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Versions: (draft-lepinski-bgpsec-protocol) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Network Working Group                                   M. Lepinski, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                       NCF
Intended status: Standards Track                          K. Sriram, Ed.
Expires: October 29, 2017                                           NIST
                                                          April 27, 2017


                     BGPsec Protocol Specification
                   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-23

Abstract

   This document describes BGPsec, an extension to the Border Gateway
   Protocol (BGP) that provides security for the path of autonomous
   systems (ASes) through which a BGP update message passes.  BGPsec is
   implemented via an optional non-transitive BGP path attribute that
   carries digital signatures produced by each autonomous system that
   propagates the update message.  The digital signatures provide
   confidence that every AS on the path of ASes listed in the update
   message has explicitly authorized the advertisement of the route.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 29, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  BGPsec Negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  The BGPsec Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Negotiating BGPsec Support  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  The BGPsec_Path Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Secure_Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Signature_Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  BGPsec Update Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  General Guidance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  Constructing the BGPsec_Path Attribute  . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.3.  Processing Instructions for Confederation Members . . . .  18
     4.4.  Reconstructing the AS_PATH Attribute  . . . . . . . . . .  19
   5.  Processing a Received BGPsec Update . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.1.  Overview of BGPsec Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.2.  Validation Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   6.  Algorithms and Extensibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     6.1.  Algorithm Suite Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     6.2.  Considerations for the SKI Size . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     6.3.  Extensibility Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   7.  Operations and Management Considerations  . . . . . . . . . .  29
     7.1.  Capability Negotiation Failure  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     7.2.  Preventing Misuse of pCount=0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     7.3.  Early Termination of Signature Verification . . . . . . .  30
     7.4.  Non-Deterministic Signature Algorithms  . . . . . . . . .  30
     7.5.  Private AS Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     7.6.  Robustness Considerations for Accessing RPKI Data . . . .  32
     7.7.  Graceful Restart  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     7.8.  Robustness of Secret Random Number in ECDSA . . . . . . .  32
     7.9.  Incremental/Partial Deployment Considerations . . . . . .  33
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     8.1.  Security Guarantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     8.2.  On the Removal of BGPsec Signatures . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     8.3.  Mitigation of Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . . .  35
     8.4.  Additional Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   10. Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     10.1.  Authors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     10.2.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40



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     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44

1.  Introduction

   This document describes BGPsec, a mechanism for providing path
   security for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271] route
   advertisements.  That is, a BGP speaker who receives a valid BGPsec
   update has cryptographic assurance that the advertised route has the
   following property: Every AS on the path of ASes listed in the update
   message has explicitly authorized the advertisement of the route to
   the subsequent AS in the path.

   This document specifies an optional (non-transitive) BGP path
   attribute, BGPsec_Path.  It also describes how a BGPsec-compliant BGP
   speaker (referred to hereafter as a BGPsec speaker) can generate,
   propagate, and validate BGP update messages containing this attribute
   to obtain the above assurances.

   BGPsec is intended to be used to supplement BGP Origin Validation
   [RFC6483][RFC6811] and when used in conjunction with origin
   validation, it is possible to prevent a wide variety of route
   hijacking attacks against BGP.

   BGPsec relies on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
   certificates that attest to the allocation of AS number and IP
   address resources.  (For more information on the RPKI, see RFC 6480
   [RFC6480] and the documents referenced therein.)  Any BGPsec speaker
   who wishes to send, to external (eBGP) peers, BGP update messages
   containing the BGPsec_Path needs to possess a private key associated
   with an RPKI router certificate [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
   that corresponds to the BGPsec speaker's AS number.  Note, however,
   that a BGPsec speaker does not need such a certificate in order to
   validate received update messages containing the BGPsec_Path
   attribute (see Section 5.2).

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  BGPsec Negotiation

   This document defines a BGP capability [RFC5492] that allows a BGP
   speaker to advertise to a neighbor the ability to send or to receive
   BGPsec update messages (i.e., update messages containing the
   BGPsec_Path attribute).



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2.1.  The BGPsec Capability

   This capability has capability code: TBD

   The capability length for this capability MUST be set to 3.

   The three octets of the capability format are specified in Figure 1.



                   0   1   2   3      4      5   6   7
                 +---------------------------------------+
                 | Version          | Dir |  Unassigned  |
                 +---------------------------------------+
                 |                                       |
                 +------           AFI              -----+
                 |                                       |
                 +---------------------------------------+

                    Figure 1: BGPsec Capability format.

   The first four bits of the first octet indicate the version of BGPsec
   for which the BGP speaker is advertising support.  This document
   defines only BGPsec version 0 (all four bits set to zero).  Other
   versions of BGPsec may be defined in future documents.  A BGPsec
   speaker MAY advertise support for multiple versions of BGPsec by
   including multiple versions of the BGPsec capability in its BGP OPEN
   message.

   The fifth bit of the first octet is a direction bit which indicates
   whether the BGP speaker is advertising the capability to send BGPsec
   update messages or receive BGPsec update messages.  The BGP speaker
   sets this bit to 0 to indicate the capability to receive BGPsec
   update messages.  The BGP speaker sets this bit to 1 to indicate the
   capability to send BGPsec update messages.

   The remaining three bits of the first octet are unassigned and for
   future use.  These bits are set to zero by the sender of the
   capability and ignored by the receiver of the capability.

   The second and third octets contain the 16-bit Address Family
   Identifier (AFI) which indicates the address family for which the
   BGPsec speaker is advertising support for BGPsec.  This document only
   specifies BGPsec for use with two address families, IPv4 and IPv6,
   AFI values 1 and 2 respectively [IANA-AF].  BGPsec for use with other
   address families may be specified in future documents.





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2.2.  Negotiating BGPsec Support

   In order to indicate that a BGP speaker is willing to send BGPsec
   update messages (for a particular address family), a BGP speaker
   sends the BGPsec Capability (see Section 2.1) with the Direction bit
   (the fifth bit of the first octet) set to 1.  In order to indicate
   that the speaker is willing to receive BGP update messages containing
   the BGPsec_Path attribute (for a particular address family), a BGP
   speaker sends the BGPsec capability with the Direction bit set to 0.
   In order to advertise the capability to both send and receive BGPsec
   update messages, the BGP speaker sends two copies of the BGPsec
   capability (one with the direction bit set to 0 and one with the
   direction bit set to 1).

   Similarly, if a BGP speaker wishes to use BGPsec with two different
   address families (i.e., IPv4 and IPv6) over the same BGP session,
   then the speaker includes two instances of this capability (one for
   each address family) in the BGP OPEN message.  A BGP speaker MUST NOT
   announce BGPsec capability if it does not support the BGP
   multiprotocol extension [RFC4760].  Additionally, a BGP speaker MUST
   NOT advertise the capability of BGPsec support for a particular AFI
   unless it has also advertised the multiprotocol extension capability
   for the same AFI [RFC4760].

   In a BGPsec peering session, a peer is permitted to send update
   messages containing the BGPsec_Path attribute if, and only if:

   o  The given peer sent the BGPsec capability for a particular version
      of BGPsec and a particular address family with the Direction bit
      set to 1; and

   o  The other (receiving) peer sent the BGPsec capability for the same
      version of BGPsec and the same address family with the Direction
      bit set to 0.

   In such a session, it can be said that the use of the particular
   version of BGPsec has been negotiated for a particular address
   family.  Traditional BGP update messages (i.e. unsigned, containing
   AS_PATH attribute) MAY be sent within a session regardless of whether
   or not the use of BGPsec is successfully negotiated.  However, if
   BGPsec is not successfully negotiated, then BGP update messages
   containing the BGPsec_Path attribute MUST NOT be sent.

   This document defines the behavior of implementations in the case
   where BGPsec version zero is the only version that has been
   successfully negotiated.  Any future document which specifies
   additional versions of BGPsec will need to specify behavior in the
   case that support for multiple versions is negotiated.



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   BGPsec cannot provide meaningful security guarantees without support
   for four-byte AS numbers.  Therefore, any BGP speaker that announces
   the BGPsec capability, MUST also announce the capability for four-
   byte AS support [RFC6793].  If a BGP speaker sends the BGPsec
   capability but not the four-byte AS support capability then BGPsec
   has not been successfully negotiated, and update messages containing
   the BGPsec_Path attribute MUST NOT be sent within such a session.

3.  The BGPsec_Path Attribute

   The BGPsec_Path attribute is an optional non-transitive BGP path
   attribute.

   This document registers an attribute type code for this attribute:
   BGPsec_Path (see Section 9).

   The BGPsec_Path attribute carries the secured information regarding
   the path of ASes through which an update message passes.  This
   includes the digital signatures used to protect the path information.
   The update messages that contain the BGPsec_Path attribute are
   referred to as "BGPsec Update messages".  The BGPsec_Path attribute
   replaces the AS_PATH attribute in a BGPsec update message.  That is,
   update messages that contain the BGPsec_Path attribute MUST NOT
   contain the AS_PATH attribute, and vice versa.

   The BGPsec_Path attribute is made up of several parts.  The high-
   level diagram in Figure 2 provides an overview of the structure of
   the BGPsec_Path attribute.























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        +---------------------------------------------------------+
        |     +-----------------+                                 |
        |     |   Secure Path   |                                 |
        |     +-----------------+                                 |
        |     |    pCount X     |                                 |
        |     |    Flags X      |                                 |
        |     |    AS X         |                                 |
        |     |    pCount Y     |                                 |
        |     |    Flags Y      |                                 |
        |     |    AS Y         |                                 |
        |     |      ...        |                                 |
        |     +-----------------+                                 |
        |                                                         |
        |     +-----------------+       +-----------------+       |
        |     | Sig Block 1     |       |  Sig Block 2    |       |
        |     +-----------------+       +-----------------+       |
        |     | Alg Suite 1     |       |  Alg Suite 2    |       |
        |     | SKI X1          |       |  SKI X2         |       |
        |     | Signature X1    |       |  Signature X2   |       |
        |     | SKI Y1          |       |  SKI Y2         |       |
        |     | Signature Y1    |       |  Signature Y2   |       |
        |     |      ...        |       |      ....       |       |
        |     +-----------------+       +-----------------+       |
        |                                                         |
        +---------------------------------------------------------+

        Figure 2: High-level diagram of the BGPsec_Path attribute.

   Figure 3 provides the specification of the format for the BGPsec_Path
   attribute.


         +-------------------------------------------------------+
         | Secure_Path                             (variable)    |
         +-------------------------------------------------------+
         | Sequence of one or two Signature_Blocks (variable)    |
         +-------------------------------------------------------+

                  Figure 3: BGPsec_Path attribute format.

   The Secure_Path contains AS path information for the BGPsec update
   message.  This is logically equivalent to the information that is
   contained in a non-BGPsec AS_PATH attribute.  The information in
   Secure_Path is used by BGPsec speakers in the same way that
   information from the AS_PATH is used by non-BGPsec speakers.  The
   format of the Secure_Path is described below in Section 3.1.





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   The BGPsec_Path attribute will contain one or two Signature_Blocks,
   each of which corresponds to a different algorithm suite.  Each of
   the Signature_Blocks will contain a Signature Segment for each AS
   number (i.e., Secure_Path Segment) in the Secure_Path.  In the most
   common case, the BGPsec_Path attribute will contain only a single
   Signature_Block.  However, in order to enable a transition from an
   old algorithm suite to a new algorithm suite (without a flag day), it
   will be necessary to include two Signature_Blocks (one for the old
   algorithm suite and one for the new algorithm suite) during the
   transition period.  (See Section 6.1 for more discussion of algorithm
   transitions.)  The format of the Signature_Blocks is described below
   in Section 3.2.

3.1.  Secure_Path

   A detailed description of the Secure_Path information in the
   BGPsec_Path attribute is provided here.


             +-----------------------------------------------+
             | Secure_Path Length                 (2 octets) |
             +-----------------------------------------------+
             | One or More Secure_Path Segments   (variable) |
             +-----------------------------------------------+

                       Figure 4: Secure_Path format.

   The specification for the Secure_Path field is provided in Figure 4
   and Figure 5.  The Secure_Path Length contains the length (in octets)
   of the entire Secure_Path (including the two octets used to express
   this length field).  As explained below, each Secure_Path Segment is
   six octets long.  Note that this means the Secure_Path Length is two
   greater than six times the number Secure_Path Segments (i.e., the
   number of AS numbers in the path).

   The Secure_Path contains one Secure_Path Segment (see Figure 5) for
   each Autonomous System in the path to the originating AS of the
   prefix specified in the update message.  (Note: Repeated Autonomous
   Systems are compressed out using the pCount field as discussed
   below.)











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     +------------------------------------------------------+
     | pCount         (1 octet)                             |
     +------------------------------------------------------+
     | Confed_Segment flag (1 bit) |  Unassigned (7 bits)   | (Flags)
     +------------------------------------------------------+
     | AS Number      (4 octets)                            |
     +------------------------------------------------------+

                   Figure 5: Secure_Path Segment format.

   The AS Number (in Figure 5) is the AS number of the BGP speaker that
   added this Secure_Path Segment to the BGPsec_Path attribute.  (See
   Section 4 for more information on populating this field.)

   The pCount field contains the number of repetitions of the associated
   autonomous system number that the signature covers.  This field
   enables a BGPsec speaker to mimic the semantics of prepending
   multiple copies of their AS to the AS_PATH without requiring the
   speaker to generate multiple signatures.  Note that Section 9.1.2.2
   ("Breaking Ties") in [RFC4271] mentions "number of AS numbers" in the
   AS_PATH attribute that is used in the route selection process.  This
   metric (number of AS numbers) is the same as the AS path length
   obtained in BGPsec by summing the pCount values in the BGPsec_Path
   attribute.  The pCount field is also useful in managing route servers
   (see Section 4.2), AS confederations (see Section 4.3), and AS Number
   migrations (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration] for details).

   The left most (i.e. the most significant) bit of the Flags field in
   Figure 5 is the Confed_Segment flag.  The Confed_Segment flag is set
   to one to indicate that the BGPsec speaker that constructed this
   Secure_Path Segment is sending the update message to a peer AS within
   the same Autonomous System confederation [RFC5065].  (That is, a
   sequence of consecutive Confed_Segment flags are set in a BGPsec
   update message whenever, in a non-BGPsec update message, an AS_PATH
   segment of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE occurs.)  In all other cases the
   Confed_Segment flag is set to zero.

   The remaining seven bits of the Flags are unassigned and MUST be set
   to zero by the sender, and ignored by the receiver.  Note, however,
   that the signature is computed over all eight bits of the flags
   field.

   As stated earlier in Section 2.2, BGPsec peering requires that the
   peering ASes MUST each support four-byte AS numbers.  Currently-
   assigned two-byte AS numbers are converted into four-byte AS numbers
   by setting the two high-order octets of the four-octet field to zero
   [RFC6793].




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3.2.  Signature_Block

   A detailed description of the Signature_Blocks in the BGPsec_Path
   attribute is provided here using Figure 6 and Figure 7.


              +---------------------------------------------+
              | Signature_Block Length         (2 octets)   |
              +---------------------------------------------+
              | Algorithm Suite Identifier     (1 octet)    |
              +---------------------------------------------+
              | Sequence of Signature Segments (variable)   |
              +---------------------------------------------+

                     Figure 6: Signature_Block format.

   The Signature_Block Length in Figure 6 is the total number of octets
   in the Signature_Block (including the two octets used to express this
   length field).

   The Algorithm Suite Identifier is a one-octet identifier specifying
   the digest algorithm and digital signature algorithm used to produce
   the digital signature in each Signature Segment.  An IANA registry of
   algorithm identifiers for use in BGPsec is specified in the BGPsec
   algorithms document [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs].

   A Signature_Block in Figure 6 has exactly one Signature Segment (see
   Figure 7) for each Secure_Path Segment in the Secure_Path portion of
   the BGPsec_Path Attribute.  (That is, one Signature Segment for each
   distinct AS on the path for the prefix in the Update message.)


              +---------------------------------------------+
              | Subject Key Identifier (SKI)  (20 octets)   |
              +---------------------------------------------+
              | Signature Length              (2 octets)    |
              +---------------------------------------------+
              | Signature                     (variable)    |
              +---------------------------------------------+

                    Figure 7: Signature Segment format.

   The Subject Key Identifier (SKI) field in Figure 7 contains the value
   in the Subject Key Identifier extension of the RPKI router
   certificate [RFC6487] that is used to verify the signature (see
   Section 5 for details on validity of BGPsec update messages).  The
   SKI field has a fixed 20 octets size.  See Section 6.2 for
   considerations for the SKI size.



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   The Signature Length field contains the size (in octets) of the value
   in the Signature field of the Signature Segment.

   The Signature in Figure 7 contains a digital signature that protects
   the prefix and the BGPsec_Path attribute (see Section 4 and Section 5
   for details on signature generation and validation, respectively).

4.  BGPsec Update Messages

   Section 4.1 provides general guidance on the creation of BGPsec
   Update Messages -- that is, update messages containing the
   BGPsec_Path attribute.

   Section 4.2 specifies how a BGPsec speaker generates the BGPsec_Path
   attribute to include in a BGPsec Update message.

   Section 4.3 contains special processing instructions for members of
   an autonomous system confederation [RFC5065].  A BGPsec speaker that
   is not a member of such a confederation MUST NOT set the
   Confed_Segment flag in its Secure_Path Segment (i.e. leave the flag
   bit at default value zero) in all BGPsec update messages it sends.

   Section 4.4 contains instructions for reconstructing the AS_PATH
   attribute in cases where a BGPsec speaker receives an update message
   with a BGPsec_Path attribute and wishes to propagate the update
   message to a peer who does not support BGPsec.

4.1.  General Guidance

   The information protected by the signature on a BGPsec update message
   includes the AS number of the peer to whom the update message is
   being sent.  Therefore, if a BGPsec speaker wishes to send a BGPsec
   update to multiple BGP peers, it MUST generate a separate BGPsec
   update message for each unique peer AS to whom the update message is
   sent.

   A BGPsec update message MUST advertise a route to only a single
   prefix.  This is because a BGPsec speaker receiving an update message
   with multiple prefixes would be unable to construct a valid BGPsec
   update message (i.e., valid path signatures) containing a subset of
   the prefixes in the received update.  If a BGPsec speaker wishes to
   advertise routes to multiple prefixes, then it MUST generate a
   separate BGPsec update message for each prefix.  Additionally, a
   BGPsec update message MUST use the MP_REACH_NLRI [RFC4760] attribute
   to encode the prefix.

   The BGPsec_Path attribute and the AS_PATH attribute are mutually
   exclusive.  That is, any update message containing the BGPsec_Path



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   attribute MUST NOT contain the AS_PATH attribute.  The information
   that would be contained in the AS_PATH attribute is instead conveyed
   in the Secure_Path portion of the BGPsec_Path attribute.

   In order to create or add a new signature to a BGPsec update message
   with a given algorithm suite, the BGPsec speaker MUST possess a
   private key suitable for generating signatures for this algorithm
   suite.  Additionally, this private key must correspond to the public
   key in a valid Resource PKI end-entity certificate whose AS number
   resource extension includes the BGPsec speaker's AS number
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles].  Note also that new signatures
   are only added to a BGPsec update message when a BGPsec speaker is
   generating an update message to send to an external peer (i.e., when
   the AS number of the peer is not equal to the BGPsec speaker's own AS
   number).

   The Resource PKI enables the legitimate holder of IP address
   prefix(es) to issue a signed object, called a Route Origination
   Authorization (ROA), that authorizes a given AS to originate routes
   to a given set of prefixes (see RFC 6482 [RFC6482]).  It is expected
   that most relying parties will utilize BGPsec in tandem with origin
   validation (see RFC 6483 [RFC6483] and RFC 6811 [RFC6811]).
   Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that a BGPsec speaker only originate a
   BGPsec update advertising a route for a given prefix if there exists
   a valid ROA authorizing the BGPsec speaker's AS to originate routes
   to this prefix.

   If a BGPsec router has received only a non-BGPsec update message
   containing the AS_PATH attribute (instead of the BGPsec_Path
   attribute) from a peer for a given prefix, then it MUST NOT attach a
   BGPsec_Path attribute when it propagates the update message.  (Note
   that a BGPsec router may also receive a non-BGPsec update message
   from an internal peer without the AS_PATH attribute, i.e., with just
   the NLRI in it.  In that case, the prefix is originating from that
   AS, and if it is selected for advertisement, the BGPsec speaker
   SHOULD attach a BGPsec_Path attribute and send a signed route (for
   that prefix) to its external BGPsec-speaking peers.)

   Conversely, if a BGPsec router has received a BGPsec update message
   (with the BGPsec_Path attribute) from a peer for a given prefix and
   it chooses to propagate that peer's route for the prefix, then it
   SHOULD propagate the route as a BGPsec update message containing the
   BGPsec_Path attribute.

   Note that removing BGPsec signatures (i.e., propagating a route
   advertisement without the BGPsec_Path attribute) has significant
   security ramifications.  (See Section 8 for discussion of the
   security ramifications of removing BGPsec signatures.)  Therefore,



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   when a route advertisement is received via a BGPsec update message,
   propagating the route advertisement without the BGPsec_Path attribute
   is NOT RECOMMENDED, unless the message is sent to a peer that did not
   advertise the capability to receive BGPsec update messages (see
   Section 4.4).

   Furthermore, note that when a BGPsec speaker propagates a route
   advertisement with the BGPsec_Path attribute it is not attesting to
   the validation state of the update message it received.  (See
   Section 8 for more discussion of the security semantics of BGPsec
   signatures.)

   If the BGPsec speaker is producing an update message which would, in
   the absence of BGPsec, contain an AS_SET (e.g., the BGPsec speaker is
   performing proxy aggregation), then the BGPsec speaker MUST NOT
   include the BGPsec_Path attribute.  In such a case, the BGPsec
   speaker MUST remove any existing BGPsec_Path in the received
   advertisement(s) for this prefix and produce a traditional (non-
   BGPsec) update message.  It should be noted that BCP 172 [RFC6472]
   recommends against the use of AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in the AS_PATH
   of BGP updates.

   The case where the BGPsec speaker sends a BGPsec update message to an
   iBGP peer is quite simple.  When originating a new route
   advertisement and sending it to a BGPsec-capable iBGP peer, the
   BGPsec speaker omits the BGPsec_Path attribute.  When originating a
   new route advertisement and sending it to a non-BGPsec iBGP peer, the
   BGPsec speaker includes an empty AS_PATH attribute in the update
   message.  (An empty AS_PATH attribute is one whose length field
   contains the value zero [RFC4271].)  When a BGPsec speaker chooses to
   forward a BGPsec update message to an iBGP peer, the BGPsec_Path
   attribute SHOULD NOT be removed, unless the peer doesn't support
   BGPsec.  In the case when an iBGP peer doesn't support BGPsec, then a
   BGP update with AS_PATH is reconstructed from the BGPsec update and
   then forwarded (see Section 4.4).  In particular, when forwarding to
   a BGPsec-capable iBGP (or eBGP) peer, the BGPsec_Path attribute
   SHOULD NOT be removed even in the case where the BGPsec update
   message has not been successfully validated.  (See Section 5 for more
   information on validation, and Section 8 for the security
   ramifications of removing BGPsec signatures.)

   All BGPsec update messages MUST conform to BGP's maximum message
   size.  If the resulting message exceeds the maximum message size,
   then the guidelines in Section 9.2 of RFC 4271 [RFC4271] MUST be
   followed.






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4.2.  Constructing the BGPsec_Path Attribute

   When a BGPsec speaker receives a BGPsec update message containing a
   BGPsec_Path attribute (with one or more signatures) from an (internal
   or external) peer, it may choose to propagate the route advertisement
   by sending it to its other (internal or external) peers.  When
   sending the route advertisement to an internal BGPsec-speaking peer,
   the BGPsec_Path attribute SHALL NOT be modified.  When sending the
   route advertisement to an external BGPsec-speaking peer, the
   following procedures are used to form or update the BGPsec_Path
   attribute.

   To generate the BGPsec_Path attribute on the outgoing update message,
   the BGPsec speaker first generates a new Secure_Path Segment.  Note
   that if the BGPsec speaker is not the origin AS and there is an
   existing BGPsec_Path attribute, then the BGPsec speaker prepends its
   new Secure_Path Segment (places in first position) onto the existing
   Secure_Path.

   The AS number in this Secure_Path Segment MUST match the AS number in
   the Subject field of the Resource PKI router certificate that will be
   used to verify the digital signature constructed by this BGPsec
   speaker (see Section 3.1.1 in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] and
   RFC 6487 [RFC6487]).

   The pCount field of the Secure_Path Segment is typically set to the
   value 1.  However, a BGPsec speaker may set the pCount field to a
   value greater than 1.  Setting the pCount field to a value greater
   than one has the same semantics as repeating an AS number multiple
   times in the AS_PATH of a non-BGPsec update message (e.g., for
   traffic engineering purposes).

   To prevent unnecessary processing load in the validation of BGPsec
   signatures, a BGPsec speaker SHOULD NOT produce multiple consecutive
   Secure_Path Segments with the same AS number.  This means that to
   achieve the semantics of prepending the same AS number k times, a
   BGPsec speaker SHOULD produce a single Secure_Path Segment -- with
   pCount of k -- and a single corresponding Signature Segment.

   A route server that participates in the BGP control plane, but does
   not act as a transit AS in the data plane, may choose to set pCount
   to 0.  This option enables the route server to participate in BGPsec
   and obtain the associated security guarantees without increasing the
   length of the AS path.  (Note that BGPsec speakers compute the length
   of the AS path by summing the pCount values in the BGPsec_Path
   attribute, see Section 5.)  However, when a route server sets the
   pCount value to 0, it still inserts its AS number into the
   Secure_Path Segment, as this information is needed to validate the



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   signature added by the route server.  See
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration] for a discussion of setting pCount to 0
   to facilitate AS Number Migration.  Also, see Section 4.3 for the use
   of pCount=0 in the context of an AS confederation.  See Section 7.2
   for operational guidance for configuring a BGPsec router for setting
   pCount=0 and/or accepting pCount=0 from a peer.

   Next, the BGPsec speaker generates one or two Signature_Blocks.
   Typically, a BGPsec speaker will use only a single algorithm suite,
   and thus create only a single Signature_Block in the BGPsec_Path
   attribute.  However, to ensure backwards compatibility during a
   period of transition from a 'current' algorithm suite to a 'new'
   algorithm suite, it will be necessary to originate update messages
   that contain a Signature_Block for both the 'current' and the 'new'
   algorithm suites (see Section 6.1).

   If the received BGPsec update message contains two Signature_Blocks
   and the BGPsec speaker supports both of the corresponding algorithm
   suites, then the new update message generated by the BGPsec speaker
   MUST include both of the Signature_Blocks.  If the received BGPsec
   update message contains two Signature_Blocks and the BGPsec speaker
   only supports one of the two corresponding algorithm suites, then the
   BGPsec speaker MUST remove the Signature_Block corresponding to the
   algorithm suite that it does not understand.  If the BGPsec speaker
   does not support the algorithm suites in any of the Signature_Blocks
   contained in the received update message, then the BGPsec speaker
   MUST NOT propagate the route advertisement with the BGPsec_Path
   attribute.  (That is, if it chooses to propagate this route
   advertisement at all, it MUST do so as an unsigned BGP update
   message.  See Section 4.4 for more information on converting to an
   unsigned BGP message.)

   Note that in the case where the BGPsec_Path has two Signature_Blocks
   (corresponding to different algorithm suites), the validation
   algorithm (see Section 5.2) deems a BGPsec update message to be
   'Valid' if there is at least one supported algorithm suite (and
   corresponding Signature_Block) that is deemed 'Valid'.  This means
   that a 'Valid' BGPsec update message may contain a Signature_Block
   which is not deemed 'Valid' (e.g., contains signatures that BGPsec
   does not successfully verify).  Nonetheless, such Signature_Blocks
   MUST NOT be removed.  (See Section 8 for a discussion of the security
   ramifications of this design choice.)

   For each Signature_Block corresponding to an algorithm suite that the
   BGPsec speaker does support, the BGPsec speaker MUST add a new
   Signature Segment to the Signature_Block.  This Signature Segment is
   prepended to the list of Signature Segments (placed in the first
   position) so that the list of Signature Segments appears in the same



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   order as the corresponding Secure_Path Segments.  The BGPsec speaker
   populates the fields of this new Signature Segment as follows.

   The Subject Key Identifier field in the new segment is populated with
   the identifier contained in the Subject Key Identifier extension of
   the RPKI router certificate corresponding to the BGPsec speaker
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles].  This Subject Key Identifier
   will be used by recipients of the route advertisement to identify the
   proper certificate to use in verifying the signature.

   The Signature field in the new segment contains a digital signature
   that binds the prefix and BGPsec_Path attribute to the RPKI router
   certificate corresponding to the BGPsec speaker.  The digital
   signature is computed as follows:

   o  For clarity, let us number the Secure_Path and corresponding
      Signature Segments from 1 to N as follows.  Let Secure_Path
      Segment 1 and Signature Segment 1 be the segments produced by the
      origin AS.  Let Secure_Path Segment 2 and Signature Segment 2 be
      the segments added by the next AS after the origin.  Continue this
      method of numbering and ultimately let Secure_Path Segment N and
      Signature Segment N be those that are being added by the current
      AS.  The current AS (Nth AS) is signing and forwarding the update
      to the next AS (i.e.  (N+1)th AS) in the chain of ASes that form
      the AS path.

   o  In order to construct the digital signature for Signature Segment
      N (the Signature Segment being produced by the current AS), first
      construct the sequence of octets to be hashed as shown in
      Figure 8.  This sequence of octets includes all the data that the
      Nth AS attests to by adding its digital signature in the update
      which is being forwarded to a BGPsec speaker in the (N+1)th AS.
      (For the design rationale for choosing the specific structure in
      Figure 8, please see [Borchert].)

















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         +------------------------------------+
         | Target AS Number                   |
         +------------------------------------+ ---\
         | Signature Segment   : N-1          |     \
         +------------------------------------+     |
         | Secure_Path Segment : N            |     |
         +------------------------------------+     \
                ...                                  >  Data from
         +------------------------------------+     /   N Segments
         | Signature Segment   : 1            |     |
         +------------------------------------+     |
         | Secure_Path Segment : 2            |     |
         +------------------------------------+     /
         | Secure_Path Segment : 1            |    /
         +------------------------------------+---/
         | Algorithm Suite Identifier         |
         +------------------------------------+
         | AFI                                |
         +------------------------------------+
         | SAFI                               |
         +------------------------------------+
         | Prefix                             |
         +------------------------------------+

                Figure 8: Sequence of octets to be hashed.

      The elements in this sequence (Figure 8) MUST be ordered exactly
      as shown.  The 'Target AS Number' is the AS to whom the BGPsec
      speaker intends to send the update message.  (Note that the
      'Target AS Number' is the AS number announced by the peer in the
      OPEN message of the BGP session within which the update is sent.)
      The Secure_Path and Signature Segments (1 through N-1) are
      obtained from the BGPsec_Path attribute.  Finally, the Address
      Family Identifier (AFI), Subsequent Address Family Identifier
      (SAFI), and Prefix fields are obtained from the MP_REACH_NLRI
      attribute [RFC4760].  Additionally, in the Prefix field all of the
      trailing bits MUST be set to zero when constructing this sequence.

   o  Apply to this octet sequence (in Figure 8) the digest algorithm
      (for the algorithm suite of this Signature_Block) to obtain a
      digest value.

   o  Apply to this digest value the signature algorithm, (for the
      algorithm suite of this Signature_Block) to obtain the digital
      signature.  Then populate the Signature Field (in Figure 7) with
      this digital signature.





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   The Signature Length field (in Figure 7) is populated with the length
   (in octets) of the value in the Signature field.

4.3.  Processing Instructions for Confederation Members

   Members of autonomous system confederations [RFC5065] MUST
   additionally follow the instructions in this section for processing
   BGPsec update messages.

   When a BGPsec speaker in an AS confederation receives a BGPsec update
   from a peer that is external to the confederation and chooses to
   propagate the update within the confederation, then it first adds a
   signature signed to its own Member-AS (i.e. the Target AS number is
   the BGPsec speaker's Member-AS number).  In this internally modified
   update, the newly added Secure_Path Segment contains the public AS
   number (i.e.  Confederation Identifier), the Segment's pCount value
   is set to 0, and Confed_Segment flag is set to one.  Setting pCount=0
   in this case helps ensure that the AS path length is not
   unnecessarily incremented.  The newly added signature is generated
   using a private key corresponding to the public AS number of the
   confederation.  The BGPsec speaker propagates the modified update to
   its peers within the confederation.

   Any BGPsec_Path modifications mentioned below in the context of
   propagation of the update within the confederation are in addition to
   the modification described above (i.e. with pCount=0).

   When a BGPsec speaker sends a BGPsec update message to a peer that
   belongs within its own Member-AS, the confederation member SHALL NOT
   modify the BGPsec_Path attribute.  When a BGPsec speaker sends a
   BGPsec update message to a peer that is within the same confederation
   but in a different Member-AS, the BGPsec speaker puts its Member-AS
   number in the AS Number field of the Secure_Path Segment that it adds
   to the BGPsec update message.  Additionally, in this case, the
   Member-AS that generates the Secure_Path Segment sets the
   Confed_Segment flag to one.  Further, the signature is generated with
   a private key corresponding to the BGPsec speaker's Member-AS Number.
   (Note: In this document, intra-Member-AS peering is regarded as iBGP
   and inter-Member-AS peering is regarded as eBGP.  The latter is also
   known as confederation-eBGP.)

   Within a confederation, the verification of BGPsec signatures added
   by other members of the confederation is optional.  Note that if a
   confederation chooses not to verify digital signatures within the
   confederation, then BGPsec is able to provide no assurances about the
   integrity of the Member-AS Numbers placed in Secure_Path Segments
   where the Confed_Segment flag is set to one.




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   When a confederation member receives a BGPsec update message from a
   peer within the confederation and propagates it to a peer outside the
   confederation, it needs to remove all of the Secure_Path Segments
   added by confederation members as well as the corresponding Signature
   Segments.  To do this, the confederation member propagating the route
   outside the confederation does the following:

   o  First, starting with the most recently added Secure_Path Segment,
      remove all of the consecutive Secure_Path Segments that have the
      Confed_Segment flag set to one.  Stop this process once a
      Secure_Path Segment is reached which has its Confed_Segment flag
      set to zero.  Keep a count of the number of segments removed in
      this fashion.

   o  Second, starting with the most recently added Signature Segment,
      remove a number of Signature Segments equal to the number of
      Secure_Path Segments removed in the previous step.  (That is,
      remove the K most recently added Signature Segments, where K is
      the number of Secure_Path Segments removed in the previous step.)

   o  Finally, add a Secure_Path Segment containing, in the AS field,
      the AS Confederation Identifier (the public AS number of the
      confederation) as well as a corresponding Signature Segment.  Note
      that all fields other than the AS field are populated as per
      Section 4.2.

   Finally, as discussed above, an AS confederation MAY optionally
   decide that its members will not verify digital signatures added by
   members.  In such a confederation, when a BGPsec speaker runs the
   algorithm in Section 5.2, the BGPsec speaker, during the process of
   Signature verifications, first checks whether the Confed_Segment flag
   in a Secure_Path Segment is set to one.  If the flag is set to one,
   the BGPsec speaker skips the verification for the corresponding
   Signature, and immediately moves on to the next Secure_Path Segment.
   Note that as specified in Section 5.2, it is an error when a BGPsec
   speaker receives from a peer, who is not in the same AS
   confederation, a BGPsec update containing a Confed_Segment flag set
   to one.

4.4.  Reconstructing the AS_PATH Attribute

   BGPsec update messages do not contain the AS_PATH attribute.
   However, the AS_PATH attribute can be reconstructed from the
   BGPsec_Path attribute.  This is necessary in the case where a route
   advertisement is received via a BGPsec update message and then
   propagated to a peer via a non-BGPsec update message (e.g., because
   the latter peer does not support BGPsec).  Note that there may be
   additional cases where an implementation finds it useful to perform



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   this reconstruction.  Before attempting to reconstruct an AS_PATH for
   the purpose of forwarding an unsigned (non-BGPsec) update to a peer,
   a BGPsec speaker MUST perform the basic integrity checks listed in
   Section 5.2 to ensure that the received BGPsec update is properly
   formed.

   The AS_PATH attribute can be constructed from the BGPsec_Path
   attribute as follows.  Starting with a blank AS_PATH attribute,
   process the Secure_Path Segments in order from least-recently added
   (corresponding to the origin) to most-recently added.  For each
   Secure_Path Segment perform the following steps:

   1.  If the Secure_Path Segment has pCount=0, then do nothing (i.e.
       move on to process the next Secure_Path Segment).

   2.  If the Secure_Path Segment has pCount greater than 0 and the
       Confed_Segment flag is set to one, then look at the most-recently
       added segment in the AS_PATH.

       *  In the case where the AS_PATH is blank or in the case where
          the most-recently added segment is of type AS_SEQUENCE, add
          (prepend to the AS_PATH) a new AS_PATH segment of type
          AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE.  This segment of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE
          shall contain a number of elements equal to the pCount field
          in the current Secure_Path Segment.  Each of these elements
          shall be the AS number contained in the current Secure_Path
          Segment.  (That is, if the pCount field is X, then the segment
          of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE contains X copies of the
          Secure_Path Segment's AS Number field.)

       *  In the case where the most-recently added segment in the
          AS_PATH is of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE then add (prepend to the
          segment) a number of elements equal to the pCount field in the
          current Secure_Path Segment.  The value of each of these
          elements shall be the AS number contained in the current
          Secure_Path Segment.  (That is, if the pCount field is X, then
          add X copies of the Secure_Path Segment's AS Number field to
          the existing AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE.)

   3.  If the Secure_Path Segment has pCount greater than 0 and the
       Confed_Segment flag is set to zero, then look at the most-
       recently added segment in the AS_PATH.

       *  In the case where the AS_PATH is blank or in the case where
          the most-recently added segment is of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE,
          add (prepend to the AS_PATH) a new AS_PATH segment of type
          AS_SEQUENCE.  This segment of type AS_SEQUENCE shall contain a
          number of elements equal to the pCount field in the current



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          Secure_Path Segment.  Each of these elements shall be the AS
          number contained in the current Secure_Path Segment.  (That
          is, if the pCount field is X, then the segment of type
          AS_SEQUENCE contains X copies of the Secure_Path Segment's AS
          Number field.)

       *  In the case where the most recently added segment in the
          AS_PATH is of type AS_SEQUENCE then add (prepend to the
          segment) a number of elements equal to the pCount field in the
          current Secure_Path Segment.  The value of each of these
          elements shall be the AS number contained in the current
          Secure_Path Segment.  (That is, if the pCount field is X, then
          add X copies of the Secure_Path Segment's AS Number field to
          the existing AS_SEQUENCE.)

   As part of the above described procedure, the following additional
   actions are performed in order not to exceed the size limitations of
   AS_SEQUENCE and AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE.  While adding the next
   Secure_Path Segment (with its prepends, if any) to the AS_PATH being
   assembled, if it would cause the AS_SEQUENCE (or AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE)
   at hand to exceed the limit of 255 AS numbers per segment [RFC4271]
   [RFC5065], then the BGPsec speaker would follow the recommendations
   in RFC 4271 [RFC4271] and RFC 5065 [RFC5065] of creating another
   segment of the same type (AS_SEQUENCE or AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE) and
   continue filling that.

   Finally, one special case of reconstruction of AS_PATH is when the
   BGPsec_Path attribute is absent.  As explained in Section 4.1, when a
   BGPsec speaker originates a prefix and sends it to a BGPsec-capable
   iBGP peer, the BGPsec_Path is not attached.  So when received from a
   BGPsec-capable iBGP peer, no BGPsec_Path attribute in a BGPsec update
   is equivalent to an empty AS_PATH [RFC4271].

5.  Processing a Received BGPsec Update

   Upon receiving a BGPsec update message from an external (eBGP) peer,
   a BGPsec speaker SHOULD validate the message to determine the
   authenticity of the path information contained in the BGPsec_Path
   attribute.  Typically, a BGPsec speaker will also wish to perform
   origin validation (see RFC 6483 [RFC6483] and RFC 6811 [RFC6811]) on
   an incoming BGPsec update message, but such validation is independent
   of the validation described in this section.

   Section 5.1 provides an overview of BGPsec validation and Section 5.2
   provides a specific algorithm for performing such validation.  (Note
   that an implementation need not follow the specific algorithm in
   Section 5.2 as long as the input/output behavior of the validation is
   identical to that of the algorithm in Section 5.2.)  During



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   exceptional conditions (e.g., the BGPsec speaker receives an
   incredibly large number of update messages at once) a BGPsec speaker
   MAY temporarily defer validation of incoming BGPsec update messages.
   The treatment of such BGPsec update messages, whose validation has
   been deferred, is a matter of local policy.  However, an
   implementation SHOULD ensure that deferment of validation and status
   of deferred messages is visible to the operator.

   The validity of BGPsec update messages is a function of the current
   RPKI state.  When a BGPsec speaker learns that RPKI state has changed
   (e.g., from an RPKI validating cache via the RPKI-to-Router protocol
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]), the BGPsec speaker MUST re-run
   validation on all affected update messages stored in its Adj-RIB-In
   [RFC4271].  For example, when a given RPKI router certificate ceases
   to be valid (e.g., it expires or is revoked), all update messages
   containing a signature whose SKI matches the SKI in the given
   certificate MUST be re-assessed to determine if they are still valid.
   If this reassessment determines that the validity state of an update
   has changed then, depending on local policy, it may be necessary to
   re-run best path selection.

   BGPsec update messages do not contain an AS_PATH attribute.  The
   Secure_Path contains AS path information for the BGPsec update
   message.  Therefore, a BGPsec speaker MUST utilize the AS path
   information in the Secure_Path in all cases where it would otherwise
   use the AS path information in the AS_PATH attribute.  The only
   exception to this rule is when AS path information must be updated in
   order to propagate a route to a peer (in which case the BGPsec
   speaker follows the instructions in Section 4).  Section 4.4 provides
   an algorithm for constructing an AS_PATH attribute from a BGPsec_Path
   attribute.  Whenever the use of AS path information is called for
   (e.g., loop detection, or use of AS path length in best path
   selection) the externally visible behavior of the implementation
   shall be the same as if the implementation had run the algorithm in
   Section 4.4 and used the resulting AS_PATH attribute as it would for
   a non-BGPsec update message.

5.1.  Overview of BGPsec Validation

   Validation of a BGPsec update message makes use of data from RPKI
   router certificates.  In particular, it is necessary that the
   recipient have access to the following data obtained from valid RPKI
   router certificates: the AS Number, Public Key and Subject Key
   Identifier from each valid RPKI router certificate.

   Note that the BGPsec speaker could perform the validation of RPKI
   router certificates on its own and extract the required data, or it
   could receive the same data from a trusted cache that performs RPKI



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   validation on behalf of (some set of) BGPsec speakers.  (For example,
   the trusted cache could deliver the necessary validity information to
   the BGPsec speaker using the router key PDU for the RPKI-to-Router
   protocol [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis].)

   To validate a BGPsec update message containing the BGPsec_Path
   attribute, the recipient performs the validation steps specified in
   Section 5.2.  The validation procedure results in one of two states:
   'Valid' and 'Not Valid'.

   It is expected that the output of the validation procedure will be
   used as an input to BGP route selection.  That said, BGP route
   selection, and thus the handling of the validation states is a matter
   of local policy, and is handled using local policy mechanisms.
   Implementations SHOULD enable operators to set such local policy on a
   per-session basis.  (That is, it is expected that some operators will
   choose to treat BGPsec validation status differently for update
   messages received over different BGP sessions.)

   BGPsec validation needs only be performed at the eBGP edge.  The
   validation status of a BGP signed/unsigned update MAY be conveyed via
   iBGP from an ingress edge router to an egress edge router via some
   mechanism, according to local policy within an AS.  As discussed in
   Section 4, when a BGPsec speaker chooses to forward a (syntactically
   correct) BGPsec update message, it SHOULD be forwarded with its
   BGPsec_Path attribute intact (regardless of the validation state of
   the update message).  Based entirely on local policy, an egress
   router receiving a BGPsec update message from within its own AS MAY
   choose to perform its own validation.

5.2.  Validation Algorithm

   This section specifies an algorithm for validation of BGPsec update
   messages.  A conformant implementation MUST include a BGPsec update
   validation algorithm that is functionally equivalent to the
   externally visible behavior of this algorithm.

   First, the recipient of a BGPsec update message performs a check to
   ensure that the message is properly formed.  Both syntactical and
   protocol violation errors are checked.  BGPsec_Path attribute MUST be
   present when a BGPsec update is received from an external (eBGP)
   BGPsec peer and also when such an update is propagated to an internal
   (iBGP) BGPsec peer (see Section 4.2).  The error checks specified in
   Section 6.3 of [RFC4271] are performed, except that for BGPsec
   updates the checks on the AS_PATH attribute do not apply and instead
   the following checks on BGPsec_Path attribute are performed:





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   1.  Check to ensure that the entire BGPsec_Path attribute is
       syntactically correct (conforms to the specification in this
       document).

   2.  Check that AS number in the most recently added Secure_Path
       Segment (i.e. the one corresponding to the eBGP peer from which
       the update message was received) matches the AS number of that
       peer as specified in the BGP OPEN message.  (Note: This check is
       performed only at an ingress BGPsec routers where the update is
       first received from a peer AS.)

   3.  Check that each Signature_Block contains one Signature Segment
       for each Secure_Path Segment in the Secure_Path portion of the
       BGPsec_Path attribute.  (Note that the entirety of each
       Signature_Block MUST be checked to ensure that it is well formed,
       even though the validation process may terminate before all
       signatures are cryptographically verified.)

   4.  Check that the update message does not contain an AS_PATH
       attribute.

   5.  If the update message was received from an BGPsec peer that is
       not a member of the BGPsec speaker's AS confederation, check to
       ensure that none of the Secure_Path Segments contain a Flags
       field with the Confed_Segment flag set to one.

   6.  If the update message was received from a BGPsec peer that is a
       member of the BGPsec speaker's AS confederation, check to ensure
       that the Secure_Path Segment corresponding to that peer contains
       a Flags field with the Confed_Segment flag set to one.

   7.  If the update message was received from a peer that is not
       expected to set pCount=0 (see Section 4.2 and Section 4.3) then
       check to ensure that the pCount field in the most-recently added
       Secure_Path Segment is not equal to zero.  (Note: See router
       configuration guidance related to this in Section 7.2.)

   8.  Using the equivalent of AS_PATH corresponding to the Secure_Path
       in the update (see Section 4.4), check that the local AS number
       is not present in the AS path (i.e. rule out AS loop).

   If any of these checks fail, it is an error in the BGPsec_Path
   attribute.  BGPsec speakers MUST handle any syntactical or protocol
   errors in the BGPsec_Path attribute using the "treat-as-withdraw"
   approach as defined in RFC 7606 [RFC7606].  (Note: Since the AS
   number of a transparent route server does appear in the Secure_Path
   with pCount=0, the route server MAY check if its local AS is listed




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   in the Secure_Path, and this check MAY be included in the loop
   detection check listed above.)

   Next, the BGPsec speaker examines the Signature_Blocks in the
   BGPsec_Path attribute.  A Signature_Block corresponding to an
   algorithm suite that the BGPsec speaker does not support is not
   considered in validation.  If there is no Signature_Block
   corresponding to an algorithm suite that the BGPsec speaker supports,
   then in order to consider the update in the route selection process,
   the BGPsec speaker MUST strip the Signature_Block(s), reconstruct the
   AS_PATH from the Secure_Path (see Section 4.4), and treat the update
   as if it was received as an unsigned BGP update.

   For each remaining Signature_Block (corresponding to an algorithm
   suite supported by the BGPsec speaker), the BGPsec speaker iterates
   through the Signature Segments in the Signature_Block, starting with
   the most recently added segment (and concluding with the least
   recently added segment).  Note that there is a one-to-one
   correspondence between Signature Segments and Secure_Path Segments
   within the BGPsec_Path attribute.  The following steps make use of
   this correspondence.

   o  (Step 1): Let there be K AS hops in a received BGPsec_Path
      attribute that is to be validated.  Let AS(1), AS(2), ..., AS(K+1)
      denote the sequence of AS numbers from the origin AS to the
      validating AS.  Let Secure_Path Segment N and Signature Segment N
      in the BGPsec_Path attribute refer to those corresponding to AS(N)
      (where N = 1, 2, ..., K).  The BGPsec speaker that is processing
      and validating the BGPsec_Path attribute resides in AS(K+1).  Let
      Signature Segment N be the Signature Segment that is currently
      being verified.

   o  (Step 2): Locate the public key needed to verify the signature (in
      the current Signature Segment).  To do this, consult the valid
      RPKI router certificate data and look up all valid (AS, SKI,
      Public Key) triples in which the AS matches the AS number in the
      corresponding Secure_Path Segment.  Of these triples that match
      the AS number, check whether there is an SKI that matches the
      value in the Subject Key Identifier field of the Signature
      Segment.  If this check finds no such matching SKI value, then
      mark the entire Signature_Block as 'Not Valid' and proceed to the
      next Signature_Block.

   o  (Step 3): Compute the digest function (for the given algorithm
      suite) on the appropriate data.

      In order to verify the digital signature in Signature Segment N,
      construct the sequence of octets to be hashed as shown in Figure 9



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      (using the notations defined in Step 1).  (Note that this sequence
      is the same sequence that was used by AS(N) that created the
      Signature Segment N (see Section 4.2 and Figure 8).)


         +------------------------------------+
         | Target AS Number                   |
         +------------------------------------+ ---\
         | Signature Segment   : N-1          |     \
         +------------------------------------+     |
         | Secure_Path Segment : N            |     |
         +------------------------------------+     \
                ...                                  >  Data from
         +------------------------------------+     /   N Segments
         | Signature Segment   : 1            |     |
         +------------------------------------+     |
         | Secure_Path Segment : 2            |     |
         +------------------------------------+     /
         | Secure_Path Segment : 1            |    /
         +------------------------------------+---/
         | Algorithm Suite Identifier         |
         +------------------------------------+
         | AFI                                |
         +------------------------------------+
         | SAFI                               |
         +------------------------------------+
         | Prefix                             |
         +------------------------------------+

        Figure 9: The Sequence of octets to be hashed for signature
   verification of Signature Segment N; N = 1,2, ..., K, where K is the
              number of AS hops in the BGPsec_Path attribute.

      The elements in this sequence (Figure 9) MUST be ordered exactly
      as shown.  For the first segment to be processed (the most
      recently added segment (i.e.  N = K) given that there are K hops
      in the Secure_Path), the 'Target AS Number' is AS(K+1), the AS
      number of the BGPsec speaker validating the update message.  Note
      that if a BGPsec speaker uses multiple AS Numbers (e.g., the
      BGPsec speaker is a member of a confederation), the AS number used
      here MUST be the AS number announced in the OPEN message for the
      BGP session over which the BGPsec update was received.

      For each other Signature Segment (N smaller than K), the 'Target
      AS Number' is AS(N+1), the AS number in the Secure_Path Segment
      that corresponds to the Signature Segment added immediately after
      the one being processed.  (That is, in the Secure_Path Segment




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      that corresponds to the Signature Segment that the validator just
      finished processing.)

      The Secure_Path and Signature Segment are obtained from the
      BGPsec_Path attribute.  The Address Family Identifier (AFI),
      Subsequent Address Family Identifier (SAFI), and Prefix fields are
      obtained from the MP_REACH_NLRI attribute [RFC4760].
      Additionally, in the Prefix field all of the trailing bits MUST be
      set to zero when constructing this sequence.

   o  (Step 4): Use the signature validation algorithm (for the given
      algorithm suite) to verify the signature in the current segment.
      That is, invoke the signature validation algorithm on the
      following three inputs: the value of the Signature field in the
      current segment; the digest value computed in Step 3 above; and
      the public key obtained from the valid RPKI data in Step 2 above.
      If the signature validation algorithm determines that the
      signature is invalid, then mark the entire Signature_Block as 'Not
      Valid' and proceed to the next Signature_Block.  If the signature
      validation algorithm determines that the signature is valid, then
      continue processing Signature Segments (within the current
      Signature_Block).

   If all Signature Segments within a Signature_Block pass validation
   (i.e., all segments are processed and the Signature_Block has not yet
   been marked 'Not Valid'), then the Signature_Block is marked as
   'Valid'.

   If at least one Signature_Block is marked as 'Valid', then the
   validation algorithm terminates and the BGPsec update message is
   deemed to be 'Valid'.  (That is, if a BGPsec update message contains
   two Signature_Blocks then the update message is deemed 'Valid' if the
   first Signature_Block is marked 'Valid' OR the second Signature_Block
   is marked 'Valid'.)

6.  Algorithms and Extensibility

6.1.  Algorithm Suite Considerations

   Note that there is currently no support for bilateral negotiation
   (using BGP capabilities) between BGPsec peers to use a particular
   (digest and signature) algorithm suite.  This is because the
   algorithm suite used by the sender of a BGPsec update message MUST be
   understood not only by the peer to whom it is directly sending the
   message, but also by all BGPsec speakers to whom the route
   advertisement is eventually propagated.  Therefore, selection of an
   algorithm suite cannot be a local matter negotiated by BGP peers, but
   instead must be coordinated throughout the Internet.



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   To this end, a mandatory algorithm suites document exists which
   specifies a mandatory-to-use 'current' algorithm suite for use by all
   BGPsec speakers [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs].

   It is anticipated that, in the future, the mandatory algorithm suites
   document will be updated to specify a transition from the 'current'
   algorithm suite to a 'new' algorithm suite.  During the period of
   transition, all BGPsec update messages SHOULD simultaneously use both
   the 'current' algorithm suite and the 'new' algorithm suite.  (Note
   that Section 3 and Section 4 specify how the BGPsec_Path attribute
   can contain signatures, in parallel, for two algorithm suites.)  Once
   the transition is complete, use of the old 'current' algorithm will
   be deprecated, use of the 'new' algorithm will be mandatory, and a
   subsequent 'even newer' algorithm suite may be specified as
   recommended to implement.  Once the transition has successfully been
   completed in this manner, BGPsec speakers SHOULD include only a
   single Signature_Block (corresponding to the 'new' algorithm).

6.2.  Considerations for the SKI Size

   Depending on the method of generating key identifiers [RFC7093], the
   size of the SKI in a RPKI router certificate may vary.  The SKI field
   in the BGPsec_Path attribute has a fixed 20 octets size (see
   Figure 7).  If the SKI is longer than 20 octets, then use the
   leftmost 20 octets of the SKI (excluding the tag and length)
   [RFC7093].  If the SKI value is shorter than 20 octets, then pad the
   SKI (excluding the tag and length) to the right (least significant
   octets) with octets having zero values.

6.3.  Extensibility Considerations

   This section discusses potential changes to BGPsec that would require
   substantial changes to the processing of the BGPsec_Path and thus
   necessitate a new version of BGPsec.  Examples of such changes
   include:

   o  A new type of signature algorithm that produces signatures of
      variable length

   o  A new type of signature algorithm for which the number of
      signatures in the Signature_Block is not equal to the number of
      ASes in the Secure_Path (e.g., aggregate signatures)

   o  Changes to the data that is protected by the BGPsec signatures
      (e.g., attributes other than the AS path)

   In the case that such a change to BGPsec were deemed desirable, it is
   expected that a subsequent version of BGPsec would be created and



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   that this version of BGPsec would specify a new BGP path attribute,
   let's call it BGPsec_Path_Two, which is designed to accommodate the
   desired changes to BGPsec.  In such a case, the mandatory algorithm
   suites document would be updated to specify algorithm suites
   appropriate for the new version of BGPsec.

   At this point a transition would begin which is analogous to the
   algorithm transition discussed in Section 6.1.  During the transition
   period all BGPsec speakers SHOULD simultaneously include both the
   BGPsec_Path attribute and the new BGPsec_Path_Two attribute.  Once
   the transition is complete, the use of BGPsec_Path could then be
   deprecated, at which point BGPsec speakers should include only the
   new BGPsec_Path_Two attribute.  Such a process could facilitate a
   transition to a new BGPsec semantics in a backwards compatible
   fashion.

7.  Operations and Management Considerations

   Some operations and management issues that are closely relevant to
   BGPsec protocol specification and its deployment are highlighted
   here.  The Best Current Practices concerning operations and
   deployment of BGPsec are provided in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops].

7.1.  Capability Negotiation Failure

   Section 2.2 describes the negotiation required to establish a BGPsec-
   capable peering session.  Not only must the BGPsec capability be
   exchanged (and agreed on), but the BGP multiprotocol extension
   [RFC4760] for the same AFI and the four-byte AS capability [RFC6793]
   MUST also be exchanged.  Failure to properly negotiate a BGPsec
   session, due to a missing capability, for example, may still result
   in the exchange of BGP (unsigned) updates.  It is RECOMMENDED that an
   implementation log the failure to properly negotiate a BGPsec
   session.  Also, an implementation MUST have the ability to prevent a
   BGP session from being established if configured for only BGPsec use.

7.2.  Preventing Misuse of pCount=0

   A peer that is an Internet Exchange Point (IXP) (i.e.  Route Server)
   with a transparent AS is expected to set pCount=0 in its Secure_Path
   Segment while forwarding an update to a peer (see Section 4.2).
   Clearly, such an IXP MUST configure its BGPsec router to set pCount=0
   in its Secure_Path Segment.  This also means that a BGPsec speaker
   MUST be configured so that it permits pCount=0 from an IXP peer.  Two
   other cases where pCount is set to zero are in the context AS
   confederation (see Section 4.3) and AS migration
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration].  In these two cases, pCount=0 is set
   and accepted within the same AS (albeit the AS has two different



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   identities).  Note that if a BGPsec speaker does not expect a peer AS
   to set its pCount=0, and if an update received from that peer
   violates this, then the update MUST be considered to be in error (see
   the list of checks in Section 5.2).  See Section 8.4 for a discussion
   of security considerations concerning pCount=0.

7.3.  Early Termination of Signature Verification

   During the validation of a BGPsec update, route processor performance
   speedup can be achieved by incorporating the following observations.
   An update is deemed 'Valid' if at least one of the Signature_Blocks
   is marked as 'Valid' (see Section 5.2).  Therefore, if an update
   contains two Signature_Blocks and the first one verified is found
   'Valid', then the second Signature_Block does not have to be
   verified.  And if the update is chosen for best path, then the BGPsec
   speaker adds its signature (generated with the respective algorithm)
   to each of the two Signature_Blocks and forwards the update.  Also, a
   BGPsec update is deemed 'Not Valid' if at least one signature in each
   of the Signature_Blocks is invalid.  This principle can also be used
   for route processor workload savings, i.e. the verification for a
   Signature_Block terminates early when the first invalid signature is
   encountered.

7.4.  Non-Deterministic Signature Algorithms

   Many signature algorithms are non-deterministic.  That is, many
   signature algorithms will produce different signatures each time they
   are run (even when they are signing the same data with the same key).
   Therefore, if a BGPsec router receives a BGPsec update from a peer
   and later receives a second BGPsec update message from the same peer
   for the same prefix with the same Secure_Path and SKIs, the second
   update MAY differ from the first update in the signature fields (for
   a non-deterministic signature algorithm).  However, the two sets of
   signature fields will not differ if the sender caches and reuses the
   previous signature.  For a deterministic signature algorithm, the
   signature fields MUST be identical between the two updates.  On the
   basis of these observations, an implementation MAY incorporate
   optimizations in update validation processing.

7.5.  Private AS Numbers

   It is possible that a stub customer of an ISP employs a private AS
   number.  Such a stub customer cannot publish a ROA in the global RPKI
   for the private AS number and the prefixes that they use.  Also, the
   global RPKI cannot support private AS numbers (i.e.  BGPsec speakers
   in private ASes cannot be issued router certificates in the global
   RPKI).  For interactions between the stub customer (with private AS
   number) and the ISP, the following two scenarios are possible:



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   1.  The stub customer sends an unsigned BGP update for a prefix to
       the ISP's AS.  An edge BGPsec speaker in the ISP's AS may choose
       to propagate the prefix to its non-BGPsec and BGPsec peers.  If
       so, the ISP's edge BGPsec speaker MUST strip the AS_PATH with the
       private AS number, and then (a) re-originate the prefix without
       any signatures towards its non-BGPsec peer and (b) re-originate
       the prefix including its own signature towards its BGPsec peer.
       In both cases (i.e. (a) and (b)), the prefix MUST have a ROA in
       the global RPKI authorizing the ISP's AS to originate it.

   2.  The ISP and the stub customer may use a local RPKI repository
       (using a mechanism such as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-slurm]).
       Then there can be a ROA for the prefix originated by the stub AS,
       and the eBGP speaker in the stub AS can be a BGPsec speaker
       having a router certificate, albeit the ROA and router
       certificate are valid only locally.  With this arrangement, the
       stub AS sends a signed update for the prefix to the ISP's AS.  An
       edge BGPsec speaker in the ISP's AS validates the update using
       RPKI data based the local RPKI view.  Further, it may choose to
       propagate the prefix to its non-BGPsec and BGPsec peers.  If so,
       the ISP's edge BGPsec speaker MUST strip the Secure_Path and the
       Signature Segment received from the stub AS with the private AS
       number, and then (a) re-originate the prefix without any
       signatures towards its non-BGPsec peer and (b) re-originate the
       prefix including its own signature towards its BGPsec peer.  In
       both cases (i.e. (a) and (b)), the prefix MUST have a ROA in the
       global RPKI authorizing the ISP's AS to originate it.

   It is possible that private AS numbers are used in an AS
   confederation [RFC5065].  BGPsec protocol requires that when a BGPsec
   update propagates through a confederation, each Member-AS that
   forwards it to a peer Member-AS MUST sign the update (see
   Section 4.3).  However, the global RPKI cannot support private AS
   numbers.  In order for the BGPsec speakers in Member-ASes with
   private AS numbers to have digital certificates, there MUST be a
   mechanism in place in the confederation that allows establishment of
   a local, customized view of the RPKI, augmenting the global RPKI
   repository data as needed.  Since this mechanism (for augmenting and
   maintaining a local image of RPKI data) operates locally within an AS
   or AS confederation, it need not be standard based.  However, a
   standard-based mechanism can be used (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-slurm]).
   Recall that in order to prevent exposure of the internals of AS
   confederations, a BGPsec speaker exporting to a non-member removes
   all intra-confederation Secure_Path Segments and Signatures (see
   Section 4.3).






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7.6.  Robustness Considerations for Accessing RPKI Data

   The deployment structure, technologies and best practices concerning
   global RPKI data to reach routers (via local RPKI caches) are
   described in [RFC6810] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-publication] [RFC7115] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops]
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-delta-protocol].  For example, serial-number based
   incremental update mechanisms are used for efficient transfer of just
   the data records that have changed since last update [RFC6810]
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis].  Update notification file is
   used by relying parties (RPs) to discover whether any changes exist
   between the state of the global RPKI repository and the RP's cache
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-delta-protocol].  The notification describes the
   location of the files containing the snapshot and incremental deltas
   which can be used by the RP to synchronize with the repository.
   Making use of these technologies and best practices results in
   enabling robustness, efficiency, and better security for the BGPsec
   routers and RPKI caches in terms of the flow of RPKI data from
   repositories to RPKI caches to routers.  With these mechanisms, it is
   believed that an attacker wouldn't be able to meaningfully correlate
   RPKI data flows with BGPsec RP (or router) actions, thus avoiding
   attacks that may attempt to determine the set of ASes interacting
   with an RP via the interactions between the RP and RPKI servers.

7.7.  Graceful Restart

   During Graceful Restart (GR), restarting and receiving BGPsec
   speakers MUST follow the procedures specified in [RFC4724] for
   restarting and receiving BGP speakers, respectively.  In particular,
   the behavior of retaining the forwarding state for the routes in the
   Loc-RIB [RFC4271] and marking them as stale as well as not
   differentiating between stale and other information during forwarding
   will be the same as specified in [RFC4724].

7.8.  Robustness of Secret Random Number in ECDSA

   The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve
   P-256 is used for signing updates in BGPsec
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs].  For ECDSA, it is stated in Section 6.3
   of [FIPS186-4] that a new secret random number "k" shall be generated
   prior to the generation of each digital signature.  A high entropy
   random bit generator (RBG) must be used for generating "k", and any
   potential bias in the "k" generation algorithm must be mitigated (see
   methods described in [FIPS186-4] [SP800-90A]).







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7.9.  Incremental/Partial Deployment Considerations

   How will migration from BGP to BGPsec look like?  What are the
   benefits for the first adopters?  Initially small groups of
   contiguous ASes would be doing BGPsec.  There would be possibly one
   or more such groups in different geographic regions of the global
   Internet.  Only the routes originated within each group and
   propagated within its borders would get the benefits of cryptographic
   AS path protection.  As BGPsec adoption grows, each group grows in
   size and eventually they join together to form even larger BGPsec
   capable groups of contiguous ASes.  The benefit for early adopters
   starts with AS path security within the contiguous-AS regions spanned
   by their respective groups.  Over time they would see those
   contiguous-AS regions grow much larger.

   During partial deployment, if an AS in the path doesn't support
   BGPsec, then BGP goes back to traditional mode, i.e. BGPsec updates
   are converted to unsigned updates before forwarding to that AS (see
   Section 4.4).  At this point, the assurance that the update
   propagated via the sequence of ASes listed is lost.  In other words,
   for the BGPsec routers residing in the ASes starting from the origin
   AS to the AS before the one not supporting BGPsec, the assurance can
   be still provided, but not beyond that (for the updates in
   consideration).

8.  Security Considerations

   For a discussion of the BGPsec threat model and related security
   considerations, please see RFC 7132 [RFC7132].

8.1.  Security Guarantees

   When used in conjunction with Origin Validation (see RFC 6483
   [RFC6483] and RFC 6811 [RFC6811]), a BGPsec speaker who receives a
   valid BGPsec update message, containing a route advertisement for a
   given prefix, is provided with the following security guarantees:

   o  The origin AS number corresponds to an autonomous system that has
      been authorized, in the RPKI, by the IP address space holder to
      originate route advertisements for the given prefix.

   o  For each AS in the path, a BGPsec speaker authorized by the holder
      of the AS number intentionally chose (in accordance with local
      policy) to propagate the route advertisement to the subsequent AS
      in the path.

   That is, the recipient of a valid BGPsec update message is assured
   that the update propagated via the sequence of ASes listed in the



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   Secure_Path portion of the BGPsec_Path attribute.  (It should be
   noted that BGPsec does not offer any guarantee that the data packets
   would flow along the indicated path; it only guarantees that the BGP
   update conveying the path indeed propagated along the indicated
   path.)  Furthermore, the recipient is assured that this path
   terminates in an autonomous system that has been authorized by the IP
   address space holder as a legitimate destination for traffic to the
   given prefix.

   Note that although BGPsec provides a mechanism for an AS to validate
   that a received update message has certain security properties, the
   use of such a mechanism to influence route selection is completely a
   matter of local policy.  Therefore, a BGPsec speaker can make no
   assumptions about the validity of a route received from an external
   (eBGP) BGPsec peer.  That is, a compliant BGPsec peer may (depending
   on the local policy of the peer) send update messages that fail the
   validity test in Section 5.  Thus, a BGPsec speaker MUST completely
   validate all BGPsec update messages received from external peers.
   (Validation of update messages received from internal peers is a
   matter of local policy, see Section 5.)

8.2.  On the Removal of BGPsec Signatures

   There may be cases where a BGPsec speaker deems 'Valid' (as per the
   validation algorithm in Section 5.2) a BGPsec update message that
   contains both a 'Valid' and a 'Not Valid' Signature_Block.  That is,
   the update message contains two sets of signatures corresponding to
   two algorithm suites, and one set of signatures verifies correctly
   and the other set of signatures fails to verify.  In this case, the
   protocol specifies that a BGPsec speaker choosing to propagate the
   route advertisement in such an update message MUST add its signature
   to each of the Signature_Blocks (see Section 4.2).  Thus the BGPsec
   speaker creates a signature using both algorithm suites and creates a
   new update message that contains both the 'Valid' and the 'Not Valid'
   set of signatures (from its own vantage point).

   To understand the reason for such a design decision, consider the
   case where the BGPsec speaker receives an update message with both a
   set of algorithm A signatures which are 'Valid' and a set of
   algorithm B signatures which are 'Not Valid'.  In such a case it is
   possible (perhaps even likely, depending on the state of the
   algorithm transition) that some of the BGPsec speaker's peers (or
   other entities further 'downstream' in the BGP topology) do not
   support algorithm A.  Therefore, if the BGPsec speaker were to remove
   the 'Not Valid' set of signatures corresponding to algorithm B, such
   entities would treat the message as though it were unsigned.  By
   including the 'Not Valid' set of signatures when propagating a route
   advertisement, the BGPsec speaker ensures that 'downstream' entities



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   have as much information as possible to make an informed opinion
   about the validation status of a BGPsec update.

   Note also that during a period of partial BGPsec deployment, a
   'downstream' entity might reasonably treat unsigned messages
   differently from BGPsec updates that contain a single set of 'Not
   Valid' signatures.  That is, by removing the set of 'Not Valid'
   signatures the BGPsec speaker might actually cause a downstream
   entity to 'upgrade' the status of a route advertisement from 'Not
   Valid' to unsigned.  Finally, note that in the above scenario, the
   BGPsec speaker might have deemed algorithm A signatures 'Valid' only
   because of some issue with RPKI state local to its AS (for example,
   its AS might not yet have obtained a CRL indicating that a key used
   to verify an algorithm A signature belongs to a newly revoked
   certificate).  In such a case, it is highly desirable for a
   downstream entity to treat the update as 'Not Valid' (due to the
   revocation) and not as 'unsigned' (which would happen if the 'Not
   Valid' Signature_Blocks were removed enroute).

   A similar argument applies to the case where a BGPsec speaker (for
   some reason such as lack of viable alternatives) selects as its best
   path (to a given prefix) a route obtained via a 'Not Valid' BGPsec
   update message.  In such a case, the BGPsec speaker should propagate
   a signed BGPsec update message, adding its signature to the 'Not
   Valid' signatures that already exist.  Again, this is to ensure that
   'downstream' entities are able to make an informed decision and not
   erroneously treat the route as unsigned.  It should also be noted
   that due to possible differences in RPKI data observed at different
   vantage points in the network, a BGPsec update deemed 'Not Valid' at
   an upstream BGPsec speaker may be deemed 'Valid' by another BGP
   speaker downstream.

   Indeed, when a BGPsec speaker signs an outgoing update message, it is
   not attesting to a belief that all signatures prior to its are valid.
   Instead it is merely asserting that:

   o  The BGPsec speaker received the given route advertisement with the
      indicated prefix, AFI, SAFI, and Secure_Path; and

   o  The BGPsec speaker chose to propagate an advertisement for this
      route to the peer (implicitly) indicated by the 'Target AS
      Number'.

8.3.  Mitigation of Denial of Service Attacks

   The BGPsec update validation procedure is a potential target for
   denial of service attacks against a BGPsec speaker.  The mitigation




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   of denial of service attacks that are specific to the BGPsec protocol
   is considered here.

   To mitigate the effectiveness of such denial of service attacks,
   BGPsec speakers should implement an update validation algorithm that
   performs expensive checks (e.g., signature verification) after
   performing less expensive checks (e.g., syntax checks).  The
   validation algorithm specified in Section 5.2 was chosen so as to
   perform checks which are likely to be expensive after checks that are
   likely to be inexpensive.  However, the relative cost of performing
   required validation steps may vary between implementations, and thus
   the algorithm specified in Section 5.2 may not provide the best
   denial of service protection for all implementations.

   Additionally, sending update messages with very long AS paths (and
   hence a large number of signatures) is a potential mechanism to
   conduct denial of service attacks.  For this reason, it is important
   that an implementation of the validation algorithm stops attempting
   to verify signatures as soon as an invalid signature is found.  (This
   ensures that long sequences of invalid signatures cannot be used for
   denial of service attacks.)  Furthermore, implementations can
   mitigate such attacks by only performing validation on update
   messages that, if valid, would be selected as the best path.  That
   is, if an update message contains a route that would lose out in best
   path selection for other reasons (e.g., a very long AS path) then it
   is not necessary to determine the BGPsec-validity status of the
   route.

8.4.  Additional Security Considerations

   The mechanism of setting the pCount field to zero is included in this
   specification to enable route servers in the control path to
   participate in BGPsec without increasing the length of the AS path.
   Two other scenarios where pCount=0 is utilized are in the context AS
   confederation (see Section 4.3) and AS migration
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration].  In these two scenarios, pCount=0 is
   set and also accepted within the same AS (albeit the AS has two
   different identities).  However, entities other than route servers,
   confederation ASes or migrating ASes could conceivably use this
   mechanism (set the pCount to zero) to attract traffic (by reducing
   the length of the AS path) illegitimately.  This risk is largely
   mitigated if every BGPsec speaker follows the operational guidance in
   Section 7.2 for configuration for setting pCount=0 and/or accepting
   pCount=0 from a peer.  However, note that a recipient of a BGPsec
   update message within which an upstream entity two or more hops away
   has set pCount to zero is unable to verify for themselves whether
   pCount was set to zero legitimately.




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   There is a possibility of passing a BGPsec update via tunneling
   between colluding ASes.  For example, say, AS-X does not peer with
   AS-Y, but colludes with AS-Y, signs and sends a BGPsec update to AS-Y
   by tunneling.  AS-Y can then further sign and propagate the BGPsec
   update to its peers.  It is beyond the scope of the BGPsec protocol
   to detect this form of malicious behavior.  BGPsec is designed to
   protect messages sent within BGP (i.e. within the control plane) -
   not when the control plane in bypassed.

   A variant of the collusion by tunneling mentioned above can happen in
   the context of AS confederations.  When a BGPsec router (outside of a
   confederation) is forwarding an update to a Member-AS in the
   confederation, it signs the update to the public AS number of the
   confederation and not to the member's AS number (see Section 4.3).
   The Member-AS can tunnel the signed update to another Member-AS as
   received (i.e. without adding a signature).  The update can then be
   propagated using BGPsec to other confederation members or to BGPsec
   neighbors outside of the confederation.  This kind of operation is
   possible, but no grave security or reachability compromise is feared
   for the following reasons: (1) The confederation members belong to
   one organization and strong internal trust is expected; and (2)
   Recall that the signatures that are internal to the confederation
   MUST be removed prior to forwarding the update to an outside BGPsec
   router (see Section 4.3).

   BGPsec does not provide protection against attacks at the transport
   layer.  As with any BGP session, an adversary on the path between a
   BGPsec speaker and its peer is able to perform attacks such as
   modifying valid BGPsec updates to cause them to fail validation,
   injecting (unsigned) BGP update messages without BGPsec_Path
   attributes, injecting BGPsec update messages with BGPsec_Path
   attributes that fail validation, or causing the peer to tear-down the
   BGP session.  The use of BGPsec does nothing to increase the power of
   an on-path adversary -- in particular, even an on-path adversary
   cannot cause a BGPsec speaker to believe a BGPsec-invalid route is
   valid.  However, as with any BGP session, BGPsec sessions SHOULD be
   protected by appropriate transport security mechanisms (see the
   Security Considerations section in [RFC4271]).

   There is a possibility of replay attacks which are defined as
   follows.  In the context of BGPsec, a replay attack occurs when a
   malicious BGPsec speaker in the AS path suppresses a prefix
   withdrawal (implicit or explicit).  Further, a replay attack is said
   to occur also when a malicious BGPsec speaker replays a previously
   received BGPsec announcement for a prefix that has since been
   withdrawn.  The mitigation strategy for replay attacks involves
   router certificate rollover; please see
   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover] for details.



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9.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to register a new BGP capability from Section 2.1
   in the BGP Capabilities Code registry's "IETF Review" range.  The
   description for the new capability is "BGPsec Capability".  The
   reference for the new capability is this document (i.e. the RFC that
   replaces draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol).

   IANA is also requested to register a new path attribute from
   Section 3 in the BGP Path Attributes registry.  The code for this new
   attribute is "BGPsec_Path".  The reference for the new attribute is
   this document (i.e. the RFC that replaces draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
   protocol).

   IANA is requested to define the "BGPsec Capability" registry in the
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) group.  The registry is as
   shown in Figure 10 with values assigned from Section 2.1:


        +------+------------------------------------+------------+
        | Bits | Field                              | Reference  |
        +------+------------------------------------+------------+
        | 0-3  | Version                            | [This RFC] |
        |      | Value = 0x0                        |            |
        +------+------------------------------------+------------+
        | 4    | Direction                          | [This RFC] |
        |      |(Both possible values 0 and 1 are   |            |
        |      | fully specified by this RFC)       |            |
        +------+------------------------------------+------------+
        | 5-7  | Unassigned                         | [This RFC] |
        |      | Value = 000 (in binary)            |            |
        +------+------------------------------------+------------+


              Figure 10: IANA registry for BGPsec Capability.

   The Direction bit (4th bit) has value either 0 or 1, and both values
   are fully specified by this document (i.e. the RFC that replaces
   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol).  Future Version values and future
   values of the Unassigned bits are assigned using the "Standards
   Action" registration procedures defined in RFC 5226 [RFC5226].

   IANA is requested to define the "BGPsec_Path Flags" registry in the
   RPKI group.  The registry is as shown in Figure 11 with one value
   assigned from Section 3.1:






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     +------+-------------------------------------------+------------+
     | Flag | Description                               | Reference  |
     +------+-------------------------------------------+------------+
     | 0    | Confed_Segment                            | [This RFC] |
     |      | Bit value = 1 means Flag set              |            |
     |      |                (indicates Confed_Segment) |            |
     |      | Bit value = 0 is default                  |            |
     +------+-------------------------------------------+------------+
     | 1-7  | Unassigned                                | [This RFC] |
     |      | Value: All 7 bits set to zero             |            |
     +------+-------------------------------------------+------------+


           Figure 11: IANA registry for BGPsec_Path Flags field.

   Future values of the Unassigned bits are assigned using the
   "Standards Action" registration procedures defined in RFC 5226
   [RFC5226].

10.  Contributors

10.1.  Authors

   Rob Austein
   Dragon Research Labs
   sra@hactrn.net

   Steven Bellovin
   Columbia University
   smb@cs.columbia.edu

   Randy Bush
   Internet Initiative Japan
   randy@psg.com

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security
   housley@vigilsec.com

   Matt Lepinski
   New College of Florida
   mlepinski@ncf.edu

   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   kent@bbn.com

   Warren Kumari



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   Google
   warren@kumari.net

   Doug Montgomery
   USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
   dougm@nist.gov

   Kotikalapudi Sriram
   USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
   kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov

   Samuel Weiler
   W3C/MIT
   weiler@csail.mit.edu

10.2.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Michael Baer, Oliver Borchert, David
   Mandelberg, Mehmet Adalier, Sean Turner, John Scudder, Wes George,
   Jeff Haas, Keyur Patel, Alvaro Retana, Nevil Brownlee, Matthias
   Waehlisch, Sandy Murphy, Chris Morrow, Tim Polk, Russ Mundy, Wes
   Hardaker, Sharon Goldberg, Ed Kern, Doug Maughan, Pradosh Mohapatra,
   Mark Reynolds, Heather Schiller, Jason Schiller, Ruediger Volk, and
   David Ward for their review, comments, and suggestions during the
   course of this work.  Thanks are also due to many IESG reviewers
   whose comments greatly helped improve the clarity, accuracy, and
   presentation in the document.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
              Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
              Formats, & Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
              algs-18 (work in progress), April 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
              Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
              BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
              and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-
              profiles-21 (work in progress), January 2017.

   [IANA-AF]  "Address Family Numbers",
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers/
              address-family-numbers.xhtml>.





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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

   [RFC4724]  Sangli, S., Chen, E., Fernando, R., Scudder, J., and Y.
              Rekhter, "Graceful Restart Mechanism for BGP", RFC 4724,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4724, January 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4724>.

   [RFC4760]  Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter,
              "Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 4760,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4760, January 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4760>.

   [RFC5065]  Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
              System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5065, August 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5065>.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.

   [RFC5492]  Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
              with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February
              2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>.

   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

   [RFC6793]  Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-Octet
              Autonomous System (AS) Number Space", RFC 6793,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6793, December 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6793>.



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   [RFC7606]  Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
              Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
              RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [Borchert]
              Borchert, O. and M. Baer, "Modification request: draft-
              ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-14", IETF SIDR WG Mailing List
              message , February 10, 2016,
              <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/
              sidr/8B_e4CNxQCUKeZ_AUzsdnn2f5Mu>.

   [FIPS186-4]
              "FIPS Standards Publication 186-4: Digital Signature
              Standard", July 2013,
              <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
              NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration]
              George, W. and S. Murphy, "BGPSec Considerations for AS
              Migration", draft-ietf-sidr-as-migration-06 (work in
              progress), December 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops]
              Bush, R., "BGPsec Operational Considerations", draft-ietf-
              sidr-bgpsec-ops-16 (work in progress), January 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-delta-protocol]
              Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., and R. Austein,
              "RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)", draft-ietf-sidr-
              delta-protocol-08 (work in progress), March 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-publication]
              Weiler, S., Sonalker, A., and R. Austein, "A Publication
              Protocol for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", draft-ietf-sidr-publication-12 (work in
              progress), March 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]
              Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
              draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-09 (work in
              progress), February 2017.






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   [I-D.ietf-sidr-slurm]
              Mandelberg, D., Ma, D., and T. Bruijnzeels, "Simplified
              Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI",
              draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-04 (work in progress), March 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover]
              Weis, B., Gagliano, R., and K. Patel, "BGPsec Router
              Certificate Rollover", draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-
              rollover-00 (work in progress), March 2017.

   [RFC6472]  Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using
              AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", BCP 172, RFC 6472,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6472, December 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6472>.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

   [RFC6483]  Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route
              Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
              Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations
              (ROAs)", RFC 6483, DOI 10.17487/RFC6483, February 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6483>.

   [RFC6810]  Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.

   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.

   [RFC7093]  Turner, S., Kent, S., and J. Manger, "Additional Methods
              for Generating Key Identifiers Values", RFC 7093,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7093, December 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7093>.

   [RFC7115]  Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the
              Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185,
              RFC 7115, DOI 10.17487/RFC7115, January 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7115>.

   [RFC7132]  Kent, S. and A. Chi, "Threat Model for BGP Path Security",
              RFC 7132, DOI 10.17487/RFC7132, February 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7132>.



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   [SP800-90A]
              "NIST 800-90A: Deterministic Random Bit Generator
              Validation System", October 2015,
              <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/drbg/
              DRBGVS.pdf>.

Authors' Addresses

   Matthew Lepinski (editor)
   NCF
   5800 Bay Shore Road
   Sarasota  FL 34243
   USA

   Email: mlepinski@ncf.edu


   Kotikalapudi Sriram (editor)
   NIST
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg  MD 20899
   USA

   Email: kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov



























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