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Versions: (draft-waltermire-sacm-use-cases) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 RFC 7632

Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring WG           D. Waltermire
Internet-Draft                                                      NIST
Intended status: Informational                             D. Harrington
Expires: April 24, 2014                               Effective Software
                                                        October 21, 2013


      Endpoint Security Posture Assessment - Enterprise Use Cases
                      draft-ietf-sacm-use-cases-04

Abstract

   This memo documents a sampling of use cases for securely aggregating
   configuration and operational data and evaluating that data to
   determine an organization's security posture.  From these operational
   use cases, we can derive common functional capabilities and
   requirements to guide development of vendor-neutral, interoperable
   standards for aggregating and evaluating data relevant to security
   posture.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 24, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Endpoint Posture Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Definition and Publication of Automatable Configuration
           Guides  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Automated Checklist Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Organizational Software Policy Compliance . . . . . . . .   7
     2.4.  Detection of Posture Deviations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.5.  Search for Signs of Infection . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.6.  Remediation and Mitigation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.7.  Endpoint Information Analysis and Reporting . . . . . . .   8
     2.8.  Asynchronous Compliance/Vulnerability Assessment at Ice
           Station Zebra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.9.  Vulnerable Endpoint Identification  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.10. Compromised Endpoint Identification . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.11. Suspicious Endpoint Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.12. Traditional endpoint assessment with stored results . . .  11
     2.13. NAC/NAP connection with no stored results using an
           endpoint evaluator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.14. NAC/NAP connection with no stored results using a third-
           party evaluator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.15. Repository Interaction - A Full Assessment  . . . . . . .  12
     2.16. Repository Interaction - Filtered Delta Assessment  . . .  12
     2.17. Direct Human Retrieval of Ancillary Materials.  . . . . .  12
     2.18. Register with repository for immediate notification of
           new  security vulnerability content that match a
           selection filter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.19. Others... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   3.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  -03- to -04-  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.2.  -02- to -03-  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.3.  -01- to -02-  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.4.  -00- to -01-  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.5.  draft-waltermire-sacm-use-cases-05 to draft-ietf-sacm-
           use-cases-00  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.6.  waltermire -04- to -05- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18



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1.  Introduction

   Our goal with this document is to improve our agreement on which
   problems we're trying to solve.  We need to start with short, simple
   problem statements and discuss those by email and in person.  Once we
   agree on which problems we're trying to solve, we can move on to
   propose various solutions and decide which ones to use.

   This document describes example use cases for endpoint posture
   assessment for enterprises.  It provides a sampling of use cases for
   securely aggregating configuration and operational data and
   evaluating that data to determine the security posture of individual
   endpoints, and, in the aggregate, the security posture of an
   enterprise.

   These use cases cross many IT security information domains.  From
   these operational use cases, we can derive common concepts, common
   information expressions, functional capabilities and requirements to
   guide development of vendor-neutral, interoperable standards for
   aggregating and evaluating data relevant to security posture.

   Using this standard data, tools can analyze the state of endpoints,
   user activities and behaviour, and evaluate the security posture of
   an organization.  Common expression of information should enable
   interoperability between tools (whether customized, commercial, or
   freely available), and the ability to automate portions of security
   processes to gain efficiency, react to new threats in a timely
   manner, and free up security personnel to work on more advanced
   problems.

   The goal is to enable organizations to make informed decisions that
   support organizational objectives, to enforce policies for hardening
   systems, to prevent network misuse, to quantify business risk, and to
   collaborate with partners to identify and mitigate threats.

   It is expected that use cases for enterprises and for service
   providers will largely overlap, but there are additional
   complications for service providers, especially in handling
   information that crosses administrative domains.

   The output of endpoint posture assessment is expected to feed into
   additional processes, such as policy-based enforcement of acceptable
   state, verification and monitoring of security controls, and
   compliance to regulatory requirements.

2.  Endpoint Posture Assessment





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   Endpoint posture assessment involves orchestrating and performing
   data collection and evaluating the posture of a given endpoint.
   Typically, endpoint posture information is gathered and then
   published to appropriate data repositories to make collected
   information available for further analysis supporting organizational
   security processes.

   Endpoint posture assessment typically includes:

   o  Collecting the attributes of a given endpoint;

   o  Making the attributes available for evaluation and action; and

   o  Verifying that the endpoint's posture is in compliance with
      enterprise standards and policy.

   As part of these activities it is often necessary to identify and
   acquire any supporting content that is needed to drive data
   collection and analysis.

   The following is a typical workflow scenario for assessing endpoint
   posture:

   1.  Some type of trigger initiates the workflow.  For example, an
       operator or an application might trigger the process with a
       request, or the endpoint might trigger the process using an
       event-driven notification.

          QUESTION: Since this is about security automation, can we drop
          the User and just use Application?  Is there a better term to
          use here?  Once the policy is selected, the rest seems like
          something we definitely would want to automate, so I dropped
          the User part.

   2.  A user/application selects a target endpoint to be assessed.

   3.  A user/application selects which policies are applicable to the
       target.

   4.  The application determines which (sets of) posture attributes
       need to be collected for evaluation.

          QUESTION: It was suggested that mentioning several common
          acquisition methods, such as local API, WMI, Puppet, DCOM,
          SNMP, CMDB query, and NEA, without forcing any specific method
          would be good.  I have concerns this could devolve into a
          "what about my favorite?" contest.  OTOH, the charter does
          specifically call for use of existing standards where



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          applicable, so the use cases document might be a good neutral
          location for such information, and might force us to consider
          what types of external interfaces we might need to support
          when we consider the requirements.  It appears that the
          generic workflow sequence would be a good place to mention
          such common acquisition methods.

   5.  The application might retrieve previously collected information
       from a cache or data store, such as a data store populated by an
       asset management system.

   6.  The application might establish communication with the target,
       mutually authenticate identities and authorizations, and collect
       posture attributes from the target.

   7.  The application might establish communication with one or more
       intermediary/agents, mutually authenticate their identities and
       determine authorizations, and collect posture attributes about
       the target from the intermediary/agents.  Such agents might be
       local or external.

   8.  The application communicates target identity and (sets of)
       collected attributes to an evaluator, possibly an external
       process or external system.

   9.  The evaluator compares the collected posture attributes with
       expected values as expressed in policies.

          QUESTION: Evaluator generates a report or log or notification
          of some type?

   The following subsections detail specific use cases for data
   collection, analysis, and related operations pertaining to the
   publication and use of supporting content.

2.1.  Definition and Publication of Automatable Configuration Guides

   A vendor manufactures a number of specialized endpoint devices.  They
   also develop and maintain an operating system for these devices that
   enables end-user organizations to configure a number of security and
   operational settings.  As part of their customer support activities,
   they publish a number of secure configuration guides that provide
   minimum security guidelines for configuring their devices.

   Each guide they produce applies to a specific model of device and
   version of the operating system and provides a number of specialized
   configurations depending on the devices intended function and what
   add-on hardware modules and software licenses are installed on the



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   device.  To enable their customers to evaluate the security posture
   of their devices to ensure that all appropriate minimal security
   settings are enabled, they publish an automatable configuration
   checklist using a popular data format that defines what settings to
   collect using a network management protocol and appropriate values
   for each setting.  They publish these guides to a public content
   repository that customers can query to retrieve applicable guides for
   their deployed enterprise network infrastructure endpoints.

   Guides could also come from sources other than a device vendor, such
   as industry groups or regulatory authorities, or enterprises could
   develop their own checklists.

2.2.  Automated Checklist Verification

   A financial services company operates a heterogeneous IT environment.
   In support of their risk management program, they utilize vendor
   provided automatable security configuration checklists for each
   operating system and application used within their IT environment.
   Multiple checklists are used from different vendors to insure
   adequate coverage of all IT assets.

   To identify what checklists are needed, they use automation to gather
   an inventory of the software versions utilized by all IT assets in
   the enterprise.  This data gathering will involve querying existing
   data stores of previously collected endpoint software inventory
   posture data and actively collecting data from reachable endpoints as
   needed utilizing network and systems management protocols.
   Previously collected data may be provided by periodic data
   collection, network connection-driven data collection, or ongoing
   event-driven monitoring of endpoint posture changes.

   Using the gathered software inventory data and associated asset
   management data indicating the organizational defined functions of
   each endpoint, they locate and query each vendors content repository
   for the appropriate checklists.  These checklists are cached locally
   to reduce the need to download the checklist multiple times.

   Driven by the setting data provided in the checklist, a combination
   of existing configuration data stores and data collection methods are
   used to gather the appropriate posture information from each
   endpoint.  Specific data is gathered based on the defined enterprise
   function and software inventory of each endpoint.  The data
   collection paths used to collect software inventory posture will be
   used again for this purpose.  Once the data is gathered, the actual
   state is evaluated against the expected state criteria in each
   applicable checklist.  Deficiencies are identified and reported to
   the appropriate endpoint operators for remedy.



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   Checklists could also come from sources other than the application or
   OS vendor, such as industry groups or regulatory authorities, or
   enterprises could develop their own checklists.

2.3.  Organizational Software Policy Compliance

   Example Corporation, in support of compliance requirements, has
   identified a number of secure baselines for different endpoint types
   that exist across their enterprise IT environment.  Determining which
   baseline applies to a given endpoint is based on the organizationally
   defined function of the device.

   Each baseline, defined using an automatable standardized data format,
   identifies the expected hardware, software and patch inventory, and
   software configuration item values for each endpoint type.  As part
   of their compliance activities, they require that all endpoints
   connecting to their network meet the appropriate baselines.  The
   configuration settings of each endpoint are collected and compared to
   the baseline to make sure the configuration complies with the
   appropriate baseline whenever it connects to the network and at least
   once a day thereafter.  These daily compliance checks evaluate the
   posture of each endpoint and report on its compliance with the
   appropriate baseline.

   [TODO: Need to speak to how the baselines are identified for a given
   endpoint connecting to the network.]

2.4.  Detection of Posture Deviations

   Example corporation has established secure configuration baselines
   for each different type of endpoint within their enterprise
   including: network infrastructure, mobile, client, and server
   computing platforms.  These baselines define an approved list of
   hardware, software (i.e., operating system, applications, and
   patches), and associated required configurations.  When an endpoint
   connects to the network, the appropriate baseline configuration is
   communicated to the endpoint based on its location in the network,
   the expected function of the device, and other asset management data.
   It is checked for compliance with the baseline indicating any
   deviations to the device's operators.  Once the baseline has been
   established, the endpoint is monitored for any change events
   pertaining to the baseline on an ongoing basis.  When a change occurs
   to posture defined in the baseline, updated posture information is
   exchanged allowing operators to be notified and/or automated action
   to be taken.

2.5.  Search for Signs of Infection




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   The Example Corporation carefully manages endpoint security with
   tools that implement the SACM standards.  One day, the endpoint
   security team at Example Corporation learns about a stealthy malware
   package.  This malware has just been discovered but has already
   spread widely around the world.  Certain signs of infection have been
   identified (e.g. the presence of certain files).  The security team
   would like to know which endpoints owned by the Example Corporation
   have been infected with this malware.  They use their tools to search
   for the signs of infection and generate a list of infected endpoints.

   The search for infected endpoints may be performed by gathering new
   endpoint posture information regarding the presence of the signs of
   infection.  However, this might miss finding endpoints that were
   previously infected but where the infection has now erased itself.
   Such previously infected endpoints may be detected by searching a
   database of posture information previously gathered for the signs of
   infection.  However, this will not work if the malware hides its
   presence carefully or if the signs of infection were not included in
   previous posture assessments.  In those cases, the database may be
   used to at least detect which endpoints previously had software
   vulnerable to infection by the malware.

2.6.  Remediation and Mitigation

   When Example Corporation discovers that one of its endpoints is
   vulnerable to infection, a process of mitigation and remediation is
   triggered.  The first step is mitigating the impact of the
   vulnerability, perhaps by placing the endpoint into a safe network or
   blocking network traffic that could infect the endpoint.  The second
   step is remediation: fixing the vulnerability.  In some cases, these
   steps may happen automatically and rapidly.  In other cases, they may
   require human intervention either to decide what response is most
   appropriate or to complete the steps, which are sometimes complex.

   These same steps of mitigation and remediation may be used when
   Example Corporation discovers that one of its endpoints has become
   infected with some malware.  Alternatively, the infected endpoint may
   simply be monitored or even placed into a honeynet or similar
   environment to observe the malware's behavior and lead the attackers
   astray.

   QUESTION: Is remediation and mitigation within the scope of the WG,
   and should the use case be included here?

2.7.  Endpoint Information Analysis and Reporting

   Freed from the drudgery of manual endpoint compliance monitoring, one
   of the security administrators at Example Corporation notices (not



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   using SACM standards) that five endpoints have been uploading lots of
   data to a suspicious server on the Internet.  The administrator
   queries the SACM database of endpoint posture to see what software is
   installed on those endpoints and finds that they all have a
   particular program installed.  She then searches the database to see
   which other endpoints have that program installed.  All these
   endpoints are monitored carefully (not using SACM standards), which
   allows the administrator to detect that the other endpoints are also
   infected.

   This is just one example of the useful analysis that a skilled
   analyst can do using the database of endpoint posture that SACM can
   provide.

2.8.  Asynchronous Compliance/Vulnerability Assessment at Ice Station
      Zebra

   A university team receives a grant to do research at a government
   facility in the arctic.  The only network communications will be via
   an intermittent low-speed high-latency high-cost satellite link.
   During their extended expedition they will need to show continue
   compliance with the security policies of the university, the
   government, and the provider of the satellite network as well as keep
   current on vulnerability testing.  Interactive assessments are
   therefore not reliable, and since the researchers have very limited
   funding they need to minimize how much money they spend on network
   data.

   Prior to departure they register all equipment with an asset
   management system owned by the university, which will also initiate
   and track assessments.

   On a periodic basis -- either after a maximum time delta or when the
   content repository has received a threshold level of new
   vulnerability definitions -- the university uses the information in
   the asset management system to put together a collection request for
   all of the deployed assets that encompasses the minimal set of
   artifacts necessary to evaluate all three security policies as well
   as vulnerability testing.

   In the case of new critical vulnerabilities this collection request
   consists only of the artifacts necessary for those vulnerabilities
   and collection is only initiated for those assets that could
   potentially have a new vulnerability.







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   [Optional] Asset artifacts are cached in a local CMDB.  When new
   vulnerabilities are reported to the content repository, a request to
   the live asset is only done if the artifacts in the CMDB are
   incomplete and/or not current enough.

   The collection request is queued for the next window of connectivity.
   The deployed assets eventually receive the request, fulfill it, and
   queue the results for the next return opportunity.

   The collected artifacts eventually make it back to the university
   where the level of compliance and vulnerability expose is calculated
   and asset characteristics are compared to what is in the asset
   management system for accuracy and completeness.

2.9.  Vulnerable Endpoint Identification

   Typically vulnerability reports identify an executable or library
   that is vulnerable, or worst case the software that is vulnerable.
   This information is used to determine if an organization has one or
   more endpoints that have exposure to a vulnerability (i.e., what
   endpoints are vulnerable?).  It is often necessary to know where you
   are running vulnerable code and what configurations are in place on
   the endpoint and upstream devices (e.g., IDS, firewall) that may
   limit the exposure.  All of this information, along with details on
   the severity and impact of a vulnerability, is necessary to
   prioritize remedies.

2.10.  Compromised Endpoint Identification

   Along with knowing if one or more endpoints are vulnerable, it is
   also important to know if you have been compromised.  Indicators of
   compromise provide details that can be used to identify malware
   (e.g., file hashes), identify malicious activity (e.g. command and
   control traffic), presence of unauthorized/malicious configuration
   items, and other indicators.  While important, this goes beyond
   determining organizational exposure.

2.11.  Suspicious Endpoint Behavior

   This Use Case describes the collaboration between specific
   participants in an information security system specific to detecting
   a connection attempt to a known-bad Internet host by a botnet zombie
   that has made its way onto an organization's Information Technology
   systems.  The primary human actor is the Security Operations Center
   Analyst, and the primary software actor is the configuration
   assessment tool.  Note, however, the dependencies on other tools,
   such as asset management, intrusion detection, and messaging.




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2.12.  Traditional endpoint assessment with stored results

   An external trigger initiates an assessment of an endpoint.  The
   Controller uses the data in the Datastore to look up authentication
   information for the endpoint and passes that along with the
   assessment request details to the Evaluator.  The Evaluator uses the
   Endpoint information to request taxonomy information from the
   Collector on the endpoint, which responds with those attributes.  The
   Evaluator uses that taxonomy information along with the information
   in the original request from the Controller to request the
   appropriate content from the Content Repository.  The Evaluator uses
   the content to derive the minimal set of endpoint attributes needed
   to perform the assessment and makes that request.  The Evaluator uses
   the Collector response to do the assessment and returns the results
   to the Controller.  The Controller puts the results in the Datastore.

2.13.  NAC/NAP connection with no stored results using an endpoint
       evaluator

   A mobile endpoint makes a VPN connection request.  The NAC/NAP broker
   requests the results of the VPN connection assessment from the
   Controller.  The Controller requests the VPN attributes from a
   Content Repository.  The Controller requests an evaluation of the
   collected attributes from the Evaluator on the endpoint.  The
   endpoint performs the assessment and returns the results.  The
   Controller completes the original assessment request by returning the
   results to the NAC/NAP broker, which uses them to set the level of
   network access allowed to the endpoint.

   QUESTION: I edited these from Gunnar's email of 9/11, to try to
   reduce the use of "assessment", to focus on collection and
   evaluation, and deal with use cases rather than architecture.  I am
   not sure I got all the concepts properly identified.

2.14.  NAC/NAP connection with no stored results using a third-party
       evaluator

   A mobile endpoint makes a VPN connection request.  The NAC/NAP broker
   requests the results of the VPN connection assessment from the
   Controller.  The Controller requests the VPN attributes from a
   Content Repository.  The Controller requests an evaluation of the
   collected attributes from an Evaluator in the network (rather than
   trusting an evaluator on the endpoint).  The evaluator performs the
   evaluation and returns the results.  The Controller completes the
   original assessment request by returning the results to the NAC/NAP
   broker, which uses them to set the level of network access allowed to
   the endpoint.




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   QUESTION: I edited these from Gunnar's email of 9/11, to try to
   reduce the use of "assessment", to focus on collection and
   evaluation, and deal with use cases rather than architecture.  I am
   not sure I got all the concepts properly identified.

2.15.  Repository Interaction - A Full Assessment

   An auditor at a health care provider needs to know the current
   compliance level of his network, including enumeration of known
   vulnerabilities, so she initiates a full enterprise-wide assessment.
   For each endpoint on the network, after determining its taxonomical
   classification, the assessment system queries the content repository
   for all materials that apply to that endpoint.

2.16.  Repository Interaction - Filtered Delta Assessment

   Before heading out on a road trip, a rep checks out an iOS tablet
   computer from the IT department.  Before turning over the laptop the
   IT administrator first initiates a quick assessment to see if any new
   vulnerabilities that potentially yield remote access or local
   privilege escalation have been identified for that device type since
   the last time the device had had a full assessment.

2.17.  Direct Human Retrieval of Ancillary Materials.

   Preceding a HIPAA assessment the local SSO wants to review the HIPAA
   regulations to determine which assets do or do not fall under the
   regulation.  Following the assessment he again queries the content
   repository for more information about remediation strategies and
   employee training materials.

2.18.  Register with repository for immediate notification of new
       security vulnerability content that match a selection filter.

   Interested in reducing the exposure time to new vulnerabilities and
   compliance policy changes, the IT administrator registers with his
   subscribed content repository(s) to receive immediate notification of
   any changes to the vulnerability and compliance content that apply to
   his managed assets.  Receipt of notifications trigger an immediate
   delta assessment against those assets that potentially match.

2.19.  Others...

   Additional use cases will be identified as we work through other
   domains.

3.  IANA Considerations




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   This memo includes no request to IANA.

4.  Security Considerations

   This memo documents, for Informational purposes, use cases for
   security automation.  While it is about security, it does not affect
   security.

5.  Acknowledgements

   The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and/or the
   MITRE Corporation have developed specifications under the general
   term "Security Automation" including languages, protocols,
   enumerations, and metrics.

   Adam Montville edited early versions of this draft.

   Kathleen Moriarty and Stephen Hanna contributed text describing the
   scope of the document.

   Steve Hanna provided use cases for Search for Signs of Infection,
   Remediation and Mitigation, and Endpoint Information Analysis and
   Reporting.

   Gunnar Engelbach provided the use case about Ice Station Zebra, and
   use cases regarding the content repository.

6.  Change Log

6.1.  -03- to -04-

   Added four new use cases regarding content repository.

6.2.  -02- to -03-

   Expanded the workflow description based on ML input.

   Changed the ambiguous "assess" to better separate data collection
   from evaluation.

   Added use case for Search for Signs of Infection.

   Added use case for Remediation and Mitigation.

   Added use case for Endpoint Information Analysis and Reporting.

   Added use case for Asynchronous Compliance/Vulnerability Assessment
   at Ice Station Zebra.



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   Added use case for Traditional endpoint assessment with stored
   results.

   Added use case for NAC/NAP connection with no stored results using an
   endpoint evaluator.

   Added use case for NAC/NAP connection with no stored results using a
   third-party evaluator.

   Added use case for Compromised Endpoint Identification.

   Added use case for Suspicious Endpoint Behavior.

   Added use case for Vulnerable Endpoint Identification.

   Updated Acknowledgements

6.3.  -01- to -02-

   Changed title

   removed section 4, expecting it will be moved into the requirements
   document.

   removed the list of proposed caabilities from section 3.1

   Added empty sections for Search for Signs of Infection, Remediation
   and Mitigation, and Endpoint Information Analysis and Reporting.

   Removed Requirements Language section and rfc2119 reference.

   Removed unused references (which ended up being all references).

6.4.  -00- to -01-

   o  Work on this revision has been focused on document content
      relating primarily to use of asset management data and functions.

   o  Made significant updates to section 3 including:

      *  Reworked introductory text.

      *  Replaced the single example with multiple use cases that focus
         on more discrete uses of asset management data to support
         hardware and software inventory, and configuration management
         use cases.





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      *  For one of the use cases, added mapping to functional
         capabilities used.  If popular, this will be added to the other
         use cases as well.

      *  Additional use cases will be added in the next revision
         capturing additional discussion from the list.

   o  Made significant updates to section 4 including:

      *  Renamed the section heading from "Use Cases" to "Functional
         Capabilities" since use cases are covered in section 3.  This
         section now extrapolates specific functions that are needed to
         support the use cases.

      *  Started work to flatten the section, moving select subsections
         up from under asset management.

      *  Removed the subsections for: Asset Discovery, Endpoint
         Components and Asset Composition, Asset Resources, and Asset
         Life Cycle.

      *  Renamed the subsection "Asset Representation Reconciliation" to
         "Deconfliction of Asset Identities".

      *  Expanded the subsections for: Asset Identification, Asset
         Characterization, and Deconfliction of Asset Identities.

      *  Added a new subsection for Asset Targeting.

      *  Moved remaining sections to "Other Unedited Content" for future
         updating.

6.5.  draft-waltermire-sacm-use-cases-05 to draft-ietf-sacm-use-cases-00

   o  Transitioned from individual I/D to WG I/D based on WG consensus
      call.

   o  Fixed a number of spelling errors.  Thank you Erik!

   o  Added keywords to the front matter.

   o  Removed the terminology section from the draft.  Terms have been
      moved to: draft-dbh-sacm-terminology-00

   o  Removed requirements to be moved into a new I/D.

   o  Extracted the functionality from the examples and made the
      examples less prominent.



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   o  Renamed "Functional Capabilities and Requirements" section to "Use
      Cases".

      *  Reorganized the "Asset Management" sub-section.  Added new text
         throughout.

         +  Renamed a few sub-section headings.

         +  Added text to the "Asset Characterization" sub-section.

   o  Renamed "Security Configuration Management" to "Endpoint
      Configuration Management".  Not sure if the "security" distinction
      is important.

      *  Added new sections, partially integrated existing content.

      *  Additional text is needed in all of the sub-sections.

   o  Changed "Security Change Management" to "Endpoint Posture Change
      Management".  Added new skeletal outline sections for future
      updates.

6.6.  waltermire -04- to -05-

   o  Are we including user activities and behavior in the scope of this
      work?  That seems to be layer 8 stuff, appropriate to an IDS/IPS
      application, not Internet stuff.

   o  I removed the references to what the WG will do because this
      belongs in the charter, not the (potentially long-lived) use cases
      document.  I removed mention of charter objectives because the
      charter may go through multiple iterations over time; there is a
      website for hosting the charter; this document is not the correct
      place for that discussion.

   o  I moved the discussion of NIST specifications to the
      acknowledgements section.

   o  Removed the portion of the introduction that describes the
      chapters; we have a table of concepts, and the existing text
      seemed redundant.

   o  Removed marketing claims, to focus on technical concepts and
      technical analysis, that would enable subsequent engineering
      effort.

   o  Removed (commented out in XML) UC2 and UC3, and eliminated some
      text that referred to these use cases.



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   o  Modified IANA and Security Consideration sections.

   o  Moved Terms to the front, so we can use them in the subsequent
      text.

   o  Removed the "Key Concepts" section, since the concepts of ORM and
      IRM were not otherwise mentioned in the document.  This would seem
      more appropriate to the arch doc rather than use cases.

   o  Removed role=editor from David Waltermire's info, since there are
      three editors on the document.  The editor is most important when
      one person writes the document that represents the work of
      multiple people.  When there are three editors, this role marking
      isn't necessary.

   o  Modified text to describe that this was specific to enterprises,
      and that it was expected to overlap with service provider use
      cases, and described the context of this scoped work within a
      larger context of policy enforcement, and verification.

   o  The document had asset management, but the charter mentioned
      asset, change, configuration, and vulnerability management, so I
      added sections for each of those categories.

   o  Added text to Introduction explaining goal of the document.

   o  Added sections on various example use cases for asset management,
      config management, change management, and vulnerability
      management.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2865]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
              "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC
              2865, June 2000.









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Authors' Addresses

   David Waltermire
   National Institute of Standards and Technology
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, Maryland  20877
   USA

   Email: david.waltermire@nist.gov


   David Harrington
   Effective Software
   50 Harding Rd
   Portsmouth, NH  03801
   USA

   Email: ietfdbh@comcast.net

































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