4.  Message Insertion/Deletion/Modification

   Logging data could be injected, deleted or modified by someone in
   control of intermediate hosts.  Logging data can also be injected by
   forging packets from either legitimate or illegitimate IP addresses.

2.7.1.5.  Man-In-The-Middle

   A man-in-the-middle attack attacks the identity of a communicating
   peer rather than the data stream itself.  The attacker intercepts
   traffic that is sent between the infrastructure device and the
   logging server or traffic sent between the logging server and the
   database which is used to archive the logged data.  Any unauthorized
   access to logging information could lead to knowledge of private and
   proprietary network topology information which could be used to
   compromise portions of the network.  An additional concern is having
   access to logging information which could be deleted or modified so
   as to cover any traces of a security breach.

2.7.2.  Security Practices

   Logging is mostly performed on an exception auditing basis when it
   comes to filtering (i.e. traffic which is NOT allowed is logged).
   Typically the data logged will contain the source and destination IP
   addresses and layer 4 port numbers as well as a timestamp.  The
   syslog protocol is used to transfer the logged data between the
   infrastructure device to the syslog server.  Many ISPs use the OOB
   management network to transfer syslog data since there is virtually
   no security performed between the syslog server and the device.  All
   ISPs have multiple syslog servers - some ISPs choose to use separate
   syslog servers for varying infrastructure devices (i.e. one syslog
   server for backbone routers, one syslog server for customer edge
   routers, etc.)




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   The timestamp is derived from NTP which is generally configured as a
   flat hierarchy at stratum1 and stratum2 to have less configuration
   and less maintenance.  Each router is configured with one stratum1
   peer both locally and remotely.

   In addition to logging filtering exceptions, the following is
   typically logged: Routing protocol state changes, all device access
   (regardless of authentication success or failure), all commands
   issued to a device, all configuration changes and all router events
   (boot-up/flaps).

   The main function of any of these log messages is to see what the
   device is doing as well as to try and ascertain what certain
   malicious attackers are trying to do.  Some ISPs put in passive
   devices to see routing updates and withdrawals and not rely solely on
   the device for log files.  This provides a backup mechanism to see
   what is going on in the network in the event that a device may
   'forget' to do syslog if the CPU is busy.

   The logs from the various syslog server devices are generally
   transferred into databases at a set interval which can be anywhere
   from every 10 minutes to every hour.  One ISP uses Rsync to push the
   data into a database and then the information is sorted manually by
   someone SSH'ing to that database.

2.7.3.  Security Services


   o  User Authentication - Not applicable

   o  User Authorization - Not applicable

   o  Data Origin Authentication - Not implemented

   o  Access Control - Filtering on logging host and server IP address
      to ensure that syslog information only goes to specific syslog
      hosts.

   o  Data Integrity - Not implemented

   o  Data Confidentiality - Not implemented

   o  Auditing / Logging - This entire section deals with logging.

   o  DoS Mitigation - TBD






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2.7.4.  Additional Considerations

   There is no security with syslog and ISPs are fully cognizant of
   this.  IPsec is considered too operationally expensive and cumbersome
   to deploy.  Syslog-ng and stunnel are being looked at for providing
   better authenticated and integrity protected solutions.  Mechanisms
   to prevent unauthorized personnel from tampering with logs is
   constrained to auditing who has access to the logging servers and
   files.

   ISPs expressed requirements for more than just UDP syslog.  They
   would also like more granular and flexible facilities and priorities,
   i.e. specific logs to specific servers.

2.8.  Filtering Considerations

   Although filtering has been covered under many of the previous
   sections, this section will provide some more insights to the
   filtering considerations that are currently being taken into account.
   Filtering is now being categorized into three specific areas: data
   plane, management plane and routing control plane.

2.8.1.  Data Plane Filtering

   Data plane filters control the traffic that traverses through a
   device and affect transit traffic.  Most ISPs deploy these kinds of
   filters at the customer facing edge devices to mitigate spoofing
   attacks.

2.8.2.  Management Plane Filtering

   Management filters control the traffic to and from a device.  All of
   the protocols which are used for device management fall under this
   category and includes SSH, Telnet, SNMP, NTP, http, DNS, TFTP, FTP,
   SCP and Syslog.  This type of traffic is currently filtered per
   interface and is based on any combination of protocol, source and
   destination IP address and source and destination port number.  Note
   that logging the filtering rules can today place a burden on many
   systems and more granularity is often required to more specifically
   log the required exceptions.

   IPv6 networks require the use of specific ICMP messages for proper
   protocol operation.  Therefore, ICMP cannot be completely filtered to
   and from a device.  Instead, granular ICMPv6 filtering is always
   deployed to allow for specific ICMPv6 types to be sourced or destined
   to a network device.





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2.8.3.  Routing Control Plane Filtering

   Routing filters are used to control the flow of routing information.
   In IPv6 networks, some providers are liberal in accepting /48Os due
   to the still unresolved multihoming issues.  Anything longer than a
   /48 is discarded on EBGP.

2.9.  Denial of Service Tracking / Tracing

   Denial of Service attacks are an ever increasing problem and require
   vast amounts of resources to combat effectively.  Some large ISPs do
   not concern themselves with attack streams that are less than 1G in
   bandwidth - this is on the larger pipes where 1G is essentially less
   than 5% of offered load.  This is largely due to the large amounts of
   DDoS traffic which continually requires investigation and mitigation.
   At last count the number of hosts making up large distributed DoS
   BOTnets exceeded 1 million hosts.

   New techniques are continually evolving to automate the process of
   detecting DoS sources and mitigating any adverse effects as quickly
   as possible.  At this time, ISPs are using a variety of mitigation
   techniques including: sink hole routing, black-hole triggered
   routing, uRPF and rate limiting.  Each of these techniques will be
   detailed below.

2.9.1.  Sink Hole Routing

   Sink hole routing refers to injecting a more specific route for any
   known attack traffic which will ensure that the malicious traffic is
   redirected to a valid subnet or specific IP address where it can be
   analyzed.

2.9.2.  Black-Hole Triggered Routing

   Black-hole triggered routing is a technique where the BGP routing
   protocol is used to propagate static routes which in turn redirects
   attack traffic to the null interface where it is effectively dropped.
   This technique is often used in large routing infrastructures since
   BGP can propagate the information in a fast effective manner as
   opposed to using any packet-based filtering techniques on hundreds or
   thousands of routers.

2.9.3.  Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding

   Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) is a mechanism for validating
   whether an incoming packet has a legitimate source address or not.
   It has two modes: strict mode and loose mode.  In strict mode, uRPF
   checks whether the incoming packet has a source address that matches



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   a prefix in the routing table, and whether the interface expects to
   receive a packet with this source address prefix.  If the incoming
   packet fails the unicast RPF check, the packet is not accepted on the
   incoming interface.  Loose mode uRPF is not as specific and the
   incoming packet is accepted if there is any route in the routing
   table for the source address.

   uRPF is not used on interfaces that are likely to have routing
   asymmetry, meaning multiple routes to the source of a packet.
   Usually for ISPs, uRPF is placed at the customer edge of a network.

2.9.4.  Rate Limiting

   Rate limiting refers to allocating a specific amount of bandwidth or
   packets per second to specific traffic types.  This technique is
   widely used to mitigate well-known protocol attacks such as the TCP-
   SYN attack where a large number of resources get allocated for
   spoofed TCP traffic.  Although this technique does not stop an
   attack, it can lessen the damage and impact on a specific service.
































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3.  Security Considerations

   This entire document deals with current security practices in large
   ISP environments.  As a synopsis, a table is shown below which
   summarizes the operational functions which are to be protected and
   the security services which currently deployed security practices
   offer: [ Table to be added ]

4.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2828]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828,
              May 2000.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              July 2003.
































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Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   The editor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of: George
   Jones, who has been instrumental in providing guidance and direction
   for this document and the insighful comments from Ross Callon and the
   numerous ISP operators who supplied the information which is depicted
   in this document.












































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Appendix B.  Protocol Specific Attacks

   This section will enumerate many of the traditional protocol based
   attacks which have been observed over the years to cause malformed
   packets and/or exploit protocol deficiencies.

B.1.  Layer 2 Attacks


   o  ARP Flooding

B.2.  IPv4 Attacks


   o  IP Stream Option

   o  IP Address Spoofing

   o  IP Source Route Option

   o  IP Short header

   o  IP Malformed Packet

   o  Ip Bad Option

   o  Ip Address Session Limit

   o  Fragmenmts - too many

   o  Fragments - large offset

   o  Fragments - same offset

   o  Fragments - reassembly with different offsets (TearDrop Attac)

   o  Fragments - reassembly off by one IP header (Nestea Attack)

   o  Fragment - flooding only initial fragment (Rose Attack)

   o  IGMP oversized packet

   o  ICMP Source Quench

   o  ICMP Mask Request

   o  ICMP Large Packet (> 1472)




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   o  ICMP Oversized packet (>65536)

   o  ICMP Flood

   o  ICMP Broadcast w/ Spoofed Source (Smurf Attack)

   o  ICMP Error Packet Flood

   o  ICMP Spoofed Unreachable

   o  TCP Packet without Flag

   o  TCP Oversized Packet

   o  TCP FIN bit with no ACK bit

   o  TCP Packet with URG/OOB flag (Nuke Attack)

   o  SYN Fragments

   o  SYN Flood

   o  SYN with IP Spoofing (Land Attack)

   o  SYN and FIN bits set

   o  TCP port scan attack

   o  UDP spoofed broadcast echo (Fraggle Attack)

   o  UDP attack on diag ports (Pepsi Attack)

B.3.  IPv6 Attacks

   Any of the above-mentioned IPv4 attacks could be used in IPv6
   networks with the exception of any fragmentation and broadcast
   traffic, which operate differently in IPv6.

   Today, IPv6 enabled hosts are starting to be used to create IPv6
   tunnels which can effectively hide botnet and other malicious traffic
   if firewalls and network flow collection tools are not capable of
   detecting this traffic.









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Author's Address

   Merike Kaeo
   Double Shot Security, Inc.
   520 Washington Blvd. #363
   Marina Del Rey, CA  90292
   U.S.A.

   Phone: +1 310 866 0165
   Email: merike@doubleshotsecurity.com









































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