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Versions: 00 01

Opsec Working Group                                              J. Gill
Internet-Draft                                          Verizon Business
Intended status: Informational                                  D. Lewis
Expires: March 4, 2007                                          P. Quinn
                                                      Cisco Systems Inc.
                                                          P. Schoenmaker
                                                             NTT America
                                                         August 31, 2006


                Service Provider Infrastructure Security
              draft-ietf-opsec-infrastructure-security-00

Status of this Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 4, 2007.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   This RFC describes best current practices for implementing Service
   Provider network infrastructure protection for network elements.
   This RFC complements and extends RFC 2267 and RFC 3704.  RFC 2267
   provides guidelines for filtering traffic on the ingress to service



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   provider networks.  RFC 3704 expands the recommendations described in
   RFC 2267 to address operational filtering guidelines for single and
   multi-homed environments.  The focus of those RFCs is on filtering
   packets on ingress to a network, regardless of destination, if those
   packets have a spoofed source address, or if the source address fall
   within "reserved" address space.  Deployment of RFCs 2267 and 3704
   has limited the effects of denial of service attacks by dropping
   ingress packets with spoofed source addresses, which in turn offers
   other benefits by ensuring that packets coming into a network
   originate from validly allocated and consistent sources.  This
   document focuses solely on traffic destined to elements of the the
   network infrastructure itself.  This document presents techniques
   that, together with network edge ingress filtering and RFC 2267 and
   RFC 3704, provides a defense in depth approach for infrastructure
   protection.  This document does not present recommendations for
   protocol validation (i.e. "sanity checking") nor does it address
   guidelines for general security configuration.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].




























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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Overview of Infrastructure Protection Techniques . . . . . . .  5
     2.1.  Edge Remarking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  Device and Element Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.3.  Infrastructure Hiding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Edge Infrastructure Access Control Lists . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Constructing the Access List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  Other Traffic  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.3.  Edge Infrastructure Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  Edge Rewrite/Remarking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.1.  Edge Rewrite/Remarking Discussion  . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.2.  Edge Rewriting/Remarking Performance Considerations  . . .  8
   5.  Device/Element Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.1.  Service Specific Access Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       5.1.1.  Common Services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.2.  Aggregate Device Access Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       5.2.1.  IP Fragments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       5.2.2.  Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       5.2.3.  Access Control Implementation Guide  . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.3.  Device Access Authorization and Accounting . . . . . . . . 10
   6.  Infrastructure Hiding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     6.1.  Use Less IP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     6.2.  MPLS Techniques  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     6.3.  IGP Configuration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     6.4.  Route Advertisement Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       6.4.1.  Route Announcement Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       6.4.2.  Address Core Out of RFC 1918 Space . . . . . . . . . . 11
     6.5.  Further obfuscation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.  IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     7.1.  Use LIPv6 Edge Infrastructure Access Control Lists . . . . 12
     7.2.  IPv6 Edge Remarking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     7.3.  IPv6 Device and Element Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     7.4.  IPv6 Infrastructure Hiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   8.  IP Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     8.1.  Multicast Group Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     8.2.  Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     8.3.  IPv6 and Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 16






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1.  Introduction

   This RFC describes best current practices for implementing Service
   Provider network infrastructure protection for network elements.  RFC
   2267 and RFC 3704 focuses on limiting the effects of denial of
   service attacks by filtering ingress packets with spoofed source
   addresses.  This offers additional benefits by ensuring that packets
   coming into a network originate from validly allocated and consistent
   sources.  RFC 3704 extends the recommendations described in RFC 2267
   to address operational filtering guidelines for single and multi-
   homed environments.  In both cases (RFC 2267 and RFC 3704), the focus
   is on dropping packets on ingress, regardless of destination, if
   those packets are have a spoofed source address or if the source of
   the packet falls within "reserved" address space.  This document both
   refines and extends the filtering best practices outlined in RFC 2267
   and RFC 3704 and focuses only on traffic destined to the network
   infrastructure itself to protect the service provider network from
   denial of service and other attacks.  This document presents
   techniques that, together with network edge ingress filtering and RFC
   2267 and RFC 3704, provides a defense in depth approach for
   infrastructure protection.  Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are
   common and the network infrastructure itself is a target.

   Attacks targeting the network infrastructure can take many forms,
   including bandwidth saturation to crafted packets destined to a
   router.  These attacks might use spoofed source addresses or they
   might use the true source address of of the traffic.  Regardless of
   the nature of the attack, the network infrastructure must be
   protected from both accidental floods and intentional attacks.
   Additionally, this protection will assist in preventing the network
   elements from being used as reflectors in attacks against others.

   The techniques outlined in this document and described in section 2
   below, describe best practices for infrastructure protection: edge
   policy (filtering and precedence), per device traffic policy
   enforcement for packets destined to a device and, limiting of address
   and routing visibility to reduce exposure to limit core network --
   that is provider (P) and provider edge (PE) infrastructure --
   attacks.  This document is targeted at network operators seeking to
   limit their exposure to risks associated with denial of service
   targeting the infrastructure.  These techniques are designed to be
   used in addition to specific protocol or application security
   features implemented in network devices.

   Infrastructure protection is a complex topic.  While the best
   practices outlines in this document do not provide perfect
   protection, they can significantly improve the protection of the
   network infrastructure.



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2.  Overview of Infrastructure Protection Techniques

   This section provides an overview of recommended techniques that may
   be used to protect network infrastructure.  The details of each area,
   along with some deployment consideration, are described in detail in
   subsequent sections.  The four technique describes in this document
   are: - Edge Infrastructure Access Control List - Edge Remarking -
   Device and Element Protection - Infrastructure Hiding The above list
   is not exhaustive; other mechanisms can be used to provide additional
   protection.  The techniques discussed in this document have been
   widely deployment and have proven operational security benefits in
   large networks.

2.1.  Edge Remarking

   Edge Remarking, detailed in section 4, ensures that ingress IP
   precedence or DSCP values match expected values within the context of
   security.  This provides another layer of defense, particularly for
   traffic permitted through any of the Edge Infrastructure Access
   Control Lists.  This document focuses only on using Edge Remarking
   best practices to enforce security policies.

2.2.  Device and Element Protection

   Each network infrastructure device should enforce local rules for
   traffic destined to the device itself.  These rules can take the form
   of filters (permit/deny) or rate limiting rules that allow ingress
   traffic at specified rates.  These should complement any existing
   Edge Infrastructure Access Control Lists and are described in more
   detail in section 5.  The deployment of these local device protection
   rules complements the edge techniques by protecting the device from
   traffic that: i) was permitted but violates device policy, ii) could
   not be filtered at the edge, iii) entered the network on an interface
   that did not have ingress filtering enabled.

2.3.  Infrastructure Hiding

   Hiding the infrastructure of the network provides an elegant
   mechanism for protecting the network infrastructure.  If the
   destination of an attack is to an infrastructure address that is
   unreachable, attacks become far more difficult.  Infrastructure
   hiding can be achieved in several ways: - MPLS techniques - IGP
   configuration - Route advertisement control Section 6 covers
   infrastructure hiding techniques.







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3.  Edge Infrastructure Access Control Lists

   Edge Infrastructure Access Control Lists (EIACLs) are a specific
   implementation of the more general Ingress Access List.  As opposed
   to generic ingress filtering which denies data (sometimes referred to
   as user) plane traffic, edge infrastructure access control lists do
   not attempt to deny transit traffic; rather, this form of access
   control limits traffic destined to infrastructureequipment while
   permitting -- if needed, explicitly -- traffic through the network.

3.1.  Constructing the Access List

   Edge Infrastructure Access Control Lists permit only required traffic
   destined to the network infrastructure, while allowing data plane
   traffic to flow through unfiltered.  The basic premise of EIACLs is
   that only a relatively limited subset of traffic, sourced from
   outside an AS, needs to be destined towards a core router and that by
   explicitly permitting only that known and understood traffic, the
   core devices are not subjected to unnecessary traffic that might
   result in a denial of service.  Since edge infrastructure access
   control lists protect only the infrastructure, the development of the
   list differs somewhat from "traditional" access filter lists:

   1.  Review addressing scheme, and identify address block(s) that
       represent core devices.

   2.  Determine what traffic must be destined to the core devices from
       outside the AS.

   3.  Create a filter that allow the required traffic, denies all
       traffic destined to the core address block and then finally,
       permits all other traffic.

   As with other ingress filtering techniques, EIACLs are applied on
   ingress interfaces, as close to the edge as possible.  Comprehensive
   coverage (i.e. on as many interface as possible) yields the most
   protection.

3.2.  Other Traffic

   In addition to the explicitly permitted traffic, EIACLs can be
   combined with other common edge filters such as: 1.  Source spoof
   prevention (as per RFC 3704) by denying internal AS addresses as
   external sources. 2.  Filtering of reserved addresses (e.g. rfc1918
   addresses) as traffic should not be sourced from reserved address. 3.
   Other unneeded or unnecessary traffic Filtering this traffic can be
   part of the list explicitly or implicitly; explicit filters often
   provide log-able information that can be of use during a security



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   event.

3.3.  Edge Infrastructure Conclusion

   Edge Infrastructure Access Control Lists provide a very effective
   first line of defense.  EIACLs are not perfect and cannot protect the
   network against every attack.  Furthermore, to be manageable, EIACLs
   must be able to clearly and simply identify infrastructure address
   space.  To be effective, the EIACLs should be deployed as widely as
   possible at the edge of the network on devices that support the
   required filtering performance characteristics.


4.  Edge Rewrite/Remarking

   RFC 1812 section 5.3 defines the use of IP Preference in IPv4 packets
   for routing, management and control traffic.  In addition, the RFC
   recommends that devices use a mechanism for providing preferential
   forwarding for packets marked as routing, management or control
   traffic using IP Preference bits 6 or 7 (110 or 111 in binary.)
   RFC2474 defines DSCP and the compatibility of IP Preference bits when
   using DSCP.  All packets received by customer- and peer-facing
   Provider Edge (PE) router interfaces with IP Preference values of 6
   or 7 or DSCP bits of 11xxxx, as specified in RFC2474 Differentiated
   Services Field Definition, should have the IP Preference bits
   rewritten.  Routing traffic received from customer- and peer-facing
   interfaces can safely have the IP Preference bits rewritten because
   only a limited number of protocols are transmitted beyond the first
   PE router.  The bits may be rewritten to any value other than IP
   Preference values 6 or 7, or any DSCP value other than 11xxxx.  The
   new value can be based on the network operators IP Preference or DSCP
   policy.  If no policy exists the bits should be rewritten to 0.

   In cases where control, management, and routing traffic enters the
   provider network via the customer- and peer-facing interfaces policy
   should be employed to ensure proper prioritization of critical
   traffic.  EIACLs maybe be used facilitate the proper classification
   of traffic.  To offer fully transparent service, a provider may not
   wish to modify the IP precedence on transit traffic through the
   network.  If a provider has alternate means of applying different
   prioritization to router management and control traffic and transit
   traffic then rewriting IP precedence bits is not required.

4.1.  Edge Rewrite/Remarking Discussion

   By default router vendors do not differentiate an interface on a PE
   router connected to a P router from an interface connected to a CE
   router.  As a result any packet with the proper IP Preference or DSCP



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   bits set may receive the same preferential forwarding behavior as
   legitimate routing, management, and control traffic.  A malicious
   attack may be able to take advantage of the vulnerability to increase
   the effectiveness of the attack or to attack the routing, management,
   and/or control traffic directly.  This document is aimed at
   protecting network infrastructure from traffic to the device rather
   than traffic through the device.  Even though the edge rewrite/
   remarking deals primarily with traffic through a device it is
   included because the traffic has a direct impact on traffic to a
   device.  The forwarding prioritization given to routing, management,
   and control traffic by default leaves devices vulnerable to indirect
   attacks to the infrastructure.  By rewriting the IP Precedence at the
   PE protection is provided for both traffic through the network along
   with traffic that is to the network that is not blocked by other
   methods discussed in this document.  This document assumes that all
   customer- and peer-facing interfaces cannot be trusted for inter-
   domain diff-serv.  In cases where a trust relationship exists for
   inter-domain diff-serv, diff-serv bits 1xxxxxxx do not have to be
   rewritten.

4.2.  Edge Rewriting/Remarking Performance Considerations

   Device resources required must be taken into consideration when
   rewriting/remarking IP Precedence/DSCP bits.  Devices may require
   additional resources to rewrite/remark packets.


5.  Device/Element Protection

   Even with the widest possible deployment of the techniques described
   above in the section Infrastructure Edge Access Control, the
   individual devices of the network must implement access control
   mechanisms.  This is required because, in addition to the case of
   incomplete or imperfect deployment of edge infrastructure control,
   threats may coem from from trusted sources within the perimeter of
   the network.

5.1.  Service Specific Access Control

   Typically these mechanisms are not directly concerned with protecting
   the availability of the device as a whole, but the device from
   exploitation via the service concerned.  Analysis of the behavior of
   widly deployed serivce security features shows that maximizing the
   security of the particular service, not overall system availability,
   is the primary goal of the feature.  There are many practical
   examples of vendor specific security mechanisms, the references
   section provides likes to several of them.  These should guide the
   operator in securing the services that they enable.



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5.1.1.  Common Services

   While each service implemented by network equipment manufacturers
   differs in its available security features there are some common
   services and security features for those services that have been
   widely deployed.  The most important first step for the operator is
   to disable any unneeded/unused services.  This reduces the devices
   profile.  If the device is not listening to a port, it is much more
   difficult to attack via that port.  Second, the operator should
   utilize the services access control mechanisms to limit the access to
   the devices service to only required sources.  Examples of per serive
   security are using virtual terminal access control lists, or SNMP
   Community access control lists.

5.2.  Aggregate Device Access Control

   The device must be protected from denial of service threats, in
   addition, aggregating the security policy -- as opposed to defining
   it on a per service basis -- allows for a simplified view of the
   access policies traffic going to the device.  A key requirement of
   these mechanisms is that it must not impact transit data plane
   traffic.

5.2.1.  IP Fragments

   Traffic destined to a router is not typically fragmented.  Use of
   mechanisms to deny fragments to the device are recommended.

5.2.2.  Performance Considerations

   Care should be taken to understand a vendors implementation of
   aggregate device access control and to make sure that device
   operation is not impaired during DoS attacks against the device.

5.2.3.  Access Control Implementation Guide

   Implementing a complex set of access controls for all traffic going
   to and from a router is non trivial.  The following is a recommended
   set of steps that has been used successfully by many carriers.

   1.  Develop list of required protocols.

   2.  Develop source address requirements: Determine destination
       interface on router Does the protocol access a single interface?
       Does the protocol access many interfaces?  Does the protocol
       access a virtual or physical interfaces?





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   3.  Prior to implementing with a deny, it is recommended to test the
       behavior with the action of "log" and observe the results

   4.  Deployment should be an iterative process: Start with relatively
       open lists then tighten as needed

5.3.  Device Access Authorization and Accounting

   Operators should use per command authorization and accounting
   wherever possible.  Aside from their utility in mitigating other
   security threats, they provide an invaluable tool in the post event
   forensics.


6.  Infrastructure Hiding

   While core equipment is in the transit path it is necessarily
   reachable and succeptible to attacks that fall beyond the scope of
   this document.  Primarily, transit equipment is always at risk for
   collateral damage when hosts downstream come under substantial
   attack.  Hiding the infrastructure of the network provides an elegant
   mechanism for protecting the network infrastructure.  If the an
   attack vector requires that packets are sent to infrastructure
   address that is unreachable, successful execution of such attacks
   becomes far more difficult.  The following sections present different
   options for accomplishing infrastructure hiding.

6.1.  Use Less IP

   One way to reduce exposure of network infrastructure is to use
   unnumbered links wherever possible.  This is particularly useful for
   customers in the simple case of a single provider with a default path
   to the Internet.  Not only can such a configuration reduce the
   exposure of the equipment on both ends of the link to malicious
   attack, the overall effort required to manage a link can be reduced
   considerably with a simplified configuration and without the
   additional overhead and expense of managing the addresses.

6.2.  MPLS Techniques

   While it may not be feasible to hide the entire infrastructure of
   large networks from edge to edge using MPLS, it is certainly possible
   to reduce exposure of critical core infrastructure beyond the first
   hop by creating an MPLS mesh where TTL is not decremented as packets
   pass through it.  In this manner the number, addresses, and even
   existence of intermediary devices can be hidden from traffic as it
   passes through the core.




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6.3.  IGP Configuration

   Using a non-IP control plane for the core routing protocol can
   substantially reduce the number of IP addresses that comprise (and
   therefore, expose) the core.  This simplifies the task of maintaining
   edge ACLs or route announcement filters.  IS-IS is an elegant and
   mature protocol that may be suitable for this task.

6.4.  Route Advertisement Control

6.4.1.  Route Announcement Filtering

   Inasmuch as it is unavoidable that some network elements must be
   configured with IP addresses, it may be possible to assign these
   address out of netblocks for which the routing advertisement can be
   filtered out, thereby limiting possible sources of traffic to core
   netblocks down to customers for whom you provide a default route, or
   direct peers who would make the effort to create a static route for
   your core netblock into your AS.  By assigining address for network
   infrastructure out of a limited number of address blocks which are
   well known to internal network administrators, the operator can
   greatly simplify ACL configuration.  This can also minimise the
   frequency with which ACLs need to be updated based on changes in the
   network.  This can also have performance implications, especially for
   equipment where the length of ACLs is limited.  By keeping ACLs short
   they may be deployable on a wider range of existing equipment.
   Further, it may be possible in those situations where customer point-
   to-point links must be numbered, to address such links out of another
   range of addresses for which announcements could be similarly
   filtered.  While this has implications for a customer's ability to
   remote-monitor their circuit, this can often be overcome with
   application of an address from the customer's routed space to the CPE
   loopback.

6.4.2.  Address Core Out of RFC 1918 Space

   In addition to filtering the visibility of core addresses to the
   wider Internet, it may be possible to use rfc1918 netblocks for
   numbering infrastructure when IP addresses are required (eg,
   loopbacks).  This added level of obscurity takes prevention of wide
   distribution of your infrastructure address space one step further.
   Many networks filter out packets with rfc1918 address at ingress/
   egress points as a matter of course.  In this circumstance, tools
   such as traceroute can work through your core, but reverse-
   resolution of descriptive names should be restricted to queries from
   internal/support groups.





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6.5.  Further obfuscation

   The strategy of changing services to run on ports different from the
   default and well-known ones will not protect you from a determined
   attacker.  It can, however, provide some level of protection from
   many attack tools, worms, auto-rooters, etc.  Should they find access
   to the infrastructure equipment in some way.  Again, this does
   nothing to restrict access, nor to make network devices more
   difficult to reach.  As with the other methods, a careful
   consideration of how much effort and management each strategy
   requires must be weighed against the protection that it provides and
   the necessity of that protection in light of all measures taken to
   protect a network.


7.  IPv6

   IPv6 Networks contain the same infrastructure security risks as IPv4.
   All techniques described in this document for IPv4 should be directly
   applicable to IPv6 networks.  Limitations exist where devices do not
   have feature parity between IPv4 and IPv6.  Different techniques
   maybe required where IPv4 and IPv6 networks deviate in
   implementation.  Multi-vendor networks create greater difficulties
   when each vendor does not have feature parity with each other.
   Hardware differences in devices that support both IPv4 and IPv6 must
   also be taken into consideration.  Because IPv6 uses a longer address
   space the scaling, and performance characteristics of ACLs maybe
   lower for IPv6 vs IPv4.  The fields or number of fields that an ACL
   can match on may also differ.  The fact that all PE devices do not
   support all the recommended ipv6 security features should not
   preclude the implementation of the recommendations in this document
   on the devices that do support the security features.  With the
   number of Network Operators deploying IPv6 growing, along with the
   continued availability of IPv6 Tunnel services, connecting to the
   IPv6 internet is less difficult.  Dual stack IPv6 networks run on
   10Gbps and greater backbones with edge speeds equal to IPv4.  Neither
   the edge nor the core limit potential IPv6 attacks.

7.1.  Use LIPv6 Edge Infrastructure Access Control Lists

   The same process should be used for constructing the IPv6 eiacl as
   the IPv4 EIACL.

7.2.  IPv6 Edge Remarking

   IPv6 DSCP bits should be rewritten in the same manner that IPv4 DSCP
   bits.  Differences between DSCP rewriting of IPv4 and IPv6 will
   minimal except in cases where the device capabilities differ between



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   IPv4 and IPv6.

7.3.  IPv6 Device and Element Protection

   Device and Element protection should be created using the same
   methods described in this document for IPv4.  The policy may differ
   for IPv6 from IPv4 in cases where services are exclusively IPv4 or
   exclusively IPv6.  Services not used with IPv6 should be disabled.

7.4.  IPv6 Infrastructure Hiding

   Network operators may deploy IPv4 differently from IPv6 in their
   network.  Providers may use native forwarding for IPv6 while using
   MPLS for IPv4, other combinations.  IPv6 infrastructure hiding should
   have parity with IPv4 infrastructure hiding even if the technique
   used is different.  Implementation of IPv6 route advertisement
   control for infrastructure hiding is difficult when using global
   address space.  Registeries assign fewer large blocks of IPv6 space
   compared to IPv4.  Providers cannot control the announcement of
   infrastructure global IPv6 blocks for infrastructure hiding without
   deaggregating their IPv6 announcements.


8.  IP Multicast

   IP Multicast behaves differently from IP unicast therefore must be
   secured in a different manner.  Some of the protocols used with
   Multicast rely on IP unicast to transport the routing, and control
   information.  Unicast based protocols should be secured using the
   technique described in much of this document.  Because this document
   is focused on hardening a service providers infrastructure rather
   than validating routing announcements, much of IP Multicast filtering
   will be better covered in other documents.  In much the same way a
   host must listen on a certain IP address and port for an IP unicast
   connection, Multicast must join a group in order to receive any
   information via Multicast.  The major difference is that multicast
   groups are global and not assigned to a specific customer or end
   user.  Administrative boundaries and scope are created to isolate
   Multicast groups within one network or desired area.

8.1.  Multicast Group Protection

   Certain Multicast groups should never be joined from outside an
   operators network or administrative boundary.  Filters should be
   placed on the protocols used to communicate with external hosts and
   networks.  IGMP should have a join filter to prevent hosts from
   joining internal groups.  MSDP should be configured with a Source
   Address (SA) filter to prevent other networks from joining internal



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   groups.  EIACLs should include administratively bounded multicast
   groups, along with any groups used for protocols internal to a
   providers network.  When constructing router Access Control as
   described in section 5.2.4, multicast protocols must be taken into
   consideration.

8.2.  Performance Considerations

   Multicast protocols and implementation have different performance and
   scaling limitation than IP unicast.  Multicast users create state on
   the router every time the user joins a group.  Router resources can
   be exhausted if the amount of state created exceeds the resources
   available on the router.  Placing limits on the resources used by the
   Multicast protocols can prevent collateral damage to services other
   than Multicast on a router.  MSDP should have a limit placed on the
   number of SA announcements received.  A fixed limit should be placed
   on the number of entries the router stores in the IP Multicast
   routing table.  The number of SAP entries should have a limit placed
   on them.

8.3.  IPv6 and Multicast

   IPv6 Multicast policy should be consistent with the IP Multicast
   policy.


9.  Security Considerations

   This entire document is concerned with security.


10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2334]  "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in
              RFCs", October 1998.

   [RFC3667]  "IETF Rights in Contributions", February 2004.

   [RFC3668]  "Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology",
              February 2004.




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Authors' Addresses

   James Gill
   Verizon Business
   22001 Louden County Parkway
   Ashburn, VA  20147
   US

   Phone: +1-703-886-3834
   Email: james.gill@verizonbusiness.com
   URI:   www.verizonbusiness.com


   Darrel Lewis
   Cisco Systems Inc.
   170 West Tasman Dr.
   San Jose, CA  95134
   US

   Phone: +1-408-853-3653
   Email: darlewis@cisco.com
   URI:   www.cisco.com


   Paul Quinn
   Cisco Systems Inc.
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   US

   Phone: +1-408-527-3560
   Email: paulq@cisco.com
   URI:   www.cisco.com


   Peter Schoenmaker
   NTT America
   101 Park Ave., FL 41
   New York, NY  10178
   US

   Phone: +1-202-808-2298
   Fax:
   Email: pds@ntt.net
   URI:






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Full Copyright Statement

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Acknowledgment

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