[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits] [IPR]

Versions: (draft-bi-savi-dhcp) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 RFC 7513

SAVI                                                               J. Bi
Internet-Draft                                                     J. Wu
Intended status: Standards Track                                  G. Yao
Expires: January 8, 2013                                  Tsinghua Univ.
                                                                F. Baker
                                                                   Cisco
                                                            July 7, 2012


                         SAVI Solution for DHCP
                        draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-14

Abstract

   This document specifies the procedure for creating bindings between a
   DHCPv4/DHCPv6 assigned source IP address and a binding anchor on SAVI
   (Source Address Validation Improvements) device.  The bindings can be
   used to filter packets generated on the local link with forged source
   IP address in DHCP scenario.  This mechanism is proposed as a
   complement of ingress filtering to provide finer granularity source
   IP address validation.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.


































Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  SAVI-DHCP Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Binding Anchor Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     5.1.  No Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     5.2.  SAVI-Validation Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.3.  SAVI-DHCP-Trust Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.4.  SAVI-SAVI Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.5.  SAVI-BindRecovery Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.6.  Table of Mutual Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  Data Structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     6.1.  Binding State Table (BST)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     6.2.  Mapping Table from Link Layer Address to Binding Anchor  . 11
   7.  Procedure of Regular Binding Set Up  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     7.1.  Rationale  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     7.2.  Binding States Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     7.3.  Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       7.3.1.  Timer Expiration Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       7.3.2.  Control Message Arriving Events  . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     7.4.  State Machine of DHCP Packet Snooping  . . . . . . . . . . 13
       7.4.1.  From NO_BIND to Other States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
         7.4.1.1.  Trigger Event  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
         7.4.1.2.  Following Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       7.4.2.  From INIT_BIND to Other States . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
         7.4.2.1.  Trigger Event  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
         7.4.2.2.  Following Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       7.4.3.  From BOUND to Other States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
         7.4.3.1.  Trigger Event  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
         7.4.3.2.  Following Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     7.5.  Table of State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   8.  Supplemental Binding Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     8.1.  Rationale  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     8.2.  Additional Binding States Description  . . . . . . . . . . 19
     8.3.  Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     8.4.  State Machine of Binding Recovery Process  . . . . . . . . 19
       8.4.1.  From NO_BIND to Other States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
         8.4.1.1.  Trigger Event  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
         8.4.1.2.  Following Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
       8.4.2.  From DETECTION to Other States . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
         8.4.2.1.  Trigger Event  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
         8.4.2.2.  Following Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
       8.4.3.  From RECOVERY to Other States  . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
         8.4.3.1.  Trigger Event  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
         8.4.3.2.  Following Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
       8.4.4.  After BOUND  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


         8.4.4.1.  Trigger Event  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
         8.4.4.2.  Following Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   9.  Filtering Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     9.1.  Data Packet Filtering  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     9.2.  Control Packet Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   10. State Restoration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     10.1. Binding Anchor Attribute Restoration . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     10.2. Binding State Restoration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   11. Constants  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   12. MLD Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   13. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     13.1. Security Problem about Binding Triggered by
           EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NULL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     13.2. Binding Number Limitation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     13.3. Risk from Link Layer Routing Dynamic . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     13.4. Duplicate Bindings of Same Address . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     13.5. Security Problems about Binding Recovery Process . . . . . 27
     13.6. Compatibility with DNA (Detecting Network Attachment)  . . 27
     13.7. Bogus DHCP Server Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     13.8. Handle Binding Anchor Off-link Event . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     13.9. Residual Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   14. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   15. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     16.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     16.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   Appendix A.  change log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33























Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


1.  Introduction

   This document describes the procedure for creating a binding between
   an address allocated to a network attachment point by DHCP and a
   suitable binding anchor on a SAVI device.  Binding anchor is defined
   to be a link layer property of network attachment in
   [savi-framework].  A list of proper binding anchors can be found in
   the Section 3.2 of [savi-framework].  The bindings can be used to
   filter or identify packets with forged source IP address.  Section 9
   suggests usage of these bindings to filter spoofing traffic in common
   practice.

   The mechanism specified in this document is designed to provide a
   finer granularity source IP address validation, as a supplement to
   [BCP38].  This mechanism mainly performs DHCP snooping to set up
   bindings between IP addresses assigned by DHCP and corresponding
   binding anchors.  The binding process is inspired by the work of
   [BA2007].  This mechanism covers DHCPv6 and binding recovery
   procedure, which are not discussed in [BA2007].

   This solution is primarily designed for a pure DHCP scenario in which
   only DHCP addresses are legitimate global addresses.  And it is
   designed for stateful DHCP scenario [rfc2131], [rfc3315].  In
   stateless DHCP scenarios [rfc3736], a node must have obtained its
   IPv6 addresses through some other mechanisms and so the address of
   the client SHOULD be bound based on other SAVI solutions.


2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [rfc2119].


3.  Terminology

   SAVI-DHCP: The name of this SAVI instance for address assigned
   through DHCP

   SAVI device: A network device which enables this SAVI instance

   Non-SAVI device: A network device without this SAVI instance

   DHCP server/relay type message: Messages that can only originate from
   DHCP server or relay.  The list of such messages contains DHCPv4 ACK,
   DHCPv4 NAK, DHCPv4 OFFER, DHCPv6 Reply, DHCPv6 Advertise, DHCPv6
   Reconfiguration, DHCPv6 Relay-forward and DHCPv6 Relay-reply



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   Lease time: Lease time in IPv4 [rfc2131] and valid lifetime in IPv6
   [rfc3315]


4.  SAVI-DHCP Scenario

   Figure 1 shows the main elements in a network where this mechanism is
   deployed.  One or more DHCP servers mediate the allocation and
   distribution of IP addresses to hosts requesting them using the DHCP
   protocol.  DHCP relay may be used to relay message between client and
   server.  Multiple SAVI devices and non-SAVI devices can co-exist on
   link.  A SAVI device can be connected to DHCP client, DHCP relay
   (even DHCP server), SAVI device and non-SAVI device.  The attribute
   of a binding anchor is determined by the role to which it is
   connected, as specified in Section 5.

   Protection perimeter (refer to Section 4 in [savi-framework]) is
   formed by SAVI Device A and SAVI Device B for scalability.  There is
   no need to setup a binding for client A on SAVI device B, or to setup
   a binding for client B on SAVI device A.

   Other address assignment mechanisms may be also used in such a
   network.  However, this solution is primarily designed for a pure
   DHCP scenario, in which only the DHCP servers can assign a valid
   global address.

   Note that in an IPv6 environment, every interface has a link-local
   address, which is not assigned by DHCP.  This solution will not
   validate the link-local address.  It is RECOMMENDED to enable a SAVI
   solution for link-local addresses, e.g. [savi-fcfs].





















Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


                                 /------------\
                  +--------+     |            |       +--------+
                  |DHCP    |-----|   Router A |       | Client |
                  |Server A|     |            |       | C      |
                  +--------+     \------------/       +--------+
                 ......................|..........        |
                 .                     |         .        |
                 . Protection          |         .    +--------+
                 . Perimeter           |         .    |Non-SAVI|
                 .                     |         .    |Device  |
                 .                     |         .    +--------+
                 .                     |         .        |
                 . +----------+    +---'------+  .        |
                 . |  SAVI    |    |  SAVI    |--.---------
            -----.-|  Device A|----|  Device B|--.---------
            |    . +----|-----+    +-|------|-+  .        |
            |    .................................        |
            |           |            |      |             |
       /----------\     |            |      |             |
       |          |  +-------+  +------+   +------+   +--------+
       | Router B |  | Client|  |DHCP  |   |Client|   |DHCP    |
       |          |  | A     |  |Relay |   |B     |   |Server B|
       \----------/  +-------+  +------+   +------+   +--------+



                       Figure 1: SAVI-DHCP Scenario


5.  Binding Anchor Attributes

   This section specifies the binding anchor attributes used by this
   mechanism.  Attributes are used to distinguish different types of
   binding anchors.  The procedure performed on each binding anchor is
   determined by the attributes set on the binding anchor.

   By default, a binding anchor has no attribute.  A binding anchor MAY
   be configured to have one or more compatible attributes.  The
   attribute of each binding anchor should be manually configured before
   enabling this SAVI-DHCP function.

5.1.  No Attribute

   Before configuration, by default, a binding anchor has no attribute.
   Generally, each binding anchor is configured to have one or more
   attributes after configuration.

   Considering the trivial of configuration, it is expected SAVI-DHCP



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   function will not cause a break of the network even though an
   attribute is not configured.  Thus, data packet filtering will not be
   performed on binding anchor with no attribute.  Note that if a
   binding anchor has no attribute, it means SAVI-DHCP-Trust is not
   configured on the binding anchor; thus, server type DHCP messages
   from the binding anchor with no attribute will be discarded.

   However, a binding anchor MAY have no attribute after configuration.
   For example, in Figure 1, on the binding anchor of SAVI Device A
   connected to Router B, it is unreasonable to set up bindings for the
   host behind Router B, or filter out traffic from Router B, or allow
   forged DHCP message from Router B. Thus, no attribute should be
   configured on this binding anchor.

5.2.  SAVI-Validation Attribute

   SAVI-Validation attribute is used on a binding anchor on which the
   source address of data packet and DHCP message is to be validated.
   The filtering process on the binding anchor with such attribute is
   described in section 9.  In Figure 1, the binding anchor between SAVI
   Device B and Client A, and the binding anchor between SAVI Device B
   and Non SAVI Device should be configured to have this attribute.

5.3.  SAVI-DHCP-Trust Attribute

   SAVI-DHCP-Trust Attribute is used on binding anchor on the path to a
   trustable DHCP server/relay.  DHCP server/relay type message coming
   from binding anchor with this attribute will be forwarded.  In
   Figure 1, the binding anchor between SAVI Device B and DHCP Relay,
   the binding anchor between SAVI Device B and DHCP Server B, and the
   binding anchor between SAVI Device B and Router A should be
   configured to have this attribute.

   Note that if the binding anchor is not exclusive for the valid DHCP
   server, messages from a valid DHCP server and a bogus DHCP server may
   arrive with the same binding anchor with this attribute.  Thus, only
   relying on configuring this attribute may not protect the network
   from bogus DHCP servers.  In deployment, it is RECOMMENDED the
   binding anchor for any DHCP server should be exclusive to the DHCP
   server on the protection perimeter.  The security problem related
   with the bogus DHCP server and deployment options are discussed in
   section 14.7.

5.4.  SAVI-SAVI Attribute

   This attribute is used on the binding anchor from which the data
   traffic is not to be checked.  Binding will not be set up on binding
   anchor with this attribute.  All data packets will be allowed



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   directly.  In Figure 1, the binding anchor between SAVI Device A and
   SAVI Device B should be configured with this attribute.  DHCP server/
   relay type messages from a binding anchor with this attribute but
   without SAVI-DHCP-Trust attribute will be filtered out.

   Through configuring this attribute on binding anchor that joins two
   or more SAVI devices, SAVI-Validation and SAVI-SAVI attributes
   implement the security perimeter concept in [savi-framework].  Since
   no binding entry is needed on such binding anchors, the resource
   requirement can be reduced significantly.

   Though there is no factual difference in packet process between a
   binding anchor with no attribute and a binding anchor only with SAVI-
   SAVI attribute, their connotations are different.  SAVI-SAVI
   attribute is configured on binding anchor between SAVI devices on the
   same link inside the protection perimeter.  However only when a
   binding anchor is on the protection perimeter and connected to
   another link, then it can have no attribute after configuration.

5.5.  SAVI-BindRecovery Attribute

   If SAVI-Validation attribute is configured on a binding anchor, the
   binding on this attribute is set up primarily based on DHCP message
   snooping described in Section 7.  However, in some scenarios, a DHCP
   address may be used without previous DHCP exchange procedure
   performed on the binding anchor, as discussed in Section 8.  In such
   scenarios, data-triggered binding procedure, which is described in
   Section 8, is required to be performed.

   This attribute is used on the binding anchor that requires data-
   triggered binding recovery.  It can be configured on any binding
   anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute, especially when the binding
   anchor is not directly attached by client.  In Figure 1, it is
   suggested to configure this attribute on binding anchor between SAVI
   Device B and Non SAVI Device.

5.6.  Table of Mutual Exclusions

   Mutually exclusive attributes MUST NOT be set on the same binding
   anchor.  The compatibility of different attributes is listed in
   Figure 2.










Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013                [Page 9]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   +-----------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
   |           | SAVI-      | SAVI-      | SAVI-      |SAVI-       |
   |           | Validation | DHCP-Trust | SAVI       |BindRecovery|
   +-----------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
   |SAVI-      |            |            | mutually   |            |
   |Validation |     -      | compatible | exclusive  | compatible |
   +-----------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
   |SAVI-      |            |            |            |            |
   |DHCP-Trust | compatible |     -      | compatible | compatible |
   +-----------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
   |SAVI-      | mutually   |            |            | mutually   |
   |SAVI       | exclusive  | compatible |     -      | exclusive  |
   +-----------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
   |SAVI-      |            |            |            |            |
   |Bind       |            |            | mutually   |            |
   |Recovery   | compatible | compatible | exclusive  |     -      |
   +-----------+------------+------------+------------+------------+




                   Figure 2: Table of Mutual Exclusions


6.  Data Structures

   This section describes the data structures used in this mechanism.
   The main data structure, named Binding State Table, is used to record
   bindings and their states.  A mapping table from the link layer
   address to the binding anchor may be required, as described in
   Section 13.7

6.1.  Binding State Table (BST)

   This table contains the state of a binding between a source address
   and a binding anchor.  Entries are keyed on the binding anchor and
   source IP address.  Each entry has a lifetime field recording the
   remaining lifetime of the entry, a state field recording the state of
   the binding and a TID field recording Transaction ID (TID) [rfc2131]
   [rfc3315] of DHCP message.  The lifetime field is used to help remove
   expired bindings.  The state field changes over time to identify the
   current state of the binding.  States of bindings are specified in
   Section 7.2 and Section 8.2.  The TID field is used to keep the TID
   in DHCP request.  The TID field can be cleared after the state is
   changed to BOUND.  An instance of this table is shown in Figure 3.






Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 10]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   +---------+----------+----------+-----------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State    | Lifetime  |TID    |
   +---------+----------+----------+-----------+-------+
   | A       | IP_1     | BOUND    |  65535    |TID_1  |
   +---------+----------+----------+-----------+-------+
   | A       | IP_2     | BOUND    |  10000    |TID_2  |
   +---------+----------+----------+-----------+-------+
   | B       | IP_3     |INIT_BIND |      1    |TID_3  |
   +---------+----------+----------+-----------+-------+



                         Figure 3: Instance of BST

6.2.  Mapping Table from Link Layer Address to Binding Anchor

   As described in Section 7.4.2.2, whenever binding anchors must be
   recovered from DCHP Reply, such a mapping table is required.  This
   table maps link layer address to binding anchor, so that the SAVI
   device can determine on which binding anchor to set up a binding only
   based on a DHCP Reply message.

   Such a table can already exist on SAVI devices.  For example, if the
   binding anchor is a switch port, the mapping table from MAC address
   to switch port is required for switching frames.  We don't require
   SAVI devices to set up a different mapping table from the existing
   ones.  Instead, the SAVI device MUST only use the existing one.

   The set up and update of this table is out of the scope of this
   document.


7.  Procedure of Regular Binding Set Up

   This section specifies the procedure of setting up bindings based on
   DHCP message snooping.  The binding procedure specified here is
   exclusively designed for binding anchor with SAVI-Validation
   attribute.

7.1.  Rationale

   The rationale of this mechanism is that if a node associated with a
   binding anchor is legitimate to use a DHCP address, the DHCP
   procedure which assigns the address to the node must have been
   performed on the same binding anchor.  This basis stands when the
   link layer routing is stable.  However, layer-2 mobility and unstable
   link layer routing may result in that data packet is received from a
   different binding anchor.  Infrequent link layer path change can be



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 11]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   handled (but not perfectly) by the mechanism described in Section 8.
   Section 13.3 discusses the situation that the link layer routing is
   naturally unstable.  A solution for this issue is outside the scope
   of this document.

7.2.  Binding States Description

   This section describes the binding states of this mechanism.

   NO_BIND: The state before a binding has been set up.

   INIT_BIND: A DHCP request (or a DHCPv6 Confirm, or a DHCPv6
   Solicitation with Rapid Commit option) has been received from client,
   and it may trigger a new binding.

   BOUND: The address is authorized to the client.

7.3.  Events

7.3.1.  Timer Expiration Event

   EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE: The lifetime of an entry expires.

7.3.2.  Control Message Arriving Events

   Only if a control message can pass the check in Section 9.2, the
   corresponding event is a valid event.  For any message that may
   trigger a new binding, the binding entry limit (cf. Section 13.2) on
   the corresponding binding anchor MUST NOT have not been reached.

   EVE_DHCP_REQUEST: A DHCP Request message is received from a binding
   anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute.

   EVE_DHCP_CONFIRM: A DHCPv6 Confirm message is received from a binding
   anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute.

   EVE_DHCP_REBIND: A DHCPv6 Rebind message is received from a binding
   anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute.

   EVE_DHCP_OPTION_RC: A DHCPv6 Solicitation message with Rapid Commit
   option is received from a binding anchor with SAVI-Validation
   attribute.

   EVE_DHCP_REPLY_LEASE: A DHCPv4 Acknowledgement or DHCPv6 Reply
   message is received, and there is an entry with matched TID in the
   BST, and lease time is contained in the message.

   EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NOLEASE: A DHCPv4 Acknowledgement or DHCPv6 Reply



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 12]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   message is received, and there is an entry with matched TID in the
   BST, and no lease time is contained in the message.

   EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NULL: A DHCPv4 Acknowledgement or DHCPv6 Reply message
   is received, and there is no entry in the BST contains the same TID
   as the message.

   EVE_DHCP_DECLINE: A DHCP Decline message is received from a binding
   anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute.

   EVE_DHCP_RELEASE: A DHCP Release message is received from a binding
   anchor with SAVI-Validation attribute.

   EVE_LEASEQUERY_REPLY: A successful DHCP LEASEQUERY_REPLY is received
   from a binding anchor with SAVI-DHCP-Trust attribute.

7.4.  State Machine of DHCP Packet Snooping

7.4.1.  From NO_BIND to Other States

7.4.1.1.  Trigger Event

   EVE_DHCP_REQUEST, EVE_DHCP_OPTION_RC, EVE_DHCP_CONFIRM,
   EVE_DHCP_REBIND, EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NULL.

7.4.1.2.  Following Actions

   If the triggering event is EVE_DHCP_REQUEST/EVE_DHCP_OPTION_RC:

   The SAVI device MUST forward the message.

   As illustrated in Figure 4, the SAVI device MUST generate an entry
   for the binding anchor in the Binding State Table (BST) and set the
   state field to INIT_BIND.  The lifetime of this entry is set to be
   MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME.  The TID field of the triggering message MUST
   be recorded in the entry.

   The TID is stored because it will be used to correctly associate
   message from the DHCP server with target binding anchor.



   +---------+-------+---------+-----------------------+-------+
   | Anchor  |Address| State   | Lifetime              |TID    |
   +---------+-------+---------+-----------------------+-------+
   | A       |       |INIT_BIND|MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME | TID   |
   +---------+-------+---------+-----------------------+-------+




Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 13]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


     Figure 4: Binding entry in BST on Request/Rapid Commit triggered
                              initialization

   If the triggering event is EVE_DHCP_CONFIRM/EVE_DHCP_REBIND:

   Besides forwarding the message and generating corresponding entry,
   the address to confirm/rebind MUST be recorded in the entry, as
   illustrated in Figure 5.  The Lifetime field is set to
   MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME.



   +---------+--------+---------+-----------------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address| State   | Lifetime              |TID    |
   +---------+--------+---------+-----------------------+-------+
   | A       | Addr   |INIT_BIND|MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME | TID   |
   +---------+--------+---------+-----------------------+-------+


        Figure 5: Binding entry in BST on Confirm/Rebind triggered
                              initialization

   If the triggering event is EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NULL:

   If the binding anchor is not a link layer address and there is not a
   mapping table from the link layer address to the binding anchor, the
   message SHOULD be discarded.

   Else:

   The SAVI device MUST generate as many new entries in BST as the
   number of IADDR found in the message.  If the binding anchor type
   inside the BST is not a link layer address, the binding anchor for an
   entry is recovered from the mapping table from the link layer address
   to the binding anchor (cf. Section 6.2) based on the destination link
   layer address inside the DHCP message.

   As illustrated in Figure 6, the states of the corresponding entries
   are set to be BOUND.  The lifetimes of the entries are set to be the
   lease time in the message.

   The binding entry limit can be exceeded when setting up bindings for
   all addresses in a REPLY message.  If there is enough binding entry
   resources, corresponding new entries MUST be generated even when the
   binding number limit is exceeded.  In case that there is not enough
   resources left, the message MUST be discarded.

   If the binding anchor is a switch port, there can be a vulnerability



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 14]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   in this process which is discussed in Section 13.1.  Similar problems
   can happen with other binding anchors.




   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State | Lifetime               |TID    |
   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
   | A       | Addr1    | BOUND |   Lease time 1         |TID    |
   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
   | A       | Addr2    | BOUND |   Lease time 2         |TID    |
   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+



     Figure 6: Binding entry in BST on Reply triggered initialization

7.4.2.  From INIT_BIND to Other States

7.4.2.1.  Trigger Event

   EVE_DHCP_REPLY_LEASE, EVE_LEASEQUERY_REPLY, EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE.

7.4.2.2.  Following Actions

   If the trigger event is EVE_DHCP_REPLY_LEASE:

   As illustrated in Figure 7, If the Address field is null, the
   lifetime field of the entry with matched TID is set to the sum of the
   lease time in Reply message and MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME.  The state of
   the entry is changed to be BOUND.  If more than one IADDR is found in
   the message and there is enough binding entry resources,
   corresponding new entries MUST be generated even when the binding
   number limit is exceeded.  If there is not enough resources left, the
   message MUST be discarded.



   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State | Lifetime               |TID    |
   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
   | A       | Addr     | BOUND |Lease time+             |TID    |
   |         |          |       |MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME  |       |
   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+






Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 15]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


             Figure 7: From INIT_BIND to BOUND with Lease Time

   If the trigger event is EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NOLEASE:

   The triggering message is in response to a Confirm message.  If the
   message doesn't contain Status Code Success, discard the message.  If
   the message is of Status Code Success, the state of the entry is
   changed to be BOUND.  Because no lease time will be contained in the
   REPLY from DHCP server, the SAVI device MUST lookup in BST to
   determine whether there is an entry with the same address and TID.
   If there is such an entry and the corresponding binding anchor is
   off-link, it can be a local movement and the lifetime can be
   recovered from the entry.  In this case, set the Lifetime to be the
   remaining value of Lifetime field of the existing entry, and remove
   the existing entry.  If there is no such an entry, the SAVI device
   MUST send a LEASEQUERY [RFC5007] message querying by IP address to
   All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers multicast address [RFC3315] or a
   configured server address.  In this case, set the Lifetime of
   corresponding entry to MAX_LEASEQUERY_DELAY, as illustrated in
   Figure 8.



   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
   | Anchor  | Address  | State | Lifetime               |TID    |
   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+
   | A       | Addr     | BOUND | MAX_LEASEQUERY_DELAY   |TID    |
   +---------+----------+-------+------------------------+-------+




           Figure 8: From INIT_BIND to BOUND without Lease Time

   If the trigger event is EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE:

   The entry MUST be deleted from BST.

7.4.3.  From BOUND to Other States

7.4.3.1.  Trigger Event

   EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE, EVE_DHCP_RELEASE, EVE_DHCP_DECLINE,
   EVE_DHCP_REPLY_LEASE, EVE_LEASEQUERY_REPLY.







Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 16]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


7.4.3.2.  Following Actions

   If the trigger event is EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE:

   Remove the corresponding entry in BST.

   If the trigger event is EVE_DHCP_RELEASE/EVE_DHCP_DECLINE:

   Remove the corresponding entry in BST.  The Release or Decline
   message MUST be forwarded.

   If the trigger event is EVE_DHCP_REPLY_LEASE:

   Set the lifetime of the entry with the corresponding address and TID
   to be the sum of the new lease time and MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME.

   If the trigger event is EVE_LEASEQUERY_REPLY:

   The Lifetime field of entry with corresponding IP address MUST be set
   to the sum of the lease time in the LEASEQUERY_REPLY and
   MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME.

7.5.  Table of State Machine

   The main state transits are listed as follows.




   State        Event            Action                       Next State
   NO_BIND      REQ/RC/RB/CFM  Generate entry                  INIT_BIND
   *NO_BIND     RPL_NULL       Generate entry with lease           BOUND
   INIT_BIND    RPLL           Record lease time                   BOUND
   INIT_BIND    RPLN           Send Leasequery/set LQ_DLY          BOUND
   INIT_BIND    Timeout        Remove entry                      NO_BIND
   BOUND        RLS/DCL        Remove entry                      NO_BIND
   BOUND        Timeout        Remove entry                      NO_BIND
   BOUND        RPLL           Set new lifetime                    BOUND
   BOUND        LQR            Record lease time                   BOUND



                        Figure 9: Table of Transit

   *: optional but NOT RECOMMENDED.

   REQ: EVE_DHCP_REQUEST




Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 17]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   CFM: EVE_DHCP_CONFIRM

   RC: EVE_DHCP_OPTION_RC

   RB: EVE_DHCP_REBIND

   RPLL: EVE_DHCP REPLY_LEASE

   RPLN: EVE_DHCP REPLY_NOLEASE

   RPL_NULL: EVE_DHCP REPLY_NULL

   DCL: DHCP DECLINE

   RLS: DHCP RELEASE

   LQR: EVE_LEASEQUERY_REPLY

   Timeout: EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE

   LQ_DLY: MAX_LEASEQUERY_DELAY


8.  Supplemental Binding Process

   Supplemental binding process is designed to cover scenarios where a
   packet is sent by a node but no previous DHCP exchanges have occurred
   to correctly update the SAVI device's BST.  A typical situation is
   when the link topology changes after the binding has been set up, and
   then the node will send packets through a different port rather than
   the bound port.  Another scenario is that a node moves on the local
   link without performing re-configuration process.

   The binding recovery process is designed to avoid permanently
   blocking legitimate traffic.  This process is performed on binding
   anchor with both SAVI-Validation and SAVI-BindRecovery attributes.
   It is not supposed to set up a binding whenever a data packet with an
   unbound source address is received.  Generally, longer time and more
   packets are needed to trigger supplemental binding processes.

   Considering the overhead of this procedure, the implementation of
   binding recovery process is a conditional SHOULD.  This function
   SHOULD be implemented unless the implementation is known to be
   directly attached to the host.  If an implementation is directly
   attached to host, change in link topology will not affect the
   bindings, and host will always start the re-configuration process
   after the interface is re-connected.  Thus, there is no need to use
   additional processes to recovery bindings.  If the mechanism is not



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 18]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   implemented and managed hosts are not directly attached, legitimate
   traffic will be blocked until the node is reconfigured.

   The security issues about this process is discussed is Section 13.5.

8.1.  Rationale

   If a DHCP address is allocated on the link, and the address is not
   used by another node in the network, the address can be bound with
   the binding anchor on which a message is received.

8.2.  Additional Binding States Description

   In addition to Section 7.2, new states used in this process are
   required here:

   DETECTION The address is under local detection.

   RECOVERY The address is in binding recovery process.

8.3.  Events

   Additional events in this process are described here.  Also, if an
   event will trigger to set up a new binding entry, the binding entry
   limit on the binding anchor MUST NOT have not been reached.

   EVE_BR_UNMATCH A data packet without matched binding of BOUND state
   in BST is received on a binding anchor with both SAVI-Validation and
   SAVI-BindRecovery attributes.

   EVE_BR_CONFLICT Response against an address in DETECTION state is
   received.

   EVE_BR_LEASEQUERY IPv4: a DHCPLEASEACTIVE message with IP Address
   Lease Time option is received from a binding anchor with SAVI-DHCP-
   Trust attribute; IPv6: a successful LEASEQUERY-REPLY is received.

8.4.  State Machine of Binding Recovery Process

   Through using additional states, the state machine of this process
   doesn't conflict the regular process described in Section 7.  Thus,
   it can be implemented separately without changing the state machine
   in Section 7.

8.4.1.  From NO_BIND to Other States






Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 19]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


8.4.1.1.  Trigger Event

   EVE_BR_UNMATCH.

8.4.1.2.  Following Action

   Determine whether to process this event with a probability.  The
   probability can be configured or calculated based on the state of the
   SAVI device.  This probability should be low enough to mitigate the
   damage from DoS attack against this process.  How to generate this
   probability is out of the scope of this document.

   If there is a corresponding binding in BST on another binding anchor
   with the same source address, and the binding anchor is not off-link,
   the packet SHOULD be dropped, and no further actions will not be
   taken.

   Check if the time since the last EVE_BR_UNMATCH on the same binding
   anchor is larger than BIND_RECOVERY_INTERVAL.  No further actions
   will be taken if the last EVE_BR_UNMATCH on the same binding anchor
   in the last BIND_RECOVERY_INTERVAL.

   Create a new entry in the BST.  Set the Binding Anchor field to the
   corresponding binding anchor.  Set the Address field to be source
   address of the packet.  Set the state field to DETECTION.  Set the
   lifetime of the created entry to 2*DAD_TIMEOUT.

   Check if the address has a local conflict (it violates an address
   being used by another node) through:

   (1)  IPv4 address: sending two Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
        Requests [rfc826]or two ARP probes [rfc5227] on the address;

   (2)  IPv6 address: performing Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
        [rfc4862] twice on the address.

   The delay between the two messages is DAD_TIMEOUT.  The detection is
   performed twice to reduce the probability that the detection doesn't
   reach targeting node in case of packet loss.

   The messages MUST NOT be sent to the link with the binding anchor of
   the triggering packet.

   The packet which triggers this event SHOULD be discarded.







Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 20]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


8.4.2.  From DETECTION to Other States

8.4.2.1.  Trigger Event

   EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE, EVE_BR_CONFLICT.

8.4.2.2.  Following Action

   If the trigger event is EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE:

   (1)  IPv4 address: Send a DHCPLEASEQUERY [rfc4388] message querying
        by IP address to all DHCPv4 servers with IP Address Lease Time
        option (option 51).  The server addresses can be found through
        DHCPv4 Discovery or from configuration.  Change the state of the
        corresponding entry to RECOVERY.  Change the lifetime of the
        entry to be MAX_LEASEQUERY_DELAY.

   (2)  IPv6 address: Send a LEASEQUERY [rfc5007] message querying by IP
        address to All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers multicast address
        or a configured server address.

   Change the state of the corresponding entry to RECOVERY.  Change the
   lifetime of the entry to be MAX_LEASEQUERY_DELAY.

   If the trigger event is EVE_BR_CONFLICT:

   Remove the entry.

8.4.3.  From RECOVERY to Other States

8.4.3.1.  Trigger Event

   EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE, EVE_BR_LEASEQUERY.

8.4.3.2.  Following Action

   If the trigger event is EVE_BR_LEASEQUERY:

   (1)  IPv4 address: Change the state of the corresponding binding to
        BOUND.  Set life time to the sum of the value encoded in IP
        Address Lease Time option of the DHCPLEASEACTIVE message and
        MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME.

   (2)  IPv6 address: Change the state of the corresponding binding to
        BOUND.  Set the lifetime to the sum of the valid lifetime
        extracted from OPTION_CLIENT_DATA option in the LEASEQUERY-REPLY
        message and MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME.




Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 21]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   If multiple addresses are specified in the LEASEQUERY-REPLY message,
   new entries MUST also be created correspondingly on the same binding
   anchor.

   If the trigger event is EVE_ENTRY_EXPIRE:

   Remove the entry.

8.4.4.  After BOUND

   Note that the TID field contains no value after the binding state
   changes to BOUND.  Because TID is used to associate entry with
   message from server, attaching node will be prevented from renewing
   the bound address.  Thus, the TID field is recovered from snooping
   DHCP Renew message.

8.4.4.1.  Trigger Event

   EVE_DHCP_RENEW.

8.4.4.2.  Following Action

   Set the TID field of the corresponding entry to the TID in the
   trigger message.


9.  Filtering Specification

   This section specifies how to use bindings to filter packets.

   Filtering policies are different for data packet and control packet.
   DHCP and NDP (Neighbor Discovery Protocol) [rfc4861] messages that
   may cause state transit are classified into control packet.  Neighbor
   Advertisement (NA) and ARP Response are also included in control
   packet, because the Target Address of NA and ARP Response should be
   checked to prevent spoofing.  All other packets are considered to be
   data packets.

9.1.  Data Packet Filtering

   Data packets with a binding anchor which has attribute SAVI-
   Validation MUST be checked.

   Packet whose source IP address is a link-local address SHOULD be
   forwarded.

   If the source IP address of a packet is not a link-local address, but
   the address is not bound with the corresponding binding anchor, this



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 22]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   packet MUST be discarded.

   The SAVI device MAY record any violation.

9.2.  Control Packet Filtering

   For binding anchors with SAVI-Validation attribute:

   Discard DHCPv4 REQUEST message whose source IP address is neither all
   zeros nor a bound address in BST.

   Discard DHCPv6 Request message whose source is neither a link-local
   address nor bound with the corresponding binding anchor in BST.

   Discard NDP messages whose source address is neither a link-local
   address nor bound with the corresponding binding anchor.  In
   addition, discard NA message whose target address is neither a link-
   local address nor bound with the corresponding binding anchor.

   Discard ARP messages whose protocol is IP and sender protocol address
   is neither all zeros address nor bound with the corresponding binding
   anchor.  In addition, discard ARP Reply messages whose target address
   is not bound with the corresponding binding anchor.

   For other binding anchors:

   Discard DHCP server/relay type message not from binding anchor with
   the SAVI-DHCP-Trust attribute or SAVI-SAVI attribute.

   The SAVI device SHOULD record any violation of the previous rules.


10.  State Restoration

   If a SAVI device reboots accidentally or designedly, the information
   kept in volatile memory will be lost.  This section specifies the
   restoration of binding anchor attribute and binding state.

10.1.  Binding Anchor Attribute Restoration

   The configuration of binding anchor attribute is critical to this
   mechanism.  If this configuration is lost, DHCPv4 Acknowledgement/
   DHCPv6 Reply will be filtered.  Though legitimate packet will not be
   discarded, host will be prevented from getting new DHCP address or
   renewing existing address.

   To avoid the loss of binding anchor attribute configuration, the
   configuration MUST be able to be stored in non-volatile storage.



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 23]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   After the reboot of SAVI device, if the configuration of binding
   anchor attribute can be found in non-volatile storage, the
   configuration MUST be used.

10.2.  Binding State Restoration

   The loss of binding state will cause legitimate traffic from host
   indirectly attached to the SAVI device to be blocked until binding
   recovery.  Purely using the Binding Recovery Process to recover a
   large number of bindings is of heavy overhead and results
   considerable delay.  Thus, recovery from non-volatile storage, as
   specified below, is RECOMMENDED.

   If this function is supported by hardware, binding entries MAY be
   saved into non-volatile storage whenever a new binding entry changes
   to BOUND state.  If a binding with BOUND state is removed, the saved
   entry MUST be removed correspondingly.

   Immediately after reboot, the SAVI device SHOULD restore binding
   states from the non-volatile storage.  The system time of save
   process MUST be stored.  After rebooting, the SAVI device MUST check
   whether each entry has been obsolete through comparing the saved
   lifetime and the difference between the current system time and saved
   system time.


11.  Constants

   MAX_DHCP_RESPONSE_TIME 120s

   BIND_RECOVERY_INTERVAL 60s and configurable

   MAX_LEASEQUERY_DELAY 10s

   OFFLINK_DELAY 30s

   DAD_TIMEOUT 0.5s


12.  MLD Considerations

   To perform the binding recovery procedure in Section 8, the SAVI
   device MUST join the tentative address multicast group whenever
   performing duplicate detection.







Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 24]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


13.  Security Considerations

13.1.  Security Problem about Binding Triggered by EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NULL

   When the binding anchor is a switch port, binding based on
   EVE_DHCP_REPLY_NULL can result in security threats.  The assigned
   address could be bound to a wrong switch port if an attacker can
   maliciously pollute the table mapping a link layer address to switch
   port (cf. Section 6.2).

   For example, host A requests address from port 1.  When a SAVI switch
   receives a DHCP REPLY with assigned address IP_A and destination link
   layer address MAC_A, it will check its MAC/port table to find the
   right binding port.  But MAC/port table might be polluted by an
   attacker host B attached to port 2.  Then the SAVI switch will find
   the MAC_A is at port 2 from the polluted MAC/port table and it will
   result in a wrong binding which binds IP_A and port 2.

   Protection from this attack can be ensured by making sure that one of
   the following conditions is satisfied:

   (1)  DHCP Option 82 is used to keep binding anchor in DHCP Request
        and Reply.  DHCP Option 82 can be used to keep the circuit
        information of the client and returned by the DHCP server.  Thus
        the binding anchor can be determined from the circuit
        information in the Option.  It can be used whenever an
        implementation doesn't want to create an entry on the DHCP
        Request message.

   (2)  Unspoofable MAC is used as binding anchor (802.11i, 802.1ae/af).

   (3)  The mapping table from MAC to binding anchor is secure.

   If the binding anchor is a link layer address, or there are
   mechanisms preventing the corruption of the table mapping the link
   layer to a switch port, mapping link layer address to binding anchor
   may be considered as secure.

   It is NOT RECOMMENDED to initialize a binding based on DHCP Reply,
   unless a mechanism protecting the mapping table from corruption is
   also implemented.  Similar problem may happen with binding anchors
   not based on link layer addresses.

13.2.  Binding Number Limitation

   It is suggested to configure some mechanism in order to prevent a
   single node from overloading the binding table entries on the SAVI
   device.  Either of the following mechanism is sufficient to prevent



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 25]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   such attack.

   (1)  Set the upper bound of binding number for each binding anchor
        with SAVI-Validation.

   (2)  Reserve a number of binding entries for each binding anchor with
        SAVI-Validation attribute and all binding anchors share a pool
        of the other binding entries.

   (3)  Limit DHCP Request rate per binding anchor.

13.3.  Risk from Link Layer Routing Dynamic

   An implicit assumption of this solution is that data packet must
   arrive at the same binding anchor with the binding anchor that the
   control packets have arrived at.  If this assumption is not valid,
   this control packet based solution will fail or at least discard a
   number of legitimate packets.  Unfortunately, the link layer routing
   between host and SAVI device can be inconsistent from time to time.
   Time consistency of the link layer routing is not assured by the link
   layer routing protocol.  For example, TRILL, a recent link layer
   routing protocol, is flexible and multiple link layer paths are
   allowed.

   To make the basic assumption stand, the best way is enforcing that
   there should be only one topology path from downstream host to the
   SAVI device.  For example, SAVI device is directly attached by hosts.

   If the assumption doesn't stand, a better solution is requiring
   inter-operation between SAVI protocol and the link layer routing
   protocol to make SAVI protocol sensitive to the link layer routing
   change.  This solution is above the scope of this document.

13.4.  Duplicate Bindings of Same Address

   The same address may be bound with multiple binding anchors, only if
   the binding processes are finished on each binding anchor
   successfully.  This mechanism is designed in consideration that a
   node may move on the local link, and a node may have multiple binding
   anchors.  However, the traceability of address is reduced.

   Note that the local link movement scenario is not handled perfectly.
   The former binding may not be removed, unless the node is directly
   attached to SAVI device.  The nodes sharing the same former binding
   anchor of the moving node have the ability to use its address.






Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 26]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


13.5.  Security Problems about Binding Recovery Process

   The Binding Recovery Process (cf. Section 8) MUST be rate limited to
   avoid Denial of Services attack against the SAVI device itself.  A
   constant BIND_RECOVERY_INTERVAL is used to control the frequency.
   Two data-triggered recovery processes on one binding anchor MUST have
   a minimum interval time BIND_RECOVERY_INTERVAL.  This constant SHOULD
   be configured prudently to avoid Denial of Service attacks.

   This process is not strictly secure.  The node attached with a SAVI-
   BindRecovery binding anchor has the ability to use the address of an
   inactive node, which doesn't reply to the detection probes.

13.6.  Compatibility with DNA (Detecting Network Attachment)

   DNA [rfc4436] [rfc6059] is designed to decrease the handover latency
   after re-attachment to the same network.  DNA mainly relies on
   performing reachability test through sending unicast Neighbor
   Solicitation/Router Solicitation/ARP Request message to determine
   whether a previously configured address is still valid.  Though DNA
   provides optimization for host, it doesn't provide sufficient
   information for this mechanism to migrate or establish a binding.  If
   a binding is set up only through snooping the reachability test
   message, the binding can be invalid.  For example, an attacker can
   perform reachability test with address bound to another host.  If
   binding is migrated to the attacker, the attacker can successful
   obtain the binding from the victim.  Because this mechanism wouldn't
   set up a binding based on snooping the DNA procedure, it cannot
   achieve perfect compatibility with DNA.  However, it only means the
   re-configuration of the interface is slowed but not prevented.
   Details are discussed as follows.

   In Simple DNAv6 [rfc6059], the probe is sent with source address set
   to link-local address, and such messages will not be filtered by the
   policy specified in section Section 9.2.  If an interface is re-
   attached to a previous network, the detection will be complete and
   the address will be regarded as valid by host.  The candidate address
   is not contained in the probe.  Thus, the binding cannot be recovered
   through snooping the probe.  The binding can only be recovered from
   the DHCP snooping procedure.  The DHCP REQUEST messages wouldn't be
   filtered by this solution as their source address is link-local
   address.  Before the DHCP procedure is completed, packets will be
   filtered by SAVI device.  In another word, in SAVI scenarios, Simple
   DNAv6 will not help reduce the handover latency.  If SAVI-
   BindRecovery attribute is configured on the new binding anchor, data
   triggered procedure may reduce the latency.

   In DNAv4 [rfc4436], the ARP probe will be filtered because unbound



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 27]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   address is used as sender protocol address.  As a result, the
   detection will not complete and false negative is caused.  The DHCP
   REQUEST message sent by the node will not be filtered, because the
   source IP address field should be all zero as required by [rfc2131].
   Thus, if the address is still valid, the binding will be recovered
   from the DHCP snooping procedure.

13.7.  Bogus DHCP Server Threat

   SAVI-DHCP-Trust attribute is designed to prevent attacks from bogus
   DHCP server.  However, the security is not strict because messages
   from valid DHCP server and bogus DHCP server may arrive at the SAVI
   device with the same binding anchor.  As a result, the SAVI device
   cannot recognize valid messages from bogus messages.  Because the
   bindings are set up primarily based on DHCP message from DHCP server,
   the results can be quite serious.  For example, invalid addresses are
   assigned to hosts and bindings of the addresses are set up.  There
   can be a lot of other attacks in such a scenario.

   Considering the restraint that no new protocol can be introduced, the
   countermeasure is quite limited.  If placing the DHCP server inside
   the protection perimeter, or making the path from each valid DHCP
   servers to the SAVI perimeter exclusive for DHCP servers, or
   filtering out DHCP server/relay type messages that may get into the
   path from each DHCP server to the protection perimeter, messages from
   bogus DHCP server cannot share the same binding anchor with messages
   from valid DHCP server, and such attack can be prevented.  If none of
   the above deployment requirements can be satisfied, the network
   administrator should be aware of the above limitation and deploy this
   mechanism prudently.

13.8.  Handle Binding Anchor Off-link Event

   Port DOWN event MUST be handled if the switch port is used as the
   binding anchor.  In a more general case, if a binding anchor turns
   off-link, this event MUST be handled.

   Whenever a binding anchor with attribute SAVI-Validation turns down,
   a timer of OFFLINK_DELAY is set.  Until the timer becomes zero, the
   bindings with the binding anchor SHOULD be kept.  As an exception to
   handle node movements, if receiving DAD Neighbor Solicitation/
   Gratuitous ARP request targeting at the address during OFFLINK_DELAY,
   the entry MAY be removed.

   If the binding anchor turns on-link during OFFLINK_DELAY, turn off
   the timer and keep corresponding bindings.





Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 28]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


13.9.  Residual Threats

   As described in [I-D.ietf-savi-framework], this solution cannot
   strictly prevent spoofing.  There are two scenarios in which spoofing
   can still happen:

   (1)  The binding anchor is spoofable.  If the binding anchor is
        spoofable, e.g., plain MAC address, an attacker can use forged
        binding anchor to send packet which will not be regarded as
        spoofing by SAVI device.  Indeed, using binding anchor that can
        be easily spoofed is dangerous.  An attacker can use the binding
        anchor of another host to perform a lot of DHCP procedures, and
        the SAVI device will refuse to set up new binding for the host
        whenever the binding number limitation has been reached.  Thus,
        it is RECOMMENDED to use strong enough binding anchor, e.g.,
        switch port, secure association in 802.11ae/af and 802.11i.

   (2)  The binding anchor is shared by more than one host.  If the
        binding anchor is shared by more than one host, they can spoof
        the addresses of each other.  For example, a number of hosts can
        attach to the same switch port of a SAVI device through a hub.
        The SAVI device cannot distinguish packets from different hosts
        and thus the spoofing between them will not be detected.  This
        problem can be solved by not sharing binding anchor between
        hosts.


14.  IANA Considerations

   This memo asks the IANA for no new parameters.

   Note to RFC Editor: This section will have served its purpose if it
   correctly tells IANA that no new assignments or registries are
   required, or if those assignments or registries are created during
   the RFC publication process.  From the authors' perspective, it may
   therefore be removed upon publication as an RFC at the RFC Editor's
   discretion.


15.  Acknowledgment

   Special thanks to Jean-Michel Combes, Christian Vogt, Joel M.
   Halpern, Eric Levy-Abegnoli, Marcelo Bagnulo Braun, Jari Arkko, Elwyn
   Davies, Barry Leiba and Alberto Garcia for careful review and
   valuation comments on the state machine and text.

   Thanks to Mark Williams, Erik Nordmark, Mikael Abrahamsson, David
   Harrington, Pekka Savola, Xing Li, Lixia Zhang, Robert Raszuk, Greg



Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 29]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   Daley, John Kaippallimalil and Tao Lin for their valuable
   contributions.

   This document was generated using the xml2rfc tool.


16.  References

16.1.  Informative References

   [BA2007]   Baker, F., "Cisco IP Version 4 Source Guard", IETF
              Internet draft (work in progress), November 2007.

   [BCP38]    Paul, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", RFC 2827, BCP 38, May 2000.

   [rfc3736]  Droms, R., "Stateless Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
              (DHCP) Service for  IPv6", RFC 3736, April 2004.

16.2.  Normative References

   [rfc2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, Match 1997.

   [rfc2131]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
              RFC 2131, March 1997.

   [rfc3315]  Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
              and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
              IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.

   [rfc4388]  Woundy, R. and K. Kinnear, "Dynamic Host Configuration
              Protocol (DHCP) Leasequery", RFC 4388, February 2006.

   [rfc4436]  Aboba, B., Carlson, J., and S. Cheshire, "Detecting
              Network Attachment in IPv4 (DNAv4)", RFC 4436, March 2006.

   [rfc4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              September 2007.

   [rfc4862]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
              Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.

   [rfc5007]  Brzozowski, J., Kinnear, K., Volz, B., and S. Zeng,
              "DHCPv6 Leasequery", RFC 5007, September 2007.




Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 30]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   [rfc5227]  Cheshire, S., "IPv4 Address Conflict Detection", RFC 5227,
              July 2008.

   [rfc6059]  Krishnan, S. and G. Daley, "Simple Procedures for
              Detecting Network Attachment in IPv6", RFC 6059,
              November 2010.

   [rfc826]   Plummer, D., "Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol:  Or
              converting network protocol addresses to 48.bit Ethernet
              address for transmission on Ethernet hardware", RFC 826,
              November 1982.

   [savi-fcfs]
              Nordmark, E., Bagnulo, M., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "FCFS-
              SAVI: First-Come First-Serve Source-Address Validation for
              Locally Assigned Addresses", RFC 6620, May 2012.

   [savi-framework]
              Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt, Ed.,
              "Source Address Validation Improvement Framework",
              draft-ietf-savi-framework-06 (work in progress),
              December 2011.


Appendix A.  change log

   Main changes from 02 to 03:

   (1)  Section 12, data trigger and counter trigger are combined to
        binding recovery process.  The expression "one of MUST" is
        changed to "conditional MUST.  Conditions related with the
        implementation are specified.  Related constants are changed in
        section 26."

   Main changes from 03 to 04:

   (1)  Section "Prefix configuration" is removed.

   (2)  Section "Supplemental binding process" is modified in
        requirement level.

   (3)  Sub-section 9.1 "Rationale" is added.

   (4)  Section "Filtering during Detection" is removed.







Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 31]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   (5)  Section "Handling layer 2 path change" is changed to
        "Consideration on Link layer routing complexity"

   (6)  Section "Background and related protocols" is removed.

   Main changes from 04 to 05:

   (1)  Trigger events are listed explicitly in section 8.

   (2)  Detection and Live states are deleted, together with
        corresponding sections.

   Main change from 05 to 06:

   (1)  Section 8.1: reference to section 20 is changed to section 15.

   Main changes from 06 to 07:

   (1)  So many changes in this modification.  We suggest to track
        http://www.ietf.org/mailarchive/web/savi/current/msg01543.ht ml.
        Changes are made according to the comments.

   Main changes from 07 to 08,09:

   (1)  The modifications are made according to the comments from Jean-
        Michel Combes.

   Main changes from 09 to 11:

   (1)  DNA issues raised by Jari Arkko

   Main changes from 11 to 12:

   (1)  The modifications are made according to the comments from Eric,
        http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/savi/current/msg01778.html.

   Main changes from 12 to 13:

   (1)  Main modifications are made based on comments from Elwyn Davies.
        http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/gen-art/current/
        msg07297.html.

   (2)  Other modifications are made based on comments from Barry Leiba.

   Main changes from 13 to 14:






Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 32]


Internet-Draft                  SAVI DCHP                      July 2012


   (1)  A symbol error is corrected.


Authors' Addresses

   Jun Bi
   Tsinghua University
   Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
   Beijing  100084
   China

   Email: junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn


   Jianping Wu
   Tsinghua University
   Computer Science, Tsinghua University
   Beijing  100084
   China

   Email: jianping@cernet.edu.cn


   Guang Yao
   Tsinghua University
   Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
   Beijing  100084
   China

   Email: yaoguang@cernet.edu.cn


   Fred Baker
   Cisco Systems
   Santa Barbara, CA  93117
   United States

   Email: fred@cisco.com













Bi, et al.               Expires January 8, 2013               [Page 33]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129d, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/