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Versions: (draft-jones-opsec-framework) 00 01
02 03 04 05
OPSEC Working Group G. Jones
Internet-Draft The MITRE Corporation
Expires: April 20, 2006 R. Callon
Juniper Networks
M. Kaeo
Double Shot Security
October 17, 2005
Framework for Operational Security Capabilities for IP Network
Infrastructure
draft-ietf-opsec-framework-01
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
This document outlines work to be done and documents to be produced
by the Operational Security Capabilities (OPSEC) Working Group. The
goal of the working group is to codify knowledge gained through
operational experience about feature sets that are needed to securely
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deploy and operate managed network elements providing transit
services at the data link and IP layers. The intent is to provide
clear, concise documentation of capabilities necessary for operating
networks securely, to assist network operators in communicating their
requirements to vendors, and to provide vendors with input that is
useful for building more secure devices. The working group will
produce a list of capabilities appropriate for large Internet Service
Provider (ISP) and Enterprise Networks. This work is intended to
refine [RFC3871].
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.1. Threats Addressed, Threats Not Addressed . . . . . . . 4
1.3.2. Active, Passive and Combined Attacks . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.3. Categories of Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.4. Threat Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4. Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4.1. Passive attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4.2. Eavesdropping/Sniffing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4.3. Off-line Cryptographic Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4.4. Active Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4.5. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4.6. Message Insertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4.7. Message Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4.8. Message Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4.9. Man-In-The-Middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4.10. Invalid Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.6. Intended Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.7. Format and Definition of Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.8. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.9. Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.10. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2. Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1. Framework Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2. Operator Practices Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3. Standards Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4. Capabilities Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5. Profile Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6. Deliberations Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 22
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1. Introduction
1.1. Goals
The goal of the Operational Security Working Group is to codify
knowledge gained through operational experience about feature sets
that are needed to securely deploy and operate managed network
elements providing transit services at the data link and IP layers.
It is anticipated that the codification of this knowledge will be an
aid to vendors in producing more securable network elements, and an
aid to operators in increasing security by deploying and configuring
more secure network elements.
This framework document provides an overview of the work to be done
by the working group, and describes the documents to be produced in
this effort.
1.2. Motivation
Network operators need the appropriate feature sets and tools on
their infrastructure devices to ensure that they can effectively
deploy and manage their networks securely while maintaining the
ability to provide reliable service to their customers. Vendors need
guidelines on which security features and functionality are critical
for operators to be able to reach that goal.
1.3. Threat Model
1.3.1. Threats Addressed, Threats Not Addressed
This section describes the general classes of threats that this work
intends to address. Specific threats and attacks will be discussed
in the documents which are referred to in this framework. Each of
those documents will enumerate the capabilities which are required to
mitigate the risk of these specific threats.
The intent is to address real-world threats to and attacks on network
infrastructure devices which have severely impacted network
operations or have immediate potential to do so. The intent is NOT
to build a complete theoretical threat model or list every possible
attack.
The threats will be limited to those that affect the management of
network infrastructure and its ability to transit traffic. Threats
to the confidentiality and integrity of transit traffic will not be
addressed.
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1.3.2. Active, Passive and Combined Attacks
[RFC3552] describes a general Internet threat model which readers of
this document should be familiar with. It defines a threat model to
describes the capabilities that an attacker is assumed to be able to
deploy against a resource. [RFC3552] classifies attacks into two
main categories: passive attacks and active attacks. Passive attacks
are ones where an attacker simply reads information off the network
and obtains confidential and/or private information which can be used
to compromise network systems. Active attacks are ones where the
attacker writes data to the network and can include replay attacks,
message insertion, message deletion, message modification and man-in-
the-middle attacks. Often, these passive and active attacks are
combined. For example, routing information is diverted via a man-in-
the-middle attack to force confidential information to transit a
network path on which the attacker is able to perform eavesdropping.
1.3.3. Categories of Threats
The following sections provide a model that can be used to further
categorize attacks on infrastructure devices and/or the operating
behavior of these devices, and also gives some examples of attacks
which fall into each classification.
It is common to categorize threats based on the effects or damage
caused by associated attacks. For example, threats generally fall
under one of the three categories as defined in [RFC2196]:
o Unauthorized access to resources and/or information
o Unintended and/or unauthorized disclosure of information
o Denial of service
There are a number of attacks, any one of which, if exploited, can
lead to any of the above mentioned threats. As one example, if an
intruder has taken control of a router (for example by guessing the
password) then he could potentially obtain unauthorized access to
resources, could gain unauthorized disclosure of information, and
could also deny service to legitimate users. This method of
categorizing threats based on the result of the threat therefore
results in categories which are orthogonal to the cause of the
effect, and thus orthogonal to the device capabilities which are
needed.
Categorization of attacks based on the capabilities required to mount
the attack will allow the analysis and description of the attacks to
be more closely aligned with the product capabilities required to
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defeat or mitigate the attack.
1.3.4. Threat Sources
The sources of threats in an operational network take many forms.
Some sources can be intentional, such as a malicious intruder
actively gaining access to an unauthorized resource or causing a
denial of service attack. Other sources can be unintentional but
still render the network unusable, such as software bugs or
configuration mistakes. Many of the unintentional threat sources can
be difficult to recognize or prevent. However wherever possible,
capabilities and functionality will be defined which minimize the
extent of the damage done under these circumstances.
Threats can originate from outside or inside and can be due to
vulnerabilities in a device or weaknesses in operational processes.
Inside threats pertain to an authorized participant in the operation
of the network performing unauthorized actions. Outside threats
pertain to any unauthorized network devices or person causing havoc
with normal network operations.
On Path network devices are able to read, modify, or remove any
datagram transmitted along a given path. Off-path hosts can transmit
arbitrary datagrams that appear to come from any hosts but cannot
necessarily receive datagrams intended for other hosts.
1.4. Attacks
This section specifies attack categories based on the capabilities
required to mount the attack and provides more granular detail of
many of the identifiable and recognized threats to which network
infrastructure devices are susceptible.
1.4.1. Passive attacks
Passive attacks are ones where an attacker simply reads information
off the network and obtains confidential and/or private information
which can be used to compromise network systems.
1.4.2. Eavesdropping/Sniffing
The most common form of passive attack is eavesdropping, where the
attacker is able to read the data which is being transmitted from the
sender to the receiver. In any operational network, the entire data
path and every device involved in the data path must be considered
for this type of attack. Any information which could be used to
potentially gain unauthorized access to a device or is private must
be protected. This includes passwords, configuration files and log
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files. It is common to think only of protecting the data path and to
make sure that data is not diverted along a different path which may
be easier to eavesdrop on, such as a wireless network. In many
instances it would be wise to consider cryptographically protecting
data confidentiality wherever sensitive information is involved.
1.4.3. Off-line Cryptographic Attacks
These attacks typically capture some data which has been
cryptographically protected and then use varying means to try and
recover the original data. Poor password protection protocols can
easily be reverse engineered and poorly chosen passwords can also be
easily deciphered. As described in [RFC3552], a number of popular
password-based challenge response protocols are vulnerable to a
dictionary attack. The attacker captures a challenge-response pair
and then proceeds to try entries from a list of common words (such as
a dictionary file) until he finds a password that produces the right
response.
1.4.4. Active Attacks
Active attacks are ones where the attacker writes data to the
network. Generally, any part of a data packet can be forged. When
the source IP address is forged, the attack is generally referred to
as a spoofing attack. These attacks can be mitigated by filtering
traffic based on IP addresses to only allow legitimate traffic to/
from a network.
Not all active attacks require forged addresses and most systems are
susceptible to a number of common attack patterns which are described
in the next sections. Note that any type of active attack can be
used for Denial of Service if the traffic is sent at such a rate that
it exceeds a networks link capacity or exhausts device resources.
1.4.5. Replay Attacks
A replay attack is a combination of a passive and an active attack.
In this type of attack, the attacker records some number of messages
off of the wire and then plays them back to the original recipient.
Note that the attacker does not need to be able to understand the
messages. He merely needs to capture and re-transmit them.
1.4.6. Message Insertion
In a message insertion attack, the attacker forges one or more
messages and injects them into the network. Often these messages
will have a forged source address in order to disguise the identity
of the attacker.
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Message insertion attacks can be used to exploit known
vulnerabilities in protocol software. Routers and switches implement
protocols which in some cases make use of software which is well
known and widely deployed. Malicious attackers therefore may be
familiar with the protocol software and be able to exploit known
vulnerabilities.
1.4.7. Message Modification
In a message modification attack, the attacker removes a message from
the wire, modifies it, and then resends it. The contents of the
message may be modified and/or the intended recipient. [need example
specific to network operations where this would be harmful]
1.4.8. Message Deletion
In a message deletion attack, the attacker simply removes a message
from the wire. [need example specific to network operations where
this is harmful]
1.4.9. Man-In-The-Middle
A Man-In-The-Middle attack combines the above techniques in a special
form: The attacker subverts the communication stream in order to pose
as the sender to receiver and the receiver to the sender. This
differs fundamentally from the above forms of attack because it
attacks the identity of the communicating parties, rather than the
data stream itself. Consequently, many techniques which provide
integrity of the communications stream are insufficient to protect
against man-in-the-middle attacks.
Man-in-the-middle attacks are possible whenever peer entity
authentication is not used. For example, it is trivial to mount man-
in-the-middle attacks on local networks via ARP spoofing where the
attacker forges an ARP with the victim's IP address and his own MAC
address to gain access to a network. The attacker can then do
further damage by sending forged messages. Imagine if the victim^Os
IP address was that of a TFTP server. The attacker could potentially
download invalid system images or configuration files to a network
device and subsequently compromise that network device.
1.4.10. Invalid Message
An invalid message attack refers to situations which can be either
deliberately invoked or are due to some non-malicious software or
configuration error. This attack can be realized if vendors do not
conform to standards and send inappropriate control packets which can
cause routing loops or neighboring routers to go down. Also, a
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malicious individual may launch DoS attacks which flood a device's
control plane with enough messages that the device becomes inoperable
due to resource starvation.
[Ed. - Need to review existing capabilities. Do the threats and
attack types listed above cover them all ? Are there capabilities
that imply threats and attack classes not listed above]
1.5. Scope
The working group will produce a list of capabilities appropriate
for:
o Internet Service Provider (ISP) Networks
o Enterprise Networks
The following are explicitly out of scope:
o general purpose hosts that do not transit traffic including
infrastructure hosts such as name/time/log/AAA servers, etc.,
o unmanaged devices,
o customer managed devices (e.g. firewalls, Intrusion Detection
System, dedicated VPN devices, etc.),
o SOHO (Small Office, Home Office) devices (e.g. personal firewalls,
Wireless Access Points, Cable Modems, etc.),
o confidentiality of customer data,
o integrity of customer data,
o physical security.
These limitations have been made to keep the amount of work and size
of documents manageable. While the capabilities listed here may
apply to systems outside the scope, no capabilities have been added
to account for their unique needs.
While the examples given are written with IPv4 in mind, most of the
capabilities are general enough to apply to IPv6.
1.6. Intended Audience
There are two intended audiences: the network operator who selects,
purchases, and operates IP network equipment, and the vendors who
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create these devices.
1.7. Format and Definition of Capabilities
A separate document will be created for specific categories of
capabilities. Each individual capability will have the following
elements:
Capability (what)
The capability describes a policy to be supported by the device.
Capabilities should not refer to specific technologies. It is
expected that desired capability will change little over time.
Supported Practices (why)
The Supported Practice section cites practices described in CITE-
OPERATOR-SURVEY-RFC that are supported by this capability. The
need to support the cited practices provides the justification for
the feature.
In a few cases, practices not listed in CITE-OPERATOR-SURVEY-RFC
may be listed at the end of the capability document and cited as
justification for a capability. This may be necessary if a
practice becomes common after CITE-OPERATOR-SURVEY-RFC is finished
or if there is widespread consensus that the practice would
improve security but it is not, for whatever reason, in widespread
deployment.
Current Implementations (how)
The Current Implementation section is intended to give examples of
implementations of the capability, citing technology and standards
current at the time of writing. Examples of configuration and
usage may also be given.
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Considerations
The Considerations section lists operational and resource
constraints, limitations of current implementations, tradeoffs,
etc.
1.8. Applicability
These capabilities are intended to give guidance on how best to
protect communications infrastructure. Service Providers, Network
Operators, and Equipment Suppliers are encouraged to study these
capabilities, and prioritize the extent and manner in which they may
implement and/or deploy equipment supporting these capabilities.
Decisions of whether or not to support a specific capabilities are
intended to be left with the responsible organization (e.g., Service
Provider, Network Operator, or Equipment Supplier). Due to the
continuously evolving nature of security threats to networks, and due
to significant variations in the specific security threats and
requirements in different network environments, it is not appropriate
to mandate implementation of these capabilities through legislation
or regulation, nor would any mandate be consistent with their intent.
1.9. Intended Use
It is anticipated that the capabilities in these documents will be
used for the following purposes:
o as a checklist when evaluating networked products,
o to create profiles of different subsets of the capabilities which
describe the needs of different devices, organizations, and
operating environments,
o to assist operators in clearly communicating their security
requirements,
o as high level guidance for the creation of detailed test plans.
o as guidance for vendors to make appropriate decisions for
engineering feature roadmaps.
1.10. Definitions
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RFC 2119 Keywords
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL"
in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
NOTE: The following definitions are take from RFC3871. Unless
otherwise stated, the working group documents will use these terms as
defined below.
Bogon.
A "Bogon" (plural: "bogons") is a packet with an IP source address
in an address block not yet allocated by IANA or the Regional
Internet Registries (ARIN, RIPE, APNIC...) as well as all
addresses reserved for private or special use by RFCs. See
[RFC3330] and [RFC1918].
CLI.
Several capabilities refer to a Command Line Interface (CLI).
While this refers at present to a classic text oriented command
interface, it is not intended to preclude other mechanisms which
may provide all the capabilities that reference "CLI".
Conformance.
Adherence to proposed standards.
Console.
Several capabilities refer to a "Console". The model for this is
the classic RS232 serial port which has, for the past 30 or more
years, provided a simple, stable, reliable, well-understood and
nearly ubiquitous management interface to network devices. Again,
these capabilities are intended primarily to codify the benefits
provided by that venerable interface, not to preclude other
mechanisms that provide the same capabilities.
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Filter.
In this document, a "filter" is defined as a group of one or more
rules where each rule specifies one or more match criteria.
In-Band management.
"In-Band management" is defined as any management done over the
same channels and interfaces used for user/customer data.
Examples would include using SSH for management via customer or
Internet facing network interfaces.
High Resolution Time.
"High resolution time" is defined in this document as "time having
a resolution greater than one second" (e.g. milliseconds).
IP.
Unless otherwise indicated, "IP" refers to IPv4.
Management.
This document uses a broad definition of the term "management".
In this document, "management" refers to any authorized
interaction with the device intended to change its operational
state or configuration. Data/Forwarding plane functions (e.g. the
transit of customer traffic) are not considered management.
Control plane functions such as routing, signaling and link
management protocols and management plane functions such as remote
access, configuration and authentication are considered to be
management.
Martian.
Per [RFC1208] "Martian: Humorous term applied to packets that turn
up unexpectedly on the wrong network because of bogus routing
entries. Also used as a name for a packet which has an altogether
bogus (non-registered or ill-formed) Internet address." For the
purposes of this document Martians are defined as "packets having
a source address that, by application of the current forwarding
tables, would not have its return traffic routed back to the
sender." "Spoofed packets" are a common source of martians.
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Note that in some cases, the traffic may be asymmetric, and a
simple forwarding table check might produce false positives. See
[RFC3704]
Out-of-Band (OoB) management.
"Out-of-Band management" is defined as any management done over
channels and interfaces that are separate from those used for
user/customer data. Examples would include a serial console
interface or a network interface connected to a dedicated
management network that is not used to carry customer traffic.
Open Review.
"Open review" refers to processes designed to generate public
discussion and review of technical solutions such as data
communications protocols and cryptographic algorithms with the
goals of improving and building confidence in the final solutions.
For the purposes of this document "open review" is defined by
[RFC2026]. All standards track documents are considered to have
been through an open review process.
It should be noted that organizations may have local requirements
that define what they view as acceptable "open review". For
example, they may be required to adhere to certain national or
international standards. Such modifications of the definition of
the term "open review", while important, are considered local
issues that should be discussed between the organization and the
vendor.
It should also be noted that section 7 of [RFC2026] permits
standards track documents to incorporate other "external standards
and specifications".
PBR.
Policy Based Routing.
Resource Starvation.
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A condition where resources necessary for communication and proper
functioning of a network element are unavailable. Such resources
might include Bandwidth of a link, memory of a routing device, or
CPU time on a routing processor.
Secure Channel.
A "secure channel" is a mechanism that ensures end-to-end
integrity and confidentiality of communications. Examples include
TLS [RFC2246] and IPsec [RFC2401]. Connecting a terminal to a
console port using physically secure, shielded cable would provide
confidentiality but possibly not integrity.
Service.
A number of capabilities refer to "services". For the purposes of
this document a "service" is defined as "any process or protocol
running in the control or management planes to which non-transit
packets may be delivered". Examples might include an SSH server,
a BGP process or an NTP server. It would also include the
transport, network and link layer protocols since, for example, a
TCP packet addressed to a port on which no service is listening
will be "delivered" to the IP stack, and possibly result in an
ICMP message being sent back.
Session.
An instance of protocol establishment, e.g. telnet, BGP, OSPF,
etc.
Single-Homed Network.
A "single-homed network" is defined as one for which
* There is only one upstream connection
* Routing is symmetric.
See [RFC3704] for a discussion of related issues and mechanisms
for multi-homed networks.
Spoofed Packet.
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A "spoofed packet" is defined as a packet that has a source
address that does not correspond to any address assigned to the
system which sent the packet. Spoofed packets are often "bogons"
or "martians".
Secure Network
For the purposes of these documents, a secure network is one in
which:
* The network keeps passing legitimate customer traffic
(availability).
* Traffic goes where it is supposed to go, and only where it is
supposed to go (availability, confidentiality).
* The network elements remain manageable (availability).
* Only authorized users can manage network elements
(authorization).
* There is a record of all security related events
(accountability).
* The network operator has the necessary tools to detect and
respond to illegitimate traffic.
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2. Documents
The following describes the types of documents to be produced by the
OPSEC working group. Each document is intended to cover an area
important to secure operation of large network infrastructure. See
the working group charter for a complete list of individual
documents.
2.1. Framework Document
Overview
This document.
2.2. Operator Practices Survey
Overview
This document is intended to provide a survey of current operator
practices in the area of securing networks. It lists current
practices that will be cited as justification for capabilities.
It defines a general threat model and classes of attacks.
2.3. Standards Survey
Overview
This document provides an overview of other efforts in developing
standards, guidelines, best practices, or other information
intended to facilitate improvement in network security. Any
effort which is known, such as the ANSI T1.276, the NRIC V "Best
Practices", ITU-T M.3016 and X.805, the T1S1 effort on securing
signalling will be included. The intent is to provide a clear
understanding of which efforts are complementary and/or
contradictory such that any efforts of future cross-certification
of standards may be facilitated.
2.4. Capabilities Documents
Overview
Capability documents list capabilities needed to support security
practices. Each capability document lists capabilities of one
logical group of functions (e.g. logging, filtering, etc.). They
define a threat model, list individual capabilities, cite
practices supported in the Operator Practices Survey and in few
cases may define additional practices.
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2.5. Profile Documents
Overview
Profile documents list capabilities appropriate to different
operating environments such as large Network Service Provider
(NSP) core or edge devices or enterprise networks. These profiles
MAY provide a good starting point for organizations to generate
their own list of requirements.
2.6. Deliberations Document
Overview
The deliberations document is intended to capture discussion, list
reasons for choices made, and give reasons for the inclusion and
exclusion of certain capabilities form the documents. This is
intended to provide insight to future work.
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3. Security Considerations
Security is the entire focus of this document.
4. Normative References
[RFC1208] Jacobsen, O. and D. Lynch, "Glossary of networking terms",
RFC 1208, March 1991.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2196] Fraser, B., "Site Security Handbook", RFC 2196,
September 1997.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, January 1999.
[RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[RFC3330] IANA, "Special-Use IPv4 Addresses", RFC 3330,
September 2002.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
July 2003.
[RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004.
[RFC3871] Jones, G., "Operational Security Requirements for Large
Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network
Infrastructure", RFC 3871, September 2004.
Jones, et al. Expires April 20, 2006 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft OpSec Framework October 2005
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of:
o Acknowledgments to be determined.
o The MITRE Corporation for supporting development of this document.
NOTE: The author's affiliation with The MITRE Corporation is
provided for identification purposes only, and is not intended to
convey or imply MITRE's concurrence with, or support for, the
positions, opinions or viewpoints expressed by the author.
o This listing is intended to acknowledge contributions, not to
imply that the individual or organizations approve the content of
this document.
o Apologies to those who commented on/contributed to the document
and were not listed.
Jones, et al. Expires April 20, 2006 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft OpSec Framework October 2005
Authors' Addresses
George M. Jones
The MITRE Corporation
7515 Colshire Drive, M/S WEST
McLean, Virginia 22102-7508
U.S.A.
Phone: +1 703 488 9740
Email: gmjones@mitre.org
Ross Callon
Juniper Networks
10 Technology Park Drive
Westford, MA 01886
U.S.A.
Phone: +1 978 692 6724
Email: rcallon@juniper.net
Merike Kaeo
Double Shot Security
520 Washington Blvd. #363
Marina Del Rey, CA 90292
U.S.A.
Phone: +1 310 866 0165
Email: kaeo@merike.com
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Internet-Draft OpSec Framework October 2005
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Jones, et al. Expires April 20, 2006 [Page 22]
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