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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 draft-ietf-sidr-cps

Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                             Kong, D.
Internet Draft                                                  Seo, K.
Expires: January 2008                                          Kent, S.
Intended Status: Informational                         BBN Technologies
                                                              July 2007




                              Template for an
        Internet Registry's Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
              for the Internet IP Address and AS Number (PKI)
                      draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-02.txt


Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that
   any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is
   aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she
   becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of
   BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2008.

Abstract

   This document contains a template to be used for creating a
   Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
   (e.g., NIR or RIR) that is part of the Internet IP Address and
   Autonomous System (AS) Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).




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Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

Table of Contents


   Preface...........................................................8
   1. Introduction...................................................9
      1.1. Overview.................................................10
      1.2. Document name and identification.........................11
      1.3. PKI participants.........................................11
         1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11
         1.3.2. Registration authorities............................11
         1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................11
         1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12
         1.3.5. Other participants..................................12
      1.4. Certificate usage........................................12
         1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12
         1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13
      1.5. Policy administration....................................13
         1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13
         1.5.2. Contact person......................................13
         1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13
         1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13
      1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................13
   2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15
      2.1. Repositories.............................................15
      2.2. Publication of certification information.................15
      2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15
      2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15
   3. Identification And Authentication.............................16
      3.1. Naming...................................................16
         3.1.1. Types of names......................................16
         3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................16
         3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............16
         3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........16
         3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................16
         3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.17
      3.2. Initial identity validation..............................17
         3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........17
         3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............17
         3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............17
         3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................18
         3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................18
         3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................18


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      3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....18
         3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key18
         3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
         revocation.................................................18
      3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.19
   4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............20
      4.1. Certificate Application..................................20
         4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............20
         4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............20
      4.2. Certificate application processing.......................20
         4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
         ...........................................................20
         4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...20
         4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............21
      4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................21
         4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............21
         4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
         certificate................................................21
      4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................21
         4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........21
         4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............21
      4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21
         4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........22
         4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......22
      4.6. Certificate renewal......................................22
         4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................22
         4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................23
         4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............23
         4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
         ...........................................................23
         4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
         certificate................................................23
         4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....23
         4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities [OMITTED].........................................23
      4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................23
         4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................23
         4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...24
         4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........24
         4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
         ...........................................................24
         4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
         certificate................................................24
         4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24
         4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities [OMITTED].........................................25
      4.8. Certificate modification.................................25
         4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........25


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         4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............25
         4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........25
         4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
         subscriber.................................................26
         4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
         ...........................................................26
         4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...26
         4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities [OMITTED].........................................26
      4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................26
         4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................26
         4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................26
         4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26
         4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................27
         4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
         request....................................................27
         4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.27
         4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................27
         4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................27
         4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
         [OMITTED]..................................................28
         4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].28
         4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
         [OMITTED]..................................................28
         4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...28
         4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............28
         4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............28
         4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........28
         4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............28
      4.10. Certificate status services.............................28
         4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............28
         4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................28
         4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................28
      4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................28
      4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................28
         4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
         ...........................................................28
         4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
         practices [OMITTED]........................................28
   5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................29
      5.1. Physical controls........................................29
         5.1.1. Site location and construction......................29
         5.1.2. Physical access.....................................29
         5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................29
         5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................29
         5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................29
         5.1.6. Media storage.......................................29
         5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................29


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         5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................29
      5.2. Procedural controls......................................29
         5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................29
         5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................29
         5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....29
         5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................29
      5.3. Personnel controls.......................................29
         5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
         ...........................................................30
         5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................30
         5.3.3. Training requirements...............................30
         5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............30
         5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................30
         5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................30
         5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................30
         5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................30
      5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................30
         5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................30
         5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................30
         5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................30
         5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................31
         5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................31
         5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
         [OMITTED]..................................................31
         5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....31
         5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................31
      5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................31
         5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................31
         5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............31
         5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................31
         5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................31
         5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].31
         5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
         [OMITTED]..................................................31
         5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
         [OMITTED]..................................................31
      5.6. Key changeover...........................................31
      5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............32
         5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]32
         5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
         corrupted [OMITTED]........................................32
         5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..32
         5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
         [OMITTED]..................................................32
      5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................32
   6. Technical Security Controls...................................33
      6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................33
         6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................33


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         6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................33
         6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........33
         6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........33
         6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................34
         6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking34
         6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)34
      6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
      Controls......................................................34
         6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........34
         6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......34
         6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................34
         6.2.4. Private key backup..................................35
         6.2.5. Private key archival................................35
         6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
         module.....................................................35
         6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........35
         6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................35
         6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................35
         6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................35
         6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................35
      6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................36
         6.3.1. Public key archival.................................36
         6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
         periods....................................................36
      6.4. Activation data..........................................36
         6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........36
         6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................36
         6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................36
      6.5. Computer security controls...............................36
         6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....36
         6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................37
      6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................37
         6.6.1. System development controls.........................37
         6.6.2. Security management controls........................37
         6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................37
      6.7. Network security controls................................37
      6.8. Time-stamping............................................37
   7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................38
      Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr-
      res-certs-01].................................................38
      7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................38
         7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................38
         7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................38
         7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............38
         7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................38
         7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................38
         7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......38
         7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....38


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         7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....38
         7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
         Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................38
      7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................38
         7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................38
         7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............38
      7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................38
         7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................38
         7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................38
   8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................39
      8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................39
      8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................39
      8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............39
      8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................39
      8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................39
      8.6. Communication of results.................................39
   9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................40
      9.1. Fees.....................................................40
         9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................40
         9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............40
         9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................40
      9.2. Financial responsibility.................................40
         9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................40
         9.2.2. Other assets........................................40
         9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....40
      9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................40
         9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................40
         9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
         information................................................40
         9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..40
      9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................40
         9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................40
         9.4.2. Information treated as private......................40
         9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................40
         9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......40
         9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......40
         9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
         process....................................................41
         9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........41
      9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............41
      9.6. Representations and warranties...........................41
         9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................41
         9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........41
         9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........41
         9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
         [OMITTED]..................................................41
      9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................41
      9.8. Limitations of liability.................................41


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      9.9. Indemnities..............................................41
      9.10. Term and termination....................................41
         9.10.1. Term...............................................41
         9.10.2. Termination........................................41
         9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................41
      9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.41
      9.12. Amendments..............................................41
         9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................41
         9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................41
         9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
         [OMITTED]..................................................41
      9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................41
      9.14. Governing law...........................................41
      9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................41
      9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................41
         9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................42
         9.16.2. Assignment.........................................42
         9.16.3. Severability.......................................42
         9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).42
         9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................42
      9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................42
   10. Security Considerations......................................43
   11. IANA Considerations..........................................43
   12. Acknowledgments..............................................43
   13. References...................................................43
      13.1. Normative References....................................43
      13.2. Informative References..................................44
   Author's Addresses...............................................44
   Intellectual Property Statement..................................45
   Disclaimer of Validity...........................................45
   Copyright Statement..............................................45



Preface

   This document contains a template to be used for creating a
   Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
   (e.g., an NIR or RIR) that is part of the Internet IP Address and
   Autonomous System (AS) Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  The
   user of this document should

     1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., "<Name of
        Registry> Certification Practice Statement for the Internet IP
        Address and AS Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)" with
        date, author, etc.

     2. delete this Preface


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     3. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
        brackets>

     4. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
        Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
        Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
        reference section with just the references in 13.2

     5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and
        additions above.

   Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
   number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
   CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
   retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections,
   in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme
   employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are
   included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
   sections are also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect
   in the Introduction below.  This information should be left in the
   CPS as an explanation to the user.

1. Introduction

   This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
   of Registry>.  It describes the practices employed by the <Name of
   Registry> Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address
   and Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI.   These practices are defined
   in accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP,
   [CP]) of this PKI.

   The Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI is aimed at supporting
   verifiable attestations about resource controls, e.g., for improved
   routing security. The goal is that each entity that allocates IP
   addresses or AS numbers to an entity will, in parallel, issue a
   certificate reflecting this allocation. These certificates will
   enable verification that the holder of the associated private key
   has been allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and
   is the current, unique holder of these resources. The certificates
   and CRLs, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data
   structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security
   mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs.

   The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
   this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an
   address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
   contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
   certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity


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   to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
   an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of
   the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification
   of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
   to digitally sign data producing a signature that is verifiable
   using the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and
   validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI
   is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims
   related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on
   support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and
   CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
   this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.

   Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
   number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
   CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
   retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections,
   in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme
   employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are
   included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
   sections are also marked [OMITTED].

1.1. Overview

   This CPS describes:

     . Participants

     . Distribution of the certificates and CRLs

     . How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked

     . Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)

     . Key management

     . Audit procedures

     . Business and legal issues

   The PKI encompasses several types of certificates:

  . CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
     and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder

  . End entity ("shadow") certificates for organizations to use in
     verifying signatures of Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs)
     and other (non-certificate/CRL) signed objects


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  . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
     support of access control for the repository system

1.2. Document name and identification

   The name of this document is "<Name of Registry>'s Certification
   Practice Statement for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI".

1.3. PKI participants

   Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
   organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
   term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
   qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
   the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
   service from an LIR/ISP.  Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber"
   can refer both to LIRs/ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs,
   and other LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but
   which are subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term.
   Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to
   subscribers as organizations, even though some subscribers are
   individuals. When necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used
   to refer to an organization that receives network services from an
   LIR/ISP.

1.3.1. Certification authorities

   <Name of Registry>  will operate a CA, the primary function of which
   is the issuance of certificates to organizations to which address
   space or AS numbers are allocated by the registry. In the future,
   this CA may also issue other types of end entity (EE) certificates,
   e.g., EE certificates to operations personnel in support of
   repository maintenance.

1.3.2. Registration authorities

   For the certificates issued by this registry under this PKI, this
   function is provided by the registry per se. The registry already
   performs this function -- establishing a formal relationship with
   each subscriber and assuming responsibility for allocating and
   tracking the current allocation of address space and AS numbers.
   Since the registry operates the CA, there is no distinct RA.

1.3.3. Subscribers

   Two types of organizations receive allocations of IP addresses and
   AS numbers from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense:
   network subscribers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs).


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   <Additionally, this CA issues certificates to <Local/National>
   Registries (choose the right term for this RIR, if either applies)
   who, in turn, issue certificates to network subscribers or
   LIRs/ISPs.>

1.3.4. Relying parties

   Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS
   number current holdings are relying parties.  Thus, for example,
   entities that make use of address and AS number allocation
   certificates in support of improved routing security are relying
   parties. Registries are relying parties because they transfer
   resources between one another and thus will need to verify (cross)
   certificates issued in conjunction with such transfers.  This
   includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4]
   traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and subscribers who have received an
   allocation of address space from one ISP or from a registry, but
   want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP to originate routes to
   this space.

   To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access
   control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and
   ROA update packages -- they too act as relying parties.

1.3.5. Other participants

   <Name of Registry> will operate a repository that holds
   certificates, CRLs, and other signed objects, e.g., ROAs.

1.4. Certificate usage

1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses

   The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
   in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address
   space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to
   routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder
   of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure
   fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to
   originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP
   proxy aggregation. Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the
   basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy.

   Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy
   could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g.,
   access control for the repository system. Such uses also are
   permitted under this policy.



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1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses

   Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.

1.5. Policy administration

1.5.1. Organization administering the document

   This CPS is administered by <Name of Registry>

1.5.2. Contact person

   <Insert Registry contact info here>

1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

   Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
   is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
   numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
   public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the
   same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence
   they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.

1.5.4. CPS approval procedures

   Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
   is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
   numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
   public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the
   same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence
   they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.

1.6. Definitions and acronyms

   CP -  Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that
         indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
         community and/or class of applications with common security
         requirements.

   CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
         specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
         in issuing certificates.

   ISP - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
         and selling Internet services to other organizations.

   LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
        network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of


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        IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional
        (or National) Registry.

   NIR - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
         manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
         portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional
         Registry. These form an optional second tier in the tree
         scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation.

   RIR - Regional Internet Registry.  An RIR is an organization that
         manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
         specified geopolitical area.  At present, there are five RIRs:
         ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -
         Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AFRINIC
         (Africa).

   ROA - Route Origination Authorization.  This is a digitally signed
         object that identifies a network operator, identified by an
         AS, that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set
         of address blocks.






























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2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

   As per the CP, certificates and CRLs, will be made available for
   downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate
   this data for use in support of routing security.

   <Describe here the basic set up of your local repository system.>

2.2. Publication of certification information

   <Name of Registry> will upload certificates and CRLs issued by it to
   a local repository system that operates as part of a world-wide
   distributed system of repositories.

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

   <Describe here your procedures for publication (via the repository)
   of the certificates and CRLs that you issue. If you choose to
   outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to provide this
   information for relying parties.>

   As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times
   and frequency:

   A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance.

   The <Name of Registry> CA will publish its CRL prior to the
   nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
   the CA. Within 24 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish
   a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate.

2.4. Access controls on repositories

   Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must
   be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
   (certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally
   signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure
   that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
   does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of
   the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated.








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3. Identification And Authentication

3.1. Naming

3.1.1. Types of names

   The Subject of each certificate issued by this Registry is
   identified by an X.500 Disinguished Name (DN). For certificates
   issued to LIRs/ISPs and subscribers, the Subject will consist of a
   single CN attribute with a value generated by the issuer. For
   certificates issued to an NIR, the Subject will be the name of the
   NIR.

3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful

   The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
   relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP>. However,
   there is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique
   in this PKI.

   Note: The name of the holder of an address block or AS number need
   not to be "meaningful" in the conventional, human-readable sense,
   since certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization
   in support of routing security, not for identification

3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

   Although Subject names in certificates issued by this registry need
   not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a
   function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature
   is provided.

3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms

   None

3.1.5. Uniqueness of names

   <Name of Registry> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
   certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
   Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate
   certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor
   enforced through technical means.





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3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

   Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
   is no provision to recognize nor authenticate trademarks, service
   marks, etc.

3.2. Initial identity validation

3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key

   <Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
   demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
   corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
   the certificate. Standard methods are described in the Certificate
   Management Protocol (CMP) (RFC 2510) and the Certificate Management
   Messages over CMS protocol (CMC), RFC 2797.>

3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity

   Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
   organizational identity of resource holders, with the exception of
   registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders in
   a fashion that preserves the accuracy of bindings in this registry's
   records.

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each
   certificate that is issued accurately reflects your records with
   regard to the organization to which you have allocated (or sub-
   allocated) the address space (or AS numbers) identified in the
   certificate. The specific procedures employed for this purpose
   should be commensurate with those you already employ as a registry
   in the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation.>

3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity

   Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
   identity of a resource holder. However, this registry maintains
   contact information for each resource holder in support of
   certificate renewal, re-key, or revocation.

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to identify at least one
   individual as a representative of each organization that is an
   address space (or AS number) holder. This is done in support of
   issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate issued to the
   organization. The procedures should be commensurate with those you
   already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives for
   address space (or AS number) holders. Note that this authentication
   is solely for use by you in dealing with the organizations to which


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   you allocate (or sub-allocate) address space (or AS numbers), and
   thus must not be relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber
   relationship.>

3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

   No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
   under this certificate policy.

3.2.5. Validation of authority

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to verify that an
   individual claiming to represent a resource holder to which a
   certificate is issued, is authorized to represent that resource
   holder in this context.  The procedures should be commensurate with
   those you already employ as a registry in authenticating individuals
   as representatives of resource holders.>

3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation

   This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
   other PKI.

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests

3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that an
   organization requesting a re-key is the legitimate holder of the
   certificate (and associated address space and AS numbers) to be re-
   keyed.  This should also include the method employed for verifying
   PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key.   With
   respect to authentication of the holder of the address space and AS
   numbers, the procedures should be commensurate with those you
   already employ in the maintenance of address (and AS number)
   allocation.  Note that your organization can choose to require
   periodic re-keying consistent with contractual agreements with the
   recipient.>

3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that an
   organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate
   holder of the address space and AS numbers in the certificate being
   re-keyed. This should also include the method employed for verifying
   PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. Note
   that there may be different procedures for the case where the
   legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as


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   opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.  With
   respect to authentication of the resource holder, the procedures
   should be commensurate with those you already employ in the
   maintenance of resource allocation records.>

3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that the
   resource holder requesting revocation is the subject of the
   certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be revoked.
   Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the
   legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as
   opposed to the case when the subject no longer has access to that
   key. These procedures should be commensurate with those you already
   employ in the maintenance of resource holder records.>

   Note:  If additional IP addresses or AS numbers are being added to
   an organization's existing allocation, the old certificate need not
   be revoked. Instead, a new certificate may be issued with both the
   old and the new resources and the old key.  If IP addresses or AS
   numbers are being removed or if there has been a key compromise,
   then the old certificate will be a revoked (and a re-key will be
   performed in the event of a key compromise). A subscriber may
   request that its resource holdings be spread over a set of
   certificates, rather than consolidating all resources in one
   certificate. This may be appropriate if the subscriber wants to
   manage his resource allocations as distinct allocations within his
   organization.






















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4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application

   The following entities may submit a certificate application to this
   CA:

     o <Insert if appropriate: "Any NIR or LIR/ISP operating in the
        geopolitical region served by this registry">

     o Any entity that holds AS numbers or address space assigned by
        this registry

4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities

   <Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
   initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that
   most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of registry
   and ISP normal business practices, as an adjunct to address space
   and AS number allocation, and thus a separate application to request
   a certificate may not be necessary.  If so, reference should be made
   to where these practices are documented.>

4.2. Certificate application processing

   <Describe the certificate request/response standards that you will
   employ.  You should make use of existing standards for certificate
   application processing.  Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
   Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
   Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
   and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. >

4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions

   <Describe your practices for identification and authentication of
   certificate applicants.  Often, existing practices employed by you
   to identify and authenticate organizations form the basis for
   issuance of certificates to these subscribers.  Reference can be
   made to documentation of such existing practices.>

4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

   <Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications
   and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant
   to this process.  Note that according to the CP, certificate
   applications will be approved based on the normal business practices


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   of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of address
   space and AS number holders. Also, each CA will verify that the
   requester holds the corresponding private key for the public key
   that will be bound to the certificate the CA issues to the
   requester.>

4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications

   <You may declare here your expected time frame for processing
   certificate applications.>

4.3. Certificate issuance

4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance

   <Describe in this section your procedures for issuance of a
   certificate.>

4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

   <Describe your procedure for notification of a subscriber when a a
   certificate has been issued.>

4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]

4.4. Certificate acceptance

4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

   When a certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the repository
   and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without subscriber
   review and acceptance.

4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA

   Certificates will be published in the Repository system once issued
   following the conduct described in 4.4.1. <Describe your procedures
   for publication of the approved certificate.>

4.5. Key pair and certificate usage

   A summary of the use model for the IP Address and AS Number PKI is
   provided below.






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4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage

   The certificates issued by this registry to resource holders are CA
   certificates. The private key associated with each of these
   certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
   CRLs. A subscriber will issue certificates to any organizations to
   which it allocates IP address space and one or more "shadow"
   certificates for use in verifying signatures on ROAs signed by the
   subscriber. <If appropriate, add "Subscribers that are NIRs issue
   certificates to organizations to which they have allocated address
   space or AS numbers.  Subscribers that are LIRs issue certificates
   to organizations to which they have allocated address space.">
   Subscribers also will issue certificates to operators in support of
   repository access control.

4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage

   The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use
   shadow certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating
   route filters.  Repositories will use operator certificates to
   verify the authorization of entities to engage in repository
   maintenance activities, and thus repositories represent a secondary
   type of relying party.

4.6. Certificate renewal

4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal

   As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
   its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
   Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing its
   resource holding agreement, or may be explicit. If <Name of
   Registry> initiates the renewal process based on the certificate
   expiration date, then <Name of Registry> will notify the resource
   holder <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 weeks in
   advance of the expiration date", or the general policy, e.g., "in
   conjunction with notification of service expiration".>  The validity
   interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the
   previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1
   week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.

   Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
   previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
   compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
   Section 4.7 will apply.





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4.6.2. Who may request renewal

   The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the
   renewal process. <For the case of the certificate holder, describe
   what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of
   the entity requesting the renewal.>

4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

   <Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
   This must include verification that the certificate in question has
   not been revoked.>

4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   <Describe your procedure for notification of new certificate
   issuance to the subscriber. This should be consistent with 4.3.2.>

4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

   When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
   repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
   subscriber review and acceptance.

4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

   <Describe your policy and procedures for publication of a renewed
   certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.2.>

4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]


4.7. Certificate re-key

4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key

   As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
   requested, based on:

  (1) knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
     private key, or

  (2) the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
     key pair




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   If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
   replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
   new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.

   If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
   certificate will be revoked.

   Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
   certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
   exceeds the validity period of the certificate.  This places
   additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.

4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key

   The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition,
   <Name of Registry> may initiate a re-key based on a verified
   compromise report. <Describe what steps will be taken to verify the
   identity and authorization of a subscriber to request a re-key when
   the private key has been reported as compromised. Also describe how
   a compromise report received from other than a subscriber is
   verified.>

4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

   <Describe your process for handling re-keying requests.  As per the
   CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section
   4.3.  So reference can be made to that section.>

4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   <Describe your policy regarding notifying the subscriber re:
   availability of the new certificate.  This should be consistent with
   the notification process for any new certificate issuance (see
   section 4.3.2).>

4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

   When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
   repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
   subscriber review and acceptance.

4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

   <Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.
   This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.4.2).>




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4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]


4.8. Certificate modification

4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification

   As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
   changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate.  A
   subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
   information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a
   result of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber. The
   request may be implicit, a side effect of the allocation of
   additional resources, or may be explicit.  A subscriber also may
   request that its existing set of resources be redistributed among
   multiple certificates. This example of certificate modification is
   effected through issuance of new certificates, and revocation of the
   previous certificates.

   If a subscriber is to be allocated address space or AS numbers in
   addition to a current allocation, and if the subscriber does not
   request that a new certificate be issued containing only these
   resources, then this is accomplished through a certificate
   modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new
   certificate is issued.  The new certificate will contain the same
   public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate,
   but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address
   space and AS allocations expanded. When previously allocated address
   space or AS numbers are to be removed from a certificate, then the
   old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting
   the new allocation) issued.

4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification

   The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the
   certificate modification process. <For the case of the certificate
   holder, state here what steps will be taken to verify the identity
   and authorization of the entity requesting the modification.>

4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests

   <Describe your procedures for verification of the modification
   request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate.  These
   should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2
   and 4.3.1.>




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4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber

   <Describe your procedure for notification of issuance of a modified
   certificate.  This should be consistent with the notification
   process for any new certificate (see section 4.3.2).>

4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

   When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
   repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
   subscriber review and acceptance.

4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

   <Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate.
   This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.4.2).>

4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]


4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation

   As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
   Either <Name of Registry> or the subject may choose to end the
   relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
   revoke the certificate. If one or more of the resources bound to the
   public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
   subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation.  A certificate
   also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
   corresponding to the public key in the certificate.  Finally, a
   certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by
   that certificate.

4.9.2. Who can request revocation

   The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may request a
   revocation. <For the case of the certificate holder, describe what
   steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of the
   entity requesting the revocation.>

4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request

   <Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation
   request.  This should include:


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   Procedure to be used by the certificate holder to request a
   revocation

   Procedure for notification of the certificate holder when the CRL is
   published by <Name of Registry>.

4.9.4. Revocation request grace period

   A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
   need for revocation has been identified.

4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

   <Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
   process a revocation request.>

4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

   As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
   checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
   certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.

4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency

   <Name of Registry> will publish CRLs approximately every 24 hours.
   Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will
   be published at or before that time.  <Name of Registry> will set
   the nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when
   the next scheduled CRL will be issued.

4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs

   A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay
   after generation.
















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4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]

4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]

4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]

4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]

4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]

4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]

4.10. Certificate status services

   <Name of Registry> does <not> support OCSP.



4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]

4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]

4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]

4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]

4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]

4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]

4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
[OMITTED]














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5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls



5.1. Physical controls

   <As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
   certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used
   in the management of address space and AS number allocation.>

5.1.1. Site location and construction

5.1.2. Physical access

5.1.3. Power and air conditioning

5.1.4. Water exposures

5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection

5.1.6. Media storage

5.1.7. Waste disposal

5.1.8. Off-site backup

5.2. Procedural controls

   <As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
   employ for certificate management.  These should be commensurate to
   those used in the management of address space and AS number
   allocation.>

5.2.1. Trusted roles

5.2.2. Number of persons required per task

5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role

5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties

5.3. Personnel controls

   <As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
   employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
   should be commensurate to those used in the management of address
   space and AS number allocation.>



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5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

5.3.2. Background check procedures

5.3.3. Training requirements

5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements

5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence

5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions

5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements

5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel

5.4. Audit logging procedures

5.4.1. Types of events recorded

   Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
   certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records will
   include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
   content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:

   Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

   Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests,
   certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications)

   Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

   Posting of any material to a repository

   Any attempts to change or delete audit data

   <List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>

5.4.2. Frequency of processing log

   <Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>

5.4.3. Retention period for audit log

   <Describe your polices for retention of audit logs.>





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5.4.4. Protection of audit log

   <Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>

5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures

   <Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>

5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]

5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]

5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments

   <Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
   already applied) to the PKI subsystems.  This should include whether
   such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
   perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>

5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]

5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]

5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]

5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]

5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]

5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]

5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]

5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]

5.6. Key changeover

   The <Name of Registry> CA certificate will contain a validity period
   that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA
   certificate.  To support this, <Name of Registry> will create a new
   signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate
   containing the public key of the pair, <specify here the minimum
   amount of lead time, e.g.,  "a minimum of 6 months"> in advance of
   the scheduled change of the current signature key pair.






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5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]

5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
[OMITTED]

5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]

5.8. CA or RA termination

   <Describe the fallback policy for management of your CA's IP address
   space and AS number allocations in case of its own termination.>



































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6. Technical Security Controls

   This section describes the security controls used by <Name of
   Registry>.

6.1. Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1. Key pair generation

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key
   pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for network subscribers.  In
   most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the
   subscriber, i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of
   address space or AS numbers.  However, your procedures may include
   one for generating key pairs on behalf of your subscribers if they
   so request. (This might be done for subscribers who do not have the
   ability to perform key generation in a secure fashion or who want a
   registry to provide backup for the subscriber private key.) Since
   the keys used in this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes,
   generation of key pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the
   security of the PKI. >

6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber

   <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation
   services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys
   are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this
   is not applicable.>

6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

   <Describe the means by which the public keys are delivered to you,
   e.g., electronic submission using a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing
   Request (CSR).  This description should explain how this public key
   delivery fits in with the process whereby the subscriber requests IP
   address space (and/or AS numbers), authenticates itself, pays for
   the resources, etc. The security of the procedures used by a
   subscriber to deliver its public key to you need only be
   commensurate with the security of the procedures already employed
   for management of the IP address space and AS numbers.>

6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

   CA public keys for all entities other than RIRs are contained in
   certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates plus
   certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address space
   or AS numbers will be published via a repository system. Relying
   parties will download these certificates from this system. Public


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   key values and associated data for the trust anchors (RIRs) will be
   distributed out of band, e.g., embedded in path validation software
   that will be made available to the Internet community.

6.1.5. Key sizes

   For the <Name of Registry> CA's certificate and shadow CA
   certificate, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For subscriber
   certificates, the RSA keys will be <insert key size -- e.g., 2048 or
   1024 bits. If NIR key size is larger than LIR/ISP/subscriber key
   size, describe each independently.>

6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

   The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent
   (e) F4 (65,537).

   <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
   insert here text specifying that the subscriber is responsible for
   performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that
   <Name of Registry> is not responsible for performing such checks for
   subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking
   the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>

6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

   The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280.
   For <Name of Registry>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and
   cRLSign bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including
   digitalSignature) will be set FALSE, and the extension will be
   marked critical.

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
     Controls

6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls

   The <Name of Registry> CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated
   under FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS].

6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

   There will be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m>
   multi-person control.

6.2.3. Private key escrow

   No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.


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6.2.4. Private key backup

   <Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
   The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
   done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
   the original private key.  (2) At least one copy should be kept at
   an off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>

6.2.5. Private key archival

   See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4

6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

   The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s CA and shadow CA will be
   generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1.  The
   private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form
   for backup and/or transfer to a new module.

6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module

   The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s CA will be stored in the
   cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in
   accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the
   module. (See [FIPS])

6.2.8. Method of activating private key

   <Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
   key.>

6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key

   The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
   unattended.  After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
   procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module
   will be stored securely when not in use.

6.2.10. Method of destroying private key

   <Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key,
   e.g., when it is superseded.  This will depend on the particular
   module.>

6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating

   The cryptographic module will be certified FIPS 140-2, at level 3
   [FIPS].


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6.3. Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1. Public key archival

   Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
   to archive public keys.

6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

   The <Name of Registry> CA's key pair will have a validity interval
   of <insert number of years - Registry key pairs and certificates
   should have long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the
   disruption caused by key changeover for top tier CAs.>

6.4. Activation data

6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation

   <Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>

6.4.2. Activation data protection

   Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by
   <Describe your procedures here>.

6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data

   <Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
   activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None.">

6.5. Computer security controls

6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement

   <Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
   support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
   capabilities, etc.  These requirements should be commensurate with
   those used for the computers used for managing allocation of IP
   addresses and AS numbers.>











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6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]

6.6. Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1. System development controls

   <Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the
   PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology
   (TSDM) Level 2.>

6.6.2. Security management controls

   <Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
   software and equipment employed by the CA.  These security measures
   should be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the
   CAs for managing and allocating IP address and AS number resources.>

6.6.3. Life cycle security controls

   <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI
   functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated.
   This should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
   equipment for the management and allocation of IP address space and
   AS numbers is handled. >

6.7. Network security controls

   <Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
   operation.  These should be commensurate with the network security
   controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation of
   IP addresses and AS numbers.>

6.8. Time-stamping

   The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping.















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7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

   Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RESCERT].

7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]

7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]

7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]

7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]

7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]

7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]

7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]

7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension [OMITTED]

7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]

7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]

7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]


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8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

   <List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
   security of the administration of IP addresses and AS numbers. These
   are sufficient for the PKI systems.>

8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment

8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor

8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

8.4. Topics covered by assessment

8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency

8.6. Communication of results

































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9. Other Business And Legal Matters



   <The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
   your organization. Note that the manner in which you manage your
   business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with
   the way in which you manage business and legal matters for the
   allocation of IP address and AS numbers.>



9.1. Fees

9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees

9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)

9.1.3. Refund policy

9.2. Financial responsibility

9.2.1. Insurance coverage

9.2.2. Other assets

9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

9.3. Confidentiality of business information

9.3.1. Scope of confidential information

9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information

9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information

9.4. Privacy of personal information

9.4.1. Privacy plan

9.4.2. Information treated as private

9.4.3. Information not deemed private

9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information

9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information



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9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process

9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances

9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)

9.6. Representations and warranties

9.6.1. CA representations and warranties

9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties

9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties

9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]

9.7. Disclaimers of warranties

9.8. Limitations of liability

9.9. Indemnities

9.10. Term and termination

9.10.1. Term

9.10.2. Termination

9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival

9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants

9.12. Amendments

9.12.1. Procedure for amendment

9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period

9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]

9.13. Dispute resolution provisions

9.14. Governing law

9.15. Compliance with applicable law

9.16. Miscellaneous provisions



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9.16.1. Entire agreement

9.16.2. Assignment

9.16.3. Severability

9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

9.16.5. Force Majeure

9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]







































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10. Security Considerations

   The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied
   in a certificate depends on several factors.  These factors can
   include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA)
   in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy,
   procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of
   the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the
   private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms
   and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
   warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a
   framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and
   physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration
   Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party
   cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate
   generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is
   done in a secure manner.  Specifically, Section 3 Identification and
   Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational
   Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational
   Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7
   Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and
   Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of
   the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
   relying party systems.

11. IANA Considerations

   None.

12. Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this
   document and Matt Houston for his help with the formatting.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

   [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
         Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3280]   Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet
         X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
         Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [CP]  Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate
         Policy for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI", draft-
         ietf-sidr-cp, July 2007 (work in progress).


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   [RESCERT]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
         X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs,
         June 2007 (work in progress).

13.2. Informative References

   [BGP4]   Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors),  A Border Gateway Protocol 4
         (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.

   [FIPS]   Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
         (FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
         Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
         Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.

   [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for
         obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
         Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.

Author's Addresses

   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
   Email: skent@bbn.com

   Derrick Kong
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
   Email: dkong@bbn.com

   Karen Seo
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
   Email: kseo@bbn.com




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Intellectual Property Statement

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
   to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described
   in this document or the extent to which any license under such
   rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that
   it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights.
   Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC
   documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
   of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
   at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
   ipr@ietf.org.

Disclaimer of Validity

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on
   an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
   REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE
   IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL
   WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY
   WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE
   ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS
   FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.








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