[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Nits] [IPR]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 draft-ietf-sidr-cps

Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                             Kent, S.
Internet Draft                                                 Kong, D.
Expires: April 13, 2007                                         Seo, K.
                                                        BBN Technologies
                                                        October 13, 2006




                               Template for an
         Internet Registry's Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
               for the Internet IP Address and AS Number (PKI)
                       draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-00.txt


Status of this Memo

    By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that
    any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is
    aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she
    becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of
    BCP 79.

    Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
    Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
    other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
    Drafts.

    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
    months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
    at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
    reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

    The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at

         http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

    The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at

         http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

    This Internet-Draft will expire on April 13, 2006.

Abstract

    This document contains a template to be used for creating a
    Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry



Kent,Kong & Seo         Expires April 13, 2007                 [Page 1]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


    (e.g., NIR or RIR) that is part of the Internet IP Address and AS
    Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).

Conventions used in this document

    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

Table of Contents


    Preface...........................................................8
    1. Introduction...................................................9
       1.1. Overview.................................................10
       1.2. Document name and identification.........................11
       1.3. PKI participants.........................................11
          1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11
          1.3.2. Registration authorities............................11
          1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................11
          1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12
          1.3.5. Other participants..................................12
       1.4. Certificate usage........................................12
          1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12
          1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................12
       1.5. Policy administration....................................12
          1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............12
          1.5.2. Contact person......................................12
          1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13
          1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13
       1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................13
    2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................14
       2.1. Repositories.............................................14
       2.2. Publication of certification information.................14
       2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................14
       2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................14
    3. Identification And Authentication.............................15
       3.1. Naming...................................................15
          3.1.1. Types of names......................................15
          3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................15
          3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............15
          3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........15
          3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................15
          3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.16
       3.2. Initial identity validation..............................16
          3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........16
          3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............16
          3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............16


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                 [Page 2]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


          3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17
          3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................17
          3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................17
       3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....17
          3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key17
          3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
          revocation.................................................17
       3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.18
    4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19
       4.1. Certificate Application..................................19
          4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19
          4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19
       4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19
          4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
          ...........................................................19
          4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...20
          4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20
       4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20
          4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20
          4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
          certificate................................................20
       4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................21
          4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........21
          4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............21
       4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21
          4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21
          4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21
       4.6. Certificate renewal......................................22
          4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................22
          4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................22
          4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22
          4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
          ...........................................................22
          4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
          certificate................................................23
          4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....23
          4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................23
       4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................23
          4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................23
          4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...23
          4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........24
          4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
          ...........................................................24
          4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
          certificate................................................24
          4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24



Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                 [Page 3]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


          4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................24
       4.8. Certificate modification.................................24
          4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24
          4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............25
          4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........25
          4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
          subscriber.................................................25
          4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
          ...........................................................25
          4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...25
          4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................25
       4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25
          4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25
          4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................26
          4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26
          4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26
          4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
          request....................................................26
          4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.26
          4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26
          4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................27
          4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
          [OMITTED]..................................................27
          4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].27
          4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
          [OMITTED]..................................................27
          4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...27
          4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............27
          4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............27
          4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........27
          4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............27
       4.10. Certificate status services.............................27
          4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............27
          4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................27
          4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................27
       4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................27
       4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................27
          4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
          ...........................................................27
          4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
          practices [OMITTED]........................................27
    5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................28
       5.1. Physical controls........................................28
          5.1.1. Site location and construction......................28
          5.1.2. Physical access.....................................28
          5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................28


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                 [Page 4]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


          5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................28
          5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................28
          5.1.6. Media storage.......................................28
          5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................28
          5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................28
       5.2. Procedural controls......................................28
          5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................28
          5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................28
          5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....28
          5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................28
       5.3. Personnel controls.......................................28
          5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
          ...........................................................29
          5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................29
          5.3.3. Training requirements...............................29
          5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............29
          5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................29
          5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................29
          5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................29
          5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................29
       5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................29
          5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................29
          5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................29
          5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................29
          5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................30
          5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................30
          5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
          [OMITTED]..................................................30
          5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....30
          5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................30
       5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................30
          5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................30
          5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............30
          5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................30
          5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................30
          5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].30
          5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
          [OMITTED]..................................................30
          5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
          [OMITTED]..................................................30
       5.6. Key changeover...........................................30
       5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............31
          5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]31
          5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
          corrupted [OMITTED]........................................31
          5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..31
          5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
          [OMITTED]..................................................31


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                 [Page 5]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


       5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................31
    6. Technical Security Controls...................................32
       6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................32
          6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................32
          6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................32
          6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........32
          6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........32
          6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................33
          6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking33
          6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)33
       6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
       Controls......................................................33
          6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........33
          6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......33
          6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................34
          6.2.4. Private key backup..................................34
          6.2.5. Private key archival................................34
          6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
          module.....................................................34
          6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........34
          6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................34
          6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................34
          6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................34
          6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................35
       6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................35
          6.3.1. Public key archival.................................35
          6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
          periods....................................................35
       6.4. Activation data..........................................35
          6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........35
          6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................35
          6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................35
       6.5. Computer security controls...............................35
          6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....35
          6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................36
       6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................36
          6.6.1. System development controls.........................36
          6.6.2. Security management controls........................36
          6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................36
       6.7. Network security controls................................36
       6.8. Time-stamping............................................36
    7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................37
       7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................38
          7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................38
          7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................38
          7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............38
          7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................38
          7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................38


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                 [Page 6]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


          7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......38
          7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....38
          7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....38
          7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
          Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................38
       7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................38
          7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................38
          7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............38
       7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................38
          7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................38
          7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................38
    8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................39
       8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................39
       8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................39
       8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............39
       8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................39
       8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................39
       8.6. Communication of results.................................39
    9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................40
       9.1. Fees.....................................................40
          9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................40
          9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............40
          9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................40
       9.2. Financial responsibility.................................40
          9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................40
          9.2.2. Other assets........................................40
          9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....40
       9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................40
          9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................40
          9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
          information................................................40
          9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..40
       9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................40
          9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................40
          9.4.2. Information treated as private......................40
          9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................40
          9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......40
          9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......40
          9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
          process....................................................41
          9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........41
       9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............41
       9.6. Representations and warranties...........................41
          9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................41
          9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........41
          9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........41
          9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
          [OMITTED]..................................................41


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                 [Page 7]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


       9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................41
       9.8. Limitations of liability.................................41
       9.9. Indemnities..............................................41
       9.10. Term and termination....................................41
          9.10.1. Term...............................................41
          9.10.2. Termination........................................41
          9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................41
       9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.41
       9.12. Amendments..............................................41
          9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................41
          9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................41
          9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
          [OMITTED]..................................................41
       9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................41
       9.14. Governing law...........................................41
       9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................41
       9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................41
          9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................42
          9.16.2. Assignment.........................................42
          9.16.3. Severability.......................................42
          9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).42
          9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................42
       9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................42
    10. Security Considerations......................................43
    11. IANA Considerations..........................................43
    12. Acknowledgments..............................................43
    13. References...................................................43
       13.1. Normative References....................................43
       13.2. Informative References..................................44
    Author's Addresses...............................................44
    Intellectual Property Statement..................................45
    Disclaimer of Validity...........................................45
    Copyright Statement..............................................45



Preface

    This document contains a template to be used for creating a
    Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
    (e.g., an NIR or RIR) that is part of the Internet IP Address and AS
    Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  The user of this document
    should

      1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., "<Name of
         Registry> Certification Practice Statement for the Internet IP
         Address and AS Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)" with
         date, author, etc.


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                 [Page 8]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


      2. delete this Preface

      3. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
         brackets>

      4. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
         Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
         Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
         reference section with just the references in 13.2

      5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and
         additions above.

    Note: This template is based on the one specified in RFC 3647. A
    number of sections contained in the template specified in RFC 3647
    were omitted from this template because they did not apply to this
    PKI. However, in order to maintain the section numbering scheme
    intact, the relevant section headings are included and marked
    [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are also
    marked [OMITTED].  There is a note to this effect in the
    Introduction below.  This information should be left in the CPS as
    an explanation to the user.

1. Introduction

    This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
    of Registry>.  It describes the practices employed by the <Name of
    Registry> Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address
    and AS Number PKI.   These practices are defined in accordance with
    the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [RFCxxxx]) of this
    PKI.

    The Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI is aimed at supporting
    verifiable attestations about resource controls, e.g., for improved
    routing security. The goal is that each entity that allocates IP
    addresses or AS numbers to an entity will, in parallel, issue a
    certificate reflecting this allocation. These certificates will
    enable verification that the holder of the associated private key
    has been allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and
    is the current, unique holder of these resources. The certificates
    and CRLs, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data
    structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security
    mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs.

    The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
    this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an
    address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
    contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                 [Page 9]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


    certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity
    to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
    an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of
    the CA responsible for the resources in question. Verification of
    the assertion is based on the ability of the entity to digitally
    sign data producing a signature that is verifiable using the public
    key contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of
    that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI is designed
    exclusively for use in support of validation of claims related to
    address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on support of
    routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and CRLs
    managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of this
    PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.

    Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
    number of sections contained in the template specified in RFC 3647
    were omitted from this CPS because they did not apply to this PKI.
    However, in order to maintain the section numbering scheme intact,
    the relevant section headings are included and marked [OMITTED]. In
    the Table of Contents the relevant sections are also marked
    [OMITTED].

1.1. Overview

    This CPS describes:

      . Participants

      . Distribution of the certificates and CRLs

      . How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked

      . Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)

      . Key management

      . Audit procedures

      . Business and legal issues

    The PKI encompasses several types of certificates:

    CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks and
    AS numbers, and for each address space holder

    End entity certificates for operations personnel, in support of
    access control for the repository system



Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 10]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


    End entity ("shadow") certificates for organizations to use in
    verifying signatures of Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs)

1.2. Document name and identification

    The name of this document is "<Name of Registry>'s Certification
    Practice Statement for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI".

1.3. PKI participants

    Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
    organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
    term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
    qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
    the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
    service from an ISP.  Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber" can
    refer both to ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, LIRs and
    other ISPs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which
    are subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term. Also
    note that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers
    as organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When
    necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used to refer to an
    organization that receives network services from an ISP.

1.3.1. Certification authorities

    <Name of Registry>  will operate a CA, the primary function of which
    is the issuance of certificates to organizations to which address
    space or AS numbers are allocated by the registry.

1.3.2. Registration authorities

    For the majority of certificates issued by this registry, this
    function is provided by the registry per se. The registry already
    performs this function -- establishing a relationship with each
    subscriber and assuming responsibility for allocating and tracking
    the current allocation of address space and AS numbers. Since the
    registry operates the CA, there is no distinct RA.

1.3.3. Subscribers

    Two types of organizations receive allocations of IP addresses and
    AS numbers from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense:
    network subscribers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
    <Additionally, this CA issues certificates to <Local/National>
    Registries (choose the right term for this RIR, if either applies)
    who, in turn, issue certificates to network subscribers or ISPs.>



Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 11]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


1.3.4. Relying parties

    Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS
    number current holdings are relying parties.  Thus, for example,
    entities that make use of address and AS number allocation
    certificates in support of improved routing security are relying
    parties. Registries are relying parties because they transfer
    resources between one another and thus will need to verify (cross)
    certificates issued in conjunction with such transfers.  This
    includes ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4]
    traffic with ISPs, and subscribers who have received an allocation
    of address space from one ISP or from a registry, but want to
    authorize an (or another) ISP to originate routes to this space.

1.3.5. Other participants

    <Name of Registry> will operate a repository that holds
    certificates, CRLs, and ROAs.

1.4. Certificate usage

1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses

    The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
    in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address
    space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to
    routing security, the intent is to allow the holder of a set of
    address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure fashion, the AS
    number of each entity that is authorized to originate a route to
    these addresses, including the context of ISP proxy aggregation.

    Some of the certificates issued under this hierarchy support
    operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access control for the
    repository system.

1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses

    Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.

1.5. Policy administration

1.5.1. Organization administering the document

    This CPS is administered by <Name of Registry>

1.5.2. Contact person

    <Insert Registry contact info here>


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 12]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

    Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
    is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
    numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
    public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the
    same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence
    they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.

1.5.4. CPS approval procedures

    Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
    is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
    numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
    public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the
    same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence
    they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.

1.6. Definitions and acronyms

    CP - Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates
    the      applicability of a certificate to a particular community
    and/or class of applications with common security requirements.

    CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
    specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs in
    issuing certificates.

    ISP - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
    and selling Internet services to other organizations.

    LIR/NIR - Local/National Internet Registry. An LIR or NIR is an
    organization that manages the assignment of IP address and AS
    numbers for a portion of the geographic region covered by a
Regional                                           rd
Registry. These form an optional 3  tier in the tree scheme used to
    manage IP address and AS number allocation.

    RIR - Regional Internet Registry.  An RIR is an organization that
    manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a specified
    geopolitical area.  At present, there are five RIRs: ARIN (North
    America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -Pacific), LACNIC (Latin
    America and Caribbean), and AFRINIC (Africa).








Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 13]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

    As per the CP, certificates and CRLs, will be made available for
    downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate
    this data for use in support of routing security.  <Name of
    Registry> will upload certificates and CRLs issued by it to a local
    repository system that it operates as part of a world-wide
    distributed system of repositories.

    <Describe here the basic set up of your local repository system.>

2.2. Publication of certification information

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

    <Describe here your procedures for publication (via the repository)
    of the certificates and CRLs that you issue. If you choose to
    outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to provide this
    information for relying parties.>

    As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times
    and frequency:

    A certificate will be published within 24 hours after a CA has
    received acknowledgement from the subject of the certificate that
    the certificate is accurate.

    The <Name of Registry> CA will publish its CRL prior to the
    nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
    the CA. Within 24 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish
    a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate.

2.4. Access controls on repositories

    Access controls for repositories are TBD.













Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 14]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006




3. Identification And Authentication

3.1. Naming

3.1.1. Types of names

    The Subject of each certificate issued by this Registry is
    identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). The DN consists of a
    single attribute of type CommonName. <If the RIR has subordinate
    (NIR/LIR) registries, insert the appropriate text: "For an NIR/LIR,
    the value of this attribute is the name of the NIR/LIR.> For <insert
    "non-registry" if appropriate> subscribers, the value of this
    attribute is selected by the registry so as to be unique among all
    certificates issued by this registry, but does not represent a
    "meaningful" or "legal" name for the Subject.

3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful

    The name of the holder of an address block or AS number need not to
    be "meaningful" in the conventional, human-readable sense, since
    certificates issued under this hierarchy are used for authorization
    in support of routing security, not for identification

3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

    Although Subject names in certificates issued by this registry need
    not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a
    function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature
    is provided.

3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms

    None

3.1.5. Uniqueness of names

    <Name of Registry> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
    certificates that it issues. It is desirable that these Subject
    names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate path
    discovery, but such uniqueness is not mandated nor enforced through
    technical means.







Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 15]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

    Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
    is no provision to recognize nor authenticate trademarks, service
    marks, etc.

3.2. Initial identity validation

3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key

    <Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
    demonstrate  proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
    corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
    the certificate. Standard methods are described in the Certificate
    Management Protocol (CMP) (RFC 2510) and the Certificate Management
    Messages over CMS protocol (CMC), RFC 2797.>

3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity

    Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
    organizational identity of resource holders, with the exception of
    registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders in
    a fashion that preserves the accuracy of bindings in this registry's
    records.

     <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each
    certificate that is issued accurately reflects your records with
    regard to the organization to which you have allocated (or sub-
    allocated) the address space (or AS numbers) identified in the
    certificate. The specific procedures employed for this purpose
    should be commensurate with those you already employ as a registry
    in the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation.>

3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity

    Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
    identity of a resource holder. However, this registry maintains
    contact information for each resource holder in support of
    certificate renewal, re-key, or revocation.

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to identify at least one
    individual as a representative of each organization that is an
    address space (or AS number) holder. This is done in support of
    issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate issued to the
    organization. The procedures should be commensurate with those you
    already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives for
    address space (or AS number) holders. Note that this individual
    authentication is solely for use by you in dealing with the


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 16]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


    organizations to which you allocate (or sub-allocate) address space
    (or AS numbers), and thus must not be relied upon outside of this
    CA-subscriber relationship.>

3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

    No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
    under this certificate policy.

3.2.5. Validation of authority

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to verify that an
    individual claiming to represent a resource holder to which a
    certificate is issued, is authorized to represent that resource
    holder in this context.  The procedures should be commensurate with
    those you already employ as a registry in authenticating individuals
    as representatives of resource holders.>

3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation

    This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
    other PKI.

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests

3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that an
    organization requesting a re-key is the legitimate holder of the
    certificate (and associated address space and AS numbers) to be re-
    keyed.  This should also include the method employed for verifying
    PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key.   With
    respect to authentication of the holder of the address space and AS
    numbers, the procedures should be commensurate with those you
    already employ in the maintenance of address (and AS number)
    allocation.  Note that your organization can choose to require
    periodic re-keying consistent with contractual agreements with the
    recipient.>

3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that an
    organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate
    holder of the address space and AS numbers in the certificate being
    re-keyed. This should also include the method employed for verifying
    PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. Note
    that there may be different procedures for the case where the
    legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 17]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


    opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.  With
    respect to authentication of the resource holder, the procedures
    should be commensurate with those you already employ in the
    maintenance of resource allocation records.>

3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that the
    resource holder requesting revocation is the subject of the
    certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be revoked.
    Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the
    legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as
    opposed to the case when the subject no longer has access to that
    key. These procedures should be commensurate with those you already
    employ in the maintenance of resource holder records.>

    Note:  If additional IP addresses or AS numbers are being added to
    an organization's existing allocation, the old certificate need not
    be revoked. Instead, a new certificate may be issued with both the
    old and the new resources and the old key.  If IP addresses or AS
    numbers are being removed or if there has been a key compromise,
    then there will be a revocation and a re-key. A subscriber may
    request that its resource holdings be spread over a set of
    certificates, rather than consolidating all resources in one
    certificate. This may be appropriate if the subscriber wants to
    manage his resource allocations as distinct allocations within his
    organization.























Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 18]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application

    The following entities may submit a certificate application to this
    CA:

    <Insert if appropriate: "Any LIR/NIR operating in the geopolitical
    region served by this registry">

    Any entity that holds AS numbers or address space assigned by this
    registry

    Individuals or roles associated with this registry and that engage
    in the maintenance of the repository system for this PKI

4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities

    <Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
    initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that
    most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of registry
    and ISP normal business practices, as an adjunct to address space
    and AS number allocation, and thus a separate application to request
    a certificate may not be necessary.  If so, reference should be made
    to where these practices are documented.>

4.2. Certificate application processing

    <Describe the certificate request/response standards that you will
    employ.  You should make use of existing standards for certificate
    application processing.  Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
    Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
    Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
    and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. >

4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions

    <Describe your practices for identification and authentication of
    certificate applicants.  Often, existing practices employed by you
    to identify and authenticate organizations form the basis for
    issuance of certificates to these subscribers.  Reference can be
    made to documentation of such existing practices.>






Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 19]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

    <Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications
    and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant
    to this process.  Note that according to the CP, certificate
    applications will be approved based on the normal business practices
    of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of address
    space and AS number holders. Also, each CA will verify that the
    requester holds the corresponding private key for the public key
    that will be bound to the certificate the CA issues to the
    requester.>

4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications

    <You may declare here your expected time frame for processing
    certificate applications.>

4.3. Certificate issuance

4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance

    <Describe in this section the following (referring to subsequent
    sections as appropriate):

    Procedures for generation of a draft certificate and form of the
    draft. Typically a draft certificate is a complete certificate
    except for the issuer's signature.

    Procedure for making the draft available to the applicant for
    review. For example, you may directly transmit the draft certificate
    to the subscriber (applying PKCS #7 or other defined syntax).
    Alternatively, you might establish a repository where draft
    certificates can be examined.

    Procedure for subscriber approval/rejection of the draft (Section
    4.4.1)

    If the draft is approved, procedure for finalization of the draft
    and subsequent publication (Section 4.4.2)

    If the draft is rejected, procedure for modification of the rejected
    certificate (Section 4.8 might be useful) or submission of a new
    certificate request.>

4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

    <Describe your procedure for notification of a subscriber when a
    draft certificate is ready for review.>


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 20]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


    Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
    [OMITTED>

4.4. Certificate acceptance

4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

    When a draft certificate is generated and the subscriber is
    notified, it is required that the subscriber review the proposed
    certificate and either approve or reject it within <X> days.
    <Describe what constitutes acceptance or rejection from the
    certificate applicant.>

    If a certificate remains unprocessed by the requester after <X>
    days, <Describe your policy for handling certificates that have not
    been acknowledged (either positively or negatively) after X days.
    For example, at your option, you may either cancel the certificate
    or finalize it and place it in the repository.>

4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA

    Certificates will be published in the Repository system once
    approved. <Describe your procedures for publication of the approved
    certificate.>

4.5. Key pair and certificate usage

    A summary of the use model for the IP Address and AS Number PKI is
    provided below.

4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage

    The certificates issued by this registry to resource holders are CA
    certificates. The private key associated with each of these
    certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
    CRLs. A (non-registry) subscriber will issue certificates to any
    organizations to which it allocates IP address space and one or more
    "shadow" certificates for use in verifying signatures on ROAs signed
    by the subscriber. <If appropriate, add "Subscribers that are
    registries (LIRs/NIRs) issue certificates to organizations to which
    they have allocated address space or AS numbers.> Subscribers also
    will issue certificates to operators in support of repository access
    control.

4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage

    The primary relying parties in this PKI are ISPs, who will use
    shadow certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 21]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


    route filters.  Repositories will use operator certificates to
    verify the authorization of entities to engage in repository
    maintenance activities, and thus repositories represent a secondary
    type of relying party.

4.6. Certificate renewal

4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal

    As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
    its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
    Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing its
    resource holding agreement, or may be explicit. If <Name of
    Registry> initiates the renewal process based on the certificate
    expiration date, then <Name of Registry> will notify the resource
    holder <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 weeks in
    advance of the expiration date", or the general policy, e.g., "in
    conjunction with notification of service expiration".>  The validity
    interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the
    previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1
    week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.

    Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
    previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
    compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
    Section 4.7 will apply.

4.6.2. Who may request renewal

    The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the
    renewal process. <For the case of the certificate holder, describe
    what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of
    the entity requesting the renewal.>

4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

    <Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
    This must include verification that the certificate in question has
    not been revoked.>

4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

    <Describe your procedure for notification of new certificate
    issuance to the subscriber. This should be consistent with 4.3.2.>






Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 22]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

    <Describe your definition of what constitutes acceptance of a
    renewed certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.1.>

4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

    <Describe your policy and procedures for publication of a renewed
    certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.2.>

4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]


4.7. Certificate re-key

4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key

    As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
    requested, based on:

   (1) knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
      private key, or

   (2) the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
      key pair

    If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
    replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
    new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.

    If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
    certificate will be revoked. If the re-key is based on the
    expiration of the key pair, then the certificate does not require
    revocation, since the certificate should expire on or before the
    date when the associated key pair expires.

4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key

    The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition,
    <Name of Registry> may initiate a re-key based on receipt and
    verification of a compromise report. <Describe what steps will be
    taken to verify the identity and authorization of a subscriber to
    request a re-key when the private key has been reported as
    compromised. Also describe how a compromise report received from
    other than a subscriber is verified.>



Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 23]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

    <Describe your process for handling re-keying requests.  As per the
    CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section
    4.3.  So reference can be made to that section.>

4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

    <Describe your policy regarding notifying the subscriber re:
    availability of the new certificate.  This should be consistent with
    the notification process for any new certificate issuance (see
    section 4.3.2).>

4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

    <Describe your policy regarding acceptance of the new certificate by
    the subscriber.  This should be consistent with the acceptance
    process for any new certificate (see section 4.4.1).>

4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

    <Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.
    This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
    certificate (see section 4.4.2).>

4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]


4.8. Certificate modification

4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification

    As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
    changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate.  A
    subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
    information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a
    result of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber. The
    request may be implicit, a side effect of the allocation of
    additional resources, or may be explicit.  A subscriber also may
    request that its existing set of resources be redistributed among
    multiple certificates. This example of certificate modification is
    effected through issuance of new certificates, and revocation of the
    previous certificates.

    If a subscriber is to be allocated address space or AS numbers in
    addition to a current allocation, and if the subscriber does not
    request that a new certificate be issued containing only these


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 24]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


    resources, then this is accomplished through a certificate
    modification. When previously allocated address space or AS numbers
    are to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate MUST
    be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new allocation)
    issued.

4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification

    The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the
    certificate modification process. <For the case of the certificate
    holder, state here what steps will be taken to verify the identity
    and authorization of the entity requesting the modification.>

4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests

    <Describe your procedures for verification of the modification
    request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate.  These
    should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2
    and 4.3.1.>

4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber

    <Describe your procedure for notification of issuance of a modified
    certificate.  This should be consistent with the notification
    process for any new certificate (see section 4.3.2).>

4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

    <Describe your criteria for acceptance of a modified certificate.
    This should be consistent with the acceptance process for any new
    certificate (see section 4.4.1).>

4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

    <Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate.
    This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
    certificate (see section 4.4.2).>

4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]


4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation

    As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
    Either <Name of Registry> or the subject may choose to end the


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 25]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


    relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
    revoke the certificate. If one or more of the resources bound to the
    public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
    subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation.  A certificate
    also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
    corresponding to the public key in the certificate.  Finally, a
    certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by
    that certificate.

4.9.2. Who can request revocation

    The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may request a
    revocation. <For the case of the certificate holder, describe what
    steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of the
    entity requesting the revocation.>

4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request

    <Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation
    request.  This should include:

    Procedure to be used by the certificate holder to request a
    revocation

    Procedure for notification of the certificate holder when the CRL is
    published by <Name of Registry>.

4.9.4. Revocation request grace period

    A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
    need for revocation has been identified.

4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

    <Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
    process a revocation request.>

4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

    As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for checking the most
    recent, scheduled CRL whenever it validates a certificate.

4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency

    <Name of Registry> will publish CRLs approximately every 24 hours.
    Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will
    be published at or before that time.  <Name of Registry> will modify



Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 26]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


    the nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when
    the next scheduled CRL will be issued.

4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs

    A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay
    after generation.

4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]

4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]

4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]

4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]

4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]

4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]

4.10. Certificate status services

    <Name of Registry> does <not> support OCSP.



4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]

4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]

4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]

4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]

4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]

4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]

4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
[OMITTED]






Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 27]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls



5.1. Physical controls

    <As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
    certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used
    in the management of address space and AS number allocation.>

5.1.1. Site location and construction

5.1.2. Physical access

5.1.3. Power and air conditioning

5.1.4. Water exposures

5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection

5.1.6. Media storage

5.1.7. Waste disposal

5.1.8. Off-site backup

5.2. Procedural controls

    <As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
    employ for certificate management.  These should be commensurate to
    those used in the management of address space and AS number
    allocation.>

5.2.1. Trusted roles

5.2.2. Number of persons required per task

5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role

5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties

5.3. Personnel controls

    <As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
    employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
    should be commensurate to those used in the management of address
    space and AS number allocation.>



Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 28]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

5.3.2. Background check procedures

5.3.3. Training requirements

5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements

5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence

5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions

5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements

5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel

5.4. Audit logging procedures

5.4.1. Types of events recorded

    Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
    certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records will
    include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
    content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:

    Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

    Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests,
    certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications)

    Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

    Posting of any material to a repository

    Any attempts to change or delete audit data

    <List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>

5.4.2. Frequency of processing log

    <Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>

5.4.3. Retention period for audit log

    <Describe your polices for retention of audit logs.>





Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 29]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


5.4.4. Protection of audit log

    <Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>

5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures

    <Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>

5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]

5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]

5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments

    <Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
    already applied) to the PKI subsystems.  This should include whether
    such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
    perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>

5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]

5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]

5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]

5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]

5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]

5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]

5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]

5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]

5.6. Key changeover

    The <Name of Registry> CA certificate will contain a validity period
    that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA
    certificate.  To support this, <Name of Registry> will create a new
    signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate
    containing the public key of the pair, <specify here the minimum
    amount of lead time, e.g.,  "a minimum of 6 months"> in advance of
    the expiration date of the current signature key pair.






Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 30]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]

5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
[OMITTED]

5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]

5.8. CA or RA termination

    <Describe the fallback policy for management of your CA's IP address
    space and AS number allocations in case of its own termination.>



































Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 31]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


6. Technical Security Controls

    This section describes the security controls used by <Name of
    Registry>.

6.1. Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1. Key pair generation

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key
    pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for subscribers.  In most
    instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subscriber,
    i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of address space or
    AS numbers.  However, your procedures may include one for generating
    key pairs on behalf of your subscribers if they so request. (This
    might be done for subscribers who do not have the ability to perform
    key generation in a secure fashion or who want a registry to provide
    backup for the subscriber private key.) Since the keys used in this
    PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by
    CAs does not undermine the security of the PKI. >

6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber

    <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation
    services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys
    are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this
    is not applicable.>

6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

    <Describe the means by which the public keys are delivered to you,
    e.g., electronic submission using a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing
    Request (CSR).  This description should explain how this public key
    delivery fits in with the process whereby the subscriber requests IP
    address space (and/or AS numbers), authenticates itself, pays for
    the resources, etc. The security of the procedures used by a
    subscriber to deliver its public key to you need only be
    commensurate with the security of the procedures already employed
    for management of the IP address space and AS numbers.>

6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

    CA public keys for all entities other than RIRs are contained in
    certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates plus
    certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address space
    or AS numbers will be published via a repository system. Relying
    parties will download these certificates from this system. Public
    key values and associated data for the trust anchors (RIRs) will be


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 32]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


    distributed out of band, embedded in path validation software that
    will be made available to the Internet community.

    [Do you (RIRs) want to make provisions for additional mechanisms for
    distribution of your public keys for use as a cross-check on the
    downloaded path validation software?]

6.1.5. Key sizes

    For the <Name of Registry> CA's certificate and shadow CA
    certificate, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For subscriber
    certificates, the RSA keys will be <insert key size -- e.g., 2048 or
    1024 bits. If NIR/LIR key size is larger than ISP/subscriber key
    size, describe each independently.>

6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

    The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent
    (e) F (65,537).              4

    <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
    insert here text specifying that the subscriber is responsible for
    performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that
    <Name of Registry> is not responsible for performing such checks for
    subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking
    the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>

6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

    The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280.
    For <Name of Registry>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and
    cRLSign bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including
    digitalSignature) will be set FALSE, and the extension will be
    marked critical.

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
      Controls

6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls

    The <Name of Registry> CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated
    under FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS].

6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

    There will be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m>
    multi-person control.



Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 33]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


6.2.3. Private key escrow

    No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.

6.2.4. Private key backup

    <Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
    The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
    done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
    the original private key.  (2) At least one copy should be kept at
    an off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>

6.2.5. Private key archival

    See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4

6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

    The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s CA and shadow CA will be
    generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1.  The
    private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form
    for backup and/or transfer to a new module.

6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module

    The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s CA will be stored in the
    cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in
    accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the
    module. (See [FIPS])

6.2.8. Method of activating private key

    <Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
    key.>

6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key

    The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
    unattended.  After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
    procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.>  The module
    will be stored securely when not in use.

6.2.10. Method of destroying private key

    <Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key,
    e.g., when it is superseded.  This will depend on the particular
    module.>



Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 34]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating

    The cryptographic module will be certified FIPS 140-2, at level 3
    [FIPS].

6.3. Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1. Public key archival

    Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
    to archive public keys.

6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

    The <Name of Registry> CA's key pair will have a validity interval
    of <insert number of years - Registry key pairs and certificates
    should have long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the
    disruption caused by key changeover for top tier CAs.>

6.4. Activation data

6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation

    <Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>

6.4.2. Activation data protection

    Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by
    <Describe your procedures here>.

6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data

    <Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
    activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None.">

6.5. Computer security controls

6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement

    <Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
    support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
    capabilities, etc.  These requirements should be commensurate with
    those used for the computers used for managing allocation of IP
    addresses and AS numbers.>






Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 35]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]

6.6. Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1. System development controls

    <Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the
    PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology
    (TSDM) Level 2.>

6.6.2. Security management controls

    <Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
    software and equipment employed by the CA.  These security measures
    should be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the
    CAs for managing and allocating IP address and AS number resources.>

6.6.3. Life cycle security controls

    <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI
    functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated.
    This should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
    equipment for the management and allocation of IP address space and
    AS numbers is handled. >

6.7. Network security controls

    <Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
    operation.  These should be commensurate with the network security
    controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation of
    IP addresses and AS numbers.>

6.8. Time-stamping

    The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping.















Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 36]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

    Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr-
    res-certs-01]














































Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 37]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]

7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]

7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]

7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]

7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]

7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]

7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]

7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension [OMITTED]

7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]

7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]

7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]






Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 38]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

    <List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
    security of the administration of IP addresses and AS numbers. These
    are sufficient for the PKI systems.>

8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment

8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor

8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

8.4. Topics covered by assessment

8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency

8.6. Communication of results

































Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 39]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


9. Other Business And Legal Matters



    <The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
    your organization. Note that the manner in which you manage your
    business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with
    the way in which you manage business and legal matters for the
    allocation of IP address and AS numbers.>



9.1. Fees

9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees

9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)

9.1.3. Refund policy

9.2. Financial responsibility

9.2.1. Insurance coverage

9.2.2. Other assets

9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

9.3. Confidentiality of business information

9.3.1. Scope of confidential information

9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information

9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information

9.4. Privacy of personal information

9.4.1. Privacy plan

9.4.2. Information treated as private

9.4.3. Information not deemed private

9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information

9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information



Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 40]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process

9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances

9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)

9.6. Representations and warranties

9.6.1. CA representations and warranties

9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties

9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties

9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]

9.7. Disclaimers of warranties

9.8. Limitations of liability

9.9. Indemnities

9.10. Term and termination

9.10.1. Term

9.10.2. Termination

9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival

9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants

9.12. Amendments

9.12.1. Procedure for amendment

9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period

9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]

9.13. Dispute resolution provisions

9.14. Governing law

9.15. Compliance with applicable law

9.16. Miscellaneous provisions



Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 41]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


9.16.1. Entire agreement

9.16.2. Assignment

9.16.3. Severability

9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

9.16.5. Force Majeure

9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]







































Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 42]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


10. Security Considerations

    The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied
    in a certificate depends on several factors.  These factors can
    include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA)
    in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy,
    procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of
    the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the
    private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms
    and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
    warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a
    framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and
    physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration
    Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party
    cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate
    generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is
    done in a secure manner.  Specifically, Section 3 Identification and
    Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational
    Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational
    Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7
    Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and
    Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of
    the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
    relying party systems.

11. IANA Considerations

    None.

12. Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this
    document.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

    [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
          Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

    [RFC3280]   Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet
          X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
          Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

    [RFCxxxx]   Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S. ,
          "Certificate Policy for the Internet IP Address and AS Number
          PKI", RFC xxxx.


Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 43]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


    [draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-01]   Huston, G., Loomans, R.,
          Michaelson, G., "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource
          Certificates", work in progress, June 19, 2006.

13.2. Informative References

    [BGP4]   Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors),  A Border Gateway Protocol 4
          (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.

    [FIPS]   Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
          (FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
          Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
          Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.

    [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for
          obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
          Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.

Author's Addresses

    Stephen Kent
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA

    Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
    Email: skent@bbn.com

    Derrick Kong
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA

    Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
    Email: dkong@bbn.com

    Karen Seo
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA

    Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
    Email: kseo@bbn.com




Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 44]


Internet-Draft        Template for CPS for RIRs       October 13, 2006


Intellectual Property Statement

    The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
    Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
    to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described
    in this document or the extent to which any license under such
    rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that
    it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights.
    Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC
    documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

    Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
    assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
    attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
    of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
    specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
    at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

    The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
    copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
    rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
    this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at ietf
    ipr@ietf.org.

Disclaimer of Validity

    This document and the information contained herein are provided on
    an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
    REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE
    INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
    IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
    THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
    WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Copyright Statement

    Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

    This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
    contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
    retain all their rights.









Kent, Kong & Seo        Expires April 13, 2007                [Page 45]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129d, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/