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RMT                                                           B. Adamson
Internet-Draft                                 Naval Research Laboratory
Intended status: Informational                                   V. Roca
Expires: January 15, 2009                                          INRIA
                                                           July 14, 2008


  Security and Reliable Multicast Transport Protocols: Discussions and
                               Guidelines
                    draft-ietf-rmt-sec-discussion-02

Status of this Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 15, 2009.

Abstract

   This document describes general security considerations for the
   Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Working Group set of building
   blocks and protocols.  An emphasis is placed on risks that might be
   resolved in the scope of transport protocol design.  However,
   relevant security issues related to IP Multicast control-plane and
   other concerns not strictly within the scope of reliable transport
   protocol design are also discussed.  The document also begins an
   exploration of approaches that could be embraced to mitigate these
   risks.  The purpose of this document is to provide a consolidated
   security discussion and provide a basis for further discussion and



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   potential resolution of any significant security issues that may
   exist in the current set of RMT standards.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Conventions Used in this Document  . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Quick Introduction to RMT Protocols and their Use  . . . . . .  5
     2.1.  The Two Families of CDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  RMT Protocol Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.3.  Target Use Case Characteristics  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  Known Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.1.  Control-Plane Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.1.1.  Control Plane Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.1.2.  Unauthorized (or Malicious) Group Membership . . . . .  9
     3.2.  Data-Plane Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.2.1.  Rogue Traffic Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.2.2.  Sender Message Spoofing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.2.3.  Receiver Message Spoofing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.2.4.  Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   4.  General Security Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.1.  Network Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.2.  Protocol Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.3.  Content Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   5.  Elementary Security Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   6.  Technological Building Blocks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     6.1.  IPsec  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       6.1.1.  Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       6.1.2.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       6.1.3.  Limitations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.2.  Use of TESLA within RMT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       6.2.1.  Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       6.2.2.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       6.2.3.  Limitations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     6.3.  Use of Group MAC within CDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       6.3.1.  Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       6.3.2.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       6.3.3.  Limitations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     6.4.  Use of Digital Signatures within CDP . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       6.4.1.  Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       6.4.2.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       6.4.3.  Limitations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     6.5.  SSM Multicast Routing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
       6.5.1.  Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
       6.5.2.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
       6.5.3.  Limitations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     6.6.  Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21



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   7.  Security Infrastructure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   8.  New Threats Introduced by the Security Scheme Itself . . . . . 22
   9.  Consequences for the RMT and MSEC Working Group  . . . . . . . 22
     9.1.  RMT Transport Message Security Encapsulation Header  . . . 22
   10. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   11. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 26








































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1.  Introduction

   The Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Working Group has produced a
   set of building block (BB) and protocol instantiation (PI)
   specifications for reliable multicast data transport.  Some present
   PIs defined within the scope of RMT include ALC
   [RFC3450][draft-ietf-rmt-pi-alc-revised] , NORM [RFC3940], and the
   FLUTE [RFC3926] application that is built on top of ALC.  These can
   be considered "Content Delivery Protocols" (CDP) as described
   in[Neumann05].  In this document, the term CDP will refer
   indifferently to either ALC or NORM, with their associated BBs.

   The use of these BBs and PIs raises some new security risks.  For
   instance, these protocols share a novel set of Forward Error
   Correction (FEC) and congestion control building blocks that present
   some new capabilities for Internet transport, but may also pose some
   new security risks.  Yet some security risks are not related to the
   particular BBs used by the PIs, but are more general.  Reliable
   multicast transport sessions are expected to involve at least one
   sender and multiple receivers.  Thus, the risk of and avenues to
   attack are implicitly greater than that of point-to-point (unicast)
   transport sessions.  Also the nature of IP multicast can expose other
   coexistent network flows and services to risk if malicious users
   exploit it.  The classic any-source multicast (ASM) model of
   multicast routing allows any host to join an IP multicast group and
   send traffic to that group.  This poses many potential security
   challenges.  And, while the emerging single-source multicast (SSM)
   model that allows only a single sender to send traffic to a group
   simplifies some challenges, there remain some specific issues.  For
   instance, possible areas of attack include those against the control
   plane where malicious hosts join IP multicast groups to cause
   multicast traffic to be directed to parts of the network where it is
   not needed or desired.  This can indirectly cause denial-of-service
   (DoS) to other network flows.  Also, attackers may transmit erroneous
   or corrupt messages to the group or employ strategies such as replay
   attack within the "data plane" of protocol operation.

   The goals of this document are therefore to:

   1.  Define the possible general security goals; i.e., define what we
       want to protect, i.e. the network itself, and/or the protocol,
       and/or the content.

   2.  List the possible elementary security services that will make it
       possible to fullfil the general security goals.  Some of these
       services are generic (e.g. object and/or packet integrity), while
       others are specific to RMT protocols (e.g. congestion control
       specific security schemes).



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   3.  List some technological building blocks and solutions that can
       provide the desired security services.

   4.  Highlight the CDP specificities that will impact security and
       define some use-cases.  Indeed, the set of solutions proposed to
       fulfill the security goals will greatly be impacted by the target
       use case.

   In some cases, the existing RMT documents already discuss the risks
   and outline approaches to solve them, at least partially.  The
   purpose of this document is to consolidate this content and provide a
   basis for further discussion and potential resolution of any
   significant security issues that may exist.

1.1.  Conventions Used in this Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


2.  Quick Introduction to RMT Protocols and their Use

2.1.  The Two Families of CDP

   The ALC/LCT and NORM classes of CDP are designed to reliably deliver
   nncontent to a group of multicast receivers, but each with a
   different set of features and limitations.  The ALC/LCT class
   supports a unidirectional delivery model where there is no feedback
   from the receivers to senders, relying upon transmission redundant
   FEC coding capable of recovering missing packet content for
   reliability.  With appropriate FEC encoding techniques, the
   transmission stream can deliver data at different rates to different
   receivers, thus offering the potential for multirate congestion
   control.  This allows scalability for delivery of bulk content to
   potentially very large group sizes.  While NORM supports the same use
   of FEC as ALC/LCT, it leverages Negative Acknowledgement techniques
   to control the senders' transmission of content.  The advantage of
   NORM is that the sender need not transmit any more information than
   necessary to satisfy the receivers' need to achive reliable transfer.
   But, while NORM specifies feedback control techniques to allow it to
   scale to considerably large group sizes, it is not as massively
   scalable as the ALC/LCT approach when feedback is used.
   Additionally, the NORM feedback control mechanisms add some
   additional header content and protocol implementation complexity as
   compared ALC/LCT.  The appropriate choice of CDP depends upon
   application needs, deployment constraints, and network connectivity
   considerations.  And while there are many common security



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   considerations for these two classes of CDP, there are also some
   unique considerations for each.

2.2.  RMT Protocol Characteristics

   This section focuses on the RMT protocol characteristics that will
   impact the choice of the technological building blocks, and the way
   they can be applied.  Both ALC and NORM have been designed with
   receiver group size scalability.  While ALC targets massively
   scalable sessions (e.g. with millions of receivers), NORM is less
   ambitious, essentially because of the use of feedback messages to the
   source.  Ideally, the use of security mechanisms should not break
   these scalability features.

   The ALC and NORM protocols differ in the communication paths:

   o  sender to receivers: ALC and NORM, for bulk data transfer and
      signaling messages;

   o  receivers to sender: NORM only, for feedback messages;

   o  receivers to receivers: NORM only for control messages;

   But the fact that ALC is capable of working on top of purely
   unidirectional networks does not mean that no back-channel will be
   available (see Section 2.3).  The NORM and ALC protocols support a
   variety of content delivery models where transport may be carefully
   coordinated among the sender and receivers or with looser
   coordination and interaction.  This leads to a number of different
   use cases for these protocols.

2.3.  Target Use Case Characteristics

   This section focuses on the target use cases and their special
   characteristics.  These details will impact both the choice of the
   technological building blocks and the way they can be applied.  One
   can distinguish the following use case features:

   o  Purely unidirectional transport versus symmetric bidirectional
      transport versus asymmetric bidirectional transport.  Most of the
      time, the amount of traffic flowing to the source is limited, and
      one can overlook whether the transport channel is symmetric or
      not.  The nature of the underlying transport channel is of
      paramount importance, since many security building blocks will
      require a bidirectional communication;

   o  Massively scalable versus moderately scalable session.  Here we do
      not define precisely what the terms "massively scalable" and



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      "moderately scalable" mean.

   o  Known set of receivers versus unknown set of receivers: I.e., does
      the source know at any point of time the set of receivers or not?
      Of course, knowing the set of receivers is usually not compatible
      with massively scalable sessions;

   o  Dynamic set of receivers versus fixed set of receivers: I.e., does
      the source know at some point of time the maximum set of receivers
      or will it evolve dynamically?

   o  High rate data flow versus small rate data flow: Some security
      building blocks are CPU-intensive and are therefore incompatible
      with high data rate sessions (e.g. solutions that digitally sign
      all packets sent).

   o  Protocol stack available at both ends: A solution that requires
      some unusual features within the protocol stack will not always be
      usable.  Some target environments (e.g. embedded systems) provide
      a minimum set of features and extending them (e.g. to add IPsec)
      is not necessarily realistic;

   o  Multicast routing and other layer-3 protocols in use: E.g., SSM
      routing is often seen as one of the key service to improve the
      security within multicast sessions, and some security building
      blocks require specialized versions of layer-3 protocols (e.g.
      IGMP/MLD with security extensions).  In some cases these
      assumptions might not be realistic.

   Depending on the target goal and the associated security building
   block used, other features might be of importance.  For instance
   TESLA requires a loose time synchronization between the source and
   the receivers.  Several possible techniques are available to provide
   this, but some of them may be feasible only if the target use case
   has the appropriate characteristics.


3.  Known Security Threats

   The IP architecture provides common access to notional control and
   data planes to both end and intermediate systems.  For the purposes
   of discussion here, the "control plane" mechanisms are considered
   those with message exchanges between end systems (typically
   computers) and intermediate systems (typically routers) (or among
   intermediate systems) while the "data plane" encompasses messages
   exchanged among end systems, usually pertaining to the transfer of
   application data.  The security threats described here are introduced
   within the taxonomy of control plane and data plane IP mechanisms.



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3.1.  Control-Plane Attacks

   In this discussion, "control-plane" in the context of Internet
   Protocol systems refers to signaling among end systems and
   intermediate systems to facilitate routing and forwarding of packets.
   For IP multicast, this notably includes Internet Group Management
   Protocol (IGMP) and multicast routing protocol messaging.  While
   control-plane attacks may be considered outside of the scope of the
   transport protocol specfications discussed here, it is important to
   understand the potential impact of such attacks with respect to the
   deployment and operation of these protocols.  For example, awareness
   of possible IP Multicast control-plane manipulation that can lead to
   unauthorized (or unexpected) monitoring of data plane traffic by
   malicious users may lead a transport application or protocol
   implementation to support encryption to ensure data confidentiality
   and/or privacy.  Also, these types of attack also have bearing on
   assessing the real risks of potentially more complex attacks against
   the transport mechanisms themselves.  In some cases, the solutions to
   these control-plane risk areas may reduce the impact or possibility
   of some data-plane attacks that are discussed in this document.

   The presence of these types of attack may necessitate that policy-
   based controls be emplaced in routers to limit the distribution
   (including transmission and reception) of multicast traffic (on a
   group-wise and/or traffic volume basis) to different parts of the
   network.  Such policy-based controls are beyond the scope of the RMT
   protocol specifications.  However, such network protection mechanisms
   may reduce the opportunities for or effectiveness of of some of the
   data-plane attacks discussed later.  For example, reverse-path checks
   can significantly limit opportunities for attackers to conduct replay
   attacks when hosts actually do use IPSec.  Also, future IP Multicast
   control protocols may wish to consider providing security mechanism
   to prevent unauthorized monitoring or manipulation of messages
   related to group membership, routing, and activity.  The sections
   below describe some variants of control-plane attacks.

3.1.1.  Control Plane Monitoring

   While this may not be a direct attack on the transport system, it may
   be possible for an attacker to gain useful information in advancing
   attack goals by monitoring IP Multicast control plane traffic
   including group membership and multicast routing information.
   Indentification of hosts and/or routers participating in specific
   multicast groups may readily identify systems vulnerable to protocol-
   specific exploitation.  And, with regards to user privacy concerns,
   such "side information" may be relevant to this emerging aspect of
   network security.




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3.1.2.  Unauthorized (or Malicious) Group Membership

   One of the simplest attacks is that where a malicious host joins an
   IP multicast group so that potentially unwanted traffic is routed to
   the host's network interface.  This type of attack can turn a
   legitimate source of IP traffic into a "attacker" without requiring
   any access privileges to the source host or routers involved.  This
   type of attack can be used for denial-of-service purposes or for the
   real attacker (the malicious joiner) to gain access to the
   information content being sent.  Similarly, some routing protocols
   may permit any sender (whether joined to the specific group or not)
   to transmit messages to a multicast group.

   It is possible that malicious hosts could also spoof IGMP messages,
   joining groups posing as legitimate hosts (or spoof source traffic
   from legitimate hosts).  This may be done at intermediate locations
   in the network or by hosts co-resident with the authorized hosts on
   local area networks.  Such spoofing could be done by raw packet
   generation or with replay of previously-recorded control messages.
   For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that multicast
   routing protocol control messaging may be subject to similar threats
   if insufficient protocol security mechanisms are enabled in the
   routing infrastructure.

3.2.  Data-Plane Attacks

   This section discusses some types of active attacks that might be
   conducted "in-band" with respect to the reliable multicast transport
   protocol operating within the data plane of network data transfer.
   I.e., the "data-plane" here refers to IP packets containing end-to-
   end transport content to support the reliable multicast transfer.
   The passive attack of unauthorized data-plan monitoring is discussed
   above since such activity might be made possible by the
   vulnerabilities of the IP Multicast control plane.  To cover the two
   classes of RMT protocols, the active data-plane attacks are
   categorized as 1) those where the attacker generates messages posing
   as a data sender, and 2) those where the attacker generates messages
   posing as a receiver providing feedback to the sender(s) or group.
   Additionally, a common threat to protocol operation is that of brute-
   force, rogue packet generation.  This is discussed briefly below, but
   the more subtle attacks that might be conducted are given more
   attention as those fall within the scope of the RMT transport
   protocol design.  Additionally, special consideration is given to
   that of the "replay attack" [see Section 3.2.4], as it can be applied
   across these different categories.






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3.2.1.  Rogue Traffic Generation

   If an attacker is able to successfully inject packets into the
   multicast distribution tree, one obvious denial-of-service attack is
   for the attacker to generate a large volume of apparently
   authenticate (and when authentication mechanisms are used, a "replay"
   attack strategy might be used) traffic.  The impact of this type of
   attack can be significant since the potential for routers to relay
   the traffic to multiple portions of a networks (as compared to a
   single unicast routing path).  However, other than the amplified
   negative impact to the network, this type of attack is no different
   than what is possible with rogue unicast packet generation and
   similar measures used to protect the network from such attacks could
   be used to contain this type of brute-force attack.  Of course, the
   pragmatic question of whether current implementations of such
   protection mechanisms support IP Multicast SHOULD be considered.

3.2.2.  Sender Message Spoofing

   These types of attacks are applicable to both general types of RMT
   protocols: ALC (sender-only transmission) and NORM (sender-receiver
   exhanges).  Without an authentication mechanism, an attacker can
   easily generate sender messages that could disrupt a reliable
   multicast transfer session.  And with FEC-based transport mechanisms,
   a single packet with an apparently-correct FEC payload identifier
   [RFC3452] but a corrupted FEC payload could potentially render an
   entire block of transported data invalid.  Thus, a modest injection
   rate of corrupt traffic could cause severe impairment of data
   transport.  Additionallly, such invalid sender packets could convey
   out-of-bound indices (e.g. bad symbol or block identifiers) that can
   lead to buffer overflow exploits or similar issues in implementations
   that insufficient check for invalid data.

   An indirect use of sender message spoofing would be to generate
   messages that would cause receivers to take inappropriate congestion-
   control action.  In the case of the layered congestion control
   mechanisms proposed for ALC use, this could lead to the receivers
   erroneusly leaving groups associated with higher bandwidth transport
   layers and suffering unnecessarily low transport rates.  Similarly,
   receivers may be misled to join inappropriate groups directing
   unwanted traffic to their part of the network.  Attacks with similar
   effect could be conducted against the TFMCC approach proposed for
   NORM operation with spoofing of sender messages carrying congestion
   control state to receivers.







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3.2.3.  Receiver Message Spoofing

   These atacks are limited to RMT protocols that use feedback from
   receivers in the group to influence sender and other receiver
   operation.  In the NORM protocol, this includes negative-
   acknowledgement (NACK) messages fed back to the sender to achieve
   reliable transfer, congestion control feedback content, and the
   optional positive acknowledgement features of the specification.  It
   is also important to note that for ASM operation, NORM receivers pay
   attention to the messages of other receivers for the purpose of
   suppression to avoid feedback implosion as group size grows large.

   An attacker that can generate false feedback can manipulate the NORM
   sender to unnecessarily transmit repair information and reduce the
   goodput of the reliable transfer regardless of the sender's transmit
   rate.  Contrived congestion control feedback could also cause the
   sender to transmit at an unfairly low rate.

   As mentioned, spoofed receiver messaging may not be directed only at
   senders, but also at receivers participating in the session.  For
   example, an attacker may direct phony receiver feedback messages to
   selected receivers in the group causing those receivers to suppress
   feedback that might have otherwise been transmitted.  This attack
   could compromise the ability of those receivers to achieve reliable
   transfer.  Also, suppressed congestion control feedback could cause
   the sender to perhaps transmit at a rate unfair to those attacked
   receivers if their fair congestion control rate were lower than other
   receivers in the group.

3.2.4.  Replay Attacks

   The infamous "replay attack" (injection of a previously transmitted
   packet (or at least its payload) into the reliable transport group or
   directly to one or more of its participants) is given special
   attention here because of the special consequences it can have on RMT
   protocol operation.  Without specific protection mechanisms against
   replay (e.g. duplicate message detection), it is possible for these
   attacks to be successful even when security mechanisms such as packet
   authentication and/or encryption are employed.

3.2.4.1.  Replay of Sender Messages

   Generally, replay of recent protocol messages from the sender will
   not harm transport, and could potentially assist it, unless it is of
   sufficient volume to result in the same type of impact as the "rogue
   traffic generation" described above.  However, it is possible that
   replay of sufficiently old messages may cause receivers to think they
   are "out of sync" with the sender and reset state, compromising the



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   transfer.  Also, if sender transport data identifiers are reused
   (object identifiers, FEC payload identifiers, etc), it is possible
   that replay of old messages could corrupt data of a current transfer.

3.2.4.2.  Replay of Receiver Messages

   Replay of receiver messages are problematic for the NORM protocol,
   because replay of NACK messages could cause the sender unnecessarily
   transmit repair information for an FEC coding block.  Similarly, the
   sender transmission rate might be manipulated by replay of congestion
   control feedback messages from receivers in the group.  And the way
   that NORM senders estimate group round-trip timing (GRTT) could allow
   a replay attack to manipulate the senders' GRTT estimate to an
   unnecessarily large value, adding latency to the reliable transport
   process.


4.  General Security Goals

   The term "security" is extremely vast and encompasses many different
   meanings.  The goal of this section is to clarify what "security"
   means when considering the reliable multicast transport (RMT)
   protocols being defined in the IETF RMT working group.  The scope can
   also encompass additional group communication applications, for
   instance streaming applications.  This section only focuses on the
   desired general goals.  The following sections will then discuss the
   possible elementary services that will be required to fulfill these
   general goals, as well as the underlying technological building
   blocks.

   The possible final goals include, in decreasing order of importance:

   o  network protection: the goal is to protect the network from
      attacks, no matter whether these attacks are voluntary (i.e.
      launched by one or several attackers) or non voluntary (i.e.
      caused by a misbehaving system, where "system" can designate a
      building block, a protocol, an application, or a user);

   o  protocol protection: the goal is to protect the RMT protocol
      itself, e.g. to avoid that a misbehaving receiver prevents other
      receivers to get the content, no matter whether this is done
      intentionally or not;

   o  and content protection: to goal is to protect the content itself,
      for instance to guaranty the integrity of the content, or to make
      sure that only authorized clients can access the content.





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4.1.  Network Protection

   Protecting the network is of course of primary importance.  An
   attacker should not be able to damage the whole infrastructure by
   exploiting some features of the RMT protocol.  Unfortunately, recent
   past has shown that the multicast routing infrastructure is
   relatively fragile, as well as the applications built on top of it.
   Since the RMT protocols may use congestion control mechanisms to
   regulate sender transmission rate, the protocol security features
   should ensure that the sender may not be manipulated to transmit at
   incorrect rates (most importantly not at an excessive rate) to any
   parts of the the receiver group.  In the case of NORM, the security
   mechanisms should ensure that the feedback suppression mechanisms are
   protected to prevent badly-behaving network nodes from purposefully
   causing feedback implosion.  In the case of ALC, where layered
   congestion control may be used via dynamic grou/layer membership,
   this extends to considerations of excessive manipulation of the
   multicast router control plane.

4.2.  Protocol Protection

   Protecting the protocols is also importance, since the higher the
   number of clients, the more serious the consequences of an attack.
   This is all the more true as scalability is often one of the desired
   goals of RMT protocols.  Ideally, receivers should be sufficiently
   isolated from one another, so that a single misbehaving receiver does
   not affect others.  Similarly, an external attacker should not be
   able to break the system, i.e. resulting in unreliable operation or
   delivery of incorrect content.

4.3.  Content Protection

   Finally, the content itself should be protected when meaningful.
   This level of security is often the concern of the content provider
   (and its responsibility).  For instance, in case of confidential (or
   non-free) content, the typical solution consists in encrypting the
   content.  It can be done within the upper application, i.e. above the
   RMT protocol, or within the transport system.

   But other requirements may exist, like verifying the integrity of a
   received object, or authenticating the sender of the received
   packets.  To that goal, one can rely on the use of building blocks
   integrated within, or above, or beneath the RMT protocol.

   One may also consider that offering the packet sender authentication
   and content integrity services are basic requirements that should
   fulfill any RMT system that operates within an open network, where
   any attacker can easily inject spurious traffic in an ongoing NORM or



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   ALC session.  In that case this goal is not the responsibility of the
   content provider but the responsibility of the administrator who
   deploys the RMT system itself.


5.  Elementary Security Techniques

   The goals defined in Section 4 will be fulfilled by means of
   underlying security techniques, provided by one or several
   technological building blocks.  This section only focuses on these
   elementary security techniques.  Some general techniques
   traditionally available are:

   +-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+
   | Technique       | Goal                                            |
   +-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+
   | packet          | Enable session participants to verify that a    |
   | integrity       | packet has not been inappropriately modified in |
   |                 | transit.                                        |
   | packet source   | Enable a receiver to verify the source of a     |
   | authentication  | packet.                                         |
   | packet group    | Enable a receiver to verify that a packet       |
   | authentication  | originated or was modified only within the      |
   |                 | group and has not been modified by nonmembers   |
   |                 | in transit; Additionally, if attribution of any |
   |                 | modifications by the group is required, certain |
   |                 | group authentication mechanisms may provide     |
   |                 | this capability.                                |
   | packet          | Enable any third party to verify the source of  |
   | non-repudiation | a packet such that the source cannot repudiate  |
   |                 | having sent the packet.                         |
   | packet          | Enable a receiver to detect that a packet is    |
   | anti-replay     | the same as a previously-received packet        |
   | object          | Enable a receiver to verify the integrity of a  |
   | integrity       | whole object.  Such bject integrity             |
   |                 | verification should be possible for any         |
   |                 | singular object or any composition of           |
   |                 | sub-objects which together constitute a larger  |
   |                 | object structure.                               |
   | object source   | Enable a receiver to verify the source of an    |
   | authentication  | object.                                         |
   | object          | Enable a source to guarantee that only          |
   | confidentiality | authorized receivers can access the object      |
   |                 | data.                                           |
   +-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+

                        General Security Techniques




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   Some additional techniques are specific to the RMT protocols:

   +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
   | Technique     | Goal                                              |
   +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
   | congestion    | Prevent an attacker from modifying the congestion |
   | control       | control protocol normal behavior (e.g. by         |
   | security      | reducing the transmission (NORM) or reception     |
   |               | (ALC) rate, or on the opposite increasing this    |
   |               | rate up to a point where congestion occurs)       |
   | group         | Ensure that only authorized receivers (as defined |
   | management    | by a certain group management policy) join the    |
   |               | RMT session and possibly inform the source        |
   | backward      | Prevent a new group member to access the          |
   | group secrecy | information in clear sent to the group before he  |
   |               | joined the group                                  |
   | forward group | Prevent a former group member to access the       |
   | secrecy       | information in clear sent to the group after he   |
   |               | left the group                                    |
   +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+

                     RMT-Specific Security Techniques

   These technques are usually achieved by means of one or several
   technological building blocks.  The target use case where the RMT
   system will be deployed will greatly impact the choice of the
   technological building block(s) used to provide these services, as
   explained in Section 2.3.


6.  Technological Building Blocks

   Here is a list of techniques and building blocks that are likely to
   fulfill one or several of the goals listed above:

   o  IPsec;

   o  Use of TESLA within RMT;

   o  Use of Group MAC within RMT;

   o  Use of Digital signatures within RMT;

   o  use of SSM (Source Specific Multicast) multicast routing;

   o  Digital Signature;





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   o  (TBD) add other BBs

   Each of them is now quickly discussed.  In particular we identify
   what service it can offer, its limitations, and its field of
   application (adequacy W.R.T. the CDP and the target use case).

6.1.  IPsec

6.1.1.  Benefits

   One direct approach using existing standards is to apply IPSec
   [RFC2401] to achieve the following properties for message
   transmission:

   1.  Authentication (IPSec AH or ESP)

   2.  Confidentiality (IPSec ESP)

6.1.2.  Requirements

   It is expected that the approach to apply IPSec for reliable
   multicast transport sessions is similar to that described for OSPFv3
   security[RFC4552].  The following list proposes the IPSec
   capabilities needed to support a similar approach to RMT protocol
   security:

   1.  Mode - Transport mode IPSec security is required;

   2.  Selectors - source and destination addresses and ports, protocol.

   3.  For some uses, preplaced manual key support may be required to
       support application deployment and operation.  For automated key
       management for group communication the Group Secure Association
       Key Management Protocol (GSAKMP) described in [RFC4535] may be
       used to emplace the keys for IPSec operation.

   Note that a periodic rekeying procedure similar to that described in
   RFC 4552 can also be applied with the additional benefit that the
   reliable transport aspects of the RMT protocols provide robustness to
   any message loss that might occur due to ANY timing discrepencies
   among the participants in the reliable multicast session.

6.1.3.  Limitations

   It should be noted that current IPSec implementations may not provide
   the capability for anti-replay protection for multicast operation.
   In the case of the NORM protocol, a sequence number is provided for
   packet loss measurement to support congestion control operation.



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   This sequence number can also be used within a NORM implementation
   for detecting duplicate (replayed) messages from sources (senders or
   receivers) within the transport session group.  In this way,
   protection against replay attack can be achieved in conjunction with
   the authentication and possibly confidentiality properties provided
   by an IPSec encapsulation of NORM messages.  NORM receivers generate
   a very low volume of feedback traffic and it is expected that the 16-
   bit sequence space provided by NORM will be sufficient for replay
   attack protection.  When a NORM session is long-lived, the limits of
   the sender repair window are expected to provide protection from
   replayed NACKs as they would typically be outside of the sender's
   current repair window.  It is suggested that IPSec implementations
   that can provide anti-replay protection for IP Multicast traffic,
   even when there are multiple senders within a group, be adopted.  The
   GSAKMP document has some discussion in this area.

6.2.  Use of TESLA within RMT

6.2.1.  Benefits

   The use of TESLA [TESLA_4_ALC_NORM] within the RMT protocols offers a
   loss tolerant, lightweight, authentication/integrity service for the
   packets generated by the session's sender.  Depending on the time
   synchronization method and bootstrap method used, TESLA is compatible
   with massively scalable sessions.  Because TESLA eavily relies on
   fast symmetric cryptographic building blocks, CPU processing remains
   limited both at the sender and receiver sides, which makes it
   suitable for high data rate transmissions, and/or lightweight
   terminals.  Finally, the transmission overhead remains limited.

6.2.2.  Requirements

   The security offered by TESLA relies heavily on time.  Therefore the
   session's sender and each receiver need to be loosely synchronized in
   a secure way.  To that purpose, several methods exist, depending on
   the use case: direct time synchronization (which requires a
   bidirectional transport channel), using a secure NTP infrastructure
   (which also requires a bidirectional transport channel), or a GPS
   device, or a clock with a time-drift that is negligible in front of
   the TESLA time accuracy requirements.

   The various bootstrap parameters must also be communicated to the
   receivers, using either an in-band or out-of-band mechanism,
   sometimes requiring bidirectional communications.

   So, depending on the time synchronization scheme and the bootstrap
   mechanism method, TESLA can be used with either bidirectional or
   unidirectional transport channels.



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6.2.3.  Limitations

   A first limitation is that TESLA does not protect the packets that
   are generated by receivers, for instance the feedback packets of
   NORM.  These packets must be protected by other means.

   Another limitation is that TESLA requires some buffering capabilities
   at the receivers in order to enable the delayed authentication
   feature.  This is not considered though as a major issue in the
   general case (e.g.  FEC decoding of objects within an ALC session
   already requires some buffering capabilities, that often exceed that
   of TESLA), but it might be one in case of embedded environments.

6.3.  Use of Group MAC within CDP

6.3.1.  Benefits

   The use of Group MAC (Message Authentication Codes) within the CDP
   [SIMPLE_AUTH_4_ALC_NORM] is a simple solution to provide a loss
   tolerant group authentication/integrity service for all the packets
   exchanged within a session (i.e. the packets generated by the
   session's sender and the session's receivers).  This scheme is easy
   to deploy since it only requires that all the group members share a
   common secret key.  Because Group MAC heavily relies on fast
   symmetric cryptographic building blocks, CPU processing remains
   limited both at the sender and receiver sides, which makes it
   suitable for high data rate transmissions, and/or lightweight
   terminals.  Finally, the transmission overhead remains limited.

6.3.2.  Requirements

   This scheme only requires that all the group members share a common
   secret key, possibly associated to a re-keying mechanism (e.g. each
   time the group membership changes, or on a periodic basis).

6.3.3.  Limitations

   This scheme cannot protect against attacks coming from inside the
   group, where a group member impersonates the sender and sends forged
   messages to other receivers.  It only provides a group-level
   authentication/integrity service, unlike the TESLA and Digital
   Signature schemes.

   Note that the Group MAC and Digital Signature schemes can be
   advantageously used together, as explained in
   [SIMPLE_AUTH_4_ALC_NORM].





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6.4.  Use of Digital Signatures within CDP

6.4.1.  Benefits

   The use of Digital Signatures within the CDP [SIMPLE_AUTH_4_ALC_NORM]
   is a simple solution to provide a loss tolerant authentication/
   integrity service for all the packets exchanged within a session
   (i.e. the packets generated by the session's sender and the session's
   receivers).  This scheme is easy to deploy since it only requires
   that the participants know the packet sender's public key, which can
   be achieved with either Public Key Infrastructre (PKI) or by pre-
   deploying these keys.

6.4.2.  Requirements

   This scheme is easy to deploy since it only requires that the
   participants know the packet sender's public key, which can be
   achieved either thanks to a PKI or by pre-deploying these keys.

6.4.3.  Limitations

   When RSA asymmetric cryptography is used, digital signatures has two
   major shortcommings:

   o  it is limited by high computational costs, especially at the
      sender, and

   o  it is limited by high transmission overheads.

   This scheme is well suited to low data rate flows, when transmission
   overheads are not a major issue.  For instance it can be used as a
   complement to TESLA for the feedback traffic coming from the
   session's receivers.

   The use of ECC ("Eliptic Curve Cryptography") significantly relaxes
   these constraints, especially when seeking for higher security
   levels.  For instance, the following key size provide equivalent
   security:

           +--------------------+--------------+--------------+
           | Symmetric Key Size | RSA Key Size | ECC Key Size |
           +--------------------+--------------+--------------+
           |       80 bits      |   1024 bits  |   160 bits   |
           |      112 bits      |   2048 bits  |   224 bits   |
           +--------------------+--------------+--------------+

   However in some cases, the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
   considerations for ECC may limit its use, so the other techniques are



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   presented here as well.

   Note that the Group MAC and Digital Signature schemes can be
   advantageously used together, as explained in
   [SIMPLE_AUTH_4_ALC_NORM].

6.5.  SSM Multicast Routing

   Source-specific Multicast (SSM) [RFC3569] amends the classical Any-
   source Multicast (ASM) model creating logical IP multicast "channels"
   that are defined by the multicast destination address _and_ the
   specific source address.  Thus for a given "channel", only one
   specific source can inject packets that are distributed to receivers
   that have joined.  This form of multicast has group management
   benefits since a source can independently control the "channels" it
   creates.  Additionally, there are some security benefits of this
   multicast paradigm.

6.5.1.  Benefits

   Since data-plane traffic for an SSM "channel" is limited to that of a
   single, specific source address, it is possible that network
   intermediate systems may impose mechanims that prevent injection of
   traffic to the group from inappropriate (perhaps malicious) nodes.
   This can reduce the risk for denial-of-service and some of the other
   attacks described in this document.  While SSM alone is not a
   complete security solution, it can simplify secure RMT operation.

6.5.2.  Requirements

   Use of SSM requires that the network intermediate systems explicitly
   support it.  Additionally, hosts are required to support the IGMPv3
   extensions for SSM and applications and RMT implementations will need
   to support use of IGMPv3 including management of the <sourceAddr:
   dstMcastAdd> "channel" identifier.

6.5.3.  Limitations

   RMT protocols such as NORM that use signaling from receivers to
   multicast senders will need to use unicast addressing for feedback
   messages.  In the case of NORM, its timer-based feedback suppression
   requires support of the sender NORM_CMD(REPAIR_ADV) message to
   control receiver feedback.  In some topologies, use of unicast
   feedback may require some additional latency (increased backoff
   factor) for safe operation.  The security of the unicast feedback
   from the receivers to sender will need to be addressed separately
   since the IP multicast model, including SSM, does not provide the
   sender knowledge of authorized group members.



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6.6.  Summary

   The following table summarizes the pros/cons of each authentication/
   integrity scheme used at application/transport level:

   +----------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+-------+
   |                | RSA Digital |  ECC Digital |  Group MAC  | TESLA |
   |                |  Signature  |   Signature  |             |       |
   +----------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+-------+
   | True auth and  |     Yes     |      Yes     |  No (group  |  Yes  |
   | integrity      |             |              |  security)  |       |
   | Immediate auth |     Yes     |      Yes     |     Yes     |   No  |
   | Processing     |      --     |       +      |      ++     |   +   |
   | load           |             |              |             |       |
   | Transmission   |      --     |       +      |      ++     |   +   |
   | overhead       |             |              |             |       |
   | Complexity     |      ++     |      ++      |      ++     |   --  |
   +----------------+-------------+--------------+-------------+-------+


7.  Security Infrastructure

   Deploying the elementary technological building blocks often requires
   that a security infrastructure exists.  Such security infrastructure
   can provide:

   o  Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for trusted third party vetting
      of, and vouching for, user identities.  PKI also allows the
      binding of public keys to users, usually by means of certificates.

   o  Group Key Management with rekeying schemes that are either
      periodic or triggered by some higher level event.  It is required
      in particular when the group is dynamic and forward/backward
      secrecy are important.  This is also required to improve the
      scalability of the CDP (since key management is done
      automatically, using a key server topology), or the security
      provided by the CDP (since the underlying cryptographic keys will
      be changed frequently)

   It is expected that some RMT protocol deployments may use existing
   client-server security infrastructure models so that receivers may
   acquire any necessary session keys, etc and be authenticated or
   validated as needed for group participation.  Then, the reliable
   delivery of session data content will be provided via the applicable
   RMT protocols.  Note that in this case the security infrastructure
   itself may limit the scalability of the group size or other aspects
   of reliable multicast transfer.




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   The IETF MSEC Working Group has developed some protocols that can be
   applied to achieve more scalable and effective group communication
   security infrastructure[RFC4046].  It is encouraged that these
   mechanisms be considered in the development of security for RMT
   protocols.


8.  New Threats Introduced by the Security Scheme Itself

   Introducing a security scheme, as a side effect, can sometimes
   introduce new security threats.  For instance, signing all packets
   with asymmetric cryptographic schemes (to provide a source
   authentication/content integrity/anti-replay service) opens the door
   to DoS attacks.  Indeed, verifying asymmetric-based cryptographic
   signatures is a CPU intensive task.  Therefore an attacker can easily
   overload a receiver (or a sender in case of NORM) by injecting a
   significant number of faked packets.


9.  Consequences for the RMT and MSEC Working Group

   To meet the goals outlined in this document, it is expected that the
   RMT and Multicast Security (MSEC) WG may need to develop some
   supporting protocol security mechanisms.

9.1.  RMT Transport Message Security Encapsulation Header

   An alternative approach to using IPSec to provide the necessary
   properties to protect RMT protocol operation from the application
   attacks described earlier, is to extend the RMT protocol message set
   to include a message encapsulation option.  This encapsulation header
   could be used to provide authentication, confidientiality, and anti-
   replay protection as needed.  Since this would be independent of the
   IP layer, the header might need to provide a source identifier to be
   used as a "selector" for recalling security state (including
   authentication certificate(s), sequence state, etc) for a given
   message.  In the case of the NORM protocol, a NormNodeId field exists
   that could be used for this purpose.  In the case of ALC, the
   security encapsulation mechanism would need to add this function.
   The security encapsulation mechanism, although resident "above" the
   IP layer, could use GSAKMP [RFC4535] or a similar approach for
   automated key managment.


10.  Security Considerations

   This document is a general discussion of security for the RMT
   protocol family.  But specific security considerations are not



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   applicable as this document does not introduce any new techniques.


11.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like acknowledge Magnus Westerlund for stimulating
   the working group activity in this area.  Additionally George Gross
   and Ran Atkinson contributed many ideas to the discussion here.


12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2401]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [RFC3450]  Luby, M., Gemmell, J., Vicisano, L., Rizzo, L., and J.
              Crowcroft, "Asynchronous Layered Coding (ALC) Protocol
              Instantiation", RFC 3450, December 2002.

   [RFC3452]  Luby, M., Vicisano, L., Gemmell, J., Rizzo, L., Handley,
              M., and J. Crowcroft, "Forward Error Correction (FEC)
              Building Block", RFC 3452, December 2002.

   [RFC3569]  Bhattacharyya, S., "An Overview of Source-Specific
              Multicast (SSM)", IETF RFC 3569, July 2003.

   [RFC3926]  Paila, T., Luby, M., Lehtonen, R., Roca, V., and R. Walsh,
              "FLUTE - File Delivery over Unidirectional Transport",
              RFC 3926, October 2004.

   [RFC3940]  Adamson, B., Bormann, C., Handley, M., and J. Macker,
              "Negative-acknowledgment (NACK)-Oriented Reliable
              Multicast (NORM) Protocol", RFC 3940, November 2004.

   [RFC4046]  Baugher, M., Canetti, R., Dondeti, L., and F. Lindholm,
              "Multicast Security (MSEC) Group Key Management
              Architecture", RFC 4046, April 2005.

   [RFC4535]  Harney, H., Meth, U., Colegrove, A., and G. Gross,
              "GSAKMP: Group Secure Association Key Management
              Protocol", RFC 4535, June 2006.

   [RFC4552]  Gupta, M. and N. Melam, "Authentication/Confidentiality



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              for OSPFv3", RFC 4552, June 2006.

   [RFC4654]  Widmer, J. and M. Handley, "TCP-Friendly Multicast
              Congestion Control (TFMCC): Protocol Specification",
              RFC 4654, August 2006.

   [SIMPLE_AUTH_4_ALC_NORM]
              Roca, V., "Simple Authentication Schemes for the ALC and
              NORM Protocols",
              draft-roca-rmt-simple_auth-for-alc-norm-00.txt (work in
              progress), June 2007.

   [TESLA_4_ALC_NORM]
              Roca, V., Francillon, A., and S. Faurite, "The Use of
              TESLA in the ALC and NORM Protocols",
              draft-ietf-msec-tesla-for-alc-norm-02.txt (work in
              progress), July 2007.

   [draft-ietf-rmt-pi-alc-revised]
              Luby, M., Watson, M., and L. Vicisano, "Asynchronous
              Layered Coding (ALC) Protocol Instantiation",
               draft-ietf-rmt-pi-alc-revised-04.txt (work in progress),
              February 2007.

12.2.  Informative References

   [Neumann05]
              Neumann, C., Roca, V., and R. Walsh, "Large Scale Content
              Distribution Protocols", ACM Computer Communications
              Review (CCR) Vol. 35 No. 5, October 2005.


Authors' Addresses

   Brian Adamson
   Naval Research Laboratory
   Washington, DC  20375
   USA

   Email: adamson@itd.nrl.navy.mil
   URI:   http://cs.itd.nrl.navy.mil










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   Vincent Roca
   INRIA
   655, av. de l'Europe
   Zirst; Montbonnot
   ST ISMIER cedex  38334
   France

   Email: vincent.roca@inria.fr
   URI:   http://planete.inrialpes.fr/~roca/










































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Full Copyright Statement

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