[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: (draft-farrell-pkix-other-certs) 00 01 02 03 04 05 RFC 5697

PKIX WG                                                       S. Farrell
Internet-Draft                                    Trinity College Dublin
Intended status: Experimental                         September 29, 2008
Expires: April 2, 2009


                      Other Certificates Extension
                     draft-ietf-pkix-other-certs-01

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 2, 2009.

Abstract

   Some applications that associate state information with public key
   certificates can benefit from a way to link together a set of
   certificates belonging to the same end entity that can safely be
   considered to be equivalent for the purposes of referencing that
   application state information.  This memo defines a certificate
   extension that allows applications to establish the required linkage
   without introducing a new application protocol data unit.








Farrell                   Expires April 2, 2009                 [Page 1]


Internet-Draft                 Other Certs                September 2008


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  A Use Case  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Other Certificates Extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   4.  Another Approach using Permanent Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . 5
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements  . . . . . . . . . . 9




































Farrell                   Expires April 2, 2009                 [Page 2]


Internet-Draft                 Other Certs                September 2008


1.  Introduction

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   RFC 5280 [RFC5280] defines a profile for the use of public key
   certificates for Internet applications.  If an application associates
   application state information with a public key certificate, then
   that association may be disrupted if the end entity changes its
   public key certificate.  Such disruption can occur due to renewals or
   if the end entity changes its certificate issuer.  Similarly, if the
   end entity is actually a distributed system, where each instance has
   a different private key, then the relying party (RP) has no way to
   assoicate the different public key certificates with the relevant
   application state information.

   For example, assume a web browser retains state information (perhaps
   passwords) about a web site, indexed (possibly indirectly) via values
   contained in the web server's public key certificate (perhaps a DNS
   name).  When the web server certificate expires, and a new certifiate
   is acquired (perhaps with a different DNS name), then the browser
   cannot safely map the new certificate to the relevant state
   information.

   This memo defines a new public key certificate extension that
   supports such linkage.

   Other than the issuer asserting that the set of certificates belong
   to the same end entity for use with the same application, the fine-
   detail of the semantics of the linkage of certifcates is not defined
   here, since that is a matter for application developers and the
   operators of certification authorities (CAs).  In particular we do
   not define how a CA can validate that the same end entity is the
   holder of the various private keys, nor how the application should
   make use of this information.  Nor do we define what kinds of state
   information may be shared.


2.  A Use Case

   Public key certificates expire, typically about a year after they are
   created.  Some applications might need to know that the same entity
   is the subject of this certificate and a previously used certificate.

   For example, if a web server certificate expires, it could be useful
   for a web browser to know that the server currently presenting a
   certificate in a TLS [RFC5246] handshake represents the same web



Farrell                   Expires April 2, 2009                 [Page 3]


Internet-Draft                 Other Certs                September 2008


   server that previously presented a certificate.  This could be used
   for example to allow the browser to automatically fill in form fields
   for the server in question, even if the server certificate has been
   replaced.  While the same effect can be achieved based on the use of
   the same issuer and subject fields in a certificate there could be
   security issues involved in such comparisons, e.g. if the subject
   name includes a DNS name and the ownership of that DNS domain has
   changed.

   The use of the new extension provides a way for the CA to signal to
   the application that the same end entity is involved, regardless of
   name changes.  The new extension could also allow the web site
   operator to more easily change CA when renewing its certificate.


3.  Other Certificates Extension

   This section defines the syntax for the other certificates extension.

   The new extension is simply a list of references to the linked
   certificates.  The references make use of the SCVPCertID structure
   from the SCVP [RFC5055] protocol which contains a hash over the
   relevant certificate and the certificate's issuer and serial number.

   When this extension is present the CA is asserting that the same end
   entity is the subject of the relevant certificates.

   This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.

   id-pe-otherCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { id-pe 19 }

   OtherCertificates ::= SEQUENCE OF SCVPCertID

   CAs MUST only issue certificates containing this extension where the
   links created are such that the relevant consumers of the
   certificates can safely make use of those links.  This will typically
   be the case where the certificates are only used by a single
   application.  CAs MUST NOT issue certificates that link to
   certificates issued for a different purpose, for example, a CA SHOULD
   NOT link a web server certificate to a VPN gateway certificate
   (unless those can be the same, which might occur for some embedded
   devices).

   Applications MUST validate certificates according to the rules
   specified in RFC 5280 [RFC5280], and MUST NOT assume that because
   certficates are linked, that they are therefore valid.  This means of
   course that both certificates must chain up to some local trust
   point(s).



Farrell                   Expires April 2, 2009                 [Page 4]


Internet-Draft                 Other Certs                September 2008


   If an application imposes further checks on certificate validity
   (e.g. as is done in RFC 2818 [RFC2818] for web server certificates),
   then both certificates MUST be valid according to those application
   specific rules.

   It is NOT REQUIRED that two linked certificates are both
   simultaneously valid.  For example, an application can validate
   certificate1 and cache that information.  When the application is
   subsequently presented with certificate2 (linked back to
   certificate1), if it considers the cached information about
   certificate1 trustworthy, then it can validate certificate2, and use
   the linkage to associate certificate2 with the relevant application
   state information.  (Just as it would have done had certificate1 been
   re-presented.)  As a second example, if certificate1 has expired, but
   would otherwise be valid, then the linkage from certificate2 can also
   be used once certificate2 has been validated.

   If the application checks certificate status for the certificates in
   question, and any of the certificates concerned has been revoked,
   then the linkage MUST NOT be used.

   Note that there are no constraints on the contents of the certificate
   to which the link "points."  The consequence is that the CA issuing
   the new certificate can link back to legacy certificates of all
   kinds, once the relevant RP supports this extension.

   This extension MUST only be used in end-entity certificates, that is,
   it MUST NOT be used in CA certificates or other similar certificates.
   [Editor's note: I think this is safest, and shouldn't cause a
   problem, but also think it might not be necessary.  However, as an
   experimental track spec. its probably best to be cautious.  I'd
   welcome suggestions for a better way to phrase this.]


4.  Another Approach using Permanent Identifiers

   RFC 4043 [RFC4043] defines a new name form (a "Permanent Identifier"
   or PI) for public key certificates that supports similar
   functionality to the new extension defined here.  If two certificates
   have the same PI and that PI form is globally unique, then the end-
   entities involved can be considered to be the same.

   The main difference between the PI and the other certificates
   extension is that, (when more than one CA is involved), PI requires a
   globally unique identifier, whereas the other certificates extension
   only requires that the issuer of the new certificate be able to link
   back to the old certificate(s).




Farrell                   Expires April 2, 2009                 [Page 5]


Internet-Draft                 Other Certs                September 2008


   As a consequence the other certificates extension can be deployed
   "reactively" to link certificates that may not match "ideal"
   application naming requirements.  If the old certificate did make use
   of PI, then presumably application naming issues have already been
   handled, and then the new certificate can contain the same PI.  In
   this latter case there would be no need for the other certificates
   extension.


5.  Acknowledgements

   The use case motivating this was contributed to the W3C web security
   context (WSC) working group by Tyler Close.  See
   http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/wiki/SafeWebFormEditor for details.


6.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.


7.  Security Considerations

   As stated above, relying parties MUST validate any certificates per
   the algorithm given in RFC 5280 [RFC5280] before making any use of
   those certificates.

   Relying parties similarly MUST NOT assume that any other fields in
   the relevant certificates have common values.  For example, linked
   certificates might have non-overlapping key usage extensions.

   Since the issuer of the new certificate (or some superior CA) is
   trusted by the RP, and the RP has validated the new certificate, the
   RP is basically as reliant on the proper operation of that CA as
   always - if the CA wished to "cheat" on the RP the other certificates
   extension simply provides a new way to do that, but one that is
   equivalent to existing vulnerabilities.  In many cases such a bad CA
   could simply issue a new certificate that is identical in all
   respects (other than the key pair) and the RP would accept the
   identity contained in that new certificate.

   [Editor's note: The NC issue below was pointed out by Steve Kent.  It
   probably needs to be better described, and needs more thought as
   well, e.g is it a real problem? are there other constraints that
   might produce similar results? is there a general way to avoid the
   problem if it is one?]

   However, if the issuer of the new certificate is limited in some way



Farrell                   Expires April 2, 2009                 [Page 6]


Internet-Draft                 Other Certs                September 2008


   (e.g. via a name constraint in a superior CA certificate), and if the
   old certificate doesn't match those limitations (e.g. the subject of
   the old certificate doesn't fit under the name constraints of the
   issuer of the new certificate), then the new certificate could be
   linked back to an identity that doesn't meet the constraints intended
   to be imposed on the issuer of the new certificate.  Applications for
   which this is an unacceptable risk SHOULD NOT make use of the other
   certificates extension.

   [Editor's note: More TBD no doubt.]


8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5055]  Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.
              Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
              (SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

   [RFC4043]  Pinkas, D. and T. Gindin, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Permanent Identifier", RFC 4043, May 2005.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.


Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

   PKIX OID registrations may be viewed at:
   http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/pkix-oid.asn








Farrell                   Expires April 2, 2009                 [Page 7]


Internet-Draft                 Other Certs                September 2008


   PKIXOtherCertsModule
        { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
          security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 44 }

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL

   IMPORTS

   -- From [RFC5055]
   SCVPCertID
   FROM SCVP { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
                  security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 21 } ;

   -- The one and only new thing, a new certificate extension

   id-pe-otherCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
             { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
                  security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 19 }

   -- The value is a sequence of cert ids.
   OtherCertificates ::= SEQUENCE OF SCVPCertID

   END



Author's Address

   Stephen Farrell
   Trinity College Dublin
   Department of Computer Science
   Trinity College
   Dublin,   2
   Ireland

   Phone: +353-1-896-1761
   Email: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie










Farrell                   Expires April 2, 2009                 [Page 8]


Internet-Draft                 Other Certs                September 2008


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.


Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.











Farrell                   Expires April 2, 2009                 [Page 9]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129d, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/