[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: (draft-ymbk-bgpsec-reqs) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 RFC 7353

Network Working Group                                        S. Bellovin
Internet-Draft                                       Columbia University
Intended status: Standards Track                                 R. Bush
Expires: October 14, 2013                      Internet Initiative Japan
                                                                 D. Ward
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                          April 12, 2013


             Security Requirements for BGP Path Validation
                     draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs-07

Abstract

   This document describes requirements for a BGP security protocol
   design to provide cryptographic assurance that the origin AS had the
   right to announce the prefix and to provide assurance of the AS Path
   of the announcement.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
   appear in all upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed
   case as English words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 14, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.



Bellovin, et al.        Expires October 14, 2013                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft    Requirements for BGP Path Validation        April 2013


   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Recommended Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  General Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  BGP UPDATE Security Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   RPKI-based Origin Validation, [RFC6811], provides a measure of
   resilience to accidental mis-origination of prefixes.  But it
   provides neither cryptographic assurance (announcements are not
   signed), nor assurance of the AS Path of the announcement.

   This document describes requirements to be placed on a BGP security
   protocol, herein termed BGPsec, intended to rectify these gaps.

   The threat model assumed here is documented in [RFC4593] and
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats].

   As noted in the threat model, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats], this
   work is limited to threats to the BGP protocol.  Issues of business
   relationship conformance, of which routing 'leaks' are a subset,
   while quite important to operators (as are many other things), are
   not security issues per se, and are outside the scope of this
   document.  It is hoped that these issues will be better understood in
   the future.

2.  Recommended Reading





Bellovin, et al.        Expires October 14, 2013                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft    Requirements for BGP Path Validation        April 2013


   This document assumes knowledge of the RPKI see [RFC6480], the RPKI
   Repository Structure, see [RFC6481].

   This document assumes ongoing incremental deployment of ROAs, see
   [RFC6482], the RPKI to Router Protocol, see [RFC6810], and RPKI-based
   Prefix Validation, see [RFC6811].

   And, of course, a knowledge of BGP [RFC4271] is required.

3.  General Requirements

   The following are general requirements for a BGPsec protocol:

   3.1   A BGPsec design must allow the receiver of a BGP announcement
      to determine, to a strong level of certainty, that the originating
      AS in the received PATH attribute posessed the authority to
      announce the prefix in the announcement.

   3.2   A BGPsec design must allow the receiver of a BGP announcement
      to determine, to a strong level of certainty, that the received
      PATH attribute accurately represents the sequence of eBGP
      exchanges that propagated the prefix from the origin AS to the
      receiver, particularly if an AS has added or deleted any AS number
      other than its own in the path attribute.  This includes
      modification to the number of AS prepends.

   3.3   A BGPsec design MUST be amenable to incremental deployment.
      This implies that incompatible protocol capabilities MUST be
      negotiated.

   3.4   A BGPsec design MUST provide analysis of the operational
      considerations for deployment and particularly of incremental
      deployment, e.g, contiguous islands, non-contiguous islands,
      universal deployment, etc.

   3.5   As proofs of possession and authentication may require
      cryptographic payloads and/or storage and computation, likely
      increasing processing and memory requirements on routers, a BGPsec
      design MAY require use of new hardware.  I.e.  compatibility with
      current hardware abilities is not a requirement that this document
      imposes on a solution.

   3.6   A BGPsec design need not prevent attacks on data plane traffic.
      It need not provide assurance that the data plane even follows the
      control plane.

   3.7   A BGPsec design MUST resist attacks by an enemy who has access
      to the inter-router link layer, per Section 3.1.1.2 of [RFC4593].



Bellovin, et al.        Expires October 14, 2013                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft    Requirements for BGP Path Validation        April 2013


      In particular, such a design must provide mechanisms for
      authentication of all data, including protecting against message
      insertion, deletion, modification, or replay.  Mechanisms that
      suffice include TCP sessions authenticated with TCP-AO [RFC5925],
      IPsec [RFC4301], or TLS [RFC5246].

   3.8   It is assumed that a BGPsec design will require information
      about holdings of address space and ASNs, and assertions about
      binding of address space to ASNs.  A BGPsec design MAY make use of
      a security infrastructure (e.g., a PKI) to distribute such
      authenticated data.

   3.9   It is entirely OPTIONAL to secure AS SETs and prefix
      aggregation.  The long range solution to this is the deprecation
      of AS-SETs, see [RFC6472].

   3.10  If a BGPsec design uses signed prefixes, given the difficulty
      of splitting a signed message while preserving the signature, it
      need NOT handle multiple prefixes in a single UPDATE PDU.

   3.11  A BGPsec design MUST enable each BGPsec speaker to configure
      use of the security mechanism on a per-peer basis.

   3.12  A BGPsec design MUST provide backward compatibility in the
      message formatting, transmission, and processing of routing
      information carried through a mixed security environment.  Message
      formatting in a fully secured environment MAY be handled in a non-
      backward compatible manner.

   3.13  While the trust level of a route should be determined by the
      BGPsec protocol, local routing preference and policy MUST then be
      applied to best path and other routing decisions.  Such mechanisms
      SHOULD conform with [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].

   3.14  A BGPsec design MUST support 'transparent' route servers,
      meaning that the AS of the route server is not counted in
      downstream BGP AS-path-length tie-breaking decisions.

   3.15  A BGPsec design MUST support AS aliasing.  This technique is
      not well-defined or universally implemented, but is being
      documented in [I-D.ga-idr-as-migration].  A BGPsec design SHOULD
      accommodate AS 'migration' techniques such as common proprietary
      and non-standard methods which allow a router to have two AS
      identities, without lengthening the effective AS Path.







Bellovin, et al.        Expires October 14, 2013                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft    Requirements for BGP Path Validation        April 2013


   3.16  If a BGPsec design makes use of a security infrastructure, that
      infrastructure SHOULD enable each network operator to select the
      entities it will trust when authenticating data in the security
      infrastructure.  See, for example, [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].

   3.17  A BGPsec design MUST NOT require operators to reveal more than
      is currently revealed in the operational inter-domain routing
      environment, other than the inclusion of necessary security
      credentials to allow others to ascertain for themselves the
      necessary degree of assurance regarding the validity of NLRI
      received via BGPsec.  This includes peering, customer, and
      provider relationships, an ISP's internal infrastructure, etc.  It
      is understood that some data are revealed to the savvy seeker by
      BGP, traceroute, etc.  today.

   3.18  A BGPsec design MUST signal (logging, SNMP, ...) security
      exceptions which are significant to the operator.  The specific
      data to be signaled are an implementation matter.

   3.19  Any routing information database MUST be re-authenticated
      periodically or in an event-driven manner, especially in response
      to events such as, for example, PKI updates.

   3.20  Any inter-AS use of cryptographic hashes or signatures, MUST
      provide mechanisms for algorithm agility.

   3.21  A BGPsec design SHOULD NOT presume to know the intent of the
      originator of a NLRI, nor that of any AS on the AS Path, other
      than that they intended to pass it to the next AS in the Path.

   3.22  A BGPsec listener SHOULD NOT trust non-BGPsec markings, such as
      communities, across trust boundaries.

4.  BGP UPDATE Security Requirements

   The following requirements MUST be met in the processing of BGP
   UPDATE messages:

   4.1  A BGPsec design MUST enable each recipient of an UPDATE to
      formally validate that the origin AS in the message is authorized
      to originate a route to the prefix(es) in the message.

   4.2  A BGPsec design MUST enable the recipient of an UPDATE to
      formally determine that the NLRI has traversed the AS path
      indicated in the UPDATE.  Note that this is more stringent than
      showing that the path is merely not impossible.





Bellovin, et al.        Expires October 14, 2013                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft    Requirements for BGP Path Validation        April 2013


   4.3  Replay of BGP UPDATE messages need not be completely prevented,
      but a BGPsec design SHOULD provide a mechanism to control the
      window of exposure to replay attacks.

   4.4  A BGPsec design SHOULD provide some level of assurance that the
      origin of a prefix is still 'alive', i.e.  that a monkey in the
      middle has not withheld a WITHDRAW message or the effects thereof.

   4.5  The AS Path of an UPDATE message SHOULD be able to be
      authenticated as the message is processed.

   4.6  Normal sanity checks of received announcements MUST be done,
      e.g.  verification that the first element of the AS_PATH list
      corresponds to the locally configured AS of the peer from which
      the UPDATE was received.

   4.7  The output of a router applying BGPsec validation to a received
      UPDATE MUST be unequivocal and conform to a fully specified state
      in the design.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document asks nothing of the IANA.

6.  Security Considerations

   The data plane might not follow the control plane.

   Security for subscriber traffic is outside the scope of this
   document, and of BGP security in general.  IETF standards for payload
   data security should be employed.  While adoption of BGP security
   measures may ameliorate some classes of attacks on traffic, these
   measures are not a substitute for use of subscriber-based security.

7.  Acknowledgments

   The author wishes to thank the authors of [I-D.ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec]
   from whom we liberally stole, Russ Housley, Geoff Huston, Steve Kent,
   Sandy Murphy, Eric Osterweil, John Scudder, Kotikalapudi Sriram, Sam
   Weiler, and a number of others.

8.  References









Bellovin, et al.        Expires October 14, 2013                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft    Requirements for BGP Path Validation        April 2013


8.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats]
              Kent, S. and A. Chi, "Threat Model for BGP Path Security",
              draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-05 (work in progress),
              March 2013.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4593]  Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
              Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, October 2006.

   [RFC5925]  Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
              Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ga-idr-as-migration]
              George, W. and S. Amante, "Autonomous System (AS)
              Migration Features and Their Effects on the BGP AS_PATH
              Attribute", draft-ga-idr-as-migration-01 (work in
              progress), February 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages]
              Patel, K., Ward, D., and R. Bush, "Extended Message
              support for BGP", draft-ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages-05
              (work in progress), December 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec]
              Christian, B. and T. Tauber, "BGP Security Requirements",
              draft-ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec-10 (work in progress), November
              2008.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]
              Reynolds, M., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Local Trust
              Anchor Management for the Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-08 (work in
              progress), April 2013.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
              Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.



Bellovin, et al.        Expires October 14, 2013                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft    Requirements for BGP Path Validation        April 2013


   [RFC6472]  Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using
              AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", BCP 172, RFC 6472,
              December 2011.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              February 2012.

   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.

   [RFC6810]  Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
              January 2013.

   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January
              2013.

Authors' Addresses

   Steven M. Bellovin
   Columbia University
   1214 Amsterdam Avenue, MC 0401
   New York, New York  10027
   US

   Phone: +1 212 939 7149
   Email: bellovin@acm.org


   Randy Bush
   Internet Initiative Japan
   5147 Crystal Springs
   Bainbridge Island, Washington  98110
   US

   Email: randy@psg.com










Bellovin, et al.        Expires October 14, 2013                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft    Requirements for BGP Path Validation        April 2013


   David Ward
   Cisco Systems
   170 W. Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email: dward@cisco.com











































Bellovin, et al.        Expires October 14, 2013                [Page 9]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129c, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/