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Versions: (draft-thomson-rtcweb-consent) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 RFC 7675

RTCWEB                                                        M. Perumal
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track                                 D. Wing
Expires: December 10, 2015                               R. Ravindranath
                                                                T. Reddy
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                              M. Thomson
                                                                 Mozilla
                                                            June 8, 2015


                    STUN Usage for Consent Freshness
              draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-14

Abstract

   To prevent WebRTC applications, such as browsers, from launching
   attacks by sending media to unwilling victims, periodic consent to
   send needs to be obtained from remote endpoints.

   This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session
   Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 10, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Solution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.1.  Expiration of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.2.  Immediate Revocation of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  DiffServ Treatment for Consent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  DTLS applicability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   To prevent attacks on peers, endpoints have to ensure the remote peer
   is willing to receive traffic.  This is performed both when the
   session is first established to the remote peer using Interactive
   Connectivity Establishment ICE [RFC5245] connectivity checks, and
   periodically for the duration of the session using the procedures
   defined in this document.

   When a session is first established, ICE implementations obtain an
   initial consent to send by performing STUN connectivity checks.  This
   document describes a new STUN usage with exchange of request and
   response messages that verifies the remote peer's ongoing consent to
   receive traffic.  This consent expires after a period of time and
   needs to be continually renewed, which ensures that consent can be
   terminated.

   This document defines what it takes to obtain, maintain, and lose
   consent to send.  Consent to send applies to a single 5-tuple.  How
   applications react to changes in consent is not described in this
   document.  The consent mechanism does not update the ICE procedures
   defined in [RFC5245].



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   Consent is obtained only by full ICE implementations.  An ICE-lite
   agent (as defined in Section 2.7 of [RFC5245]) does not generate
   connectivity checks or run the ICE state machine.  An ICE-lite agent
   does not generate consent checks, it will only respond to any checks
   that it receives.  No changes are required to ICE-lite
   implementations in order to respond to consent checks, as they are
   processed as normal ICE connectivity checks.

2.  Applicability

   This document defines what it takes to obtain, maintain, and lose
   consent to send using ICE.  Verification of peer consent before
   sending traffic is necessary in deployments like WebRTC to ensure
   that a malicious JavaScript cannot use the browser as a platform for
   launching attacks.  Section 4.4 and Section 5.3 of
   [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch] further explains the value of
   obtaining and maintaining consent.

   Other Applications that have similar security requirements to verify
   peer's consent before sending non-ICE packets can use the consent
   mechanism described in this document.  The mechanism of how
   applications are made aware of consent expiration is outside the
   scope of the document.

3.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   Consent:  The mechanism of obtaining permission from the remote
      endpoint to send non-ICE traffic to a remote transport address.
      Consent is obtained using ICE.

   Consent Freshness:  Maintaining and renewing consent over time.

   Transport Address:  The remote peer's IP address and UDP or TCP port
      number.

4.  Design Considerations

   Although ICE requires periodic keepalive traffic to keep NAT bindings
   alive (Section 10 of [RFC5245], [RFC6263]), those keepalives are sent
   as STUN Indications which are send-and-forget, and do not evoke a
   response.  A response is necessary for consent to continue sending
   traffic.  Thus, we need a request/response mechanism for consent
   freshness.  ICE can be used for that mechanism because ICE
   implementations are already required to continue listening for ICE



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   messages, as described in Section 10 of [RFC5245].  STUN binding
   requests sent for consent freshness also serve the keepalive purpose
   (i.e to keep NAT bindings alive).  Because of that, dedicated
   keepalives (e.g.  STUN Binding Indications) are not sent on candidate
   pairs where consent requests are sent, in accordance with
   Section 20.2.3 of [RFC5245].

   When Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) is used, the
   following considerations are applicable.  SRTP is encrypted and
   authenticated with symmetric keys; that is, both sender and receiver
   know the keys.  With two party sessions, receipt of an authenticated
   packet from the single remote party is a strong assurance the packet
   came from that party.  However, when a session involves more than two
   parties, all of whom know each other's keys, any of those parties
   could have sent (or spoofed) the packet.  Such shared key
   distributions are possible with some MIKEY [RFC3830] modes, Security
   Descriptions [RFC4568], and EKT [I-D.ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt].  Thus,
   in such shared keying distributions, receipt of an authenticated SRTP
   packet is not sufficient to verify consent.

   The mechanism proposed in the document is an optional extension to
   the ICE protocol, it can be deployed at one end of the two-party
   communication session without impact on the other party.

5.  Solution

   Initial consent to send traffic is obtained using ICE [RFC5245].  An
   endpoint gains consent to send on a candidate pair when the pair
   enters the Succeeded ICE state.  This document establishes a 30
   second expiry time on consent. 30 seconds was chosen to balance the
   need to minimize the time taken to respond to a loss of consent with
   the desire to reduce the occurrence of spurious failures.

   ICE does not identify when consent to send traffic ends.  This
   document describes two ways in which consent to send ends: expiration
   of consent and immediate revocation of consent, which are discussed
   in the following sections.

5.1.  Expiration of Consent

   A full ICE implementation obtains consent to send using ICE.  After a
   successful ICE connectivity check on a particular transport address
   (i.e., a candidate pair has been marked as Succeeded), consent MUST
   be maintained following the procedure described in this document.

   An endpoint MUST NOT send data other than the messages used to
   establish consent unless the receiving endpoint has consented to
   receive data.  Connectivity checks that are paced as described in



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   Section 16 of [RFC5245] and responses to connectivity checks are
   permitted.  That is, no application data (e.g., RTP or Datagram
   Transport Layer Security (DTLS)) can be sent until consent is
   obtained.

   Explicit consent to send is obtained and maintained by sending an
   STUN binding request to the remote peer's transport address and
   receiving a matching, authenticated, non-error STUN binding response
   from the remote peer's transport address.  These STUN binding
   requests and responses are authenticated using the same short-term
   credentials as the initial ICE exchange.

   Note:  Although TCP has its own consent mechanism (TCP
      acknowledgements), consent is necessary over a TCP connection
      because it could be translated to a UDP connection (e.g.,
      [RFC6062]).

   Consent expires after 30 seconds.  That is, if a valid STUN binding
   response has not been received from the remote peer's transport
   address in 30 seconds, the endpoint MUST cease transmission on that
   5-tuple.  STUN consent responses received after consent expiry do not
   re-establish consent, and may be discarded or cause an ICMP error.

   To prevent expiry of consent, a STUN binding request can be sent
   periodically.  To prevent synchronization of consent checks, each
   interval MUST be randomized from between 0.8 and 1.2 times the basic
   period.  Implementations SHOULD set a default interval of 5 seconds,
   resulting in a period between checks of 4 to 6 seconds.
   Implementations MUST NOT set the period between checks to less than 4
   seconds.  This timer is independent of the consent expiry timeout.

   Each STUN binding request for consent MUST use a new STUN transaction
   identifier for every consent binding request, as described in
   Section 6 of [RFC5389].  Each STUN binding request for consent is
   transmitted once only.  A sender therefore cannot assume that it will
   receive a response for every consent request, and a response might be
   for a previous request (rather than for the most recently sent
   request).

   An endpoint SHOULD await a binding response for each request it sends
   for a time based on the estimated round-trip time (RTT) (see
   Section 7.2.1 of [RFC5389]) with an allowance for variation in
   network delay.  The RTT value can be updated as described in
   [RFC5389].  All outstanding STUN consent transactions for a candidate
   pair MUST be discarded when consent expires.

   To meet the security needs of consent, an untrusted application
   (e.g., JavaScript or signaling servers) MUST NOT be able to obtain or



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   control the STUN transaction identifier, because that enables
   spoofing of STUN responses, falsifying consent.

   To prevent attacks on the peer during ICE restart, an endpoint that
   continues to send traffic on the previously validated candidate pair
   during ICE restart MUST continue to perform consent freshness on that
   candidate pair as described earlier.

   While TCP affords some protection from off-path attackers ([RFC5961],
   [RFC4953]), there is still a risk an attacker could cause a TCP
   sender to send forever by spoofing ACKs.  To prevent such an attack,
   consent checks MUST be performed over all transport connections,
   including TCP.  In this way, an off-path attacker spoofing TCP
   segments cannot cause a TCP sender to send once the consent timer
   expires (30 seconds).

   An endpoint that is not sending any application data does not need to
   maintain consent.  However, not sending any traffic could cause NAT
   or firewall mappings to expire.  Furthermore, having one peer unable
   to send is detrimental to many protocols.  Absent better information
   about the network, if an endpoint needs to ensure its NAT or firewall
   mappings do not expire, it can be done using keepalive or other
   techniques (see Section 10 of [RFC5245] and see [RFC6263]).

   After consent is lost, the same ICE credentials MUST NOT be used on
   the affected 5-tuple again.  That means that a new session, or an ICE
   restart, is needed to obtain consent to send on the affected
   candidate pair.

5.2.  Immediate Revocation of Consent

   In some cases it is useful to signal that consent is terminated
   rather than relying on a timeout.

   Consent for sending application data is immediately revoked by
   receipt of an authenticated message that closes the connection (e.g.,
   a TLS fatal alert) or receipt of a valid and authenticated STUN
   response with error code Forbidden (403).  Note however that consent
   revocation messages can be lost on the network, so an endpoint could
   resend these messages, or wait for consent to expire.

   Receipt of an unauthenticated message that closes a connection (e.g.,
   TCP FIN) does not indicate revocation of consent.  Thus, an endpoint
   receiving an unauthenticated end-of-session message SHOULD continue
   sending media (over connectionless transport) or attempt to re-
   establish the connection (over connection-oriented transport) until
   consent expires or it receives an authenticated message revoking
   consent.



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   Note that an authenticated SRTCP BYE does not terminate consent; it
   only indicates the associated SRTP source has quit.

6.  DiffServ Treatment for Consent

   It is RECOMMENDED that STUN consent checks use the same Diffserv
   Codepoint markings as the ICE connectivity checks described in
   Section 7.1.2.4 of [RFC5245] for a given 5-tuple.

   Note:  It is possible that different Diffserv Codepoints are used by
      different media over the same transport address
      [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos].  Such a case is outside the scope of
      this document.

7.  DTLS applicability

   The DTLS applicability is identical to what is described in
   Section 4.2 of [RFC7350].

8.  Security Considerations

   This document describes a security mechanism, details of which are
   mentioned in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2.  Consent requires 96 bits
   transaction ID to be uniformly and randomly chosen from the interval
   0 .. 2**96-1, and be cryptographically strong.  This is good enough
   security against an off-path attacker replaying old STUN consent
   responses.  Consent Verification to avoid attacks using a browser as
   an attack platform against machines is discussed in Sections 3.3 and
   4.2 of [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security].

   The security considerations discussed in [RFC5245] should also be
   taken into account.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not require any action from IANA.

10.  Acknowledgement

   Thanks to Eric Rescorla, Harald Alvestrand, Bernard Aboba, Magnus
   Westerland, Cullen Jennings, Christer Holmberg, Simon Perreault, Paul
   Kyzivat, Emil Ivov, Jonathan Lennox, Inaki Baz Castillo, Rajmohan
   Banavi, Christian Groves, Meral Shirazipour and David Black for their
   valuable inputs and comments.  Thanks to Christer Holmberg for doing
   a thorough review.






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11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security]
              Rescorla, E., "Security Considerations for WebRTC", draft-
              ietf-rtcweb-security-08 (work in progress), February 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch]
              Rescorla, E., "WebRTC Security Architecture", draft-ietf-
              rtcweb-security-arch-11 (work in progress), March 2015.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5245]  Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
              (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT)
              Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245, April
              2010.

   [RFC5389]  Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing,
              "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389,
              October 2008.

   [RFC6263]  Marjou, X. and A. Sollaud, "Application Mechanism for
              Keeping Alive the NAT Mappings Associated with RTP / RTP
              Control Protocol (RTCP) Flows", RFC 6263, June 2011.

11.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt]
              Mattsson, J., McGrew, D., and D. Wing, "Encrypted Key
              Transport for Secure RTP", draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-03
              (work in progress), October 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos]
              Dhesikan, S., Jennings, C., Druta, D., Jones, P., and J.
              Polk, "DSCP and other packet markings for RTCWeb QoS",
              draft-ietf-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos-03 (work in progress),
              November 2014.

   [RFC3830]  Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K.
              Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
              August 2004.

   [RFC4568]  Andreasen, F., Baugher, M., and D. Wing, "Session
              Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media
              Streams", RFC 4568, July 2006.



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   [RFC4953]  Touch, J., "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks", RFC
              4953, July 2007.

   [RFC5961]  Ramaiah, A., Stewart, R., and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's
              Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks", RFC 5961, August
              2010.

   [RFC6062]  Perreault, S. and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using Relays
              around NAT (TURN) Extensions for TCP Allocations", RFC
              6062, November 2010.

   [RFC7350]  Petit-Huguenin, M. and G. Salgueiro, "Datagram Transport
              Layer Security (DTLS) as Transport for Session Traversal
              Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 7350, August 2014.

Authors' Addresses

   Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal
   Ericsson
   Ferns Icon
   Doddanekundi, Mahadevapura
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560037
   India

   Email: muthu.arul@gmail.com


   Dan Wing
   Cisco Systems
   821 Alder Drive
   Milpitas, California  95035
   USA

   Email: dwing@cisco.com


   Ram Mohan Ravindranath
   Cisco Systems
   Cessna Business Park
   Sarjapur-Marathahalli Outer Ring Road
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560103
   India

   Email: rmohanr@cisco.com







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   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   Cisco Systems
   Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli
   Sarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring Road
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560103
   India

   Email: tireddy@cisco.com


   Martin Thomson
   Mozilla
   Suite 300
   650 Castro Street
   Mountain View, California  94041
   US

   Email: martin.thomson@gmail.com

































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