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Versions: 00 01 02 RFC 1812
INTERNET DRAFT
Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers
17 March 1995
Document Revision 2.05 |
draft-ietf-rreq-cidr-02.txt |
Revision Date:
3/17/95 |
Fred Baker (Editor)
Cisco Systems
519 Lado Drive
Santa Barbara, California 93111
fred@cisco.com
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet Draft. Internet Drafts are
working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF), its Areas, and its Working Groups. Note that other
groups may also distribute working documents as Internet
Drafts.
Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months. Internet Drafts may be updated, replaced, or
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cite them other than as a ``working draft'' or ``work in
progress.'' Please check the 1id-abstracts.txt listing
contained in the internet-drafts Shadow Directories on
nic.ddn.mil, venera.isi.edu, nnsc.nsf.net, nic.nordu.net,
ftp.nisc.sri.com, or munnari.oz.au to learn the current status
of any Internet Draft.
Draft Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers March 1995
This is a working document only, it should neither be cited
nor quoted in any formal document.
This document will expire before 22 Sep. 1995.
Distribution of this document is unlimited.
Please send comments to The editor or the Router Requirements
Working Group (rreq@isi.edu).
If your comment pertains to a particular piece of text, please
remember to mention the section number. This document is very
large and locating the text solely by context might not be
possible. Please also mention the date of this draft |
(3/17/95) and the revision level (2.05).
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0. PREFACE
This document is an updated version of RFC 1716, the
historical Router Requirements document. That RFC preserved
the significant work that went into the working group, but
failed to adequately describe current technology for the IESG
to consider it a current standard.
The current editor had been asked to bring the document up to
date, so that it is useful as a procurement specification and
a guide to implementors. In this, he stands squarely on the
shoulders of those who have gone before him, and depends
largely on expert contributors for text. Any credit is
theirs; the errors are his.
The content and form of this document are due, in large part,
to the working group's chair, and document's original editor
and author: Philip Almquist. It is also largely due to the
efforts of its previous editor, Frank Kastenholz. Without
their efforts, this document would not exist.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The memo replaces for RFC 1716, "Requirements for Internet
Gateways" ([INTRO:1]).
This memo defines and discusses requirements for devices that
perform the network layer forwarding function of the Internet
protocol suite. The Internet community usually refers to such
devices as "IP routers" or simply "routers"; The OSI community
refers to such devices as "intermediate systems". Many older
Internet documents refer to these devices as "gateways", a
name which more recently has largely passed out of favor to
avoid confusion with application gateways.
An IP router can be distinguished from other sorts of packet
switching devices in that a router examines the IP protocol
header as part of the switching process. It generally removes
the Link Layer header a message was received with, modifies
the IP header, and replaces the Link Layer header for
retransmission.
The authors of this memo recognize, as should its readers,
that many routers support more than one protocol. Support for
multiple protocol suites will be required in increasingly
large parts of the Internet in the future. This memo,
however, does not attempt to specify Internet requirements for
protocol suites other than TCP/IP.
This document enumerates standard protocols that a router
connected to the Internet must use, and it incorporates by
reference the RFCs and other documents describing the current
specifications for these protocols. It corrects errors in the
referenced documents and adds additional discussion and
guidance for an implementor.
For each protocol, this memo also contains an explicit set of
requirements, recommendations, and options. The reader must
understand that the list of requirements in this memo is
incomplete by itself. The complete set of requirements for an
Internet protocol router is primarily defined in the standard
protocol specification documents, with the corrections,
amendments, and supplements contained in this memo.
This memo should be read in conjunction with the Requirements
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for Internet Hosts RFCs ([INTRO:2] and [INTRO:3]). Internet
hosts and routers must both be capable of originating IP
datagrams and receiving IP datagrams destined for them. The
major distinction between Internet hosts and routers is that
routers implement forwarding algorithms, while Internet hosts
do not require forwarding capabilities. Any Internet host
acting as a router must adhere to the requirements contained
in this memo.
The goal of "open system interconnection" dictates that
routers must function correctly as Internet hosts when
necessary. To achieve this, this memo provides guidelines for
such instances. For simplification and ease of document
updates, this memo tries to avoid overlapping discussions of
host requirements with [INTRO:2] and [INTRO:3] and
incorporates the relevant requirements of those documents by
reference. In some cases the requirements stated in [INTRO:2]
and [INTRO:3] are superseded by this document.
A good-faith implementation of the protocols produced after
careful reading of the RFCs should differ from the
requirements of this memo in only minor ways. Producing such
an implementation often requires some interaction with the
Internet technical community, and must follow good
communications software engineering practices. In many cases,
the "requirements" in this document are already stated or
implied in the standard protocol documents, so that their
inclusion here is, in a sense, redundant. They were included
because some past implementation has made the wrong choice,
causing problems of interoperability, performance, and/or
robustness.
This memo includes discussion and explanation of many of the
requirements and recommendations. A simple list of
requirements would be dangerous, because:
+ Some required features are more important than others, and
some features are optional.
+ Some features are critical in some applications of routers
but irrelevant in others.
+ There may be valid reasons why particular vendor products
that are designed for restricted contexts might choose to
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use different specifications.
However, the specifications of this memo must be followed to
meet the general goal of arbitrary router interoperation
across the diversity and complexity of the Internet. Although
most current implementations fail to meet these requirements
in various ways, some minor and some major, this specification
is the ideal towards which we need to move.
These requirements are based on the current level of Internet
architecture. This memo will be updated as required to
provide additional clarifications or to include additional
information in those areas in which specifications are still
evolving.
1.1 Reading this Document
1.1.1 Organization
This memo emulates the layered organization used by
[INTRO:2] and [INTRO:3]. Thus, Chapter 2 describes the
layers found in the Internet architecture. Chapter 3
covers the Link Layer. Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned
with the Internet Layer protocols and forwarding
algorithms. Chapter 6 covers the Transport Layer.
Upper layer protocols are divided among Chapters 7, 8,
and 9. Chapter 7 discusses the protocols which routers
use to exchange routing information with each other.
Chapter 8 discusses network management. Chapter 9
discusses other upper layer protocols. The final
chapter covers operations and maintenance features.
This organization was chosen for simplicity, clarity,
and consistency with the Host Requirements RFCs.
Appendices to this memo include a bibliography, a
glossary, and some conjectures about future directions
of router standards.
In describing the requirements, we assume that an
implementation strictly mirrors the layering of the
protocols. However, strict layering is an imperfect
model, both for the protocol suite and for recommended
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implementation approaches. Protocols in different
layers interact in complex and sometimes subtle ways,
and particular functions often involve multiple layers.
There are many design choices in an implementation, many
of which involve creative "breaking" of strict layering.
Every implementor is urged to read [INTRO:4] and
[INTRO:5].
Each major section of this memo is organized into the
following subsections:
(1) Introduction
(2) Protocol Walk-Through - considers the protocol
specification documents section-by-section,
correcting errors, stating requirements that may be
ambiguous or ill-defined, and providing further
clarification or explanation.
(3) Specific Issues - discusses protocol design and
implementation issues that were not included in the
walk-through.
Under many of the individual topics in this memo, there
is parenthetical material labeled "DISCUSSION" or
"IMPLEMENTATION". This material is intended to give a
justification, clarification or explanation to the
preceding requirements text. The implementation
material contains suggested approaches that an
implementor may want to consider. The DISCUSSION and
IMPLEMENTATION sections are not part of the standard.
1.1.2 Requirements
In this memo, the words that are used to define the
significance of each particular requirement are
capitalized. These words are:
+ "MUST"
This word means that the item is an absolute
requirement of the specification. Violation of such
a requirement is a fundamental error; there is no
case where it is justified.
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+ "MUST IMPLEMENT"
This phrase means that this specification requires
that the item be implemented, but does not require
that it be enabled by default.
+ "MUST NOT"
This phrase means that the item is an absolute
prohibition of the specification.
+ "SHOULD"
This word means that there may exist valid reasons in
particular circumstances to ignore this item, but the
full implications should be understood and the case
carefully weighed before choosing a different course.
+ "SHOULD IMPLEMENT"
This phrase is similar in meaning to SHOULD, but is
used when we recommend that a particular feature be
provided but does not necessarily recommend that it
be enabled by default.
+ "SHOULD NOT"
This phrase means that there may exist valid reasons
in particular circumstances when the described
behavior is acceptable or even useful. Even so, the
full implications should be understood and the case
carefully weighed before implementing any behavior
described with this label.
+ "MAY"
This word means that this item is truly optional.
One vendor may choose to include the item because a
particular marketplace requires it or because it
enhances the product, for example; another vendor may
omit the same item.
1.1.3 Compliance
Some requirements are applicable to all routers. Other
requirements are applicable only to those which
implement particular features or protocols. In the
following paragraphs, "relevant" refers to the union of
the requirements applicable to all routers and the set
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of requirements applicable to a particular router
because of the set of features and protocols it has
implemented.
Note that not all Relevant requirements are stated
directly in this memo. Various parts of this memo
incorporate by reference sections of the Host
Requirements specification, [INTRO:2] and [INTRO:3].
For purposes of determining compliance with this memo,
it does not matter whether a Relevant requirement is
stated directly in this memo or merely incorporated by
reference from one of those documents.
An implementation is said to be "conditionally
compliant" if it satisfies all the Relevant MUST, MUST
IMPLEMENT, and MUST NOT requirements. An implementation
is said to be "unconditionally compliant" if it is
conditionally compliant and also satisfies all the
Relevant SHOULD, SHOULD IMPLEMENT, and SHOULD NOT
requirements. An implementation is not compliant if it
is not conditionally compliant (i.e., it fails to
satisfy one or more of the Relevant MUST, MUST
IMPLEMENT, or MUST NOT requirements).
This specification occasionally indicates that an
implementation SHOULD implement a management variable,
and that it SHOULD have a certain default value. An
unconditionally compliant implementation implements the
default behavior, and if there are other implemented
behaviors implements the variable. A conditionally
compliant implementation clearly documents what the
default setting of the variable is or, in the absence of
the implementation of a variable, may be construed to
be. An implementation that both fails to implement the
variable and chooses a different behavior is "not
compliant".
For any of the SHOULD and SHOULD NOT requirements, a
router may provide a configuration option that will
cause the router to act other than as specified by the
requirement. Having such a configuration option does
not void a router's claim to unconditional compliance if
the option has a default setting, and that setting
causes the router to operate in the required manner.
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Likewise, routers may provide, except where explicitly
prohibited by this memo, options which cause them to
violate MUST or MUST NOT requirements. A router that
provides such options is compliant (either fully or
conditionally) if and only if each such option has a
default setting that causes the router to conform to the
requirements of this memo. Please note that the authors
of this memo, although aware of market realities,
strongly recommend against provision of such options.
Requirements are labeled MUST or MUST NOT because
experts in the field have judged them to be particularly
important to interoperability or proper functioning in
the Internet. Vendors should weigh carefully the
customer support costs of providing options that violate
those rules.
Of course, this memo is not a complete specification of
an IP router, but rather is closer to what in the OSI
world is called a profile. For example, this memo
requires that a number of protocols be implemented.
Although most of the contents of their protocol
specifications are not repeated in this memo,
implementors are nonetheless required to implement the
protocols according to those specifications.
1.2 Relationships to Other Standards
There are several reference documents of interest in
checking the status of protocol specifications and
standardization:
+ INTERNET OFFICIAL PROTOCOL STANDARDS
This document describes the Internet standards process
and lists the standards status of the protocols. As
of this writing, the current version of this document
is [ARCH:7]. This document is periodically re-issued.
You should always consult an RFC repository and use
the latest version of this document.
+ Assigned Numbers
This document lists the assigned values of the
parameters used in the various protocols. For
example, it lists IP protocol codes, TCP port numbers,
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Telnet Option Codes, ARP hardware types, and Terminal
Type names. As of this writing, the current version
of this document is [INTRO:7]. This document is
periodically re-issued. You should always consult an
RFC repository and use the latest version of this
document.
+ Host Requirements
This pair of documents reviews the specifications that
apply to hosts and supplies guidance and clarification
for any ambiguities. Note that these requirements
also apply to routers, except where otherwise
specified in this memo. As of this writing, the
current versions of these documents are [INTRO:2], and
[INTRO:3].
+ Router Requirements (formerly "Gateway Requirements")
This memo.
Note that these documents are revised and updated at
different times; in case of differences between these
documents, the most recent must prevail.
These and other Internet protocol documents may be
obtained from the:
DDN Network Information Center
14200 Park Meadow Drive,
Suite 200
Chantilly,
VA 22021
USA
nic@ds.internic.net
(800)
365-3642 or |
(703)
802-4535
1.3 General Considerations
There are several important lessons that vendors of
Internet software have learned and which a new vendor
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should consider seriously.
1.3.1 Continuing Internet Evolution
The enormous growth of the Internet has revealed
problems of management and scaling in a large datagram
based packet communication system. These problems are
being addressed, and as a result there will be
continuing evolution of the specifications described in
this memo. New routing protocols, algorithms, and
architectures are constantly being developed. New
internet layer protocols, and modifications to existing
protocols, are also constantly being devised. Routers
play a crucial role in the Internet, and the number of
routers deployed in the Internet is much smaller than
the number of hosts. Vendors should therefore expect
that router standards will continue to evolve much more
quickly than host standards. These changes will be
carefully planned and controlled since there is
extensive participation in this planning by the vendors
and by the organizations responsible for operation of
the networks.
Development, evolution, and revision are characteristic
of computer network protocols today, and this situation
will persist for some years. A vendor who develops
computer communications software for the Internet
protocol suite (or any other protocol suite!) and then
fails to maintain and update that software for changing
specifications is going to leave a trail of unhappy
customers. The Internet is a large communication
network, and the users are in constant contact through
it. Experience has shown that knowledge of deficiencies
in vendor software propagates quickly through the
Internet technical community.
1.3.2 Robustness Principle
At every layer of the protocols, there is a general rule
(from [TRANS:2] by Jon Postel) whose application can
lead to enormous benefits in robustness and
interoperability:
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"Be conservative in what you do,
be liberal in what you accept from others."
Software should be written to deal with every
conceivable error, no matter how unlikely. Eventually a
packet will come in with that particular combination of
errors and attributes, and unless the software is
prepared, chaos can ensue. It is best to assume that
the network is filled with malevolent entities that will
send packets designed to have the worst possible effect.
This assumption will lead to suitably protective design.
The most serious problems in the Internet have been
caused by unforeseen mechanisms triggered by low
probability events; mere human malice would never have
taken so devious a course!
Adaptability to change must be designed into all levels
of router software. As a simple example, consider a
protocol specification that contains an enumeration of
values for a particular header field - e.g., a type
field, a port number, or an error code; this enumeration
must be assumed to be incomplete. If the protocol
specification defines four possible error codes, the
software must not break when a fifth code is defined.
An undefined code might be logged, but it must not cause
a failure.
The second part of the principal is almost as important:
software on hosts or other routers may contain
deficiencies that make it unwise to exploit legal but
obscure protocol features. It is unwise to stray far
from the obvious and simple, lest untoward effects
result elsewhere. A corollary of this is "watch out for
misbehaving hosts"; router software should be prepared
to survive in the presence of misbehaving hosts. An
important function of routers in the Internet is to
limit the amount of disruption such hosts can inflict on
the shared communication facility.
1.3.3 Error Logging
The Internet includes a great variety of systems, each
implementing many protocols and protocol layers, and
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some of these contain bugs and misguided features in
their Internet protocol software. As a result of
complexity, diversity, and distribution of function, the
diagnosis of problems is often very difficult.
Problem diagnosis will be aided if routers include a
carefully designed facility for logging erroneous or
"strange" events. It is important to include as much
diagnostic information as possible when an error is
logged. In particular, it is often useful to record the
header(s) of a packet that caused an error. However,
care must be taken to ensure that error logging does not
consume prohibitive amounts of resources or otherwise
interfere with the operation of the router.
There is a tendency for abnormal but harmless protocol
events to overflow error logging files; this can be
avoided by using a "circular" log, or by enabling
logging only while diagnosing a known failure. It may
be useful to filter and count duplicate successive
messages. One strategy that seems to work well is to
both:
+ Always count abnormalities and make such counts
accessible through the management protocol (see
Chapter 8); and
+ Allow the logging of a great variety of events to be
selectively enabled. For example, it might useful to
be able to "log everything" or to "log everything for
host X".
This topic is further discussed in [MGT:5].
1.3.4 Configuration
In an ideal world, routers would be easy to configure,
and perhaps even entirely self-configuring. However,
practical experience in the real world suggests that
this is an impossible goal, and that many attempts by
vendors to make configuration easy actually cause
customers more grief than they prevent. As an extreme
example, a router designed to come up and start routing
packets without requiring any configuration information
at all would almost certainly choose some incorrect
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parameter, possibly causing serious problems on any
networks unfortunate enough to be connected to it.
Often this memo requires that a parameter be a
configurable option. There are several reasons for
this. In a few cases there currently is some
uncertainty or disagreement about the best value and it
may be necessary to update the recommended value in the
future. In other cases, the value really depends on
external factors - e.g., the distribution of its
communication load, or the speeds and topology of nearby
networks - and self-tuning algorithms are unavailable
and may be insufficient. In some cases, configurability
is needed because of administrative requirements.
Finally, some configuration options are required to
communicate with obsolete or incorrect implementations
of the protocols, distributed without sources, that
persist in many parts of the Internet. To make correct
systems coexist with these faulty systems,
administrators must occasionally misconfigure the
correct systems. This problem will correct itself
gradually as the faulty systems are retired, but cannot
be ignored by vendors.
When we say that a parameter must be configurable, we do
not intend to require that its value be explicitly read
from a configuration file at every boot time. For many
parameters, there is one value that is appropriate for
all but the most unusual situations. In such cases, it
is quite reasonable that the parameter default to that
value if not explicitly set.
This memo requires a particular value for such defaults
in some cases. The choice of default is a sensitive
issue when the configuration item controls accommodation
of existing, faulty, systems. If the Internet is to
converge successfully to complete interoperability, the
default values built into implementations must implement
the official protocol, not misconfigurations to
accommodate faulty implementations. Although marketing
considerations have led some vendors to choose
misconfiguration defaults, we urge vendors to choose
defaults that will conform to the standard.
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Finally, we note that a vendor needs to provide adequate
documentation on all configuration parameters, their
limits and effects.
1.4 Algorithms
In several places in this memo, specific algorithms that a
router ought to follow are specified. These algorithms are
not, per se, required of the router. A router need not
implement each algorithm as it is written in this document.
Rather, an implementation must present a behavior to the
external world that is the same as a strict, literal,
implementation of the specified algorithm.
Algorithms are described in a manner that differs from the
way a good implementor would implement them. For
expository purposes, a style that emphasizes conciseness,
clarity, and independence from implementation details has
been chosen. A good implementor will choose algorithms and
implementation methods that produce the same results as
these algorithms, but may be more efficient or less
general.
We note that the art of efficient router implementation is
outside the scope of this memo.
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2. INTERNET ARCHITECTURE
This chapter does not contain any requirements. However, it
does contain useful background information on the general
architecture of the Internet and of routers.
General background and discussion on the Internet architecture
and supporting protocol suite can be found in the DDN Protocol
Handbook [ARCH:1]; for background see for example [ARCH:2],
[ARCH:3], and [ARCH:4]. The Internet architecture and
protocols are also covered in an ever-growing number of
textbooks, such as [ARCH:5] and [ARCH:6].
2.1 Introduction
The Internet system consists of a number of interconnected
packet networks supporting communication among host
computers using the Internet protocols. These protocols
include the Internet Protocol (IP), the Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP), the Internet Group Management
Protocol (IGMP), and a variety transport and application
protocols that depend upon them. As was described in
Section [1.2], the Internet Engineering Steering Group
periodically releases an "Official Protocols" memo listing
all the Internet protocols.
All Internet protocols use IP as the basic data transport
mechanism. IP is a datagram, or connectionless,
internetwork service and includes provision for addressing,
type-of-service specification, fragmentation and
reassembly, and security. ICMP and IGMP are considered
integral parts of IP, although they are architecturally
layered upon IP. ICMP provides error reporting, flow
control, first-hop router redirection, and other
maintenance and control functions. IGMP provides the
mechanisms by which hosts and routers can join and leave IP
multicast groups.
Reliable data delivery is provided in the Internet protocol
suite by Transport Layer protocols such as the Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP), which provides end-end
retransmission, resequencing and connection control.
Transport Layer connectionless service is provided by the
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User Datagram Protocol (UDP).
2.2 Elements of the Architecture
2.2.1 Protocol Layering
To communicate using the Internet system, a host must
implement the layered set of protocols comprising the
Internet protocol suite. A host typically must
implement at least one protocol from each layer.
The protocol layers used in the Internet architecture
are as follows [ARCH:7]:
+ Application Layer
The Application Layer is the top layer of the
Internet protocol suite. The Internet suite does not
further subdivide the Application Layer, although
some application layer protocols do contain some
internal sub-layering. The application layer of the
Internet suite essentially combines the functions of
the top two layers - Presentation and Application -
of the OSI Reference Model [ARCH:8]. The Application
Layer in the Internet protocol suite also includes
some of the function relegated to the Session Layer
in the OSI Reference Model.
We distinguish two categories of application layer
protocols: user protocols that provide service
directly to users, and support protocols that provide
common system functions. The most common Internet
user protocols are:
- Telnet (remote login)
- FTP (file transfer)
- SMTP (electronic mail delivery)
There are a number of other standardized user
protocols and many private user protocols.
Support protocols, used for host name mapping,
booting, and management include SNMP, BOOTP, TFTP,
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the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol, and a variety
of routing protocols.
Application Layer protocols relevant to routers are
discussed in chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this memo.
+ Transport Layer
The Transport Layer provides end-to-end communication
services. This layer is roughly equivalent to the
"Transport Layer" in the OSI Reference Model, except
that it also incorporates some of OSI's Session Layer
establishment and destruction functions.
There are two primary Transport Layer protocols at
present:
- Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
- User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
TCP is a reliable connection-oriented transport
service that provides end-to-end reliability,
resequencing, and flow control. UDP is a
connectionless ("datagram") transport service. Other
transport protocols have been developed by the
research community, and the set of official Internet
transport protocols may be expanded in the future.
Transport Layer protocols relevant to routers are
discussed in Chapter 6.
+ Internet Layer
All Internet transport protocols use the Internet
Protocol (IP) to carry data from source host to
destination host. IP is a connectionless or datagram
internetwork service, providing no end-to-end
delivery guarantees. IP datagrams may arrive at the
destination host damaged, duplicated, out of order,
or not at all. The layers above IP are responsible
for reliable delivery service when it is required.
The IP protocol includes provision for addressing,
type-of-service specification, fragmentation and
reassembly, and security.
The datagram or connectionless nature of IP is a
fundamental and characteristic feature of the
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Internet architecture.
The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is a
control protocol that is considered to be an integral
part of IP, although it is architecturally layered
upon IP - it uses IP to carry its data end-to-end.
ICMP provides error reporting, congestion reporting,
and first-hop router redirection.
The Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) is an
Internet layer protocol used for establishing dynamic
host groups for IP multicasting.
The Internet layer protocols IP, ICMP, and IGMP are
discussed in chapter 4.
+ Link Layer
To communicate on a directly connected network, a
host must implement the communication protocol used
to interface to that network. We call this a Link
Layer protocol.
Some older Internet documents refer to this layer as
the "Network Layer", but it is not the same as the
"Network Layer" in the OSI Reference Model.
This layer contains everything "below" the Internet
Layer and "above" the Physical Layer (which is the
media connectivity, normally electrical or optical,
which encodes and transports messages). Its
responsibility is the correct delivery of messages,
among which it does not differentiate.
Protocols in this Layer are generally outside the
scope of Internet standardization; the Internet
(intentionally) uses existing standards whenever
possible. Thus, Internet Link Layer standards
usually address only address resolution and rules for
transmitting IP packets over specific Link Layer
protocols. Internet Link Layer standards are
discussed in chapter 3.
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2.2.2 Networks
The constituent networks of the Internet system are
required to provide only packet (connectionless)
transport. According to the IP service specification,
datagrams can be delivered out of order, be lost or
duplicated, and/or contain errors.
For reasonable performance of the protocols that use IP
(e.g., TCP), the loss rate of the network should be very
low. In networks providing connection-oriented service,
the extra reliability provided by virtual circuits
enhances the end-end robustness of the system, but is
not necessary for Internet operation.
Constituent networks may generally be divided into two
classes:
+ Local-Area Networks (LANs)
LANs may have a variety of designs. LANs normally
cover a small geographical area (e.g., a single
building or plant site) and provide high bandwidth
with low delays. LANs may be passive (similar to
Ethernet) or they may be active (such as ATM).
+ Wide-Area Networks (WANs)
Geographically dispersed hosts and LANs are
interconnected by wide-area networks, also called
long-haul networks. These networks may have a
complex internal structure of lines and packet-
switches, or they may be as simple as point-to-
point lines.
2.2.3 Routers
In the Internet model, constituent networks are
connected together by IP datagram forwarders which are
called "routers" or "IP routers". In this document,
every use of the term "router" is equivalent to "IP
router". Many older Internet documents refer to routers
as "gateways".
Historically, routers have been realized with packet-
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switching software executing on a general-purpose CPU.
However, as custom hardware development becomes cheaper
and as higher throughput is required, special purpose
hardware is becoming increasingly common. This
specification applies to routers regardless of how they
are implemented.
A router connects to two or more logical interfaces,
represented by IP subnets or unnumbered point to point
lines (discussed in section [2.2.7]). Thus, it has at
least one physical interface. Forwarding an IP datagram
generally requires the router to choose the address and
relevant interface of the next-hop router or (for the
final hop) the destination host. This choice, called
"relaying" or "forwarding depends upon a route database
within the router. The route database is also called a
routing table or forwarding table. The term "router"
derives from the process of building this route
database; routing protocols and configuration interact
in a process called "routing".
The routing database should be maintained dynamically to
reflect the current topology of the Internet system. A
router normally accomplishes this by participating in
distributed routing and reachability algorithms with
other routers.
Routers provide datagram transport only, and they seek
to minimize the state information necessary to sustain
this service in the interest of routing flexibility and
robustness.
Packet switching devices may also operate at the Link
Layer; such devices are usually called "bridges".
Network segments that are connected by bridges share the
same IP network prefix forming a single IP subnet.
These other devices are outside the scope of this
document.
2.2.4 Autonomous Systems
An Autonomous System (AS) is a connected segment of a |
network topology that consists of a collection of |
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subnetworks (with hosts attached) interconnected by a |
set of routes. The subnetworks and the routers are |
expected to be under the control of a single operations |
and maintenance (O&M) organization. Within an AS |
routers may use one or more interior routing protocols, |
and sometimes several sets of metrics. An AS is |
expected to present to other ASs an appearence of a |
coherent interior routing plan, and a consistent picture |
of the destinations reachable through the AS. An AS is |
identified by an Autonomous System number.
The concept of an AS plays an important role in the |
Internet routing (see Section 7.1).
2.2.5 Addressing Architecture
An IP datagram carries 32-bit source and destination
addresses, each of which is partitioned into two parts -
a constituent network prefix and a host number on that
network. Symbolically:
IP-address ::= { <Network-prefix>, <Host-number> }
To finally deliver the datagram, the last router in its
path must map the Host-number (or "rest") part of an IP
address to the host's Link Layer address.
2.2.5.1 Classical IP Addressing Architecture
Although well documented elsewhere [INTERNET:2], it
is useful to describe the historical use of the
network prefix. The language developed to describe
it is used in this and other documents and permeates
the thinking behind many protocols.
The simplest classical network prefix is the Class A,
B, C, D, or E network prefix. These address ranges
are discriminated by observing the values of the most
significant bits of the address, and break the
address into simple prefix and host number fields.
This is described in [INTERNET:18]. In short, the
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classification is:
0xxx - Class A - general purpose unicast
addresses with standard 8 bit prefix
10xx - Class B - general purpose unicast
addresses with standard 16 bit prefix
110x - Class C - general purpose unicast
addresses with standard 24 bit prefix
1110 - Class D - IP Multicast Addresses - 28 bit
prefix, non-aggregatable
1111 - Class E - reserved for experimental use
This simple notion has been extended by the concept
of "subnets". These were introduced to allow
arbitrary complexity of interconnected LAN structures
within an organization, while insulating the Internet
system against explosive growth in assigned network
prefixes and routing complexity. Subnets provide a
multi-level hierarchical routing structure for the
Internet system. The subnet extension, described in
[INTERNET:2], is a required part of the Internet
architecture. The basic idea is to partition the
<Host-number> field into two parts: a subnet number,
and a true host number on that subnet:
IP-address ::=
{ <Network-number>, <Subnet-number>, <Host-
number> }
The interconnected physical networks within an
organization use the same network prefix but
different subnet numbers. The distinction between
the subnets of such a subnetted network is not
normally visible outside of that network. Thus,
routing in the rest of the Internet uses only the
<Network-prefix> part of the IP destination address.
Routers outside the network treat <Network-prefix>
and <Host-number> together as an uninterpreted "rest"
part of the 32-bit IP address. Within the subnetted
network, the routers use the extended network prefix:
{ <Network-number>, <Subnet-number> }
The bit positions containing this extended network
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number have historically been indicated by a 32-bit
mask called the "subnet mask". The <Subnet-number>
bits SHOULD be contiguous and fall between the
<Network-number> and the <Host-number> fields. More
up to date protocols do not refer to a subnet mask,
but to a "prefix length"; the "prefix" portion of an
address is that which would be selected by a subnet
mask whose most significant bits are all ones and the
rest are zeroes. The length of the prefix equals the
number of ones in the subnet mask. This document
assumes that all subnet masks are expressible as
prefix lengths.
The inventors of the subnet mechanism presumed that
each piece of an organization's network would have
only a single subnet number. In practice, it has
often proven necessary or useful to have several
subnets share a single physical cable. For this
reason, routers should be capable of configuring
multiple subnets on the same physical interfaces, and
treat them (from a routing or forwarding perspective)
as though they were distinct physical interfaces.
2.2.5.2 Classless Inter Domain Routing (CIDR)
The explosive growth of the Internet has forced a
review of address assignment policies. The
traditional uses of general purpose (Class A, B, and
C) networks have been modified to achieve better use
of IP's 32-bit address space. Classless Inter Domain
Routing (CIDR) [INTERNET:15] is a method currently
being deployed in the Internet backbones to achieve
this added efficiency. CIDR depends on deploying and
routing to arbitrarily sized networks. In this
model, hosts and routers make no assumptions about
the use of addressing in the internet. The Class D
(IP Multicast) and Class E (Experimental) address
spaces are preserved, although this is primarily an
assignment policy.
By definition, CIDR comprises three elements:
+ topologically significant address assignment,
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+ routing protocols that are capable of aggregating
network layer reachability information, and
+ consistent forwarding algorithm ("longest
match").
The use of networks and subnets is now historical,
although the language used to describe them remains
in current use. They have been replaced by the more
tractable concept of a "network prefix". A network
prefix is, by definition, a contiguous set of bits at
the more significant end of the address that defines
a set of systems; host numbers select among those
systems. There is no requirement that all the
internet use network prefixes uniformly. To collapse
routing information, it is useful to divide the
internet into addressing domains. Within such a
domain, detailed information is available about
constituent networks; outside it, only the common
network prefix is advertised.
The classical IP addressing architecture used
addresses and subnet masks to discriminate the host
number from the network prefix. With network
prefixes, it is sufficient to indicate the number of
bits in the prefix. Both representations are in
common use. Architecturally correct subnet masks are
capable of being represented using the prefix length
description. They comprise that subset of all
possible bits patterns that have
+ a contiguous string of ones at the more
significant end,
+ a contiguous string of zeros at the less
significant end, and
+ no intervening bits.
Routers SHOULD always treat a route as a network
prefix, and SHOULD reject configuration and routing
information inconsistent with that model.
IP-address ::= { <Network-prefix>, <Host-number> } |
An effect of the use of CIDR is that the set of
destinations associated with address prefixes in the
routing table may exhibit subset relationship. A
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route describing a smaller set of destinations (a
longer prefix) is said to be more specific than a
route describing a larger set of destinations (a
shorter prefix); similarly, a route describing a
larger set of destinations (a shorter prefix) is said
to be less specific than a route describing a smaller
set of destinations (a longer prefix). Routers must
use the most specific matching route (the longest
matching network prefix) when forwarding traffic.
2.2.6 IP Multicasting
IP multicasting is an extension of Link Layer multicast
to IP internets. Using IP multicasts, a single datagram
can be addressed to multiple hosts without sending it to
all. In the extended case, these hosts may reside in
different address domains. This collection of hosts is
called a multicast group. Each multicast group is
represented as a Class D IP address. An IP datagram
sent to the group is to be delivered to each group
member with the same best-effort delivery as that
provided for unicast IP traffic. The sender of the
datagram does not itself need to be a member of the
destination group.
The semantics of IP multicast group membership are
defined in [INTERNET:4]. That document describes how
hosts and routers join and leave multicast groups. It
also defines a protocol, the Internet Group Management
Protocol (IGMP), that monitors IP multicast group
membership.
Forwarding of IP multicast datagrams is accomplished
either through static routing information or via a
multicast routing protocol. Devices that forward IP
multicast datagrams are called multicast routers. They
may or may not also forward IP unicasts. Multicast
datagrams are forwarded on the basis of both their
source and destination addresses. Forwarding of IP
multicast packets is described in more detail in Section
[5.2.1]. Appendix D discusses multicast routing
protocols.
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2.2.7 Unnumbered Lines and Networks Prefixes
Traditionally, each network interface on an IP host or
router has its own IP address. This can cause
inefficient use of the scarce IP address space, since it
forces allocation of an IP network prefix to every
point-to-point link.
To solve this problem, a number of people have proposed
and implemented the concept of "unnumbered point to
point lines". An unnumbered point to point line does
not have any network prefix associated with it. As a
consequence, the network interfaces connected to an
unnumbered point to point line do not have IP addresses.
Because the IP architecture has traditionally assumed
that all interfaces had IP addresses, these unnumbered
interfaces cause some interesting dilemmas. For
example, some IP options (e.g., Record Route) specify
that a router must insert the interface address into the
option, but an unnumbered interface has no IP address.
Even more fundamental (as we shall see in chapter 5) is
that routes contain the IP address of the next hop
router. A router expects that this IP address will be
on an IP (sub)net to which the router is connected.
That assumption is of course violated if the only
connection is an unnumbered point to point line.
To get around these difficulties, two schemes have been
conceived. The first scheme says that two routers
connected by an unnumbered point to point line are not
really two routers at all, but rather two "half-routers"
that together make up a single virtual router. The
unnumbered point to point line is essentially considered
to be an internal bus in the virtual router. The two
halves of the virtual router must coordinate their
activities in such a way that they act exactly like a
single router.
This scheme fits in well with the IP architecture, but
suffers from two important drawbacks. The first is
that, although it handles the common case of a single
unnumbered point to point line, it is not readily
extensible to handle the case of a mesh of routers and
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unnumbered point to point lines. The second drawback is
that the interactions between the half routers are
necessarily complex and are not standardized,
effectively precluding the connection of equipment from
different vendors using unnumbered point to point lines.
Because of these drawbacks, this memo has adopted an
alternate scheme, which has been invented multiple times
but which is probably originally attributable to Phil
Karn. In this scheme, a router that has unnumbered
point to point lines also has a special IP address,
called a "router-id" in this memo. The router-id is one
of the router's IP addresses (a router is required to
have at least one IP address). This router-id is used
as if it is the IP address of all unnumbered interfaces.
2.2.8 Notable Oddities
2.2.8.1 Embedded Routers
A router may be a stand-alone computer system,
dedicated to its IP router functions. Alternatively,
it is possible to embed router functions within a
host operating system that supports connections to
two or more networks. The best-known example of an
operating system with embedded router code is the
Berkeley BSD system. The embedded router feature
seems to make building a network easy, but it has a
number of hidden pitfalls:
(1) If a host has only a single constituent-network
interface, it should not act as a router.
For example, hosts with embedded router code
that gratuitously forward broadcast packets or
datagrams on the same net often cause packet
avalanches.
(2) If a (multihomed) host acts as a router, it is
subject to the requirements for routers
contained in this document.
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For example, the routing protocol issues and the
router control and monitoring problems are as
hard and important for embedded routers as for
stand-alone routers.
Internet router requirements and specifications
may change independently of operating system
changes. An administration that operates an
embedded router in the Internet is strongly
advised to maintain and update the router code.
This might require router source code.
(3) When a host executes embedded router code, it
becomes part of the Internet infrastructure.
Thus, errors in software or configuration can
hinder communication between other hosts. As a
consequence, the host administrator must lose
some autonomy.
In many circumstances, a host administrator will
need to disable router code embedded in the
operating system. For this reason, it should be
straightforward to disable embedded router
functionality.
(4) When a host running embedded router code is
concurrently used for other services, the
Operation and Maintenance requirements for the
two modes of use may conflict.
For example, router O&M will in many cases be
performed remotely by an operations center; this
may require privileged system access that the
host administrator would not normally want to
distribute.
2.2.8.2 Transparent Routers
There are two basic models for interconnecting
local-area networks and wide-area (or long-haul)
networks in the Internet. In the first, the local-
area network is assigned a network prefix and all
routers in the Internet must know how to route to
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that network. In the second, the local-area network
shares (a small part of) the address space of the
wide-area network. Routers that support this second
model are called "address sharing routers" or
"transparent routers". The focus of this memo is on
routers that support the first model, but this is not
intended to exclude the use of transparent routers.
The basic idea of a transparent router is that the
hosts on the local-area network behind such a router
share the address space of the wide-area network in
front of the router. In certain situations this is a
very useful approach and the limitations do not
present significant drawbacks.
The words "in front" and "behind" indicate one of the
limitations of this approach: this model of
interconnection is suitable only for a geographically
(and topologically) limited stub environment. It
requires that there be some form of logical
addressing in the network level addressing of the
wide-area network. IP addresses in the local
environment map to a few (usually one) physical
address in the wide-area network. This mapping
occurs in a way consistent with the { IP address <->
network address } mapping used throughout the wide-
area network.
Multihoming is possible on one wide-area network, but
may present routing problems if the interfaces are
geographically or topologically separated.
Multihoming on two (or more) wide-area networks is a
problem due to the confusion of addresses.
The behavior that hosts see from other hosts in what
is apparently the same network may differ if the
transparent router cannot fully emulate the normal
wide-area network service. For example, the ARPANET
used a Link Layer protocol that provided a
"Destination Dead" indication in response to an
attempt to send to a host that was off-line.
However, if there were a transparent router between
the ARPANET and an Ethernet, a host on the ARPANET
would not receive a Destination Dead indication for
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Ethernet hosts.
2.3 Router Characteristics
An Internet router performs the following functions:
(1) Conforms to specific Internet protocols specified in
this document, including the Internet Protocol (IP),
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and others
as necessary.
(2) Interfaces to two or more packet networks. For each
connected network the router must implement the
functions required by that network. These functions
typically include:
+ Encapsulating and decapsulating the IP datagrams
with the connected network framing (e.g., an
Ethernet header and checksum),
+ Sending and receiving IP datagrams up to the maximum
size supported by that network, this size is the
network's "Maximum Transmission Unit" or "MTU",
+ Translating the IP destination address into an
appropriate network-level address for the connected
network (e.g., an Ethernet hardware address), if
needed, and
+ Responding to network flow control and error
indications, if any.
See chapter 3 (Link Layer).
(3) Receives and forwards Internet datagrams. Important
issues in this process are buffer management,
congestion control, and fairness.
+ Recognizes error conditions and generates ICMP error
and information messages as required.
+ Drops datagrams whose time-to-live fields have
reached zero.
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+ Fragments datagrams when necessary to fit into the
MTU of the next network.
See chapter 4 (Internet Layer - Protocols) and chapter
5 (Internet Layer - Forwarding) for more information.
(4) Chooses a next-hop destination for each IP datagram,
based on the information in its routing database. See
chapter 5 (Internet Layer - Forwarding) for more
information.
(5) (Usually) supports an interior gateway protocol (IGP)
to carry out distributed routing and reachability
algorithms with the other routers in the same
autonomous system. In addition, some routers will
need to support an exterior gateway protocol (EGP) to
exchange topological information with other autonomous
systems. See chapter 7 (Application Layer - Routing
Protocols) for more information.
(6) Provides network management and system support
facilities, including loading, debugging, status
reporting, exception reporting and control. See
chapter 8 (Application Layer - Network Management
Protocols) and chapter 10 (Operation and Maintenance)
for more information.
A router vendor will have many choices on power,
complexity, and features for a particular router product.
It may be helpful to observe that the Internet system is
neither homogeneous nor fully connected. For reasons of
technology and geography it is growing into a global
interconnect system plus a "fringe" of LANs around the
"edge". More and more these fringe LANs are becoming
richly interconnected, thus making them less out on the
fringe and more demanding on router requirements.
+ The global interconnect system is composed of a number of
wide-area networks to which are attached routers of
several Autonomous Systems (AS); there are relatively
few hosts connected directly to the system.
+ Most hosts are connected to LANs. Many organizations
have clusters of LANs interconnected by local routers.
Each such cluster is connected by routers at one or more
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points into the global interconnect system. If it is
connected at only one point, a LAN is known as a "stub"
network.
Routers in the global interconnect system generally
require:
+ Advanced Routing and Forwarding Algorithms
These routers need routing algorithms that are highly
dynamic, impose minimal processing and communication
burdens, and offer type-of-service routing. Congestion
is still not a completely resolved issue (see Section
[5.3.6]). Improvements in these areas are expected, as
the research community is actively working on these
issues.
+ High Availability
These routers need to be highly reliable, providing 24
hours a day, 7 days a week service. Equipment and
software faults can have a wide-spread (sometimes
global) effect. In case of failure, they must recover
quickly. In any environment, a router must be highly
robust and able to operate, possibly in a degraded
state, under conditions of extreme congestion or failure
of network resources.
+ Advanced O&M Features
Internet routers normally operate in an unattended mode.
They will typically be operated remotely from a
centralized monitoring center. They need to provide
sophisticated means for monitoring and measuring traffic
and other events and for diagnosing faults.
+ High Performance
Long-haul lines in the Internet today are most
frequently full duplex 56 KBPS, DS1 (1.544 Mbps), or DS3
(45 Mbps) speeds. LANs, which are half duplex
multiaccess media, are typically Ethernet (10Mbps) and,
to a lesser degree, FDDI (100Mbps). However, network
media technology is constantly advancing and higher
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speeds are likely in the future.
The requirements for routers used in the LAN fringe (e.g.,
campus networks) depend greatly on the demands of the local
networks. These may be high or medium-performance devices,
probably competitively procured from several different
vendors and operated by an internal organization (e.g., a
campus computing center). The design of these routers
should emphasize low average latency and good burst
performance, together with delay and type-of-service
sensitive resource management. In this environment there
may be less formal O&M but it will not be less important.
The need for the routing mechanism to be highly dynamic
will become more important as networks become more complex
and interconnected. Users will demand more out of their
local connections because of the speed of the global
interconnects.
As networks have grown, and as more networks have become
old enough that they are phasing out older equipment, it
has become increasingly imperative that routers
interoperate with routers from other vendors.
Even though the Internet system is not fully
interconnected, many parts of the system need to have
redundant connectivity. Rich connectivity allows reliable
service despite failures of communication lines and
routers, and it can also improve service by shortening
Internet paths and by providing additional capacity.
Unfortunately, this richer topology can make it much more
difficult to choose the best path to a particular
destination.
2.4 Architectural Assumptions
The current Internet architecture is based on a set of
assumptions about the communication system. The
assumptions most relevant to routers are as follows:
+ The Internet is a network of networks.
Each host is directly connected to some particular
network(s); its connection to the Internet is only
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conceptual. Two hosts on the same network communicate
with each other using the same set of protocols that
they would use to communicate with hosts on distant
networks.
+ Routers do not keep connection state information.
To improve the robustness of the communication system,
routers are designed to be stateless, forwarding each IP
packet independently of other packets. As a result,
redundant paths can be exploited to provide robust
service in spite of failures of intervening routers and
networks.
All state information required for end-to-end flow
control and reliability is implemented in the hosts, in
the transport layer or in application programs. All
connection control information is thus co-located with
the end points of the communication, so it will be lost
only if an end point fails. Routers control message
flow only indirectly, by dropping packets or increasing
network delay.
Note that future protocol developments may well end up
putting some more state into routers. This is
especially likely for multicast routing, resource
reservation, and flow based forwarding.
+ Routing complexity should be in the routers.
Routing is a complex and difficult problem, and ought to
be performed by the routers, not the hosts. An
important objective is to insulate host software from
changes caused by the inevitable evolution of the
Internet routing architecture.
+ The system must tolerate wide network variation.
A basic objective of the Internet design is to tolerate
a wide range of network characteristics - e.g.,
bandwidth, delay, packet loss, packet reordering, and
maximum packet size. Another objective is robustness
against failure of individual networks, routers, and
hosts, using whatever bandwidth is still available.
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Finally, the goal is full "open system interconnection":
an Internet router must be able to interoperate robustly
and effectively with any other router or Internet host,
across diverse Internet paths.
Sometimes implementors have designed for less ambitious
goals. For example, the LAN environment is typically
much more benign than the Internet as a whole; LANs have
low packet loss and delay and do not reorder packets.
Some vendors have fielded implementations that are
adequate for a simple LAN environment, but work badly
for general interoperation. The vendor justifies such a
product as being economical within the restricted LAN
market. However, isolated LANs seldom stay isolated for
long. They are soon connected to each other, to
organization-wide internets, and eventually to the
global Internet system. In the end, neither the
customer nor the vendor is served by incomplete or
substandard routers.
The requirements in this document are designed for a
full-function router. It is intended that fully
compliant routers will be usable in almost any part of
the Internet.
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3. LINK LAYER
Although [INTRO:1] covers Link Layer standards (IP over
various link layers, ARP, etc.), this document anticipates
that Link-Layer material will be covered in a separate Link
Layer Requirements document. A Link-Layer Requirements
document would be applicable to both hosts and routers. Thus,
this document will not obsolete the parts of [INTRO:1] that
deal with link-layer issues.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Routers have essentially the same Link Layer protocol
requirements as other sorts of Internet systems. These
requirements are given in chapter 3 of "Requirements for
Internet Gateways" [INTRO:1]. A router MUST comply with
its requirements and SHOULD comply with its
recommendations. Since some of the material in that
document has become somewhat dated, some additional
requirements and explanations are included below.
DISCUSSION:
It is expected that the Internet community will produce
a "Requirements for Internet Link Layer" standard which
will supersede both this chapter and the chapter
entitled "INTERNET LAYER PROTOCOLS" in [INTRO:1].
3.2 LINK/INTERNET LAYER INTERFACE
This document does not attempt to specify the interface
between the Link Layer and the upper layers. However, note
well that other parts of this document, particularly
chapter 5, require various sorts of information to be
passed across this layer boundary.
This section uses the following definitions:
+ Source physical address
The source physical address is the Link Layer address of
the host or router from which the packet was received.
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+ Destination physical address
The destination physical address is the Link Layer
address to which the packet was sent.
The information that must pass from the Link Layer to the
Internetwork Layer for each received packet is:
(1) The IP packet [5.2.2],
(2) The length of the data portion (i.e., not including the
Link-Layer framing) of the Link Layer frame [5.2.2],
(3) The identity of the physical interface from which the
IP packet was received [5.2.3], and
(4) The classification of the packet's destination physical
address as a Link Layer unicast, broadcast, or
multicast [4.3.2], [5.3.4].
In addition, the Link Layer also should provide:
(5) The source physical address.
The information that must pass from the Internetwork Layer
to the Link Layer for each transmitted packet is:
(1) The IP packet [5.2.1]
(2) The length of the IP packet [5.2.1]
(3) The destination physical interface [5.2.1]
(4) The next hop IP address [5.2.1]
In addition, the Internetwork Layer also should provide:
(5) The Link Layer priority value [5.3.3.2]
The Link Layer must also notify the Internetwork Layer if
the packet to be transmitted causes a Link Layer
precedence-related error [5.3.3.3].
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3.3 SPECIFIC ISSUES
3.3.1 Trailer Encapsulation
Routers that can connect to ten megabit Ethernets MAY be
able to receive and forward Ethernet packets
encapsulated using the trailer encapsulation described
in [LINK:1]. However, a router SHOULD NOT originate
trailer encapsulated packets. A router MUST NOT
originate trailer encapsulated packets without first
verifying, using the mechanism described in [INTRO:2],
that the immediate destination of the packet is willing
and able to accept trailer-encapsulated packets. A
router SHOULD NOT agree (using these mechanisms) to
accept trailer-encapsulated packets.
3.3.2 Address Resolution Protocol - ARP
Routers that implement ARP MUST be compliant and SHOULD
be unconditionally compliant with the requirements in
[INTRO:2].
The link layer MUST NOT report a Destination Unreachable
error to IP solely because there is no ARP cache entry
for a destination; it SHOULD queue up to a small number
of datagrams breifly while performing the ARP
request/reply sequence, and reply that the destination
is unreachable to one of the queued datagrams only when
this proves fruitless.
A router MUST not believe any ARP reply that claims that
the Link Layer address of another host or router is a
broadcast or multicast address.
3.3.3 Ethernet and 802.3 Coexistence
Routers that can connect to ten megabit Ethernets MUST
be compliant and SHOULD be unconditionally compliant
with the Ethernet requirements of [INTRO:2].
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3.3.4 Maximum Transmission Unit - MTU
The MTU of each logical interface MUST be configurable
within the range of legal MTUs for the interface.
Many Link Layer protocols define a maximum frame size
that may be sent. In such cases, a router MUST NOT
allow an MTU to be set which would allow sending of
frames larger than those allowed by the Link Layer
protocol. However, a router SHOULD be willing to
receive a packet as large as the maximum frame size even
if that is larger than the MTU.
DISCUSSION:
Note that this is a stricter requirement than imposed
on hosts by [INTRO:2], which requires that the MTU of
each physical interface be configurable.
If a network is using an MTU smaller than the maximum
frame size for the Link Layer, a router may receive
packets larger than the MTU from misconfigured and
incompletely initialized hosts. The Robustness
Principle indicates that the router should
successfully receive these packets if possible.
3.3.5 Point-to-Point Protocol - PPP
Contrary to [INTRO:1], the Internet does have a standard
point to point line protocol: the Point-to-Point
Protocol (PPP), defined in [LINK:2], [LINK:3], [LINK:4],
and [LINK:5].
A "point to point interface" is any interface that is
designed to send data over a point to point line. Such
interfaces include telephone, leased, dedicated or
direct lines (either 2 or 4 wire), and may use point to
point channels or virtual circuits of multiplexed
interfaces such as ISDN. They normally use a
standardized modem or bit serial interface (such as RS-
232, RS-449 or V.35), using either synchronous or
asynchronous clocking. Multiplexed interfaces often
have special physical interfaces.
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A "general purpose serial interface" uses the same
physical media as a point to point line, but supports
the use of link layer networks as well as point to point
connectivity. Link layer networks (such as X.25 or
Frame Relay) use an alternative IP link layer
specification.
Routers that implement point to point or general purpose
serial interfaces MUST IMPLEMENT PPP.
PPP MUST be supported on all general purpose serial
interfaces on a router. The router MAY allow the line
to be configured to use point to point line protocols
other than PPP. Point to point interfaces SHOULD either
default to using PPP when enabled or require
configuration of the link layer protocol before being
enabled. General purpose serial interfaces SHOULD
require configuration of the link layer protocol before
being enabled.
3.3.5.1 Introduction
This section provides guidelines to router
implementors so that they can ensure interoperability
with other routers using PPP over either synchronous
or asynchronous links.
It is critical that an implementor understand the
semantics of the option negotiation mechanism.
Options are a means for a local device to indicate to
a remote peer what the local device will accept from
the remote peer, not what it wishes to send. It is
up to the remote peer to decide what is most
convenient to send within the confines of the set of
options that the local device has stated that it can
accept. Therefore it is perfectly acceptable and
normal for a remote peer to ACK all the options
indicated in an LCP Configuration Request (CR) even
if the remote peer does not support any of those
options. Again, the options are simply a mechanism
for either device to indicate to its peer what it
will accept, not necessarily what it will send.
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3.3.5.2 Link Control Protocol (LCP) Options
The PPP Link Control Protocol (LCP) offers a number
of options that may be negotiated. These options
include (among others) address and control field
compression, protocol field compression, asynchronous
character map, Maximum Receive Unit (MRU), Link
Quality Monitoring (LQM), magic number (for loopback
detection), Password Authentication Protocol (PAP),
Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP),
and the 32-bit Frame Check Sequence (FCS).
A router MAY use address/control field compression on
either synchronous or asynchronous links. A router
MAY use protocol field compression on either
synchronous or asynchronous links. A router that
indicates that it can accept these compressions MUST
be able to accept uncompressed PPP header information
also.
DISCUSSION:
These options control the appearance of the PPP
header. Normally the PPP header consists of the
address, the control field, and the protocol
field. The address, on a point to point line, is
0xFF, indicating "broadcast". The control field
is 0x03, indicating "Unnumbered Information." The
Protocol Identifier is a two byte value indicating
the contents of the data area of the frame. If a
system negotiates address and control field
compression it indicates to its peer that it will
accept PPP frames that have or do not have these
fields at the front of the header. It does not
indicate that it will be sending frames with these
fields removed.
Protocol field compression, when negotiated,
indicates that the system is willing to receive
protocol fields compressed to one byte when this
is legal. There is no requirement that the sender
do so.
Use of address/control field compression is
inconsistent with the use of numbered mode
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(reliable) PPP.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Some hardware does not deal well with variable
length header information. In those cases it
makes most sense for the remote peer to send the
full PPP header. Implementations may ensure this
by not sending the address/control field and
protocol field compression options to the remote
peer. Even if the remote peer has indicated an
ability to receive compressed headers there is no
requirement for the local router to send
compressed headers.
A router MUST negotiate the Asynchronous Control
Character Map (ACCM) for asynchronous PPP links, but
SHOULD NOT negotiate the ACCM for synchronous links.
If a router receives an attempt to negotiate the ACCM
over a synchronous link, it MUST ACKnowledge the
option and then ignore it.
DISCUSSION:
There are implementations that offer both
synchronous and asynchronous modes of operation
and may use the same code to implement the option
negotiation. In this situation it is possible
that one end or the other may send the ACCM option
on a synchronous link.
A router SHOULD properly negotiate the maximum
receive unit (MRU). Even if a system negotiates an
MRU smaller than 1,500 bytes, it MUST be able to
receive a 1,500 byte frame.
A router SHOULD negotiate and enable the link quality
monitoring (LQM) option.
DISCUSSION:
This memo does not specify a policy for deciding
whether the link's quality is adequate. However,
it is important (see Section [3.3.6]) that a
router disable failed links.
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A router SHOULD implement and negotiate the magic
number option for loopback detection.
A router MAY support the authentication options (PAP
- Password Authentication Protocol, and/or CHAP -
Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol).
A router MUST support 16-bit CRC frame check sequence
(FCS) and MAY support the 32-bit CRC.
3.3.5.3 IP Control Protocol (IPCP) Options
A router MAY offer to perform IP address negotiation.
A router MUST accept a refusal (REJect) to perform IP
address negotiation from the peer.
Routers operating at link speeds of 19,200 BPS or
less SHOULD implement and offer to perform Van
Jacobson header compression. Routers that implement
VJ compression SHOULD implement an administrative
control enabling or disabling it.
3.3.6 Interface Testing
A router MUST have a mechanism to allow routing software
to determine whether a physical interface is available
to send packets or not; on multiplexed interfaces where
permanent virtual circuits are opened for limited sets
of neighbors, the router must also be able to determine
whether the virtual circuits are viable. A router
SHOULD have a mechanism to allow routing software to
judge the quality of a physical interface. A router
MUST have a mechanism for informing the routing software
when a physical interface becomes available or
unavailable to send packets because of administrative
action. A router MUST have a mechanism for informing
the routing software when it detects a Link level
interface has become available or unavailable, for any
reason.
DISCUSSION:
It is crucial that routers have workable mechanisms
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for determining that their network connections are
functioning properly. Failure to detect link loss,
or failure to take the proper actions when a problem
is detected, can lead to black holes.
The mechanisms available for detecting problems with
network connections vary considerably, depending on
the Link Layer protocols in use and the interface
hardware. The intent is to maximize the capability
to detect failures within the Link-Layer constraints.
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4. INTERNET LAYER - PROTOCOLS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter and chapter 5 discuss the protocols used at
the Internet Layer: IP, ICMP, and IGMP. Since forwarding
is obviously a crucial topic in a document discussing
routers, chapter 5 limits itself to the aspects of the
protocols that directly relate to forwarding. The current
chapter contains the remainder of the discussion of the
Internet Layer protocols.
4.2 INTERNET PROTOCOL - IP
4.2.1 INTRODUCTION
Routers MUST implement the IP protocol, as defined by
[INTERNET:1]. They MUST also implement its mandatory
extensions: subnets (defined in [INTERNET:2]), IP
broadcast (defined in [INTERNET:3]), and Classless
Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR, defined in [INTERNET:15]).
Router implementors need not consider compliance with
the section of [INTRO:2] entitled "Internet Protocol --
IP," as that section is entirely duplicated or
superseded in this document. A router MUST be
compliant, and SHOULD be unconditionally compliant, with
the requirements of the section entitled "SPECIFIC
ISSUES" relating to IP in [INTRO:2].
In the following, the action specified in certain cases
is to "silently discard" a received datagram. This
means that the datagram will be discarded without
further processing and that the router will not send any
ICMP error message (see Section [4.3]) as a result.
However, for diagnosis of problems a router SHOULD
provide the capability of logging the error (see Section
[1.3.3]), including the contents of the silently
discarded datagram, and SHOULD count datagrams
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discarded.
4.2.2 PROTOCOL WALK-THROUGH
RFC 791 [INTERNET:1] is the specification for the
Internet Protocol.
4.2.2.1 Options: RFC 791 Section 3.2
In datagrams received by the router itself, the IP
layer MUST interpret IP options that it understands
and preserve the rest unchanged for use by higher
layer protocols.
Higher layer protocols may require the ability to set
IP options in datagrams they send or examine IP
options in datagrams they receive. Later sections of
this document discuss specific IP option support
required by higher layer protocols.
DISCUSSION:
Neither this memo nor [INTRO:2] define the order
in which a receiver must process multiple options
in the same IP header. Hosts and routers
originating datagrams containing multiple options
must be aware that this introduces an ambiguity in
the meaning of certain options when combined with
a source-route option.
Here are the requirements for specific IP options:
(a) Security Option
Some environments require the Security option in
every packet originated or received. Routers
SHOULD IMPLEMENT the revised security option
described in [INTERNET:5].
DISCUSSION:
Note that the security options described in
[INTERNET:1] and RFC 1038 ([INTERNET:16]) are
obsolete.
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(b) Stream Identifier Option
This option is obsolete; routers SHOULD NOT
place this option in a datagram that the router
originates. This option MUST be ignored in
datagrams received by the router.
(c) Source Route Options
A router MUST be able to act as the final
destination of a source route. If a router
receives a packet containing a completed source
route, the packet has reached its final
destination. In such an option, the pointer
points beyond the last field and the destination
address in the IP header addresses the router.
The option as received (the recorded route) MUST
be passed up to the transport layer (or to ICMP
message processing).
In the general case, a correct response to a
source-routed datagram traverses the same route.
A router MUST provide a means whereby transport
protocols and applications can reverse the
source route in a received datagram. This
reversed source route MUST be inserted into
datagrams they originate (see [INTRO:2] for
details) when the router is unaware of policy
constraints. However, if the router is policy
aware, it MAY select another path.
Some applications in the router MAY require that
the user be able to enter a source route.
A router MUST NOT originate a datagram
containing multiple source route options. What
a router should do if asked to forward a packet
containing multiple source route options is
described in Section [5.2.4.1].
When a source route option is created (which
would happen when the router is originating a
source routed datagram or is inserting a source
route option as a result of a special filter),
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it MUST be correctly formed even if it is being
created by reversing a recorded route that
erroneously includes the source host (see case
(B) in the discussion below).
DISCUSSION:
Suppose a source routed datagram is to be
routed from source S to destination D via
routers G1, G2, Gn. Source S constructs a
datagram with G1's IP address as its
destination address, and a source route
option to get the datagram the rest of the
way to its destination. However, there is an
ambiguity in the specification over whether
the source route option in a datagram sent
out by S should be (A) or (B):
(A): {>>G2, G3, ... Gn, D} <--- CORRECT
(B): {S, >>G2, G3, ... Gn, D} <---- WRONG
(where >> represents the pointer). If (A) is
sent, the datagram received at D will contain
the option: {G1, G2, ... Gn >>}, with S and D
as the IP source and destination addresses.
If (B) were sent, the datagram received at D
would again contain S and D as the same IP
source and destination addresses, but the
option would be: {S, G1, ...Gn >>}; i.e., the
originating host would be the first hop in
the route.
(d) Record Route Option
Routers MAY support the Record Route option in
datagrams originated by the router.
(e) Timestamp Option
Routers MAY support the timestamp option in
datagrams originated by the router. The
following rules apply:
+ When originating a datagram containing a
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Timestamp Option, a router MUST record a
timestamp in the option if
- Its Internet address fields are not pre-
specified or
- Its first pre-specified address is the IP
address of the logical interface over
which the datagram is being sent (or the
router's router-id if the datagram is
being sent over an unnumbered interface).
+ If the router itself receives a datagram
containing a Timestamp Option, the router
MUST insert the current time into the
Timestamp Option (if there is space in the
option to do so) before passing the option to
the transport layer or to ICMP for
processing. If space is not present, the |
router MUST increment the Overflow Count in |
the option.
+ A timestamp value MUST follow the rules
defined in [INTRO:2].
IMPLEMENTATION:
To maximize the utility of the timestamps
contained in the timestamp option, the
timestamp inserted should be, as nearly as
practical, the time at which the packet
arrived at the router. For datagrams
originated by the router, the timestamp
inserted should be, as nearly as practical,
the time at which the datagram was passed to
the Link Layer for transmission.
The timestamp option permits the use of a
non-standard time clock, but the use of a
non-synchronized clock limits the utility of
the time stamp. Therefore, routers are well
advised to implement the Network Time
Protocol for the purpose of synchronizing
their clocks.
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4.2.2.2 Addresses in Options: RFC 791 Section 3.1
Routers are called upon to insert their address into
Record Route, Strict Source and Record Route, Loose
Source and Record Route, or Timestamp Options. When
a router inserts its address into such an option, it
MUST use the IP address of the logical interface on
which the packet is being sent. Where this rule
cannot be obeyed because the output interface has no
IP address (i.e., is an unnumbered interface), the
router MUST instead insert its "router-id". The
router's router-id is one of the router's IP
addresses. The Router ID may be specified on a
system basis or on a per-link basis. Which of the
router's addresses is used as the router-id MUST NOT
change (even across reboots) unless changed by the
network manager. Relevant management changes include
reconfiguration of the router such that the IP
address used as the router-id ceases to be one of the
router's IP addresses. Routers with multiple
unnumbered interfaces MAY have multiple router-id's.
Each unnumbered interface MUST be associated with a
particular router-id. This association MUST NOT
change (even across reboots) without reconfiguration
of the router.
DISCUSSION:
This specification does not allow for routers that
do not have at least one IP address. We do not
view this as a serious limitation, since a router
needs an IP address to meet the manageability
requirements of Chapter [8] even if the router is
connected only to point-to-point links.
IMPLEMENTATION:
One possible method of choosing the router-id that
fulfills this requirement is to use the
numerically smallest (or greatest) IP address
(treating the address as a 32-bit integer) that is
assigned to the router.
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4.2.2.3 Unused IP Header Bits: RFC 791 Section 3.1
The IP header contains two reserved bits: one in the
Type of Service byte and the other in the Flags
field. A router MUST NOT set either of these bits to
one in datagrams originated by the router. A router
MUST NOT drop (refuse to receive or forward) a packet
merely because one or more of these reserved bits has
a non-zero value; i.e., the router MUST NOT check the
values of thes bits.
DISCUSSION:
Future revisions to the IP protocol may make use
of these unused bits. These rules are intended to
ensure that these revisions can be deployed
without having to simultaneously upgrade all
routers in the Internet.
4.2.2.4 Type of Service: RFC 791 Section 3.1
The "Type-of-Service" byte in the IP header is
divided into three sections: the Precedence field
(high-order 3 bits), a field that is customarily
called "Type of Service" or "TOS" (next 4 bits), and
a reserved bit (the low order bit).
Rules governing the reserved bit were described in
Section [4.2.2.3].
A more extensive discussion of the TOS field and its
use can be found in [ROUTE:11].
The description of the IP Precedence field is
superseded by Section [5.3.3]. RFC 795, "Service
Mappings", is obsolete and SHOULD NOT be implemented.
4.2.2.5 Header Checksum: RFC 791 Section 3.1
As stated in Section [5.2.2], a router MUST verify
the IP checksum of any packet that is received, and
MUST discard messages containing invalid checksums.
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The router MUST NOT provide a means to disable this
checksum verification.
A router MAY use incremental IP header checksum
updating when the only change to the IP header is the
time to live. This will reduce the possibility of
undetected corruption of the IP header by the router.
See [INTERNET:6] for a discussion of incrementally
updating the checksum.
IMPLEMENTATION:
A more extensive description of the IP checksum,
including extensive implementation hints, can be
found in [INTERNET:6] and [INTERNET:7].
4.2.2.6 Unrecognized Header Options: RFC 791 Section 3.1
A router MUST ignore IP options which it does not
recognize. A corollary of this requirement is that a
router MUST implement the End of Option List option
and the No Operation option, since neither contains
an explicit length.
DISCUSSION:
All future IP options will include an explicit
length.
4.2.2.7 Fragmentation: RFC 791 Section 3.2
Fragmentation, as described in [INTERNET:1], MUST be
supported by a router.
When a router fragments an IP datagram, it SHOULD
minimize the number of fragments. When a router
fragments an IP datagram, it SHOULD send the
fragments in order. A fragmentation method that may
generate one IP fragment that is significantly
smaller than the other MAY cause the first IP
fragment to be the smaller one.
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DISCUSSION:
There are several fragmentation techniques in
common use in the Internet. One involves
splitting the IP datagram into IP fragments with
the first being MTU sized, and the others being
approximately the same size, smaller than the MTU.
The reason for this is twofold. The first IP
fragment in the sequence will be the effective MTU
of the current path between the hosts, and the
following IP fragments are sized to minimize the
further fragmentation of the IP datagram. Another
technique is to split the IP datagram into MTU
sized IP fragments, with the last fragment being
the only one smaller, as described in
[INTERNET:1].
A common trick used by some implementations of
TCP/IP is to fragment an IP datagram into IP
fragments that are no larger than 576 bytes when
the IP datagram is to travel through a router.
This is intended to allow the resulting IP
fragments to pass the rest of the path without
further fragmentation. This would, though, create
more of a load on the destination host, since it
would have a larger number of IP fragments to
reassemble into one IP datagram. It would also
not be efficient on networks where the MTU only
changes once and stays much larger than 576 bytes.
Examples include LAN networks such as an IEEE
802.5 network with a MTU of 2048 or an Ethernet
network with an MTU of 1500).
One other fragmentation technique discussed was
splitting the IP datagram into approximately equal
sized IP fragments, with the size less than or
equal to the next hop network's MTU. This is
intended to minimize the number of fragments that
would result from additional fragmentation further
down the path, and assure equal delay for each
fragment.
Routers SHOULD generate the least possible number
of IP fragments.
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Work with slow machines leads us to believe that
if it is necessary to fragment messages, sending
the small IP fragment first maximizes the chance
of a host with a slow interface of receiving all
the fragments.
4.2.2.8 Reassembly: RFC 791 Section 3.2
As specified in the corresponding section of
[INTRO:2], a router MUST support reassembly of
datagrams that it delivers to itself.
4.2.2.9 Time to Live: RFC 791 Section 3.2
Time to Live (TTL) handling for packets originated or
received by the router is governed by [INTRO:2]; this
section changes none of its stipulations. However,
since the remainder of the IP Protocol section of
[INTRO:2] is rewritten, this section is as well.
Note in particular that a router MUST NOT check the
TTL of a packet except when forwarding it.
A router MUST NOT originate or forward a datagram
with a Time-to-Live (TTL) value of zero.
A router MUST NOT discard a datagram just because it
was received with TTL equal to zero or one; if it is
to the router and otherwise valid, the router MUST
attempt to receive it.
On messages the router originates, the IP layer MUST
provide a means for the transport layer to set the
TTL field of every datagram that is sent. When a
fixed TTL value is used, it MUST be configurable.
The number SHOULD exceed the typical internet
diameter, and current wisdom suggests that it should
exceed twice the internet diameter to allow for
growth. Current suggested values are normally posted
in the Assigned Numbers RFC. The TTL field has two
functions: limit the lifetime of TCP segments (see
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RFC 793 [TCP:1], p. 28), and terminate Internet
routing loops. Although TTL is a time in seconds, it
also has some attributes of a hop-count, since each
router is required to reduce the TTL field by at
least one.
TTL expiration is intended to cause datagrams to be
discarded by routers, but not by the destination
host. Hosts that act as routers by forwarding
datagrams must therefore follow the router's rules
for TTL.
A higher-layer protocol may want to set the TTL in
order to implement an "expanding scope" search for
some Internet resource. This is used by some
diagnostic tools, and is expected to be useful for
locating the "nearest" server of a given class using
IP multicasting, for example. A particular transport
protocol may also want to specify its own TTL bound
on maximum datagram lifetime.
A fixed default value must be at least big enough for
the Internet "diameter," i.e., the longest possible
path. A reasonable value is about twice the
diameter, to allow for continued Internet growth. As
of this writing, messages crossing the United States
frequently traverse 15 to 20 routers; this argues for
a default TTL value in excess of 40, and 64 is a
common value.
4.2.2.10 Multi-subnet Broadcasts: RFC 922
All-subnets broadcasts (called "multi-subnet
broadcasts" in [INTERNET:3]) have been deprecated.
See Section [5.3.5.3].
4.2.2.11 Addressing: RFC 791 Section 3.2
As noted in 2.2.5.1, there are now five classes of IP
addresses: Class A through Class E. Class D
addresses are used for IP multicasting [INTERNET:4],
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while Class E addresses are reserved for experimental
use. The distinction between Class A, B, and C
addresses is no longer important; they are used as
generalized unicast network prefixes with only
historical interest in their class.
An IP multicast address is a 28-bit logical address
that stands for a group of hosts, and may be either
permanent or transient. Permanent multicast
addresses are allocated by the Internet Assigned
Number Authority [INTRO:7], while transient addresses
may be allocated dynamically to transient groups.
Group membership is determined dynamically using IGMP
[INTERNET:4].
We now summarize the important special cases for
general purpose unicast IP addresses, using the
following notation for an IP address:
{ <Network-prefix>, <Host-number> }
and the notation "-1" for a field that contains all 1
bits and the notation "0" for a field that contains
all 0 bits.
(a) { 0, 0 }
This host on this network. It MUST NOT be used
as a source address by routers, except the
router MAY use this as a source address as part
of an initialization procedure (e.g., if the
router is using BOOTP to load its configuration
information).
Incoming datagrams with a source address of { 0,
0 } which are received for local delivery (see
Section [5.2.3]), MUST be accepted if the router
implements the associated protocol and that
protocol clearly defines appropriate action to
be taken. Otherwise, a router MUST silently
discard any locally-delivered datagram whose
source address is { 0, 0 }.
DISCUSSION:
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Some protocols define specific actions to
take in response to a received datagram whose
source address is { 0, 0 }. Two examples are
BOOTP and ICMP Mask Request. The proper
operation of these protocols often depends on
the ability to receive datagrams whose source
address is { 0, 0 }. For most protocols,
however, it is best to ignore datagrams
having a source address of { 0, 0 } since
they were probably generated by a
misconfigured host or router. Thus, if a
router knows how to deal with a given
datagram having a { 0, 0 } source address,
the router MUST accept it. Otherwise, the
router MUST discard it.
See also Section [4.2.3.1] for a non-standard
use of { 0, 0 }.
(b) { 0, <Host-number> }
Specified host on this network. It MUST NOT be
sent by routers except that the router MAY use
this as a source address as part of an
initialization procedure by which the it learns
its own IP address.
(c) { -1, -1 }
Limited broadcast. It MUST NOT be used as a
source address.
A datagram with this destination address will be
received by every host and router on the
connected physical network, but will not be
forwarded outside that network.
(d) { <Network-prefix>, -1 }
Directed Broadcast - a broadcast directed to the
specified network prefix. It MUST NOT be used
as a source address. A router MAY originate
Network Directed Broadcast packets. A router
MUST receive Network Directed Broadcast packets;
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however a router MAY have a configuration option
to prevent reception of these packets. Such an
option MUST default to allowing reception.
(e) { 127, <any> }
Internal host loopback address. Addresses of
this form MUST NOT appear outside a host.
The <Network-prefix> is administratively assigned so
that its value will be unique in the routing domain
to which the device is connected.
IP addresses are not permitted to have the value 0 or
-1 for the <Host-number> or <Network-prefix> fields
except in the special cases listed above. This
implies that each of these fields will be at least
two bits long.
DISCUSSION:
Previous versions of this document also noted that
subnet numbers must be neither 0 nor -1, and must
be at least two bits in length. In a CIDR world,
the subnet number is clearly an extension of the
network prefix and cannot be interpreted without
the remainder of the prefix. This restriction of
subnet numbers is therefore meaningless in view of
CIDR and may be safely ignored.
For further discussion of broadcast addresses, see
Section [4.2.3.1].
When a router originates any datagram, the IP source
address MUST be one of its own IP addresses (but not
a broadcast or multicast address). The only
exception is during initialization.
For most purposes, a datagram addressed to a
broadcast or multicast destination is processed as if
it had been addressed to one of the router's IP
addresses; that is to say:
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+ A router MUST receive and process normally any
packets with a broadcast destination address.
+ A router MUST receive and process normally any
packets sent to a multicast destination address
that the router has asked to receive.
The term "specific-destination address" means the
equivalent local IP address of the host. The
specific-destination address is defined to be the
destination address in the IP header unless the
header contains a broadcast or multicast address, in
which case the specific-destination is an IP address
assigned to the physical interface on which the
datagram arrived.
A router MUST silently discard any received datagram
containing an IP source address that is invalid by
the rules of this section. This validation could be
done either by the IP layer or (when appropriate) by
each protocol in the transport layer. As with any
datagram a router discards, the datagram discard
SHOULD be counted.
DISCUSSION:
A misaddressed datagram might be caused by a Link
Layer broadcast of a unicast datagram or by
another router or host that is confused or
misconfigured.
4.2.3 SPECIFIC ISSUES
4.2.3.1 IP Broadcast Addresses
For historical reasons, there are a number of IP
addresses (some standard and some not) which are used
to indicate that an IP packet is an IP broadcast. A
router
(1) MUST treat as IP broadcasts packets addressed to
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255.255.255.255 or { <Network-prefix>, -1 }.
(2) SHOULD silently discard on receipt (i.e., do not
even deliver to applications in the router) any
packet addressed to 0.0.0.0 or { <Network-
prefix>, 0 }. If these packets are not silently
discarded, they MUST be treated as IP broadcasts
(see Section [5.3.5]). There MAY be a
configuration option to allow receipt of these
packets. This option SHOULD default to
discarding them.
(3) SHOULD (by default) use the limited broadcast
address (255.255.255.255) when originating an IP
broadcast destined for a connected (sub)network
(except when sending an ICMP Address Mask Reply,
as discussed in Section [4.3.3.9]). A router
MUST receive limited broadcasts.
(4) SHOULD NOT originate datagrams addressed to
0.0.0.0 or { <Network-prefix>, 0 }. There MAY
be a configuration option to allow generation of
these packets (instead of using the relevant
"1s" format broadcast). This option SHOULD
default to not generating them.
DISCUSSION:
In the second bullet, the router obviously cannot
recognize addresses of the form { <Network-
prefix>, 0 } if the router has no interface to
that network prefix. In that case, the rules of
the second bullet do not apply because, from the
point of view of the router, the packet is not an
IP broadcast packet.
4.2.3.2 IP Multicasting
An IP router SHOULD satisfy the Host Requirements
with respect to IP multicasting, as specified in
[INTRO:2]. An IP router SHOULD support local IP
multicasting on all connected networks. When a
mapping from IP multicast addresses to link-layer
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addresses has been specified (see the various IP-
over-xxx specifications), it SHOULD use that mapping,
and MAY be configurable to use the link layer
broadcast instead. On point-to-point links and all
other interfaces, multicasts are encapsulated as link
layer broadcasts. Support for local IP multicasting
includes originating multicast datagrams, joining
multicast groups and receiving multicast datagrams,
and leaving multicast groups. This implies support
for all of [INTERNET:4] including IGMP (see Section
[4.4]).
DISCUSSION:
Although [INTERNET:4] is entitled Host Extensions
for IP Multicasting, it applies to all IP systems,
both hosts and routers. In particular, since
routers may join multicast groups, it is correct
for them to perform the "host" part of IGMP,
reporting their group memberships to any multicast
routers that may be present on their attached
networks (whether or not they themselves are
multicast routers).
Some router protocols may specifically require
support for IP multicasting (e.g., OSPF
[ROUTE:1]), or may recommend it (e.g., ICMP Router
Discovery [INTERNET:13]).
4.2.3.3 Path MTU Discovery
To eliminate fragmentation or minimize it, it is
desirable to know what is the path MTU along the path
from the source to destination. The path MTU is the
minimum of the MTUs of each hop in the path.
[INTERNET:14] describes a technique for dynamically
discovering the maximum transmission unit (MTU) of an
arbitrary internet path. For a path that passes
through a router that does not support [INTERNET:14],
this technique might not discover the correct Path
MTU, but it will always choose a Path MTU as accurate
as, and in many cases more accurate than, the Path
MTU that would be chosen by older techniques or the
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current practice.
When a router is originating an IP datagram, it
SHOULD use the scheme described in [INTERNET:14] to
limit the datagram's size. If the router's route to
the datagram's destination was learned from a routing
protocol that provides Path MTU information, the
scheme described in [INTERNET:14] is still used, but
the Path MTU information from the routing protocol
SHOULD be used as the initial guess as to the Path
MTU and also as an upper bound on the Path MTU.
4.2.3.4 Subnetting
Under certain circumstances, it may be desirable to
support subnets of a particular network being
interconnected only through a path that is not part
of the subnetted network. This is known as
discontiguous subnetwork support.
Routers MUST support discontiguous subnetworks.
IMPLEMENTATION:
In classical IP networks, this was very difficult
to achieve; in CIDR networks, it is a natural by-
product. Therefore, a router SHOULD NOT make
assumptions about subnet architecture, but SHOULD
treat each route as a generalized network prefix.
DISCUSSION:
The Internet has been growing at a tremendous rate
of late. This has been placing severe strains on
the IP addressing technology. A major factor in
this strain is the strict IP Address class
boundaries. These make it difficult to
efficiently size network prefixes to their
networks and aggregate several network prefixes
into a single route advertisement. By eliminating
the strict class boundaries of the IP address and
treating each route as a generalized network
prefix, these strains may be greatly reduced.
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The technology for currently doing this is
Classless Inter Domain Routing (CIDR)
[INTERNET:15].
For similar reasons, an address block associated with
a given network prefix could be subdivided into
subblocks of different sizes, so that the network
prefixes associated with the subblocks would have
different length. For example, within a block whose
network prefix is 8 bits long, one subblock may have
a 16 bit network prefix, another may have an 18 bit
network prefix, and a third a 14 bit network prefix.
Routers MUST support variable length network prefixes
in both their interface configurations and their
routing databases.
4.3 INTERNET CONTROL MESSAGE PROTOCOL - ICMP
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION
ICMP is an auxiliary protocol, which provides routing,
diagnostic and error functionality for IP. It is
described in [INTERNET:8]. A router MUST support ICMP.
ICMP messages are grouped in two classes that are
discussed in the following sections:
ICMP error messages:
Destination Unreachable Section 4.3.3.1
Redirect Section 4.3.3.2
Source Quench Section 4.3.3.3
Time Exceeded Section 4.3.3.4
Parameter Problem Section 4.3.3.5
ICMP query messages:
Echo Section 4.3.3.6
Information Section 4.3.3.7
Timestamp Section 4.3.3.8
Address Mask Section 4.3.3.9
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Router Discovery Section 4.3.3.10
General ICMP requirements and discussion are in the next
section.
4.3.2 GENERAL ISSUES
4.3.2.1 Unknown Message Types
If an ICMP message of unknown type is received, it
MUST be passed to the ICMP user interface (if the
router has one) or silently discarded (if the router
does not have one).
4.3.2.2 ICMP Message TTL
When originating an ICMP message, the router MUST
initialize the TTL. The TTL for ICMP responses must
not be taken from the packet that triggered the
response.
4.3.2.3 Original Message Header
Historically, every ICMP error message has included
the Internet header and at least the first 8 data
bytes of the datagram that triggered the error. This
is no longer adequate, due to the use of IP-in-IP
tunneling and other technologies. Therefore, the
ICMP datagram SHOULD contain as much of the original
datagram as possible without the length of the ICMP
datagram exceeding 576 bytes. The returned IP header
(and user data) MUST be identical to that which was
received, except that the router is not required to
undo any modifications to the IP header that are
normally performed in forwarding that were performed
before the error was detected (e.g., decrementing the
TTL, or updating options). Note that the
requirements of Section [4.3.3.5] supersede this
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requirement in some cases (i.e., for a Parameter
Problem message, if the problem is in a modified
field, the router must "undo" the modification). See
Section [4.3.3.5]).
4.3.2.4 ICMP Message Source Address
Except where this document specifies otherwise, the
IP source address in an ICMP message originated by
the router MUST be one of the IP addresses associated
with the physical interface over which the ICMP
message is transmitted. If the interface has no IP
addresses associated with it, the router's router-id
(see Section [5.2.5]) is used instead.
4.3.2.5 TOS and Precedence
ICMP error messages SHOULD have their TOS bits set to
the same value as the TOS bits in the packet that
provoked the sending of the ICMP error message,
unless setting them to that value would cause the
ICMP error message to be immediately discarded
because it could not be routed to its destination.
Otherwise, ICMP error messages MUST be sent with a
normal (i.e., zero) TOS. An ICMP reply message
SHOULD have its TOS bits set to the same value as the
TOS bits in the ICMP request that provoked the reply.
ICMP Source Quench error messages, if sent at all,
MUST have their IP Precedence field set to the same
value as the IP Precedence field in the packet that
provoked the sending of the ICMP Source Quench
message. All other ICMP error messages (Destination
Unreachable, Redirect, Time Exceeded, and Parameter
Problem) SHOULD have their precedence value set to 6
(INTERNETWORK CONTROL) or 7 (NETWORK CONTROL). The
IP Precedence value for these error messages MAY be
settable.
An ICMP reply message MUST have its IP Precedence
field set to the same value as the IP Precedence
field in the ICMP request that provoked the reply.
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4.3.2.6 Source Route
If the packet which provokes the sending of an ICMP
error message contains a source route option, the
ICMP error message SHOULD also contain a source route
option of the same type (strict or loose), created by
reversing the portion before the pointer of the route
recorded in the source route option of the original
packet UNLESS the ICMP error message is an ICMP
Parameter Problem complaining about a source route
option in the original packet, or unless the router
is aware of policy that would prevent the delivery of
the ICMP error message.
DISCUSSION:
In environments which use the U.S. Department of
Defense security option (defined in [INTERNET:5]),
ICMP messages may need to include a security
option. Detailed information on this topic should
be available from the Defense Communications
Agency.
4.3.2.7 When Not to Send ICMP Errors
An ICMP error message MUST NOT be sent as the result
of receiving:
+ An ICMP error message, or
+ A packet which fails the IP header validation tests
described in Section [5.2.2] (except where that
section specifically permits the sending of an
ICMP error message), or
+ A packet destined to an IP broadcast or IP
multicast address, or
+ A packet sent as a Link Layer broadcast or
multicast, or
+ A packet whose source address has a network prefix
of zero or is an invalid source address (as
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defined in Section [5.3.7]), or
+ Any fragment of a datagram other then the first
fragment (i.e., a packet for which the fragment
offset in the IP header is nonzero).
Furthermore, an ICMP error message MUST NOT be sent
in any case where this memo states that a packet is
to be "silently discarded".
NOTE: THESE RESTRICTIONS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY
REQUIREMENT ELSEWHERE IN THIS DOCUMENT FOR SENDING
ICMP ERROR MESSAGES.
DISCUSSION:
These rules aim to prevent the "broadcast storms"
that have resulted from routers or hosts returning
ICMP error messages in response to broadcast
packets. For example, a broadcast UDP packet to a
non-existent port could trigger a flood of ICMP
Destination Unreachable datagrams from all devices
that do not have a client for that destination
port. On a large Ethernet, the resulting
collisions can render the network useless for a
second or more.
Every packet that is broadcast on the connected
network should have a valid IP broadcast address
as its IP destination (see Section [5.3.4] and
[INTRO:2]). However, some devices violate this
rule. To be certain to detect broadcast packets,
therefore, routers are required to check for a
link-layer broadcast as well as an IP-layer
address.
IMPLEMENTATION:
This requires that the link layer inform the IP
layer when a link-layer broadcast packet has been
received; see Section [3.1].
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4.3.2.8 Rate Limiting
A router which sends ICMP Source Quench messages MUST
be able to limit the rate at which the messages can
be generated. A router SHOULD also be able to limit
the rate at which it sends other sorts of ICMP error
messages (Destination Unreachable, Redirect, Time
Exceeded, Parameter Problem). The rate limit
parameters SHOULD be settable as part of the
configuration of the router. How the limits are
applied (e.g., per router or per interface) is left
to the implementor's discretion.
DISCUSSION:
Two problems for a router sending ICMP error
message are:
(1) The consumption of bandwidth on the reverse
path, and
(2) The use of router resources (e.g., memory, CPU
time)
To help solve these problems a router can limit
the frequency with which it generates ICMP error
messages. For similar reasons, a router may limit
the frequency at which some other sorts of
messages, such as ICMP Echo Replies, are
generated.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Various mechanisms have been used or proposed for
limiting the rate at which ICMP messages are sent:
(1) Count-based - for example, send an ICMP error
message for every N dropped packets overall
or per given source host. This mechanism
might be appropriate for ICMP Source Quench,
if used, but probably not for other types of
ICMP messages.
(2) Timer-based - for example, send an ICMP error
message to a given source host or overall at
most once per T milliseconds.
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(3) Bandwidth-based - for example, limit the rate
at which ICMP messages are sent over a
particular interface to some fraction of the
attached network's bandwidth.
4.3.3 SPECIFIC ISSUES
4.3.3.1 Destination Unreachable
If a route cannot forward a packet because it has no
routes at all (including no default route) to the
destination specified in the packet, then the router
MUST generate a Destination Unreachable, Code 0
(Network Unreachable) ICMP message. If the router
does have routes to the destination network specified
in the packet but the TOS specified for the routes is
neither the default TOS (0000) nor the TOS of the
packet that the router is attempting to route, then
the router MUST generate a Destination Unreachable,
Code 11 (Network Unreachable for TOS) ICMP message.
If a packet is to be forwarded to a host on a network
that is directly connected to the router (i.e., the
router is the last-hop router) and the router has
ascertained that there is no path to the destination
host then the router MUST generate a Destination
Unreachable, Code 1 (Host Unreachable) ICMP message.
If a packet is to be forwarded to a host that is on a
network that is directly connected to the router and
the router cannot forward the packet because no route
to the destination has a TOS that is either equal to
the TOS requested in the packet or is the default TOS
(0000) then the router MUST generate a Destination
Unreachable, Code 12 (Host Unreachable for TOS) ICMP
message.
DISCUSSION:
The intent is that a router generates the
"generic" host/network unreachable if it has no
path at all (including default routes) to the
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destination. If the router has one or more paths
to the destination, but none of those paths have
an acceptable TOS, then the router generates the
"unreachable for TOS" message.
4.3.3.2 Redirect
The ICMP Redirect message is generated to inform a
local host that it should use a different next hop
router for certain traffic.
Contrary to [INTRO:2], a router MAY ignore ICMP
Redirects when choosing a path for a packet
originated by the router if the router is running a
routing protocol or if forwarding is enabled on the
router and on the interface over which the packet is
being sent.
4.3.3.3 Source Quench
A router SHOULD NOT originate ICMP Source Quench
messages. As specified in Section [4.3.2], a router
that does originate Source Quench messages MUST be
able to limit the rate at which they are generated.
DISCUSSION:
Research seems to suggest that Source Quench
consumes network bandwidth but is an ineffective
(and unfair) antidote to congestion. See, for
example, [INTERNET:9] and [INTERNET:10]. Section
[5.3.6] discusses the current thinking on how
routers ought to deal with overload and network
congestion.
A router MAY ignore any ICMP Source Quench messages
it receives.
DISCUSSION:
A router itself may receive a Source Quench as the
result of originating a packet sent to another
router or host. Such datagrams might be, e.g., an
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EGP update sent to another router, or a telnet
stream sent to a host. A mechanism has been
proposed ([INTERNET:11], [INTERNET:12]) to make
the IP layer respond directly to Source Quench by
controlling the rate at which packets are sent,
however, this proposal is currently experimental
and not currently recommended.
4.3.3.4 Time Exceeded
When a router is forwarding a packet and the TTL
field of the packet is reduced to 0, the requirements
of section [5.2.3.8] apply.
When the router is reassembling a packet that is
destined for the router, it is acting as an Internet
host. [INTRO:2]'s reassembly requirements therefore
apply.
When the router receives (i.e., is destined for the
router) a Time Exceeded message, it MUST comply with
[INTRO:2].
4.3.3.5 Parameter Problem
A router MUST generate a Parameter Problem message
for any error not specifically covered by another
ICMP message. The IP header field or IP option
including the byte indicated by the pointer field
MUST be included unchanged in the IP header returned
with this ICMP message. Section [4.3.2] defines an
exception to this requirement.
A new variant of the Parameter Problem message was
defined in [INTRO:2]:
Code 1 = required option is missing.
DISCUSSION:
This variant is currently in use in the military
community for a missing security option.
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4.3.3.6 Echo Request/Reply
A router MUST implement an ICMP Echo server function
that receives Echo Requests sent to the router, and
sends corresponding Echo Replies. A router MUST be
prepared to receive, reassemble and echo an ICMP Echo
Request datagram at least as the maximum of 576 and
the MTUs of all the connected networks.
The Echo server function MAY choose not to respond to
ICMP echo requests addressed to IP broadcast or IP
multicast addresses.
A router SHOULD have a configuration option that, if
enabled, causes the router to silently ignore all
ICMP echo requests; if provided, this option MUST
default to allowing responses.
DISCUSSION:
The neutral provision about responding to
broadcast and multicast Echo Requests derives from
[INTRO:2]'s "Echo Request/Reply" section.
As stated in Section [10.3.3], a router MUST also
implement a user/application-layer interface for
sending an Echo Request and receiving an Echo Reply,
for diagnostic purposes. All ICMP Echo Reply
messages MUST be passed to this interface.
The IP source address in an ICMP Echo Reply MUST be
the same as the specific-destination address of the
corresponding ICMP Echo Request message.
Data received in an ICMP Echo Request MUST be
entirely included in the resulting Echo Reply.
If a Record Route and/or Timestamp option is received
in an ICMP Echo Request, this option (these options)
SHOULD be updated to include the current router and
included in the IP header of the Echo Reply message,
without "truncation". Thus, the recorded route will
be for the entire round trip.
If a Source Route option is received in an ICMP Echo
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Request, the return route MUST be reversed and used
as a Source Route option for the Echo Reply message,
unless the router is aware of policy that would
prevent the delivery of the message.
4.3.3.7 Information Request/Reply
A router SHOULD NOT originate or respond to these
messages.
DISCUSSION:
The Information Request/Reply pair was intended to
support self-configuring systems such as diskless
workstations, to allow them to discover their IP
network prefixes at boot time. However, these
messages are now obsolete. The RARP and BOOTP
protocols provide better mechanisms for a host to
discover its own IP address.
4.3.3.8 Timestamp and Timestamp Reply
A router MAY implement Timestamp and Timestamp Reply.
If they are implemented then:
+ The ICMP Timestamp server function MUST return a
Timestamp Reply to every Timestamp message that is
received. It SHOULD be designed for minimum
variability in delay.
+ An ICMP Timestamp Request message to an IP
broadcast or IP multicast address MAY be silently
discarded.
+ The IP source address in an ICMP Timestamp Reply
MUST be the same as the specific-destination
address of the corresponding Timestamp Request
message.
+ If a Source Route option is received in an ICMP
Timestamp Request, the return route MUST be
reversed and used as a Source Route option for the
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Timestamp Reply message, unless the router is
aware of policy that would prevent the delivery of
the message.
+ If a Record Route and/or Timestamp option is
received in a Timestamp Request, this (these)
option(s) SHOULD be updated to include the current
router and included in the IP header of the
Timestamp Reply message.
+ If the router provides an application-layer
interface for sending Timestamp Request messages
then incoming Timestamp Reply messages MUST be
passed up to the ICMP user interface.
The preferred form for a timestamp value (the
"standard value") is milliseconds since midnight,
Universal Time. However, it may be difficult to
provide this value with millisecond resolution. For
example, many systems use clocks that update only at
line frequency, 50 or 60 times per second.
Therefore, some latitude is allowed in a "standard
value":
(a) A "standard value" MUST be updated at least 16
times per second (i.e., at most the six low-
order bits of the value may be undefined).
(b) The accuracy of a "standard value" MUST
approximate that of operator-set CPU clocks,
i.e., correct within a few minutes.
IMPLEMENTATION:
To meet the second condition, a router may need to
query some time server when the router is booted
or restarted. It is recommended that the UDP Time
Server Protocol be used for this purpose. A more
advanced implementation would use the Network Time
Protocol (NTP) to achieve nearly millisecond clock
synchronization; however, this is not required.
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4.3.3.9 Address Mask Request/Reply
A router MUST implement support for receiving ICMP
Address Mask Request messages and responding with
ICMP Address Mask Reply messages. These messages are
defined in [INTERNET:2].
A router SHOULD have a configuration option for each
logical interface specifying whether the router is
allowed to answer Address Mask Requests for that
interface; this option MUST default to allowing
responses. A router MUST NOT respond to an Address
Mask Request before the router knows the correct
address mask.
A router MUST NOT respond to an Address Mask Request
that has a source address of 0.0.0.0 and which
arrives on a physical interface that has associated
with it multiple logical interfaces and the address
masks for those interfaces are not all the same.
A router SHOULD examine all ICMP Address Mask Replies
that it receives to determine whether the information
it contains matches the router's knowledge of the
address mask. If the ICMP Address Mask Reply appears
to be in error, the router SHOULD log the address
mask and the sender's IP address. A router MUST NOT
use the contents of an ICMP Address Mask Reply to
determine the correct address mask.
Because hosts may not be able to learn the address
mask if a router is down when the host boots up, a
router MAY broadcast a gratuitous ICMP Address Mask
Reply on each of its logical interfaces after it has
configured its own address masks. However, this
feature can be dangerous in environments that use
variable length address masks. Therefore, if this
feature is implemented, gratuitous Address Mask
Replies MUST NOT be broadcast over any logical
interface(s) which either:
+ Are not configured to send gratuitous Address Mask
Replies. Each logical interface MUST have a
configuration parameter controlling this, and that
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parameter MUST default to not sending the
gratuitous Address Mask Replies.
+ Share subsuming (but not identical) network
prefixes and physical interface.
The { <Network-prefix>, -1 } form of the IP broadcast
address MUST be used for broadcast Address Mask
Replies.
DISCUSSION:
The ability to disable sending Address Mask
Replies by routers is required at a few sites that
intentionally lie to their hosts about the address
mask. The need for this is expected to go away as
more and more hosts become compliant with the Host
Requirements standards.
The reason for both the second bullet above and
the requirement about which IP broadcast address
to use is to prevent problems when multiple IP
network prefixes are in use on the same physical
network.
4.3.3.10 Router Advertisement and Solicitations
An IP router MUST support the router part of the ICMP
Router Discovery Protocol [INTERNET:13] on all
connected networks on which the router supports
either IP multicast or IP broadcast addressing. The
implementation MUST include all the configuration
variables specified for routers, with the specified
defaults.
DISCUSSION:
Routers are not required to implement the host
part of the ICMP Router Discovery Protocol, but
might find it useful for operation while IP
forwarding is disabled (i.e., when operating as a
host).
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DISCUSSION:
We note that it is quite common for hosts to use |
RIP Version 1 as the "router discovery" protocol.
Such hosts listen to RIP traffic and use and use
information extracted from that traffic to
discover routers and to make decisions as to which
router to use as a first-hop router for a given
destination. While this behavior is discouraged,
it is still common and implementors should be
aware of it.
4.4 INTERNET GROUP MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL - IGMP
IGMP [INTERNET:4] is a protocol used between hosts and
multicast routers on a single physical network to establish
hosts' membership in particular multicast groups.
Multicast routers use this information, in conjunction with
a multicast routing protocol, to support IP multicast
forwarding across the Internet.
A router SHOULD implement the host part of IGMP.
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5. INTERNET LAYER - FORWARDING
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This section describes the process of forwarding packets.
5.2 FORWARDING WALK-THROUGH
There is no separate specification of the forwarding
function in IP. Instead, forwarding is covered by the
protocol specifications for the internet layer protocols
([INTERNET:1], [INTERNET:2], [INTERNET:3], [INTERNET:8],
and [ROUTE:11]).
5.2.1 Forwarding Algorithm
Since none of the primary protocol documents describe
the forwarding algorithm in any detail, we present it
here. This is just a general outline, and omits
important details, such as handling of congestion, that
are dealt with in later sections.
It is not required that an implementation follow exactly
the algorithms given in sections [5.2.1.1], [5.2.1.2],
and [5.2.1.3]. Much of the challenge of writing router
software is to maximize the rate at which the router can
forward packets while still achieving the same effect of
the algorithm. Details of how to do that are beyond the
scope of this document, in part because they are heavily
dependent on the architecture of the router. Instead,
we merely point out the order dependencies among the
steps:
(1) A router MUST verify the IP header, as described in
section [5.2.2], before performing any actions
based on the contents of the header. This allows
the router to detect and discard bad packets before
the expenditure of other resources.
(2) Processing of certain IP options requires that the
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router insert its IP address into the option. As
noted in Section [5.2.4], the address inserted MUST
be the address of the logical interface on which
the packet is sent or the router's router-id if the
packet is sent over an unnumbered interface. Thus,
processing of these options cannot be completed
until after the output interface is chosen.
(3) The router cannot check and decrement the TTL before
checking whether the packet should be delivered to
the router itself, for reasons mentioned in Section
[4.2.2.9].
(4) More generally, when a packet is delivered locally
to the router, its IP header MUST NOT be modified
in any way (except that a router may be required to
insert a timestamp into any Timestamp options in
the IP header). Thus, before the router determines
whether the packet is to be delivered locally to
the router, it cannot update the IP header in any
way that it is not prepared to undo.
5.2.1.1 General
This section covers the general forwarding algorithm.
This algorithm applies to all forms of packets to be
forwarded: unicast, multicast, and broadcast.
(1) The router receives the IP packet (plus
additional information about it, as described in
Section [3.1]) from the Link Layer.
(2) The router validates the IP header, as described
in Section [5.2.2]. Note that IP reassembly is
not done, except on IP fragments to be queued
for local delivery in step (4).
(3) The router performs most of the processing of any
IP options. As described in Section [5.2.4],
some IP options require additional processing
after the routing decision has been made.
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(4) The router examines the destination IP address of
the IP datagram, as described in Section
[5.2.3], to determine how it should continue to
process the IP datagram. There are three
possibilities:
+ The IP datagram is destined for the router,
and should be queued for local delivery,
doing reassembly if needed.
+ The IP datagram is not destined for the
router, and should be queued for forwarding.
+ The IP datagram should be queued for
forwarding, but (a copy) must also be queued
for local delivery.
5.2.1.2 Unicast
Since the local delivery case is well covered by
[INTRO:2], the following assumes that the IP datagram
was queued for forwarding. If the destination is an
IP unicast address:
(5) The forwarder determines the next hop IP address
for the packet, usually by looking up the
packet's destination in the router's routing
table. This procedure is described in more
detail in Section [5.2.4]. This procedure also
decides which network interface should be used
to send the packet.
(6) The forwarder verifies that forwarding the packet
is permitted. The source and destination
addresses should be valid, as described in
Section [5.3.7] and Section [5.3.4] If the
router supports administrative constraints on
forwarding, such as those described in Section
[5.3.9], those constraints must be satisfied.
(7) The forwarder decrements (by at least one) and
checks the packet's TTL, as described in Section
[5.3.1].
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(8) The forwarder performs any IP option processing
that could not be completed in step 3.
(9) The forwarder performs any necessary IP
fragmentation, as described in Section
[4.2.2.7]. Since this step occurs after
outbound interface selection (step 5), all
fragments of the same datagram will be
transmitted out the same interface.
(10) The forwarder determines the Link Layer address
of the packet's next hop. The mechanisms for
doing this are Link Layer-dependent (see chapter
3).
(11) The forwarder encapsulates the IP datagram (or
each of the fragments thereof) in an appropriate
Link Layer frame and queues it for output on the
interface selected in step 5.
(12) The forwarder sends an ICMP redirect if
necessary, as described in Section [4.3.3.2].
5.2.1.3 Multicast
If the destination is an IP multicast, the following
steps are taken.
Note that the main differences between the forwarding
of IP unicasts and the forwarding of IP multicasts
are
+ IP multicasts are usually forwarded based on both
the datagram's source and destination IP
addresses,
+ IP multicast uses an expanding ring search,
+ IP multicasts are forwarded as Link Level
multicasts, and
+ ICMP errors are never sent in response to IP
multicast datagrams.
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Note that the forwarding of IP multicasts is still
somewhat experimental. As a result, the algorithm
presented below is not mandatory, and is provided as
an example only.
(5a) Based on the IP source and destination addresses
found in the datagram header, the router
determines whether the datagram has been
received on the proper interface for forwarding.
If not, the datagram is dropped silently. The
method for determining the proper receiving
interface depends on the multicast routing
algorithm(s) in use. In one of the simplest
algorithms, reverse path forwarding (RPF), the
proper interface is the one that would be used
to forward unicasts back to the datagram source.
(6a) Based on the IP source and destination addresses
found in the datagram header, the router
determines the datagram's outgoing interfaces.
To implement IP multicast's expanding ring
search (see [INTERNET:4]) a minimum TTL value is
specified for each outgoing interface. A copy
of the multicast datagram is forwarded out each
outgoing interface whose minimum TTL value is
less than or equal to the TTL value in the
datagram header, by separately applying the
remaining steps on each such interface.
(7a) The router decrements the packet's TTL by one.
(8a) The forwarder performs any IP option processing
that could not be completed in step (3).
(9a) The forwarder performs any necessary IP
fragmentation, as described in Section
[4.2.2.7].
(10a) The forwarder determines the Link Layer address
to use in the Link Level encapsulation. The
mechanisms for doing this are Link Layer-
dependent. On LANs a Link Level multicast or
broadcast is selected, as an algorithmic
translation of the datagrams' IP multicast
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address. See the various IP-over-xxx
specifications for more details.
(11a) The forwarder encapsulates the packet (or each
of the fragments thereof) in an appropriate Link
Layer frame and queues it for output on the
appropriate interface.
5.2.2 IP Header Validation
Before a router can process any IP packet, it MUST
perform a the following basic validity checks on the
packet's IP header to ensure that the header is
meaningful. If the packet fails any of the following
tests, it MUST be silently discarded, and the error
SHOULD be logged.
(1) The packet length reported by the Link Layer must be
large enough to hold the minimum length legal IP
datagram (20 bytes).
(2) The IP checksum must be correct.
(3) The IP version number must be 4. If the version
number is not 4 then the packet may be another
version of IP, such as IPng or ST-II.
(4) The IP header length field must be large enough to
hold the minimum length legal IP datagram (20 bytes
= 5 words).
(5) The IP header length field must be large enough to
hold the IP datagram header, whose length is
specified in the IP header length field.
A router MUST NOT have a configuration option that
allows disabling any of these tests.
If the packet passes the second and third tests, the IP
header length field is at least 4, and both the IP total
length field and the packet length reported by the Link
Layer are at least 16 then, despite the above rule, the
router MAY respond with an ICMP Parameter Problem
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message, whose pointer points at the IP header length
field (if it failed the fourth test) or the IP total
length field (if it failed the fifth test). However, it
still MUST discard the packet and still SHOULD log the
error.
These rules (and this entire document) apply only to
version 4 of the Internet Protocol. These rules should
not be construed as prohibiting routers from supporting
other versions of IP. Furthermore, if a router can
truly classify a packet as being some other version of
IP then it ought not treat that packet as an error
packet within the context of this memo.
IMPLEMENTATION:
It is desirable for purposes of error reporting,
though not always entirely possible, to determine why
a header was invalid. There are four possible
reasons:
+ The Link Layer truncated the IP header
+ The datagram is using a version of IP other than
the standard one (version 4).
+ The IP header has been corrupted in transit.
+ The sender generated an illegal IP header.
It is probably desirable to perform the checks in the
order listed, since we believe that this ordering is
most likely to correctly categorize the cause of the
error. For purposes of error reporting, it may also
be desirable to check if a packet that fails these
tests has an IP version number indicating IPng or
ST-II; these should be handled according to their
respective specifications.
Additionally, the router SHOULD verify that the packet
length reported by the Link Layer is at least as large
as the IP total length recorded in the packet's IP
header. If it appears that the packet has been
truncated, the packet MUST be discarded, the error
SHOULD be logged, and the router SHOULD respond with an
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ICMP Parameter Problem message whose pointer points at
the IP total length field.
DISCUSSION:
Because any higher layer protocol that concerns
itself with data corruption will detect truncation of
the packet data when it reaches its final
destination, it is not absolutely necessary for
routers to perform the check suggested above to
maintain protocol correctness. However, by making
this check a router can simplify considerably the
task of determining which hop in the path is
truncating the packets. It will also reduce the
expenditure of resources "down-stream" from the
router in that down-stream systems will not need to
deal with the packet.
Finally, if the destination address in the IP header is
not one of the addresses of the router, the router
SHOULD verify that the packet does not contain a Strict
Source and Record Route option. If a packet fails this
test (if it contains a strict source route option), the
router SHOULD log the error and SHOULD respond with an
ICMP Parameter Problem error with the pointer pointing
at the offending packet's IP destination address.
DISCUSSION:
Some people might suggest that the router should
respond with a Bad Source Route message instead of a
Parameter Problem message. However, when a packet
fails this test, it usually indicates a protocol
error by the previous hop router, whereas Bad Source
Route would suggest that the source host had
requested a nonexistent or broken path through the
network.
5.2.3 Local Delivery Decision
When a router receives an IP packet, it must decide
whether the packet is addressed to the router (and
should be delivered locally) or the packet is addressed
to another system (and should be handled by the
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forwarder). There is also a hybrid case, where certain
IP broadcasts and IP multicasts are both delivered
locally and forwarded. A router MUST determine which of
the these three cases applies using the following rules.
+ An unexpired source route option is one whose pointer
value does not point past the last entry in the
source route. If the packet contains an unexpired
source route option, the pointer in the option is
advanced until either the pointer does point past the
last address in the option or else the next address
is not one of the router's own addresses. In the
latter (normal) case, the packet is forwarded (and
not delivered locally) regardless of the rules below.
+ The packet is delivered locally and not considered for
forwarding in the following cases:
- The packet's destination address exactly matches
one of the router's IP addresses,
- The packet's destination address is a limited
broadcast address ({-1, -1}), or
- The packet's destination is an IP multicast address
which is never forwarded (such as 224.0.0.1 or
224.0.0.2) and (at least) one of the logical
interfaces associated with the physical interface
on which the packet arrived is a member of the
destination multicast group.
+ The packet is passed to the forwarder AND delivered
locally in the following cases:
- The packet's destination address is an IP broadcast
address that addresses at least one of the
router's logical interfaces but does not address
any of the logical interfaces associated with the
physical interface on which the packet arrived
- The packet's destination is an IP multicast address
which is permitted to be forwarded (unlike
224.0.0.1 and 224.0.0.2) and (at least) one of the
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logical interfaces associated with the physical
interface on which the packet arrived is a member
of the destination multicast group.
+ The packet is delivered locally if the packet's
destination address is an IP broadcast address (other
than a limited broadcast address) that addresses at
least one of the logical interfaces associated with
the physical interface on which the packet arrived.
The packet is ALSO passed to the forwarder unless the
link on which the packet arrived uses an IP
encapsulation that does not encapsulate broadcasts
differently than unicasts (e.g., by using different
Link Layer destination addresses).
+ The packet is passed to the forwarder in all other
cases.
DISCUSSION:
The purpose of the requirement in the last sentence
of the fourth bullet is to deal with a directed
broadcast to another network prefix on the same
physical cable. Normally, this works as expected:
the sender sends the broadcast to the router as a
Link Layer unicast. The router notes that it arrived
as a unicast, and therefore must be destined for a
different network prefix than the sender sent it on.
Therefore, the router can safely send it as a Link
Layer broadcast out the same (physical) interface
over which it arrived. However, if the router can't
tell whether the packet was received as a Link Layer
unicast, the sentence ensures that the router does
the safe but wrong thing rather than the unsafe but
right thing.
IMPLEMENTATION:
As described in Section [5.3.4], packets received as
Link Layer broadcasts are generally not forwarded.
It may be advantageous to avoid passing to the
forwarder packets it would later discard because of
the rules in that section.
Some Link Layers (either because of the hardware or
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because of special code in the drivers) can deliver
to the router copies of all Link Layer broadcasts and
multicasts it transmits. Use of this feature can
simplify the implementation of cases where a packet
has to both be passed to the forwarder and delivered
locally, since forwarding the packet will
automatically cause the router to receive a copy of
the packet that it can then deliver locally. One
must use care in these circumstances to prevent
treating a received loop-back packet as a normal
packet that was received (and then being subject to
the rules of forwarding, etc.).
Even without such a Link Layer, it is of course
hardly necessary to make a copy of an entire packet
to queue it both for forwarding and for local
delivery, though care must be taken with fragments,
since reassembly is performed on locally delivered
packets but not on forwarded packets. One simple
scheme is to associate a flag with each packet on the
router's output queue that indicates whether it
should be queued for local delivery after it has been
sent.
5.2.4 Determining the Next Hop Address
When a router is going to forward a packet, it must
determine whether it can send it directly to its
destination, or whether it needs to pass it through
another router. If the latter, it needs to determine
which router to use. This section explains how these
determinations are made.
This section makes use of the following definitions:
+ "LSRR" - IP Loose Source and Record Route option
+ "SSRR" - IP Strict Source and Record Route option
+ "Source Route Option" - an LSRR or an SSRR
+ "Ultimate Destination Address" - where the packet is
being sent to: the last address in the source route
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of a source-routed packet, or the destination address
in the IP header of a non-source-routed packet
+ "Adjacent" - reachable without going through any IP
routers
+ "Next Hop Address" - the IP address of the adjacent
host or router to which the packet should be sent
next
+ "IP Destination Address" - the ultimate destination
address, except in source routed packets, where it is
the next address specified in the source route
+ Immediate Destination - the node, System, router,
end-system, or whatever that is addressed by the IP
Destination Address.
5.2.4.1 IP Destination Address
If :
+ the destination address in the IP header is one of
the addresses of the router,
+ the packet contains a Source Route Option, and
+ the pointer in the Source Route Option does not
point past the end of the option,
then the next IP Destination Address is the address
pointed at by the pointer in that option. If :
+ the destination address in the IP header is one of
the addresses of the router,
+ the packet contains a Source Route Option, and
+ the pointer in the Source Route Option points past
the end of the option,
then the message is addressed to the system analyzing
the message.
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A router MUST use the IP Destination Address, not the
Ultimate Destination Address (the last address in the
source route option), when determining how to handle
a packet.
It is an error for more than one source route option
to appear in a datagram. If it receives such a
datagram, it SHOULD discard the packet and reply with
an ICMP Parameter Problem message whose pointer
points at the beginning of the second source route
option.
5.2.4.2 Local/Remote Decision
After it has been determined that the IP packet needs
to be forwarded according to the rules specified in
Section [5.2.3], the following algorithm MUST be used
to determine if the Immediate Destination is directly
accessible (see [INTERNET:2]).
(1) For each network interface that has not been
assigned any IP address (the "unnumbered lines"
as described in Section [2.2.7]), compare the
router-id of the other end of the line to the IP
Destination Address. If they are exactly equal,
the packet can be transmitted through this
interface.
DISCUSSION:
In other words, the router or host at the
remote end of the line is the destination of
the packet or is the next step in the source
route of a source routed packet.
(2) If no network interface has been selected in the
first step, for each IP address assigned to the
router:
(a) isolate the network prefix used by the
interface.
IMPLEMENTATION:
The result of this operation will
usually have been computed and saved
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during initialization.
(b) Isolate the corresponding set of bits from
the IP Destination Address of the packet.
(c) Compare the resulting network prefixes. If
they are equal to each other, the packet
can be transmitted through the
corresponding network interface.
(3) If the destination was neither the router-id of a
neighbor on an unnumbered interface nor a member
of a directly connected network prefix, the IP
Destination is accessible only through some
other router. The selection of the router and
the "next hop" IP address is described in
Section [5.2.4.3]. In the case of a host that
is not also a router, this may be the configured
default router. Ongoing work in the IETF
[ARCH:9, NRHP] considers some cases such as when
multiple IP (sub)networks are overlaid on the
same link layer network. Barring policy
restrictions, hosts and routers using a common
link layer network can directly communicate even
if they are not in the same IP (sub)network, if
there is adequate information present. The Next
Hop Routing Protocol (NHRP) enables IP entities
to determine the "optimal" link layer address to
be used to traverse such a link layer network
towards a remote destination.
(4) If the selected "next hop" is reachable through an
interface configured to use NHRP, then the
following additional steps apply:
(a) Compare the IP Destination Address to the
destination addresses in the NHRP cache. If
the address is in the cache, then send the
datagram to the corresponding cached link
layer address.
(b) If the address is not in the cache, then
construct an NHRP request packet containing
the IP Destination Address. This message is
sent to the NHRP server configured for that
interface. This may be a logically separate
process or entity in the router itself.
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(c) The NHRP server will respond with the proper
link layer address to use to transmit the
datagram and subsequent datagrams to the same
destination. The system MAY transmit the
datagram(s) to the traditional "next hop"
router while awaiting the NHRP reply.
5.2.4.3 Next Hop Address
The router applies the algorithm in the previous section *
to determine if the IP Destination Address is adjacent.
If so, the next hop address is the same as the IP
Destination Address. Otherwise, the packet must be
forwarded through another router to reach its Immediate
Destination. The selection of this router is the topic
of this section.
If the packet contains an SSRR, the router MUST discard
the packet and reply with an ICMP Bad Source Route
error. Otherwise, the router looks up the IP
Destination Address in its routing table to determine an
appropriate next hop address.
DISCUSSION:
Per the IP specification, a Strict Source Route must
specify a sequence of nodes through which the packet
must traverse; the packet must go from one node of
the source route to the next, traversing intermediate
networks only. Thus, if the router is not adjacent
to the next step of the source route, the source
route can not be fulfilled. Therefore, the router
rejects such with an ICMP Bad Source Route error.
The goal of the next-hop selection process is to examine
the entries in the router's Forwarding Information Base
(FIB) and select the best route (if there is one) for
the packet from those available in the FIB.
Conceptually, any route lookup algorithm starts out with
a set of candidate routes that consists of the entire
contents of the FIB. The algorithm consists of a series
of steps that discard routes from the set. These steps
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are referred to as Pruning Rules. Normally, when the
algorithm terminates there is exactly one route
remaining in the set. If the set ever becomes empty,
the packet is discarded because the destination is
unreachable. It is also possible for the algorithm to
terminate when more than one route remains in the set.
In this case, the router may arbitrarily discard all but
one of them, or may perform "load-splitting" by choosing
whichever of the routes has been least recently used.
With the exception of rule 3 (Weak TOS), a router MUST
use the following Pruning Rules when selecting a next
hop for a packet. If a router does consider TOS when
making next-hop decisions, the Rule 3 must be applied in
the order indicated below. These rules MUST be
(conceptually) applied to the FIB in the order that they
are presented. (For some historical perspective,
additional pruning rules, and other common algorithms in
use, see Appendix E.)
DISCUSSION:
Rule 3 is optional in that Section [5.3.2] says that
a router only SHOULD consider TOS when making
forwarding decisions.
(1) Basic Match
This rule discards any routes to destinations other
than the IP Destination Address of the packet. For
example, if a packet's IP Destination Address is |
10.144.2.5, this step would discard a route to net
128.12.0.0/16 but would retain any routes to the |
network prefixes 10.0.0.0/8 and 10.144.0.0/16, and
any default routes.
More precisely, we assume that each route has a
destination attribute, called route.dest, and a
corresponding prefix length, called route.length,
to specify which bits of route.dest are
significant. The IP Destination Address of the
packet being forwarded is ip.dest. This rule
discards all routes from the set of candidates
except those for which the most significant
route.length bits of route.dest and ip.dest are
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equal.
For example, if a packet's IP Destination Address |
is 10.144.2.5 and there are network prefixes |
10.144.1.0/24, 10.144.2.0/24, and 10.144.3.0/24, |
this rule would keep only 10.144.2.0/24; it is the
only route whose prefix has the same value as the
corresponding bits in the IP Destination Address of
the packet.
(2) Longest Match
Longest Match is a refinement of Basic Match,
described above. After performing Basic Match
pruning, the algorithm examines the remaining
routes to determine which among them have the
largest route.length values. All except these are
discarded.
For example, if a packet's IP Destination Address |
is 10.144.2.5 and there are network prefixes |
10.144.2.0/24, 10.144.0.0/16, and 10.0.0.0/8, then |
this rule would keep only the first (10.144.2.0/24)
because its prefix length is longest.
(3) Weak TOS
Each route has a type of service attribute, called
route.tos, whose possible values are assumed to be
identical to those used in the TOS field of the IP
header. Routing protocols that distribute TOS
information fill in route.tos appropriately in
routes they add to the FIB; routes from other
routing protocols are treated as if they have the
default TOS (0000). The TOS field in the IP header
of the packet being routed is called ip.tos.
The set of candidate routes is examined to
determine if it contains any routes for which
route.tos = ip.tos. If so, all routes except those
for which route.tos = ip.tos are discarded. If
not, all routes except those for which route.tos =
0000 are discarded from the set of candidate
routes.
Additional discussion of routing based on Weak TOS
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may be found in [ROUTE:11].
DISCUSSION:
The effect of this rule is to select only those
routes that have a TOS that matches the TOS
requested in the packet. If no such routes
exist then routes with the default TOS are
considered. Routes with a non-default TOS that
is not the TOS requested in the packet are never
used, even if such routes are the only available
routes that go to the packet's destination.
(4) Best Metric
Each route has a metric attribute, called
route.metric, and a routing domain identifier,
called route.domain. Each member of the set of
candidate routes is compared with each other member
of the set. If route.domain is equal for the two
routes and route.metric is strictly "inferior" for
one when compared with the other, then the one with
the "inferior" metric is discarded from the set.
The determination of "inferior" is usually by a
simple arithmetic comparison, though some protocols
may have structured metrics requiring more complex
comparisons.
(5) Vendor Policy
Vendor Policy is sort of a catch-all to make up for
the fact that the previously listed rules are often
inadequate to choose from the possible routes.
Vendor Policy pruning rules are extremely vendor-
specific. See section [5.2.4.4].
This algorithm has two distinct disadvantages.
Presumably, a router implementor might develop
techniques to deal with these disadvantages and make
them a part of the Vendor Policy pruning rule.
(1) IS-IS and OSPF route classes are not directly
handled.
(2) Path properties other than type of service (e.g.,
MTU) are ignored.
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It is also worth noting a deficiency in the way that TOS
is supported: routing protocols that support TOS are
implicitly preferred when forwarding packets that have
non-zero TOS values.
The Basic Match and Longest Match pruning rules
generalize the treatment of a number of particular types
of routes. These routes are selected in the following,
decreasing, order of preference:
(1) Host Route: This is a route to a specific end
system.
(2) Hierarchical Network Prefix Routes: This is a route
to a particular network prefix. Note that the FIB
may contain several routes to network prefixes that
subsume each other (one prefix is the other prefix
with additional bits). These are selected in order
of decreasing prefix length.
(5) Default Route: This is a route to all networks for
which there are no explicit routes. It is by
definition the route whose prefix length is zero.
If, after application of the pruning rules, the set of
routes is empty (i.e., no routes were found), the packet
MUST be discarded and an appropriate ICMP error
generated (ICMP Bad Source Route if the IP Destination
Address came from a source route option; otherwise,
whichever of ICMP Destination Host Unreachable or
Destination Network Unreachable is appropriate, as
described in Section [4.3.3.1]).
5.2.4.4 Administrative Preference
One suggested mechanism for the Vendor Policy Pruning
Rule is to use administrative preference, which is a
simple prioritization algorithm. The idea is to
manually prioritize the routes that one might need to
select among.
Each route has associated with it a "preference
value", based on various attributes of the route
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(specific mechanisms for assignment of preference
values are suggested below). This preference value
is an integer in the range [0..255], with zero being
the most preferred and 254 being the least preferred.
255 is a special value that means that the route
should never be used. The first step in the Vendor
Policy pruning rule discards all but the most
preferable routes (and always discards routes whose
preference value is 255).
This policy is not "safe" in that it can easily be
misused to create routing loops. Since no protocol
ensures that the preferences configured for a router
is consistent with the preferences configured in its
neighbors, network managers must exercise care in
configuring preferences.
+ Address Match
It is useful to be able to assign a single
preference value to all routes (learned from the
same routing domain) to any of a specified set of
destinations, where the set of destinations is all
destinations that match a specified network
prefix.
+ Route Class
For routing protocols which maintain the
distinction, it is useful to be able to assign a
single preference value to all routes (learned
from the same routing domain) which have a
particular route class (intra-area, inter-area,
external with internal metrics, or external with
external metrics).
+ Interface
It is useful to be able to assign a single
preference value to all routes (learned from a
particular routing domain) that would cause
packets to be routed out a particular logical
interface on the router (logical interfaces
generally map one-to-one onto the router's network
interfaces, except that any network interface that
has multiple IP addresses will have multiple
logical interfaces associated with it).
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+ Source router
It is useful to be able to assign a single
preference value to all routes (learned from the
same routing domain) that were learned from any of
a set of routers, where the set of routers are
those whose updates have a source address that
match a specified network prefix.
+ Originating AS
For routing protocols which provide the
information, it is useful to be able to assign a
single preference value to all routes (learned
from a particular routing domain) which originated
in another particular routing domain. For BGP
routes, the originating AS is the first AS listed
in the route's AS_PATH attribute. For OSPF
external routes, the originating AS may be
considered to be the low order 16 bits of the
route's external route tag if the tag's Automatic
bit is set and the tag's Path Length is not equal
to 3.
+ External route tag
It is useful to be able to assign a single
preference value to all OSPF external routes
(learned from the same routing domain) whose
external route tags match any of a list of
specified values. Because the external route tag
may contain a structured value, it may be useful
to provide the ability to match particular
subfields of the tag.
+ AS path
It may be useful to be able to assign a single
preference value to all BGP routes (learned from
the same routing domain) whose AS path "matches"
any of a set of specified values. It is not yet
clear exactly what kinds of matches are most
useful. A simple option would be to allow
matching of all routes for which a particular AS
number appears (or alternatively, does not appear)
anywhere in the route's AS_PATH attribute. A more
general but somewhat more difficult alternative
would be to allow matching all routes for which
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the AS path matches a specified regular
expression.
5.2.4.6 Load Splitting
At the end of the Next-hop selection process,
multiple routes may still remain. A router has
several options when this occurs. It may arbitrarily
discard some of the routes. It may reduce the number
of candidate routes by comparing metrics of routes
from routing domains that are not considered
equivalent. It may retain more than one route and
employ a "load-splitting" mechanism to divide traffic
among them. Perhaps the only thing that can be said
about the relative merits of the options is that
load-splitting is useful in some situations but not
in others, so a wise implementor who implements
load-splitting will also provide a way for the
network manager to disable it.
5.2.5 Unused IP Header Bits: RFC-791 Section 3.1
The IP header contains several reserved bits, in the
Type of Service field and in the Flags field. Routers
MUST NOT drop packets merely because one or more of
these reserved bits has a non-zero value.
Routers MUST ignore and MUST pass through unchanged the
values of these reserved bits. If a router fragments a
packet, it MUST copy these bits into each fragment.
DISCUSSION:
Future revisions to the IP protocol may make use of
these unused bits. These rules are intended to
ensure that these revisions can be deployed without
having to simultaneously upgrade all routers in the
Internet.
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5.2.6 Fragmentation and Reassembly: RFC-791 Section 3.2
As was discussed in Section [4.2.2.7], a router MUST
support IP fragmentation.
A router MUST NOT reassemble any datagram before
forwarding it.
DISCUSSION:
A few people have suggested that there might be some
topologies where reassembly of transit datagrams by
routers might improve performance. The fact that
fragments may take different paths to the destination
precludes safe use of such a feature.
Nothing in this section should be construed to
control or limit fragmentation or reassembly
performed as a link layer function by the router.
Similarly, if an IP datagram is encapsulated in
another IP datagram (e.g., it is tunnelled), that
datagram is in turn fragmented, the fragments must be
reassembled in order to forward the original
datagram. This section does not preclude this.
5.2.7 Internet Control Message Protocol - ICMP
General requirements for ICMP were discussed in Section
[4.3]. This section discusses ICMP messages that are
sent only by routers.
5.2.7.1 Destination Unreachable
The ICMP Destination Unreachable message is sent by a
router in response to a packet which it cannot
forward because the destination (or next hop) is
unreachable or a service is unavailable. Examples of
such cases include a message addressed to a host
which is not there and therefore does not respond to
ARP requests, and messages addressed to network
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prefixes for which the router has no valid route.
A router MUST be able to generate ICMP Destination
Unreachable messages and SHOULD choose a response
code that most closely matches the reason the message
is being generated.
The following codes are defined in [INTERNET:8] and
[INTRO:2]:
0 = Network Unreachable - generated by a router if a
forwarding path (route) to the destination
network is not available;
1 = Host Unreachable - generated by a router if a
forwarding path (route) to the destination host
on a directly connected network is not available
(does not respond to ARP);
2 = Protocol Unreachable - generated if the transport
protocol designated in a datagram is not
supported in the transport layer of the final
destination;
3 = Port Unreachable - generated if the designated
transport protocol (e.g., UDP) is unable to
demultiplex the datagram in the transport layer
of the final destination but has no protocol
mechanism to inform the sender;
4 = Fragmentation Needed and DF Set - generated if a
router needs to fragment a datagram but cannot
since the DF flag is set;
5 = Source Route Failed - generated if a router
cannot forward a packet to the next hop in a
source route option;
6 = Destination Network Unknown - This code SHOULD
NOT be generated since it would imply on the
part of the router that the destination network
does not exist (net unreachable code 0 SHOULD be
used in place of code 6);
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7 = Destination Host Unknown - generated only when a
router can determine (from link layer advice)
that the destination host does not exist;
11 = Network Unreachable For Type Of Service -
generated by a router if a forwarding path
(route) to the destination network with the
requested or default TOS is not available;
12 = Host Unreachable For Type Of Service - generated
if a router cannot forward a packet because its
route(s) to the destination do not match either
the TOS requested in the datagram or the default
TOS (0).
The following additional codes are hereby defined:
13 = Communication Administratively Prohibited -
generated if a router cannot forward a packet
due to administrative filtering;
14 = Host Precedence Violation. Sent by the first
hop router to a host to indicate that a
requested precedence is not permitted for the
particular combination of source/destination
host or network, upper layer protocol, and
source/destination port;
15 = Precedence cutoff in effect. The network
operators have imposed a minimum level of
precedence required for operation, the datagram
was sent with a precedence below this level;
NOTE: [INTRO:2] defined Code 8 for "source host
isolated". Routers SHOULD NOT generate Code 8;
whichever of Codes 0 (Network Unreachable) and 1
(Host Unreachable) is appropriate SHOULD be used
instead. [INTRO:2] also defined Code 9 for
communication with destination network
administratively prohibited and Code 10 for
communication with destination host administratively
prohibited. These codes were intended for use by
end-to-end encryption devices used by U.S military
agencies. Routers SHOULD use the newly defined Code
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13 (Communication Administratively Prohibited) if
they administratively filter packets.
Routers MAY have a configuration option that causes
Code 13 (Communication Administratively Prohibited)
messages not to be generated. When this option is
enabled, no ICMP error message is sent in response to
a packet that is dropped because its forwarding is
administratively prohibited.
Similarly, routers MAY have a configuration option
that causes Code 14 (Host Precedence Violation) and
Code 15 (Precedence Cutoff in Effect) messages not to
be generated. When this option is enabled, no ICMP
error message is sent in response to a packet that is
dropped because of a precedence violation.
Routers MUST use Host Unreachable or Destination Host
Unknown codes whenever other hosts on the same
destination network might be reachable; otherwise,
the source host may erroneously conclude that all
hosts on the network are unreachable, and that may
not be the case.
[INTERNET:14] describes a slight modification the
form of Destination Unreachable messages containing
Code 4 (Fragmentation needed and DF set). A router
MUST use this modified form when originating Code 4
Destination Unreachable messages.
5.2.7.2 Redirect
The ICMP Redirect message is generated to inform a
local host the it should use a different next hop
router for a certain class of traffic.
Routers MUST NOT generate the Redirect for Network or
Redirect for Network and Type of Service messages
(Codes 0 and 2) specified in [INTERNET:8]. Routers
MUST be able to generate the Redirect for Host
message (Code 1) and SHOULD be able to generate the
Redirect for Type of Service and Host message (Code
3) specified in [INTERNET:8].
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DISCUSSION:
If the directly connected network is not subnetted
(in the classical sense), a router can normally
generate a network Redirect that applies to all
hosts on a specified remote network. Using a
network rather than a host Redirect may economize
slightly on network traffic and on host routing
table storage. However, the savings are not
significant, and subnets create an ambiguity about
the subnet mask to be used to interpret a network
Redirect. In a CIDR environment, it is difficult
to specify precisely the cases in which network
Redirects can be used. Therefore, routers must
send only host (or host and type of service)
Redirects.
A Code 3 (Redirect for Host and Type of Service)
message is generated when the packet provoking the
redirect has a destination for which the path chosen
by the router would depend (in part) on the TOS
requested.
Routers that can generate Code 3 redirects (Host and
Type of Service) MUST have a configuration option
(which defaults to on) to enable Code 1 (Host)
redirects to be substituted for Code 3 redirects. A
router MUST send a Code 1 Redirect in place of a Code
3 Redirect if it has been configured to do so.
If a router is not able to generate Code 3 Redirects
then it MUST generate Code 1 Redirects in situations
where a Code 3 Redirect is called for.
Routers MUST NOT generate a Redirect Message unless
all the following conditions are met:
+ The packet is being forwarded out the same physical
interface that it was received from,
+ The IP source address in the packet is on the same
Logical IP (sub)network as the next-hop IP
address, and
+ The packet does not contain an IP source route
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option.
The source address used in the ICMP Redirect MUST
belong to the same logical (sub)net as the
destination address.
A router using a routing protocol (other than static
routes) MUST NOT consider paths learned from ICMP
Redirects when forwarding a packet. If a router is
not using a routing protocol, a router MAY have a
configuration that, if set, allows the router to
consider routes learned through ICMP Redirects when
forwarding packets.
DISCUSSION:
ICMP Redirect is a mechanism for routers to convey
routing information to hosts. Routers use other
mechanisms to learn routing information, and
therefore have no reason to obey redirects.
Believing a redirect which contradicted the
router's other information would likely create
routing loops.
On the other hand, when a router is not acting as
a router, it MUST comply with the behavior
required of a host.
5.2.7.3 Time Exceeded
A router MUST generate a Time Exceeded message Code 0
(In Transit) when it discards a packet due to an
expired TTL field. A router MAY have a per-interface
option to disable origination of these messages on
that interface, but that option MUST default to
allowing the messages to be originated.
5.2.8 INTERNET GROUP MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL - IGMP
IGMP [INTERNET:4] is a protocol used between hosts and
multicast routers on a single physical network to
establish hosts' membership in particular multicast
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groups. Multicast routers use this information, in
conjunction with a multicast routing protocol, to
support IP multicast forwarding across the Internet.
A router SHOULD implement the multicast router part of
IGMP.
5.3 SPECIFIC ISSUES
5.3.1 Time to Live (TTL)
The Time-to-Live (TTL) field of the IP header is defined
to be a timer limiting the lifetime of a datagram. It
is an 8-bit field and the units are seconds. Each
router (or other module) that handles a packet MUST
decrement the TTL by at least one, even if the elapsed
time was much less than a second. Since this is very
often the case, the TTL is effectively a hop count limit
on how far a datagram can propagate through the
Internet.
When a router forwards a packet, it MUST reduce the TTL
by at least one. If it holds a packet for more than one
second, it MAY decrement the TTL by one for each second.
If the TTL is reduced to zero (or less), the packet MUST
be discarded, and if the destination is not a multicast
address the router MUST send an ICMP Time Exceeded
message, Code 0 (TTL Exceeded in Transit) message to the
source. Note that a router MUST NOT discard an IP
unicast or broadcast packet with a non-zero TTL merely
because it can predict that another router on the path
to the packet's final destination will decrement the TTL
to zero. However, a router MAY do so for IP multicasts,
in order to more efficiently implement IP multicast's
expanding ring search algorithm (see [INTERNET:4]).
DISCUSSION:
The IP TTL is used, somewhat schizophrenically, as
both a hop count limit and a time limit. Its hop
count function is critical to ensuring that routing
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problems can't melt down the network by causing
packets to loop infinitely in the network. The time
limit function is used by transport protocols such as
TCP to ensure reliable data transfer. Many current
implementations treat TTL as a pure hop count, and in
parts of the Internet community there is a strong
sentiment that the time limit function should instead
be performed by the transport protocols that need it.
In this specification, we have reluctantly decided to
follow the strong belief among the router vendors
that the time limit function should be optional.
They argued that implementation of the time limit
function is difficult enough that it is currently not
generally done. They further pointed to the lack of
documented cases where this shortcut has caused TCP
to corrupt data (of course, we would expect the
problems created to be rare and difficult to
reproduce, so the lack of documented cases provides
little reassurance that there haven't been a number
of undocumented cases).
IP multicast notions such as the expanding ring
search may not work as expected unless the TTL is
treated as a pure hop count. The same thing is
somewhat true of traceroute.
ICMP Time Exceeded messages are required because the
traceroute diagnostic tool depends on them.
Thus, the tradeoff is between severely crippling, if
not eliminating, two very useful tools and avoiding a
very rare and transient data transport problem that
may not occur at all. We have chosen to preserve the
tools.
5.3.2 Type of Service (TOS)
The "Type-of-Service" byte in the IP header is divided
into three sections: the Precedence field (high-order 3
bits), a field that is customarily called "Type of
Service" or "TOS" (next 4 bits), and a reserved bit (the
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low order bit). Rules governing the reserved bit were
described in Section [4.2.2.3]. The Precedence field
will be discussed in Section [5.3.3]. A more extensive
discussion of the TOS field and its use can be found in
[ROUTE:11].
A router SHOULD consider the TOS field in a packet's IP
header when deciding how to forward it. The remainder
of this section describes the rules that apply to
routers that conform to this requirement.
A router MUST maintain a TOS value for each route in its
routing table. Routes learned through a routing
protocol that does not support TOS MUST be assigned a
TOS of zero (the default TOS).
To choose a route to a destination, a router MUST use an
algorithm equivalent to the following:
(1) The router locates in its routing table all
available routes to the destination (see Section
[5.2.4]).
(2) If there are none, the router drops the packet
because the destination is unreachable. See
section [5.2.4].
(3) If one or more of those routes have a TOS that
exactly matches the TOS specified in the packet,
the router chooses the route with the best metric.
(4) Otherwise, the router repeats the above step, except
looking at routes whose TOS is zero.
(5) If no route was chosen above, the router drops the
packet because the destination is unreachable. The
router returns an ICMP Destination Unreachable
error specifying the appropriate code: either
Network Unreachable with Type of Service (code 11)
or Host Unreachable with Type of Service (code 12).
DISCUSSION:
Although TOS has been little used in the past, its
use by hosts is now mandated by the Requirements for
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Internet Hosts RFCs ([INTRO:2] and [INTRO:3]).
Support for TOS in routers may become a MUST in the
future, but is a SHOULD for now until we get more
experience with it and can better judge both its
benefits and its costs.
Various people have proposed that TOS should affect
other aspects of the forwarding function. For
example:
(1) A router could place packets that have the "Low
Delay" bit set ahead of other packets in its
output queues.
(2) a router is forced to discard packets, it could
try to avoid discarding those which have the
"High Reliability" bit set.
These ideas have been explored in more detail in
[INTERNET:17] but we don't yet have enough experience
with such schemes to make requirements in this area.
5.3.3 IP Precedence
This section specifies requirements and guidelines for
appropriate processing of the IP Precedence field in
routers. Precedence is a scheme for allocating
resources in the network based on the relative
importance of different traffic flows. The IP
specification defines specific values to be used in this
field for various types of traffic.
The basic mechanisms for precedence processing in a
router are preferential resource allocation, including
both precedence-ordered queue service and precedence-
based congestion control, and selection of Link Layer
priority features. The router also selects the IP
precedence for routing, management and control traffic
it originates. For a more extensive discussion of IP
Precedence and its implementation see [FORWARD:6].
Precedence-ordered queue service, as discussed in this
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section, includes but is not limited to the queue for
the forwarding process and queues for outgoing links.
It is intended that a router supporting precedence
should also use the precedence indication at whatever
points in its processing are concerned with allocation
of finite resources, such as packet buffers or Link
Layer connections. The set of such points is
implementation-dependent.
DISCUSSION:
Although the Precedence field was originally provided
for use in DOD systems where large traffic surges or
major damage to the network are viewed as inherent
threats, it has useful applications for many non-
military IP networks. Although the traffic handling
capacity of networks has grown greatly in recent
years, the traffic generating ability of the users
has also grown, and network overload conditions still
occur at times. Since IP-based routing and
management protocols have become more critical to the
successful operation of the Internet, overloads
present two additional risks to the network:
(1) High delays may result in routing protocol
packets being lost. This may cause the routing
protocol to falsely deduce a topology change and
propagate this false information to other
routers. Not only can this cause routes to
oscillate, but an extra processing burden may be
placed on other routers.
(2) High delays may interfere with the use of network
management tools to analyze and perhaps correct
or relieve the problem in the network that
caused the overload condition to occur.
Implementation and appropriate use of the Precedence
mechanism alleviates both of these problems.
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5.3.3.1 Precedence-Ordered Queue Service
Routers SHOULD implement precedence-ordered queue
service. Precedence-ordered queue service means that
when a packet is selected for output on a (logical)
link, the packet of highest precedence that has been
queued for that link is sent. Routers that implement
precedence-ordered queue service MUST also have a
configuration option to suppress precedence-ordered
queue service in the Internet Layer.
Any router MAY implement other policy-based
throughput management procedures that result in other
than strict precedence ordering, but it MUST be
configurable to suppress them (i.e., use strict
ordering).
As detailed in Section [5.3.6], routers that
implement precedence-ordered queue service discard
low precedence packets before discarding high
precedence packets for congestion control purposes.
Preemption (interruption of processing or
transmission of a packet) is not envisioned as a
function of the Internet Layer. Some protocols at
other layers may provide preemption features.
5.3.3.2 Lower Layer Precedence Mappings
Routers that implement precedence-ordered queuing
MUST IMPLEMENT, and other routers SHOULD IMPLEMENT,
Lower Layer Precedence Mapping.
A router that implements Lower Layer Precedence
Mapping:
+ MUST be able to map IP Precedence to Link Layer
priority mechanisms for link layers that have such
a feature defined.
+ MUST have a configuration option to select the Link
Layer's default priority treatment for all IP
traffic
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+ SHOULD be able to configure specific nonstandard
mappings of IP precedence values to Link Layer
priority values for each interface.
DISCUSSION:
Some research questions the workability of the
priority features of some Link Layer protocols,
and some networks may have faulty implementations
of the link layer priority mechanism. It seems
prudent to provide an escape mechanism in case
such problems show up in a network.
On the other hand, there are proposals to use
novel queuing strategies to implement special
services such as multimedia bandwidth reservation
or low-delay service. Special services and
queuing strategies to support them are current
research subjects and are in the process of
standardization.
Implementors may wish to consider that correct
link layer mapping of IP precedence is required by
DOD policy for TCP/IP systems used on DOD
networks. Since these requirements are intended
to encourage (but not force) the use of precedence
features in the hope of providing better Internet
service to all users, routers supporting
precedence-ordered queue service should default to
maintaining strict precedence ordering regardless
of the type of service requested.
5.3.3.3 Precedence Handling For All Routers
A router (whether or not it employs precedence-
ordered queue service):
(1) MUST accept and process incoming traffic of all
precedence levels normally, unless it has been
administratively configured to do otherwise.
(2) MAY implement a validation filter to
administratively restrict the use of precedence
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levels by particular traffic sources. If
provided, this filter MUST NOT filter out or cut
off the following sorts of ICMP error messages:
Destination Unreachable, Redirect, Time
Exceeded, and Parameter Problem. If this filter
is provided, the procedures required for packet
filtering by addresses are required for this
filter also.
DISCUSSION:
Precedence filtering should be applicable to
specific source/destination IP Address pairs,
specific protocols, specific ports, and so
on.
An ICMP Destination Unreachable message with
code 14 SHOULD be sent when a packet is dropped
by the validation filter, unless this has been
suppressed by configuration choice.
(3) MAY implement a cutoff function that allows the
router to be set to refuse or drop traffic with
precedence below a specified level. This
function may be activated by management actions
or by some implementation dependent heuristics,
but there MUST be a configuration option to
disable any heuristic mechanism that operates
without human intervention. An ICMP Destination
Unreachable message with code 15 SHOULD be sent
when a packet is dropped by the cutoff function,
unless this has been suppressed by configuration
choice.
A router MUST NOT refuse to forward datagrams
with IP precedence of 6 (Internetwork Control)
or 7 (Network Control) solely due to precedence
cutoff. However, other criteria may be used in
conjunction with precedence cutoff to filter
high precedence traffic.
DISCUSSION:
Unrestricted precedence cutoff could result
in an unintentional cutoff of routing and
control traffic. In the general case, host
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traffic should be restricted to a value of 5
(CRITIC/ECP) or below; this is not a
requirement and may not be correct in certain
systems.
(4) MUST NOT change precedence settings on packets it
did not originate.
(5) SHOULD be able to configure distinct precedence
values to be used for each routing or management
protocol supported (except for those protocols,
such as OSPF, which specify which precedence
value must be used).
(6) MAY be able to configure routing or management
traffic precedence values independently for each
peer address.
(7) MUST respond appropriately to Link Layer
precedence-related error indications where
provided. An ICMP Destination Unreachable
message with code 15 SHOULD be sent when a
packet is dropped because a link cannot accept
it due to a precedence-related condition, unless
this has been suppressed by configuration
choice.
DISCUSSION:
The precedence cutoff mechanism described in
(3) is somewhat controversial. Depending on
the topological location of the area affected
by the cutoff, transit traffic may be
directed by routing protocols into the area
of the cutoff, where it will be dropped.
This is only a problem if another path that
is unaffected by the cutoff exists between
the communicating points. Proposed ways of
avoiding this problem include providing some
minimum bandwidth to all precedence levels
even under overload conditions, or
propagating cutoff information in routing
protocols. In the absence of a widely
accepted (and implemented) solution to this
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problem, great caution is recommended in
activating cutoff mechanisms in transit
networks.
A transport layer relay could legitimately
provide the function prohibited by (4) above.
Changing precedence levels may cause subtle
interactions with TCP and perhaps other
protocols; a correct design is a non-trivial
task.
The intent of (5) and (6) (and the discussion
of IP Precedence in ICMP messages in Section
[4.3.2]) is that the IP precedence bits
should be appropriately set, whether or not
this router acts upon those bits in any other
way. We expect that in the future
specifications for routing protocols and
network management protocols will specify how
the IP Precedence should be set for messages
sent by those protocols.
The appropriate response for (7) depends on
the link layer protocol in use. Typically,
the router should stop trying to send
"offensive" traffic to that destination for
some period of time, and should return an
ICMP Destination Unreachable message with
code 15 (service not available for precedence
requested) to the traffic source. It also
should not try to reestablish a preempted
Link Layer connection for some time.
5.3.4 Forwarding of Link Layer Broadcasts
The encapsulation of IP packets in most Link Layer
protocols (except PPP) allows a receiver to distinguish
broadcasts and multicasts from unicasts simply by
examining the Link Layer protocol headers (most
commonly, the Link Layer destination address). The
rules in this section that refer to "Link Layer
broadcasts" apply only to Link Layer protocols that
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allow broadcasts to be distinguished; likewise, the
rules that refer to "Link Layer multicasts" apply only
to Link Layer protocols that allow multicasts to be
distinguished.
A router MUST NOT forward any packet that the router
received as a Link Layer broadcast, unless it is
directed to an IP Multicast address. In this latter
case, one would presume that link layer broadcast was
used due to the lack of an effective multicast service.
A router MUST NOT forward any packet which the router
received as a Link Layer multicast unless the packet's
destination address is an IP multicast address.
A router SHOULD silently discard a packet that is
received via a Link Layer broadcast but does not specify
an IP multicast or IP broadcast destination address.
When a router sends a packet as a Link Layer broadcast,
the IP destination address MUST be a legal IP broadcast
or IP multicast address.
5.3.5 Forwarding of Internet Layer Broadcasts
There are two major types of IP broadcast addresses;
limited broadcast and directed broadcast. In addition,
there are three subtypes of directed broadcast: a
broadcast directed to a specified network prefix, a
broadcast directed to a specified subnetwork, and a
broadcast directed to all subnets of a specified
network. Classification by a router of a broadcast into
one of these categories depends on the broadcast address
and on the router's understanding (if any) of the subnet
structure of the destination network. The same
broadcast will be classified differently by different
routers.
A limited IP broadcast address is defined to be all-
ones: { -1, -1 } or 255.255.255.255.
A network-prefix-directed broadcast is composed of the |
network prefix of the IP address with a local part of |
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all-ones or { <Network-prefix>, -1 }. For example, a
Class A net broadcast address is net.255.255.255, a
Class B net broadcast address is net.net.255.255 and a
Class C net broadcast address is net.net.net.255 where
"net" is a byte of the network address.
The all-subnets-directed-broadcast is not well defined
in a CIDR environment, and was deprecated in version 1
of this memo.
As was described in Section [4.2.3.1], a router may
encounter certain non-standard IP broadcast addresses:
+ 0.0.0.0 is an obsolete form of the limited broadcast
address
+ { <Network-prefix>, 0 } is an obsolete form of a
network-prefix-directed broadcast address.
As was described in that section, packets addressed to
any of these addresses SHOULD be silently discarded, but
if they are not, they MUST be treated according to the
same rules that apply to packets addressed to the non-
obsolete forms of the broadcast addresses described
above. These rules are described in the next few
sections.
5.3.5.1 Limited Broadcasts
Limited broadcasts MUST NOT be forwarded. Limited
broadcasts MUST NOT be discarded. Limited broadcasts
MAY be sent and SHOULD be sent instead of directed
broadcasts where limited broadcasts will suffice.
DISCUSSION:
Some routers contain UDP servers which function by
resending the requests (as unicasts or directed
broadcasts) to other servers. This requirement
should not be interpreted as prohibiting such
servers. Note, however, that such servers can
easily cause packet looping if misconfigured.
Thus, providers of such servers would probably be
well advised to document their setup carefully and
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to consider carefully the TTL on packets that are
sent.
5.3.5.2 Directed Broadcasts
A router MUST classify as network-prefix-directed |
broadcasts all valid, directed broadcasts destined
for a remote network or an attached nonsubnetted
network. Note that in view of CIDR, such appear to |
be host addresses within the network prefix; we
preclude inspection of the host part of such network
prefixes. Given a route and no overriding policy, |
then, a router MUST forward network-prefix-directed
broadcasts. Network-Prefix-Directed broadcasts MAY
be sent.
A router MAY have an option to disable receiving |
network-prefix-directed broadcasts on an interface |
and MUST have an option to disable forwarding |
network-prefix-directed broadcasts. These options
MUST default to permit receiving and forwarding
network-prefix-directed broadcasts.
DISCUSSION:
There has been some debate about forwarding or not
forwarding directed broadcasts. In this memo we
have made the forwarding decision depend on the
router's knowledge of the destination network
prefix. Routers cannot determine that a message
is unicast or directed broadcast apart from this
knowledge. The decision to forward or not forward
the message is by definition only possible in the
last hop router.
5.3.5.3 All-subnets-directed Broadcasts
The first version of this memo described an algorithm
for distributing a directed broadcast to all the
subnets of a classical network number. This
algorithm was stated to be "broken," and certain
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failure cases were specified.
In a CIDR routing domain, wherein classical IP
network numbers are meaningless, the concept of an
all-subnets-directed-broadcast is also meaningless.
To the knowledge of the working group, the facility
was never implemented or deployed, and is now
relegated to the dustbin of history.
5.3.5.4 Network-Prefix-Directed Broadcasts
The first version of this memo spelled out procedures
for dealing with network-prefix-directed-broadcasts.
In a CIDR routing domain, these are indistinguishable
from network-prefix-directed-broadcasts. The two are
therefore treated together in section [5.3.5.2
Directed Broadcasts].
5.3.6 Congestion Control
Congestion in a network is loosely defined as a
condition where demand for resources (usually bandwidth
or CPU time) exceeds capacity. Congestion avoidance
tries to prevent demand from exceeding capacity, while
congestion recovery tries to restore an operative state.
It is possible for a router to contribute to both of
these mechanisms. A great deal of effort has been spent
studying the problem. The reader is encouraged to read
[FORWARD:2] for a survey of the work. Important papers
on the subject include [FORWARD:3], [FORWARD:4],
[FORWARD:5], [FORWARD:10], [FORWARD:11], [FORWARD:12],
[FORWARD:13], [FORWARD:14], and [INTERNET:10], among
others.
The amount of storage that router should have available
to handle peak instantaneous demand when hosts use
reasonable congestion policies, such as described in
[FORWARD:5], is a function of the product of the
bandwidth of the link times the path delay of the flows
using the link, and therefore storage should increase as
this Bandwidth*Delay product increases. The exact
function relating storage capacity to probability of
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discard is not known.
When a router receives a packet beyond its storage
capacity it must (by definition, not by decree) discard
it or some other packet or packets. Which packet to
discard is the subject of much study but, unfortunately,
little agreement so far. The best wisdom to date
suggests discarding a packet from the data stream most
heavily using the link. However, a number of additional
factors may be relevant, including the precedence of the
traffic, active bandwidth reservation, and the
complexity associated with selecting that packet.
A router MAY discard the packet it has just received;
this is the simplest but not the best policy. Ideally,
the router should select a packet from one of the
sessions most heavily abusing the link, given that the
applicable Quality of Service policy permits this. A
recommended policy in datagram environments using FIFO
queues is to discard a packet randomly selected from the
queue (see [FORWARD:5]). An equivalent algorithm in
routers using fair queues is to discard from the longest |
queue or that using the greatest virtual time (see |
[FORWARD:13]). A router MAY use these algorithms to
determine which packet to discard.
If a router implements a discard policy (such as Random
Drop) under which it chooses a packet to discard from a
pool of eligible packets:
+ If precedence-ordered queue service (described in
Section [5.3.3.1]) is implemented and enabled, the
router MUST NOT discard a packet whose IP precedence
is higher than that of a packet that is not
discarded.
+ A router MAY protect packets whose IP headers request
the "maximize reliability" TOS, except where doing so
would be in violation of the previous rule.
+ A router MAY protect fragmented IP packets, on the
theory that dropping a fragment of a datagram may
increase congestion by causing all fragments of the
datagram to be retransmitted by the source.
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+ To help prevent routing perturbations or disruption of
management functions, the router MAY protect packets
used for routing control, link control, or network
management from being discarded. Dedicated routers
(i.e., routers that are not also general purpose
hosts, terminal servers, etc.) can achieve an
approximation of this rule by protecting packets
whose source or destination is the router itself.
Advanced methods of congestion control include a notion
of fairness, so that the 'user' that is penalized by
losing a packet is the one that contributed the most to
the congestion. No matter what mechanism is implemented
to deal with bandwidth congestion control, it is
important that the CPU effort expended be sufficiently
small that the router is not driven into CPU congestion
also.
As described in Section [4.3.3.3], this document
recommends that a router SHOULD NOT send a Source Quench
to the sender of the packet that it is discarding. ICMP
Source Quench is a very weak mechanism, so it is not
necessary for a router to send it, and host software
should not use it exclusively as an indicator of
congestion.
5.3.7 Martian Address Filtering
An IP source address is invalid if it is a special IP
address, as defined in 4.2.2.11 or 5.3.7, or is not a
unicast address.
An IP destination address is invalid if it is among
those defined as illegal destinations in 4.2.3.1, or is
a Class E address (except 255.255.255.255).
A router SHOULD NOT forward any packet that has an
invalid IP source address or a source address on network
0. A router SHOULD NOT forward, except over a loopback
interface, any packet that has a source address on
network 127. A router MAY have a switch that allows the
network manager to disable these checks. If such a
switch is provided, it MUST default to performing the
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checks.
A router SHOULD NOT forward any packet that has an
invalid IP destination address or a destination address
on network 0. A router SHOULD NOT forward, except over
a loopback interface, any packet that has a destination
address on network 127. A router MAY have a switch that
allows the network manager to disable these checks. If
such a switch is provided, it MUST default to performing
the checks.
If a router discards a packet because of these rules, it
SHOULD log at least the IP source address, the IP
destination address, and, if the problem was with the
source address, the physical interface on which the
packet was received and the Link Layer address of the
host or router from which the packet was received.
5.3.8 Source Address Validation
A router SHOULD IMPLEMENT the ability to filter traffic
based on a comparison of the source address of a packet
and the forwarding table for a logical interface on
which the packet was received. If this filtering is
enabled, the router MUST silently discard a packet if
the interface on which the packet was received is not
the interface on which a packet would be forwarded to
reach the address contained in the source address. In
simpler terms, if a router wouldn't route a packet
containing this address through a particular interface,
it shouldn't believe the address if it appears as a
source address in a packet read from this interface.
If this feature is implemented, it MUST be disabled by
default.
DISCUSSION:
This feature can provide useful security improvements
in some situations, but can erroneously discard valid
packets in situations where paths are asymmetric.
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5.3.9 Packet Filtering and Access Lists
As a means of providing security and/or limiting traffic
through portions of a network a router SHOULD provide
the ability to selectively forward (or filter) packets.
If this capability is provided, filtering of packets
SHOULD be configurable either to forward all packets or
to selectively forward them based upon the source and
destination prefixes, and MAY filter on other message
attributes. Each source and destination address SHOULD
allow specification of an arbitrary prefix length.
DISCUSSION:
This feature can provide a measure of privacy, where
systems outside a boundary are not permitted to
exchange certain protocols with systems inside the
boundary, or are limited as to which systems they may
communicate with. It can also help prevent certain
classes of security breach, wherein a system outside
a boundary masquerades as a system inside the
boundary and mimics a session with it.
If supported, a router SHOULD be configurable to allow
one of an
+ Include list - specification of a list of message
definitions to be forwarded, or an
+ Exclude list - specification of a list of message
definitions NOT to be forwarded.
A "message definition", in this context, specifies the
source and destination network prefix, and may include
other identifying information such as IP Protocol Type
or TCP port number.
A router MAY provide a configuration switch that allows
a choice between specifying an include or an exclude
list, or other equivalent controls.
A value matching any address (e.g., a keyword "any", an
address with a mask of all 0's, or a network prefix
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whose length is zero) MUST be allowed as a source and/or
destination address.
In addition to address pairs, the router MAY allow any
combination of transport and/or application protocol and
source and destination ports to be specified.
The router MUST allow packets to be silently discarded
(i.e., discarded without an ICMP error message being
sent).
The router SHOULD allow an appropriate ICMP unreachable
message to be sent when a packet is discarded. The ICMP
message SHOULD specify Communication Administratively
Prohibited (code 13) as the reason for the destination
being unreachable.
The router SHOULD allow the sending of ICMP destination
unreachable messages (code 13) to be configured for each
combination of address pairs, protocol types, and ports
it allows to be specified.
The router SHOULD count and SHOULD allow selective
logging of packets not forwarded.
5.3.10 Multicast Routing
An IP router SHOULD support forwarding of IP multicast
packets, based either on static multicast routes or on
routes dynamically determined by a multicast routing
protocol (e.g., DVMRP [ROUTE:9]). A router that
forwards IP multicast packets is called a multicast
router.
5.3.11 Controls on Forwarding
For each physical interface, a router SHOULD have a
configuration option that specifies whether forwarding
is enabled on that interface. When forwarding on an
interface is disabled, the router:
+ MUST silently discard any packets which are received
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on that interface but are not addressed to the router
+ MUST NOT send packets out that interface, except for
datagrams originated by the router
+ MUST NOT announce via any routing protocols the
availability of paths through the interface
DISCUSSION:
This feature allows the network manager to
essentially turn off an interface but leaves it
accessible for network management.
Ideally, this control would apply to logical rather
than physical interfaces. It cannot, because there
is no known way for a router to determine which
logical interface a packet arrived absent a one-to-
one correspondence between logical and physical
interfaces.
5.3.12 State Changes
During router operation, interfaces may fail or be
manually disabled, or may become available for use by
the router. Similarly, forwarding may be disabled for a
particular interface or for the entire router or may be
(re)enabled. While such transitions are (usually)
uncommon, it is important that routers handle them
correctly.
5.3.12.1 When a Router Ceases Forwarding
When a router ceases forwarding it MUST stop
advertising all routes, except for third party
routes. It MAY continue to receive and use routes
from other routers in its routing domains. If the
forwarding database is retained, the router MUST NOT
cease timing the routes in the forwarding database.
If routes that have been received from other routers
are remembered, the router MUST NOT cease timing the
routes that it has remembered. It MUST discard any
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routes whose timers expire while forwarding is
disabled, just as it would do if forwarding were
enabled.
DISCUSSION:
When a router ceases forwarding, it essentially
ceases being a router. It is still a host, and
must follow all of the requirements of Host
Requirements [INTRO:2]. The router may still be a
passive member of one or more routing domains,
however. As such, it is allowed to maintain its
forwarding database by listening to other routers
in its routing domain. It may not, however,
advertise any of the routes in its forwarding
database, since it itself is doing no forwarding.
The only exception to this rule is when the router
is advertising a route that uses only some other
router, but which this router has been asked to
advertise.
A router MAY send ICMP destination unreachable (host
unreachable) messages to the senders of packets that
it is unable to forward. It SHOULD NOT send ICMP
redirect messages.
DISCUSSION:
Note that sending an ICMP destination unreachable
(host unreachable) is a router action. This
message should not be sent by hosts. This
exception to the rules for hosts is allowed so
that packets may be rerouted in the shortest
possible time, and so that "black holes" are
avoided.
5.3.12.2 When a Router Starts Forwarding
When a router begins forwarding, it SHOULD expedite
the sending of new routing information to all routers
with which it normally exchanges routing information.
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5.3.12.3 When an Interface Fails or is Disabled
If an interface fails or is disabled a router MUST
remove and stop advertising all routes in its
forwarding database that make use of that interface.
It MUST disable all static routes that make use of
that interface. If other routes to the same
destination and TOS are learned or remembered by the
router, the router MUST choose the best alternate,
and add it to its forwarding database. The router
SHOULD send ICMP destination unreachable or ICMP
redirect messages, as appropriate, in reply to all
packets that it is unable to forward due to the
interface being unavailable.
5.3.12.4 When an Interface is Enabled
If an interface that had not been available becomes
available, a router MUST reenable any static routes
that use that interface. If routes that would use
that interface are learned by the router, then these
routes MUST be evaluated along with all the other
learned routes, and the router MUST make a decision
as to which routes should be placed in the forwarding
database. The implementor is referred to Chapter
[7], "Application Layer - Routing Protocols" for
further information on how this decision is made.
A router SHOULD expedite the sending of new routing
information to all routers with which it normally
exchanges routing information.
5.3.13 IP Options
Several options, such as Record Route and Timestamp,
contain "slots" into which a router inserts its address
when forwarding the packet. However, each such option
has a finite number of slots, and therefore a router may
find that there is not free slot into which it can
insert its address. No requirement listed below should
be construed as requiring a router to insert its address
into an option that has no remaining slot to insert it
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into. Section [5.2.5] discusses how a router must
choose which of its addresses to insert into an option.
5.3.13.1 Unrecognized Options
Unrecognized IP options in forwarded packets MUST be
passed through unchanged.
5.3.13.2 Security Option
Some environments require the Security option in
every packet; such a requirement is outside the scope
of this document and the IP standard specification.
Note, however, that the security options described in
[INTERNET:1] and [INTERNET:16] are obsolete. Routers
SHOULD IMPLEMENT the revised security option
described in [INTERNET:5].
DISCUSSION:
Routers intended for use in networks with multiple
security levels should support packet filtering
based on IPSO (RFC-1108) labels. To implement
this support, the router would need to permit the
router administrator to configure both a lower
sensitivity limit (e.g. Unclassified) and an upper
sensitivity limit (e.g. Secret) on each interface.
It is commonly but not always the case that the
two limits are the same (e.g. a single-level
interface). Packets caught by an IPSO filter as
being out of range should be silently dropped and
a counter should note the number of packets
dropped because of out of range IPSO labels.
5.3.13.3 Stream Identifier Option
This option is obsolete. If the Stream Identifier
option is present in a packet forwarded by the
router, the option MUST be ignored and passed through
unchanged.
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5.3.13.4 Source Route Options
A router MUST implement support for source route
options in forwarded packets. A router MAY implement
a configuration option that, when enabled, causes all
source-routed packets to be discarded. However, such
an option MUST NOT be enabled by default.
DISCUSSION:
The ability to source route datagrams through the
Internet is important to various network
diagnostic tools. However, source routing may be
used to bypass administrative and security
controls within a network. Specifically, those
cases where manipulation of routing tables is used
to provide administrative separation in lieu of
other methods such as packet filtering may be
vulnerable through source routed packets.
EDITOR'S COMMENTS:
Packet filtering can be defeated by source
routing as well, if it is applied in any router
except one on the final leg of the source
routed path. Neither route nor packet filters
constitute a complete solution for security.
5.3.13.5 Record Route Option
Routers MUST support the Record Route option in
forwarded packets.
A router MAY provide a configuration option that, if
enabled, will cause the router to ignore (i.e., pass
through unchanged) Record Route options in forwarded
packets. If provided, such an option MUST default to
enabling the record-route. This option should not
affect the processing of Record Route options in
datagrams received by the router itself (in
particular, Record Route options in ICMP echo
requests will still be processed according to Section
[4.3.3.6]).
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DISCUSSION:
There are some people who believe that Record
Route is a security problem because it discloses
information about the topology of the network.
Thus, this document allows it to be disabled.
5.3.13.6 Timestamp Option
Routers MUST support the timestamp option in
forwarded packets. A timestamp value MUST follow the
rules given [INTRO:2].
If the flags field = 3 (timestamp and prespecified
address), the router MUST add its timestamp if the
next prespecified address matches any of the router's
IP addresses. It is not necessary that the
prespecified address be either the address of the
interface on which the packet arrived or the address
of the interface over which it will be sent.
IMPLEMENTATION:
To maximize the utility of the timestamps
contained in the timestamp option, it is suggested
that the timestamp inserted be, as nearly as
practical, the time at which the packet arrived at
the router. For datagrams originated by the
router, the timestamp inserted should be, as
nearly as practical, the time at which the
datagram was passed to the network layer for
transmission.
A router MAY provide a configuration option which, if
enabled, will cause the router to ignore (i.e., pass
through unchanged) Timestamp options in forwarded
datagrams when the flag word is set to zero
(timestamps only) or one (timestamp and registering
IP address). If provided, such an option MUST
default to off (that is, the router does not ignore
the timestamp). This option should not affect the
processing of Timestamp options in datagrams received
by the router itself (in particular, a router will
insert timestamps into Timestamp options in datagrams
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received by the router, and Timestamp options in ICMP
echo requests will still be processed according to
Section [4.3.3.6]).
DISCUSSION:
Like the Record Route option, the Timestamp option
can reveal information about a network's topology.
Some people consider this to be a security
concern.
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6. TRANSPORT LAYER
A router is not required to implement any Transport Layer
protocols except those required to support Application Layer
protocols supported by the router. In practice, this means
that most routers implement both the Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).
6.1 USER DATAGRAM PROTOCOL - UDP
The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is specified in [TRANS:1].
A router that implements UDP MUST be compliant, and SHOULD
be unconditionally compliant, with the requirements of
[INTRO:2], except that:
+ This specification does not specify the interfaces
between the various protocol layers. Thus, a router's
interfaces need not comply with [INTRO:2], except where
compliance is required for proper functioning of
Application Layer protocols supported by the router.
+ Contrary to [INTRO:2], an application SHOULD NOT disable
generation of UDP checksums.
DISCUSSION:
Although a particular application protocol may require
that UDP datagrams it receives must contain a UDP
checksum, there is no general requirement that received
UDP datagrams contain UDP checksums. Of course, if a
UDP checksum is present in a received datagram, the
checksum must be verified and the datagram discarded if
the checksum is incorrect.
6.2 TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL - TCP
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is specified in
[TRANS:2].
A router that implements TCP MUST be compliant, and SHOULD
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be unconditionally compliant, with the requirements of
[INTRO:2], except that:
+ This specification does not specify the interfaces
between the various protocol layers. Thus, a router
need not comply with the following requirements of
[INTRO:2] (except of course where compliance is required
for proper functioning of Application Layer protocols
supported by the router):
Use of Push: RFC-793 Section 2.8:
"Passing a received PSH flag to the application
layer is now OPTIONAL."
Urgent Pointer: RFC-793 Section 3.1:
"A TCP MUST inform the application layer
asynchronously whenever it receives an Urgent
pointer and there was previously no pending urgent
data, or whenever the Urgent pointer advances in
the data stream. There MUST be a way for the
application to learn how much urgent data remains
to be read from the connection, or at least to
determine whether or not more urgent data remains
to be read."
TCP Connection Failures:
"An application MUST be able to set the value for
R2 for a particular connection. For example, an
interactive application might set R2 to
``infinity,'' giving the user control over when to
disconnect."
TCP Multihoming:
"If an application on a multihomed host does not
specify the local IP address when actively opening
a TCP connection, then the TCP MUST ask the IP
layer to select a local IP address before sending
the (first) SYN. See the function GET_SRCADDR() in
Section 3.4."
IP Options:
"An application MUST be able to specify a source
route when it actively opens a TCP connection, and
this MUST take precedence over a source route
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received in a datagram."
+ For similar reasons, a router need not comply with any of
the requirements of [INTRO:2].
+ The requirements concerning the Maximum Segment Size
Option in [INTRO:2] are amended as follows: a router
that implements the host portion of MTU discovery
(discussed in Section [4.2.3.3] of this memo) uses 536
as the default value of SendMSS only if the path MTU is
unknown; if the path MTU is known, the default value for
SendMSS is the path MTU - 40.
+ The requirements concerning the Maximum Segment Size
Option in [INTRO:2] are amended as follows: ICMP
Destination Unreachable codes 11 and 12 are additional
soft error conditions. Therefore, these message MUST
NOT cause TCP to abort a connection.
DISCUSSION:
It should particularly be noted that a TCP
implementation in a router must conform to the following
requirements of [INTRO:2]:
+ Providing a configurable TTL. [Time to Live: RFC-793
Section 3.9]
+ Providing an interface to configure keep-alive
behavior, if keep-alives are used at all. [TCP
Keep-Alives]
+ Providing an error reporting mechanism, and the
ability to manage it. [Asynchronous Reports]
+ Specifying type of service. [Type-of-Service]
The general paradigm applied is that if a particular
interface is visible outside the router, then all
requirements for the interface must be followed. For
example, if a router provides a telnet function, then it
will be generating traffic, likely to be routed in the
external networks. Therefore, it must be able to set
the type of service correctly or else the telnet traffic
may not get through.
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7. APPLICATION LAYER - ROUTING PROTOCOLS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
For technical, managerial, and sometimes political reasons, |
the Internet routing system consists of two components - |
interior routing and exterior routing. The concept of an |
Autonomous System (AS), as define in Section 2.2.4 of this |
document, plays a key role in separating interior from an |
exterior routing, as this concept allows to deliniate the |
set of routers where a change from interior to exterior |
routing occurs. An IP datagram may have to traverse the |
routers of two or more Autonomous Systems to reach its |
destination, and the Autonomous Systems must provide each |
other with topology information to allow such forwarding.
Interior gateway protocols (IGPs) are used to distribute |
routing information within an AS (i.e., intra-AS routing). |
Exterior gateway protocols are used to exchange routing |
information among ASs (i.e., inter-AS routing). |
7.1.1 Routing Security Considerations
Routing is one of the few places where the Robustness
Principle ("be liberal in what you accept") does not
apply. Routers should be relatively suspicious in
accepting routing data from other routing systems.
A router SHOULD provide the ability to rank routing
information sources from "most trustworthy" to "least
trustworthy" and to accept routing information about any
particular destination from the most trustworthy sources
first. This was implicit in the original core/stub
autonomous system routing model using EGP and various
interior routing protocols. It is even more important
with the demise of a central, "trusted" core.
A router SHOULD provide a mechanism to filter out
"obviously invalid" routes (such as those for net 127).
Routers MUST NOT by default redistribute routing data
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they do not themselves use, trust or otherwise consider
valid. In rare cases, it may be necessary to
redistribute suspicious information, but this should
only happen under direct intercession by some human
agency.
Routers must be at least a little paranoid about
accepting routing data from anyone, and must be
especially careful when they distribute routing
information provided to them by another party. See
below for specific guidelines.
7.1.2 Precedence
Except where the specification for a particular routing
protocol specifies otherwise, a router SHOULD set the IP
Precedence value for IP datagrams carrying routing
traffic it originates to 6 (INTERNETWORK CONTROL).
DISCUSSION:
Routing traffic with VERY FEW exceptions should be
the highest precedence traffic on any network. If a
system's routing traffic can't get through, chances
are nothing else will.
7.1.3 Message Validation
Peer-to-peer authentication involves several tests. The
application of message passwords and explicit acceptable
neighbor lists has in the past improved the robustness
of the route database. Routers SHOULD IMPLEMENT
management controls that enable explicit listing of
valid routing neighbors. Routers SHOULD IMPLEMENT
peer-to-peer authentication for those routing protocols
that support them.
Routers SHOULD validate routing neighbors based on their
source address and the interface a message is received
on; neighbors in a directly attached subnet SHOULD be
restricted to communicate with the router via the
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interface that subnet is posited on or via unnumbered
interfaces. Messages received on other interfaces
SHOULD be silently discarded.
DISCUSSION:
Security breaches and numerous routing problems are
avoided by this basic testing.
7.2 INTERIOR GATEWAY PROTOCOLS
7.2.1 INTRODUCTION
An Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) is used to distribute
routing information between the various routers in a
particular AS. Independent of the algorithm used to
implement a particular IGP, it should perform the
following functions:
(1) Respond quickly to changes in the internal topology
of an AS
(2) Provide a mechanism such that circuit flapping does
not cause continuous routing updates
(3) Provide quick convergence to loop-free routing
(4) Utilize minimal bandwidth
(5) Provide "equal cost" routes to enable "load-
splitting"
(6) Provide a means for authentication of routing
updates
Current IGPs used in the internet today are
characterized as either being based on a distance-vector
or a link-state algorithm.
Several IGPs are detailed in this section, including
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those most commonly used and some recently developed
protocols that may be widely used in the future.
Numerous other protocols intended for use in intra-AS
routing exist in the Internet community.
A router that implements any routing protocol (other
than static routes) MUST IMPLEMENT OSPF (see Section
[7.2.2]). A router MAY implement additional IGPs.
7.2.2 OPEN SHORTEST PATH FIRST - OSPF
Shortest Path First (SPF) based routing protocols are a
class of link-state algorithms that are based on the
shortest-path algorithm of Dijkstra. Although SPF based
algorithms have been around since the inception of the
ARPANET, it is only recently that they have achieved
popularity both inside both the IP and the OSI
communities. In an SPF based system, each router
obtains the entire topology database through a process
known as flooding. Flooding insures a reliable transfer
of the information. Each router then runs the SPF
algorithm on its database to build the IP routing table.
The OSPF routing protocol is an implementation of an SPF
algorithm. The current version, OSPF version 2, is
specified in [ROUTE:1]. Note that RFC-1131, which
describes OSPF version 1, is obsolete.
Note that to comply with Section [8.3] of this memo, a
router that implements OSPF MUST implement the OSPF MIB
[MGT:14].
7.2.3 INTERMEDIATE SYSTEM TO INTERMEDIATE SYSTEM - DUAL IS-
IS
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) X3S3.3
committee has defined an intra-domain routing protocol.
This protocol is titled "Intermediate System to
Intermediate System Routeing Exchange Protocol".
Its application to an IP network has been defined in
[ROUTE:2], and is referred to as Dual IS-IS (or
sometimes as Integrated IS-IS). IS-IS is based on a
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link-state (SPF) routing algorithm and shares all the
advantages for this class of protocols.
7.3 EXTERIOR GATEWAY PROTOCOLS
7.3.1 INTRODUCTION
Exterior Gateway Protocols are utilized for inter-
Autonomous System routing to exchange reachability
information for a set of networks internal to a
particular autonomous system to a neighboring autonomous
system.
The area of inter-AS routing is a current topic of
research inside the Internet Engineering Task Force.
The Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) described in Section
[Appendix F.1] has traditionally been the inter-AS
protocol of choice, but is now historical. The Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) eliminates many of the
restrictions and limitations of EGP, and is therefore
growing rapidly in popularity. A router is not required
to implement any inter-AS routing protocol. However, if
a router does implement EGP it also MUST IMPLEMENT BGP.
Although it was not designed as an exterior gateway
protocol, RIP (described in Section [7.2.4]) is
sometimes used for inter-AS routing.
7.3.2 BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL - BGP
7.3.2.1 Introduction
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4) is an inter-AS
routing protocol that exchanges network reachability
information with other BGP speakers. The information
for a network includes the complete list of ASs that
traffic must transit to reach that network. This
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information can then be used to insure loop-free
paths. This information is sufficient to construct a
graph of AS connectivity from which routing loops may
be pruned and some policy decisions at the AS level
may be enforced.
BGP is defined by [ROUTE:4]. [ROUTE:5] specifies the
proper usage of BGP in the Internet, and provides
some useful implementation hints and guidelines.
[ROUTE:12] and [ROUTE:13] provide additional useful
information.
To comply with Section [8.3] of this memo, a router
that implements BGP is required to implement the BGP
MIB [MGT:15].
To characterize the set of policy decisions that can
be enforced using BGP, one must focus on the rule
that an AS advertises to its neighbor ASs only those
routes that it itself uses. This rule reflects the
"hop-by-hop" routing paradigm generally used
throughout the current Internet. Note that some
policies cannot be supported by the "hop-by-hop"
routing paradigm and thus require techniques such as
source routing to enforce. For example, BGP does not
enable one AS to send traffic to a neighbor AS
intending that traffic take a different route from
that taken by traffic originating in the neighbor AS.
On the other hand, BGP can support any policy
conforming to the "hop-by-hop" routing paradigm.
Implementors of BGP are strongly encouraged to follow
the recommendations outlined in Section 6 of
[ROUTE:5].
7.3.2.2 Protocol Walk-through
While BGP provides support for quite complex routing
policies (as an example see Section 4.2 in
[ROUTE:5]), it is not required for all BGP
implementors to support such policies. At a minimum,
however, a BGP implementation:
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(1) SHOULD allow an AS to control announcements of
the BGP learned routes to adjacent AS's.
Implementations SHOULD support such control with
at least the granularity of a single network.
Implementations SHOULD also support such control
with the granularity of an autonomous system,
where the autonomous system may be either the
autonomous system that originated the route, or
the autonomous system that advertised the route
to the local system (adjacent autonomous
system).
(2) SHOULD allow an AS to prefer a particular path to
a destination (when more than one path is
available). Such function SHOULD be implemented
by allowing system administrator to assign
"weights" to Autonomous Systems, and making
route selection process to select a route with
the lowest "weight" (where "weight" of a route
is defined as a sum of "weights" of all AS's in
the AS_PATH path attribute associated with that
route).
(3) SHOULD allow an AS to ignore routes with certain
AS's in the AS_PATH path attribute. Such
function can be implemented by using technique
outlined in (2), and by assigning "infinity" as
"weights" for such AS's. The route selection
process must ignore routes that have "weight"
equal to "infinity".
7.3.3 INTER-AS ROUTING WITHOUT AN EXTERIOR PROTOCOL
It is possible to exchange routing information between
two autonomous systems or routing domains without using
a standard exterior routing protocol between two
separate, standard interior routing protocols. The most
common way of doing this is to run both interior
protocols independently in one of the border routers
with an exchange of route information between the two
processes.
As with the exchange of information from an EGP to an
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IGP, without appropriate controls these exchanges of
routing information between two IGPs in a single router
are subject to creation of routing loops.
7.4 STATIC ROUTING
Static routing provides a means of explicitly defining the
next hop from a router for a particular destination. A
router SHOULD provide a means for defining a static route
to a destination, where the destination is defined by a
network prefix. The mechanism SHOULD also allow for a
metric to be specified for each static route.
A router that supports a dynamic routing protocol MUST
allow static routes to be defined with any metric valid for
the routing protocol used. The router MUST provide the
ability for the user to specify a list of static routes
that may or may not be propagated through the routing
protocol. In addition, a router SHOULD support the
following additional information if it supports a routing
protocol that could make use of the information. They are:
+ TOS,
+ Subnet Mask, or
+ Prefix Length, or
+ A metric specific to a given routing protocol that can
import the route.
DISCUSSION:
We intend that one needs to support only the things
useful to the given routing protocol. The need for TOS
should not require the vendor to implement the other
parts if they are not used.
Whether a router prefers a static route over a dynamic
route (or vice versa) or whether the associated metrics are
used to choose between conflicting static and dynamic
routes SHOULD be configurable for each static route.
A router MUST allow a metric to be assigned to a static
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route for each routing domain that it supports. Each such
metric MUST be explicitly assigned to a specific routing
domain. For example:
route 10.0.0.0/8 via 192.0.2.3 rip metric 3 |
route 10.21.0.0/16 via 192.0.2.4 ospf inter-area |
metric 27
route 10.22.0.0/16 via 192.0.2.5 egp 123 metric 99 |
DISCUSSION:
It has been suggested that, ideally, static routes
should have preference values rather than metrics (since
metrics can only be compared with metrics of other
routes in the same routing domain, the metric of a
static route could only be compared with metrics of
other static routes). This is contrary to some current
implementations, where static routes really do have
metrics, and those metrics are used to determine whether
a particular dynamic route overrides the static route to
the same destination. Thus, this document uses the term
metric rather than preference.
This technique essentially makes the static route into a
RIP route, or an OSPF route (or whatever, depending on
the domain of the metric). Thus, the route lookup
algorithm of that domain applies. However, this is NOT
route leaking, in that coercing a static route into a
dynamic routing domain does not authorize the router to
redistribute the route into the dynamic routing domain.
For static routes not put into a specific routing
domain, the route lookup algorithm is:
(1) Basic match
(2) Longest match
(3) Weak TOS (if TOS supported)
(4) Best metric (where metric are implementation-
defined)
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The last step may not be necessary, but it's useful in
the case where you want to have a primary static route
over one interface and a secondary static route over an
alternate interface, with failover to the alternate path
if the interface for the primary route fails.
7.5 FILTERING OF ROUTING INFORMATION
Each router within a network makes forwarding decisions
based upon information contained within its forwarding
database. In a simple network the contents of the database
may be configured statically. As the network grows more
complex, the need for dynamic updating of the forwarding
database becomes critical to the efficient operation of the
network.
If the data flow through a network is to be as efficient as
possible, it is necessary to provide a mechanism for
controlling the propagation of the information a router
uses to build its forwarding database. This control takes
the form of choosing which sources of routing information
should be trusted and selecting which pieces of the
information to believe. The resulting forwarding database
is a filtered version of the available routing information.
In addition to efficiency, controlling the propagation of
routing information can reduce instability by preventing
the spread of incorrect or bad routing information.
In some cases local policy may require that complete
routing information not be widely propagated.
These filtering requirements apply only to non-SPF-based
protocols (and therefore not at all to routers which don't
implement any distance vector protocols).
7.5.1 Route Validation
A router SHOULD log as an error any routing update
advertising a route that violates the specifications of
this memo, unless the routing protocol from which the
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update was received uses those values to encode special
routes (such as default routes).
7.5.2 Basic Route Filtering
Filtering of routing information allows control of paths
used by a router to forward packets it receives. A
router should be selective in which sources of routing
information it listens to and what routes it believes.
Therefore, a router MUST provide the ability to specify:
+ On which logical interfaces routing information will
be accepted and which routes will be accepted from
each logical interface.
+ Whether all routes or only a default route is
advertised on a logical interface.
Some routing protocols do not recognize logical
interfaces as a source of routing information. In such
cases the router MUST provide the ability to specify
+ from which other routers routing information will be
accepted.
For example, assume a router connecting one or more leaf
networks to the main portion or backbone of a larger
network. Since each of the leaf networks has only one
path in and out, the router can simply send a default
route to them. It advertises the leaf networks to the
main network.
7.5.3 Advanced Route Filtering
As the topology of a network grows more complex, the
need for more complex route filtering arises.
Therefore, a router SHOULD provide the ability to
specify independently for each routing protocol:
+ Which logical interfaces or routers routing
information (routes) will be accepted from and which
routes will be believed from each other router or
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logical interface,
+ Which routes will be sent via which logical
interface(s), and
+ Which routers routing information will be sent to, if
this is supported by the routing protocol in use.
In many situations it is desirable to assign a
reliability ordering to routing information received
from another router instead of the simple believe or
don't believe choice listed in the first bullet above.
A router MAY provide the ability to specify:
+ A reliability or preference to be assigned to each
route received. A route with higher reliability will
be chosen over one with lower reliability regardless
of the routing metric associated with each route.
If a router supports assignment of preferences, the
router MUST NOT propagate any routes it does not prefer
as first party information. If the routing protocol
being used to propagate the routes does not support
distinguishing between first and third party
information, the router MUST NOT propagate any routes it
does not prefer.
DISCUSSION:
For example, assume a router receives a route to
network C from router R and a route to the same
network from router S. If router R is considered
more reliable than router S traffic destined for
network C will be forwarded to router R regardless of
the route received from router S.
Routing information for routes which the router does not
use (router S in the above example) MUST NOT be passed
to any other router.
7.6 INTER-ROUTING-PROTOCOL INFORMATION EXCHANGE
Routers MUST be able to exchange routing information
between separate IP interior routing protocols, if
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independent IP routing processes can run in the same
router. Routers MUST provide some mechanism for avoiding
routing loops when routers are configured for bi-
directional exchange of routing information between two
separate interior routing processes. Routers MUST provide
some priority mechanism for choosing routes from
independent routing processes. Routers SHOULD provide
administrative control of IGP-IGP exchange when used across
administrative boundaries.
Routers SHOULD provide some mechanism for translating or
transforming metrics on a per network basis. Routers (or
routing protocols) MAY allow for global preference of
exterior routes imported into an IGP.
DISCUSSION:
Different IGPs use different metrics, requiring some
translation technique when introducing information from
one protocol into another protocol with a different form
of metric. Some IGPs can run multiple instances within
the same router or set of routers. In this case metric
information can be preserved exactly or translated.
There are at least two techniques for translation
between different routing processes. The static (or
reachability) approach uses the existence of a route
advertisement in one IGP to generate a route
advertisement in the other IGP with a given metric. The
translation or tabular approach uses the metric in one
IGP to create a metric in the other IGP through use of
either a function (such as adding a constant) or a table
lookup.
Bi-directional exchange of routing information is
dangerous without control mechanisms to limit feedback.
This is the same problem that distance vector routing
protocols must address with the split horizon technique
and that EGP addresses with the third-party rule.
Routing loops can be avoided explicitly through use of
tables or lists of permitted/denied routes or implicitly
through use of a split horizon rule, a no-third-party
rule, or a route tagging mechanism. Vendors are
encouraged to use implicit techniques where possible to
make administration easier for network operators.
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8. APPLICATION LAYER - NETWORK MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS
Note that this chapter supersedes any requirements stated
under "REMOTE MANAGEMENT" in [INTRO:3].
8.1 The Simple Network Management Protocol - SNMP
8.1.1 SNMP Protocol Elements
Routers MUST be manageable by SNMP [MGT:3]. The SNMP
MUST operate using UDP/IP as its transport and network
protocols. Others MAY be supported (e.g., see [MGT:25,
MGT:26, MGT:27, and MGT:28]). SNMP management
operations MUST operate as if the SNMP was implemented
on the router itself. Specifically, management
operations MUST be effected by sending SNMP management
requests to any of the IP addresses assigned to any of
the router's interfaces. The actual management
operation may be performed either by the router or by a
proxy for the router.
DISCUSSION:
This wording is intended to allow management either
by proxy, where the proxy device responds to SNMP
packets that have one of the router's IP addresses in
the packets destination address field, or the SNMP is
implemented directly in the router itself and
receives packets and responds to them in the proper
manner.
It is important that management operations can be
sent to one of the router's IP Addresses. In
diagnosing network problems the only thing
identifying the router that is available may be one
of the router's IP address; obtained perhaps by
looking through another router's routing table.
All SNMP operations (get, get-next, get-response, set,
and trap) MUST be implemented.
Routers MUST provide a mechanism for rate-limiting the
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generation of SNMP trap messages. Routers MAY provide
this mechanism through the algorithms for asynchronous
alert management described in [MGT:5].
DISCUSSION:
Although there is general agreement about the need to
rate-limit traps, there is not yet consensus on how
this is best achieved. The reference cited is
considered experimental.
8.2 Community Table
For the purposes of this specification, we assume that
there is an abstract `community table' in the router. This
table contains several entries, each entry for a specific
community and containing the parameters necessary to
completely define the attributes of that community. The
actual implementation method of the abstract community
table is, of course, implementation specific.
A router's community table MUST allow for at least one
entry and SHOULD allow for at least two entries.
DISCUSSION:
A community table with zero capacity is useless. It
means that the router will not recognize any communities
and, therefore, all SNMP operations will be rejected.
Therefore, one entry is the minimal useful size of the
table. Having two entries allows one entry to be
limited to read-only access while the other would have
write capabilities.
Routers MUST allow the user to manually (i.e., without
using SNMP) examine, add, delete and change entries in the
SNMP community table. The user MUST be able to set the
community name or construct a MIB view. The user MUST be
able to configure communities as read-only (i.e., they do
not allow SETs) or read-write (i.e., they do allow SETs).
The user MUST be able to define at least one IP address to
which notifications are sent for each community or MIB
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view, if traps are used. These addresses SHOULD be
definable on a community or MIB view basis. It SHOULD be
possible to enable or disable notifications on a community
or MIB view basis.
A router SHOULD provide the ability to specify a list of
valid network managers for any particular community. If
enabled, a router MUST validate the source address of the
SNMP datagram against the list and MUST discard the
datagram if its address does not appear. If the datagram
is discarded the router MUST take all actions appropriate
to an SNMP authentication failure.
DISCUSSION:
This is a rather limited authentication system, but
coupled with various forms of packet filtering may
provide some small measure of increased security.
The community table MUST be saved in non-volatile storage.
The initial state of the community table SHOULD contain one
entry, with the community name string "public" and read-
only access. The default state of this entry MUST NOT send
traps. If it is implemented, then this entry MUST remain
in the community table until the administrator changes it
or deletes it.
DISCUSSION:
By default, traps are not sent to this community. Trap
PDUs are sent to unicast IP addresses. This address
must be configured into the router in some manner.
Before the configuration occurs, there is no such
address, so to whom should the trap be sent? Therefore
trap sending to the "public" community defaults to be
disabled. This can, of course, be changed by an
administrative operation once the router is operational.
8.3 Standard MIBS
All MIBS relevant to a router's configuration are to be
implemented. To wit:
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+ The System, Interface, IP, ICMP, and UDP groups of MIB-II
[MGT:2] MUST be implemented.
+ The Interface Extensions MIB [MGT:18] MUST be
implemented.
+ The IP Forwarding Table MIB [MGT:20] MUST be implemented.
+ If the router implements TCP (e.g., for Telnet) then the
TCP group of MIB-II [MGT:2] MUST be implemented.
+ If the router implements EGP then the EGP group of MIB-II
[MGT:2] MUST be implemented.
+ If the router supports OSPF then the OSPF MIB [MGT:14]
MUST be implemented.
+ If the router supports BGP then the BGP MIB [MGT:15] MUST
be implemented.
+ If the router has Ethernet, 802.3, or StarLan interfaces
then the Ethernet-Like MIB [MGT:6] MUST be implemented.
+ If the router has 802.4 interfaces then the 802.4 MIB
[MGT:7] MUST be implemented.
+ If the router has 802.5 interfaces then the 802.5 MIB
[MGT:8] MUST be implemented.
+ If the router has FDDI interfaces that implement ANSI SMT
7.3 then the FDDI MIB [MGT:9] MUST be implemented.
+ If the router has FDDI interfaces that implement ANSI SMT
6.2 then the FDDI MIB [MGT:29] MUST be implemented.
+ If the router has RS-232 interfaces then the RS-232
[MGT:10] MIB MUST be implemented.
+ If the router has T1/DS1 interfaces then the T1/DS1 MIB
[MGT:16] MUST be implemented.
+ If the router has T3/DS3 interfaces then the T3/DS3 MIB
[MGT:17] MUST be implemented.
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+ If the router has SMDS interfaces then the SMDS Interface
Protocol MIB [MGT:19] MUST be implemented.
+ If the router supports PPP over any of its interfaces
then the PPP MIBs [MGT:11], [MGT:12], and [MGT:13] MUST
be implemented.
+ If the router supports RIP Version 2 then the RIP Version
2 MIB [MGT:21] MUST be implemented.
+ If the router supports X.25 over any of its interfaces
then the X.25 MIBs [MGT:22, MGT:23 and MGT:24] MUST be
implemented.
8.4 Vendor Specific MIBS
The Internet Standard and Experimental MIBs do not cover
the entire range of statistical, state, configuration and
control information that may be available in a network
element. This information is, nevertheless, extremely
useful. Vendors of routers (and other network devices)
generally have developed MIB extensions that cover this
information. These MIB extensions are called Vendor
Specific MIBs.
The Vendor Specific MIB for the router MUST provide access
to all statistical, state, configuration, and control
information that is not available through the Standard and
Experimental MIBs that have been implemented. This
information MUST be available for both monitoring and
control operations.
DISCUSSION:
The intent of this requirement is to provide the ability
to do anything on the router through SNMP that can be
done through a console, and vice versa. A certain
minimal amount of configuration is necessary before SNMP
can operate (e.g., the router must have an IP address).
This initial configuration can not be done through SNMP.
However, once the initial configuration is done, full
capabilities ought to be available through network
management.
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The vendor SHOULD make available the specifications for all
Vendor Specific MIB variables. These specifications MUST
conform to the SMI [MGT:1] and the descriptions MUST be in
the form specified in [MGT:4].
DISCUSSION:
Making the Vendor Specific MIB available to the user is
necessary. Without this information the users would not
be able to configure their network management systems to
be able to access the Vendor Specific parameters. These
parameters would then be useless.
The format of the MIB specification is also specified.
Parsers that read MIB specifications and generate the
needed tables for the network management station are
available. These parsers generally understand only the
standard MIB specification format.
8.5 Saving Changes
Parameters altered by SNMP MAY be saved to non-volatile
storage.
DISCUSSION:
Reasons why this "requirement" is a MAY:
+ The exact physical nature of non-volatile storage is
not specified in this document. Hence, parameters
may be saved in NVRAM/EEPROM, local floppy or hard
disk, or in some TFTP file server or BOOTP server,
etc. Suppose that this information is in a file that
is retrieved through TFTP. In that case, a change
made to a configuration parameter on the router would
need to be propagated back to the file server holding
the configuration file. Alternatively, the SNMP
operation would need to be directed to the file
server, and then the change somehow propagated to the
router. The answer to this problem does not seem
obvious.
This also places more requirements on the host
holding the configuration information than just
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having an available TFTP server, so much more that
its probably unsafe for a vendor to assume that any
potential customer will have a suitable host
available.
+ The timing of committing changed parameters to non-
volatile storage is still an issue for debate. Some
prefer to commit all changes immediately. Others
prefer to commit changes to non-volatile storage only
upon an explicit command.
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9. APPLICATION LAYER - MISCELLANEOUS PROTOCOLS
For all additional application protocols that a router
implements, the router MUST be compliant and SHOULD be
unconditionally compliant with the relevant requirements of
[INTRO:3].
9.1 BOOTP
9.1.1 Introduction
The Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) is a UDP/IP-based
protocol that allows a booting host to configure itself
dynamically and without user supervision. BOOTP
provides a means to notify a host of its assigned IP
address, the IP address of a boot server host, and the
name of a file to be loaded into memory and executed
([APPL:1]). Other configuration information such as the
local prefix length or subnet mask, the local time
offset, the addresses of default routers, and the
addresses of various Internet servers can also be
communicated to a host using BOOTP ([APPL:2]).
9.1.2 BOOTP Relay Agents
In many cases, BOOTP clients and their associated BOOTP
server(s) do not reside on the same IP (sub)network. In
such cases, a third-party agent is required to transfer
BOOTP messages between clients and servers. Such an
agent was originally referred to as a "BOOTP forwarding
agent." However, to avoid confusion with the IP
forwarding function of a router, the name "BOOTP relay
agent" has been adopted instead.
DISCUSSION:
A BOOTP relay agent performs a task that is distinct
from a router's normal IP forwarding function. While
a router normally switches IP datagrams between
networks more-or-less transparently, a BOOTP relay
agent may more properly be thought to receive BOOTP
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messages as a final destination and then generate new
BOOTP messages as a result. One should resist the
notion of simply forwarding a BOOTP message "straight
through like a regular packet."
This relay-agent functionality is most conveniently
located in the routers that interconnect the clients and
servers (although it may alternatively be located in a
host that is directly connected to the client (sub)net).
A router MAY provide BOOTP relay-agent capability. If
it does, it MUST conform to the specifications in
[APPL:3].
Section [5.2.3] discussed the circumstances under which
a packet is delivered locally (to the router). All
locally delivered UDP messages whose UDP destination
port number is BOOTPS (67) are considered for special
processing by the router's logical BOOTP relay agent.
Sections [4.2.2.11] and [5.3.7] discussed invalid IP
source addresses. According to these rules, a router
must not forward any received datagram whose IP source
address is 0.0.0.0. However, routers that support a
BOOTP relay agent MUST accept for local delivery to the
relay agent BOOTREQUEST messages whose IP source address
is 0.0.0.0.
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10. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
This chapter supersedes any requirements of [INTRO:3] relating
to "Extensions to the IP Module."
Facilities to support operation and maintenance (O&M)
activities form an essential part of any router
implementation. Although these functions do not seem to
relate directly to interoperability, they are essential to the
network manager who must make the router interoperate and must
track down problems when it doesn't. This chapter also
includes some discussion of router initialization and of
facilities to assist network managers in securing and
accounting for their networks.
10.1 Introduction
The following kinds of activities are included under router
O&M:
+ Diagnosing hardware problems in the router's processor,
in its network interfaces, or in its connected networks,
modems, or communication lines.
+ Installing new hardware
+ Installing new software.
+ Restarting or rebooting the router after a crash.
+ Configuring (or reconfiguring) the router.
+ Detecting and diagnosing Internet problems such as
congestion, routing loops, bad IP addresses, black
holes, packet avalanches, and misbehaved hosts.
+ Changing network topology, either temporarily (e.g., to
bypass a communication line problem) or permanently.
+ Monitoring the status and performance of the routers and
the connected networks.
+ Collecting traffic statistics for use in (Inter-)network
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planning.
+ Coordinating the above activities with appropriate
vendors and telecommunications specialists.
Routers and their connected communication lines are often
operated as a system by a centralized O&M organization.
This organization may maintain a (Inter-)network operation
center, or NOC, to carry out its O&M functions. It is
essential that routers support remote control and
monitoring from such a NOC through an Internet path, since
routers might not be connected to the same network as their
NOC. Since a network failure may temporarily preclude
network access, many NOCs insist that routers be accessible
for network management through an alternative means, often
dial-up modems attached to console ports on the routers.
Since an IP packet traversing an internet will often use
routers under the control of more than one NOC, Internet
problem diagnosis will often involve cooperation of
personnel of more than one NOC. In some cases, the same
router may need to be monitored by more than one NOC, but
only if necessary, because excessive monitoring could
impact a router's performance.
The tools available for monitoring at a NOC may cover a
wide range of sophistication. Current implementations
include multi-window, dynamic displays of the entire router
system. The use of AI techniques for automatic problem
diagnosis is proposed for the future.
Router O&M facilities discussed here are only a part of the
large and difficult problem of Internet management. These
problems encompass not only multiple management
organizations, but also multiple protocol layers. For
example, at the current stage of evolution of the Internet
architecture, there is a strong coupling between host TCP
implementations and eventual IP-level congestion in the
router system [OPER:1]. Therefore, diagnosis of congestion
problems will sometimes require the monitoring of TCP
statistics in hosts. There are currently a number of R&D
efforts in progress in the area of Internet management and
more specifically router O&M. These R&D efforts have
already produced standards for router O&M. This is also an
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area in which vendor creativity can make a significant
contribution.
10.2 Router Initialization
10.2.1 Minimum Router Configuration
There exists a minimum set of conditions that must be
satisfied before a router may forward packets. A router
MUST NOT enable forwarding on any physical interface
unless either:
(1) The router knows the IP address and associated
subnet mask or network prefix length of at least
one logical interface associated with that physical
interface, or
(2) The router knows that the interface is an unnumbered
interface and knows its router-id.
These parameters MUST be explicitly configured:
+ A router MUST NOT use factory-configured default
values for its IP addresses, prefix lengths, or
router-id, and
+ A router MUST NOT assume that an unconfigured
interface is an unnumbered interface.
DISCUSSION:
There have been instances in which routers have been
shipped with vendor-installed default addresses for
interfaces. In a few cases, this has resulted in
routers advertising these default addresses into
active networks.
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10.2.2 Address and Prefix Initialization
A router MUST allow its IP addresses and their address
masks or prefix lengths to be statically configured and
saved in non-volatile storage.
A router MAY obtain its IP addresses and their
corresponding address masks dynamically as a side effect
of the system initialization process (see Section
10.2.3]);
If the dynamic method is provided, the choice of method
to be used in a particular router MUST be configurable.
As was described in Section [4.2.2.11], IP addresses are
not permitted to have the value 0 or -1 in the <Host-
number> or <Network-prefix> fields. Therefore, a router
SHOULD NOT allow an IP address or address mask to be set
to a value that would make any of the these fields above
have the value zero or -1.
DISCUSSION:
It is possible using arbitrary address masks to
create situations in which routing is ambiguous
(i.e., two routes with different but equally specific
subnet masks match a particular destination address).
This is one of the strongest arguments for the use of
network prefixes, and the reason the use of
discontiguous subnet masks is not permitted.
A router SHOULD make the following checks on any address
mask it installs:
+ The mask is neither all ones nor all zeroes (the
prefix length is neither zero nor 32).
+ The bits which correspond to the network prefix part
of the address are all set to 1.
+ The bits that correspond to the network prefix are
contiguous.
DISCUSSION:
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The masks associated with routes are also sometimes
called "subnet masks", this test should not be
applied to them.
10.2.3 Network Booting using BOOTP and TFTP
There has been much discussion of how routers can and
should be booted from the network. These discussions
have revolved around BOOTP and TFTP. Currently, there
are routers that boot with TFTP from the network. There
is no reason that BOOTP could not be used for locating
the server that the boot image should be loaded from.
BOOTP is a protocol used to boot end systems, and
requires some stretching to accommodate its use with
routers. If a router is using BOOTP to locate the
current boot host, it should send a BOOTP Request with
its hardware address for its first interface, or, if it
has been previously configured otherwise, with either
another interface's hardware address, or another number
to put in the hardware address field of the BOOTP
packet. This is to allow routers without hardware
addresses (like synchronous line only routers) to use
BOOTP for bootload discovery. TFTP can then be used to
retrieve the image found in the BOOTP Reply. If there
are no configured interfaces or numbers to use, a router
MAY cycle through the interface hardware addresses it
has until a match is found by the BOOTP server.
A router SHOULD IMPLEMENT the ability to store
parameters learned through BOOTP into local non-volatile
storage. A router MAY implement the ability to store a
system image loaded over the network into local stable
storage.
A router MAY have a facility to allow a remote user to
request that the router get a new boot image.
Differentiation should be made between getting the new
boot image from one of three locations: the one included
in the request, from the last boot image server, and
using BOOTP to locate a server.
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10.3 Operation and Maintenance
10.3.1 Introduction
There is a range of possible models for performing O&M
functions on a router. At one extreme is the local-only
model, under which the O&M functions can only be
executed locally (e.g., from a terminal plugged into the
router machine). At the other extreme, the fully remote
model allows only an absolute minimum of functions to be
performed locally (e.g., forcing a boot), with most O&M
being done remotely from the NOC. There are
intermediate models, such as one in which NOC personnel
can log into the router as a host, using the Telnet
protocol, to perform functions that can also be invoked
locally. The local-only model may be adequate in a few
router installations, but remote operation from a NOC is
normally required, and therefore remote O&M provisions
are required for most routers.
Remote O&M functions may be exercised through a control
agent (program). In the direct approach, the router
would support remote O&M functions directly from the NOC
using standard Internet protocols (e.g., SNMP, UDP or
TCP); in the indirect approach, the control agent would
support these protocols and control the router itself
using proprietary protocols. The direct approach is
preferred, although either approach is acceptable. The
use of specialized host hardware and/or software
requiring significant additional investment is
discouraged; nevertheless, some vendors may elect to
provide the control agent as an integrated part of the
network in which the routers are a part. If this is the
case, it is required that a means be available to
operate the control agent from a remote site using
Internet protocols and paths and with equivalent
functionality with respect to a local agent terminal.
It is desirable that a control agent and any other NOC
software tools that a vendor provides operate as user
programs in a standard operating system. The use of the
standard Internet protocols UDP and TCP for
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communicating with the routers should facilitate this.
Remote router monitoring and (especially) remote router
control present important access control problems that
must be addressed. Care must also be taken to ensure
control of the use of router resources for these
functions. It is not desirable to let router monitoring
take more than some limited fraction of the router CPU
time, for example. On the other hand, O&M functions
must receive priority so they can be exercised when the
router is congested, since often that is when O&M is
most needed.
10.3.2 Out Of Band Access
Routers MUST support Out-Of-Band (OOB) access. OOB
access SHOULD provide the same functionality as in-band
access. This access SHOULD implement access controls,
to prevent unauthorized access.
DISCUSSION:
This Out-Of-Band access will allow the NOC a way to
access isolated routers during times when network
access is not available.
Out-Of-Band access is an important management tool
for the network administrator. It allows the access
of equipment independent of the network connections.
There are many ways to achieve this access.
Whichever one is used it is important that the access
is independent of the network connections. An
example of Out-Of-Band access would be a serial port
connected to a modem that provides dial up access to
the router.
It is important that the OOB access provides the same
functionality as in-band access. In-band access, or
accessing equipment through the existing network
connection, is limiting, because most of the time,
administrators need to reach equipment to figure out
why it is unreachable. In band access is still very
important for configuring a router, and for
troubleshooting more subtle problems.
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10.3.2 Router O&M Functions
10.3.2.1 Maintenance - Hardware Diagnosis
Each router SHOULD operate as a stand-alone device
for the purposes of local hardware maintenance.
Means SHOULD be available to run diagnostic programs
at the router site using only on-site tools. A
router SHOULD be able to run diagnostics in case of a
fault. For suggested hardware and software
diagnostics see Section [10.3.3].
10.3.2.2 Control - Dumping and Rebooting
A router MUST include both in-band and out-of-band
mechanisms to allow the network manager to reload,
stop, and restart the router. A router SHOULD also
contain a mechanism (such as a watchdog timer) which
will reboot the router automatically if it "hangs"
due to a software or hardware fault.
A router SHOULD IMPLEMENT a mechanism for dumping the
contents of a router's memory (and/or other state
useful for vendor debugging after a crash), and
either saving them on a stable storage device local
to the router or saving them on another host via an
up-line dump mechanism such as TFTP (see [OPER:2],
[INTRO:3]).
10.3.2.3 Control - Configuring the Router
Every router has configuration parameters that may
need to be set. It SHOULD be possible to update the
parameters without rebooting the router; at worst, a
restart MAY be required. There may be cases when it
is not possible to change parameters without
rebooting the router (for instance, changing the IP
address of an interface). In these cases, care
should be taken to minimize disruption to the router
and the surrounding network.
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There SHOULD be a way to configure the router over
the network either manually or automatically. A
router SHOULD be able to upload or download its
parameters from a host or another router. A means
SHOULD be provided, either as an application program
or a router function, to convert between the
parameter format and a human-editable format. A
router SHOULD have some sort of stable storage for
its configuration. A router SHOULD NOT believe
protocols such as RARP, ICMP Address Mask Reply, and
MAY not believe BOOTP.
DISCUSSION:
It is necessary to note here that in the future
RARP, ICMP Address Mask Reply, BOOTP and other
mechanisms may be needed to allow a router to
auto-configure. Although routers may in the
future be able to configure automatically, the
intent here is to discourage this practice in a
production environment until auto-configuration
has been tested more thoroughly. The intent is
NOT to discourage auto-configuration all together.
In cases where a router is expected to get its
configuration automatically it may be wise to
allow the router to believe these things as it
comes up and then ignore them after it has gotten
its configuration.
10.3.2.4 Net Booting of System Software
A router SHOULD keep its system image in local non-
volatile storage such as PROM, NVRAM, or disk. It
MAY also be able to load its system software over the
network from a host or another router.
A router that can keep its system image in local
non-volatile storage MAY be configurable to boot its
system image over the network. A router that offers
this option SHOULD be configurable to boot the system
image in its non-volatile local storage if it is
unable to boot its system image over the network.
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DISCUSSION:
It is important that the router be able to come up
and run on its own. NVRAM may be a particular
solution for routers used in large networks, since
changing PROMs can be quite time consuming for a
network manager responsible for numerous or
geographically dispersed routers. It is important
to be able to netboot the system image because
there should be an easy way for a router to get a
bug fix or new feature more quickly than getting
PROMs installed. Also if the router has NVRAM
instead of PROMs, it will netboot the image and
then put it in NVRAM.
Routers SHOULD perform some basic consistency
check on any image loaded, to detect and perhaps
prevent incorrect images.
A router MAY also be able to distinguish between
different configurations based on which software it
is running. If configuration commands change from
one software version to another, it would be helpful
if the router could use the configuration that was
compatible with the software.
10.3.2.5 Detecting and responding to misconfiguration
There MUST be mechanisms for detecting and responding
to misconfigurations. If a command is executed
incorrectly, the router SHOULD give an error message.
The router SHOULD NOT accept a poorly formed command
as if it were correct.
DISCUSSION:
There are cases where it is not possible to detect
errors: the command is correctly formed, but
incorrect with respect to the network. This may
be detected by the router, but may not be
possible.
Another form of misconfiguration is misconfiguration
of the network to which the router is attached. A
router MAY detect misconfigurations in the network.
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The router MAY log these findings to a file, either
on the router or a host, so that the network manager
will see that there are possible problems on the
network.
DISCUSSION:
Examples of such misconfigurations might be
another router with the same address as the one in
question or a router with the wrong address mask.
If a router detects such problems it is probably
not the best idea for the router to try to fix the
situation. That could cause more harm than good.
10.3.2.6 Minimizing Disruption
Changing the configuration of a router SHOULD have
minimal affect on the network. Routing tables SHOULD
NOT be unnecessarily flushed when a simple change is
made to the router. If a router is running several
routing protocols, stopping one routing protocol
SHOULD NOT disrupt other routing protocols, except in
the case where one network is learned by more than
one routing protocol.
DISCUSSION:
It is the goal of a network manager to run a
network so that users of the network get the best
connectivity possible. Reloading a router for
simple configuration changes can cause disruptions
in routing and ultimately cause disruptions to the
network and its users. If routing tables are
unnecessarily flushed, for instance, the default
route will be lost as well as specific routes to
sites within the network. This sort of disruption
will cause significant downtime for the users. It
is the purpose of this section to point out that
whenever possible, these disruptions should be
avoided.
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10.3.2.7 Control - Troubleshooting Problems
(1) A router MUST provide in-band network access, but
(except as required by Section [8.2]) for
security considerations this access SHOULD be
disabled by default. Vendors MUST document the
default state of any in-band access. This
access SHOULD implement access controls, to
prevent unauthorized access.
DISCUSSION:
In-band access primarily refers to access
through the normal network protocols that may
or may not affect the permanent operational
state of the router. This includes, but is
not limited to Telnet/RLOGIN console access
and SNMP operations.
This was a point of contention between the
"operational out of the box" and "secure out
of The box" contingents. Any "automagic"
access to the router may introduce
insecurities, but it may be more important
for the customer to have a router that is
accessible over the network as soon as it is
plugged in. At least one vendor supplies
routers without any external console access
and depends on being able to access the
router through the network to complete its
configuration.
It is the vendors call whether in-band access
is enabled by default; but it is also the
vendor's responsibility to make its customers
aware of possible insecurities.
(2) A router MUST provide the ability to initiate an
ICMP echo. The following options SHOULD be
implemented:
+ Choice of data patterns
+ Choice of packet size
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+ Record route
and the following additional options MAY be
implemented:
+ Loose source route
+ Strict source route
+ Timestamps
(3) A router SHOULD provide the ability to initiate a
traceroute. If traceroute is provided, then the
3rd party traceroute SHOULD be implemented.
Each of the above three facilities (if implemented)
SHOULD have access restrictions placed on it to
prevent its abuse by unauthorized persons.
10.4 Security Considerations
10.4.1 Auditing and Audit Trails
Auditing and billing are the bane of the network
operator, but are the two features most requested by
those in charge of network security and those who are
responsible for paying the bills. In the context of
security, auditing is desirable if it helps you keep
your network working and protects your resources from
abuse, without costing you more than those resources are
worth.
(1) Configuration Changes
Router SHOULD provide a method for auditing a
configuration change of a router, even if it's
something as simple as recording the operator's
initials and time of change.
DISCUSSION:
Configuration change logging (who made a
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configuration change, what was changed, and
when) is very useful, especially when traffic is
suddenly routed through Alaska on its way across
town. So is the ability to revert to a previous
configuration.
(2) Packet Accounting
Vendors should strongly consider providing a system
for tracking traffic levels between pairs of hosts
or networks. A mechanism for limiting the
collection of this information to specific pairs of
hosts or networks is also strongly encouraged.
DISCUSSION:
A "host traffic matrix" as described above can
give the network operator a glimpse of traffic
trends not apparent from other statistics. It
can also identify hosts or networks that are
"probing" the structure of the attached networks
- e.g., a single external host that tries to
send packets to every IP address in the network
address range for a connected network.
(3) Security Auditing
Routers MUST provide a method for auditing security
related failures or violations to include:
+ Authorization Failures: bad passwords, invalid
SNMP communities, invalid authorization tokens,
+ Violations of Policy Controls: Prohibited Source
Routes, Filtered Destinations, and
+ Authorization Approvals: good passwords - Telnet
in-band access, console access.
Routers MUST provide a method of limiting or
disabling such auditing but auditing SHOULD be on
by default. Possible methods for auditing include
listing violations to a console if present, logging
or counting them internally, or logging them to a
remote security server through the SNMP trap
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mechanism or the Unix logging mechanism as
appropriate. A router MUST implement at least one
of these reporting mechanisms - it MAY implement
more than one.
10.4.2 Configuration Control
A vendor has a responsibility to use good configuration
control practices in the creation of the
software/firmware loads for their routers. In
particular, if a vendor makes updates and loads
available for retrieval over the Internet, the vendor
should also provide a way for the customer to confirm
the load is a valid one, perhaps by the verification of
a checksum over the load.
DISCUSSION:
Many vendors currently provide short notice updates
of their software products through the Internet.
This a good trend and should be encouraged, but
provides a point of vulnerability in the
configuration control process.
If a vendor provides the ability for the customer to
change the configuration parameters of a router
remotely, for example through a Telnet session, the
ability to do so SHOULD be configurable and SHOULD
default to off. The router SHOULD require a password or
other valid authentication before permitting remote
reconfiguration.
DISCUSSION:
Allowing your properly identified network operator to
twiddle with your routers is necessary; allowing
anyone else to do so is foolhardy.
A router MUST NOT have undocumented "back door" access
and "master passwords". A vendor MUST ensure any such
access added for purposes of debugging or product
development are deleted before the product is
distributed to its customers.
DISCUSSION:
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A vendor has a responsibility to its customers to
ensure they are aware of the vulnerabilities present
in its code by intention - e.g., in-band access.
"Trap doors", "back doors" and "master passwords"
intentional or unintentional can turn a relatively
secure router into a major problem on an operational
network. The supposed operational benefits are not
matched by the potential problems.
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11. REFERENCES
Implementors should be aware that Internet protocol standards
are occasionally updated. These references are current as of
this writing, but a cautious implementor will always check a
recent version of the RFC index to ensure that an RFC has not
been updated or superseded by another, more recent RFC.
Reference [INTRO:6] explains various ways to obtain a current
RFC index.
APPL:1.
B. Croft and J. Gilmore, "Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP),
Request For Comments (RFC) 951, DDN Network Information
Center, SRI International, Menlo Park, California, USA,
September 1985.
APPL:2.
S. Alexander and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP
Vendor Extensions", Request For Comments (RFC) 1533,
October 1993.
APPL:3.
W. Wimer, "Clarifications and Extensions for the
Bootstrap Protocol", Request For Comments (RFC) 1542,
October 1993.
ARCH:1.
"DDN Protocol Handbook, NIC-50004, NIC-50005, NIC-50006
(three volumes), DDN Network Information Center, SRI
International, Menlo Park, California, USA, December
1985.
ARCH:2.
V. Cerf and R. Kahn, "A Protocol for Packet Network
Intercommunication," IEEE Transactions on Communication,
May 1974. Also included in [ARCH:1].
ARCH:3.
J. Postel, C. Sunshine, and D. Cohen, "The ARPA
Internet Protocol," Computer Networks, volume 5, number
4, July 1981. Also included in [ARCH:1].
ARCH:4.
B. Leiner, J. Postel, R. Cole, and D. Mills, "The
IETF Exp. 22 Sep. 1995 [Page 173]
Draft Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers March 1995
DARPA Internet Protocol Suite," Proceedings of INFOCOM
'85, IEEE, Washington, DC, March 1985. Also in: IEEE
Communications Magazine, March 1985. Also available from
the Information Sciences Institute, University of
Southern California as Technical Report ISI-RS-85-153.
ARCH:5.
D. Comer, "Internetworking With TCP/IP Volume 1:
Principles, Protocols, and Architecture", Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1991.
ARCH:6.
W. Stallings, "Handbook of Computer-Communications
Standards Volume 3: The TCP/IP Protocol Suite",
Macmillan, New York, NY, 1990.
ARCH:7.
J. Postel, "Internet Official Protocol Standards",
Request For Comments (RFC) 1540, October 1993.
ARCH:8.
"Information processing systems - Open Systems
Interconnection - Basic Reference Model", ISO 7489,
International Standards Organization, 1984.
ARCH:9
R. Braden, J. Postel, Y. Rekhter, "Internet
Architecture Extensions for Shared Media", 05/20/1994
FORWARD:1.
IETF CIP Working Group (C. Topolcic, Editor),
"Experimental Internet Stream Protocol, Version 2 (ST-
II)", Request For Comments (RFC) 1190, DDN Network
Information Center, SRI International, Menlo Park,
California, USA, October 1990.
FORWARD:2.
A. Mankin and K. Ramakrishnan, Editors, "Gateway
Congestion Control Survey", Request For Comments (RFC)
1254, DDN Network Information Center, SRI International,
Menlo Park, California, USA, August 1991.
FORWARD:3.
J. Nagle, "On Packet Switches with Infinite Storage,"
IETF Exp. 22 Sep. 1995 [Page 174]
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IEEE Transactions on Communications, volume COM-35,
number 4, April 1987.
FORWARD:4.
R. Jain, K. Ramakrishnan, and D. Chiu, "Congestion
Avoidance in Computer Networks With a Connectionless
Network Layer", Technical Report DEC-TR-506, Digital
Equipment Corporation.
FORWARD:5.
V. Jacobson, "Congestion Avoidance and Control,"
Proceedings of SIGCOMM '88, Association for Computing
Machinery, August 1988.
FORWARD:6.
W. Barns, "Precedence and Priority Access Implementation
for Department of Defense Data Networks", Technical
Report MTR-91W00029, The Mitre Corporation, McLean,
Virginia, USA, July 1991.
FORWARD:7
Fang, Chen, Hutchins, "Simulation Results of TCP
Performance over ATM with and without Flow Control",
presentation to the ATM Forum, November 15, 1993.
FORWARD:8
V. Paxson, S. Floyd "Wide Area Traffic: the Failure of
Poisson Modeling", short version in SIGCOMM '94
FORWARD:9
Leland, Taqqu, Willinger and Wilson, "On the Self-Similar
Nature of Ethernet Traffic", Proceedings of SIGCOMM '93,
September, 1993.
FORWARD:10
S. Keshav "A Control Theoretic Approach to Flow
Control", SIGCOMM 91, pages 3-16
FORWARD:11
K.K. Ramakrishnan and R. Jain, "A Binary Feedback
Scheme for Congestion Avoidance in Computer Networks,"
ACM Transactions of Computer Systems, volume 8, number 2,
1980.
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FORWARD:12
H. Kanakia, P. Mishara, and A. Reibman]. An adaptive
congestion control scheme for real-time packet video
transport. In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM 1994, pages
20-31, San Francisco, California, September 1993.
FORWARD:13
A. Demers, S. Keshav, S. Shenker "Analysis and
Simulation of a Fair Queuing Algorithm",
93 pages 1-12
FORWARD:14
D. Clark, S. Shenker , L. Zhang, "Supporting Real-Time
Applications in an Integrated Services Packet Network:
Architecture and Mechanism", 92 pages 14-26
INTERNET:1.
J. Postel, "Internet Protocol", Request For Comments
(RFC) 791, DDN Network Information Center, SRI
International, Menlo Park, California, USA, September
1981.
INTERNET:2.
J. Mogul and J. Postel, "Internet Standard Subnetting
Procedure", Request For Comments (RFC) 950, DDN Network
Information Center, SRI International, Menlo Park,
California, USA, August 1985.
INTERNET:3.
J. Mogul, "Broadcasting Internet Datagrams in the
Presence of Subnets", Request For Comments (RFC) 922, DDN
Network Information Center, SRI International, Menlo
Park, California, USA, October 1984.
INTERNET:4.
S. Deering, "Host Extensions for IP Multicasting",
Request For Comments (RFC) 1112, DDN Network Information
Center, SRI International, Menlo Park, California, USA,
August 1989.
INTERNET:5.
S. Kent, "U.S. Department of Defense Security Options
for the Internet Protocol", Request for Comments (RFC)
1108, November 1991.
IETF Exp. 22 Sep. 1995 [Page 176]
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INTERNET:6.
R. Braden, D. Borman, and C. Partridge, "Computing the
Internet Checksum", Request For Comments (RFC) 1071, DDN
Network Information Center, SRI International, Menlo
Park, California, USA, September 1988.
INTERNET:7.
T. Mallory and A. Kullberg, "Incremental Updating of
the Internet Checksum", Request For Comments (RFC) 1141, |
DDN Network Information Center, SRI International, Menlo
Park, California, USA, January 1990.
INTERNET:8.
J. Postel, "Internet Control Message Protocol", Request
For Comments (RFC) 792, DDN Network Information Center,
SRI International, Menlo Park, California, USA, September
1981.
INTERNET:9.
A. Mankin, G. Hollingsworth, G. Reichlen, K.
Thompson, R. Wilder, and R. Zahavi, "Evaluation of
Internet Performance - FY89", Technical Report MTR-
89W00216, MITRE Corporation, February, 1990.
INTERNET:10.
G. Finn, "A Connectionless Congestion Control
Algorithm," Computer Communications Review, volume 19,
number 5, Association for Computing Machinery, October
1989.
INTERNET:11.
W. Prue, "The Source Quench Introduced Delay (SQuID)",
Request For Comments (RFC) 1016, DDN Network Information
Center, SRI International, J. Postel, August 1987.
INTERNET:12.
A. McKenzie, "Some comments on SQuID", Request For
Comments (RFC) 1018, DDN Network Information Center, SRI
International, Menlo Park, California, USA, August 1987.
INTERNET:13.
S. Deering, "ICMP Router Discovery Messages", Request
For Comments (RFC) 1256, DDN Network Information Center,
SRI International, Menlo Park, California, USA, September
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1991.
INTERNET:14.
J. Mogul and S. Deering, "Path MTU Discovery", Request
For Comments (RFC) 1191, DDN Network Information Center,
SRI International, Menlo Park, California, USA, November
1990.
INTERNET:15
V. Fuller, T. Li, J. Yi, and K. Varadhan, "Classless
Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR): an Address Assignment and
Aggregation Strategy" Request For Comments (RFC) 1519,
DDN Network Information Center, SRI International Menlo
Park, California, USA September 1993.
INTERNET:16
M. St. Johns, "Draft Revised IP Security Option",
Request for Comments 1038, January 1988.
INTERNET:17
W. Prue and J. Postel, "Queuing Algorithm to Provide
Type-of-service For IP Links", Request for Comments 1046,
February 1988.
INTERNET:18
J. Postel, "Address Mappings ", Request for Comments
796, September 1981.
INTRO:1.
R. Braden and J. Postel, "Requirements for Internet
Gateways", Request For Comments (RFC) 1009, DDN Network
Information Center, SRI International, Menlo Park,
California, USA, June 1987.
INTRO:2.
Internet Engineering Task Force (R. Braden, Editor),
"Requirements for Internet Hosts - Communication Layers",
Request For Comments (RFC) 1122, DDN Network Information
Center, SRI International, Menlo Park, California, USA,
October 1989.
INTRO:3.
Internet Engineering Task Force (R. Braden, Editor),
"Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and
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Support", Request For Comments (RFC) 1123, DDN Network
Information Center, SRI International, Menlo Park,
California, USA, October 1989.
INTRO:4.
D. Clark, "Modularity and Efficiency in Protocol
Implementations", Request For Comments (RFC) 817, DDN
Network Information Center, SRI International, Menlo
Park, California, USA, July 1982.
INTRO:5.
D. Clark, "The Structuring of Systems Using Upcalls,"
Proceedings of 10th ACM SOSP, December 1985.
INTRO:6.
O. Jacobsen and J. Postel, "Protocol Document Order
Information", Request For Comments (RFC) 980, DDN Network
Information Center, SRI International, Menlo Park,
California, USA, March 1986.
INTRO:7.
J. Reynolds and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", Request
For Comments (RFC) 1340, July 1992. This document is
periodically updated and reissued with a new number. It
is wise to verify occasionally that the version you have
is still current.
INTRO:8.
"DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria", DoD
publication 5200.28-STD, U.S. Department of Defense,
December 1985.
INTRO:9
G. Malkin and T. LaQuey Parker, "Internet Users'
Glossary", Request for Comments (RFC) 1392 (also FYI
0018), Network Information Center, January 1993.
LINK:1.
S. Leffler and M. Karels, "Trailer Encapsulations",
Request For Comments (RFC) 893, DDN Network Information
Center, SRI International, Menlo Park, California, USA,
April 1984.
LINK:2
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W. Simpson, "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) for the
Transmission of Multi-protocol Datagrams over Point-to-
Point Links", Request For Comments (RFC) 1331, May 1992.
LINK:3
G. McGregor, "The PPP Internet Protocol Control Protocol
(IPCP)", Request For Comments (RFC) 1332, May 1992.
LINK:4
B. Lloyd, W. Simpson, "PPP Authentication Protocols",
Request For Comments (RFC) 1334, May 1992.
LINK:5
W. Simpson "PPP Link Quality Monitoring", Request For
Comments (RFC) 1333, May 1992.
MGT:1.
M. Rose and K. McCloghrie, "Structure and
Identification of Management Information of TCP/IP-based
Internets", Request For Comments (RFC) 1155, DDN Network
Information Center, SRI International, Menlo Park,
California, USA, May 1990.
MGT:2.
K. McCloghrie and M. Rose (Editors), "Management
Information Base of TCP/IP-Based Internets: MIB-II",
Request For Comments (RFC) 1213, DDN Network Information
Center, SRI International, Menlo Park, California, USA,
March 1991.
MGT:3.
J. Case, M. Fedor, M. Schoffstall, and J. Davin,
"Simple Network Management Protocol", Request For
Comments (RFC) 1157, DDN Network Information Center, SRI
International, Menlo Park, California, USA, May 1990.
MGT:4.
M. Rose and K. McCloghrie (Editors), "Towards Concise
MIB Definitions", Request For Comments (RFC) 1212, DDN
Network Information Center, SRI International, Menlo
Park, California, USA, March 1991.
MGT:5.
L. Steinberg, "Techniques for Managing Asynchronously
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Generated Alerts", Request for Comments (RFC) 1224, May
1991.
MGT:6.
F. Kastenholz, "Definitions of Managed Objects for the
Ethernet-like Interface Types", Request for Comments
(RFC) 1398, January 1993.
MGT:7.
R. Fox and K. McCloghrie, "IEEE 802.4 Token Bus MIB",
Request for Comments (RFC) 1230, May 1991.
MGT:8.
E. Decker, R. Fox and K. McCloghrie, "IEEE 802.5 Token
Ring MIB", Request for Comments (RFC) 1231, February
1993.
MGT:9.
J. Case and A. Rijsinghani, "FDDI Management
Information Base", Request for Comments (RFC) 1512,
September 1993.
MGT:10.
B. Stewart, "Definitions of Managed Objects for RS-232-
like Hardware Devices", Request for Comments (RFC) 1317,
April 1992.
MGT:11.
F. Kastenholz, " Definitions of Managed Objects for the
Link Control Protocol of the Point-to-Point Protocol",
Request For Comments (RFC) 1471 June 1992.
MGT:12.
F. Kastenholz, "The Definitions of Managed Objects for
the Security Protocols of the Point-to-Point Protocol",
Request For Comments (RFC) 1472 June 1992.
MGT:13.
F. Kastenholz, "The Definitions of Managed Objects for
the IP Network Control Protocol of the Point-to-Point
Protocol", Request For Comments (RFC) 1473 June 1992.
MGT:14.
F. Baker and R. Coltun, "OSPF Version 2 Management
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Information Base", Request For Comments (RFC) 1253,
August 1991.
MGT:15.
S. Willis and J. Burruss, "Definitions of Managed
Objects for the Border Gateway Protocol (Version 3)",
Request For Comments (RFC) 1269, October 1991.
MGT:16.
F. Baker, J. Watt, "Definitions of Managed Objects for
the DS1 and E1 Interface Types", Request For Comments
(RFC) 1406, January 1993.
MGT:17.
T. Cox and K. Tesink, "Definitions of Managed Objects
for the DS3/E3 Interface Types", Request For Comments
(RFC) 1407, January 1993.
MGT:18.
K. McCloghrie, "Extensions to the Generic-Interface
MIB", Request For Comments (RFC) 1229, August 1992.
MGT:19.
T. Cox and K. Tesink, "Definitions of Managed Objects
for the SIP Interface Type", Request For Comments (RFC)
1304, February 1992.
MGT:20
F. Baker, "IP Forwarding Table MIB", Request For
Comments (RFC) 1354, July 1992.
MGT:21.
G. Malkin and F. Baker, "RIP Version 2 MIB Extension",
Request For Comments (RFC) 1389, January 1993.
MGT:22.
D. Throop, "SNMP MIB Extension for the X.25 Packet
Layer", Request For Comments (RFC) 1382, November 1992.
MGT:23.
D. Throop and F. Baker, "SNMP MIB Extension for X.25
LAPB", Request For Comments (RFC) 1381, November 1992.
MGT:24.
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D. Throop and F. Baker, "SNMP MIB Extension for
MultiProtocol Interconnect over X.25", Request For
Comments (RFC) 1461, May 1993.
MGT:25.
M. Rose, "SNMP over OSI", Request For Comments (RFC)
1418, March 1993.
MGT:26.
G. Minshall and M. Ritter, "SNMP over AppleTalk",
Request For Comments (RFC) 1419, March 1993.
MGT:27.
S. Bostock, "SNMP over IPX", Request For Comments (RFC)
1420, March 1993.
MGT:28.
M. Schoffstall, C. Davin, M. Fedor, J. Case, "SNMP
over Ethernet", Request For Comments (RFC) 1089, February
1989.
MGT:29.
J. Case, "FDDI Management Information Base", Request For
Comments (RFC) 1285, January 1992.
OPER:1.
J. Nagle, "Congestion Control in IP/TCP Internetworks",
Request For Comments (RFC) 896, DDN Network Information
Center, SRI International, Menlo Park, California, USA,
January 1984.
OPER:2.
K.R. Sollins, "TFTP Protocol (revision 2)", Request For
Comments (RFC) 1350, July 1992.
ROUTE:1.
J. Moy, "OSPF Version 2", Request For Comments (RFC)
1247, DDN Network Information Center, SRI International,
Menlo Park, California, USA, July 1991.
ROUTE:2.
R. Callon, "Use of OSI IS-IS for Routing in TCP/IP and
Dual Environments", Request For Comments (RFC) 1195, DDN
Network Information Center, SRI International, Menlo
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Park, California, USA, December 1990.
ROUTE:3.
C. L. Hedrick, "Routing Information Protocol", Request
For Comments (RFC) 1058, DDN Network Information Center,
SRI International, Menlo Park, California, USA, June
1988.
ROUTE:4.
K. Lougheed and Y. Rekhter, "A Border Gateway Protocol
3 (BGP-3)", Request For Comments (RFC) 1267, October
1991.
ROUTE:5.
P. Gross and Y. Rekhter, "Application of the Border
Gateway Protocol in the Internet", Request For Comments
(RFC) 1268, October 1991.
ROUTE:6.
D. Mills, "Exterior Gateway Protocol Formal
Specification", Request For Comments (RFC) 904, DDN
Network Information Center, SRI International, Menlo
Park, California, USA, April 1984.
ROUTE:7.
E. Rosen, "Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP)", Request For
Comments (RFC) 827, DDN Network Information Center, SRI
International, Menlo Park, California, USA, October 1982.
ROUTE:8.
L. Seamonson and E. Rosen, ""STUB" Exterior Gateway
Protocol", Request For Comments (RFC) 888, DDN Network
Information Center, SRI International, Menlo Park,
California, USA, January 1984.
ROUTE:9.
D. Waitzman, C. Partridge, and S. Deering, "Distance
Vector Multicast Routing Protocol", Request For Comments
(RFC) 1075, DDN Network Information Center, SRI
International, Menlo Park, California, USA, November
1988.
ROUTE:10.
S. Deering, "Multicast Routing in Internetworks and
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Extended LANs," Proceedings of '88, Association for
Computing Machinery, August 1988.
ROUTE:11.
P. Almquist, "Type of Service in the Internet Protocol
Suite", Request for Comments (RFC) 1349, July 1992.
ROUTE:12.
Y. Rekhter, "Experience with the BGP Protocol", Request
For Comments (RFC) 1266, October 1991.
ROUTE:13.
Y. Rekhter, "BGP Protocol Analysis", Request For
Comments (RFC) 1265, October 1991.
TRANS:1.
J. Postel, "User Datagram Protocol", Request For
Comments (RFC) 768, DDN Network Information Center, SRI
International, Menlo Park, California, USA, August 1980.
TRANS:2.
J. Postel, "Transmission Control Protocol", Request For
Comments (RFC) 793, DDN Network Information Center, SRI
International, Menlo Park, California, USA, September
1981.
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APPENDIX A. REQUIREMENTS FOR SOURCE-ROUTING HOSTS
Subject to restrictions given below, a host MAY be able to act
as an intermediate hop in a source route, forwarding a
source-routed datagram to the next specified hop.
However, in performing this router-like function, the host
MUST obey all the relevant rules for a router forwarding
source-routed datagrams [INTRO:2]. This includes the
following specific provisions:
(A) TTL
The TTL field MUST be decremented and the datagram
perhaps discarded as specified for a router in [INTRO:2].
(B) ICMP Destination Unreachable
A host MUST be able to generate Destination Unreachable
messages with the following codes:
4 (Fragmentation Required but DF Set) when a source-
routed datagram cannot be fragmented to fit into the
target network;
5 (Source Route Failed) when a source-routed datagram
cannot be forwarded, e.g., because of a routing problem
or because the next hop of a strict source route is not
on a connected network.
(C) IP Source Address
A source-routed datagram being forwarded MAY (and
normally will) have a source address that is not one of
the IP addresses of the forwarding host.
(D) Record Route Option
A host that is forwarding a source-routed datagram
containing a Record Route option MUST update that option,
if it has room.
(E) Timestamp Option
A host that is forwarding a source-routed datagram
containing a Timestamp Option MUST add the current
timestamp to that option, according to the rules for this
option.
To define the rules restricting host forwarding of source-
routed datagrams, we use the term "local source-routing" if
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the next hop will be through the same physical interface
through which the datagram arrived; otherwise, it is "non-
local source-routing".
A host is permitted to perform local source-routing without
restriction.
A host that supports non-local source-routing MUST have a
configurable switch to disable forwarding, and this switch
MUST default to disabled.
The host MUST satisfy all router requirements for configurable
policy filters [INTRO:2] restricting non-local forwarding.
If a host receives a datagram with an incomplete source route
but does not forward it for some reason, the host SHOULD
return an ICMP Destination Unreachable (code 5, Source Route
Failed) message, unless the datagram was itself an ICMP error
message.
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APPENDIX B. GLOSSARY
This Appendix defines specific terms used in this memo. It
also defines some general purpose terms that may be of
interest. See also [INTRO:9] for a more general set of
definitions.
Autonomous System (AS) |
An Autonomous System (AS) is a connected segment of a |
network topology that consists of a collection of |
subnetworks (with hosts attached) interconnected by a set |
of routes. The subnetworks and the routers are expected |
to be under the control of a single operations and |
maintenance (O&M) organization. Within an AS routers may |
use one or more interior routing protocols, and sometimes |
several sets of metrics. An AS is expected to present to |
other ASs an appearence of a coherent interior routing |
plan, and a consistent picture of the destinations |
reachable through the AS. An AS is identified by an |
Autonomous System number.
Connected Network
A network prefix to which a router is interfaced is often
known as a "local network" or the "subnetwork" of that
router. However, these terms can cause confusion, and
therefore we use the term "Connected Network" in this
memo.
Connected (Sub)Network
A Connected (Sub)Network is an IP subnetwork to which a
router is interfaced, or a connected network if the
connected network is not subnetted. See also Connected
Network.
Datagram
The unit transmitted between a pair of internet modules.
Data, called datagrams, from sources to destinations.
The Internet Protocol does not provide a reliable
communication facility. There are no acknowledgments
either end-to-end or hop-by-hop. There is no error no
retransmissions. There is no flow control. See IP.
Default Route
A routing table entry that is used to direct any data
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addressed to any network prefixes not explicitly listed
in the routing table.
Dense Mode
In multicast forwarding, two paradigms are possible: in
"Dense Mode" forwarding, a network multicast is forwarded
as a data link layer multicast to all interfaces except
that on which it was received, unless and until the
router is instructed not to by a multicast routing
neighbor. See Sparse Mode.
EGP
Exterior Gateway Protocol A protocol that distributes
routing information to the gateways (routers) which
connect autonomous systems. See IGP.
EGP-2
Exterior Gateway Protocol version 2 This is an EGP
routing protocol developed to handle traffic between
Autonomous Systems in the Internet.
Forwarder
The logical entity within a router that is responsible
for switching packets among the router's interfaces. The
Forwarder also makes the decisions to queue a packet for
local delivery, to queue a packet for transmission out
another interface, or both.
Forwarding
Forwarding is the process a router goes through for each
packet received by the router. The packet may be
consumed by the router, it may be output on one or more
interfaces of the router, or both. Forwarding includes
the process of deciding what to do with the packet as
well as queuing it up for (possible) output or internal
consumption.
Forwarding Information Base (FIB)
The table containing the information necessary to forward
IP Datagrams, in this document, is called the Forwarding
Information Base. At minimum, this contains the
interface identifier and next hop information for each
reachable destination network prefix.
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Fragment
An IP datagram that represents a portion of a higher
layer's packet that was too large to be sent in its
entirety over the output network.
General Purpose Serial Interface
A physical medium capable of connecting exactly two
systems, and therefore configurable as a point to point
line, but also configurable to support link layer
networking using protocols such as X.25 or Frame Relay.
A link layer network connects another system to a switch,
and a higher communication layer multiplexes virtual
circuits on the connection. See Point to Point Line.
IGP
Interior Gateway Protocol A protocol that distributes
routing information with an Autonomous System (AS). See
EGP.
Interface IP Address
The IP Address and network prefix length that is assigned
to a specific interface of a router.
Internet Address
An assigned number that identifies a host in an internet.
It has two parts: an IP address and a prefix length. The
prefix length indicates how many of the most specific
bits of the address constitute the network prefix.
IP
Internet Protocol The network layer protocol for the
Internet. It is a packet switching, datagram protocol
defined in RFC 791. IP does not provide a reliable
communications facility; that is, there are no end-to-end
of hop-by-hop acknowledgments.
IP Datagram
An IP Datagram is the unit of end-to-end transmission in
the Internet Protocol. An IP Datagram consists of an IP
header followed by all of higher-layer data (such as TCP,
UDP, ICMP, and the like). An IP Datagram is an IP header
followed by a message.
An IP Datagram is a complete IP end-to-end transmission
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unit. An IP Datagram is composed of one or more IP
Fragments.
In this memo, the unqualified term "Datagram" should be
understood to refer to an IP Datagram.
IP Fragment
An IP Fragment is a component of an IP Datagram. An IP
Fragment consists of an IP header followed by all or part
of the higher-layer of the original IP Datagram.
One or more IP Fragments comprises a single IP Datagram.
In this memo, the unqualified term "Fragment" should be
understood to refer to an IP Fragment.
IP Packet
An IP Datagram or an IP Fragment.
In this memo, the unqualified term "Packet" should
generally be understood to refer to an IP Packet.
Logical [network] interface
We define a logical [network] interface to be a logical
path, distinguished by a unique IP address, to a
connected network.
Martian Filtering
A packet that contains an invalid source or destination
address is considered to be "martian" and discarded.
MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit)
The size of the largest packet that can be transmitted or
received through a logical interface. This size includes
the IP header but does not include the size of any Link
Layer headers or framing.
Multicast
A packet that is destined for multiple hosts. See
"broadcast".
Multicast Address
A special type of address that is recognizable by
multiple hosts.
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A Multicast Address is sometimes known as a Functional
Address or a Group Address.
Network Prefix
The portion of an IP Address that signifies a set of
systems. It is selected from the IP Address by logically
ANDing a subnet mask with the address, or (equivalently)
setting the bits of the address not among the most
significant <prefix-length> bits of the address to zero.
Originate
Packets can be transmitted by a router for one of two
reasons: 1) the packet was received and is being
forwarded or 2) the router itself created the packet for
transmission (such as route advertisements). Packets
that the router creates for transmission are said to
originate at the router.
Packet
A packet is the unit of data passed across the interface
between the Internet Layer and the Link Layer. It
includes an IP header and data. A packet may be a
complete IP datagram or a fragment of an IP datagram.
Path
The sequence of routers and (sub-)networks that a packet
traverses from a particular router to a particular
destination host. Note that a path is uni-directional;
it is not unusual to have different paths in the two
directions between a given host pair.
Physical Network
A Physical Network is a network (or a piece of an
internet) which is contiguous at the Link Layer. Its
internal structure (if any) is transparent to the
Internet Layer.
In this memo, several media components that are connected
using devices such as bridges or repeaters are considered
to be a single Physical Network since such devices are
transparent to the IP.
Physical Network Interface
This is a physical interface to a Connected Network and
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has a (possibly unique) Link-Layer address. Multiple
Physical Network Interfaces on a single router may share
the same Link-Layer address, but the address must be
unique for different routers on the same Physical
Network.
Point to Point Line
A physical medium capable of connecting exactly two
systems. In this document, it is only used to refer to
such a line when used to connect IP entities. See
General Purpose Serial Interface.
router
A special-purpose dedicated computer that connects
several networks. Routers switch packets between these
networks in a process known as forwarding. This process
may be repeated several times on a single packet by
multiple routers until the packet can be delivered to the
final destination - switching the packet from router to
router to router... until the packet gets to its
destination.
RPF
Reverse Path Forwarding - A method used to deduce the
next hops for broadcast and multicast packets.
Silently Discard
This memo specifies several cases where a router is to
"Silently Discard" a received packet (or datagram). This
means that the router should discard the packet without
further processing, and that the router will not send any
ICMP error message (see Section [4.3.2]) as a result.
However, for diagnosis of problems, the router should
provide the capability of logging the error (see Section
[1.3.3]), including the contents of the silently
discarded packet, and should record the event in a
statistics counter.
Silently Ignore
A router is said to "Silently Ignore" an error or
condition if it takes no action other than possibly
generating an error report in an error log or through
some network management protocol, and discarding, or
ignoring, the source of the error. In particular, the
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router does NOT generate an ICMP error message.
Sparse Mode
In multicast forwarding, two paradigms are possible: in
"Sparse Mode" forwarding, a network layer multicast
datagram is forwarded as a data link layer multicast
frame to routers and hosts that have asked for it. The
initial forwarding state is the inverse of dense-mode in
that it assumes no part of the network wants the data.
See Dense Mode.
Specific-destination address
This is defined to be the destination address in the IP
header unless the header contains an IP broadcast or IP
multicast address, in which case the specific-destination
is an IP address assigned to the physical interface on
which the packet arrived.
subnet
A portion of a network, which may be a physically
independent network, which shares a network address with
other portions of the network and is distinguished by a
subnet number. A subnet is to a network what a network
is to an internet.
subnet number
A part of the internet address that designates a subnet.
It is ignored for the purposes internet routing, but is
used for intranet routing.
TOS
Type Of Service A field in the IP header that represents
the degree of reliability expected from the network layer
by the transport layer or application.
TTL
Time To Live A field in the IP header that represents how
long a packet is considered valid. It is a combination
"hop count" and "timer value".
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APPENDIX C. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This appendix lists work that future revisions of this
document may wish to address.
In the preparation of Router Requirements, we stumbled across
several other architectural issues. Each of these is dealt
with somewhat in the document, but still ought to be
classified as an open issue in the IP architecture.
Most of the he topics presented here generally indicate areas
where the technology is still relatively new and it is not
appropriate to develop specific requirements since the
community is still gaining operational experience.
Other topics represent areas of ongoing research and indicate
areas that the prudent developer would closely monitor.
(1) SNMP Version 2
(2) Additional SNMP MIBs |
(7) More detailed requirements for leaking routes between |
routing protocols
(8) Router system security
(9) Routing protocol security
(10) Internetwork Protocol layer security. There has been
extensive work refining the security of IP since the
original work writing this document. This security work
should be included in here.
(12) Load Splitting
(13) Sending fragments along different paths
(15) Multiple logical (sub)nets on the same wire. Router
Requirements does not require support for this. We made
some attempt to identify pieces of the architecture
(e.g., forwarding of directed broadcasts and issuing of
Redirects) where the wording of the rules has to be done
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carefully to make "the right thing" happen, and tried to
clearly distinguish logical interfaces from physical
interfaces. However, we did not study this issue in
detail, and we are not at all confident that all the
rules in the document are correct in the presence of
multiple logical (sub)nets on the same wire.
(15) Congestion control and resource management. On the
advice of the IETF's experts (Mankin and Ramakrishnan) we
deprecated (SHOULD NOT) Source Quench and said little
else concrete (Section 5.3.6).
(16) Developing a Link-Layer requirements document that would
be common for both routers and hosts.
(17) Developing a common PPP LQM algorithm.
(18) Investigate of other information (above and beyond
section [3.2]) that passes between the layers, such as
physical network MTU, mappings of IP precedence to Link
Layer priority values, etc.
(19) Should the Link Layer notify IP if address resolution
failed (just like it notifies IP when there is a Link
Layer priority value problem)?
(20) Should all routers be required to implement a DNS
resolver?
(21) Should a human user be able to use a host name anywhere
you can use an IP address when configuring the router?
Even in ping and traceroute?
(22) Almquist's draft ruminations on the next hop and
ruminations on route leaking need to be reviewed, brought
up to date, and published.
(23) Investigation is needed to determine if a redirect
message for precedence is needed or not. If not, are the
type-of-service redirects acceptable?
(24) RIPv2 and RIP+CIDR and variable length network prefixes.
(25) BGP-4 CIDR is going to be important, and everyone is
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betting on BGP-4. We can't avoid mentioning it.
Probably need to describe the differences between BGP-3
and BGP-4, and explore upgrade issues...
(26) Loose Source Route Mobile IP and some multicasting may
require this. Perhaps it should be elevated to a SHOULD
(per Fred Baker's Suggestion).
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APPENDIX D. Multicast Routing Protocols
Multicasting is a relatively new technology within the
Internet Protocol family. It is not widely deployed or
commonly in use yet. Its importance, however, is expected to
grow over the coming years.
This Appendix describes some of the technologies being
investigated for routing multicasts through the Internet.
A diligent implementor will keep abreast of developments in
this area to properly develop multicast facilities.
This Appendix does not specify any standards or requirements.
D.1 Introduction
Multicast routing protocols enable the forwarding of IP
multicast datagrams throughout a TCP/IP internet.
Generally these algorithms forward the datagram based on
its source and destination addresses. Additionally, the
datagram may need to be forwarded to several multicast
group members, at times requiring the datagram to be
replicated and sent out multiple interfaces.
The state of multicast routing protocols is less developed
than the protocols available for the forwarding of IP
unicasts. Three experimental multicast routing protocols
have been documented for TCP/IP. Each uses the IGMP
protocol (discussed in Section [4.4]) to monitor multicast
group membership.
D.2 Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol - DVMRP
DVMRP, documented in [ROUTE:9], is based on Distance Vector
or Bellman-Ford technology. It routes multicast datagrams
only, and does so within a single Autonomous System. DVMRP
is an implementation of the Truncated Reverse Path
Broadcasting algorithm described in [ROUTE:10]. In
addition, it specifies the tunneling of IP multicasts
through non-multicast-routing-capable IP domains.
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D.3 Multicast Extensions to OSPF - MOSPF
MOSPF, currently under development, is a backward-
compatible addition to OSPF that allows the forwarding of
both IP multicasts and unicasts within an Autonomous
System. MOSPF routers can be mixed with OSPF routers
within a routing domain, and they will interoperate in the
forwarding of unicasts. OSPF is a link-state or SPF-based
protocol. By adding link state advertisements that
pinpoint group membership, MOSPF routers can calculate the
path of a multicast datagram as a tree rooted at the
datagram source. Those branches that do not contain group
members can then be discarded, eliminating unnecessary
datagram forwarding hops.
D.4 Protocol Independent Multicast - PIM
PIM, currently under development, is a multicast routing
protocol that runs over an existing unicast infrastructure.
PIM provides for both dense and sparse group membership.
It is different from other protocols, since it uses an
explicit join model for sparse groups. Joining occurs on a
shared tree and can switch to a per-source tree. Where
bandwidth is plentiful and group membership is dense,
overhead can be reduced by flooding data out all links and
later pruning exception cases where there are no group
members.
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APPENDIX E Additional Next-Hop Selection Algorithms
Section [5.2.4.3] specifies an algorithm that routers ought to
use when selecting a next-hop for a packet.
This appendix provides historical perspective for the next-hop
selection problem. It also presents several additional
pruning rules and next-hop selection algorithms that might be
found in the Internet.
This appendix presents material drawn from an earlier,
unpublished, work by Philip Almquist; "Ruminations on the Next
Hop".
This Appendix does not specify any standards or requirements.
E.1. Some Historical Perspective
It is useful to briefly review the history of the topic,
beginning with what is sometimes called the "classic model"
of how a router makes routing decisions. This model
predates IP. In this model, a router speaks some single
routing protocol such as RIP. The protocol completely
determines the contents of the router's Forwarding
Information Base (FIB). The route lookup algorithm is
trivial: the router looks in the FIB for a route whose
destination attribute exactly matches the network prefix
portion of the destination address in the packet. If one
is found, it is used; if none is found, the destination is
unreachable. Because the routing protocol keeps at most
one route to each destination, the problem of what to do
when there are multiple routes that match the same
destination cannot arise.
Over the years, this classic model has been augmented in
small ways. With the deployment of default routes,
subnets, and host routes, it became possible to have more
than one routing table entry which in some sense matched
the destination. This was easily resolved by a consensus
that there was a hierarchy of routes: host routes should be
preferred over subnet routes, subnet routes over net
routes, and net routes over default routes.
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With the deployment of technologies supporting variable
length subnet masks (variable length network prefixes), the
general approach remained the same although its description
became a little more complicated; network prefixes were
introduced as a conscious simplification and regularization
of the architecture. We now say that each route to a
network prefix route has a prefix length associated with
it. This prefix length indicates the number of bits in the
prefix. This may also be represented using the classical
subnet mask. A route cannot be used to route a packet
unless each significant bit in the route's network prefix
matches the corresponding bit in the packet's destination
address. Routes with more bits set in their masks are
preferred over routes that have fewer bits set in their
masks. This is simply a generalization of the hierarchy of
routes described above, and will be referred to for the
rest of this memo as choosing a route by preferring longest
match.
Another way the classic model has been augmented is through
a small amount of relaxation of the notion that a routing
protocol has complete control over the contents of the
routing table. First, static routes were introduced. For
the first time, it was possible to simultaneously have two
routes (one dynamic and one static) to the same
destination. When this happened, a router had to have a
policy (in some cases configurable, and in other cases
chosen by the author of the router's software) which
determined whether the static route or the dynamic route
was preferred. However, this policy was only used as a
tie-breaker when longest match didn't uniquely determine
which route to use. Thus, for example, a static default
route would never be preferred over a dynamic net route
even if the policy preferred static routes over dynamic
routes.
The classic model had to be further augmented when inter-
domain routing protocols were invented. Traditional
routing protocols came to be called "interior gateway
protocols" (IGPs), and at each Internet site there was a
strange new beast called an "exterior gateway", a router
that spoke EGP to several "BBN Core Gateways" (the routers
that made up the Internet backbone at the time) at the same
time as it spoke its IGP to the other routers at its site.
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Both protocols wanted to determine the contents of the
router's routing table. Theoretically, this could result
in a router having three routes (EGP, IGP, and static) to
the same destination. Because of the Internet topology at
the time, it was resolved with little debate that routers
would be best served by a policy of preferring IGP routes
over EGP routes. However, the sanctity of longest match
remained unquestioned: a default route learned from the IGP
would never be preferred over a net route from learned EGP.
Although the Internet topology, and consequently routing in
the Internet, have evolved considerably since then, this
slightly augmented version of the classic model has
survived intact to this day in the Internet (except that
BGP has replaced EGP). Conceptually (and often in
implementation) each router has a routing table and one or
more routing protocol processes. Each of these processes
can add any entry that it pleases, and can delete or modify
any entry that it has created. When routing a packet, the
router picks the best route using longest match, augmented
with a policy mechanism to break ties. Although this
augmented classic model has served us well, it has a number
of shortcomings:
+ It ignores (although it could be augmented to consider)
path characteristics such as quality of service and MTU.
+ It doesn't support routing protocols (such as OSPF and
Integrated IS-IS) that require route lookup algorithms
different than pure longest match.
+ There has not been a firm consensus on what the tie-
breaking mechanism ought to be. Tie-breaking mechanisms
have often been found to be difficult if not impossible
to configure in such a way that the router will always
pick what the network manger considers to be the
"correct" route.
E.2. Additional Pruning Rules
Section [5.2.4.3] defined several pruning rules to use to
select routes from the FIB. There are other rules that
could also be used.
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+ OSPF Route Class
Routing protocols that have areas or make a distinction
between internal and external routes divide their routes
into classes by the type of information used to
calculate the route. A route is always chosen from the
most preferred class unless none is available, in which
case one is chosen from the second most preferred class,
and so on. In OSPF, the classes (in order from most
preferred to least preferred) are intra-area, inter-
area, type 1 external (external routes with internal
metrics), and type 2 external. As an additional
wrinkle, a router is configured to know what addresses
ought to be accessible using intra-area routes, and will
not use inter- area or external routes to reach these
destinations even when no intra-area route is available.
More precisely, we assume that each route has a class
attribute, called route.class, which is assigned by the
routing protocol. The set of candidate routes is
examined to determine if it contains any for which
route.class = intra-area. If so, all routes except
those for which route.class = intra-area are discarded.
Otherwise, router checks whether the packet's
destination falls within the address ranges configured
for the local area. If so, the entire set of candidate
routes is deleted. Otherwise, the set of candidate
routes is examined to determine if it contains any for
which route.class = inter-area. If so, all routes
except those for which route.class = inter-area are
discarded. Otherwise, the set of candidate routes is
examined to determine if it contains any for which
route.class = type 1 external. If so, all routes except
those for which route.class = type 1 external are
discarded.
+ IS-IS Route Class
IS-IS route classes work identically to OSPF's.
However, the set of classes defined by Integrated IS-IS
is different, such that there isn't a one-to-one mapping
between IS-IS route classes and OSPF route classes. The
route classes used by Integrated IS-IS are (in order
from most preferred to least preferred) intra-area,
inter-area, and external.
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The Integrated IS-IS internal class is equivalent to the
OSPF internal class. Likewise, the Integrated IS-IS
external class is equivalent to OSPF's type 2 external
class. However, Integrated IS-IS does not make a
distinction between inter-area routes and external
routes with internal metrics - both are considered to be
inter-area routes. Thus, OSPF prefers true inter-area
routes over external routes with internal metrics,
whereas Integrated IS-IS gives the two types of routes
equal preference.
+ IDPR Policy
A specific case of Policy. The IETF's Inter-domain
Policy Routing Working Group is devising a routing
protocol called Inter-Domain Policy Routing (IDPR) to
support true policy-based routing in the Internet.
Packets with certain combinations of header attributes
(such as specific combinations of source and destination
addresses or special IDPR source route options) are
required to use routes provided by the IDPR protocol.
Thus, unlike other Policy pruning rules, IDPR Policy
would have to be applied before any other pruning rules
except Basic Match.
Specifically, IDPR Policy examines the packet being
forwarded to ascertain if its attributes require that it
be forwarded using policy-based routes. If so, IDPR
Policy deletes all routes not provided by the IDPR
protocol.
E.3 Some Route Lookup Algorithms
This section examines several route lookup algorithms that
are in use or have been proposed. Each is described by
giving the sequence of pruning rules it uses. The
strengths and weaknesses of each algorithm are presented
E.3.1 The Revised Classic Algorithm
The Revised Classic Algorithm is the form of the
traditional algorithm that was discussed in Section
[E.1]. The steps of this algorithm are:
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1. Basic match
2. Longest match
3. Best metric
4. Policy
Some implementations omit the Policy step, since it is
needed only when routes may have metrics that are not
comparable (because they were learned from different
routing domains).
The advantages of this algorithm are:
(1) It is widely implemented.
(2) Except for the Policy step (which an implementor can
choose to make arbitrarily complex) the algorithm
is simple both to understand and to implement.
Its disadvantages are:
(1) It does not handle IS-IS or OSPF route classes, and
therefore cannot be used for Integrated IS-IS or
OSPF.
(2) It does not handle TOS or other path attributes.
(3) The policy mechanisms are not standardized in any
way, and are therefore are often implementation-
specific. This causes extra work for implementors
(who must invent appropriate policy mechanisms) and
for users (who must learn how to use the
mechanisms. This lack of a standardized mechanism
also makes it difficult to build consistent
configurations for routers from different vendors.
This presents a significant practical deterrent to
multi-vendor interoperability.
(4) The proprietary policy mechanisms currently provided
by vendors are often inadequate in complex parts of
the Internet.
(5) The algorithm has not been written down in any
generally available document or standard. It is,
in effect, a part of the Internet Folklore.
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E.3.2 The Variant Router Requirements Algorithm
Some Router Requirements Working Group members have
proposed a slight variant of the algorithm described in
the Section [5.2.4.3]. In this variant, matching the
type of service requested is considered to be more
important, rather than less important, than matching as
much of the destination address as possible. For
example, this algorithm would prefer a default route
that had the correct type of service over a network
route that had the default type of service, whereas the
algorithm in [5.2.4.3] would make the opposite choice.
The steps of the algorithm are:
1. Basic match
2. Weak TOS
3. Longest match
4. Best metric
5. Policy
Debate between the proponents of this algorithm and the
regular Router Requirements Algorithm suggests that each
side can show cases where its algorithm leads to
simpler, more intuitive routing than the other's
algorithm does. This variant has the same set of
advantages and disadvantages that the algorithm
specified in [5.2.4.3] does, except that pruning on Weak
TOS before pruning on Longest Match makes this algorithm
less compatible with OSPF and Integrated IS-IS than the
standard Router Requirements Algorithm.
E.3.3 The OSPF Algorithm
OSPF uses an algorithm that is virtually identical to
the Router Requirements Algorithm except for one crucial
difference: OSPF considers OSPF route classes.
The algorithm is:
1. Basic match
2. OSPF route class
3. Longest match
4. Weak TOS
5. Best metric
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6. Policy
Type of service support is not always present. If it is
not present then, of course, the fourth step would be
omitted
This algorithm has some advantages over the Revised
Classic Algorithm:
(1) It supports type of service routing.
(2) Its rules are written down, rather than merely being
a part of the Internet folklore.
(3) It (obviously) works with OSPF.
However, this algorithm also retains some of the
disadvantages of the Revised Classic Algorithm:
(1) Path properties other than type of service (e.g.,
MTU) are ignored.
(2) As in the Revised Classic Algorithm, the details (or
even the existence) of the Policy step are left to
the discretion of the implementor.
The OSPF Algorithm also has a further disadvantage
(which is not shared by the Revised Classic Algorithm).
OSPF internal (intra-area or inter-area) routes are
always considered to be superior to routes learned from
other routing protocols, even in cases where the OSPF
route matches fewer bits of the destination address.
This is a policy decision that is inappropriate in some
networks.
Finally, it is worth noting that the OSPF Algorithm's
TOS support suffers from a deficiency in that routing
protocols that support TOS are implicitly preferred when
forwarding packets that have non-zero TOS values. This
may not be appropriate in some cases.
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E.3.4 The Integrated IS-IS Algorithm
Integrated IS-IS uses an algorithm that is similar to
but not quite identical to the OSPF Algorithm.
Integrated IS-IS uses a different set of route classes,
and differs slightly in its handling of type of service.
The algorithm is:
1. Basic Match
2. IS-IS Route Classes
3. Longest Match
4. Weak TOS
5. Best Metric
6. Policy
Although Integrated IS-IS uses Weak TOS, the protocol is
only capable of carrying routes for a small specific
subset of the possible values for the TOS field in the
IP header. Packets containing other values in the TOS
field are routed using the default TOS.
Type of service support is optional; if disabled, the
fourth step would be omitted. As in OSPF, the
specification does not include the Policy step.
This algorithm has some advantages over the Revised
Classic Algorithm:
(1) It supports type of service routing.
(2) Its rules are written down, rather than merely being
a part of the Internet folklore.
(3) It (obviously) works with Integrated IS-IS.
However, this algorithm also retains some of the
disadvantages of the Revised Classic Algorithm:
(1) Path properties other than type of service (e.g.,
MTU) are ignored.
(2) As in the Revised Classic Algorithm, the details (or
even the existence) of the Policy step are left to
the discretion of the implementor.
(3) It doesn't work with OSPF because of the differences
between IS-IS route classes and OSPF route classes.
Also, because IS-IS supports only a subset of the
possible TOS values, some obvious implementations
of the Integrated IS-IS algorithm would not support
OSPF's interpretation of TOS.
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The Integrated IS-IS Algorithm also has a further
disadvantage (which is not shared by the Revised Classic
Algorithm): IS-IS internal (intra-area or inter-area)
routes are always considered to be superior to routes
learned from other routing protocols, even in cases
where the IS-IS route matches fewer bits of the
destination address and doesn't provide the requested
type of service. This is a policy decision that may not
be appropriate in all cases.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Integrated IS-IS
Algorithm's TOS support suffers from the same deficiency
noted for the OSPF Algorithm.
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Security Considerations
Although the focus of this document is interoperability rather
than security, there are obviously many sections of this
document that have some ramifications on network security.
"Security" means different things to different people.
Security from a router's point of view is anything that helps
to keep its own networks operational and in addition helps to
keep the Internet as a whole healthy. For the purposes of
this document, the security services we are concerned with are
"denial of service", "integrity", and "authentication" as it
applies to the first two. "Privacy" as a security service is
important, but only peripherally a concern of a router - at
least as of the date of this document.
In several places in this document there are sections entitled
"... Security Considerations". These sections discuss
specific considerations that apply to the general topic under
discussion.
Rarely does this document say "do this and your router/network
will be secure". More likely, it says "this is a good idea
and if you do it, it *may* improve the security of the
Internet and your local system in general."
Unfortunately, this is the state-of-the-art AT THIS TIME. Few
if any of the network protocols a router is concerned with
have reasonable, built-in security features. Industry and the
protocol designers have been and are continuing to struggle
with these issues. There is progress, but only small baby
steps such as the peer-to-peer authentication available in the
BGP and OSPF routing protocols.
In particular, this document notes the current research into
developing and enhancing network security. Specific areas of
research, development, and engineering that are underway as of
this writing (December 1993) are in IP Security, SNMP
Security, and common authentication technologies.
Notwithstanding all the above, there are things both vendors
and users can do to improve the security of their router.
Vendors should get a copy of "Trusted Computer System
Interpretation" [INTRO:8]. Even if a vendor decides not to
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submit their device for formal verification under these
guidelines, the publication provides excellent guidance on
general security design and practices for computing devices.
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APPENDIX F: HISTORICAL ROUTING PROTOCOLS
Certain routing protocols are common in the Internet, but the
authors of this document cannot in good conscience recommend
their use. This is not because they do not work correctly,
but because the characteristics of the Internet assumed in
their design (simple routing, no policy, a single "core
router" network under common administration, limited
complexity, or limited network diameter) are not attributes of
today's Internet. Those parts of the Internet that still use
them are generally limited "fringe" domains with limited
complexity.
As a matter of good faith, collected wisdom concerning their
implementation is recorded in this section.
F.1 EXTERIOR GATEWAY PROTOCOL - EGP
F.1.1 Introduction
The Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) specifies an EGP
that is used to exchange reachability information
between routers of the same or differing autonomous
systems. EGP is not considered a routing protocol since
there is no standard interpretation (i.e. metric) for
the distance fields in the EGP update message, so
distances are comparable only among routers of the same
AS. It is however designed to provide high-quality
reachability information, both about neighbor routers
and about routes to non-neighbor routers.
EGP is defined by [ROUTE:6]. An implementor almost
certainly wants to read [ROUTE:7] and [ROUTE:8] as well,
for they contain useful explanations and background
material.
DISCUSSION:
The present EGP specification has serious
limitations, most importantly a restriction that
limits routers to advertising only those networks
that are reachable from within the router's
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autonomous system. This restriction against
propagating "third party" EGP information is to
prevent long-lived routing loops. This effectively
limits EGP to a two-level hierarchy.
RFC-975 is not a part of the EGP specification, and
should be ignored.
F.1.2 Protocol Walk-through
Indirect Neighbors: RFC-888, pp. 26
An implementation of EGP MUST include indirect
neighbor support.
Polling Intervals: RFC-904, pp. 10
The interval between Hello command retransmissions
and the interval between Poll retransmissions SHOULD
be configurable but there MUST be a minimum value
defined.
The interval at which an implementation will respond
to Hello commands and Poll commands SHOULD be
configurable but there MUST be a minimum value
defined.
Network Reachability: RFC-904, pp. 15
An implementation MUST default to not providing the
external list of routers in other autonomous systems;
only the internal list of routers together with the
nets that are reachable through those routers should
be included in an Update Response/Indication packet.
However, an implementation MAY elect to provide a
configuration option enabling the external list to be
provided. An implementation MUST NOT include in the
external list routers that were learned through the
external list provided by a router in another
autonomous system. An implementation MUST NOT send a
network back to the autonomous system from which it
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is learned, i.e. it MUST do split-horizon on an
autonomous system level.
If more than 255 internal or 255 external routers
need to be specified in a Network Reachability
update, the networks reachable from routers that can
not be listed MUST be merged into the list for one of
the listed routers. Which of the listed routers is
chosen for this purpose SHOULD be user configurable,
but SHOULD default to the source address of the EGP
update being generated.
An EGP update contains a series of blocks of network
numbers, where each block contains a list of network
numbers reachable at a particular distance through a
particular router. If more than 255 networks are
reachable at a particular distance through a
particular router, they are split into multiple
blocks (all of which have the same distance).
Similarly, if more than 255 blocks are required to
list the networks reachable through a particular
router, the router's address is listed as many times
as necessary to include all the blocks in the update.
Unsolicited Updates: RFC-904, pp. 16
If a network is shared with the peer, an
implementation MUST send an unsolicited update upon
entry to the Up state if the source network is the
shared network.
Neighbor Reachability: RFC-904, pp. 6, 13-15
The table on page 6 that describes the values of j
and k (the neighbor up and down thresholds) is
incorrect. It is reproduced correctly here:
Name Active Passive Description
-----------------------------------------------
j 3 1 neighbor-up threshold
k 1 0 neighbor-down threshold
The value for k in passive mode also specified
incorrectly in RFC-904, page 14 The values in
parenthesis should read:
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(j = 1, k = 0, and T3/T1 = 4)
As an optimization, an implementation can refrain
from sending a Hello command when a Poll is due. If
an implementation does so, it SHOULD provide a user
configurable option to disable this optimization.
Abort timer: RFC-904, pages 6, 12, 13
An EGP implementation MUST include support for the
abort timer (as documented in section 4.1.4 of RFC-
904). An implementation SHOULD use the abort timer
in the Idle state to automatically issue a Start
event to restart the protocol machine. Recommended
values are P4 for a critical error (Administratively
prohibited, Protocol Violation and Parameter Problem)
and P5 for all others. The abort timer SHOULD NOT be
started when a Stop event was manually initiated
(such as through a network management protocol).
Cease command received in Idle state: RFC-904, page 13
When the EGP state machine is in the Idle state, it
MUST reply to Cease commands with a Cease-ack
response.
Hello Polling Mode: RFC-904, page 11
An EGP implementation MUST include support for both
active and passive polling modes.
Neighbor Acquisition Messages: RFC-904, page 18
As noted the Hello and Poll Intervals should only be
present in Request and Confirm messages. Therefore
the length of an EGP Neighbor Acquisition Message is
14 bytes for a Request or Confirm message and 10
bytes for a Refuse, Cease or Cease-ack message.
Implementations MUST NOT send 14 bytes for Refuse,
Cease or Cease-ack messages but MUST allow for
implementations that send 14 bytes for these
messages.
Sequence Numbers: RFC-904, page 10
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Response or indication packets received with a
sequence number not equal to S MUST be discarded.
The send sequence number S MUST be incremented just
before the time a Poll command is sent and at no
other times.
F.2 ROUTING INFORMATION PROTOCOL - RIP
F.2.1 Introduction
RIP is specified in [ROUTE:3]. Although RIP is still
quite important in the Internet, it is being replaced in
sophisticated applications by more modern IGPs such as
the ones described above. A router implementing RIP
SHOULD implement RIP Version 2 [ROUTE:?], as it supports
CIDR routes. If occasional access networking is in use,
a router implementing RIP SHOULD implement Demand RIP
[ROUTE:?].
Another common use for RIP is as a "router discovery"
protocol. Section [4.3.3.10] briefly touches upon this
subject.
F.2.2 Protocol Walk-Through
Dealing with changes in topology: [ROUTE:3], pp. 11
An implementation of RIP MUST provide a means for
timing out routes. Since messages are occasionally
lost, implementations MUST NOT invalidate a route
based on a single missed update.
Implementations MUST by default wait six times the
update interval before invalidating a route. A
router MAY have configuration options to alter this
value.
DISCUSSION:
It is important to routing stability that all
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routers in a RIP autonomous system use similar
timeout value for invalidating routes, and
therefore it is important that an implementation
default to the timeout value specified in the
RIP specification. However, that timeout value
is too conservative in environments where packet
loss is reasonably rare. In such an
environment, a network manager may wish to be
able to decrease the timeout period to promote
faster recovery from failures.
IMPLEMENTATION:
There is a very simple mechanism that a router
may use to meet the requirement to invalidate
routes promptly after they time out. Whenever
the router scans the routing table to see if any
routes have timed out, it also notes the age of
the least recently updated route that has not
yet timed out. Subtracting this age from the
timeout period gives the amount of time until
the router again needs to scan the table for
timed out routes.
Split Horizon: [ROUTE:3], pp. 14-15
An implementation of RIP MUST implement "split
horizon", a scheme used for avoiding problems
caused by including routes in updates sent to the
router from which they were learned.
An implementation of RIP SHOULD implement "Split
horizon with poisoned reverse", a variant of split
horizon that includes routes learned from a router
sent to that router, but sets their metric to
infinity. Because of the routing overhead that may
be incurred by implementing split horizon with
poisoned reverse, implementations MAY include an
option to select whether poisoned reverse is in
effect. An implementation SHOULD limit the time in
which it sends reverse routes at an infinite
metric.
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IMPLEMENTATION:
Each of the following algorithms can be used to
limit the time for which poisoned reverse is
applied to a route. The first algorithm is more
complex but does a more thorough job of limiting
poisoned reverse to only those cases where it is
necessary.
The goal of both algorithms is to ensure that
poison reverse is done for any destination whose
route has changed in the last Route Lifetime
(typically 180 seconds), unless it can be sure
that the previous route used the same output
interface. The Route Lifetime is used because
that is the amount of time RIP will keep around
an old route before declaring it stale.
The time intervals (and derived variables) used
in the following algorithms are as follows:
Tu The Update Timer; the number of seconds
between RIP updates. This typically
defaults to 30 seconds.
Rl The Route Lifetime, in seconds. This is the
amount of time that a route is presumed to
be good, without requiring an update. This
typically defaults to 180 seconds.
Ul The Update Loss; the number of consecutive
updates that have to be lost or fail to
mention a route before RIP deletes the
route. Ul is calculated to be (Rl/Tu)+1.
The "+1" is to account for the fact that
the first time the ifcounter is decremented
will be less than Tu seconds after it is
initialized. Typically, Ul will be 7:
(180/30)+1.
In The value to set ifcounter to when a
destination is newly learned. This value
is Ul-4, where the "4" is RIP's garbage
collection timer/30
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The first algorithm is:
- Associated with each destination is a counter,
called the ifcounter below. Poison reverse
is done for any route whose destination's
ifcounter is greater than zero.
- After a regular (not triggered or in response
to a request) update is sent, all the non-
zero ifcounters are decremented by one.
- When a route to a destination is created, its
ifcounter is set as follows:
- If the new route is superseding a valid
route, and the old route used a different
(logical) output interface, then the
ifcounter is set to Ul.
- If the new route is superseding a stale
route, and the old route used a different
(logical) output interface, then the
ifcounter is set to MAX(0, Ul -
INT(seconds that the route has been
stale/Ut).
- If there was no previous route to the
destination, the ifcounter is set to In.
- Otherwise, the ifcounter is set to zero
- RIP also maintains a timer, called the
resettimer below. Poison reverse is done on
all routes whenever resettimer has not
expired (regardless of the ifcounter values).
- When RIP is started, restarted, reset, or
otherwise has its routing table cleared, it
sets the resettimer to go off in Rl seconds.
The second algorithm is identical to the first
except that:
- The rules which set the ifcounter to non-zero
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values are changed to always set it to Rl/Tu,
and
- The resettimer is eliminated.
Triggered updates: [ROUTE:3], pp. 15-16; page 29
Triggered updates (also called "flash updates")
are a mechanism for immediately notifying a
router's neighbors when the router adds or
deletes routes or changes their metrics. A
router MUST send a triggered update when routes
are deleted or their metrics are increased. A
router MAY send a triggered update when routes
are added or their metrics decreased.
Since triggered updates can cause excessive
routing overhead, implementations MUST use the
following mechanism to limit the frequency of
triggered updates:
(1) When a router sends a triggered update, it
sets a timer to a random time between one
and five seconds in the future. The router
must not generate additional triggered
updates before this timer expires.
(2) If the router would generate a triggered
update during this interval it sets a flag
indicating that a triggered update is
desired. The router also logs the desired
triggered update.
(3) When the triggered update timer expires, the
router checks the triggered update flag.
If the flag is set then the router sends a
single triggered update which includes all
the changes that were logged. The router
then clears the flag and, since a triggered
update was sent, restarts this algorithm.
(4) The flag is also cleared whenever a regular
update is sent.
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Triggered updates SHOULD include all routes that
have changed since the most recent regular
(non-triggered) update. Triggered updates MUST
NOT include routes that have not changed since
the most recent regular update.
DISCUSSION:
Sending all routes, whether they have changed
recently or not, is unacceptable in triggered
updates because the tremendous size of many
Internet routing tables could otherwise
result in considerable bandwidth being wasted
on triggered updates.
Use of UDP: [ROUTE:3], pp. 18-19.
RIP packets sent to an IP broadcast address
SHOULD have their initial TTL set to one.
Note that to comply with Section [6.1] of this
memo, a router SHOULD use UDP checksums in RIP
packets that it originates, MUST discard RIP
packets received with invalid UDP checksums, but
MUST NOT discard received RIP packets simply
because they do not contain UDP checksums.
Addressing Considerations: [ROUTE:3], pp. 22
A RIP implementation SHOULD support host routes.
If it does not, it MUST (as described on page 27
of [ROUTE:3]) ignore host routes in received
updates. A router MAY log ignored hosts routes.
The special address 0.0.0.0 is used to describe
a default route. A default route is used as the
route of last resort (i.e., when a route to the
specific net does not exist in the routing
table). The router MUST be able to create a RIP
entry for the address 0.0.0.0.
Input Processing - Response: [ROUTE:3], pp. 26
When processing an update, the following
validity checks MUST be performed:
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+ The response MUST be from UDP port 520.
+ The source address MUST be on a directly
connected subnet (or on a directly connected,
non-subnetted network) to be considered
valid.
+ The source address MUST NOT be one of the
router's addresses.
DISCUSSION:
Some networks, media, and interfaces allow
a sending node to receive packets that it
broadcasts. A router must not accept its
own packets as valid routing updates and
process them. The last requirement
prevents a router from accepting its own
routing updates and processing them (on
the assumption that they were sent by some
other router on the network).
An implementation MUST NOT replace an existing
route if the metric received is equal to the
existing metric except in accordance with the
following heuristic.
An implementation MAY choose to implement the
following heuristic to deal with the above
situation. Normally, it is useless to change
the route to a network from one router to
another if both are advertised at the same
metric. However, the route being advertised by
one of the routers may be in the process of
timing out. Instead of waiting for the route to
timeout, the new route can be used after a
specified amount of time has elapsed. If this
heuristic is implemented, it MUST wait at least
halfway to the expiration point before the new
route is installed.
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F.2.3 Specific Issues
RIP Shutdown
An implementation of RIP SHOULD provide for a
graceful shutdown using the following steps:
(1) Input processing is terminated,
(2) Four updates are generated at random intervals
of between two and four seconds, These updates
contain all routes that were previously
announced, but with some metric changes.
Routes that were being announced at a metric
of infinity should continue to use this
metric. Routes that had been announced with a
non-infinite metric should be announced with a
metric of 15 (infinity - 1).
DISCUSSION:
The metric used for the above really ought
to be 16 (infinity); setting it to 15 is a
kludge to avoid breaking certain old hosts
that wiretap the RIP protocol. Such a host
will (erroneously) abort a TCP connection
if it tries to send a datagram on the
connection while the host has no route to
the destination (even if the period when
the host has no route lasts only a few
seconds while RIP chooses an alternate path
to the destination).
RIP Split Horizon and Static Routes
Split horizon SHOULD be applied to static routes by
default. An implementation SHOULD provide a way to
specify, per static route, that split horizon
should not be applied to this route.
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F.3 GATEWAY TO GATEWAY PROTOCOL - GGP |
The Gateway to Gateway protocol is considered obsolete
and SHOULD NOT be implemented. *
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Acknowledgments
O that we now had here
But one ten thousand of those men in England
That do no work to-day!
What's he that wishes so?
My cousin Westmoreland? No, my fair cousin:
If we are mark'd to die, we are enow
To do our country loss; and if to live,
The fewer men, the greater share of honour.
God's will! I pray thee, wish not one man more.
By Jove, I am not covetous for gold,
Nor care I who doth feed upon my cost;
It yearns me not if men my garments wear;
Such outward things dwell not in my desires:
But if it be a sin to covet honour,
I am the most offending soul alive.
No, faith, my coz, wish not a man from England:
God's peace! I would not lose so great an honour
As one man more, methinks, would share from me
For the best hope I have. O, do not wish one more!
Rather proclaim it, Westmoreland, through my host,
That he which hath no stomach to this fight,
Let him depart; his passport shall be made
And crowns for convoy put into his purse:
We would not die in that man's company
That fears his fellowship to die with us.
This day is called the feast of Crispian:
He that outlives this day, and comes safe home,
Will stand a tip-toe when the day is named,
And rouse him at the name of Crispian.
He that shall live this day, and see old age,
Will yearly on the vigil feast his neighbours,
And say 'To-morrow is Saint Crispian:'
Then will he strip his sleeve and show his scars.
And say 'These wounds I had on Crispin's day.'
Old men forget: yet all shall be forgot,
But he'll remember with advantages
What feats he did that day: then shall our names.
Familiar in his mouth as household words
Harry the king, Bedford and Exeter,
Warwick and Talbot, Salisbury and Gloucester,
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Be in their flowing cups freshly remember'd.
This story shall the good man teach his son;
And Crispin Crispian shall ne'er go by,
From this day to the ending of the world,
But we in it shall be remember'd;
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers;
For he to-day that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother; be he ne'er so vile,
This day shall gentle his condition:
And gentlemen in England now a-bed
Shall think themselves accursed they were not here,
And hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks
That fought with us upon Saint Crispin's day.
This memo is a product of the IETF's Router Requirements
Working Group. A memo such as this one is of necessity the
work of many more people than could be listed here. A wide
variety of vendors, network managers, and other experts from
the Internet community graciously contributed their time and
wisdom to improve the quality of this memo. The editor wishes
to extend sincere thanks to all of them.
The current editor also wishes to single out and extend his
heartfelt gratitude and appreciation to the original editor of
this document; Philip Almquist. Without Philip's work, both
as the original editor and as the Chair of the working group,
this document would not have been produced. He also wishes to
express deep and heartfelt gratitude to the previous editor,
Frank Kastenholz. Frank changed the original document from a
collection of information to a useful description of IP
technology - in his words, a "snapshot" of the technology in
1991. One can only hope that this snapshot, of the technology
in 1994, is as clear.
Philip Almquist, Jeffrey Burgan, Frank Kastenholz, and Cathy
Wittbrodt each wrote major chapters of this memo. Others who
made major contributions to the document included Bill Barns,
Steve Deering, Kent England, Jim Forster, Martin Gross, Jeff
Honig, Steve Knowles, Yoni Malachi, Michael Reilly, and Walt
Wimer.
Additional text came from Andy Malis, Paul Traina, Art
Berggreen, John Cavanaugh, Ross Callon, John Lekashman, Brian
Lloyd, Gary Malkin, Milo Medin, John Moy, Craig Partridge,
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Stephanie Price, Yakov Rekhter, Steve Senum, Richard Smith,
Frank Solensky, Rich Woundy, and others who have been
inadvertently overlooked.
Some of the text in this memo has been (shamelessly)
plagiarized from earlier documents, most notably RFC-1122 by
Bob Braden and the Host Requirements Working Group, and RFC-
1009 by Bob Braden and Jon Postel. The work of these earlier
authors is gratefully acknowledged.
Jim Forster was a co-chair of the Router Requirements Working
Group during its early meetings, and was instrumental in
getting the group off to a good start. Jon Postel, Bob
Braden, and Walt Prue also contributed to the success by
providing a wealth of good advice before the group's first
meeting. Later on, Phill Gross, Vint Cerf, and Noel Chiappa
all provided valuable advice and support.
Mike St. Johns coordinated the Working Group's interactions
with the security community, and Frank Kastenholz coordinated
the Working Group's interactions with the network management
area. Allison Mankin and K.K. Ramakrishnan provided
expertise on the issues of congestion control and resource
allocation.
Many more people than could possibly be listed or credited
here participated in the deliberations of the Router
Requirements Working Group, either through electronic mail or
by attending meetings. However, the efforts of Ross Callon
and Vince Fuller in sorting out the difficult issues of route
choice and route leaking are especially acknowledged.
The editor thanks his employer, Cisco Systems, for allowing
him to spend the time necessary to produce the 1994 snapshot.
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Editor's Address
The address of the current editor of this document is
Fred Baker
Cisco Systems
519 Lado Drive
Santa Barbara, California 93111
USA
Phone:+1 805-681-0115
EMail: fred@cisco.com
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Table of Contents
Status of this Memo .................................... i
0. PREFACE ............................................. 1
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 2
1.1 Reading this Document .............................. 4
1.1.1 Organization ..................................... 4
1.1.2 Requirements ..................................... 5
1.1.3 Compliance ....................................... 6
1.2 Relationships to Other Standards ................... 8
1.3 General Considerations ............................. 9
1.3.1 Continuing Internet Evolution .................... 10
1.3.2 Robustness Principle ............................. 10
1.3.3 Error Logging .................................... 11
1.3.4 Configuration .................................... 12
1.4 Algorithms ......................................... 14
2. INTERNET ARCHITECTURE ............................... 15
2.1 Introduction ....................................... 15
2.2 Elements of the Architecture ....................... 16
2.2.1 Protocol Layering ................................ 16
2.2.2 Networks ......................................... 19
2.2.3 Routers .......................................... 19
2.2.4 Autonomous Systems ............................... 20
2.2.5 Addressing Architecture .......................... 21
2.2.5.1 Classical IP Addressing Architecture ........... 21
2.2.5.2 Classless Inter Domain Routing (CIDR) .......... 23
2.2.6 IP Multicasting .................................. 25
2.2.7 Unnumbered Lines and Networks Prefixes ........... 26
2.2.8 Notable Oddities ................................. 27
2.2.8.1 Embedded Routers ............................... 27
2.2.8.2 Transparent Routers ............................ 28
2.3 Router Characteristics ............................. 30
2.4 Architectural Assumptions .......................... 33
3. LINK LAYER .......................................... 36
3.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................... 36
3.2 LINK/INTERNET LAYER INTERFACE ...................... 36
3.3 SPECIFIC ISSUES .................................... 38
3.3.1 Trailer Encapsulation ............................ 38
3.3.2 Address Resolution Protocol - ARP ................ 38
3.3.3 Ethernet and 802.3 Coexistence ................... 38
3.3.4 Maximum Transmission Unit - MTU .................. 39
3.3.5 Point-to-Point Protocol - PPP .................... 39
3.3.5.1 Introduction ................................... 40
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3.3.5.2 Link Control Protocol (LCP) Options ............ 41
3.3.5.3 IP Control Protocol (IPCP) Options ............. 43
3.3.6 Interface Testing ................................ 43
4. INTERNET LAYER - PROTOCOLS .......................... 45
4.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................... 45
4.2 INTERNET PROTOCOL - IP ............................. 45
4.2.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................... 45
4.2.2 PROTOCOL WALK-THROUGH ............................ 46
4.2.2.1 Options: RFC 791 Section 3.2 ................... 46
4.2.2.2 Addresses in Options: RFC 791 Section 3.1 ...... 50
4.2.2.3 Unused IP Header Bits: RFC 791 Section 3.1 ..... 51
4.2.2.4 Type of Service: RFC 791 Section 3.1 ........... 51
4.2.2.5 Header Checksum: RFC 791 Section 3.1 ........... 51
4.2.2.6 Unrecognized Header Options: RFC 791 Section
3.1 ................................................ 52
4.2.2.7 Fragmentation: RFC 791 Section 3.2 ............. 52
4.2.2.8 Reassembly: RFC 791 Section 3.2 ................ 54
4.2.2.9 Time to Live: RFC 791 Section 3.2 .............. 54
4.2.2.10 Multi-subnet Broadcasts: RFC 922 .............. 55
4.2.2.11 Addressing: RFC 791 Section 3.2 ............... 55
4.2.3 SPECIFIC ISSUES .................................. 59
4.2.3.1 IP Broadcast Addresses ......................... 59
4.2.3.2 IP Multicasting ................................ 60
4.2.3.3 Path MTU Discovery ............................. 61
4.2.3.4 Subnetting ..................................... 62
4.3 INTERNET CONTROL MESSAGE PROTOCOL - ICMP ........... 63
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................... 63
4.3.2 GENERAL ISSUES ................................... 64
4.3.2.1 Unknown Message Types .......................... 64
4.3.2.2 ICMP Message TTL ............................... 64
4.3.2.3 Original Message Header ........................ 64
4.3.2.4 ICMP Message Source Address .................... 65
4.3.2.5 TOS and Precedence ............................. 65
4.3.2.6 Source Route ................................... 66
4.3.2.7 When Not to Send ICMP Errors ................... 66
4.3.2.8 Rate Limiting .................................. 68
4.3.3 SPECIFIC ISSUES .................................. 69
4.3.3.1 Destination Unreachable ........................ 69
4.3.3.2 Redirect ....................................... 70
4.3.3.3 Source Quench .................................. 70
4.3.3.4 Time Exceeded .................................. 71
4.3.3.5 Parameter Problem .............................. 71
4.3.3.6 Echo Request/Reply ............................. 72
4.3.3.7 Information Request/Reply ...................... 73
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4.3.3.8 Timestamp and Timestamp Reply .................. 73
4.3.3.9 Address Mask Request/Reply ..................... 75
4.3.3.10 Router Advertisement and Solicitations ........ 76
4.4 INTERNET GROUP MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL - IGMP .......... 77
5. INTERNET LAYER - FORWARDING ......................... 78
5.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................... 78
5.2 FORWARDING WALK-THROUGH ............................ 78
5.2.1 Forwarding Algorithm ............................. 78
5.2.1.1 General ........................................ 79
5.2.1.2 Unicast ........................................ 80
5.2.1.3 Multicast ...................................... 81
5.2.2 IP Header Validation ............................. 83
5.2.3 Local Delivery Decision .......................... 85
5.2.4 Determining the Next Hop Address ................. 88
5.2.4.1 IP Destination Address ......................... 89
5.2.4.2 Local/Remote Decision .......................... 90
5.2.4.3 Next Hop Address ............................... 92
5.2.4.4 Administrative Preference ...................... 96
5.2.4.6 Load Splitting ................................. 99
5.2.5 Unused IP Header Bits: RFC-791 Section 3.1 ....... 99
5.2.6 Fragmentation and Reassembly: RFC-791 Section
3.2 ................................................ 100
5.2.7 Internet Control Message Protocol - ICMP ......... 100
5.2.7.1 Destination Unreachable ........................ 100
5.2.7.2 Redirect ....................................... 103
5.2.7.3 Time Exceeded .................................. 105
5.2.8 INTERNET GROUP MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL - IGMP ........ 105
5.3 SPECIFIC ISSUES .................................... 106
5.3.1 Time to Live (TTL) ............................... 106
5.3.2 Type of Service (TOS) ............................ 107
5.3.3 IP Precedence .................................... 109
5.3.3.1 Precedence-Ordered Queue Service ............... 111
5.3.3.2 Lower Layer Precedence Mappings ................ 111
5.3.3.3 Precedence Handling For All Routers ............ 112
5.3.4 Forwarding of Link Layer Broadcasts .............. 115
5.3.5 Forwarding of Internet Layer Broadcasts .......... 116
5.3.5.1 Limited Broadcasts ............................. 117
5.3.5.2 Directed Broadcasts ............................ 118
5.3.5.3 All-subnets-directed Broadcasts ................ 118
5.3.5.4 Network-Prefix-Directed Broadcasts ............. 119
5.3.6 Congestion Control ............................... 119
5.3.7 Martian Address Filtering ........................ 121
5.3.8 Source Address Validation ........................ 122
5.3.9 Packet Filtering and Access Lists ................ 123
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5.3.10 Multicast Routing ............................... 124
5.3.11 Controls on Forwarding .......................... 124
5.3.12 State Changes ................................... 125
5.3.12.1 When a Router Ceases Forwarding ............... 125
5.3.12.2 When a Router Starts Forwarding ............... 126
5.3.12.3 When an Interface Fails or is Disabled ........ 127
5.3.12.4 When an Interface is Enabled .................. 127
5.3.13 IP Options ...................................... 127
5.3.13.1 Unrecognized Options .......................... 128
5.3.13.2 Security Option ............................... 128
5.3.13.3 Stream Identifier Option ...................... 128
5.3.13.4 Source Route Options .......................... 129
5.3.13.5 Record Route Option ........................... 129
5.3.13.6 Timestamp Option .............................. 130
6. TRANSPORT LAYER ..................................... 132
6.1 USER DATAGRAM PROTOCOL - UDP ....................... 132
6.2 TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL - TCP ................ 132
7. APPLICATION LAYER - ROUTING PROTOCOLS ............... 135
7.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................... 135
7.1.1 Routing Security Considerations .................. 135
7.1.2 Precedence ....................................... 136
7.1.3 Message Validation ............................... 136
7.2 INTERIOR GATEWAY PROTOCOLS ......................... 137
7.2.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................... 137
7.2.2 OPEN SHORTEST PATH FIRST - OSPF .................. 138
7.2.3 INTERMEDIATE SYSTEM TO INTERMEDIATE SYSTEM -
DUAL IS-IS ......................................... 138
7.3 EXTERIOR GATEWAY PROTOCOLS ........................ 139
7.3.1 INTRODUCTION .................................... 139
7.3.2 BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL - BGP .................... 139
7.3.2.1 Introduction ................................... 139
7.3.2.2 Protocol Walk-through .......................... 140
7.3.3 INTER-AS ROUTING WITHOUT AN EXTERIOR PROTOCOL
.................................................... 141
7.4 STATIC ROUTING ..................................... 142
7.5 FILTERING OF ROUTING INFORMATION ................... 144
7.5.1 Route Validation ................................. 144
7.5.2 Basic Route Filtering ............................ 145
7.5.3 Advanced Route Filtering ......................... 145
7.6 INTER-ROUTING-PROTOCOL INFORMATION EXCHANGE ........ 146
8. APPLICATION LAYER - NETWORK MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS
.................................................... 148
8.1 The Simple Network Management Protocol - SNMP ...... 148
8.1.1 SNMP Protocol Elements ........................... 148
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8.2 Community Table .................................... 149
8.3 Standard MIBS ...................................... 150
8.4 Vendor Specific MIBS ............................... 152
8.5 Saving Changes ..................................... 153
9. APPLICATION LAYER - MISCELLANEOUS PROTOCOLS ......... 155
9.1 BOOTP .............................................. 155
9.1.1 Introduction ..................................... 155
9.1.2 BOOTP Relay Agents ............................... 155
10. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE ......................... 157
10.1 Introduction ...................................... 157
10.2 Router Initialization ............................. 159
10.2.1 Minimum Router Configuration .................... 159
10.2.2 Address and Prefix Initialization ............... 160
10.2.3 Network Booting using BOOTP and TFTP ............ 161
10.3 Operation and Maintenance ......................... 162
10.3.1 Introduction .................................... 162
10.3.2 Out Of Band Access .............................. 163
10.3.2 Router O&M Functions ............................ 164
10.3.2.1 Maintenance - Hardware Diagnosis .............. 164
10.3.2.2 Control - Dumping and Rebooting ............... 164
10.3.2.3 Control - Configuring the Router .............. 164
10.3.2.4 Net Booting of System Software ................ 165
10.3.2.5 Detecting and responding to misconfiguration
.................................................... 166
10.3.2.6 Minimizing Disruption ......................... 167
10.3.2.7 Control - Troubleshooting Problems ............ 168
10.4 Security Considerations ........................... 169
10.4.1 Auditing and Audit Trails ....................... 169
10.4.2 Configuration Control ........................... 171
11. REFERENCES ......................................... 173
APPENDIX A. REQUIREMENTS FOR SOURCE-ROUTING HOSTS ...... 186
APPENDIX B. GLOSSARY ................................... 188
APPENDIX C. FUTURE DIRECTIONS .......................... 195
APPENDIX D. Multicast Routing Protocols ................ 198
D.1 Introduction ....................................... 198
D.2 Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol -
DVMRP .............................................. 198
D.3 Multicast Extensions to OSPF - MOSPF ............... 199
D.4 Protocol Independent Multicast - PIM ............... 199
APPENDIX E Additional Next-Hop Selection Algorithms
.................................................... 200
E.1. Some Historical Perspective ....................... 200
E.2. Additional Pruning Rules .......................... 202
E.3 Some Route Lookup Algorithms ....................... 204
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E.3.1 The Revised Classic Algorithm .................... 204
E.3.2 The Variant Router Requirements Algorithm ........ 206
E.3.3 The OSPF Algorithm ............................... 206
E.3.4 The Integrated IS-IS Algorithm ................... 208
Security Considerations ................................ 210
APPENDIX F: HISTORICAL ROUTING PROTOCOLS ............... 212
F.1 EXTERIOR GATEWAY PROTOCOL - EGP .................... 212
F.1.1 Introduction ..................................... 212
F.1.2 Protocol Walk-through ............................ 213
F.2 ROUTING INFORMATION PROTOCOL - RIP ................. 216
F.2.1 Introduction ..................................... 216
F.2.2 Protocol Walk-Through ............................ 216
F.2.3 Specific Issues .................................. 223
F.3 GATEWAY TO GATEWAY PROTOCOL - GGP .................. 224
Acknowledgments ........................................ 225
Editor's Address ....................................... 228
IETF Exp. 22 Sep. 1995 [Page vii]
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