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Internet Draft T. Freeman
draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-17.txt Microsoft Corp
February 2005 R. Housley
Expires in six months Vigil Security
A. Malpani
Malpani Consulting Services
D. Cooper
NIST
T. Polk
NIST
Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be
disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
SCVP allows a client to delegate certificate path construction and
certificate path validation to a server. The path construction or
validation (e.g. making sure that none of the certificates in the
path are revoked) is performed according to a validation policy,
which contains one or more trust anchors. It allows simplification
of client implementations and use of a set of predefined validation
policies.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction..................................................5
1.1 SCVP overview and requirements............................5
1.2 Terminology................................................6
1.3 Validation Policies........................................6
1.4 Validation Algorithm.......................................7
1.5 Validation Requirements....................................8
2 Protocol Overview.............................................8
3 Validation Request............................................9
3.1 cvRequestVersion..........................................12
3.2 query.....................................................12
3.2.1 queriedCerts..........................................13
3.2.2 checks................................................13
3.2.3 wantBack..............................................15
3.2.4 validationPolicy......................................17
3.2.4.1 validationPolRef..................................18
3.2.4.1.1 Default Validation Policy......................18
3.2.4.2 validationAlg.....................................19
3.2.4.2.1 Basic Validation Algorithm.....................19
3.2.4.2.2 Basic Validation Algorithm Errors..............20
3.2.4.2.3 Name Validation Algorithm......................21
3.2.4.2.4 Name Validation Algorithm Errors...............22
3.2.4.3 userPolicySet.....................................23
3.2.4.4 inhibitPolicyMapping..............................23
3.2.4.5 requireExplicitPolicy.............................23
3.2.4.6 inhibitAnyPolicy..................................23
3.2.4.7 trustAnchors......................................24
3.2.4.8 keyUsages.........................................24
3.2.4.9 extendedKeyUsages.................................25
3.2.5 responseFlags.........................................25
3.2.5.1 fullRequestInResponse.............................26
3.2.5.2 responseValidationPolByRef........................26
3.2.5.3 protectResponse...................................26
3.2.5.4 cachedResponse....................................27
3.2.6 serverContextInfo.....................................27
3.2.7 valididationTime......................................28
3.2.8 intermediateCerts.....................................29
3.2.9 revInfos..............................................29
3.2.10 producedAt...........................................30
3.2.11 queryExtensions......................................31
3.2.11.1 extnID...........................................31
3.2.11.2 critical.........................................31
3.2.11.3 extnValue........................................31
3.3 requestorRef..............................................31
3.4 requestNonce..............................................32
3.5 requestorName.............................................32
3.6 requestExtensions.........................................33
3.6.1 extnID................................................33
3.6.2 critical..............................................33
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3.6.3 extnValue.............................................33
3.7 SCVP Request Authentication...............................33
4 Validation Response..........................................34
4.1 cvResponseVersion.........................................37
4.2 policyID..................................................37
4.3 producedAt................................................37
4.4 responseStatus............................................38
4.5 respValidationPolicy......................................40
4.5.1 validationPolicy......................................40
4.5.2 validationPolicyAttr..................................40
4.6 requestRef................................................40
4.6.1 requestHash...........................................41
4.6.2 fullRequest...........................................42
4.7 requestorRef..............................................42
4.8 requestorName.............................................42
4.9 replyObjects..............................................42
4.9.1 cert..................................................43
4.9.2 replyStatus...........................................44
4.9.3 replyValTime..........................................45
4.9.4 replyChecks...........................................45
4.9.5 replyWantBacks........................................47
4.9.6 validationErrors......................................48
4.9.7 nextUpdate............................................49
4.9.8 certReplyExtensions...................................49
4.10 respNonce................................................49
4.11 serverContextInfo........................................50
4.12 cvResponseExtensions.....................................50
4.13 SCVP Response Validation.................................51
4.13.1 Simple Key Validation................................51
4.13.2 SCVP Server Certificate Validation...................51
5 Server Policy Request........................................52
5.1 vpRequestVersion..........................................52
5.2 requestNonce..............................................52
6 Validation Policy Response...................................52
6.1 vpResponseVersion.........................................54
6.2 maxCVRequestVersion.......................................54
6.3 maxVPRequestVersion.......................................54
6.4 defaultPolicyID...........................................54
6.5 thisUpdate................................................55
6.6 nextUpdate and requestNonce...............................55
6.7 validationPolicies........................................56
6.8 validationAlgs............................................56
6.9 authPolicies..............................................56
6.10 responseTypes............................................56
6.11 revocationInfoTypes......................................56
6.12 defaultPolicyValues......................................56
6.13 serverPublicKeys.........................................57
6.14 clockSkew................................................57
7 SCVP Server Relay............................................57
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8 SCVP ASN.1 Module............................................58
9 Security Considerations......................................66
10 References..................................................68
10.1 Normative References.....................................68
10.2 Informative References...................................69
11 Acknowledgments.............................................69
Appendix A -- MIME Registrations...............................70
A.1 application/cv-request....................................70
A.2 application/cv-response...................................71
A.3 application/vp-request....................................72
A.4 application/vp-response...................................72
Appendix B -- SCVP over HTTP...................................73
B.1 SCVP Request..............................................73
B.2 SCVP Response.............................................74
B.3 SCVP Policy Request.......................................74
B.4 SCVP Policy Response......................................74
Appendix C -- Author Contact Information.......................75
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1 Introduction
Certificate validation is complex. If certificate handling is to be
widely deployed in a variety of applications and environments, the
amount of processing an application needs to perform before it can
accept a certificate needs to be reduced. There are a variety of
applications that can make use of public key certificates, but these
applications are burdened with the overhead of constructing and
validating the certification paths. SCVP reduces this overhead for
two classes of certificate-using applications.
The first class of applications wants just two things: confirmation
that the public key belongs to the identity named in the certificate
and confirmation that the public key can be used for the intended
purpose. Such clients can completely delegate certification path
construction and validation to the SCVP server. This is often
referred to as delegated path validation (DPV).
The second class of applications can perform certification path
validation, but they lack a reliable or efficient method of
constructing a valid certification path. Such clients delegate
certification path construction to the SCVP server, but not
validation of the returned certification path. This is often
referred to as delegated path discovery (DPD).
1.1 SCVP overview and requirements
SCVP meets the mandatory requirements documented in [RQMTS].
The primary goals of SCVP are to make it easier to deploy PKI-enabled
applications and to allow central administration of PKI policies
within an organization. SCVP can be used by clients that do much of
the certificate processing themselves but simply want an untrusted
server to collect information for them. However, when the client has
complete trust in the SCVP server, SCVP can be used to delegate the
work of certification path construction and validation, and SCVP can
be used to ensure that policies are consistently enforced throughout
an organization.
Untrusted SCVP servers can provide clients the certification paths.
They can also provide clients the revocation information, such as
CRLs and OCSP responses, that the clients need to validate the
certification paths constructed by the SCVP server. These services
can be valuable to clients that do not include the protocols needed
to find and download intermediate certificates, CRLs, and OCSP
responses.
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Trusted SCVP servers can perform certification path construction and
validation for the client. For a client that uses these services,
the client inherently trusts the SCVP server as much as it would its
own certification path validation software (if it contained such
software). There are two main reasons that a client may want to
trust such an SCVP server:
1. The client does not want to incur the overhead of including
certification path validation software and running it for each
certificate it receives.
2. The client is in an organization or community that wants to
centralize its PKI policies. These policies might dictate that
particular trust anchors are to be used and the types of policy
checking that are to be performed during certification path
validation.
1.2 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [STDWORDS].
1.3 Validation Policies
A validation policy (as defined in RFC 3379 [RQMTS]) specifies the
rules and parameters to be used by the SCVP server when validating a
certificate. In SCVP, the validation policy to be used by the server
can either be fully referenced in the request by the client (and thus
no additional parameters are necessary) or it can be referenced in
the request by the client with additional parameters.
Policy definitions can be quite long and complex, and some policies
may allow for the setting of a few parameters. The request can
therefore be very simple if an OBJECT IDENTIFIER (OID) or URI is used
to specify both the algorithm to be used and all the associated
parameters of the validation policy. The request can be more complex
if the validation policy fixes many of the parameters but allows the
client to specify some of them. When the validation policy defines
every parameter necessary, an SCVP request needs only to contain the
certificate to be validated, the referenced validation policy, and
any run-time parameters for the request.
A server publishes the references of the validation policies it
supports. When these policies have parameters that may be
overridden, the server communicates the default values for these
parameters as well. The client can simplify the request by omitting
a parameter from a request if the default value published by the
server for a given validation policy reference is acceptable.
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However, if there is a desire to demonstrate to someone else that a
specific validation policy with all its parameters has been used, the
client will need to ask the server for the inclusion of the full
validation policy with all the parameters in the response.
The inputs to the basic certification path processing algorithm used
by SCVP are defined by [PKIX-1] in section 6.1.1 and comprise:
Certificate to be validated (by value or by reference);
Validation time;
Set of Trust Anchors (by value or by reference);
The initial policy set;
Initial inhibit policy mapping setting;
Initial inhibit anyPolicy setting; and
Initial require explicit policy setting.
The basic certification path processing algorithm also supports the
following parameters, which are defined in [PKIX-1] section 4:
The usage of the key contained in the certificate (e.g., key
encipherment, key agreement, signature); and
Other application-specific purposes for which the certified public
key may be used.
1.4 Validation Algorithm
The validation algorithm is determined by agreement between the
client and the server and is represented as an OID. The algorithm
defines the checking that will be performed by the server to
determine whether the certificate is valid. A validation algorithm
is one of the parameters to a validation policy. SCVP defines a
basic validation algorithm which implements the certification path
validation algorithm as defined in [PKIX-1]. New validation
algorithms can be specified that define additional checks if needed.
These new validation algorithms may specify additional parameters.
The values for these parameters may be defined by any validation
policy that uses the algorithm or may be included by the client in
the request.
Application-specific validation algorithms in addition to those
defined in this document can be defined to meet specific requirements
not covered by the basic validation algorithm. The validation
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algorithms documented here should serve as a guide for the
development of further application-specific validation algorithms.
For example, a new application-specific validation algorithm might
require the presence of a particular name form in the subject
alternative name extension of the certificate.
1.5 Validation Requirements
For a certification path to be considered valid under a particular
validation policy it MUST be a valid certification path as defined in
[PKIX-1] and all validation policy constraints that apply to the
certification path MUST be verified.
Revocation checking is one aspect of certification path validation
defined in [PKIX-1]. However, revocation checking is an optional
feature in [PKIX-1], and revocation information is distributed in
multiple formats. Clients specify in requests whether revocation
checking should be performed and whether revocation information
should be returned in the response.
Servers MUST be capable of indicating the sources of revocation
information that they are capable of processing:
1. full CRLs (or full Authority Revocation Lists);
2. OCSP responses, using [OCSP];
3. delta CRLs; and
4. indirect CRLs.
2 Protocol Overview
SCVP uses a simple request-response model. That is, the SCVP client
creates a request and sends it to the SCVP server, and then the SCVP
server creates a single response and sends it to the client. The
typical use of SCVP is expected to be over HTTP [HTTP], but it can
also be used with email or any other protocol that can transport
digitally signed objects. Appendices A and B provide the details
necessary to use SCVP with HTTP.
SCVP includes two request-response pairs. The primary request-
response pair handles certificate validation. The secondary request-
response pair is used to determine the list of validation policies
and default parameters supported by a specific SCVP server.
Section 3 defines the certificate validation request.
Section 4 defines the corresponding certificate validation response.
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Section 5 defines the validation policies request.
Section 6 defines the corresponding validation policies response.
Appendix A registers MIME types for SCVP requests and responses, and
Appendix B describes the use of these MIME types with HTTP.
3 Validation Request
An SCVP client request to the server MUST be a single CVRequest item.
When a CVRequest is encapsulated in a MIME body part, application/cv-
request MUST be used.
There are two forms of SCVP request: unprotected and protected. A
protected request is used to authenticate the client to the server or
to provide anonymous client integrity over the request-response pair.
The protection is provided by a digital signature or message
authentication code (MAC). In the later case, the MAC key is derived
using a key agreement algorithm, such as Diffie-Hellman. If the
client's public key is contained in a certificate, then it may be
used to authenticate the client. More commonly, the client's key
agreement public key will be ephemeral, supporting anonymous client
integrity.
A server MAY require all requests to be protected, and a server MAY
discard all unprotected requests. Alternatively, a server MAY choose
to process unprotected requests.
The unprotected request consists of a CVRequest encapsulated in a CMS
ContentInfo [CMS]. An overview of these structures is provided below
and is only intended as illustrative. The definitive ASN.1 is found
in [CMS]. Many details are not shown, but the way that SCVP makes
use of CMS is clearly illustrated.
ContentInfo {
contentType id-ct-scvp-certValRequest,
-- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.10)
content CVRequest }
The protected request consists of a CVRequest encapsulated in either
a SignedData or AuthenticatedData, which is in turn encapsulated in a
ContentInfo. SignedData is used when the request is digitally
signed. AuthenticatedData is used with a message authentication code
(MAC). An overview of these structures is provided below. Again,
many details are not shown, but the way that SCVP makes use of CMS is
clearly illustrated.
SignedData example:
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ContentInfo {
contentType id-signedData, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2)
content SignedData }
SignedData {
version CMSVersion,
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet, -- Optional
crls [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists,
-- Optional
signerInfos SET OF SignerInfo } -- Only one in SCVP
SignerInfo {
version CMSVersion,
sid SignerIdentifier,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
signedAttrs SignedAttributes, -- Required in SCVP
signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
signature SignatureValue,
unsignedAttrs UnsignedAttributes } -- not used in SCVP
EncapsulatedContentInfo {
eContentType id-ct-scvp-certValRequest,
-- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.10)
eContent OCTET STRING } -- Contains CVRequest
AuthenticatedData example:
ContentInfo {
contentType id-ct-authData,
-- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.2)
content AuthenticatedData }
AuthenticatedData {
version CMSVersion,
originatorInfo OriginatorInfo, -- Optional
recipientInfos RecipientInfos, -- Only SCVP server
macAlgorithm MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, -- Optional
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
authAttrs AuthAttributes, -- Required in SCVP
mac MessageAuthenticationCode,
unauthAttrs UnauthAttributes } -- not used in SCVP
EncapsulatedContentInfo {
eContentType id-ct-scvp-certValRequest,
-- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.10)
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eContent OCTET STRING } -- Contains CVRequest
All SCVP clients MUST support SignedData for signed requests and
responses. SCVP clients SHOULD support AuthenticatedData for MAC
protected requests and responses.
If the client uses SignedData it MUST have a public key that has been
bound to a subject identity by a certificate that conforms to the
PKIX profile [PKIX-1] and that certificate MUST be suitable for
signing the SCVP request. That is:
1. If the key usage extension is present, either the digital
signature or the non-repudiation bit MUST be asserted.
2. If the extended key usage extension is present, it MUST
contain either the SCVP client OID (see Section 3.7) or
another OID acceptable to the SCVP server.
The client MUST put an unambiguous reference to its certificate in
the SignedData that encapsulates the request. The client SHOULD
include its certificate in the request, but MAY omit the certificate
to reduce the size of the request. The client MAY include other
certificates in the request to aid the validation of its certificates
by the SCVP server.
The client MUST put its key agreement public key or an unambiguous
reference to a certificate that contains its key agreement public key
in the AuthenticatedData that encapsulates the request. If an
ephemeral key agreement key pair is used, then the ephemeral key
agreement public key is carried in the originatorKey field of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, which requires the client to obtain the
server's key agreement public key before computing the message
authentication code (MAC).
The syntax and semantics for SignedData, AuthenticatedData, and
ContentInfo are defined in [CMS]. The syntax and semantics for
CVRequest are defined below. The CVRequest item contains the client
request. The CVRequest contains the cvRequestVersion and query
items; the CVRequest MAY also contain the requestorRef, requestNonce,
requestorName, and requestExtensions items.
The CVRequest MUST have the following syntax:
CVRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
cvRequestVersion INTEGER,
query Query,
requestorRef [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OCTET STRING
OPTIONAL,
requestNonce [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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requestorName [2] GeneralName OPTIONAL,
requestExtensions [3] Extensions OPTIONAL }
Each of the items within the CVRequest is described in the following
sections.
3.1 cvRequestVersion
The cvRequestVersion item defines the version of the SCVP CVRequest
used in a request. The subsequent response MUST use the same version
number. The value of the cvRequestVersion item MUST be one (1) for a
client implementing this specification. Future updates to this
specification must specify other values if there are any changes to
syntax or semantics.
3.2 query
The query item specifies one or more certificates that are the
subject of the request; the certificates can be either public key
certificates [PKIX-1] or attribute certificates [PKIX-AC]. A query
MUST contain a queriedCerts item as well as one checks, one wantBack,
and one validationPolicy item; a query MAY also contain
responseFlags, serverContextInfo, validationTime, intermediateCerts,
revInfos, producedAt, and queryExtensions items.
Query MUST have the following syntax:
Query ::= SEQUENCE {
queriedCerts CertReferences,
checks CertChecks,
wantBack WantBack,
validationPolicy ValidationPolicy,
responseFlags ResponseFlags OPTIONAL,
serverContextInfo [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
validationTime [3] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
intermediateCerts [4] CertBundle OPTIONAL,
revInfos [5] RevocationInfos OPTIONAL,
producedAt [6] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
queryExtensions [7] Extensions OPTIONAL }
The list of certificate references in the query item tells the server
the certificate(s) for which the client wants information. The
checks item specifies the checking that the client wants performed.
The wantBack item specifies the objects that the client wants the
server to return in the response. The validationPolicy item
specifies the validation policy that the client wants the server to
employ. The responseFlags item allows the client to request optional
features for the response. The serverContextInfo item tells the
server that additional information from a previous request-response
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is desired. The validationTime item tells the date and time relative
to which the client wants the server to perform the checks. The
intermediateCerts and revInfos items provide context for the client
request. The queryExtensions item provides for future expansion of
the query syntax. The syntax and semantics of each of these items is
discussed in the following sections.
3.2.1 queriedCerts
The queriedCerts field is a SEQUENCE of one or more certificates,
each of which is a subject of the request. The specified
certificates are either public key certificates or attribute
certificates; if more than one certificate is specified, all must be
of the same type. Each certificate is either directly included or it
is referenced. When referenced, a SHA-1 hash value [SHA-1] of the
referenced item is included to ensure that the SCVP client and the
SCVP server both obtain the same certificate when the referenced
certificate is fetched. Certificate references use the ESSCertID
type defined in [ESS]. A single request MAY contain both directly
included and referenced certificates.
CertReferences has the following syntax:
CertReferences ::= CHOICE {
pkcRefs [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKCReference,
acRefs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ACReference }
PKCReference ::= CHOICE {
cert [0] Certificate,
pkcRef [1] ESSCertID }
ACReference ::= CHOICE {
attrCert [2] AttributeCertificate,
acRef [3] ESSCertID }
The ASN.1 definition of Certificate is imported from [PKIX-1]; the
definition of AttributeCertificate is imported from [PKIX-AC]; and
the definition of ESSCertID is imported from [ESS].
3.2.2 checks
The checks item describes the checking that the SCVP client wants the
SCVP server to perform on the certificate(s) in the queriedCerts
item. The checks item MUST contain a sequence of object identifiers
(OIDs). Each OID tells the SCVP server what checking the client
expects the server to perform. For each check specified in the
request, the SCVP server MUST perform all of the requested checks, or
return an error. A server may choose to perform additional checks
(e.g., a server that is only asked to build a validated certification
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path may choose to also perform revocation status checks), although
the server cannot indicate in the response that the additional checks
have been performed.
The checks item uses the CertChecks type, which has the following
syntax:
CertChecks ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
For public key certificates, the following checks are defined:
- id-stc-build-pkc-path: Build a certification path to a trust
anchor;
- id-stc-build-valid-pkc-path: Build a validated certification path
to a trust anchor (revocation checking not required);
- id-stc-build-status-checked-pkc-path: Build a validated
certification path to a trust anchor and perform revocation
status checks on the certification path.
Conforming SCVP server implementations MUST support the id-stc-build-
pkc-path check. Conforming SCVP server implementations that support
delegated path validation (DPV) as defined in [RQMTS] MUST support
the id-stc-build-valid-pkc-path and id-stc-build-status-checked-pkc-
path checks.
For attribute certificates, the following checks are defined:
- id-stc-build-aa-path: Build a certification path to a trust
anchor for the AC issuer;
- id-stc-build-valid-aa-path: Build a validated certification path
to a trust anchor for the AC issuer;
- id-stc-build-status-checked-aa-path: Build a validated
certification path to a trust anchor for the AC issuer and
perform revocation status checks on the certification path for
the AC issuer;
- id-stc-status-check-ac-and-build-status-checked-aa-path: Build a
validated certification path to a trust anchor for the AC issuer
and perform revocation status checks on the AC as well as the
certification path for the AC issuer.
Conforming SCVP server implementations MAY support the attribute
certificates checks.
For these purposes, the following OIDs are defined:
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id-stc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 17 }
id-stc-build-pkc-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 1 }
id-stc-build-valid-pkc-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 2 }
id-stc-build-status-checked-pkc-path
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 3 }
id-stc-build-aa-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 4 }
id-stc-build-valid-aa-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 5 }
id-stc-build-status-checked-aa-path
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 6 }
id-stc-status-check-ac-and-build-status-checked-aa-path
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 7 }
3.2.3 wantBack
The wantBack item describes the kind of information the SCVP client
wants from the SCVP server for the certificate(s) in the queriedCerts
item. The wantBack item MUST contain a sequence of object
identifiers (OIDs). Each OID tells the SCVP server what the client
wants to know about the queriedCerts item. For each type of
information specified in the request, the server MUST return
information regarding its finding (in a successful response).
For example, a request might include a checks item that only
specifies certification path building and include a wantBack item
that requests the return of the certification path built by the
server. In this case, the response would not include a status for
the validation of the certification path, but it would include a
certification path that the server considers to be valid. A client
that wants to perform its own certification path validation might use
a request of this form.
Alternatively, a request might include a checks item that requests
the server to build a certification path and validate it, including
revocation checking, and include a wantBack item that requests the
return of the status. In this case, the response would include only
a status for the validation of the certification path. A client that
completely delegates certification path validation might use a
request of this form.
The wantBack item uses the WantBack type, which has the following
syntax:
WantBack ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
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For public key certificates, the types of information that can be
requested are:
- id-swb-pkc-cert: The certificate that was the subject of the
request;
- id-swb-pkc-best-cert-path: The certification path built for the
certificate including the certificate that was validated;
- id-swb-pkc-revocation-info: Proof of revocation status for each
certificate in the certification path;
- id-swb-pkc-cert-status: Status indication;
- id-swb-pkc-public-key-info: The public key from the certificate;
and
- id-swb-pkc-all-cert-paths: A set of certification paths for the
certificate.
The SCVP protocol provides two methods for a client to obtain
multiple certification paths for a certificate. The client could use
serverContextInfo to request one path at a time (see section 3.2.6).
After obtaining each path, the client could submit the
serverContextInfo from the previous request to obtain another path
until the client either found a suitable path or the server indicated
(by not returning a serverContextInfo) that no more paths were
available. Alternatively, the client could send a single request
with an id-swb-pkc-all-cert-paths wantBack, in which case the server
would return all of the available paths in a single response.
The server may, at its discretion, limit the number of paths that it
returns in response to the id-swb-pkc-all-cert-paths. When the
request includes an id-swb-pkc-all-cert-paths wantBack, the response
should not include a serverContextInfo.
For attribute certificates, the types of information that can be
requested are:
- id-swb-ac-cert: The attribute certificate that was the subject of
the request;
- id-swb-aa-cert-path: The certification path built for the AC
issuer certificate;
- id-swb-ac-revocation-info: Proof of revocation status for each
certificate in the AC issuer certification path;
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- id-swb-aa-revocation-info: Proof of revocation status for the
attribute certificate; and
- id-swb-ac-cert-status: Status indication.
For these purposes, the following OIDs are defined:
id-swb OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 18 }
id-swb-pkc-best-cert-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 1 }
id-swb-pkc-revocation-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 2 }
id-swb-pkc-cert-status OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 3 }
id-swb-pkc-public-key-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 4 }
id-swb-aa-cert-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 5 }
id-swb-aa-revocation-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 6 }
id-swb-ac-revocation-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 7 }
id-swb-ac-cert-status OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 8 }
id-swb-pkc-cert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 10}
id-swb-ac-cert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 11}
id-swb-pkc-all-cert-paths OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 12}
3.2.4 validationPolicy
The validationPolicy item defines the validation policy that the
client wants the SCVP server to use during certificate validation.
If this policy cannot be used for any reason, then the server MUST
return an error response.
A validation policy MUST define default values for all parameters
necessary for processing an SCVP request. For each parameter, a
validation policy may either allow the client to specify a non-
default value or forbid the use of a non-default value. If the
client wishes to use the default values for all of the parameters,
then the client need only supply a reference to the policy in this
item. If the client wishes to use non-default values for one or more
parameters, then the client supplies a reference to the policy plus
whatever parameters are necessary to complete the request in this
item. If there are any conflicts between the policy referenced in
the request and any supplied parameter values in the request, then
the server MUST return an error response.
The syntax of the validationPolicy item is:
ValidationPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
validationPolRef ValidationPolRef,
validationAlg [0] ValidationAlg OPTIONAL,
userPolicySet [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT
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IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
inhibitPolicyMapping [2] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
requireExplicitPolicy [3] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
inhibitAnyPolicy [4] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
trustAnchors [6] TrustAnchors OPTIONAL,
keyUsages [7] KeyUsages OPTIONAL,
extendedKeyUsages [8] SEQUENCE OF KeyPurposeId OPTIONAL}
The validationPolRef item is required, but the remaining items are
optional. The optional items are used to provide validation policy
parameters. When the client uses the validation policy's default
values for all parameters, all of the optional items are absent. The
validationAlg item specifies the validation algorithm. The
userPolicySet item provides an acceptable set of certificate
policies. The inhibitPolicyMapping item inhibits certificate policy
mapping during certification path validation. The
requireExplicitPolicy item requires at least one valid certificate
policy in the certificate policies extension. The inhibitAnyPolicy
item indicates whether the anyPolicy certificate policy OID is
processed or ignored when evaluating certificate policy. The
trustAnchors item indicates the trust anchors that are acceptable to
the client. The keyUsages item indicates the technical usage of the
public key that is to be confirmed by the server as acceptable. The
extendedKeyUsages item indicates the application-specific usage of
the public key that is to be confirmed by the server as acceptable.
The syntax and semantics of each of these items is discussed in the
following sections.
3.2.4.1 validationPolRef
The reference to the validation policy can be either an OID or a URI.
In either case, the client and server have agreed that the value
represents a particular validation policy. The URI can point to a
human readable definition of the policy to facilitate correct
configuration.
The syntax of the ValidationPolRef item is:
ValidationPolRef::= CHOICE {
valPolRefByOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
valPolRefByURI IA5String}
There is no requirement for either the client or the server to
dereference the URI during SCVP request processing. The URI is
simply used as a reference for the validation policy. Clients and
server MAY dereference the URI as part of configuration.
3.2.4.1.1 Default Validation Policy
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The client can request the SCVP server's default validation policy or
another validation policy. The object identifier to identify the
default validation policy is:
id-svp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 19 }
id-svp-defaultValPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-svp 1 }
The default validation policy MUST use the basic validation algorithm
as its default validation algorithm (see section 3.2.4.2.1).
When using the default validation policy, the client can override any
of the default parameter values by supplying a specific value in the
request. The SCVP server MUST make use of the provided parameter
values or return an error response.
Conforming implementations of SCVP servers MUST support the default
policy. However, an SCVP server may be configured to send an error
response to all requests using the default policy to meet local
security requirements.
3.2.4.2 validationAlg
The optional validationAlg item defines the validation algorithm to
be used by the SCVP server during certificate validation. The value
of this item can be determined by agreement between the client and
the server. The validation algorithm is represented by an object
identifier.
The syntax of the validationAlg is:
ValidationAlg ::= SEQUENCE {
valAlgId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
parameters ANY DEFINED BY valAlgId OPTIONAL }
The following section specifies the basic validation algorithm and
the name validation algorithm.
SCVP clients and servers MUST support both validation algorithms
defined in this section. Other validation algorithms can be
specified in other documents for use with specific applications.
SCVP clients and servers MAY support any such validation algorithms.
3.2.4.2.1 Basic Validation Algorithm
The client can request use of the SCVP basic validation algorithm or
another algorithm. For identity certificates, the basic validation
algorithm MUST implement the certification path validation algorithm
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as defined in section 6 of [PKIX-1]. For attribute certificates, the
basic validation algorithm MUST implement certificate path validation
as defined in section 5 of [PKIX-AC]. Other validation algorithms
MAY implement functions over and above those in the basic algorithm,
but validation algorithms MUST generate results compliant with the
basic validation algorithm. That is, none of the validation
requirements in the basic algorithm may be omitted from any newly
defined validation algorithms. However, other validation algorithms
MAY reject paths that are valid using the basic validation algorithm.
The object identifier to identify the basic validation algorithm is:
id-svp-basicValAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-svp 3 }
When id-svp-basicValAlg appears in valAlgId, the parameters item MUST
be absent.
3.2.4.2.2 Basic Validation Algorithm Errors
The following errors are defined for the basic validation algorithm
for inclusion in the validationErrors item in the response (see
section 4.9.6). These errors can be used by any other validation
algorithm since all validation algorithms MUST implement the
functionality of the basic validation algorithm.
id-bvae OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-svp-basicValAlg
id-bvae-expired OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 1 }
id-bvae-not-yet-valid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 2 }
id-bvae-wrong-anchor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 3 }
id-bvae-invalid-key-usage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 10 }
id-bvae-invalid-purpose OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 11 }
id-bvae-revoked OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 16 }
The id-bvae-expired value means that the validation time used for the
request was later than the notAfter time in the end certificate.
The id-bvae-not-yet-valid value means that the validation time used
for the request was before the notBefore time in the end certificate.
The id-bvae-wrong-anchor value means that a certification path could
not be constructed for the client specified trust anchor(s), but a
path exists for one of the trust anchors specified in the server's
default validation policy.
The id-bvae-invalid-key-usage value means that the keyUsage extension
(PKIX-1 section 4.2.1.3) in the end certificate does not satisfy the
validation policy. For example, the keyUsage extension in the
certificate may assert only the keyEncipherment bit, but the
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validation policy specifies in the keyUsages field that
digitalSignature is required.
The id-bvae-invalid-purpose value means that the extended key usage
extension (PKIX-1 section 4.2.1.13) in the end certificate does not
satisfy the validation policy.
The id-bvae-revoked value means that the end certificate was revoked.
3.2.4.2.3 Name Validation Algorithm
The name validation is a refinement of the basic validation algorithm
that allows the client to specify one or more subject names that MUST
appear in the end certificate. The name validation algorithm allows
the client to supply an application identifier and a name to the
server. The application identifier defines the name matching rules
to use in comparing the name supplied in the request with the names
in the certificate.
id-svp-nameValAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-svp 2 }
When the id-svp-nameValAlg appears as a valAlgId, the parameters MUST
use the NameValidationAlgParms syntax:
NameValidationAlgParms ::= SEQUENCE {
nameCompAlgId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
validationNames GeneralNames }
GeneralNames is defined in [PKIX-1].
If more than one name is supplied in the validationNames value, all
names MUST be of the same type. The certificate must contain a
matching name for each of the names supplied in validationNames
according to the name matching rules associated with the
nameCompAlgId. This specification defines three sets of name
matching rules.
If the nameCompAlgId supplied in the request is id-nva-dnCompAlg,
then GeneralNames supplied in the request MUST be a directoryName,
and the matching rules to be used are defined in [PKIX-1]. The
certificate must contain a matching name in either the subject field
or a directoryName in the subjectAltName extension. This
specification defines the OID for id-nva-dnCompAlg as follows:
id-nva-dnCompAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-svp 4 }
If the nameCompAlgId supplied in the request is id-kp-serverAuth
[PKIX-1], then GeneralNames supplied in the request MUST be a
dNSName, and the matching rules to be used are defined in [HTTP-TLS].
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If the nameCompAlgId supplied in the request is id-kp-mailProtection
[PKIX-1], then GeneralNames supplied in the request MUST be an
rfc822Name, and the matching rules are defined in [SMIME-CERT].
Conforming SCVP servers MUST support the name validation algorithm
and the matching rules associated with id-nva-dnCompAlg, id-kp-
serverAuth, id-kp-mailProtection. SCVP server MAY support other name
matching rules.
3.2.4.2.4 Name Validation Algorithm Errors
The following errors are defined for the Name Validation Algorithm:
id-nvae OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-svp-nameValAlg
id-nvae-name-mismatch OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 1 }
id-nvae-no-name OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 2 }
id-nvae-unknown-alg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 3 }
id-nvae-bad-name OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 4 }
id-nvae-bad-name-type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 5 }
id-nvae-mixed-names OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 6 }
The id-nvae-name-mismatch value means the client supplied a name with
the request, which the server recognized and the server found
corresponding name type in the certificate, but was unable to find a
match to the name supplied. For example, the client supplied a DNS
name of example1.com, the certificate contained a DNS name of
example.com.
The id-nvae-no-name value means the client supplied a name with the
request, which the server recognized, but the server could not find
the corresponding name type in the certificate. For example, the
client supplied a DNS name of example1.com, the certificate only
contained a rfc822Name of user@example.com.
The id-nvae-unknown-alg value means the client supplied a
nameCompAlgId which the server does not recognize.
The id-nvae-bad-name value means the client supplied either an empty
or malformed name in the request.
The id-nvae-bad-name-type value means the client supplied an
inappropriate name type for the application identifier. For example,
the client specified a nameCompAlgId of id-kp-serverAuth, and an
rfc822Name of user@example.com.
The id-nvae-mixed-names value means the client supplied multiple
names in the request of different types.
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3.2.4.3 userPolicySet
The userPolicySet item specifies a list of certificate policy
identifiers that the SCVP server MUST use when constructing and
validating a certification path. The userPolicySet item specifies
the user-initial-policy-set as defined in Section 6 of [PKIX-1]. A
userPolicySet containing the anyPolicy OID indicates a user-initial-
policy-set of any-policy.
SCVP clients SHOULD support userPolicySet item in requests, and SCVP
servers MUST support userPolicySet item in requests.
3.2.4.4 inhibitPolicyMapping
The inihibitPolicyMapping item specifies an input to the
certification path validation algorithm, and it controls whether
policy mapping is allowed during certification path validation (see
[PKIX-1], section 6.1.1). If the client wants the server to inhibit
policy mapping, inhibitPolicyMapping is set to TRUE in the request.
SCVP clients MAY support inhibiting policy mapping. SCVP servers
SHOULD support inhibiting policy mapping.
3.2.4.5 requireExplicitPolicy
The requireExplicitPolicy item specifies an input to the
certification path validation algorithm, and it controls whether
there must be at least one valid policy in the certificate policies
extension (see [PKIX-1], section 6.1.1). If the client wants the
server to require at least one policy, requireExplicitPolicy is set
to TRUE in the request.
SCVP clients MAY support requiring explicit policies. SCVP servers
SHOULD support requiring explicit policies.
3.2.4.6 inhibitAnyPolicy
The inhibitAnyPolicy item specifies an input to the certification
path validation algorithm (see [PKIX-1], section 6.1.1), and it
controls whether the anyPolicy OID is processed or ignored when
evaluating certificate policy. If the client wants the server to
ignore the anyPolicy OID, inhibitAnyPolicy MUST be set to TRUE in the
request.
SCVP clients MAY support ignoring the anyPolicy OID. SCVP servers
SHOULD support ignoring the anyPolicy OID.
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3.2.4.7 trustAnchors
The trustAnchors item specifies the trust anchors at which the
certification path must terminate if the path is to be considered
valid by the SCVP server for the request. If a trustAnchors item is
present, the server MUST NOT consider any certification paths ending
in other trust anchors as valid.
The TrustAnchors type contains one or more trust anchor
specifications. A certificate reference can be used to identify the
trust anchor by certificate hash and optionally a distinguished name
with serial number. Alternatively, trust anchors can be provided
directly. The order of trust anchor specifications within the
sequence is not important. Any CA certificate that meets the
requirements of [PKIX-1] for signing certificates can be provided as
a trust anchor. If a trust anchor is supplied which does not meet
these requirements, the server MUST return an error response.
The trust anchor itself, regardless of its form, MUST NOT be included
in any certification path returned by the SCVP server.
TrustAnchors has the following syntax:
TrustAnchors ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKCReference
SCVP server MUST support trustAnchors. SCVP clients SHOULD support
trustAnchors.
3.2.4.8 keyUsages
The key usage extension [PKIX-1, section 4.2.1.3] in the certificate
defines the technical purpose (such as encipherment, signature, and
certificate signing) of the key contained in the certificate. If the
client wishes to confirm the technical usage, then it can communicate
the usage it wants to validate by the same structure using the same
semantics as defined in [PKIX-1]. Therefore, if the client obtained
the certificate in the context of a digital signature, it can confirm
this use by including a keyUsage structure with the digital signature
bit set.
KeyUsages ::= CHOICE {
anyKeyUsage NULL,
requiredKeyUsages SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyUsage }
The keyUsages item may indicate either the particular key usages that
are required by the client or that the client does not require any
particular key usage.
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The requiredKeyUsages item can contain one or more keyUsage
definitions to allow the client to search for a set of patterns any
one of which is acceptable to the client. If the client wishes to
match against multiple possibilities then the client passes in a
sequence of possible patterns. Each keyUsage can contain a set of
one or more bits set in the request, all bits MUST be present in the
certificate to match against an instance of the keyUsage in the SCVP
request. If the certificate key usage extension contains more usages
than requested, then the certificate MUST be considered a match.
Therefore if a client wishes to check for either digital signature or
non-repudiation, then the client provides two keyUsage values, one
with digital signature set and the other with non-repudiation set.
If the key usage extension is absent from the certificate, the
certificate MUST be considered good for all usages and therefore any
pattern in the SCVP request will match.
SCVP clients SHOULD support keyUsages, and SCVP servers MUST support
keyUsages.
3.2.4.9 extendedKeyUsages
The extended key usage extension [PKIX-1, section 4.2.1.13] defines
more specific technical purposes, in addition to or in place of the
purposes indicated in the key usage extension, for which the
certified public key may be used. If the client wishes to confirm
the extended key usage, then it can communicate the usage it wants to
validate by the same extension using the same semantics as defined in
[PKIX-1]. Therefore if the client obtained the certificate in the
context of a TLS server, it can confirm this usage by including the
extended key usage structure with the id-kp-serverAuth object
identifier. If the extension is absent or is present and asserts the
anyExtendedKeyUsage OID, then all usages specified in the request are
a match. If the extension is present and more than one usage is set
in the request, all usages MUST be present in the certificate. If
the certificate extension contains more usages than requested, then
the certificate MUST be considered a match.
Where the client does not require any particular extended key usage,
the client can specify an empty SEQUENCE. This may be used to
override extended key usage requirements imposed in the validation
policy specified by validationPolRef.
SCVP clients SHOULD support extendedKeyUsages, and SCVP servers MUST
support extendedKeyUsages.
3.2.5 responseFlags
The optional response flags item allows the client to indicate which
optional features in the CVResponse it wants the server to include.
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If the default values for all of the flags are used, then the
response flags item MUST NOT be included in the request.
The syntax of the responseFlags is:
ResponseFlags ::= SEQUENCE {
fullRequestInResponse [0] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
responseValidationPolByRef [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
protectResponse [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
cachedResponse [3] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE }
Each of the response flags is described in the following sections.
3.2.5.1 fullRequestInResponse
By default, the server includes a hash of the request in non-cached
responses to allow the client to identify the response. If the
client wants the server to include the full request in the non-cached
response, fullRequestInResponse is set to TRUE. The main reason a
client would request the server to include the full request in the
response is to archive the request-response exchange in a single
object. That is, the client wants to archive a single object that
includes both request and response.
SCVP clients and servers MUST support the default behavior. SCVP
clients MAY support requesting and processing the full request. SCVP
servers SHOULD support returning the full request.
3.2.5.2 responseValidationPolByRef
The responseValidationPolByRef item controls whether the response
includes just a reference to the policy or a reference to the policy
plus all the parameters by value of the policy used to process the
request. The response MUST contain a reference to the validation
policy. If the client wants the validation policy parameters to be
also included by value, then responseValidationPolByRef is set to
FALSE. The main reason a client would request the server to include
validation policy to be included by value is to archive the request-
response exchange in a single object. That is, the client wants to
archive the CVResponse and have it include every aspect of the
validation policy.
SCVP clients and servers MUST support the default behavior. SCVP
clients MAY support requesting and processing the validation policy
by values. SVCP server SHOULD support returning the validation
policy by values.
3.2.5.3 protectResponse
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The protectResponse item indicates whether the client requires the
server to protect the response. If the client is performing full
certification path validation on the response and it is not concerned
about the source of the response, then the client does not benefit
from a digital signature or MAC on the response. In this case, the
client can indicate to the server that protecting the message is
unnecessary. However, the server is always permitted to return a
protected response.
SCVP clients that support delegated path discovery (DPD) as defined
in [RQMTS] MUST support setting this value to FALSE.
SCVP clients that support delegated path validation (DPV) as defined
in [RQMTS] require an authenticated response. Unless a protected
transport mechanism (such a TLS) is used, such clients MUST always
set this value to TRUE or omit the responseFlags item entirely, which
requires the server to return a protected response.
SCVP servers MUST support returning protected responses, and SCVP
servers SHOULD support returning unprotected responses. Based on
local policy, the server can be configured to return protected or
unprotected responses if this value is set to FALSE. If based on
local policy the server is unable to return protected responses, then
the server MUST return an error if this value is set to TRUE.
3.2.5.4 cachedResponse
The cachedResponse item indicates whether the client will accept a
cached response. To enhance performance and limit the exposure of
signing keys, an SCVP service may be designed to cache responses
until new revocation information is expected. Where cachedResponse
is set to TRUE, the client will accept a previously cached response.
Clients may insist on creation of a fresh response to protect against
a replay attack and ensure information is up to date. Where
cachedResponse is FALSE, the client will not accept a cached
response. To ensure that a response is fresh, the client MUST also
include the requestNonce as defined in Section 3.4.
Servers MUST process the cachedResponse flag. Where cachedResponse
is FALSE, servers that cannot produce fresh responses MUST reply with
an error message. Servers MAY choose to provide fresh responses even
where cachedResponse is set to TRUE.
3.2.6 serverContextInfo
The optional serverContextInfo item, if present, contains context
from a previous request-response exchange with the same SCVP server.
It allows the server to return more than one certification path for
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the same certificate to the client. For example, if a server
constructs a particular certification path for a certificate, but the
client finds it unacceptable, the client can then send the same query
back to the server with the serverContextInfo from the first
response, and the server will be able to provide a different
certification path (if another one can be found).
Contents of the serverContextInfo are opaque to the SCVP client.
That is, the client only knows that it needs to return the value
provided by the server with the subsequent request to get a different
certification path. Note that the subsequent query needs to be
identical to the previous query with the exception of the following:
- requestNonce;
- serverContextInfo; and
- the client's digital signature or MAC on the request.
SCVP clients MAY support serverContextInfo, and SCVP servers SHOULD
support serverContextInfo.
3.2.7 valididationTime
The optional validationTime item, if present, tells the date and time
relative to which the SCVP client wants the server to perform the
checks. If the validationTime is not present, the server MUST
perform the validation using the date and time at which the server
processes the request. If the validationTime is present, it MUST be
encoded as GeneralizedTime. The validationTime provided MUST be a
retrospective time since the server can only perform a validity check
using the current time (default) or previous time. A server can
ignore the validationTime provided in the request if the time is
within the clock skew of the server's current time.
The revocation status information is obtained with respect to the
validation time. When specifying a validation time other than the
current time, the validation time should not necessarily be identical
to the time when the private key was used. The validation time
specified by the client may be adjusted to compensate for:
1) time for the end-entity to realize that its private key has
been or could possibly be compromised, and/or
2) time for the end-entity to report the key compromise, and/or
3) time for the revocation authority to process the revocation
request from the end-entity, and/or
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4) time for the revocation authority to update and distribute the
revocation status information.
GeneralizedTime values MUST be expressed in Universal Coordinated
Time (UTC) (which is also known as Greenwich Mean Time and Zulu time)
and MUST include seconds (i.e., times are YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even when
the number of seconds is zero. GeneralizedTime values MUST NOT
include fractional seconds.
The information in the corresponding CertReply item in the response
MUST be formatted as if the server created the response at the time
indicated in the validationTime. However, if the server does not
have appropriate historical information, the server MUST return an
error response.
SCVP servers MUST apply a clock skew to the validity time to allow
for minor time synchronization errors. The default value is 10
minutes. If the server uses a value other than the default it MUST
include the clock skew value in the validation policy response.
SCVP clients MAY support validationTime other than the current time.
SCVP servers MUST support using its current time, and SHOULD support
the client setting the validationTime in the request.
3.2.8 intermediateCerts
The optional intermediateCerts item may help the SCVP server create
valid certification paths. The intermediateCerts item, when present,
provides certificates that the server MAY use when forming a
certification path. When building certification paths, the server
MAY use the certificates in the intermediateCerts item in addition to
any other certificates that the server can access. When present, the
intermediateCerts item MUST contain at least one certificate, and the
intermediateCerts item MUST be structured as a CertBundle. The
certificates in the intermediateCerts item MUST NOT be considered as
valid by the server just because they are present in this item.
The CertBundle type contains one or more certificates. The order of
the entries in the bundle is not important. CertBundle has the
following syntax:
CertBundle ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate
SCVP clients SHOULD support intermediateCerts, and SCVP servers MUST
support intermediateCerts.
3.2.9 revInfos
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The optional revInfos item specifies revocation information such as
CRLs, delta CRLs [PKIX-1], and OCSP responses [OCSP] that the SCVP
server MAY use when validating certification paths. The purpose of
the revInfos item is to provide revocation information to which the
server might not otherwise have access, such as an OCSP response that
the client received along with the certificate. Note that the
information in the revInfos item might not be used by the server.
For example, the revocation information might be associated with
certificates that the server does not use in the certification path
that it constructs.
Clients SHOULD be courteous to the SCVP server by separating CRLs and
delta CRLs. However, since the two share a common syntax, SCVP
servers SHOULD accept delta CRLs even if they are identified as
regular CRLs by the SCVP client.
CRLs, delta CRLs, and OCSP responses can be provided as revocation
information. If needed, additional object identifiers can be
assigned for additional revocation information types in the future.
The revInfos item uses the RevocationInfos type, which has the
following syntax:
RevocationInfos ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF RevocationInfo
RevocationInfo ::= CHOICE {
crl [0] CertificateList,
delta-crl [1] CertificateList,
ocsp [2] OCSPResponse,
other [3] OtherRevInfo }
OtherRevInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
riType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
riValue ANY DEFINED BY riType }
3.2.10 producedAt
The client MAY allow the server to use a cached SCVP response. When
doing so, the client MAY use the producedAt item to express
requirements on the freshness of the cached response. The producedAt
item tells the earliest date and time at which an acceptable cached
response could have been produced. The producedAt item represents
the date and time in UTC, using the GeneralizedTime type. The value
in the producedAt item is independent of the validation time.
GeneralizedTime value MUST be expressed in UTC, as defined in section
3.2.7.
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SCVP client MAY support using producedAt values in the request. SCVP
server MAY support the producedAt values in the request. SCVP
servers that support cached responses SHOULD support the producedAt
value in requests.
3.2.11 queryExtensions
The optional queryExtensions item contains Extensions. If present,
each extension in the sequence extends the query. This specification
does not define any extensions; the facility is provided to allow
future specifications to extend SCVP. The syntax for extensions is
imported from [PKIX-1]. The queryExtensions item, when present, MUST
contain a sequence of extension items, and each of the extensions
MUST contain extnID, critical, and extnValue items. Each of these is
described in the following sections.
3.2.11.1 extnID
The extnID item is an identifier for the extension. It contains the
object identifier that names the extension.
3.2.11.2 critical
The critical item is a BOOLEAN. Each extension is designated as
either critical (with a value of TRUE) or non-critical (with a value
of FALSE). By default, the extension is non-critical. An SCVP
server MUST reject the query if it encounters a critical extension
that it does not recognize; however, a non-critical extension MAY be
ignored if it is not recognized, but MUST be processed if it is
recognized.
3.2.11.3 extnValue
The extnValue item is an octet string, which contains the extension
value. An ASN.1 type is specified for each extension, identified by
the associated extnID object identifier.
3.3 requestorRef
The optional requestorRef item contains a SEQUENCE of OCTET STRINGs
identifying SCVP servers, and it is intended for use in environments
where SCVP relay is employed. As described in [RQMTS], in some
network environments an SCVP server might not be able to obtain all
of the information that it needs to process a request. However, the
SCVP server might be configured to use the services of one or more
other SCVP servers to fulfill all requests. In such cases, the
client is unaware that the queried SCVP server is using the services
of other SCVP servers, and the client-queried SCVP server acts as an
SCVP client to another SCVP server. Unlike the original client, the
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SCVP server is expected to have moderate computing and memory
resources, enabling the use of relay, re-direct or multicasting
mechanisms. The requestorRef item is used to detect looping in some
configurations. The value and use of requestorRef is defined in
section 7. To detect loops, the server MUST inspect the sequence
of octet strings, looking for values that it inserted as a client.
If the SCVP client includes a requestorRef value in the request, then
the SCVP server MUST return the same value in a non-cached response.
The SCVP server MAY omit the requestorRef value from cached SCVP
responses.
The requestorRef item MUST be a sequence of octet strings. No
provisions are made to ensure uniqueness of the requestorRef octet
strings.
3.4 requestNonce
The optional requestNonce item contains a request identifier
generated by the SCVP client. If the client includes a requestNonce
value in the request, it is expressing a preference that the SCVP
server SHOULD return a non-cached response. If the server returns a
non-cached response it MUST include the value of requestNonce from
the request in the response as the respNonce field; however, the
server MAY return a cached response which MUST NOT have a respNonce.
If the client includes a requestNonce and also sets the
cachedResponse flag to FALSE as defined in section 3.2.5.4, the
client is indicating that the SCVP server MUST return either a non-
cached response including the respNonce or an error response. The
client SHOULD include a requestNonce item in every request to prevent
an attacker from acting as a man-in-the-middle by replaying old
responses from the server. The requestNonce value SHOULD change with
every request sent by the client.
The client MUST NOT set the cachedResponse flag to FALSE without also
including a requestNonce. A server receiving such a request SHOULD
return an invalidRequest error response.
The requestNonce item, if present, MUST be an octet string that was
generated exclusively for this request.
3.5 requestorName
The optional requestorName item is used by the client to include an
identifier in the request. The client MAY include this information
for the DPV server to copy into the response.
SCVP servers MUST be able to process requests that include this
field.
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3.6 requestExtensions
The OPTIONAL requestExtensions item contains Extensions. If present,
each Extension in the sequence extends the request. This
specification does not define any extensions; the facility is
provided to allow future specifications to extend SCVP. The syntax
for Extensions is imported from [PKIX-1]. The requestExtensions
item,when present, MUST contain a sequence of extension items, and
each of extension MUST contain extnID, critical, and extnValue items.
Each of these is described in the following sections.
3.6.1 extnID
The extnID item is an identifier for the extension. It contains the
object identifier that names the extension.
3.6.2 critical
The critical item is a BOOLEAN. Each extension is designated as
either critical (with a value of TRUE) or non-critical (with a value
of FALSE). By default, the extension is non-critical. An SCVP
server MUST reject the query if it encounters a critical extension it
does not recognize. A non-critical extension MAY be ignored if it is
not recognized, but MUST be processed if it is recognized.
3.6.3 extnValue
The extnValue item contains an octet string. Within the octet string
is the extension value. An ASN.1 type is specified for each
extension, identified by the associated extnID object identifier.
3.7 SCVP Request Authentication
It is a matter of local policy what validation policy the server uses
when authenticating requests. When authenticating protected SCVP
requests, the SCVP servers SHOULD use the validation algorithm
defined in section 6 of [PKIX-1].
If the certificate used to validate a SignedData validation request
includes the key usage extension [PKIX-1, section 4.2.1.3], it MUST
have either the digital signature bit set, the non-repudiation bit
set, or both bits set.
If the certificate used to validate an AuthenticatedData validation
request includes the key usage extension, it MUST have the key
agreement bit set.
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If the certificate used on a validation request contains the extended
key usage extension [PKIX-1, section 4.2.1.13], the server SHALL
verify that it contains the SCVP client OID or another OID acceptable
to the server. The SCVP client OID is defined as follows:
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 }
id-kp-scvpClient OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 16 }
If a protected request fails to meet the validation policy of the
server, it MUST be treated as an unauthenticated request.
4 Validation Response
An SCVP server response to the client MUST be a single CVResponse
item. When a CVResponse is encapsulated in a MIME body part,
application/cv-response MUST be used.
There are a number of forms of an SCVP response:
1. A success response to a request made over a protected transport
such as TLS. These responses SHOULD NOT be protected by the
server.
2. A success response to a request that has protectResponse set to
FALSE. These responses SHOULD NOT be protected by the server.
3. The server MUST protect all other success responses. If the
server is unable to return a protected success response due to
local policy, then it MUST return an error response.
4. An error response to a request made over a protected transport
such as TLS. These responses SHOULD NOT be protected by the
server
5. An error response to a request that has protectResponse set to
FALSE. These responses SHOULD NOT be protected by the server.
6. An error response to an authenticated request. The server MUST
protect these responses.
7. An error response to an AuthenticatedData request where MAC is
valid. The server MUST protect these responses.
8. All other error responses MUST NOT be protected by the server.
Successful responses are made when the server has fully complied with
the request. That is, the server was able to build a certification
path using the referenced or supplied validation policy, and it was
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able to comply with all the requested parameters. If the server is
unable to perform validations using the required validation policy or
the request contains an unsupported option, then the server MUST
return an error response.
For protected requests and responses, SCVP servers MUST support
SignedData and SHOULD support AuthenticatedData. It is a matter of
local policy which types are used.
If the server is making a protected response to a protected request,
then the server MUST use the same protection mechanism (SignedData or
AuthenticatedData) as in the request.
An overview of the structure used for an unprotected response is
provided below. Many details are not shown, but the way that SCVP
makes use of CMS is clearly illustrated.
ContentInfo {
contentType id-ct-scvp-certValResponse,
-- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.11)
content CVResponse }
The protected response consists of a CVResponse encapsulated in
either a SignedData or an AuthenticatedData, which is in turn
encapsulated in a ContentInfo. An overview of the structure used for
a protected response is provided below. As above, many details are
not shown, but the way that SCVP makes use of CMS is clearly
illustrated.
SignedData Example:
ContentInfo {
contentType id-signedData, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2)
content SignedData }
SignedData {
version CMSVersion,
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
-- MUST include server cert
crls [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists
OPTIONAL,
signerInfos SET OF SignerInfos } -- Only one in SCVP
SignerInfo {
version CMSVersion,
sid SignerIdentifier,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
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signedAttrs SignedAttributes, -- Required by CMS
signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
signature SignatureValue,
unsignedAttrs UnsignedAttributes } -- Not used in SCVP
EncapsulatedContentInfo {
eContentType id-ct-scvp-certValResponse,
-- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.11)
eContent OCTET STRING } -- Contains CVResponse
AuthenticatedData Example:
ContentInfo {
contentType id-ct-authData,
-- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.2)
content AuthenticatedData }
AuthenticatedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
originatorInfo OriginatorInfo,
recipientInfos RecipientInfos, -- Only for SCVP client
macAlgorithm MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
authAttrs AuthAttributes, -- Required by CMS
mac MessageAuthenticationCode,
unauthAttrs UnauthAttributes } -- Not used in SCVP
EncapsulatedContentInfo {
eContentType id-ct-scvp-certValResponse,
-- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.11)
eContent OCTET STRING } -- Contains CVResponse
The SCVP server MUST include its own certificate in the certificates
field within SignedData. Other certificates MAY also be included.
The SCVP server MAY also provide one or more CRLs in the crls field
within SignedData.
The signedAttrs field within SignerInfo MUST include the content-type
and message-digest attributes defined in [CMS], and it SHOULD include
the signing-certificate attribute as defined in [ESS]. Within the
signing-certificate attribute, the first certificate identified in
the sequence of certificate identifiers MUST be the certificate of
the SCVP server. The inclusion of other certificate identifiers in
the signing-certificate attribute is OPTIONAL. The inclusion of
policies in the signing-certificate is OPTIONAL.
The CVResponse item contains the server's response. The CVResponse
MUST contain the cvResponseVersion, policyID, producedAt, and
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responseStatus items. The CVResponse MAY also contain the
respValidationPolicy, requestRef, requestorRef, requestorName,
replyObjects, respNonce, serverContextInfo, and cvResponseExtensions
items. The replyObjects item MUST contain exactly one CertReply item
for each certificate requested. The requestorRef item MUST be
included if the request included a requestorRef item. The respNonce
item MUST be included if the request included a requestNonce item and
a non-cached response is provided.
The CVResponse MUST have the following syntax:
CVResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
cvResponseVersion INTEGER,
policyID INTEGER,
producedAt GeneralizedTime,
responseStatus ResponseStatus,
respValidationPolicy [0] RespValidationPolicy OPTIONAL,
requestRef [1] RequestReference OPTIONAL,
requestorRef [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OCTET
STRING OPTIONAL,
requestorName [3] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
replyObjects [5] ReplyObjects OPTIONAL,
respNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
serverContextInfo [7] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
cvResponseExtensions [8] Extensions OPTIONAL }
4.1 cvResponseVersion
The syntax and semantics of cvResponseVersion are the same as
cvRequestVersion as described in section 3.1. The
cvResponseVersion MUST match the cvRequestVersion in the request. If
the server cannot generate a response with a matching version number,
then the server MUST return an error response that indicates the
highest version number that the server supports as the version
number.
4.2 policyID
The policy ID representing the version of the default validation
policy that was used by the SCVP server when it processed the
request. See section 6.4 for details.
4.3 producedAt
The producedAt item tells the date and time at which the SCVP server
generated the response. The producedAt item MUST be expressed in
UTC, and it MUST be interpreted as defined in section 3.2.7. This
value is independent of the validation time.
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4.4 responseStatus
The responseStatus item gives status information to the SCVP client
about its request. The responseStatus item has a numeric status code
and an optional string that is a sequence of characters from the
ISO/IEC 10646-1 character set encoded with the UTF-8 transformation
format defined in [UTF8].
The string MAY be used to transmit status information. The client
MAY choose to display the string to a human user. However, because
there is often no way to know the languages understood by a human
user, the string may be of little or no assistance.
The responseStatus item uses the ResponseStatus type, which has the
following syntax:
ResponseStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
statusCode CVStatusCode,
errorMessage [0] UTF8String OPTIONAL }
CVStatusCode ::= ENUMERATED {
okay (0),
skipUnrecognizedItems (1),
tooBusy (10),
invalidRequest (11),
internalError (12),
badStructure (20),
unsupportedVersion (21),
abortUnrecognizedItems (22),
unrecognizedSigKey (23),
badSignatureOrMAC (24),
unableToDecode (25),
notAuthorized (26),
unsupportedChecks (27),
unsupportedWantBacks (28),
unsupportedSignatureOrMAC (29),
invalidSignatureOrMAC (30),
relayingLoop (40),
unrecognizedValPol (50),
unrecognizedValAlg (51),
fullRequestInResponseUnsupported (52),
fullPolResponseUnsupported (53),
inhibitPolicyMappingUnsuported (54),
requireExplicitPolicyUnsupported (55),
inhibitAnyPolicyUnsupported (56),
validityTimeUnsupported (57),
unrecognizedCritQueryExt (63),
unrecognizedCritRequestExt (64)}
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The CVStatusCode values have the following meaning:
0 The request was fully processed.
1 The request included some unrecognized non-critical extensions;
however, processing was able to continue ignoring them.
10 Too busy; try again later.
11 The server was able to decode the request, but there was some
other problem with the request.
12 An internal server error occurred.
20 The structure of the request was wrong.
21 The version of request is not supported by this server.
22 The request included unrecognized items, and the server was not
able to continue processing.
23 The server could not validate the key used to protect the
request.
24 The signature or message authentication code did not match the
body of the request.
25 The encoding was not understood.
26 The request was not authorized.
27 The request included unsupported checks items, and the server
was not able to continue processing.
28 The request included unsupported want back items, and the server
was not able to continue processing.
29 The server does not support the signature or message
authentication code algorithm used by the client to protect the
request.
30 The server could not validate the client's signature or message
authentication code on the request.
40 The request was previously relayed by the same server.
50 The request contained an unrecognized validation policy
reference.
51 The request contained an unrecognized validation algorithm OID.
52 The server does not support returning the full request in the
response.
53 The server does not support returning the full validation policy
by value in the response.
54 The server does not support inhibiting policy mapping.
55 The server does not support requiring explicit policy.
56 The server does not support ignoring the anyPolicy certificate
policy OID.
57 The server only validates requests using current time.
63 The query item in the request contains a critical extension
whose OID is not recognized.
64 The request contains a critical request extension whose OID is
not recognized.
Status codes 0-9 are reserved for codes that indicate the request was
processed by the server and therefore MUST be sent in a success
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response. Status codes 10 and above indicate an error and MUST
therefore be sent in an error response.
4.5 respValidationPolicy
The respValidationPolicy item contains either a reference to the full
validation policy or the full policy by value used by the server to
validate the request. It MUST be present in success responses and
MUST NOT be present in error responses. The choice between returning
the policy by reference or by value is controlled by the
responseValidationPolByRef item in the request. The resultant
validation policy is the union of the following:
1. Values from the request.
2. For values that are not explicitly included in the request,
values from the validation policy specified by reference in
the request.
The RespValidationPolicy syntax is:
RespValidationPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
validationPolicy ValidationPolicy,
validationPolicyAttr SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
OPTIONAL }
4.5.1 validationPolicy
The validationPolicy item is defined in section 3.2.4. When
responseValidationPolByRef is set to FALSE in the request, all fields
in the validationPolicy item MUST be populated. When
responseValidationPolByRef is set to TRUE, OPTIONAL fields in the
validationPolicy item only need to be populated for items for which
the value in the request differs from the value from the referenced
validation policy.
4.5.2 validationPolicyAttr
The validationPolicyAttr item MAY contain Attributes. If present,
each attribute in the sequence extends the policy values for the
validation policy. This specification does not define any
attributes. The facility is provided to allow future
specifications to extend SCVP. The syntax for Attribute is
imported from [CMS].
4.6 requestRef
The requestRef item allows the SCVP client to identify the request
that corresponds to this response from the server. It associates the
response to a particular request using either a hash of the request
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or a copy of CVRequest from the request. The hash is calculated as
described in [CMS] for SignedData and AuthenticatedData. That is, it
covers the encapsulated content and authenticated attributes but not
the unauthenticated attributes.
The requestRef item does not provide authentication, but does allow
the client to determine that the request was not maliciously
modified.
The requestRef item allows the client to associate a response with a
request. The requestNonce provides an alternative mechanism for
matching requests and responses if the client has selected to include
a full request. When the fullRequest alternative is used, the
response provides a single data structure that is suitable for
archive of the transaction.
The requestRef item uses the RequestReference type, which has the
following syntax:
RequestReference ::= CHOICE {
requestHash [0] HashValue, -- hash of CVRequest
fullRequest [1] CVRequest }
SCVP clients MUST support requestHash, and they MAY support
fullRequest. SCVP servers MUST support using requestHash, and they
SHOULD support using fullRequest.
4.6.1 requestHash
The requestHash item is the hash of the CVRequest. By default, SHA-1
is used as the one-way hash function, but others can be used. The
requestHash item serves two purposes. First, it allows a client to
determine that the request was not maliciously modified. Second, it
allows the client to associate a response with a request when using
connectionless protocols. The requestNonce provides an alternative
mechanism for matching requests and responses.
The requestHash item uses the HashValue type, which has the following
syntax:
HashValue ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { sha-1 },
value OCTET STRING }
sha-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 }
The algorithm identifier for SHA-1 is imported from [PKIX-ALG]. It
is repeated here for convenience.
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4.6.2 fullRequest
Like requestHash, the fullRequest alternative allows a client to
determine that the request was not maliciously modified. It also
provides a single data structure that is suitable for archive of the
transaction.
The fullRequest item uses the CVRequest type. The syntax and
semantics of the CVRequest type are described in section 3.
4.7 requestorRef
The optional requestorRef item is used by the client to identify the
original requestor in cases where SCVP relay is used. The value is
only of local significance to the client. If the SCVP client
includes a requestorRef value in the request, then the SCVP server
MUST return the same value if the server is generating a non-cached
response.
4.8 requestorName
The optional requestorName item is used by the server to return one
or more identities associated with the client in the response.
The SCVP server MAY choose to include any or all of the following:
(1) the identity asserted by the client in the requestorName field
of the request,
(2) an authenticated identity for the client from a certificate or
other credential used to authenticate the request, or
(3) a client identifier from an out-of-band mechanism.
Alternatively, the SCVP server MAY omit this item.
In the case of non-cached responses to signed requests, the SCVP
server SHOULD return a requestor name.
SCVP servers that support signed requests SHOULD support this item.
SCVP clients MUST be able to process responses that include this
field, although the item value might not impact the processing in any
manner.
4.9 replyObjects
The replyObjects item returns requested objects to the SCVP client,
each of which tells the client about a single certificate from the
request. The replyObjects item MUST be present in the response,
unless the response is reporting an error. The CertReply item MUST
contain cert, replyStatus, replyValTime, replyChecks, and
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replyWantBacks items; and the CertReply item MAY contain the
validationErrors, nextUpdate, and certReplyExtensions items.
A success response MUST contain one CertReply for each certificate
specified in the queriedCerts item in the request. The order is
important. The first CertReply in the sequence MUST correspond to
the first certificate in the request; the second CertReply in the
sequence MUST correspond to the second certificate in the request;
and so on.
The checks item in the request determines the content of the
replyChecks item in the response. The wantBack item in the request
determines the content of the replyWantBacks item in the response.
The queryExtensions items in the request controls the absence or the
presence and content of the certReplyExtensions item in the response.
The replyObjects item uses the ReplyObjects type, which has the
following syntax:
ReplyObjects ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertReply
CertReply ::= SEQUENCE {
cert CertReference,
replyStatus ReplyStatus,
replyValTime GeneralizedTime,
replyChecks ReplyChecks,
replyWantBacks ReplyWantBacks,
validationErrors [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
nextUpdate [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
certReplyExtensions [2] Extensions OPTIONAL }
4.9.1 cert
The cert item contains either the certificate or a reference to the
certificate about which the client is requesting information. If the
certificate was specified by reference in the request, the request
included either the id-swb-pkc-cert or id-swb-aa-cert wantBack, and
the server was able to obtain the referenced certificate then this
item MUST include the certificate. Otherwise, this item MUST include
the same value as was used in the queriedCerts item in the request.
CertReference has the following syntax:
CertReference ::= CHOICE {
pkc PKCReference,
ac ACReference }
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4.9.2 replyStatus
The replyStatus item gives status information to the client about the
request for the specific certificate. Note that the responseStatus
item is different than the replyStatus item. The responseStatus item
is the status of the whole request, while the replyStatus item is the
status for the individual query item.
The replyStatus item uses the ReplyStatus type, which has the
following syntax:
ReplyStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
success (0),
malformedPKC (1),
malformedAC (2),
unavailableValidityTime (3),
referenceCertHashFail (4),
certPathConstructFail (5),
certPathNotValid (6),
certPathNotValidNow (7),
wantBackUnsatisfied (8) }
The meaning of the various ReplyStatus values are:
0 Success: all checks were performed successfully.
1 Failure: the public key certificate was malformed.
2 Failure: the attribute certificate was malformed.
3 Failure: historical data for the requested validity time is not
available.
4 Failure: the server could not locate the reference certificate or
the referenced certificate did not match the hash value provided.
5 Failure: no certification path could be constructed.
6 Failure: the constructed certification path is not valid with
respect to the validation policy.
7 Failure: the constructed certification path is not valid with
respect to the validation policy, but a query at a later time
may be successful.
8 Failure: all checks were performed successfully, however one or
more of the wantBacks could not be satisfied.
Codes 1 and 2 are used to tell the client that the request was
properly formed, but the certificate in question was not. This is
especially useful to clients that do not parse certificates.
Code 7 is used to tell the client that a valid certification path was
found with the exception that a certificate in the path is on hold,
current revocation information is unavailable, or the validation time
precedes the notBefore time in one or more certificates in the path.
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For codes 1, 2, 3, and 4, the replyChecks and replyWantBacks items
are not populated (i.e., they MUST be an empty sequence). For codes
5, 6, 7, and 8 replyChecks MUST include an entry corresponding to
each check in the request; the replyWantBacks item is not populated.
4.9.3 replyValTime
The replyValTime item tells the time at which the information in the
CertReply was correct. The replyValTime item represents the date and
time in UTC, using GeneralizedTime type. The encoding rules for
GeneralizedTime in section 3.2.7 MUST be used.
Within the request, the optional validityTime item tells the date and
time relative to which the SCVP client wants the server to perform
the checks. If the validityTime is not present, the server MUST
respond as if the client provided the date and time at which the
server processes the request.
The information in the CertReply item MUST be formatted as if the
server created this portion of the response at the time indicated in
the validityTime item of the query. However, if the server does not
have appropriate historical information, the server MAY either return
an error or return information for a later time.
4.9.4 replyChecks
The replyChecks item contains the responses to the checks item in the
query. The replyChecks item includes the object identifier (OID)
from the query and an integer. The value of the integer indicates
whether the requested check was successful. The OIDs in the checks
item of the query are used to identify the corresponding replyChecks
values. The OIDs in the replyChecks item MUST match the OIDs in the
checks item in the request.
The replyChecks item uses the ReplyChecks type, which has the
following syntax:
ReplyChecks ::= SEQUENCE OF ReplyCheck
ReplyCheck ::= SEQUENCE {
check OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
status INTEGER }
The status value for public key certification path building to a
trusted root, { id-stc 1 }, can be one of the following:
0: Built a path
1: Could not build a path
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The status value for public key certification path building to a
trusted root along with simple validation processing, { id-stc 2 },
can be one of the following:
0: Valid
1: Not valid
The status value for public key certification path building to a
trusted root along with complete status checking, { id-stc 3 }, can
be one of the following:
0: Valid
1: Not valid
2: Revocation Offline
3: Revocation Unavailable
4: No known source for revocation information
Revocation offline means that the server or distribution point for
the revocation information was connected to successfully without a
network error but either no data was returned or if data was returned
it was stale. Revocation unavailable means that a network error was
returned when an attempt was made to reach the server or distribution
point. No known source for revocation information means that the
server was able to build a valid certification path but was unable to
locate a source for revocation information for one or more
certificates in the path.
The status value for AC issuer certification path building to a
trusted root, { id-stc 4 }, can be one of the following:
0: Built a path
1: Could not build a path
The status value for AC issuer certification path building to a
trusted root along with simple validation processing, { id-stc 5 },
can be one of the following:
0: Valid
1: Not valid
The status value for AC issuer certification path building to a
trusted root along with complete status checking, { id-stc 6 }, can
be one of the following:
0: Valid
1: Not Valid
2: Revocation Offline
3: Revocation Unavailable
4: No known source for revocation information
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The status value for revocation status checking of an AC as well as
AC issuer certification path building to a trusted root along with
complete status checking, { id-stc 7 }, can be one of the following:
0: Valid
1: Not Valid
2: Revocation Offline
3: Revocation Unavailable
4: No known source for revocation information
4.9.5 replyWantBacks
The replyWantBacks item contains the responses to the wantBack item
in the request. The replyWantBacks item includes the object
identifier (OID) from the wantBack item in the request and an octet
string. Within the octet string is the requested value. The OIDs in
the wantBack item in the request are used to identify the
corresponding reply value. The OIDs in the replyWantBacks item MUST
match the OIDs in the wantBack item in the request.
The replyWantBacks item uses the ReplyWantBacks type, which has the
following syntax:
ReplyWantBacks ::= SEQUENCE OF ReplyWantBack
ReplyWantBack::= SEQUENCE {
wb OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
value OCTET STRING }
The octet string value for the certification path used to verify the
certificate in the request, { id-swb 1 }, contains the CertBundle
type. The syntax and semantics of the CertBundle type are described
in section 3.2.8. This CertBundle includes all the certificates in
the path, starting with the end certificate and ending with the
certificate issued by the trust anchor. If proof of revocation
status was also requested, the CertBundle also contains any
additional certificates used to validate the revocation information.
These certificates follow the certificate issued by the trust anchor
in the sequence.
The octet string value for the proof of revocation status, { id-swb
2 }, contains the RevocationInfos type. The syntax and semantics of
the RevocationInfos type are described in section 3.2.9.
The octet string value for the public key certificate status, { id-
swb 3 }, contains an ASN.1 BOOLEAN type. The value will be TRUE if
the certificate is valid, and the value will be FALSE if the
certificate is not valid.
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The octet string value for the public key information, { id-swb 4 },
contains the SubjectPublicKeyInfo type. The syntax and semantics of
the SubjectPublicKeyInfo type are described in [PKIX-1].
The octet string value for the AC issuer certification path used to
verify the certificate in the request, { id-swb 5 }, contains the
CertBundle type. The syntax and semantics of the CertBundle type are
described in section 3.2.8. This CertBundle includes all the
certificates in the path, beginning with the AC issuer certificate
and ending with the certificate issued by the trust anchor. If proof
of revocation status was also requested, the CertBundle also contains
any additional certificates used to validate the revocation
information. These certificates follow the certificate issued by the
trust anchor in the sequence.
The octet string value for the proof of revocation status of the AC
issuer certification path, { id-swb 6 }, contains the RevocationInfos
type. The syntax and semantics of the RevocationInfos type are
described in section 3.2.9.
The octet string value for the proof of revocation status of the
attribute certificate, { id-swb 7 }, contains the RevocationInfos
type. The syntax and semantics of the RevocationInfos type are
described in section 3.2.9.
The octet string value for the attribute certificate status, { id-swb
8 }, contains an ASN.1 BOOLEAN type. The value will be TRUE if the
certificate is valid, and the value will be FALSE if the certificate
is not valid.
The octet string value for returning all paths, { id-swb 12 },
contains an ASN.1 type CertBundles, as defined below. The syntax and
semantics of the CertBundle type are described in section 3.2.8.
Each CertBundle includes all the certificates in one path, starting
the end certificate and ending with the certificate issued by the
trust anchor. If proof of revocation status was also requested, the
CertBundle also contains any additional certificates used to validate
the revocation information for that path. These certificates follow
the certificate issued by the trust anchor in the sequence.
CertBundles ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertBundle
4.9.6 validationErrors
The validationErrors item MUST only be present in failure responses.
If present, it MUST contain one or more OIDs representing the reason
the validation failed (validation errors for the basic validation
algorithm and name validation algorithm are defined in sections
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3.2.4.2.2 and 3.2.4.2.4). The validationErrors item SHOULD only
be included when the replyStatus is 3, 5, 6, 7, or 8. SCVP servers
are not required to specify all of the reasons that validation
failed. SCVP clients MUST NOT assume that the OIDs included in
validationErrors represent all of the validation errors for the
certification path.
4.9.7 nextUpdate
The nextUpdate item tells the time at which the server expects a
refresh of information regarding the validity of the certificate to
become available. The nextUpdate item is especially interesting if
the certificate revocation status information is not available or the
certificate is suspended. The nextUpdate item represents the date
and time in UTC, using the GeneralizedTime type. The encoding rules
for GeneralizedTime in section 3.2.7 MUST be used.
4.9.8 certReplyExtensions
The certReplyExtensions contains the responses to the queryExtensions
item in the request. The certReplyExtensions item uses the
Extensions type defined in [PKIX-1]. The object identifiers (OIDs)
in the queryExtensions item in the request are used to identify the
corresponding reply values. The certReplyExtensions item, when
present, contains a sequence of Extension items, each of which
contains an extnID item, a critical item, and an extnValue item.
The extnID item is an identifier for the extension. It contains the
OID that names the extension, and it MUST match one of the OIDs in
the queryExtensions item in the request.
The critical item is a BOOLEAN, and it MUST be set to FALSE.
The extnValue item contains an OCTET STRING. Within the OCTET STRING
is the extension value. An ASN.1 type is specified for each
extension, identified by the associated extnID object identifier.
4.10 respNonce
The respNonce item contains an identifier to bind the request to the
response.
If the client includes a requestNonce value in the request and the
server is generating a specific non-cached response to the request
then the server MUST return the same value in the response.
If the server is using a cached response to the request then it
MUST omit the respNonce field.
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If the server is returning a specific non-cached response to a
request without a nonce, then the server MAY include a message
specific nonce. For digitally signed messages, the server MAY use
the value of the message-digest attribute in the signedAttrs within
SignerInfo of the request as the value in the respNonce field.
The requestNonce item uses the octet string type.
Client SHOULD support respNonce and servers MUST support respNonce.
4.11 serverContextInfo
The serverContextInfo item in a response is a mechanism for the
server to pass some opaque context information to the client. If the
client does not like the certification path returned, it can make a
new query and pass along this context information.
Section 3.2.6 contains information about the client's usage of this
item.
The context information is opaque to the client, but it provides
information to the server that ensures that a different certification
path will be returned (if another one can be found). The context
information could indicate state on the server or it could contain a
sequence of hashes of certification paths that have already been
returned to the client. The protocol does not dictate any structure
or requirements for this item. However, implementers should review
the Security Considerations section of this document before selecting
a structure.
Servers that are incapable of returning additional paths MUST NOT
include the serverContextInfo item in the response.
4.12 cvResponseExtensions
If present, the CVResponseExtensions item contains a sequence of
Extensions that extend the response. This specification does not
define any extensions. The facility is provided to allow future
specifications to extend SCVP. The syntax for Extensions is imported
from [PKIX-1]. The cvResponseExtensions item, when present, contains
a sequence of Extension items, each of which contains an extnID item,
a critical item, and an extnValue item.
The extnID item is an identifier for the extension. It contains the
object identifier (OID) that names the extension.
The critical item is a BOOLEAN. Each extension is designated as
either critical (with a value of TRUE) or non-critical (with a value
of FALSE). An SCVP client MUST reject the response if it encounters
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a critical extension it does not recognize; however, a non-critical
extension MAY be ignored if it is not recognized.
The extnValue item contains an OCTET STRING. Within the OCTET STRING
is the extension value. An ASN.1 type is specified for each
extension, identified by the associated extnID object identifier.
4.13 SCVP Response Validation
There are two mechanisms for validation of SCVP responses, one based
on the client's knowledge of a specific SCVP server key and the other
based on validation of the certificate corresponding to the private
key used to protect the SCVP response.
4.13.1 Simple Key Validation
The simple key validation method is where the SCVP client has a local
policy of one or more SCVP server keys that directly identify the set
of valid SCVP servers. Mechanisms for storage of server keys or
identifiers are a local matter. For example, a client could store
cryptographic hashes of public keys used to verify SignedData
responses. Alternatively, a client could store shared symmetric keys
used to verify MACs in AuthenticatedData responses.
Simple key validation MUST be used by SCVP clients that cannot
validate PKIX-1 certificates and are therefore making delegated path
validation requests to the SCVP server [RQTMS]. It is a matter of
local policy with these clients whether to use SignedData or
AuthenticatedData. Simple key validation MAY be used by other SCVP
clients for other reasons.
4.13.2 SCVP Server Certificate Validation
It is a matter of local policy what validation policy the client uses
when validating responses. When validating protected SCVP responses,
SCVP clients SHOULD use the validation algorithm defined in section 6
of [PKIX-1].
If the certificate used to sign the validation policy responses and
SignedData validation responses contains the key usage extension
[PKIX-1 section 4.2.1.3] it MUST have either the digital signature
bit set, the non-repudiation bit set, or both bits set.
If the certificate for AuthenticatedData validation responses
contains the key usage extension it MUST have the key agreement bit
set.
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If the certificate used on a validation policy response or a
validation response contains the extended key usage extension [PKIX-1
section 4.2.1.13] it MUST contain the following OID:
id-kp-scvpServer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 15 }
5 Server Policy Request
An SCVP client uses the ValPolRequest item to request the list of
validation policies supported by the SCVP server. When a
ValPolRequest is encapsulated in a MIME body part, it MUST be carried
in an application/vp-request MIME body part.
The request consists of a ValPolRequest encapsulated in a
ContentInfo. The client does not sign the request.
ContentInfo {
contentType id-ct-scvp-valPolRequest,
-- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.12)
content ValPolRequest }
The ValPolRequest type has the following syntax:
ValPolRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
vpRequestVersion INTEGER,
requestNonce OCTET STRING }
5.1 vpRequestVersion
The syntax and semantics of vpRequestVersion are the same as
cvRequestVersion as described in section 3.1.
5.2 requestNonce
The requestNonce item contains a request identifier generated by the
SCVP client. If the server returns a specific response it MUST
include the requestNonce from the request in the response, but the
server MAY return a cached response which MUST NOT include a
requestNonce.
6 Validation Policy Response
In response to a ValPolRequest, the SCVP server provides a
ValPolResponse. The ValPolResponse MAY not be unique to any
ValPolRequest, so may be reused by the server in response to multiple
ValPolRequests. The ValPolResponse also has an indication of how
frequently the ValPolResponse may be reissued. The server MUST sign
the response using its digital signature certificate. When a
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ValPolResponse is encapsulated in a MIME body part, it MUST be
carried in an application/vp-response MIME body part.
The response consists of a ValPolResponse encapsulated in a
SignedData, which is in turn encapsulated in a ContentInfo. An
overview of the structure used for the response is provided below.
Many details are not shown, but the way that SCVP makes use of CMS is
clearly illustrated.
ContentInfo {
contentType id-signedData, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2)
content SignedData }
SignedData {
version CMSVersion,
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
-- MUST include server cert
crls [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists
OPTIONAL,
signerInfos SET OF SignerInfos } -- Only one in SCVP
SignerInfo {
version CMSVersion,
sid SignerIdentifier,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
signedAttrs SignedAttributes, -- Required by CMS
signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
signature SignatureValue,
unsignedAttrs UnsignedAttributes } -- Not used in SCVP
EncapsulatedContentInfo {
eContentType id-ct-scvp-valPolResponse,
-- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.13)
eContent OCTET STRING } -- Contains ValPolResponse
The ValPolResponse type has the following syntax:
ValPolResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
vpResponseVersion INTEGER,
maxCVResponseVersion INTEGER,
maxVPResponseVersion INTEGER,
defaultPolicyID INTEGER,
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
nextUpdate GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
validationPolices SEQUENCE OF ValidationPolRef,
validationAlgs SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
authPolicies SEQUENCE OF AuthPolicy,
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responseTypes ResponseTypes,
defaultPolicyValues RespValidationPolicy,
revocationInfoTypes RevocationInfoTypes,
serverPublicKeys SEQUENCE OF KeyAgreePublicKey
OPTIONAL,
clockSkew [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 10,
requestNonce [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
ResponseTypes ::= ENUMERATED {
cached-only (0),
non-cached-only (1),
cached-and-non-cached (2)}
RevocationInfoTypes ::= BIT STRING {
fullCRLs (0),
deltaCRLs (1),
indirectCRLs (2),
oCSPResponses (3) }
SCVP clients that support validation policy requests MUST support
validation policy responses. SCVP servers MUST support validation
policy responses.
SCVP servers MUST support cached policy responses and MAY support
specific responses to policy requests.
6.1 vpResponseVersion
The syntax and semantics of the vpResponseVersion item are the same
as cvRequestVersion as described in section 3.1. The
vpResponseVersion used MUST be the same as the vpRequestVersion
unless the client has used a value greater than the values the server
supports. If the client submits a vpRequestVersion greater than the
version supported by the server, the server MUST return a
vpResponseVersion using the highest version number the server
supports as the version number.
6.2 maxCVRequestVersion
The maxCVRequestVersion defines the maximum version number for CV
requests that the server supports.
6.3 maxVPRequestVersion
The maxVPRequestVersion defines the maximum version number for VP
requests that the server supports.
6.4 defaultPolicyID
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An integer that uniquely represents the version of the default
validation policy as represented by the validationPolicy,
validationAlg, authPolicies, and clockSkew. If any of these values
change, the server MUST create a new ValPolResponse with a new
defaultPolicyID. If the policy and therefore the defaultPolicyID has
not changed, then the server may reuse defaultPolicyID across
multiple ValPolResponse messages. However if the server, having
changed the policy, then reverts to an earlier policy, the server
MUST NOT revert the policy ID as well, but MUST select another unique
value.
6.5 thisUpdate
This field indicates the signing date and time of this policy
response.
GeneralizedTime values MUST be expressed Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu)
and interpreted as defined in section 3.2.7.
6.6 nextUpdate and requestNonce
These fields are used to indicate whether policy responses are
specific to policy requests. Where policy responses are cached,
these fields indicate when the information will be updated. The
optional nextUpdate field indicates the time by which the next policy
response will be published. The optional requestNonce field links
the response to a specific request by returning the nonce provided in
the request.
If the nextUpdate field is omitted it indicates a non-cached response
generated in response to a specific request (i.e. the ValPolResponse
is bound to a specific request). If this field is omitted the
requestNonce field MUST be present and MUST include the requestNonce
value from the request.
If the nextUpdate field is present it indicates a cached response
that is not bound to a specific request. An SCVP server MUST
periodically generate a new response as defined by the next update
time, but MAY use the same ValPolResponse to respond to multiple
requests. Thes requestNonce is omitted if the nextUpdate field is
present.
It is a matter of local server policy to return a cached or non-
cached specific response.
GeneralizedTime values in nextUpdate MUST be expressed Greenwich Mean
Time (Zulu) as specified in section 3.2.7.
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6.7 validationPolicies
The validationPolicies item contains a sequence of ValidationPolRef
representing the validation policies supported by the server. It is
a matter of local policy if the server wishes to process requests
using the default validation policy, and if it does not, then it MUST
NOT include the id-svp-defaultValPolicy in this list.
6.8 validationAlgs
The validationAlgs item contains a sequence of OIDs. Each OID
identifies a validation algorithm supported by the server.
6.9 authPolicies
The authPolicies item contains a sequence of policy references for
authenticating to the SCVP server.
The reference to the authentication policy can be either an OID where
the client and server have agreed the OID to represent an
authentication policy or a URI where the URI points to a human
readable definition of the policy. The list of policies is intended
to document to the client if authentication is required for some
requests and if so how.
AuthPolicy ::= CHOICE {
authPolRefByOID [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
authPolRefByURI [1] IA5String}
6.10 responseTypes
responseTypes allows the server to publish the range of response
types it supports. Cached only means the server will only return
cached responses to requests. Non-cached only means the server will
return a specific response to the request i.e. containing the
requestor's nonce. Both means the server will return either,
depending on the request.
6.11 revocationInfoTypes
revocationInfoTypes allows the server to indicate the sources of
revocation information that it is capable of processing. For each
bit in the RevocationInfoTypes bit string, the server MUST set the
bit to one if it is capable of processing the corresponding
revocation information type and to zero if it can not.
6.12 defaultPolicyValues
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This is the default validation policy used by the server. It
contains a RespValidationPolicy, which is defined in section 4.5.
All OPTIONAL fields in the validationPolicy field MUST be populated.
A server will use these default values when the request references
the default validation policy and the client does not override the
default values by supplying other values in the request.
This allows the client to optimize the request by omitting parameters
that match the server default values.
6.13 serverPublicKeys
The serverPublicKeys item is a sequence of one or more key agreement
public keys and associated parameters. It is used by clients making
AuthenticatedData requests to the server. Each item in the
serverPublicKeys sequence is of the KeyAgreePublicKey type:
KeyAgreePublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
publicKey BIT STRING }
The KeyAgreePublicKey includes the algorithm identifier and the
server's public key. SCVP servers that support the key agreement
mode of AuthenticatedData for SCVP requests MUST support
serverPublicKeys and the Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm as
specified in [PKIX-ALG]. SCVP servers that support serverPublicKeys
MUST support the 1024-bit MODP group key (group 2) as defined in
[IKE]. SCVP servers that support serverPublicKeys MAY support other
Diffie-Hellman groups [IKE-GROUPS], as well as other key agreement
algorithms.
6.14 clockSkew
The clockSkew item is the number of minutes the server will allow for
clock skew. The default value of 10 minutes.
7 SCVP Server Relay
In some network environments, especially ones that include firewalls,
an SCVP server might not be able to obtain all of the information
that it needs to process a request. However, the server might be
configured to use the services of one or more other SCVP servers to
fulfill all requests. In such cases, the SCVP client is unaware that
the initial SCVP server is using the services of other SCVP servers.
The initial SCVP server acts as a client to another SCVP server.
Unlike the original client, the SCVP server is expected to have
moderate computing and memory resources. This section describes
SCVP server-to-SCVP server exchanges. This section does not impose
any requirements on SCVP clients that are not also SCVP servers.
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Further, this section does not impose any requirements on SCVP
servers that do not relay requests to other SCVP servers.
When one SCVP server relays a request to another server, in an
incorrectly configured system of servers, it is possible that the
same request will be relayed back again. Any SCVP server that relays
requests MUST implement the conventions described in this section to
detect and break loops.
When an SCVP server relays a request, the request MUST include the
requestorRef item. If the request to be relayed already contains a
requestorRef item, then the server-generated request MUST contain a
requestorRef item constructed from this value followed by an octet
string that contains an identifier of the SCVP server. If the
request to be relayed does not contain a requestorRef item, then the
server-generated request MUST contain a requestorRef item that
includes a single octet string that contains an identifier of the
SCVP server.
To prevent false loop detection, servers should use identifiers that
are unique within their network of cooperating SCVP servers. SCVP
servers that support relay SHOULD populate this item with the DNS
name of the server or the distinguished name in the server's
certificate. SCVP servers MAY choose other procedures for generating
identifiers that are unique within their community.
When an SVCP server receives a request that contains a requestorRef
item, the server MUST check the sequence of octet strings in the
requestorRef item for its own identifier. If the server discovers
its own identifier in the requestor item, it MUST respond with an
error, setting the cvResponseStatus to 40.
When an SCVP server generates a non-cached response to a relayed
request, the server MUST include the requestorRef item from the
request in the response.
8 SCVP ASN.1 Module
This section defines the syntax for SCVP request-response pairs. The
semantics for the messages are defined in sections 3, 4, 5, and 6.
The SCVP ASN.1 module follows.
SCVP
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 21 }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
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IMPORTS
AlgorithmIdentifier, Attribute, Certificate, Extensions,
-- Import UTF8String if required by compiler
-- UTF8String, -- CertificateList
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 -- RFC 3280
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 18 }
GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyUsage, KeyPurposeId
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 -- RFC 3280
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 19 }
AttributeCertificate
FROM PKIXAttributeCertificate -- RFC 3281
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 12 }
ESSCertID
FROM ExtendedSecurityServices -- RFC 2634
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) 2 }
OCSPResponse
FROM OCSP -- RFC 2560
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 14 } ;
-- SCVP Certificate Validation Request
id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
id-smime(16) 1 }
id-ct-scvp-certValRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 10 }
CVRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
cvRequestVersion INTEGER,
query Query,
requestorRef [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OCTET STRING
OPTIONAL,
requestNonce [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
requestorName [2] GeneralName OPTIONAL,
reqestExtensions [3] Extensions OPTIONAL }
Query ::= SEQUENCE {
queriedCerts CertReferences,
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checks CertChecks,
wantBack WantBack,
validationPolicy ValidationPolicy,
responseFlags ResponseFlags OPTIONAL,
serverContextInfo [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
validationTime [3] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
intermediateCerts [4] CertBundle OPTIONAL,
revInfos [5] RevocationInfos OPTIONAL,
producedAt [6] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
queryExtensions [7] Extensions OPTIONAL }
CertReferences ::= CHOICE {
pkcRefs [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKCReference,
acRefs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ACReference }
CertReference::= CHOICE {
pkc PKCReference,
ac ACReference }
PKCReference ::= CHOICE {
cert [0] Certificate,
pkcRef [1] ESSCertID }
ACReference ::= CHOICE {
attrCert [2] AttributeCertificate,
acRef [3] ESSCertID }
ValidationPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
validationPolRef ValidationPolRef,
validationAlg [0] ValidationAlg OPTIONAL,
userPolicySet [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT
IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
inhibitPolicyMapping [2] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
requireExplicitPolicy [3] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
inhibitAnyPolicy [4] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
trustAnchors [6] TrustAnchors OPTIONAL,
keyUsages [7] KeyUsages OPTIONAL,
extendedKeyUsages [8] SEQUENCE OF KeyPurposeId OPTIONAL}
CertChecks ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
WantBack ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
ValidationPolRef ::= CHOICE {
valPolRefByOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
valPolRefByURI IA5String}
ValidationAlg ::= SEQUENCE {
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valAlgId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
parameters ANY DEFINED BY valAlgId OPTIONAL }
NameValidationAlgParms ::= SEQUENCE {
nameCompAlgId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
validationNames GeneralNames }
TrustAnchors ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKCReference
KeyUsages ::= CHOICE {
anyKeyUsage NULL,
requiredKeyUsages SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyUsage }
KeyAgreePublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
publicKey BIT STRING }
ResponseFlags ::= SEQUENCE {
fullRequestInResponse [0] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
responseValidationPolByRef [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
protectResponse [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
cachedResponse [3] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE }
CertBundle ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate
RevocationInfos ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF RevocationInfo
RevocationInfo ::= CHOICE {
crl [0] CertificateList,
delta-crl [1] CertificateList,
ocsp [2] OCSPResponse,
other [3] OtherRevInfo }
OtherRevInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
riType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
riValue ANY DEFINED BY riType }
-- SCVP Certificate Validation Response
id-ct-scvp-certValResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 11 }
CVResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
cvResponseVersion INTEGER,
policyID INTEGER,
producedAt GeneralizedTime,
responseStatus ResponseStatus,
respValidationPolicy [0] RespValidationPolicy OPTIONAL,
requestRef [1] RequestReference OPTIONAL,
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requestorRef [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OCTET STRING
OPTIONAL,
requestorName [3] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
replyObjects [5] ReplyObjects OPTIONAL,
respNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
serverContextInfo [7] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
cvResponseExtensions [8] Extensions OPTIONAL }
ResponseStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
statusCode CVStatusCode,
errorMessage [0] UTF8String OPTIONAL }
CVStatusCode ::= ENUMERATED {
okay (0),
skipUnrecognizedItems (1),
tooBusy (10),
invalidREquest (11),
internalError (12),
badStructure (20),
unsupportedVersion (21),
abortUnrecognizedItems (22),
unrecognizedSigKey (23),
badSignatureOrMAC (24),
unableToDecode (25),
notAuthorized (26),
unsupportedChecks (27),
unsupportedWantBacks (28),
unsupportedSignatureOrMAC (29),
invalidSignatureOrMAC (30),
relayingLoop (40),
unrecognizedValPol (50),
unrecognizedValAlg (51),
fullRequestInResponseUnsupported (52),
fullPolResponseUnsupported (53),
inhibitPolicyMappingUnsupported (54),
requireExplicitPolicyUnsupported (55),
inhibitAnyPolicyUnsupported (56),
validityTimeUnsupported (57),
unrecognizedCritQueryExt (63),
unrecognizedCriticalRequestExt (64)}
RespValidationPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
validationPolicy ValidationPolicy,
validationPolicyAttr SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
OPTIONAL }
RequestReference ::= CHOICE {
requestHash [0] HashValue, -- hash of CVRequest
fullRequest [1] CVRequest }
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HashValue ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { sha-1 },
value OCTET STRING }
sha-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 }
ReplyObjects ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertReply
CertReply ::= SEQUENCE {
cert CertReference,
replyStatus ReplyStatus,
replyValTime GeneralizedTime,
replyChecks ReplyChecks,
replyWantBacks ReplyWantBacks,
validationErrors [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
nextUpdate [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
certReplyExtensions [2] Extensions OPTIONAL }
ReplyStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
success (0),
malformedPKC (1),
malformedAC (2),
unavailableValidityTime (3),
referenceCertHashFail (4),
certPathConstructFail (5),
certPathNotValid (6),
certPathNotValidNow (7),
wantBackUnsatisfied (8) }
ReplyChecks ::= SEQUENCE OF ReplyCheck
ReplyCheck ::= SEQUENCE {
check OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
status INTEGER }
ReplyWantBacks ::= SEQUENCE OF ReplyWantBack
ReplyWantBack::= SEQUENCE {
wb OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
value OCTET STRING }
CertBundles ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertBundle
-- SCVP Validation Policies Request
id-ct-scvp-valPolRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 12 }
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ValPolRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
vpRequestVersion INTEGER,
requestNonce OCTET STRING }
-- SCVP Validation Policies Response
id-ct-scvp-valPolResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 13 }
ValPolResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
vpResponseVersion INTEGER,
maxCVResponseVersion INTEGER,
maxVPResponseVersion INTEGER,
defaultPolicyID INTEGER,
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
nextUpdate GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
validationPolices SEQUENCE OF ValidationPolRef,
validationAlgs SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
authPolicies SEQUENCE OF AuthPolicy,
responseTypes ResponseTypes,
defaultPolicyValues RespValidationPolicy,
revocationInfoTypes RevocationInfoTypes,
serverPublicKeys SEQUENCE OF KeyAgreePublicKey
OPTIONAL,
clockSkew [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 10,
requestNonce [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
ResponseTypes ::= ENUMERATED {
cached-only (0),
non-cached-only (1),
cached-and-non-cached (2)}
RevocationInfoTypes ::= BIT STRING {
fullCRLs (0),
deltaCRLs (1),
indirectCRLs (2),
oCSPResponses (3) }
AuthPolicy ::= CHOICE {
authPolRefByOID [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
authPolRefByURI [1] IA5String}
-- SCVP Check Identifiers
id-stc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 17 }
id-stc-build-pkc-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 1 }
id-stc-build-valid-pkc-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 2 }
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id-stc-build-status-checked-pkc-path
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 3 }
id-stc-build-aa-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 4 }
id-stc-build-valid-aa-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 5 }
id-stc-build-status-checked-aa-path
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 6 }
id-stc-status-check-ac-and-build-status-checked-aa-path
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 7 }
-- SCVP WantBack Identifiers
id-swb OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 18 }
id-swb-pkc-best-cert-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 1 }
id-swb-pkc-revocation-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 2 }
id-swb-pkc-cert-status OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 3 }
id-swb-pkc-public-key-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 4 }
id-swb-aa-cert-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 5 }
id-swb-aa-revocation-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 6 }
id-swb-ac-revocation-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 7 }
id-swb-ac-cert-status OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 8 }
id-swb-pkc-cert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 10}
id-swb-ac-cert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 11}
id-swb-pkc-all-cert-paths OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 12}
-- SCVP Validation Policy and Algorithm Identifiers
id-svp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 19 }
id-svp-defaultValPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-svp 1 }
-- SCVP Basic Validation Algorithm Identifier
id-svp-basicValAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-svp 3 }
-- SCVP Basic Validation Algorithm Errors
id-bvae OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-svp-basicValAlg
id-bvae-expired OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 1 }
id-bvae-not-yet-valid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 2 }
id-bvae-wrong-anchor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 3 }
id-bvae-invalid-key-usage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 10 }
id-bvae-invalid-purpose OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 11 }
id-bvae-revoked OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 16 }
-- SCVP Name Validation Algorithm Identifier
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id-svp-nameValAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-svp 2 }
-- SCVP Name Validation Algorithm DN comparison algorithm
id-nva-dnCompAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-svp 4 }
-- SCVP Name Validation Algorithm Errors
id-nvae OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-svp-nameValAlg
id-nvae-name-mismatch OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 1 }
id-nvae-no-name OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 2 }
id-nvae-unknown-alg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 3 }
id-nvae-bad-name OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 4 }
id-nvae-bad-name-type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 5 }
id-nvae-mixed-names OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 6 }
-- SCVP Extended Key Usage Key Purpose Identifiers
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 3 }
id-kp-scvpServer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 15 }
id-kp-scvpClient OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 16 }
END
9 Security Considerations
For security considerations specific to the Cryptographic Message
Syntax message formats, see [CMS]. For security considerations
specific to the process of PKI certificate path validation, see
[PKIX-1].
A client that trusts a server's response for validation of a
certificate inherently trusts that server as much as it would trust
its own validation software. This means that if an attacker
compromises a trusted SCVP server, the attacker can change the
validation processing for every client that relies on that server.
Thus, an SCVP server must be protected at least as well as the trust
anchors that the SCVP server trusts.
Clients MUST check the requestRef item in the response and ensure
that it matches their original request. Requests contain a lot of
information that affects the response and clients need to ensure that
the server response corresponds to the request.
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When the SCVP response is used to determine the validity of a
certificate, the client MUST validate the digital signature or MAC on
the response to ensure that the expected SCVP server generated it.
If the client does not check the digital signature or MAC on the
response, a man-in-the-middle attack could fool the client into
believing modified responses from the server, or responses to
questions the client did not ask.
If the client does not include a requestNonce item, or if the client
does not check that the requestNonce in the response matches the
value in the request, an attacker can replay previous responses from
the SCVP server.
If the server does not require some sort of authorization (such as
signed requests), an attacker can get the server to respond to
arbitrary requests. Such responses may give the attacker information
about weaknesses in the server or about the timeliness of the
server's checking. This information may be valuable for a future
attack.
If the server uses the serverContextInfo item to indicate some server
state associated with a requestor, implementers must take appropriate
measures against denial of service attacks where an attacker sends in
a lot of requests at one time to force the server to keep a lot of
state information.
SCVP does not include any confidentiality mechanisms. If
confidentiality is needed, it can be achieved with a lower-layer
security protocol.
The only validation policy references that are truly persistent are
OIDs. If the ownership of the policy could in any way be an issue,
then OIDs should be the reference type of choice. However in many
situations, even though URIs are technically non-persistent, the use
of a URI is much more readily understood because of its widespread
use elsewhere, and with many organizations they may be viewed as
persistent for practical purposes. Therefore in these situations use
of a URI many be more attractive.
If an SCVP client is not operating on a network with good physical
protection, it must ensure that there is integrity over the SCVP
request-response pair and ensure that the response cannot be a replay
of a cached response obtained by another client. It can do this by
using a protected transport such as TLS. It can also do this by
using the Diffie-hellman keys to protect the request. It can also
use signing keys and request a fresh response from the server.
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If an SCVP client populates the userPolicySet in a request with a
value other than anyPolicy, but does not set the
requireExplicitPolicy flag, the server may return an affirmative
answer for paths that do not satisfy any of the specified policies.
In general, when a client populates the userPolicySet in a request
with a value other than anyPolicy, the requireExplicitPolicy flag
should also be set. This guarantees that all valid paths satisfy at
least one of the requested policies.
In SCVP, historical validation of a certificate returns the known
status of the certificate at the time specified in validationTime.
This may be used to demonstrate due diligence, but does not
necessarily provide the most complete information. A certificate may
have been revoked after the time specified in validationTime, but an
invalidity date that precedes the validationTime. The SCVP server
would provide an affirmative response even though the most current
information available indicates the certificate should not be trusted
at that time. SCVP clients may wish to specify a validationTime
later than the actual time of interest to mitigate this risk.
10 References
Normative and informative references are provided.
10.1 Normative References
[STDWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630,June 1999.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2630.txt
[OCSP] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S. and C. Adams,
"X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure - Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2560.txt
[PKIX-1] Housley, R., Polk, T, Ford, W. and Solo, D., "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3280.txt
[PKIX-AC] Farrell, S., and R. Housley, "An Internet Attribute
Certificate Profile for Authorization", RFC 3281, April
2002.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3281.txt
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[PKIX-ALG] Polk, W., Housley, R. and L. Bassham, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3280.txt
[SHA-1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash
Standard", NIST FIPS Pub 180-1, April 1995.
[UTF8] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC
2279, January 1998.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2279.txt
[ESS] Hoffman, P., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME", RFC 2634,
June 1999.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2634.txt
[HTTP-TLS] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC2818, May 2000.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2818.txt
[SMIME-CERT] B. Ramsdell, Ed. "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Certificate Handling"
RFC3850, July 2004.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3850.txt
[IKE] D. Harkins, D. Carrel. "The Internet Key Exchange"
RFC2409, November 1998
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2409.txt
10.2 Informative References
[HTTP] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H. and T.
Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1",
RFC 2068, January 1997.
[IKE-GROUPS] T. Kivinen, M. Kojo "More Modular Exponential (MODP)
Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
RFC3526, May 2003
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3526.txt
[RQMTS] Pinkas, D., and R. Housley, "Delegated Path Validation and
Delegated Path Discovery Protocol Requirements", RFC 3379,
September 2002.
11 Acknowledgments
The lively debate in the PKIX Working Group has made a significant
impact on this protocol. Special thanks to the following for their
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contributions to this standard and diligence in greatly improving
this document.
Denis Pinkas
Phillip Hallam-Baker
Mike Myers
Frank Balluffi
Ameya Talwalkar
John Thielens
Peter Sylvester
Yuriy Dzambasow
Sean P. Turner
Wen-Cheng Wang
Francis Dupont
Dave Engberg
Faisal Maqsood
Thanks also to working group chair Steve Kent for his support and
help.
Appendix A -- MIME Registrations
Four MIME type registrations are provided in this appendix.
A.1 application/cv-request
To: ietf-types@iana.org
Subject: Registration of MIME media type application/cv-request
MIME media type name: application
MIME subtype name: cv-request
Required parameters: format
Optional parameters: None
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: Carries a request for information. This
request may optionally be cryptographically protected.
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: IETF PKIX Working Group Draft on Simple
Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
Applications that use this media type: SCVP clients
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Additional information:
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .SCQ
Macintosh File Type Code(s): none
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Ambarish Malpani <ambarish@malpani.biz>
Intended usage: COMMON
Author/Change controller:
Ambarish Malpani <ambarish@malpani.biz>
A.2 application/cv-response
To: ietf-types@iana.org
Subject: Registration of MIME media type application/cv-response
MIME media type name: application
MIME subtype name: cv-response
Required parameters: format
Optional parameters: None
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: The client may require that this response be
cryptographically protected, or may choose to use secure transport
mechanism. DPD responses may be unprotected, but the client
validates the information provided in the request.
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: IETF PKIX Working Group Draft on Simple
Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
Applications that use this media type: SCVP servers
Additional information:
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .SCS
Macintosh File Type Code(s): none
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Ambarish Malpani <ambarish@malpani.biz>
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Intended usage: COMMON
Author/Change controller: Ambarish Malpani <ambarish@malpani.biz>
A.3 application/vp-request
To: ietf-types@iana.org
Subject: Registration of MIME media type application/vp-request
MIME media type name: application
MIME subtype name: vp-request
Required parameters: format
Optional parameters: None
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: Carries a request for information.
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: IETF PKIX Working Group Draft on Simple
Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
Applications that use this media type: SCVP clients
Additional information:
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .SPQ
Macintosh File Type Code(s): none
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Ambarish Malpani <ambarish@malpani.biz>
Intended usage: COMMON
Author/Change controller: Ambarish Malpani <ambarish@malpani.biz>
A.4 application/vp-response
To: ietf-types@iana.org
Subject: Registration of MIME media type application/vp-response
MIME media type name: application
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MIME subtype name: vp-response
Required parameters: format
Optional parameters: None
Encoding considerations: Binary
Security considerations: None
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: IETF PKIX Working Group Draft on Simple
Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
Applications that use this media type: SCVP servers
Additional information:
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .SPP
Macintosh File Type Code(s): none
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Ambarish Malpani <ambarish@malpani.biz>
Intended usage: COMMON
Author/Change controller:
Ambarish Malpani <ambarish@malpani.biz>
Appendix B -- SCVP over HTTP
This appendix describes the formatting conventions for the SCVP
request and response when carried by HTTP.
B.1 SCVP Request
HTTP based SCVP requests can use the POST method to submit their
requests. Where privacy is a requirement, SCVP transactions
exchanged using HTTP MAY be protected using either TLS/SSL or some
other lower layer protocol.
An SCVP request using the POST method is constructed as follows:
The Content-Type header MUST have the value "application/cv-
request".
The Content-Length header MUST be present and have the exact
length of the request.
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The body of the message is the binary value of the DER encoding
of the CVRequest, wrapped in a CMS body as described in
Section 3. Other HTTP headers MAY be present and MAY be
ignored if not understood by the requestor.
Sample Content-Type headers are:
Content-Type: application/cv- request
B.2 SCVP Response
An HTTP-based SCVP response is composed of the appropriate HTTP
headers, followed by the binary value of the DER encoding of the
CVResponse, wrapped in a CMS body as described in Section 4.
The Content-Type header MUST have the value "application/cv-
response".
The Content-Length header MUST be present and specify the length of
the response.
Other HTTP headers MAY be present and MAY be ignored if not
understood by the requestor.
B.3 SCVP Policy Request
HTTP based SCVP policy requests can use the POST method to submit
their requests. Where privacy is a requirement, SCVP transactions
exchanged using HTTP MAY be protected using either TLS/SSL or some
other lower layer protocol.
An SCVP request using the POST method is constructed as follows:
The Content-Type header MUST have the value "application/vp-
request".
The Content-Length header MUST be present and have the exact
length of the request.
The body of the message is the binary value of the DER encoding
of the ValPolRequest, wrapped in a CMS body as described in
Section 5. Other HTTP headers MAY be present and
MAY be ignored if not understood by the requestor.
Sample Content-Type headers are:
Content-Type: application/vp-request
B.4 SCVP Policy Response
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An HTTP-based SCVP policy response is composed of the appropriate
HTTP headers, followed by the binary value of the DER encoding of the
ValPolResponse, wrapped in a CMS body as described in Section 6.
The Content-Type header MUST have the value "application/vp-
response".
The Content-Length header MUST be present and specify the length of
the response.
Other HTTP headers MAY be present and MAY be ignored if not
understood by the requestor.
Appendix C -- Author Contact Information
Trevor Freeman
Microsoft Corporation,
One Microsoft way.
Redmond, WA 98052
USA.
trevorf@microsoft.com
Russell Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
housley@Vigilsec.com
Ambarish Malpani
Malpani Consulting Services
ambarish@malpani.biz
David Cooper
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 8930
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
david.cooper@nist.gov
Tim Polk
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 8930
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
tim.polk@nist.gov
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Full Copyright Statement
"Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights."
"This document and the information contained herein are provided on
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