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Versions: (draft-haynes-sacm-ecp) 00 01 02 03 04

SACM                                                           D. Haynes
Internet-Draft                                     The MITRE Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track                     J. Fitzgerald-McKay
Expires: August 3, 2018                            Department of Defense
                                                             L. Lorenzin
                                                            Pulse Secure
                                                        January 30, 2018


                      Endpoint Compliance Profile
                         draft-ietf-sacm-ecp-01

Abstract

   This document specifies the Endpoint Compliance Profile, a high-level
   specification that describes a specific combination and application
   of IETF and TNC protocols and interfaces specifically designed to
   support ongoing assessment of endpoint posture and the controlled
   exposure of collected posture information to appropriate security
   applications.  This document is an extension of the Trusted Computing
   Group's Endpoint Compliance Profile Version 1.0 specification.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 3, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents



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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Preventative Posture Assessments  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  All Network-Connected Endpoints are Endpoints . . . . . .   5
     1.3.  All Endpoints on the Network Must be Uniquely Identified    5
     1.4.  Standardized Data Models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.5.  Secure Standardized Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.6.  Posture Information Must Be Stored  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.7.  Posture Information Can Be Shared . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.8.  Enterprise Asset Posture Information Belongs to the
           Enterprise  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.9.  Keywords  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Endpoint Compliance Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Posture Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Data Storage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Data Sharing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  ECP Components  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  Endpoint  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       5.1.1.  Posture Collector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       5.1.2.  Posture Collection Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.2.  Posture Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.2.1.  Posture Validator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.2.2.  Posture Collection Manager  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.3.  Repository  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.4.  Evaluator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.5.  Orchestrator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  ECP Transactions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.1.  Provisioning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.2.  Discovery and Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.3.  Event Driven Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.4.  Querying  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.5.  Data Storage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.6.  Data Sharing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  ECP Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.1.  IETF NEA ECP Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       7.1.1.  Endpoint Pre-Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       7.1.2.  Endpoint  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
         7.1.2.1.  Posture Collector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
         7.1.2.2.  Posture Collection Engine . . . . . . . . . . . .  18



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       7.1.3.  Posture Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
         7.1.3.1.  Posture Validator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
         7.1.3.2.  Posture Collection Manager  . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       7.1.4.  Repository  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       7.1.5.  Administrative Interface and API  . . . . . . . . . .  20
       7.1.6.  IETF SACM SWAM Extension to the IETF NEA ECP
               Implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
         7.1.6.1.  Endpoint Pre-Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
         7.1.6.2.  SWID Tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
         7.1.6.3.  SWID Posture Collectors and Posture Validators  .  21
         7.1.6.4.  Repository  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.2.  IETF NETMOD ECP Implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   8.  ECP Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     8.1.  Hardware Asset Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     8.2.  Software Asset Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     8.3.  Vulnerability Searches  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     8.4.  Threat Detection and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   9.  Non-supported Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   10. Endpoint Compliance Profile Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     10.1.  Continuous Posture Assessment of an Endpoint . . . . . .  24
       10.1.1.  Change on Endpoint Triggers Posture Assessment . . .  25
     10.2.  Administrator Searches for Vulnerable Endpoints  . . . .  27
   11. Profile Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   12. Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   13. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     15.1.  Security Benefits of Endpoint Compliance Profile . . . .  32
     15.2.  Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       15.2.1.  Endpoint Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       15.2.2.  Network Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       15.2.3.  Posture Manager Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       15.2.4.  Repository Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     15.3.  Countermeasures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       15.3.1.  Countermeasures for Endpoint Attacks . . . . . . . .  36
       15.3.2.  Countermeasures for Network Attacks  . . . . . . . .  37
       15.3.3.  Countermeasures for Posture Manager Attacks  . . . .  37
       15.3.4.  Countermeasures for Repository Attacks . . . . . . .  38
   16. Privacy-Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   17. Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     17.1.  -00 to -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     17.2.  -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     17.3.  -02 to -00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     17.4.  -00 to -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   18. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     18.1.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     18.2.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41



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1.  Introduction

   The Endpoint Compliance Profile (ECP) builds on prior work from the
   IETF NEA WG, the IETF NETMOD WG, and the Trusted Computing Group
   [TNC]Trusted Network Communications (TNC) WG to standardize the
   collection, storage and sharing of posture information from network-
   connected endpoints, including user endpoints, servers, and
   infrastructure.  The first generation of this specification focuses
   on reducing the security exposure of a network by enabling event-
   driven posture collection, as well as standardized querying for
   additional endpoint data as needed.  Standardized collection improves
   network security by confirming that endpoints are known and
   authorized, and are compliant with network policy.

   When ECP is used, posture collectors running on the target endpoint
   gather posture information as changes occur on the endpoint, and
   forward this information to a posture manager, which stores it in a
   repository.  This information is gathered while the target endpoint
   is already connected to the network.  Administrators will query the
   repository to determine the posture status of an endpoint.

   Building and maintaining a continuously updated repository of
   information using the ECP enables network owners and administrators
   to perform the asset, vulnerability, and configuration management
   tasks that are the basis for robust network security.

   The ECP also describes how to expose information--such as endpoint
   purpose, the software that is supposed to be running on an endpoint,
   and the activities an endpoint is supposed to be performing--to
   sensors that are looking for indicators of attacks and malicious
   activity on the network.  The ECP does not set requirements for this
   future-leaning work; it instead sets requirements for building a data
   repository that best enhances decision-making by these sensors.
   Therefore, while data sharing components are included in ECP diagrams
   and high-level capability descriptions, vendors are free to
   experiment with best approaches for sharing data beyond the
   repository.  Suggestions and ideas for future integration are
   captured in the Section 12 section of this document.

1.1.  Preventative Posture Assessments

   The value of continuous endpoint posture assessment is well
   established.  Security experts have for years identified asset
   management and vulnerability remediation as a critical step for
   preventing intrusions.  Application whitelisting, patching
   applications and operating systems, and using the latest versions of
   applications top the Defense Signals Directorate's "Top 4 Mitigations
   to Protect Your ICT System".  [DSD] "Inventory of Authorized and



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   Unauthorized Endpoints", "Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized
   Software", and "Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation"
   are Critical Controls 1, 2, and 4, respectively, of the CIS "20
   Critical Security Controls".  [CIS] While there are commercially
   available solutions that attempt to address these security controls,
   these solutions do not run on all types of endpoints; consistently
   interoperate with other tools that could make use of the data
   collected; collect posture information from all types of endpoints in
   a consistent, standardized schema; or require vetted, standardized
   protocols that have been evaluated by the international community for
   cryptographic soundness.

   As is true of most solutions offered today, the solution found in the
   ECP does not attempt to solve the lying endpoint problem.  An
   endpoint that has already been infected with malicious software can
   provide false information about its identity and the software it is
   running.  The primary purpose of the ECP is not to detect infected
   endpoints; rather, it focuses on ensuring that healthy endpoints
   remain healthy by keeping software up-to-date and patched.  The first
   goal of the ECP is to help an administrator easily determine which
   endpoints require some follow-up action.  By sharing posture
   information with sensors on the network, ECP aids in the detection of
   attacks on endpoints and drives follow-up actions.

1.2.  All Network-Connected Endpoints are Endpoints

   As defined by [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology], an endpoint is any
   physical or virtual computing endpoint that can be connected to a
   network.  Posture assessment against policy is equally, if not more,
   important for continuously connected endpoints, such as enterprise
   workstations and infrastructure endpoints, as it is for sporadically
   connected endpoints.  Continuously connected endpoints are just as
   likely to fall out of compliance with policy, and a standardized
   posture assessment method is necessary to ensure they can be properly
   handled.

1.3.  All Endpoints on the Network Must be Uniquely Identified

   Many administrators struggle to identify what endpoints are connected
   to the network at any given time.  By requiring a standardized method
   of endpoint identity, the Endpoint Compliance Profile will enable
   administrators to answer the basic question, "What is on my network?"
   Unique endpoint identification also enables the comparison of current
   and past endpoint posture assessments, by allowing administrators to
   correlate assessments from the same endpoint.  This makes it easier
   to flag suspicious changes in endpoint posture for manual or
   automatic review, and helps to swiftly identify malicious changes to
   endpoint applications.



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1.4.  Standardized Data Models

   The ECP requires the use of standardized data models for the exchange
   of posture information.  This helps to ensure that the posture
   information sent from endpoints to the repository can be easily
   stored, due to their known format, and shared with authorized
   endpoints and users.  Standardized data models also enable collection
   from myriad types of endpoints.  Such standardization saves vendors
   time and money--time that does not have to be spent integrating new
   data models into the enterprise's reporting mechanisms, and money
   that does not have to be spent on developing tools to parse
   information from each type of endpoint connected to the network.
   Standardized data models also enable the development of standardized
   client software.  This allows endpoint vendors to include their own
   client software that can interoperate with posture assessment
   infrastructure and thus not have to introduce third party code in
   their products.

1.5.  Secure Standardized Protocols

   Posture information must be sent over mature, standardized protocols
   to ensure the confidentiality and authenticity of this data while in
   transit.  Conformant implementations of the ECP include [RFC6876] and
   [I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-push] for communication between the target
   endpoint and the posture manager.  These protocols allow networks
   that implement this solution to collect large amounts of posture
   information from an endpoint to make decisions about that endpoint's
   compliance with some policy.  The ECP offers a solution for all
   endpoints already connected to the network.  Periodic assessments and
   automated reporting of changes to endpoint posture allow for
   instantaneous identification of connected endpoints that are no
   longer compliant to some policy.

1.6.  Posture Information Must Be Stored

   Posture information must be stored by the repository and must be
   exposed to an interface at the posture manager.  Standard data models
   enable standard queries from an interface exposed to an administrator
   at the posture manager console.  A repository must retain any current
   posture information retrieved from the target endpoint and store it
   indexed by the unique identifier for the endpoint.  Any posture
   validator specified by this profile must be able to ascertain from
   its corresponding posture collector whether the posture information
   is up to date.  An interface on the posture manager must support a
   request to the posture validator to obtain up-to-date information
   when an endpoint is connected.  This interface must also support the
   ability to make a standard set of queries about the posture
   information stored by the repository.  In the future, some forms of



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   posture information might be retained at the endpoint.  The interface
   on the server must accommodate the ability to make a request through
   the posture validator to the corresponding posture collector about
   the posture of the target endpoint.  Standard data models and
   protocols also enable the security of posture assessment results.  By
   storing these results indexed under the endpoint's unique
   identification, secure storage itself enables endpoint posture
   information correlation, and ensures that the enterprise's
   repositories always offer the freshest, most up-to-date view of the
   enterprise's endpoint posture information possible.

1.7.  Posture Information Can Be Shared

   By exposing posture information using a standard interface and API,
   other security and operational components have a high level of
   insight into the enterprise's endpoints and the software installed on
   them.  This will support innovation in the areas of asset management,
   vulnerability scanning, and administrative interfaces, as any
   authorized infrastructure endpoint can interact with the posture
   information.

1.8.  Enterprise Asset Posture Information Belongs to the Enterprise

   Owners and administrators must have complete control of posture
   information, policy, and endpoint mitigation.  Standardized data
   models, protocols and interfaces help to ensure that this posture
   information is not locked in proprietary databases, but is made
   available to its owners.  This enables administrators to develop as
   nuanced a policy as necessary to keep their networks secure.

1.9.  Keywords

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].  This
   specification does not distinguish blocks of informative comments and
   normative requirements.  Therefore, for the sake of clarity, note
   that lower case instances of must, should, etc. do not indicate
   normative requirements.

2.  Terminology

   This document uses terms as defined in [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology]
   unless otherwise specified.







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3.  Assumptions

   Here are the assumptions that the Endpoint Compliance Profile makes
   about other components in the SACM architecture.

   o  Existence of a posture manager and repository: The Endpoint
      Compliance Profile assumes that a posture manager and repository
      exist.

   o  Endpoint posture information availability: The Endpoint Compliance
      Profile assumes that an endpoint has posture information in
      standardized data model that can be communicated to the posture
      manager.

   o  Certificate provisioning: In order to implement the most secure
      endpoint identification option, the Endpoint Compliance Profile
      assumes that the enterprise has set up a certificate root
      authority, and has provisioned each endpoint with an endpoint
      identification certificate.  This is not required if an enterprise
      chooses to use other endpoint authentication methods.

   In addition, the Endpoint Compliance Profile makes the following
   assumptions about the SACM ecosystem:

   o  All network-connected endpoints are endpoints: As defined by [I-
      D.ietf-sacm-terminology], an endpoint is any physical or virtual
      computing endpoint that can be connected to a network.  Posture
      assessment against policy is equally, if not more, important for
      continuously connected endpoints, such as enterprise workstations
      and infrastructure endpoints, as it is for sporadically connected
      endpoints.  Continuously connected endpoints are just as likely to
      fall out of compliance with policy, and a standardized posture
      assessment method is necessary to ensure they can be properly
      handled.

   o  All endpoints on the network must be uniquely identified: Many
      administrators struggle to identify what endpoints are connected
      at any given time.  By requiring a standardized method of endpoint
      identity, the Endpoint Compliance Profile will enable
      administrators to answer the basic question, "What is on my
      network?"  Unique endpoint identification also enables the
      comparison of current and past endpoint posture assessments, by
      allowing administrators to correlate assessments from the same
      endpoint.  This makes it easier to flag suspicious changes in
      endpoint posture for manual or automatic review, and helps to
      swiftly identify malicious changes to endpoint applications.





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   o  Posture assessments must occur over secure, standardized
      protocols: Endpoint identity and application information is very
      valuable, both to administrators and to attackers.  Therefore, it
      must be kept confidential, using secure protocols to transport it
      from the endpoint to the posture manager.  Additionally, it is
      critical that only authorized parties be capable of requesting
      information, receiving information, or taking action to change an
      endpoint's connectivity status.  Relying on standardized protocols
      to provide this security enables greater interoperability and
      compatibility between endpoints, and allows for the development of
      compliance testing to ensure that each endpoint operates securely
      and in conformance with appropriate specifications.  A standards
      body provides a process for experts in protocols and cryptography
      to evaluate the soundness of protocols and security management
      procedures; a set of security standards allows an enterprise to
      make the most effective use of their investment in a security
      management infrastructure.

   o  Posture assessment results must be formatted using standardized
      data models: Well-known, standard data models allow for a
      universal language for generating compliance reports.  With each
      endpoint speaking the same language, the Endpoint Compliance
      Profile enables information sharing between user endpoints and
      infrastructure endpoints, and between infrastructure endpoints
      that perform different security tasks.

   o  Posture information must be stored by the repository and must be
      exposed to an interface at the posture manager: Standard data
      models enable standard queries from an interface exposed to an
      administrator at the posture manager console.  A repository must
      retain any current posture information retrieved from the endpoint
      and store it indexed by the unique identifier for the endpoint.
      Any posture validator specified by this profile must be able to
      ascertain from its corresponding posture collector whether the
      posture information is up to date.  An interface on the posture
      manager must support a request to the posture validator to obtain
      up-to-date information when an endpoint is connected.  This
      interface must also support the ability to make a standard set of
      queries about the posture information stored by the repository.
      In the future, some forms of posture information might be retained
      at the endpoint.  The interface on the posture manager must
      accommodate the ability to make a request through the posture
      validator to the corresponding posture collector about the posture
      of the endpoint.  Standard data models and protocols also enable
      the security of posture assessment results.  By storing these
      results indexed under the endpoint's unique identifier, secure
      storage itself enables endpoint posture information correlation,
      and ensures that the enterprise's repositories always offer the



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      freshest, most up-to-date view of the enterprise's endpoint
      posture information possible.

   o  Posture information can be shared: By exposing posture information
      using a standard interface and API, other security and operational
      components have a high level of insight into the enterprise's
      endpoints and the software installed on them.  This will support
      innovation in the areas of asset management, vulnerability
      scanning, and administrative interfaces, as any authorized
      infrastructure endpoint can interact with the posture information.

   o  Owners and administrators must have complete control of posture
      information, policy, and endpoint mitigation: Enterprise asset
      posture information belongs to the enterprise.  Standardized data
      models, protocols and interfaces help to ensure that this posture
      information is not locked in proprietary databases, but is made
      available to its owners.  This enables administrators to develop
      as nuanced a policy as necessary to keep their networks secure.

4.  Endpoint Compliance Profile

   The Endpoint Compliance Profile describes how IETF data models and
   protocols can be used to support the posture assessment of endpoints
   on a network.  This profile does not generate new data models or
   protocols; rather, it offers a full end-to-end solution for posture
   assessment, as well as a fresh perspective on how existing standards
   can be leveraged against vulnerabilities.

4.1.  Posture Assessments

   The Endpoint Compliance Profile 1.0 describes how IETF and TNC data
   models and protocols make it possible to perform posture assessments
   against all network-connected endpoints by:

   1.  uniquely identifying the endpoint;

   2.  collecting and assessing posture based on data from the endpoint;

   3.  creating a secure, authenticated, confidential channel between
       the endpoint and the posture manager;

   4.  enabling the endpoint to notify the posture manager about changes
       to its configuration;

   5.  enabling the posture manager to request information about the
       configuration of the endpoint; and





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   6.  storing the posture information in a repository linked to the
       identifier for the endpoint.

4.2.  Data Storage

   The Endpoint Compliance Profile 1.0 focuses on being able to collect
   posture information from an endpoint and store it in a repository.
   This makes posture information from a network's endpoints available
   to authorized parties.  Uses of this data are innumerable -
   vulnerability management, asset management, software asset
   management, and configuration management solutions, analytics tools,
   endpoints that need to make connectivity decisions, and metrics
   reporting scripts, among others, are all able to reference the data
   stored in the repository to achieve their purposes.  Currently, the
   Endpoint Compliance Profile 1.0 does not specify a protocol or
   interfaces to access stored posture information.  This needs to be
   addressed in a future revision to make collected posture information
   accessible to components in a standardized manner.  Until then,
   vendors are free to implement a repository and the protocols and
   interfaces used to interact with it in a way that makes the most
   sense for them.

4.3.  Data Sharing

   The Endpoint Compliance Profile 1.0 aims to facilitate the sharing of
   posture information between components to enable asset management,
   software asset management, and configuration management use cases as
   well as support analytic, access control, remediation, and reporting
   processes.  However, the Endpoint Compliance Profile 1.0 does not
   currently specify a protocol for communicating this information
   between components to support these use cases and processes.  This
   needs to be addressed in a future revision.
   [I-D.ietf-mile-xmpp-grid] which is publish/subscribe protocol being
   developed in the IETF MILE WG may be a potential candidate for
   sharing information between components.

5.  ECP Components

   To perform posture assessment, data storage, and data sharing, ECP
   defines a number of components.  Some of these components reside on
   the target endpoint.  Others reside on a posture manager that manages
   communications with the target endpoint and stores the target
   endpoint's posture information in a repository.








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                                Posture Manager          Endpoint
               Orchestrator     +---------------+        +---------------+
                +--------+      |               |        |               |
                |        |      | +-----------+ |        | +-----------+ |
                |        |<---->| | Posture   | |        | | Posture   | |
                |        | pub/ | | Validator | |        | | Collector | |
                |        | sub  | +-----------+ |        | +-----------+ |
                +--------+      |      |        |        |      |        |
                                |      |        |        |      |        |
Evaluator       Repository      |      |        |        |      |        |
+------+        +--------+      | +-----------+ |<-------| +-----------+ |
|      |        |        |      | | Posture   | | report | | Posture   | |
|      |        |        |      | | Collection| |        | | Collection| |
|      |<-----> |        |<---->| | Manager   | | query  | | Engine    | |
|      |request/|        | store| +-----------+ |------->| +-----------+ |
|      |respond |        |      |               |        |               |
|      |        |        |      |               |        |               |
+------+        +--------+      +---------------+        +---------------+


                         Figure 1: ECP Components

5.1.  Endpoint

   An endpoint is defined in [RFC6876].  In the Endpoint Compliance
   Profile, the endpoint is monitored by the enterprise and is the
   target of posture assessments.  To support these posture assessments,
   posture information is collected via posture collectors.

5.1.1.  Posture Collector

   A posture collector is responsible for monitoring and gathering
   posture information from the target endpoint.  This component reports
   changes to posture information as they occur.  This event-driven
   collection provides network administrators up-to-date insight into
   the state of the network as the network state changes, which enables
   continuous monitoring of the network.  Posture collectors can also be
   queried supporting ad-hoc collection, addressed below as "querying"
   which can be used to refresh information about the target endpoint,
   or to ask a specific question about posture information.
   Furthermore, a posture collector may process posture information
   before it is communicated to the posture manager.  An endpoint may
   have one or more posture collectors depending on the type of endpoint
   and what posture information is being monitored and collected.







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5.1.2.  Posture Collection Engine

   The posture collection engine is located on the target endpoint.  It
   receives queries from a posture collection manager and directs them
   to the appropriate posture collector on the target endpoint.  It also
   sends collected posture information to the posture manager where it
   can be received by the posture collection manager and distributed to
   the appropriate posture validator where it can be sanity checked and
   stored in the repository.  The posture collection engine also
   contains a capability that sets up exchanges between the target
   endpoint and posture manager.  This capability makes the posture
   collection engine responsible for performing the client-side portion
   of encryption handshakes, and for locating authorized posture
   managers with which to communicate.

5.2.  Posture Manager

   The posture manager is an endpoint that collects, validates, and
   enriches posture information received about a target endpoint.  It
   also stores the posture information it receives in the repository.
   The posture manager does not evaluate the posture information.

5.2.1.  Posture Validator

   A posture validator receives data from a posture collector, performs
   basic sanity checking, and stores that data in the repository.  It
   can also send queries to a posture collector.  There is a posture
   validator for every posture collector.

5.2.2.  Posture Collection Manager

   A posture collection manager is a lightweight and extensible
   component that facilitates the coordination and execution of posture
   collection requests using collection mechanisms deployed across the
   enterprise.  The posture collection manager may query and retrieve
   guidance from the repository to guide the collection of posture
   information from the target endpoint.

   The posture collection manager also contains a capability that sets
   up exchanges between the target endpoint and the posture manager, and
   manages data sent to and from posture validators.  It is also
   responsible for performing the server-side portion of encryption
   handshakes.  It is also responsible for performing the server-side
   portion of encryption handshakes.







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5.3.  Repository

   The repository hosts guidance, endpoint identification information,
   and posture information reported by target endpoints where it is made
   available to authorized components and persisted over a period of
   time set by the administrator.  Information stored in the repository
   will be accessible to authorized parties via a standard
   administrative interface as well as through a standardized API.  The
   repository may be a standalone component or may be located on the
   posture manager.

   Currently, the Endpoint Compliance Profile does not provide a
   standardized interface or API for accessing the information contained
   within the repository.  A future revision of the Endpoint Compliance
   Profile may specify a standardized interface and API for components
   to interact with the repository.

5.4.  Evaluator

   The evaluator assesses the posture status of a target endpoint by
   comparing collected posture information against the desired state of
   the target endpoint specified in guidance.  The evaluator queries and
   retrieves the appropriate guidance from the repository as well as
   queries and retrieves the posture information required for the
   assessment from the repository.  If the required posture information
   is not available in the repository, the evaluator may request the
   posture information from the posture collection engine, which will
   result in the collection of additional posture information from the
   target endpoint.  This information is subsequently stored in the
   repository where it is made available to the evaluator and other
   components.  The results of the assessment are stored in the
   repository where they are available to tools and administrators for
   follow-up actions, further evaluation, and historical purposes.

5.5.  Orchestrator

   The orchestrator provides a publish/subscribe interface for the
   repository so that infrastructure endpoints can subscribe to and
   receive published posture assessment results from the repository
   regarding endpoint posture changes.

   The Endpoint Compliance Profile 1.0 does not currently define an
   orchestrator component nor does it specify a standardized publish/
   subscribe interface for this purpose.  Future revisions of the
   Endpoint Compliance Profile may specify such an interface.






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6.  ECP Transactions

6.1.  Provisioning

   An endpoint is provisioned with one or more attributes that will
   serve as its unique identifier on the network as well as the
   components necessary to interact with the posture manager.  The
   endpoint is deployed on the network.

   NOTE: TO BE EXPANDED

6.2.  Discovery and Validation

   If necessary, the target endpoint finds and validates the posture
   manager.  The posture collection engine on the target endpoint and
   posture collection manager on the posture manager complete a TLS
   handshake, during which endpoint identity information is exchanged.

6.3.  Event Driven Collection

   The posture assessment is initiated when a posture collector on the
   target endpoint notices that relevant posture information on the
   endpoint has changed.  The posture collector notified the posture
   collection engine, which initiates a posture assessment information
   exchange with the posture collection manager.

6.4.  Querying

   The posture assessment is initiated by the posture validator.  This
   can occur because:

   1.  policy states that a previous assessment has aged out or become
       invalid, or

   2.  the posture validator is alerted by a sensor or an administrator
       (via the posture manager's user interface) that an assessment
       must be completed

6.5.  Data Storage

   Once posture information is received by the posture manager, it is
   forwarded to the repository.  The repository could be co-located with
   the posture manager, or there could be direct or brokered
   communication between the posture manager and the repository.  The
   posture information is stored in the repository along with past
   posture information collected about the target endpoint.





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6.6.  Data Sharing

   Because the target endpoint posture information was sent in
   standards-based data models over secure, standardized protocols, and
   then stored in a centralized repository linked to unique endpoint
   identifiers, authorized parties are able to access the posture
   information.  Such authorized parties may include, but are not
   limited to, administrators or endpoint owners (via the server's
   administrative interface), evaluators that access the repository
   directly, and orchestrators that rely on publish/subscribe
   communications with the repository.

                                Posture Manager          Endpoint
               Orchestrator     +---------------+        +---------------+
                +--------+      |               |        |               |
                |        |      | +-----------+ |        | +-----------+ |
                |        |<---->| | Posture   | |        | | Posture   | |
                |        | pub/ | | Validator | |        | | Collector | |
                |        | sub  | +-----------+ |        | +-----------+ |
                +--------+      |      |        |        |      |        |
                                |      |        |        |      |        |
Evaluator       Repository      |      |        |        |      |        |
+------+        +--------+      | +-----------+ |<-------| +-----------+ |
|      |        |        |      | | Posture   | | report | | Posture   | |
|      |        |        |      | | Collection| |        | | Collection| |
|      |<-----> |        |<-----| | Manager   | | query  | | Engine    | |
|      |request/|        | store| +-----------+ |------->| +-----------+ |
|      |respond |        |      |               |        |               |
|      |        |        |      |               |        |               |
+------+        +--------+      +---------------+        +---------------+

               +--------------------------------+
               | Administrative Interface       |
               | and API                        |
               +--------------------------------+

                  Figure 2: Exposing Data to the Network

   It should be noted that the neither the Endpoint Compliance Profile
   nor the protocols, interfaces, and data models that it references
   provide solutions to the repository, evaluator, and orchestrator
   components and capabilities listed above.  However, these
   capabilities are useful and solutions for them should be pursued in
   the future.







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7.  ECP Implementations

   The following sections describe implementations of the Endpoint
   Compliance Profile leveraging the IETF NEA and IETF NETMOD
   architectures.

7.1.  IETF NEA ECP Implementation

   These requirements are written with a view to performing a posture
   assessment on an endpoint; as the Endpoint Compliance Profile grows
   and evolves, these requirements will be expanded to address issues
   that arise.  Note that these requirements refer to defined components
   of the NEA architecture.  As with the NEA architecture, vendors have
   discretion as to how these NEA components map to separate pieces of
   software or endpoints.

7.1.1.  Endpoint Pre-Provisioning

   An endpoint is provisioned with a machine certificate that will serve
   as its unique identifier on the network as well as the components
   necessary to interact with the posture manager.  This includes a
   posture collection engine to manage requests from the posture manager
   and the posture collectors necessary to collect the posture
   information of importance to the enterprise.  The endpoint is
   deployed on the network.

   The target endpoint SHOULD authenticate to the posture manager using
   a machine certificate during the establishment of the outer tunnel
   achieved with the posture transport protocol defined in [RFC6876].
   [IF-IMV] specifies how to pull an endpoint identifier out of a
   machine certificate.  An endpoint identifier SHOULD be created in
   conformance with [IF-IMV] from a machine certificate sent via
   [RFC6876].

   In the future, the identity could be a hardware certificate compliant
   with [IEEE-802-1ar]; ideally, this identifier SHOULD be associated
   with the identity of a hardware cryptographic module, in accordance
   with [IEEE-802-1ar], if present on the endpoint.  The enterprise
   SHOULD stand up a certificate root authority; install its root
   certificate on endpoints and on the posture manager; and provision
   the endpoints and the posture manager with machine certificates.  The
   target endpoint MAY authenticate to the posture manager using a
   combination of the machine account and password; however, this is
   less secure and not recommended.







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7.1.2.  Endpoint

   The endpoint MUST conform to [RFC5793], which levies a number of
   requirements against the endpoint.  An endpoint that complies with
   these requirements will be able to:

   1.  attempt to initiate a session with the posture manager if the
       posture makes a request to send an update to posture manager;

   2.  notify the posture collector if no PT-TLS session with the
       posture manager can be created;

   3.  notify the posture collector when a PT-TLS session is
       established; and

   4.  receive information from the posture collectors, forward this
       information to the server via the posture collection engine.

7.1.2.1.  Posture Collector

   Any posture collector used in an Endpoint Compliance Profile solution
   MUST be conformant with [IF-IMC]; an Internet-Draft, under
   development, that is a subset of the TCG TNC Integrity Measurement
   Collector interface [IF-IMC] and will be submitted in the near
   future.

7.1.2.2.  Posture Collection Engine

   In the original IETF NEA ECP implementation, the endpoint contained
   posture collector(s), a posture broker client, and posture transport
   client(s).  However, in this draft, the functionality of the posture
   broker client and posture transport client(s) have been combined into
   what is now called the posture collection engine.  This was done
   because there is currently no standard interface to handle the
   communication between the posture broker client and posture transport
   client(s) meaning vendors will need to define proprietary interfaces
   that will not be interoperable.

   The endpoint MUST conform to [IF-IMC] to enable communications
   between the posture collection engine and the posture collectors on
   the endpoint.

   The posture collection engine MUST implement PT-TLS.

   The posture collection engine MUST support the use of machine
   certificates for TLS at each endpoint consistent with the
   requirements stipulated in [RFC6876] and [Server-Discovery].




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   The posture collection engine MUST be able to locate an authorized
   posture manager, and switch to a new posture manager when required by
   the network, in conformance with [Server-Discovery].

7.1.3.  Posture Manager

   The posture manager MUST conform to all requirements in the
   [RFC5793].

7.1.3.1.  Posture Validator

   Any posture validator used in an Endpoint Compliance Profile solution
   MUST be conformant with [IF-IMV]; an Internet-Draft, under
   development, that is a subset of the TCG TNC Integrity Measurement
   Verifier interface [IF-IMV] and will be submitted in the near future.

7.1.3.2.  Posture Collection Manager

   In the original IETF NEA ECP implementation, the posture manager
   contained posture validators(s), a posture broker server, and posture
   transport servers(s).  Similar to the approach take on the endpoint,
   in this draft, the functionality of the posture broker server and
   posture transport servers(s) have been combined into what is now
   called the posture collection manager.  This was done because there
   is currently no standard interface to handle the communication
   between the posture broker server and posture transport servers(s)
   meaning vendors will need to define proprietary interfaces that will
   not be interoperable.

   The posture manager MUST conform to [IF-IMV].  Conformance to
   [IF-IMV] enables the posture manager to obtain endpoint identity
   information from the posture collection manager, and pass this
   information to any posture validators on the posture manager.

   The posture collection manager MUST implement PT-TLS.

   The posture collection manager MUST support the use of machine
   certificates for TLS at each endpoint consistent with the
   requirements stipulated in [RFC6876] and [Server-Discovery].

7.1.4.  Repository

   ECP 1.0 requires a simple administrative interface for the
   repository.  Posture validators on the posture manager receive the
   target endpoint posture information via PA-TNC [RFC5792] messages
   sent from corresponding posture collectors on the target endpoint and
   store this information in the repository linked to the identity of
   the target endpoint where the posture collectors are located.



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7.1.5.  Administrative Interface and API

   An interface is necessary to allow administrators to manage the
   endpoints and software used in the Endpoint Compliance Profile.  This
   interface SHOULD be accessible either on or through (as in the case
   of a remotely hosted interface) the posture manager.  Using this
   interface, an authorized user or administrator SHOULD be able to:

   o  Query the repository

   o  Send commands to the posture validators, requesting information
      from the associated posture collectors residing on network
      endpoints

   o  Update the policy that resides on the posture manager

   An API is necessary to allow infrastructure endpoints and software
   access to the information stored in the repository.  Using this API,
   an authorized endpoint SHOULD be able to:

   o  Query the repository

7.1.6.  IETF SACM SWAM Extension to the IETF NEA ECP Implementation

   This section defines the requirements associated with the software
   asset management extension [I-D.ietf-sacm-nea-swima-patnc] to the
   IETF NEA ECP implementation.

7.1.6.1.  Endpoint Pre-Provisioning

   This section defines the requirements associated with implementing
   SWIMA.

   The following requirements assume that the platform or OS vendor
   supports the use of SWID tags and has identified a standard directory
   location for the SWID tags to be located as specified by [SWID].

7.1.6.2.  SWID Tags

   The primary content for the Endpoint Compliance Profile 1.0 is the
   information conveyed in the elements of a SWID tag.

   The endpoint MUST have SWID tags stored in a directory specified in
   [SWID].  The tags SHOULD be provided by the software vendor; they MAY
   also be generated by:

   o  the software installer; or




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   o  third-party software that creates tags based on the applications
      it sees installed on the endpoint.

   The elements in the SWID tag MUST be populated as specified in
   [SWID].  These tags, and the directory in which they are stored, MUST
   be updated as software is added, removed, or updated.

7.1.6.3.  SWID Posture Collectors and Posture Validators

7.1.6.3.1.  The SWID Posture Collector

   For the Endpoint Compliance Profile, the SWID posture collector MUST
   be conformant with [I-D.ietf-sacm-nea-swima-patnc], which includes
   requirements for:

   1.  Collecting SWID tags from the SWID directory

   2.  Monitoring the SWID directory for changes

   3.  Initiating a session with the posture manager to report changes
       to the directory

   4.  Maintaining a list of changes to the SWID directory when updates
       take place and no PT-TLS connection can be created with the
       posture manager

   5.  Responding to a request for SWID tags from the SWID Posture
       Validator on the posture manager

   6.  Responding to a query from the SWID posture validator as to
       whether all updates have been sent

   The SWID posture collector is not responsible for detecting that the
   SWID directory was not updated when an application was either
   installed or uninstalled.

7.1.6.3.2.  The SWID Posture Validator

   Conformance to [I-D.ietf-sacm-nea-swima-patnc] enables the SWID
   posture validator to:

   1.  Send messages to the SWID posture collector (at the behest of the
       administrator at the posture manager console) requesting updates
       for SWID tags located on endpoint

   2.  Ask the SWID posture collector whether all updates to the SWID
       directory located at the posture manager have been sent




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   3.  Compare an endpoint's SWID posture information to policy, and
       make a recommendation to the NEA server about the endpoint

   In addition to these requirements, a SWID posture validator used in
   conformance with this profile MUST be capable of passing information
   from the posture assessment results and the endpoint identity
   associated with those results to the repository for storage.

7.1.6.4.  Repository

   The administrative interface SHOULD enable an administrator to:

   1.  Query which endpoints have reported SWID tags for a particular
       application

   2.  Query which SWID tags are installed on an endpoint

   3.  Query tags based on characteristics, such as vendor, publisher,
       etc.

7.2.  IETF NETMOD ECP Implementation

   NOTE: TO BE WRITTEN

8.  ECP Use Cases

   The following sections describe the different use cases supported by
   the Endpoint Compliance Profile.

8.1.  Hardware Asset Management

   Using the administrative interface on the posture manager, an
   authorized user can learn:

   o  what endpoints are connected to the network at any given time; and

   o  what SWID tags were reported for the endpoints.

   The ability to answer these questions offers a standards-based
   approach to asset management, which is a vital part of enterprise
   processes such as compliance report generation for the Federal
   Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), Payment Card Industry
   Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), Health Insurance Portability and
   Accountability Act (HIPAA), etc.







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8.2.  Software Asset Management

   The administrative interface on the posture manager provides the
   ability for authorized users and infrastructure to know which
   software is installed on which endpoints on the enterprise's network.
   This allows the enterprise to answer questions about what software is
   installed to determine if it is licensed or prohibited.  This
   information can also drive other use cases such as:

   o  vulnerability management: knowing what software is installed
      supports the ability to determine which endpoints contain
      vulnerable software and need to be patched.

   o  configuration management: knowing which security controls need to
      be applied to harden installed software and better protect
      endpoints.

8.3.  Vulnerability Searches

   The administrative interface also provides the ability for authorized
   users or infrastructure to locate endpoints running software for
   which vulnerabilities have been announced.  Because of

   1.  the unique IDs assigned to each endpoint; and

   2.  the rich application data provided in the endpoints' posture
       information,

   the repository can be queried to find all endpoints running a
   vulnerable application.  Endpoints suspected of being vulnerable can
   be addressed by the administrator or flagged for further scrutiny.

8.4.  Threat Detection and Analysis

   The repository's standardized API allows authorized infrastructure
   endpoints and software to search endpoint posture assessment
   information for evidence that an endpoint's software inventory has
   changed, and can make endpoint software inventory data available to
   other endpoints.  This automates security data sharing in a way that
   expedites the correlation of relevant network data, allowing
   administrators and infrastructure endpoints to identify odd endpoint
   behavior and configuration using secure, standards-based data models
   and protocols.








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9.  Non-supported Use Cases

   Several use cases, including but not limited to these, are not
   covered by the Endpoint Compliance Profile 1.0:

   o  Gathering non-standardized types of posture information: The
      Endpoint Compliance Profile does not prevent administrators from
      collecting posture information in proprietary formats from the
      endpoint; however it does not set requirements for doing so.

   o  Solving the lying endpoint problem: The Endpoint Compliance
      Profile does not address the lying endpoint problem; the Profile
      makes no assertions that it can catch an endpoint that is, either
      maliciously or accidentally, reporting false posture information
      to the posture manager.  However, other solutions may be able to
      use the posture information collected using the capabilities
      described in this profile to catch an endpoint in a lie.  For
      example, a sensor may be able to compare the posture information
      it has collected on an endpoint's activity on the network to what
      the endpoint reported to the server and flag discrepancies.
      However, these capabilities are not described in this profile.

10.  Endpoint Compliance Profile Examples

10.1.  Continuous Posture Assessment of an Endpoint

               Endpoint                  Posture Manager
               +----------------+        +----------------+
               |                |        |                |
               | +------------+ |        | +------------+ |
               | | SWID       | |        | | SWID       | |
               | | Posture    | |        | | Posture    | |
               | | Collector  | |        | | Validator  | |
               | +------------+ |        | +------------+ |
               |      |         |        |      |         |
               |      | IF-IMC  |        |      | IF-IMV  |
               |      |         |        |      |         |
               | +------------+ |        | +------------+ |
               | | Posture    | |        | | Posture    | |
               | | Collection | |        | | Collection | |
               | | Engine     | |<------>| | Manager    | |
               | +------------+ | PT-TLS | +------------+ |
               |                |        |                |
               +----------------+        +----------------+

          Figure 3: Continuous Posture Assessment of an Endpoint





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10.1.1.  Change on Endpoint Triggers Posture Assessment

   A new application is installed on the endpoint, and the SWID
   directory is updated.  This triggers an update from the SWID posture
   collector to the SWID posture validator.  The message is sent down
   the NEA stack, encapsulated by NEA protocols until it is sent by the
   posture transport client to the posture transport server.  The
   posture transport server then forwards it up through the stack, where
   the layers of encapsulation are removed until the SWID Message
   arrives at the SWID posture validator.

                 Endpoint                           Posture Manager
                 +----------------+                 +----------------+
                 |                |                 |                |
                 | +------------+ |                 | +------------+ |
                 | | SWID       | |                 | | SWID       | |
                 | | Posture    | |                 | | Posture    | |
                 | | Collector  | |                 | | Validator  | |
                 | +------------+ |                 | +------------+ |
                 |      |         | SWIMA for       |      |         |
                 |      | IF-IMC  | PA-TNC          |      | IF-IMV  |
                 |      |         |                 |      |         |
                 | +------------+ | PB-TNC {SWIMA   | +------------+ |
                 | | Posture    | | for PA-TNC}     | | Posture    | |
                 | | Collection | |<--------------->| | Collection | |
                 | | Engine     | | PT-TLS {PB-TNC  | | Manager    | |
                 | +------------+ | {SWIMA for      | +------------+ |
                 |                | PA-TNC}}        |                |
                 +----------------+                 +----------------+

                Figure 4: Compliance Protocol Encapsulation

   The SWID posture validator stores the new tag information in the
   repository.  If the tag indicates that the endpoint is compliant to
   the policy, then the process is complete until the next time an
   update is needed (either because policy states that the endpoint must
   submit posture assessment results periodically or because an
   install/uninstall/update on the endpoint triggers a posture
   assessment).












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              Endpoint                  Posture Manager
              +----------------+        +----------------+
              |                |        |                |
              | +------------+ |        | +------------+ |
              | | SWID       | |        | | SWID       |-|-+
              | | Posture    | |        | | Posture    | | |
              | | Collector  | |        | | Validator  | | |
              | +------------+ |        | +------------+ | |
              |      |         |        |      |         | |     Repository
              |      | IF-IMC  |        |      | IF-IMV  | |     +--------+
              |      |         |        |      |         | |     |        |
              | +------------+ |        | +------------+ | |     |        |
              | | Posture    | |        | | Posture    | | +---->|        |
              | | Collection | |        | | Collection | |       |        |
              | | Engine     | |<------>| | Manager    | |       |        |
              | +------------+ |        | +------------+ |       |        |
              |                |        |                |       +--------+
              +----------------+        +----------------+

                 Figure 5: Storing SWIDs in the Repository

   If the endpoint has fallen out of compliance with a policy, the
   server can alert the administrator via the posture manager's
   administrative interface.  The administrator can then take steps to
   address the problem.  If the administrator has already established a
   policy for automatically addressing this problem, that policy will be
   followed.
























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                                                              (")
                                                             __|__
                                                           +-->|
              Endpoint                  Posture Manager    |  / \
              +----------------+        +----------------+ |
              |                |        |                | |
              | +------------+ |        | +------------+ | |
              | | SWID       | |        | | SWID       |-|-+
              | | Posture    | |        | | Posture    | |
              | | Collector  | |        | | Validator  | |
              | +------------+ |        | +------------+ |
              |      |         |        |      |         |       Repository
              |      | IF-IMC  |        |      | IF-IMV  |       +--------+
              |      |         |        |      |         |       |        |
              | +------------+ |        | +------------+ |       |        |
              | | Posture    | |        | | Posture    | |       |        |
              | | Collection | |        | | Collection | |       |        |
              | | Engine     | |<------>| | Manager    | |       +--------+
              | +------------+ |        | +------------+ |
              |                |        |                |
              +----------------+        +----------------+

                   Figure 6: Server Alerts Network Admin

10.2.  Administrator Searches for Vulnerable Endpoints

   An announcement is made that a particular version of a piece of
   software has a vulnerability.  The administrator uses the
   Administrative Interface on the server to search the repository for
   endpoints that reported the SWID tag for the vulnerable software.





















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                                                            (")
                                                           __|__
                                                         +-->|
            Endpoint                  Posture Manager    |  / \
            +----------------+        +----------------+ |
            |                |        |                | |
            | +------------+ |        | +------------+ | |
            | | SWID       | |        | | SWID       |-|-+
            | | Posture    | |        | | Posture    | |
            | | Collector  | |        | | Validator  | |
            | +------------+ |        | +------------+ |
            |      |         |        |      |         |       Repository
            |      | IF-IMC  |        |      | IF-IMV  |       +--------+
            |      |         |        |      |         |       |        |
            | +------------+ |        | +------------+ |       |        |
            | | Posture    | |        | | Posture    | |------>|        |
            | | Collection | |        | | Collection | |       |        |
            | | Engine     | |<------>| | Manager    | |       |        |
            | +------------+ |        | +------------+ |       +--------+
            |                |        |                |
            +----------------+        +----------------+

             Figure 7: Admin Searches for Vulnerable Endpoints

   The repository returns a list of entries in the matching the
   administrator's search.  The administrator can then address the
   vulnerable endpoints by taking some follow-up action such as removing
   it from the network, quarantining it, or updating the vulnerable
   software.

11.  Profile Requirements

   Here are the requirements that the Endpoint Compliance Profile
   protocol must meet in order to successfully fit in the SACM
   architecture.

   o  Meets the needs of SACM use cases: The Endpoint Compliance Profile
      must support the use cases described in [RFC7632] as they apply to
      endpoint self-reporting and endpoint posture assessment.

   o  Efficient: To minimize user frustration, it is essential to
      minimize delays by making endpoint posture information collection,
      transmission, and assessment as brief and efficient as possible.

   o  Extensible: The Endpoint Compliance Profile needs to expand over
      time as new features are added to the SACM architecture.  The
      solution must allow new features to be added easily, providing for
      a smooth transition and allowing newer and older architectural



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      components to continue to work together.  Further, the Endpoint
      Compliance Profile and the specifications referenced here must
      define safe extensibility mechanisms that enable innovation
      without breaking interoperability.

   o  Easy to implement: The Endpoint Compliance Profile should be easy
      for vendors to implement in their products, and should result in
      products that are easy for administrators to implement on their
      networks.  Products conformant to the Endpoint Compliance Profile
      should interoperate seamlessly, and be simple to integrate into
      existing network infrastructure.

   o  Easy to use: The Endpoint Compliance Profile should describe a
      simple, integrated user interface that administrators can use to
      perform the activities listed in the profile's use cases.  The
      Endpoint Compliance Profile should not constrain innovation by
      specifying details of the user interface but rather functional
      requirements.

   o  Platform-independent: Since network environments may contain many
      different types of endpoints, the solution should operate
      independently of the endpoint platform.

   o  Scalable: The Endpoint Compliance Profile must be designed to
      scale to very large numbers of endpoints.

12.  Future Work

   This section captures ideas for future work related to ECP that might
   be of interest to the IETF SACM WG.  These ideas are listed in no
   particular order.

   o  Integratate the IETF NETMOD Yang Push architecture.

   o  Add support endpoint types beyond workstations, servers, and
      network infrastructure devices.

   o  Examine the integration of [I-D.ietf-mile-xmpp-grid].

   o  Define a standard interface and API for interacting with the
      repository.  Requirements to consider include: creating a secure
      channel between a publisher and the repository, creating a secure
      channel between a subscriber and the repository, and the types of
      interactions that must be supported between publishers and
      subscribers to a repository.






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   o  Define a standard interface for communications between the posture
      broker client and posture transport client(s) as well as the
      posture broker server and posture transport server(s).

   o  Retention of posture information on the target endpoint.

   o  Define an orchestrator component as well as publish/subscribe
      interface for it.

   o  Define an evaluator component as well as an interface for it.

13.  Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to thank all of those in the TCG TNC work group who
   contributed to development of the TNC ECP specification upon which
   this document is based.

   +-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
   | Member                | Organization                              |
   +-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
   | Padma Krishnaswamy    | Battelle Memorial Institute               |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Eric Fleischman       | Boeing                                    |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Richard Hill          | Boeing                                    |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Steven Venema         | Boeing                                    |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Nancy Cam-Winget      | Cisco Systems                             |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Scott Pope            | Cisco Systems                             |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Max Pritikin          | Cisco Systems                             |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Allan Thompson        | Cisco Systems                             |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Nicolai Kuntze        | Fraunhofer Institute for Secure           |
   |                       | Information Technology (SIT)              |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Ira McDonald          | High North                                |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Dr. Andreas Steffen   | HSR University of Applied Sciences        |
   |                       | Rapperswil                                |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Josef von Helden      | Hochschule Hannover                       |
   |                       |                                           |
   | James Tan             | Infoblox                                  |
   |                       |                                           |



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   | Steve Hanna (TNC-WG   | Juniper Networks                          |
   | Co-Chair)             |                                           |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Cliff Kahn            | Juniper Networks                          |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Lisa Lorenzin         | Juniper Networks                          |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Atul Shah (TNC-WG Co- | Microsoft                                 |
   | Chair)                |                                           |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Jon Baker             | MITRE                                     |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Charles Schmidt       | MITRE                                     |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Rainer Enders         | NCP Engineering                           |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Dick Wilkins          | Phoenix Technologies                      |
   |                       |                                           |
   | David Waltermire      | NIST                                      |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Mike Boyle            | U.S. Government                           |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Emily Doll            | U.S. Government                           |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Jessica Fitzgerald-   | U.S. Government                           |
   | McKay                 |                                           |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Mary Lessels          | U.S. Government                           |
   |                       |                                           |
   | Chris Salter          | U.S. Government                           |
   +-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+

      Table 1: Members of the TNC Work Group that Contributed to the
                                 Document

14.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not define any new IANA registries.  However, this
   document does reference other documents that do define IANA
   registries.  As a result, the IANA Considerations section of the
   referenced documents should be consulted.

15.  Security Considerations

   The Endpoint Compliance Profile offers substantial improvements in
   endpoint security, as evidenced by the Australian Defense Signals
   Directorate's analysis that 85% of targeted cyber intrusions can be
   prevented through application whitelisting, patching applications and



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   operating systems, and using the latest versions of applications.
   [DSD] Despite these gains, some security risks continue to exist and
   must be considered.

   To ensure that these benefits and risks are properly understood, this
   Security Considerations section includes an analysis of the benefits
   provided by the Endpoint Compliance Profile (Section 15.1), the
   attacks that may be mounted against systems that implement the
   Endpoint Compliance Profile (Section 15.2), and the countermeasures
   that may be used to prevent or mitigate these attacks (Section 15.3).
   Overall, a substantial reduction in cyber risk can be achieved.

15.1.  Security Benefits of Endpoint Compliance Profile

   Security weaknesses of the components for this profile should be
   considered in light of the practical considerations that must be
   addressed to have a viable solution.

   Posture assessment has two parts: assessment and follow-up actions.
   The point of posture assessment is to ensure that authorized users
   are using authorized software configured to be as resilient as
   possible against an attack.

   Posture assessment answers the question whether the endpoint is
   healthy.  Our goal for posture assessment is to make it harder for an
   adversary to execute code on one of our endpoints.  This profile
   represents an important first step in reaching that goal.  If we keep
   our endpoints healthier, we are able to prevent more attacks on our
   endpoints and thus on our information systems.

   The goal of ECP is to address posture assessment in stages.  Stage 1
   is the ability to ascertain whether all endpoints are authorized and
   whether all applications are authorized and up to date.  Stage 2 will
   attempt to address the harder problem of whether all software is
   configured safely.  Eventually, the goal is to also address
   remediation which is currently out-of-scope for the SACM WG; that
   presents a far greater security challenge than reporting, since
   remediation implies the ability of a remote party to modify software
   or its settings on endpoints.

   A second security consideration is how to gain visibility over every
   type of endpoint and every piece of software installed on the
   endpoint.  This is a problem of scaling and observation.  A solution
   is needed that can report from every type of endpoint.  All software
   on the endpoint has to be discovered.  Information about the software
   has to be up to date and accurate.  The information that is
   discovered has to be reported in a consistent format, so
   administrators do not have to squander time deciphering proprietary



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   systems and the information can be made readily useful for other
   security automation purposes.

   ECP is based on a model of a standards-based schema, a standards-
   based set of protocols and interfaces, and the existence of an
   oversight group, the IETF, that can update the data models and
   protocols to meet new use cases and security issues that may be
   discovered.

   The data elements in the schema determine what work can be done
   consistently for every endpoint and every piece of software.  How the
   data gets populated is an important consideration.  ECP leverages the
   SWID tags from ISO 19770-2 because the tag originates with a single
   authoritative source, the application vendor itself.  Moreover, there
   is a natural incentive for the vendor to create this content, since
   it makes it easier for enterprises and vendors to track whether
   software is licensed.  Practical considerations are security
   considerations.  A sustainable business model for obtaining all the
   necessary content is a fundamental requirement.

   The NEA model is based on having a NEA client run on an endpoint that
   publishes posture information to a server.  The advantages are easy
   to list.  A platform vendor can implement its own NEA client and have
   it be compatible with the NEA server from a different vendor.  The
   interfaces are layered on top of mature protocols such as TLS.  TLS
   is the protocol of choice for ECP, since:

   o  it has proven secure properties,

   o  it can be implemented on most types of endpoints,

   o  it allows the gathering of large amounts of information when a
      endpoint is connected, and

   o  it enables use of a mechanism to ensure that the client is
      authenticated (authorized) - a client certificate - which also
      provides a consistent identifier.

   Mature protocols that can be implemented on most types of endpoints
   and a standards-based schema with a sustainable business model are
   both critical security considerations for compliance.

   Additionally, it is important to consider the future stages for ECP
   such as a posture assessment being followed up by some action (e.g.
   remediation, alert, etc.).  Ensuring that clients are taking
   instructions only from authorized parties will be critical.  Inasmuch
   as it is practical, enterprises will want to use the same




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   infrastructure and investment in PKI to send those instructions to a
   client.

   Likewise, as more information with more value is gathered from
   endpoints, we will also want to ensure that this information is only
   released to authorized applications and parties.  For the next stage
   of ECP, SACM may want to define an interface on the repository that
   can be queried by other security automation applications to make it
   easier to detect attacks and for other security automation
   applications.  This interface has to be standards-based for
   enterprises to reap the benefits of innovation that can be achieved
   by making the enterprise's data available to other tools and
   services.

15.2.  Threat Model

   This section lists the attacks that can be mounted on an Endpoint
   Compliance Profile environment.  The following section (Section 15.3)
   describes countermeasures.

   Because the Endpoint Compliance Profile describes a specific use case
   for NEA components, many security considerations for these components
   are addressed in more detail in the technical specifications:
   [I-D.ietf-sacm-nea-swima-patnc], [IF-IMC], [RFC5793],
   [Server-Discovery], [RFC6876], [IF-IMV].

15.2.1.  Endpoint Attacks

   While the Endpoint Compliance Profile provides substantial
   improvements in endpoint security as described in Section 15.1, a
   certain percentage of endpoints will always get compromised.  For
   this reason, all parties must regard data coming from endpoints as
   potentially unreliable or even malicious.  An analogy can be drawn
   with human testimony in an investigation or trial.  Human testimony
   is essential but must be regarded with suspicion.

   o  Compromise of endpoint: A compromised endpoint may report false
      information to confuse or even provide maliciously crafted
      information with a goal of infecting others.

   o  Putting bad information in SWID directory: Even if an endpoint is
      not completely compromised, some of the software running on it may
      be unreliable or even malicious.  This software, potentially
      including the SWID generation or discovery tool, or malicious
      software pretending to be a SWID generation or discovery tool, can
      place incorrect or maliciously crafted information into the SWID
      directory.  Endpoint users may even place such information in the




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      directory, whether motivated by curiosity or confusion or a desire
      to bypass restrictions on their use of the endpoint.

   o  Identity spoofing (impersonation): A compromised endpoint may
      attempt to impersonate another endpoint to gain its privileges or
      to besmirch the reputation of that other endpoint.

15.2.2.  Network Attacks

   A variety of attacks can be mounted using the network.  Generally,
   the network cannot be trusted.

   o  Eavesdropping, modification, injection, replay, deletion

   o  Traffic analysis

   o  Denial of service and blocking traffic

15.2.3.  Posture Manager Attacks

   The posture manager is a critical security element and therefore
   merits considerable scrutiny.

   o  Compromised trusted manager: A compromised posture manager or a
      malicious party that is able to impersonate a posture manager can
      incorrectly grant or deny access to endpoints, place incorrect
      information into the repository, or send malicious messages to
      endpoints.

   o  Misconfiguration of posture manager: Accidental or purposeful
      misconfiguration of a trusted posture manager can cause effects
      that are similar to those listed for compromised trusted posture
      manager.

   o  Malicious untrusted posture manager: An untrusted posture manager
      cannot mount any significant attacks because all properly
      implemented endpoints will refuse to engage in any meaningful
      dialog with such a posture manager.

15.2.4.  Repository Attacks

   The repository is also an important security element and therefore
   merits careful scrutiny.

   o  Putting bad information into trusted repository: An authorized
      repository client such as a server may be able to put incorrect
      information into a trusted repository or delete or modify
      historical information, causing incorrect decisions about endpoint



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      security.  Placing maliciously crafted data in the repository
      could even lead to compromise of repository clients, if they fail
      to carefully check such data.

   o  Compromised trusted repository: A compromised trusted repository
      or a malicious untrusted repository that is able to impersonate a
      trusted repository can lead to effects similar to those listed for
      "Putting bad information into trusted repository".  Further, a
      compromised trusted repository can report different results to
      different repository clients or deny access to the repository for
      selected repository clients.

   o  Misconfiguration of trusted repository: Accidental or purposeful
      misconfiguration of a trusted repository can deny access to the
      repository or result in loss of historical data.

   o  Malicious untrusted repository: An untrusted repository cannot
      mount any significant attacks because all properly implemented
      repository clients will refuse to engage in any meaningful dialog
      with such a repository.

15.3.  Countermeasures

   This section lists the countermeasures that can be used in an
   Endpoint Compliance Profile environment.

15.3.1.  Countermeasures for Endpoint Attacks

   This profile is in and of itself a countermeasure for a compromised
   endpoint.  A primary defense for an endpoint is to run up to date
   software configured to be run as safely as possible.

   Ensuring that anti-virus signatures are up to date and that a
   firewall is configured are also protections for an endpoint that are
   supported by the current NEA specifications.

   Endpoints that have hardware cryptographic modules that are
   provisioned by the enterprise, in accordance with [IEEE-802-1ar], can
   protect the private keys used for authentication and help prevent
   adversaries from stealing credentials that can be used for
   impersonation.  Future versions of the Endpoint Compliance Profile
   may want to discuss in greater detail how to use a hardware
   cryptographic module, in accordance with [IEEE-802-1ar], to protect
   credentials and to protect the integrity of the code that executes
   during the bootstrap process.






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15.3.2.  Countermeasures for Network Attacks

   To address network attacks, [RFC6876] includes required encryption,
   authentication, integrity protection, and replay protection.
   [Server-Discovery] also includes authorization checks to ensure that
   only authorized servers are trusted by endpoints.  Any unspecified or
   not yet specified network protocols employed in the Endpoint
   Compliance Profile (e.g. the protocol used to interface with the
   repository) should include similar protections.

   These protections reduce the scope of the network threat to traffic
   analysis and denial of service.  Countermeasures for traffic analysis
   (e.g. masking) are usually impractical but may be employed.
   Countermeasures for denial of service (e.g. detecting and blocking
   particular sources) SHOULD be used when appropriate to detect and
   block denial of service attacks.  These are routine practices in
   network security.

15.3.3.  Countermeasures for Posture Manager Attacks

   Because of the serious consequences of posture manager compromise,
   posture managers SHOULD be especially well hardened against attack
   and minimized to reduce their attack surface.  They SHOULD be
   monitored using the NEA protocols to ensure the integrity of the
   behavior and analysis data stored on the posture manager and SHOULD
   utilize a [IEEE-802-1ar]compliant hardware cryptographic module for
   identity and/or integrity measurements of the posture manager.  They
   should be well managed to minimize vulnerabilities in the underlying
   platform and in systems upon which the posture manager depends.
   Network security measures such as firewalls or intrusion detection
   systems may be used to monitor and limit traffic to and from the
   posture manager.  Personnel with administrative access to the posture
   manager should be carefully screened and monitored to detect problems
   as soon as possible.  Posture manager administrators should not use
   password-based authentication but should instead use non-reusable
   credentials and multi-factor authentication (where available).
   Physical security measures should be employed to prevent physical
   attacks on posture managers.

   To ease detection of posture manager compromise should it occur,
   posture manager behavior should be monitored to detect unusual
   behavior (such as a server reboot, unusual traffic patterns, or other
   odd behavior).  Endpoints should log and/or notify users and/or
   administrators when peculiar posture manager behavior is detected.
   To aid forensic investigation, permanent read-only audit logs of
   security-relevant information pertaining to posture manager
   (especially administrative actions) should be maintained.  If posture
   manager compromise is detected, the posture manager's certificate



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   should be revoked and careful analysis should be performed of the
   source and impact of this compromise.  Any reusable credentials that
   may have been compromised should be reissued.

   Endpoints can reduce the threat of server compromise by minimizing
   the number of trusted posture managers, using the mechanisms
   described in [Server-Discovery].

15.3.4.  Countermeasures for Repository Attacks

   If the host for the repository is located on its own endpoint, it
   should be protected with the same measures taken to protect the
   posture manager.  In this circumstance, all messages between the
   posture manager and repository should be protected with a mature
   security protocol such as TLS or IPsec.

   The repository can aid in the detection of compromised endpoints if
   an adversary cannot tamper with its contents.  For instance, if an
   endpoint reports that it does not have an application with a known
   vulnerability installed, an administrator can check whether the
   endpoint might be lying by querying the repository for the history of
   what applications were installed on the endpoint.

   To help prevent tampering with the information in the repository:

   1.  Only authorized parties should have privilege to run code on the
       endpoint and to change the repository.

   2.  If a separate endpoint hosts the repository, then the
       functionality of that endpoint should be limited to hosting the
       repository.  The firewall on the repository should only allow
       access to the posture manager and to any endpoint authorized for
       administration.

   3.  The repository should ideally use "write once" media to archive
       the history of what was placed in the repository, to include a
       snapshot of the current status of applications on endpoints.

16.  Privacy-Considerations

   The Endpoint Compliance Profile specifically addresses the collection
   of posture data from enterprise endpoints by an enterprise network.
   As such, privacy is not going to often arise as a concern for those
   deploying this solution.

   A possible exception may be the concerns a user may have when
   attempting to connect a personal endpoint (such as a phone or mobile
   endpoint) to an enterprise network.  The user may not want to share



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   certain details, such as an endpoint identifier or SWID tags, with
   the enterprise.  The user can configure their NEA client to reject
   requests for this information; however, it is possible that the
   enterprise policy will not allow the user's endpoint to connect to
   the network without providing the requested data.

17.  Change Log

17.1.  -00 to -01

   There are no textual changes associated with this revision.  This
   revision simply reflects a resubmission of the document so that it
   remains in active status.

17.2.  -01 to -02

   Added references to the Software Inventory Message and Attributes
   (SWIMA) for PA-TNC I-D.

   Replaced references to PC-TNC with IF-IMC.

   Removed erroneous hyphens from a couple of section titles.

   Made a few minor editorial changes.

17.3.  -02 to -00

   Draft adopted by IETF SACM WG.

17.4.  -00 to -01

   Significant edits to up-level the draft to describe SACM collection
   over multiple different protocols.

   Replaced references to SANS with CIS.

   Made other minor editorial changes.

18.  References

18.1.  Informative References

   [CIS]      http://www.cisecurity.org/controls/, "CIS Critical
              Security Controls".

   [DSD]      http://www.dsd.gov.au/publications/csocprotect/
              top_4_mitigations.htm, "Top 4 Mitigation Strategies to
              Protect Your ICT System", November 2012.



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   [IEEE-802-1ar]
              Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
              802.1ar", December 2009.

   [RFC5209]  Sangster, P., Khosravi, H., Mani, M., Narayan, K., and J.
              Tardo, "Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and
              Requirements", RFC 5209, DOI 10.17487/RFC5209, June 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5209>.

   [TNC]      Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Trusted Network Connect TNC
              Architecture for Interoperability, Version 1.5", February
              2012.

18.2.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-mile-xmpp-grid]
              Cam-Winget, N., Appala, S., Pope, S., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Using XMPP for Security Information Exchange", draft-
              ietf-mile-xmpp-grid-04 (work in progress), October 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-push]
              Clemm, A., Voit, E., Prieto, A., Tripathy, A., Nilsen-
              Nygaard, E., Bierman, A., and B. Lengyel, "YANG Datastore
              Subscription", draft-ietf-netconf-yang-push-12 (work in
              progress), December 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-sacm-nea-swima-patnc]
              Schmidt, C., Haynes, D., Coffin, C., Waltermire, D., and
              J. Fitzgerald-McKay, "Software Inventory Message and
              Attributes (SWIMA) for PA-TNC", draft-ietf-sacm-nea-swima-
              patnc-01 (work in progress), September 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology]
              Waltermire, D., Montville, A., Harrington, D., and N. Cam-
              Winget, "Terminology for Security Assessment", draft-ietf-
              sacm-terminology-05 (work in progress), August 2014.

   [IF-IMC]   Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Trusted Network Connect TNC
              IF-IMC, Version 1.3", February 2013.

   [IF-IMV]   Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Trusted Network Connect TNC
              IF-IMV, Version 1.4", December 2014.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.




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   [RFC5792]  Sangster, P. and K. Narayan, "PA-TNC: A Posture Attribute
              (PA) Protocol Compatible with Trusted Network Connect
              (TNC)", RFC 5792, DOI 10.17487/RFC5792, March 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5792>.

   [RFC5793]  Sahita, R., Hanna, S., Hurst, R., and K. Narayan, "PB-TNC:
              A Posture Broker (PB) Protocol Compatible with Trusted
              Network Connect (TNC)", RFC 5793, DOI 10.17487/RFC5793,
              March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5793>.

   [RFC6876]  Sangster, P., Cam-Winget, N., and J. Salowey, "A Posture
              Transport Protocol over TLS (PT-TLS)", RFC 6876,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6876, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6876>.

   [RFC7632]  Waltermire, D. and D. Harrington, "Endpoint Security
              Posture Assessment: Enterprise Use Cases", RFC 7632,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7632, September 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7632>.

   [Server-Discovery]
              Trusted Computing Group, "DRAFT: TCG Trusted Network
              Connect PDP Discovery and Validation, Version 1.0",
              October 2015.

   [SWID]     "Information technology--Software asset management--Part
              2: Software identification tag", ISO/IEC 9899:1999, 2009.

Authors' Addresses

   Danny Haynes
   The MITRE Corporation
   202 Burlington Road
   Bedford, MA  01730
   USA

   Email: dhaynes@mitre.org


   Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay
   Department of Defense
   9800 Savage Road
   Ft. Meade, Maryland
   USA

   Email: jmfitz2@nsa.gov





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   Lisa Lorenzin
   Pulse Secure
   2700 Zanker Rd., Suite 200
   San Jose, CA  95134
   US

   Email: llorenzin@pulsesecure.net












































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