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PRECIS                                                    P. Saint-Andre
Internet-Draft                                                      &yet
Obsoletes: 4013 (if approved)                                A. Melnikov
Intended status: Standards Track                               Isode Ltd
Expires: May 25, 2015                                  November 21, 2014


 Preparation, Enforcement, and Comparison of Internationalized Strings
                  Representing Usernames and Passwords
                    draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis-10

Abstract

   This document describes methods for handling Unicode strings
   representing usernames and passwords.  This document obsoletes RFC
   4013.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 25, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Usernames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  UsernameIdentifierClass Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.1.  Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.2.  Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.3.  Comparison  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Case Mapping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Application-Layer Constructs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.5.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.2.  PasswordFreeformClass Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.2.1.  Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.2.2.  Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.2.3.  Comparison  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  Usernames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.1.  UsernameIdentifierClass Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.2.  PasswordFreeformClass Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.1.  Password/Passphrase Strength  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.2.  Identifier Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.3.  Reuse of PRECIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.4.  Reuse of Unicode  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix A.  Differences from RFC 4013  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   Usernames and passwords are widely used for authentication and
   authorization on the Internet, either directly when provided in
   plaintext (as in the SASL PLAIN mechanism [RFC4616] or the HTTP Basic
   scheme [RFC2617] / [I-D.ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update]) or
   indirectly when provided as the input to a cryptographic algorithm
   such as a hash function (as in the SASL SCRAM mechanism [RFC5802] or
   the HTTP Digest scheme [RFC2617] / [I-D.ietf-httpauth-digest]).




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   To increase the likelihood that the input and comparison of usernames
   and passwords will work in ways that make sense for typical users
   throughout the world, this document defines rules for preparing,
   enforcing, and comparing internationalized strings that represent
   usernames and passwords.  Such strings consist of characters from the
   Unicode character set [UNICODE], with special attention to characters
   outside the ASCII range [RFC20].  The rules for handling such strings
   are specified through profiles of the string classes defined in the
   PRECIS framework specification [I-D.ietf-precis-framework].

   Profiles of the PRECIS framework enable software to handle Unicode
   characters outside the ASCII range in an automated way, so that such
   characters are treated carefully and consistently in application
   protocols.  In large measure, these profiles are designed to protect
   application developers from the potentially negative consequences of
   supporting the full range of Unicode characters.  For instance, in
   almost all application protocols it would be dangerous to treat the
   Unicode character SUPERSCRIPT ONE (U+0089) as equivalent to DIGIT ONE
   (U+0031), since that would result in false positives during
   comparison, authentication, and authorization (e.g., an attacker
   could easy spoof an account "user1@example.com").

   Whereas a naive use of Unicode would make such attacks trivially
   easy, the PRECIS profile defined here for usernames generally
   protects applications from inadvertently causing such problems.
   (Similar considerations apply to passwords, although here it is
   desirable to support a wider range of characters so as to maximize
   entropy during authentication.)

   The methods defined here might be applicable wherever usernames or
   passwords are used.  However, the methods are not intended for use in
   preparing strings that are not usernames (e.g., email addresses and
   LDAP distinguished names), nor in cases where identifiers or secrets
   are not strings (e.g., keys and certificates) or require specialized
   handling.

   This document obsoletes RFC 4013 (the "SASLprep" profile of
   stringprep [RFC3454]) but can be used by technologies other than the
   Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [RFC4422], such as
   HTTP authentication [RFC2617] / [I-D.ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update]
   / [I-D.ietf-httpauth-digest].

2.  Terminology

   Many important terms used in this document are defined in
   [I-D.ietf-precis-framework], [RFC5890], [RFC6365], and [UNICODE].
   The term "non-ASCII space" refers to any Unicode code point having a




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   general category of "Zs", with the exception of U+0020 (here called
   "ASCII space").

   As used here, the term "password" is not literally limited to a word;
   i.e., a password could be a passphrase consisting of more than one
   word, perhaps separated by spaces or other such characters.

   Some SASL mechanisms (e.g., CRAM-MD5, DIGEST-MD5, and SCRAM) specify
   that the authentication identity used in the context of such
   mechanisms is a "simple user name" (see Section 2 of [RFC4422] as
   well as [RFC4013]).  Various application technologies also assume
   that the identity of a user or account takes the form of a username
   (e.g., authentication for the HyperText Transfer Protocol [RFC2617] /
   [I-D.ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update] / [I-D.ietf-httpauth-digest]),
   whether or not they use SASL.  Note well that the exact form of a
   username in any particular SASL mechanism or application technology
   is a matter for implementation and deployment, and that a username
   does not necessarily map to any particular application identifier
   (such as the localpart of an email address).

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

3.  Usernames

3.1.  Definition

   This document specifies that a username is a string of Unicode code
   points [UNICODE], encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629], and structured as an
   ordered sequence of "userparts" (where the complete username can
   consist of a single userpart or a space-separated sequence of
   userparts).

   The syntax for a username is defined as follows using the Augmented
   Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) [RFC5234].

      username   = userpart *(1*SP userpart)
      userpart   = 1*(idbyte)
                   ;
                   ; an "idbyte" is a byte used to represent a
                   ; UTF-8 encoded Unicode code point that can be
                   ; contained in a string that conforms to the
                   ; PRECIS "IdentifierClass"
                   ;





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   All code points and blocks not explicitly allowed in the PRECIS
   IdentifierClass are disallowed; this includes private use characters,
   surrogate code points, and the other code points and blocks that were
   defined as "Prohibited Output" in [RFC4013].  In addition, common
   constructions such as "user@example.com" are allowed as usernames
   under this specification, as they were under [RFC4013].

      Implementation Note: The username construct defined in this
      document does not necessarily match what all deployed applications
      might refer to as a "username" or "userid", but instead provides a
      relatively safe subset of Unicode characters that can be used in
      existing SASL mechanisms and SASL-using application protocols, and
      even in most application protocols that do not currently use SASL.

   A username MUST NOT be zero bytes in length.  This rule is to be
   enforced after any normalization and mapping of code points.

   In protocols that provide usernames as input to a cryptographic
   algorithm such as a hash function, the client will need to perform
   proper preparation of the username before applying the algorithm.

3.2.  UsernameIdentifierClass Profile

   The definition of the UsernameIdentifierClass profile is provided in
   the following sections, including detailed information about
   preparation, enforcement, and comparison (on the distinction between
   these actions, refer to [I-D.ietf-precis-framework]).

3.2.1.  Preparation

   An entity that prepares a string for inclusion in a username slot
   MUST ensure that the string consists only of Unicode code points that
   conform to the "IdentifierClass" base string class defined in
   [I-D.ietf-precis-framework].  In addition, the string MUST be encoded
   as UTF-8 [RFC3629].

3.2.2.  Enforcement

   An entity that performs enforcement in username slots MUST prepare a
   string as described in the previous section and MUST also apply the
   rules specified below for the UsernameIdentifierClass profile (these
   rules MUST be applied in the order shown).

   1.  Width Mapping Rule: Fullwidth and halfwidth characters MUST be
       mapped to their decomposition mappings.

   2.  Additional Mapping Rule: There is no additional mapping rule.




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   3.  Case Mapping Rule: There is no case mapping rule (although see
       Section 3.3 below).

   4.  Normalization Rule: Unicode Normalization Form C (NFC) MUST be
       applied to all characters.

   5.  Directionality Rule: Applications MUST apply the "Bidi Rule"
       defined in [RFC5893] (i.e., each of the six conditions of the
       Bidi Rule must be satisfied).

3.2.3.  Comparison

   An entity that performs comparison of two strings before or after
   their inclusion in username slots MUST prepare each string and
   enforce the rules specified in the previous two sections.  The two
   strings are to be considered equivalent if they are an exact octet-
   for-octet match (sometimes called "bit-string identity").

3.3.  Case Mapping

   Case mapping is a matter for the application protocol, protocol
   implementation, or end deployment.  In general, this document
   suggests that it is preferable to perform case mapping, since not
   doing so can lead to false positives during authentication and
   authorization (as described in [RFC6943]) and can result in confusion
   among end users given the prevalence of case mapping in many existing
   protocols and applications.  However, there can be good reasons to
   not perform case mapping, such as backward compatibility with
   deployed infrastructure.

   In particular:

   o  SASL mechanisms that directly re-use this profile MUST specify
      whether and when case mapping is to be applied to authentication
      identifiers.  SASL mechanisms SHOULD delay any case mapping to the
      last possible moment, such as when doing a lookup by username,
      username comparisons, or generating a cryptographic salt from a
      username (if the last possible moment happens on the server, then
      decisions about case mapping can be a matter of deployment
      policy).  In keeping with [RFC4422], SASL mechanisms are not to
      apply this or any other profile to authorization identifiers.

   o  Application protocols that use SASL (such as IMAP [RFC3501] and
      XMPP [RFC6120]) and that directly re-use this profile MUST specify
      whether case mapping is to be applied to authorization
      identifiers.  Such "SASL application protocols" SHOULD delay any
      case mapping of authorization identifiers to the last possible
      moment, which happens to necessarily be on the server side (this



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      enables decisions about case mapping to be a matter of deployment
      policy).  In keeping with [RFC4422], SASL application protocols
      are not to apply this or any other profile to authentication
      identifiers.

   o  Application protocols that do not use SASL (such as HTTP
      authentication with the Basic and Digest schemes [RFC2617] /
      [I-D.ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update] / [I-D.ietf-httpauth-digest])
      MUST specify whether and when case mapping is to be applied to
      authentication identifiers and authorization identifiers.  Such
      "non-SASL application protocols" SHOULD delay any case mapping to
      the last possible moment, such as when doing a lookup by username,
      username comparisons, or generating a cryptographic salt from a
      username (if the last possible moment happens on the server, then
      decisions about case mapping can be a matter of deployment
      policy).

   If the specification for a SASL mechanism, SASL application protocol,
   or non-SASL application protocol specifies the handling of case
   mapping for strings that conform to the UsernameIdentifierClass, it
   MUST clearly describe whether case mapping is required, recommended,
   or optional at the level of the protocol itself, implementations
   thereof, or service deployments.

      Informational Note: The LocalpartIdentifierClass profile defined
      in [I-D.ietf-xmpp-6122bis] is identical to the
      UsernameIdentifierClass profile defined here, except that the
      LocalpartIdentifierClass profile specifies case mapping.

3.4.  Application-Layer Constructs

   The username rule allows an application protocol, implementation, or
   deployment to create application-layer constructs such as
   "user@domain" or "Firstname Middlename Lastname" (e.g., because the
   PRECIS IdentifierClass allows any ASCII7 character, because spaces
   can be used to separate userpart instances, and because domain names
   as specified in [RFC5890] and [RFC5892] are a subset of the PRECIS
   IdentifierClass).

3.5.  Examples

   The following examples illustrate a small number of userparts (not
   usernames) that are consistent with the format defined above (note
   that the characters < and > are used here to delineate the actual
   userparts and are not part of the userpart strings).






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   Table 1: A sample of legal userparts

   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | # | Userpart             | Notes                           |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | 1 | <juliet@example.com> | The at-sign is allowed in the   |
   |   |                      | PRECIS IdentifierClass          |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | 2 | <fussball>           |                                 |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | 3 | <fu&#xDF;ball>       | The third character is LATIN    |
   |   |                      | SMALL LETTER SHARP S (U+00DF)   |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | 4 | <&#x3C0;>            | A userpart of GREEK SMALL       |
   |   |                      | LETTER PI (U+03C0)              |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | 5 | <&#x3A3;>            | A userpart of GREEK CAPITAL     |
   |   |                      | LETTER SIGMA (U+03A3)           |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | 6 | <&#x3C3;>            | A userpart of GREEK SMALL       |
   |   |                      | LETTER SIGMA (U+03C3)           |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | 7 | <&#x3C2;>            | A userpart of GREEK SMALL       |
   |   |                      | LETTER FINAL SIGMA (U+03C2)     |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+

   Several points are worth noting.  Regarding examples 2 and 3:
   although in German the character esszett (LATIN SMALL LETTER SHARP S,
   U+00DF) can mostly be used interchangeably with the two characters
   "ss", the userparts in these examples are different and (if desired)
   a server would need to enforce a registration policy that disallows
   one of them if the other is registered.  Regarding examples 5, 6, and
   7: optional case-mapping of GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA (U+03A3) to
   lowercase (i.e., to GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA, U+03C3) during
   comparison would result in matching the userparts in examples 5 and
   6; however, because the PRECIS mapping rules do not account for the
   special status of GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA (U+03C2), the
   userparts in examples 5 and 7 or examples 6 and 7 would not be
   matched during comparison.

   The following examples illustrate strings that are not valid
   userparts (not usernames) because they violate the format defined
   above.








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   Table 2: A sample of strings that violate the userpart rule

   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | # | Non-Userpart string  | Notes                           |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | 8 | <foo bar>            | Space (U+0020) is disallowed in |
   |   |                      | the userpart                    |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | 9 | <>                   | Zero-length userpart            |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | 10| <henry&#x2163;>      | The sixth character is ROMAN    |
   |   |                      | NUMERAL FOUR (U+2163)           |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | 11| <&#x265A;>           | A localpart of BLACK CHESS KING |
   |   |                      | (U+265A)                        |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------+

   Here again, several points are worth noting.  Regarding example 10,
   the Unicode character ROMAN NUMERAL FOUR (U+2163) has a compatibility
   equivalent of the string formed of LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I (U+0049)
   and LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V (U+0056), but characters with
   compatibility equivalents are not allowed in the PRECIS
   IdentiferClass.  Regarding example 11: symbol characters such as
   BLACK CHESS KING (U+265A) are not allowed in the PRECIS
   IdentifierClass.

4.  Passwords

4.1.  Definition

   This document specifies that a password is a string of Unicode code
   points [UNICODE], encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629], and conformant to
   the PRECIS FreeformClass.

   The syntax for a password is defined as follows using the Augmented
   Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) [RFC5234].

      password   = 1*(freebyte)
                   ;
                   ; a "freebyte" is a byte used to represent a
                   ; UTF-8 encoded Unicode code point that can be
                   ; contained in a string that conforms to the
                   ; PRECIS "FreefromClass"
                   ;

   All code points and blocks not explicitly allowed in the PRECIS
   FreeformClass are disallowed; this includes private use characters,




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   surrogate code points, and the other code points and blocks defined
   as "Prohibited Output" in Section 2.3 of RFC 4013.

   A password MUST NOT be zero bytes in length.  This rule is to be
   enforced after any normalization and mapping of code points.

      Note: The prohibition on zero-length passwords is not a
      recommendation regarding password strength (since a password of
      only one byte is highly insecure), but is meant to prevent
      applications from omitting a password entirely.

   In protocols that provide passwords as input to a cryptographic
   algorithm such as a hash function, the client will need to perform
   proper preparation of the password before applying the algorithm,
   since the password is not available to the server in plaintext form.

4.2.  PasswordFreeformClass Profile

   The definition of the PasswordFreeformClass profile is provided in
   the following sections, including detailed information about
   preparation, enforcement, and comparison (on the distinction between
   these actions, refer to [I-D.ietf-precis-framework]).

4.2.1.  Preparation

   An entity that prepares a string for inclusion in a password slot
   MUST ensure that the string consists only of Unicode code points that
   conform to the "FreeformClass" base string class defined in
   [I-D.ietf-precis-framework].  In addition, the string MUST be encoded
   as UTF-8 [RFC3629].

4.2.2.  Enforcement

   An entity that performs enforcement in password slots MUST prepare a
   string as described in the previous section and MUST also apply the
   rules specified below for the PasswordFreeformClass (these rules MUST
   be applied in the order shown).

   1.  Width Mapping Rule: Fullwidth and halfwidth characters MUST NOT
       be mapped to their decomposition mappings.

   2.  Additional Mapping Rule: Any instances of non-ASCII space MUST be
       mapped to ASCII space (U+0020); a non-ASCII space is any Unicode
       code point having a general category of "Zs", naturally with the
       exception of U+0020.

   3.  Case Mapping Rule: Uppercase and titlecase characters MUST NOT be
       mapped to their lowercase equivalents.



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   4.  Normalization Rule: Unicode Normalization Form C (NFC) MUST be
       applied to all characters.

   5.  Directionality Rule: There is no directionality rule.  The "Bidi
       Rule" (defined in [RFC5893]) and similar rules are unnecessary
       and inapplicable to passwords, since they can reduce the range of
       characters that are allowed in a string and therefore reduce the
       amount of entropy that is possible in a password.  Furthermore,
       such rules are intended to minimize the possibility that the same
       string will be displayed differently on a system set for right-
       to-left display and a system set for left-to-right display;
       however, passwords are typically not displayed at all and are
       rarely meant to be interoperable across different systems in the
       way that non-secret strings like domain names and usernames are.

4.2.3.  Comparison

   An entity that performs comparison of two strings before or after
   their inclusion in password slots MUST prepare each string and
   enforce the rules specified in the previous two sections.  The two
   strings are to be considered equivalent if they are an exact octet-
   for-octet match (sometimes called "bit-string identity").

4.3.  Examples

   The following examples illustrate a small number of passwords that
   are consistent with the format defined above (note that the
   characters < and > are used here to delineate the actual passwords
   and are not part of the password strings).

   Table 3: A sample of legal passwords

   +------------------------------------+------------------------------+
   | # | Password                       | Notes                        |
   +------------------------------------+------------------------------+
   | 12| <correct horse battery staple> | ASCII space is allowed       |
   +------------------------------------+------------------------------+
   | 13| <Correct Horse Battery Staple> | Different from example 12    |
   +------------------------------------+------------------------------+
   | 14| <&#x3C0;&#xDF;&#xE5;>          | Non-ASCII letters are OK     |
   |   |                                | (e.g., GREEK SMALL LETTER    |
   |   |                                | PI, U+03C0)                  |
   +------------------------------------+------------------------------+
   | 15| <Jack of &#x2666;s>            | Symbols are OK (e.g., BLACK  |
   |   |                                | DIAMOND SUIT, U+2666)        |
   +------------------------------------+------------------------------+





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   The following examples illustrate strings that are not valid
   passwords because they violate the format defined above.

   Table 4: A sample of strings that violate the password rules

   +------------------------------------+------------------------------+
   | # | Password                       | Notes                        |
   +------------------------------------+------------------------------+
   | 16| <foo&#x1680;bar>               | Non-ASCII space (here, OGHAM |
   |   |                                | SPACE MARK, U+1680) is not   |
   |   |                                | allowed                      |
   +------------------------------------+------------------------------+
   | 17| <my cat is a &#x9;by>          | Controls are disallowed      |
   +------------------------------------+------------------------------+

5.  Migration

   The rules defined in this specification differ slightly from those
   defined by the SASLprep specification [RFC4013].  The following
   sections describe these differences, along with their implications
   for migration, in more detail.

5.1.  Usernames

   Deployments that currently use SASLprep for handling usernames might
   need to scrub existing data when migrating to use of the rules
   defined in this specification.  In particular:

   o  SASLprep specified the use of Unicode Normalization Form KC
      (NFKC), whereas the UsernameIdentifierClass profile employs
      Unicode Normalization Form C (NFC).  In practice this change is
      unlikely to cause significant problems, because NFKC provides
      methods for mapping Unicode code points with compatibility
      equivalents to those equivalents, whereas the PRECIS
      IdentifierClass entirely disallows Unicode code points with
      compatibility equivalents (i.e., during comparison NFKC is more
      "aggressive" about finding matches than NFC).  A few examples
      might suffice to indicate the nature of the problem:

      1.  U+017F LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S is compatibility equivalent
          to U+0073 LATIN SMALL LETTER S

      2.  U+2163 ROMAN NUMERAL FOUR is compatibility equivalent to
          U+0049 LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I and U+0056 LATIN CAPITAL LETTER
          V

      3.  U+FB01 LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FI is compatibility equivalent to
          U+0066 LATIN SMALL LETTER F and U+0069 LATIN SMALL LETTER I



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      Under SASLprep, the use of NFKC also handled the mapping of
      fullwidth and halfwidth code points to their decomposition
      mappings.  Although it is expected that code points with
      compatibility equivalents are rare in existing usernames, for
      migration purposes deployments might want to search their database
      of usernames for Unicode code points with compatibility
      equivalents and map those code points to their compatibility
      equivalents.

   o  SASLprep mapped the "characters commonly mapped to nothing" from
      Appendix B.1 of [RFC3454]) to nothing, whereas the PRECIS
      IdentifierClass entirely disallows most of these characters, which
      correspond to the code points from the "M" category defined under
      Section 8.13 of [I-D.ietf-precis-framework] (with the exception of
      U+1806 MONGOLIAN TODO SOFT HYPHEN, which was "commonly mapped to
      nothing" in Unicode 3.2 but at the time of this writing does not
      have a derived property of Default_Ignorable_Code_Point in Unicode
      7.0).  For migration purposes, deployments might want to remove
      code points contained in the PRECIS "M" category from usernames.

   o  SASLprep allowed uppercase and titlecase characters, whereas the
      UsernameIdentifierClass profile maps uppercase and titlecase
      characters to their lowercase equivalents.  For migration
      purposes, deployments can either convert uppercase and titlecase
      characters to their lowercase equivalents in usernames (thus
      losing the case information) or preserve uppercase and titlecase
      characters and ignore the case difference when comparing
      usernames.

5.2.  Passwords

   Depending on local service policy, migration from RFC 4013 to this
   specification might not involve any scrubbing of data (since
   passwords might not be stored in the clear anyway); however, service
   providers need to be aware of possible issues that might arise during
   migration.  In particular:

   o  SASLprep specified the use of Unicode Normalization Form KC
      (NFKC), whereas the PasswordFreeformClass profile employs Unicode
      Normalization Form C (NFC).  Because NFKC is more aggressive about
      finding matches than NFC, in practice this change is unlikely to
      cause significant problems and indeed has the security benefit of
      probably resulting in fewer false positives when comparing
      passwords.  A few examples might suffice to indicate the nature of
      the problem:

      1.  U+017F LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S is compatibility equivalent
          to U+0073 LATIN SMALL LETTER S



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      2.  U+2163 ROMAN NUMERAL FOUR is compatibility equivalent to
          U+0049 LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I and U+0056 LATIN CAPITAL LETTER
          V

      3.  U+FB01 LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FI is compatibility equivalent to
          U+0066 LATIN SMALL LETTER F and U+0069 LATIN SMALL LETTER I

      Under SASLprep, the use of NFKC also handled the mapping of
      fullwidth and halfwidth code points to their decomposition
      mappings.  Although it is expected that code points with
      compatibility equivalents are rare in existing passwords, some
      passwords that matched when SASLprep was used might no longer work
      when the rules in this specification are applied.

   o  SASLprep mapped the "characters commonly mapped to nothing" from
      Appendix B.1 of [RFC3454]) to nothing, whereas the PRECIS
      FreeformClass entirely disallows such characters, which correspond
      to the code points from the "M" category defined under
      Section 8.13 of [I-D.ietf-precis-framework] (with the exception of
      U+1806 MONGOLIAN TODO SOFT HYPHEN, which was commonly mapped to
      nothing in Unicode 3.2 but at the time of this writing is allowed
      by Unicode 7.0).  In practice, this change will probably have no
      effect on comparison, but user-oriented software might reject such
      code points instead of ignoring them during password preparation.

6.  IANA Considerations

   The IANA shall add the following entries to the PRECIS Profiles
   Registry.

6.1.  UsernameIdentifierClass Profile

   Name:  UsernameIdentifierClass.

   Applicability:  Usernames in security and application protocols.

   Base Class:  IdentifierClass.

   Replaces:  The SASLprep profile of Stringprep.

   Width Mapping Rule:  Map fullwidth and halfwidth characters to their
      decomposition mappings.

   Additional Mapping Rule:  None.

   Case Mapping Rule:  To be defined by security or application
      protocols that use this profile.




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   Normalization Rule:  NFC.

   Directionality Rule:  The "Bidi Rule" defined in RFC 5893 applies.

   Enforcement:  To be defined by security or application protocols that
      use this profile.

   Specification:  RFC XXXX.  [Note to RFC Editor: please change XXXX to
      the number issued for this specification.]

6.2.  PasswordFreeformClass Profile

   Name:  PasswordFreeformClass.

   Applicability:  Passwords in security and application protocols.

   Base Class:  FreeformClass

   Replaces:  The SASLprep profile of Stringprep.

   Width Mapping Rule:  None.

   Additional Mapping Rule:  Map non-ASCII space characters to ASCII
      space.

   Case Mapping Rule:  None.

   Normalization Rule:  NFC.

   Directionality Rule:  None.

   Enforcement:  To be defined by security or application protocols that
      use this profile.

   Specification:  RFC XXXX.  [Note to RFC Editor: please change XXXX to
      the number issued for this specification.]

7.  Security Considerations

7.1.  Password/Passphrase Strength

   The ability to include a wide range of characters in passwords and
   passphrases can increase the potential for creating a strong password
   with high entropy.  However, in practice, the ability to include such
   characters ought to be weighed against the possible need to reproduce
   them on various devices using various input methods.





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7.2.  Identifier Comparison

   The process of comparing identifiers (such as SASL simple user names,
   authentication identifiers, and authorization identifiers) can lead
   to either false negatives or false positives, both of which have
   security implications.  A more detailed discussion can be found in
   [RFC6943].

7.3.  Reuse of PRECIS

   The security considerations described in [I-D.ietf-precis-framework]
   apply to the "IdentifierClass" and "FreeformClass" base string
   classes used in this document for usernames and passwords,
   respectively.

7.4.  Reuse of Unicode

   The security considerations described in [UTS39] apply to the use of
   Unicode characters in usernames and passwords.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-precis-framework]
              Saint-Andre, P. and M. Blanchet, "Precis Framework:
              Handling Internationalized Strings in Protocols", draft-
              ietf-precis-framework-20 (work in progress), November
              2014.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.

   [UNICODE]  The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version
              6.3", 2013,
              <http://www.unicode.org/versions/Unicode6.3.0/>.

8.2.  Informative References







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   [I-D.ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update]
              Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
              draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02 (work in
              progress), October 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-httpauth-digest]
              Shekh-Yusef, R., Ahrens, D., and S. Bremer, "HTTP Digest
              Access Authentication", draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08
              (work in progress), August 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-xmpp-6122bis]
              Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
              Protocol (XMPP): Address Format", draft-ietf-xmpp-
              6122bis-16 (work in progress), November 2014.

   [RFC20]    Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", RFC 20,
              October 1969.

   [RFC2617]  Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
              Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
              Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
              RFC 2617, June 1999.

   [RFC3454]  Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of
              Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454,
              December 2002.

   [RFC3501]  Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
              4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.

   [RFC4013]  Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User Names
              and Passwords", RFC 4013, February 2005.

   [RFC4422]  Melnikov, A., Ed. and K. Zeilenga, Ed., "Simple
              Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June
              2006.

   [RFC4616]  Zeilenga, K., "The PLAIN Simple Authentication and
              Security Layer (SASL) Mechanism", RFC 4616, August 2006.

   [RFC5802]  Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams,
              "Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism
              (SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802, July 2010.

   [RFC5890]  Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
              Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
              RFC 5890, August 2010.




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   [RFC5891]  Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names in
              Applications (IDNA): Protocol", RFC 5891, August 2010.

   [RFC5892]  Faltstrom, P., "The Unicode Code Points and
              Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA)",
              RFC 5892, August 2010.

   [RFC5893]  Alvestrand, H. and C. Karp, "Right-to-Left Scripts for
              Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA)",
              RFC 5893, August 2010.

   [RFC5894]  Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
              Applications (IDNA): Background, Explanation, and
              Rationale", RFC 5894, August 2010.

   [RFC6120]  Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
              Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, March 2011.

   [RFC6365]  Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in
              Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365,
              September 2011.

   [RFC6943]  Thaler, D., "Issues in Identifier Comparison for Security
              Purposes", RFC 6943, May 2013.

   [UTS39]    The Unicode Consortium, "Unicode Technical Standard #39:
              Unicode Security Mechanisms", July 2012,
              <http://unicode.org/reports/tr39/>.

Appendix A.  Differences from RFC 4013

   This document builds upon the PRECIS framework defined in
   [I-D.ietf-precis-framework], which differs fundamentally from the
   stringprep technology [RFC3454] used in SASLprep [RFC4013].  The
   primary difference is that stringprep profiles allowed all characters
   except those which were explicitly disallowed, whereas PRECIS
   profiles disallow all characters except those which are explicitly
   allowed (this "inclusion model" was originally used for
   internationalized domain names in [RFC5891]; see [RFC5894] for
   further discussion).  It is important to keep this distinction in
   mind when comparing the technology defined in this document to
   SASLprep [RFC4013].

   The following substantive modifications were made from RFC 4013.

   o  A single SASLprep algorithm was replaced by two separate
      algorithms: one for usernames and another for passwords.




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   o  The new preparation algorithms use PRECIS instead of a stringprep
      profile.  The new algorithms work independenctly of Unicode
      versions.

   o  As recommended in the PRECIS framework, changed the Unicode
      normalization form from NFKC to NFC.

   o  Some Unicode code points that were mapped to nothing in RFC 4013
      are simply disallowed by PRECIS.

Appendix B.  Acknowledgements

   The following individuals provided helpful feedback on this document:
   Marc Blanchet, Alan DeKok, Joe Hildebrand, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Simon
   Josefsson, Jonathan Lennox, James Manger, Matt Miller, Chris Newman,
   Yutaka OIWA, Pete Resnick, Andrew Sullivan, and Nico Williams.  Nico
   in particular deserves special recognition for providing text that
   was used in Section 3.3.  Thanks also to Yoshiro YONEYA and Takahiro
   NEMOTO for implementation feedback.

   This document borrows some text from [RFC4013] and [RFC6120].

   Peter Saint-Andre wishes to acknowledge Cisco Systems, Inc., for
   employing him during his work on earlier versions of this document.

Authors' Addresses

   Peter Saint-Andre
   &yet

   Email: peter@andyet.com
   URI:   https://andyet.com/


   Alexey Melnikov
   Isode Ltd
   5 Castle Business Village
   36 Station Road
   Hampton, Middlesex  TW12 2BX
   UK

   Email: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com









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