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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 draft-ietf-sidr-cps

Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                             Kong, D.
Internet Draft                                                  Seo, K.
Expires: August 2008                                           Kent, S.
Intended Status: Informational                         BBN Technologies
                                                           February 2008




                               Template for an
         Internet Registry's Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
                         for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
                       draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-03.txt


Status of this Memo

    By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that
    any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is
    aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she
    becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of
    BCP 79.

    Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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    This Internet-Draft will expire on August 31, 2008.

Abstract

    This document contains a template to be used for creating a
    Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
    (e.g., NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
    Infrastructure (RPKI).




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Conventions used in this document

    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

Table of Contents


    Preface...........................................................8
    1. Introduction...................................................9
       1.1. Overview.................................................10
       1.2. Document name and identification.........................11
       1.3. PKI participants.........................................11
          1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11
          1.3.2. Registration authorities............................11
          1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12
          1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12
          1.3.5. Other participants..................................12
       1.4. Certificate usage........................................12
          1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12
          1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13
       1.5. Policy administration....................................13
          1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13
          1.5.2. Contact person......................................13
          1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13
          1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13
       1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................13
    2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15
       2.1. Repositories.............................................15
       2.2. Publication of certification information.................15
       2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15
       2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15
    3. Identification And Authentication.............................16
       3.1. Naming...................................................16
          3.1.1. Types of names......................................16
          3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................16
          3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............16
          3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........16
          3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................16
          3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.17
       3.2. Initial identity validation..............................17
          3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........17
          3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............17
          3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............17
          3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17
          3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................18
          3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................18


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       3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....18
          3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key18
          3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
          revocation.................................................18
       3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.18
    4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19
       4.1. Certificate Application..................................19
          4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19
          4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19
       4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19
          4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
          ...........................................................19
          4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...19
          4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20
       4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20
          4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20
          4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
          certificate................................................20
       4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20
          4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20
          4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20
       4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21
          4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21
          4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21
       4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21
          4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................21
          4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................22
          4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22
          4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
          ...........................................................22
          4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
          certificate................................................22
          4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22
          4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................22
       4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................22
          4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................22
          4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...23
          4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........23
          4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
          ...........................................................23
          4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
          certificate................................................23
          4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24
          4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................24
       4.8. Certificate modification.................................24
          4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24


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          4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24
          4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........25
          4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
          subscriber.................................................25
          4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
          ...........................................................25
          4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...25
          4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................25
       4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25
          4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25
          4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................26
          4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26
          4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26
          4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
          request....................................................26
          4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.26
          4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26
          4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26
          4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
          [OMITTED]..................................................27
          4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].27
          4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
          [OMITTED]..................................................27
          4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...27
          4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............27
          4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............27
          4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........27
          4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............27
       4.10. Certificate status services.............................27
          4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............27
          4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................27
          4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................27
       4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................27
       4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................27
          4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
          ...........................................................27
          4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
          practices [OMITTED]........................................27
    5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................28
       5.1. Physical controls........................................28
          5.1.1. Site location and construction......................28
          5.1.2. Physical access.....................................28
          5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................28
          5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................28
          5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................28
          5.1.6. Media storage.......................................28
          5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................28


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          5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................28
       5.2. Procedural controls......................................28
          5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................28
          5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................28
          5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....28
          5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................28
       5.3. Personnel controls.......................................28
          5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
          ...........................................................29
          5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................29
          5.3.3. Training requirements...............................29
          5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............29
          5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................29
          5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................29
          5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................29
          5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................29
       5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................29
          5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................29
          5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................29
          5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................29
          5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................30
          5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................30
          5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
          [OMITTED]..................................................30
          5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....30
          5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................30
       5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................30
          5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................30
          5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............30
          5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................30
          5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................30
          5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].30
          5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
          [OMITTED]..................................................30
          5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
          [OMITTED]..................................................30
       5.6. Key changeover...........................................30
       5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............31
          5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]31
          5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
          corrupted [OMITTED]........................................31
          5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..31
          5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
          [OMITTED]..................................................31
       5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................31
    6. Technical Security Controls...................................32
       6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................32
          6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................32


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          6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................32
          6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........32
          6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........32
          6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................33
          6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking33
          6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)33
       6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
       Controls......................................................33
          6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........33
          6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......33
          6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................33
          6.2.4. Private key backup..................................34
          6.2.5. Private key archival................................34
          6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
          module.....................................................34
          6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........34
          6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................34
          6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................34
          6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................34
          6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................34
       6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................35
          6.3.1. Public key archival.................................35
          6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
          periods....................................................35
       6.4. Activation data..........................................35
          6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........35
          6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................35
          6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................35
       6.5. Computer security controls...............................35
          6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....35
          6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................36
       6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................36
          6.6.1. System development controls.........................36
          6.6.2. Security management controls........................36
          6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................36
       6.7. Network security controls................................36
       6.8. Time-stamping............................................36
    7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................37
       Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr-
       res-certs-01].................................................37
       7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................37
          7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
          7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................37
          7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............37
          7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................37
          7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................37
          7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......37
          7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....37


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          7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....37
          7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
          Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................37
       7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................37
          7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
          7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............37
       7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................37
          7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
          7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................37
    8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................38
       8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................38
       8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................38
       8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............38
       8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................38
       8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................38
       8.6. Communication of results.................................38
    9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................39
       9.1. Fees.....................................................39
          9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................39
          9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............39
          9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................39
       9.2. Financial responsibility.................................39
          9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................39
          9.2.2. Other assets........................................39
          9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....39
       9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................39
          9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................39
          9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
          information................................................39
          9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..39
       9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................39
          9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................39
          9.4.2. Information treated as private......................39
          9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................39
          9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......39
          9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......39
          9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
          process....................................................40
          9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........40
       9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............40
       9.6. Representations and warranties...........................40
          9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................40
          9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........40
          9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........40
          9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
          [OMITTED]..................................................40
       9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................40
       9.8. Limitations of liability.................................40


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       9.9. Indemnities..............................................40
       9.10. Term and termination....................................40
          9.10.1. Term...............................................40
          9.10.2. Termination........................................40
          9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................40
       9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.40
       9.12. Amendments..............................................40
          9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................40
          9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................40
          9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
          [OMITTED]..................................................40
       9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................40
       9.14. Governing law...........................................40
       9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................40
       9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................40
          9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................41
          9.16.2. Assignment.........................................41
          9.16.3. Severability.......................................41
          9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).41
          9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................41
       9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................41
    10. Security Considerations......................................42
    11. IANA Considerations..........................................42
    12. Acknowledgments..............................................42
    13. References...................................................42
       13.1. Normative References....................................42
       13.2. Informative References..................................43
    Author's Addresses...............................................43
    Intellectual Property Statement..................................44
    Disclaimer of Validity...........................................45
    Copyright Statement..............................................45



Preface

    This document contains a template to be used for creating a
    Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
    (e.g., an NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
    Infrastructure (RPKI).  The user of this document should

      1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., "<Name of
         Registry> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource
         Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" with date, author, etc.

      2. delete this Preface




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      3. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
         brackets>

      4. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
         Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
         Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
         reference section with just the references in 13.2

      5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and
         additions above.

    Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
    number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
    CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
    retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections,
    in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme
    employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are
    included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
    sections are also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect
    in the Introduction below.  This information should be left in the
    CPS as an explanation to the user.

1. Introduction

    This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
    of Registry>.  It describes the practices employed by the <Name of
    Registry> Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address
    and Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI.   These practices are defined
    in accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP,
    [RFCxxxx]) of this PKI.

    The Resource PKI is aimed at supporting verifiable attestations
    about resource controls, e.g., for improved routing security. The
    goal is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS numbers
    to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this
    allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the
    holder of the associated private key has been allocated the
    resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique
    holder of these resources. The certificates and CRLs, in conjunction
    with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will provide
    critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., generation of
    route filters by ISPs.

    The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
    this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an
    address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
    contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
    certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity


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    to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
    an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of
    the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification
    of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
    to digitally sign data producing a signature that is verifiable
    using the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and
    validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI
    is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims
    related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on
    support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and
    CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
    this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.

    Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
    number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
    CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
    retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections,
    in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme
    employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are
    included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
    sections are also marked [OMITTED].

1.1. Overview

    This CPS describes:

      . Participants

      . Distribution of the certificates and CRLs

      . How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked

      . Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)

      . Key management

      . Audit procedures

      . Business and legal issues

    The PKI encompasses several types of certificates:

   . CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
      and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder

   . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying
      signatures of Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other
      (non-certificate/CRL) signed objects


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   . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
      support of access control for the repository system

1.2. Document name and identification

    The name of this document is "<Name of Registry>'s Certification
    Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
    (RPKI)".

1.3. PKI participants

    Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
    organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
    term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
    qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
    the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
    service from an LIR/ISP.  Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber"
    can refer both to LIRs/ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs,
    and other LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but
    which are subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term.
    Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to
    subscribers as organizations, even though some subscribers are
    individuals. When necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used
    to refer to an organization that receives network services from an
    LIR/ISP.

1.3.1. Certification authorities

    <Name of Registry> will operate two CAs for the RPKI: one is
    designated "offline" and the other is designated "production." The
    offline CA is the top level CA for the <Name of Registry> portion of
    the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation and recovery capability in
    case the production CA is compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus
    this CA issues certificates only to instances of the production CA
    and the CRLs it issues are used to revoke only a certificate issued
    to that CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to
    <Name of Registry> members, to which address space or AS numbers
    have been allocated.

1.3.2. Registration authorities

    There is no registration authority (RA) for either the offline or
    the production CA operating under this CPS. The former needs no RA
    capability because it issues certificates only to the production CA.
    The production CA relies upon certificates issued by the <Name of
    Registry> Business PKI (BPKI) (see Section 3.2.6) to identify
    individuals authorized to requests certificates under the RPKI.
    <Name of Registry> already establishes a business relationship with


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    each subscriber (<Name of Registry> member) and assumes
    responsibility for allocating and tracking the current allocation of
    address space and AS numbers. Since <Name of Registry> operates the
    BPKI CA, there is no distinct RA for the RPKI.

1.3.3. Subscribers

    Two types of organizations receive allocations of IP addresses and
    AS numbers from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense:
    network subscribers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
    <Additionally, this CA issues certificates to <Local/National>
    Registries (choose the right term for this RIR, if either applies)
    who, in turn, issue certificates to network subscribers or
    LIRs/ISPs.>

1.3.4. Relying parties

    Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS
    number current holdings are relying parties.  Thus, for example,
    entities that make use of address and AS number allocation
    certificates in support of improved routing security are relying
    parties. Registries are relying parties because they transfer
    resources between one another and thus will need to verify (cross)
    certificates issued in conjunction with such transfers.  This
    includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4]
    traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and subscribers who have received an
    allocation of address space from one ISP or from a registry, but
    want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP to originate routes to
    this space.

    To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access
    control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and
    ROA update packages -- they too act as relying parties.

1.3.5. Other participants

    <Name of Registry> will operate a repository that holds
    certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects, e.g., ROAs.

1.4. Certificate usage

1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses

    The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
    in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address
    space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to
    routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder
    of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure


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    fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to
    originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP
    proxy aggregation. Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the
    basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy.

    Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy
    could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g.,
    access control for the repository system. Such uses also are
    permitted under this policy.

1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses

    Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.

1.5. Policy administration

1.5.1. Organization administering the document

    This CPS is administered by <Name of Registry>

1.5.2. Contact person

    <Insert Registry contact info here>

1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

    Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
    is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
    numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
    public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the
    same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence
    they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.

1.5.4. CPS approval procedures

    Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
    is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
    numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
    public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the
    same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence
    they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.

1.6. Definitions and acronyms

    BPKI - Business PKI: A BPKI is used by an RIR to identify members to
          whom RPKI certificates can be issued.




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    CP -  Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that
          indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
          community and/or class of applications with common security
          requirements.

    CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
          specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
          in issuing certificates.

    ISP - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
          and selling Internet services to other organizations.

    LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
         network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of
         IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional
         (or National) Registry.

    NIR - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
          manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
          portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional
          Registry. These form an optional second tier in the tree
          scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation.

    RIR - Regional Internet Registry.  An RIR is an organization that
          manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
          specified geopolitical area.  At present, there are five RIRs:
          ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -
          Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AfriNIC
          (Africa).

    ROA - Route Origination Authorization.  This is a digitally signed
          object that identifies a network operator, identified by an
          AS, that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set
          of address blocks.
















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2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

    As per the CP, certificates and CRLs, will be made available for
    downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate
    this data for use in support of routing security.

    The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs, and
    other signed objects accessible via RSYNC at rpki.<Name of
    Registry>.net.

2.2. Publication of certification information

    <Name of Registry> will upload certificates and CRLs issued by it to
    a local repository system that operates as part of a world-wide
    distributed system of repositories.

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

    <Describe here your procedures for publication (via the repository)
    of the certificates and CRLs that you issue. If you choose to
    outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to provide this
    information for relying parties.>

    As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times
    and frequency:

    A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance.

    The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will publish its CRL prior to the
    nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
    the CA. Within 24 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish
    a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate.

2.4. Access controls on repositories

    Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must
    be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
    (certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally
    signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure
    that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
    does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of
    the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated.






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3. Identification And Authentication

3.1. Naming

3.1.1. Types of names

    The Subject of each certificate issued by this Registry is
    identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). For certificates
    issued to LIRs/ISPs and subscribers, the Subject will consist of a
    single CN attribute with a value generated by the issuer. For
    certificates issued to an NIR, the Subject will be the name of the
    NIR.

3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful

    The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
    relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP> RPKI CA.
    However, there is no guarantee that the subject name will be
    globally unique in this PKI.

    Note: The name of the holder of an address block or AS number need
    not to be "meaningful" in the conventional, human-readable sense,
    since certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization
    in support of routing security, not for identification

3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

    Although Subject names in certificates issued by this registry need
    not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a
    function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature
    is provided.

3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms

    None

3.1.5. Uniqueness of names

    <Name of Registry> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
    certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
    Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate
    certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor
    enforced through technical means.





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3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

    Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
    is no provision to recognize nor authenticate trademarks, service
    marks, etc.

3.2. Initial identity validation

3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key

    <Name of Registry> accepts certificate requests via the protocol
    described in [up/down]. This protocol makes use of the PKCS #10
    format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request format requires that
    the PKCS #10 request be signed using the (RSA) private key
    corresponding to the public key in the certificate request. This
    mechanism provides proof of possession by the requester.

3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity

    Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
    organizational identity of resource holders, with the exception of
    registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders in
    a fashion that preserves the accuracy of allocations as represented
    in <Name of Registry> records. Specifically, a BPKI certificate used
    to authenticate a certificate request serves as a link to the <Name
    of Registry> member database that maintains the resource allocation
    records. The certificate request is matched against the database
    record for the member in question, and an RPKI certificate is issued
    only if the resources requested are a subset of those held by the
    member.

3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity

    Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
    identity of a resource holder. However, <Name of Registry> maintains
    contact information for each resource holder in support of
    certificate renewal, re-key, or revocation, via the BPKI.

    The <Name of Registry> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates
    that are used to identify individuals who represent <Name of
    Registry> members that are address space (or AS number) holders.

3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

    No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
    under this certificate policy.




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3.2.5. Validation of authority

    Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6)
    has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate. Each
    certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI.

3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation

    The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
    other PKI. However, <Name of Registry> operates a BPKI [cps-
    business-pki] that is used to authenticate members and to enable
    them to manage their resource allocations. The Resource PKI relies
    on this BPKI to authenticate Subscribers who make certificate
    requests, revocation requests, etc.

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests

3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

    Routine re-key is effected via a Certificate Issuance Request
    message as described in [up/down]. This digitally signed CMS message
    is authenticated using a BPKI certificate associated with the
    requester.

3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

    Re-key after revocation is effected via a Certificate Issuance
    Request message as described in [up/down]. This digitally signed CMS
    message is authenticated using a BPKI certificate associated with
    the requester.

3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request

    An RPKI Subscriber makes an explicit revocation request using the
    protocol defined in [up/down]. Revocation requests in this protocol
    are digitally signed CMS messages, and are verified using a public
    key bound to an authorized representative via the <Name of Registry>
    BPKI.

    When a Subscriber requests an new resource allocation, an existing
    resource certificate issued to the subscriber is NOT revoked, so
    long as the set of resources allocated to the Subscriber did not
    "shrink," i.e., the new resources are a superset of the old resource
    set. However, if a new resource allocation results in "shrinkage" of
    the set of resources allocated to a Subscriber, this triggers an
    implicit revocation of the old resource certificate(s) associated
    with that Subscriber.



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4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application

    The following entities may submit a certificate application to this
    CA:

      o <Insert if appropriate: "Any NIR or LIR/ISP operating in the
         geopolitical region served by this registry">

      o Any entity that holds AS numbers or address space assigned by
         this registry

4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities

    <Name of Registry> members who are resource holders are enrolled in
    the <Name of Registry> BPKI via the process described in
    [operations-business-pki]. Only a member who holds a certificate
    issued under the BPKI is eligible to make an RPKI certificate
    request.

4.2. Certificate application processing

    <A/An Name of Registry> resource holder requests a certificate via a
    Certificate Issuance Request message [up/down], which is
    authenticated via the digital signature on the CMS envelope. The
    certificate used to authenticate the message is issued under the
    <Name of Registry> BPKI. <Name of Registry> processes the resource
    request as described in [up/down]. The Certificate Issuance Response
    message [up/down] either provides the certificate to the Subscriber,
    or provides a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled.

4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions

    The <Name of Registry> BPKI is used to identify <A/An Name of
    Registry> member representative applying for a certificate via a
    certificate issuance request in the up/down protocol. See the <Name
    of Registry> BPKI CPS for additional details [cp-business-pki].

4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

    The Certificate Issuance Response message [up/down] either provides
    the certificate to the Subscriber, or provides a response indicating
    why the request was not fulfilled. <Describe your practices for
    approval or rejection of applications and refer to documentation of
    existing business practices relevant to this process.  Note that


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    according to the CP, certificate applications will be approved based
    on the normal business practices of the entity operating the CA,
    based on the CA's records of address space and AS number holders.
    Also, each CA will verify that the requester holds the corresponding
    private key for the public key that will be bound to the certificate
    the CA issues to the requester.>

4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications

    <You may declare here your expected time frame for processing
    certificate applications.>

4.3. Certificate issuance

4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance

    A Subscriber generates a draft certificate using the PKCS #10
    format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This draft certificate is
    encapsulated in a CMS message, signed by the requester, and
    submitted as a Certificate Issuance Request as described in
    [up/down]. The CA verifies the request message as described in
    [up/down] and generates a Certificate Issuance Response message.
    That message either contains the requested certificate, or provides
    a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled.

4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

    A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a new certificate by the
    Certificate Issuance Response message.

4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]

4.4. Certificate acceptance

4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

    When a certificate is issued, the RPKI CA will place it in the
    repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate
    issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation
    of the certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
    repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3

4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA

    Certificates will be published in the Repository system within 1
    business day of being issued by this CA.



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4.5. Key pair and certificate usage

    A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.

4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage

    The certificates issued by this registry to resource holders are CA
    certificates. The private key associated with each of these
    certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
    CRLs. A subscriber will issue certificates to any organizations to
    which it allocates resources and one or more EE certificates for use
    in verifying signatures on ROAs signed by the subscriber. <If
    appropriate, add "Subscribers that are NIRs issue certificates to
    organizations to which they have allocated address space or AS
    numbers.  Subscribers that are LIRs issue certificates to
    organizations to which they have allocated address space.">
    Subscribers also will issue certificates to operators in support of
    repository access control.

4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage

    The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use
    RPKI EE certificates to verify ROAs and other signed objects, e.g.,
    in support of generating route filters.

4.6. Certificate renewal

4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal

    As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
    its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
    Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing its
    resource holding agreement, or may be explicit. If <Name of
    Registry> initiates the renewal process based on the certificate
    expiration date, then <Name of Registry> will notify the resource
    holder <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 weeks in
    advance of the expiration date", or the general policy, e.g., "in
    conjunction with notification of service expiration".>  The validity
    interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the
    previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1
    week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.

    Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
    previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
    compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
    Section 4.7 will apply.




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4.6.2. Who may request renewal

    The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the
    renewal process. For the case of the certificate holder, only an
    individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been
    issued may request renewal of an RPKI certificate. Each certificate
    issuance request is verified using the BPKI.

4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

    A Subscriber requests certificate renewal by sending a Certificate
    Issuance Request message [up/down].

4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

    A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a new certificate via
    the Certificate Issuance Response message, if the Subscriber
    initiated the renewal. If <Name of Registry> initiated the renewal
    process, the Subscriber is notified by the posting of the renewed
    certificate in the <Name of Registry> repository. A Subscriber can
    discover a certificate renewed by <Name of Registry> through use of
    the List message [up/down].

4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

    When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
    repository. A Subscriber is deemed to have accepted a certificate
    unless the subscriber explicitly requests revocation of the
    certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
    repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3.

4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

    <Name of Registry> will publish a renewal certificate in the <Name
    of Registry> RPKI repository within 1 business day after issuance of
    the renewed certificate.

4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]


4.7. Certificate re-key

4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key

    As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
    requested, based on:


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   (1) knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
      private key, or

   (2) the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
      key pair

    If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
    replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
    new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.

    If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
    certificate will be revoked.

    Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
    certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
    exceeds the validity period of the certificate.  This places
    additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.

4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key

    The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition,
    <Name of Registry> may initiate a re-key based on a verified
    compromise report. If the Subscriber (certificate Subject) requests
    the rekey, authentication is effected using the <Name of Registry>
    BPKI. <Describe how a compromise report received from other than a
    subscriber is verified.>

4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

    A Subscriber requests a re-key of a certificate by issuing a
    Certificate Issuance Request message in which the resources are ones
    that the Subscriber already holds, but a new public key is provided
    in the PKCS #10 portion of the request.

4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

    A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a re-keyed certificate
    via the Certificate Issuance Response message.

4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

    When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
    repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate
    issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation
    of the certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
    repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3.




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4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

    A re-keyed certificate will be published in the Repository system
    within 1 business day of being issued by this CA.

4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]


4.8. Certificate modification

4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification

    As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
    changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate.  A
    subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
    information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a
    result of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber. The
    request may be implicit, a side effect of the allocation of
    additional resources, or may be explicit.  A subscriber also may
    request that its existing set of resources be redistributed among
    multiple certificates. This example of certificate modification is
    effected through issuance of new certificates, and revocation of the
    previous certificates.

    If a subscriber is to be allocated address space or AS numbers in
    addition to a current allocation, and if the subscriber does not
    request that a new certificate be issued containing only these
    resources, then this is accomplished through a certificate
    modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new
    certificate is issued.  The new certificate will contain the same
    public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate,
    but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address
    space and AS allocations expanded. When previously allocated address
    space or AS numbers are to be removed from a certificate, then the
    old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting
    the new allocation) issued.

4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification

    The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the
    certificate modification process. If a certificate holder requests
    the modification, the request is authenticated using the <Name of
    Registry> BPKI, as described in [up/down]. <Name of Registry> will
    modify a certificate, and revoke the old certificate, if, for
    example, a Subscriber fails to renew membership in a timely fashion.




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4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests

    A certificate can be modified (other than for re-key) only by the
    addition or removal or resources. A Subscriber requests certificate
    modification by submitting a Certificate Issuance Request. If the
    request contains values for AS and/or (IPv4 or IPv6) address
    resource sets that the Subscriber already holds, but which are
    different from those in the currently issued certificates, the
    request is interpreted as a request for certificate modification.

4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber

    A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a modified certificate
    by the publication of the certificate in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
    repository system.

4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

    When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
    repository and notify the subscriber. A subject is deemed to have
    accepted the modified certificate unless the subject explicitly
    requests revocation of the certificate after publication in the
    <Name of Registry> RPKI repository system, as described in Section
    4.9.3.

4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

    A modified certificate will be published in the <Name of Registry>
    RPKI Repository system within 1 business day of being issued by this
    CA.

4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]


4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation

    As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
    Either <Name of Registry> or the subject may choose to end the
    relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
    revoke the certificate. If one or more of the resources bound to the
    public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
    subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation.  A certificate
    also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
    corresponding to the public key in the certificate.  Finally, a



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    certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by
    that certificate.

4.9.2. Who can request revocation

    The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may request a
    revocation. A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using the
    Certificate Revocation Request message described in [up/down].

4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request

    A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using the Certificate
    Revocation Request message described in [up/down]. The Certificate
    Revocation Response message confirms receipt of the revocation
    request by <Name of Registry>, and indicates that <Name of Registry>
    will include the revoked certificate in a CRL.

4.9.4. Revocation request grace period

    A Subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
    need for revocation has been identified.

4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

    <Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
    process a revocation request.>

4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

    As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
    checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
    certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.

4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency

    The <Name of Registry> RPKI production CA will publish CRLs
    approximately every 24 hours. The <Name of Registry> RPKI offline CA
    will publish CRLs on a monthly basis. Each CRL will carry a
    nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be published at or
    before that time.  <Name of Registry> will set the
    nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the
    next scheduled CRL will be issued.

4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs

    A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay
    after generation.



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4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]

4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]

4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]

4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]

4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]

4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]

4.10. Certificate status services

    <Name of Registry> does not support OCSP. <Name of Registry> issues
    CRLs.

4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]

4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]

4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]

4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]

4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]

4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]

4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
[OMITTED]















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5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls



5.1. Physical controls

    <As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
    certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used
    in the management of address space and AS number allocation.>

5.1.1. Site location and construction

5.1.2. Physical access

5.1.3. Power and air conditioning

5.1.4. Water exposures

5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection

5.1.6. Media storage

5.1.7. Waste disposal

5.1.8. Off-site backup

5.2. Procedural controls

    <As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
    employ for certificate management.  These should be commensurate to
    those used in the management of address space and AS number
    allocation.>

5.2.1. Trusted roles

5.2.2. Number of persons required per task

5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role

5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties

5.3. Personnel controls

    <As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
    employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
    should be commensurate to those used in the management of address
    space and AS number allocation.>



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5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

5.3.2. Background check procedures

5.3.3. Training requirements

5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements

5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence

5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions

5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements

5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel

5.4. Audit logging procedures

5.4.1. Types of events recorded

    Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
    certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records will
    include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
    content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:

    Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

    Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests,
    certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications)

    Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

    Posting of any material to a repository

    Any attempts to change or delete audit data

    <List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>

5.4.2. Frequency of processing log

    <Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>

5.4.3. Retention period for audit log

    <Describe your polices for retention of audit logs.>





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5.4.4. Protection of audit log

    <Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>

5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures

    <Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>

5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]

5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]

5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments

    <Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
    already applied) to the PKI subsystems.  This should include whether
    such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
    perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>

5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]

5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]

5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]

5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]

5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]

5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]

5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]

5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]

5.6. Key changeover

    The <Name of Registry> CA certificate will contain a validity period
    that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA
    certificate.  To support this, <Name of Registry> will create a new
    signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate
    containing the public key of the pair, <specify here the minimum
    amount of lead time, e.g.,  "a minimum of 6 months"> in advance of
    the scheduled change of the current signature key pair.






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5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]

5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
[OMITTED]

5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]

5.8. CA or RA termination

    <Describe the fallback policy for management of your CA's IP address
    space and AS number allocations in case of its own termination.>



































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6. Technical Security Controls

    This section describes the security controls used by <Name of
    Registry>.

6.1. Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1. Key pair generation

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key
    pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for network subscribers.  In
    most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the
    subscriber, i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of
    address space or AS numbers.  However, your procedures may include
    one for generating key pairs on behalf of your subscribers if they
    so request. (This might be done for subscribers who do not have the
    ability to perform key generation in a secure fashion or who want a
    registry to provide backup for the subscriber private key.) Since
    the keys used in this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes,
    generation of key pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the
    security of the PKI. >

6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber

    <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation
    services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys
    are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this
    is not applicable.>

6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

    Subscribers deliver public keys to the <Name of Registry> RPKI CA by
    use of the up/down protocol as described in [up/down].

6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

    CA public keys for all entities other than RIRs are contained in
    certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates plus
    certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address space
    or AS numbers will be published via a repository system. Relying
    parties will download these certificates from this system. Public
    key values and associated data for the trust anchors (RIRs) will be
    distributed out of band, e.g., embedded in path validation software
    that will be made available to the Internet community.






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6.1.5. Key sizes

    For the <Name of Registry> offline CA'sand production CA's
    certificates, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For subscriber
    certificates, the RSA keys will be <insert key size -- e.g., 2048 or
    1024 bits. If NIR key size is larger than LIR/ISP/subscriber key
    size, describe each independently.>

6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

    The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent
    (e) F4 (65,537).

    <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
    insert here text specifying that the subscriber is responsible for
    performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that
    <Name of Registry> is not responsible for performing such checks for
    subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking
    the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>

6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

    The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280.
    For <Name of Registry>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and
    cRLSign bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including
    digitalSignature) will be set FALSE, and the extension will be
    marked critical.

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
      Controls

6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls

    The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA employs a cryptographic module
    evaluated under FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS].

6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

    There will be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m>
    multi-person control.

6.2.3. Private key escrow

    No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.






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6.2.4. Private key backup

    <Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
    The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
    done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
    the original private key.  (2) At least one copy should be kept at
    an off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>

6.2.5. Private key archival

    See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4

6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

    The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s offline CA and production
    CA will be generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1.
    The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted
    form for backup and/or transfer to a new module.

6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module

    The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s CA will be stored in the
    cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in
    accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the
    module. (See [FIPS])

6.2.8. Method of activating private key

    <Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
    key.>

6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key

    The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
    unattended.  After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
    procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module
    will be stored securely when not in use.

6.2.10. Method of destroying private key

    <Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key,
    e.g., when it is superseded.  This will depend on the particular
    module.>

6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating

    The cryptographic module used by the <Name of Registry> production
    CA will be certified FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS].


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6.3. Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1. Public key archival

    Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
    to archive public keys.

6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

    The <Name of Registry> CA's key pair will have a validity interval
    of <insert number of years - Registry key pairs and certificates
    should have long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the
    disruption caused by key changeover for top tier CAs.>

6.4. Activation data

6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation

    <Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>

6.4.2. Activation data protection

    Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by
    <Describe your procedures here>.

6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data

    <Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
    activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None.">

6.5. Computer security controls

6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement

    <Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
    support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
    capabilities, etc.  These requirements should be commensurate with
    those used for the computers used for managing allocation of IP
    addresses and AS numbers.>











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6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]

6.6. Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1. System development controls

    <Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the
    PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology
    (TSDM) Level 2.>

6.6.2. Security management controls

    <Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
    software and equipment employed by the CA.  These security measures
    should be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the
    CAs for managing and allocating RPKI resources.>

6.6.3. Life cycle security controls

    <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI
    functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated.
    This should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
    equipment for the management and allocation of IP address space and
    AS numbers is handled. >

6.7. Network security controls

    <Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
    operation.  These should be commensurate with the network security
    controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation of
    IP addresses and AS numbers.>

6.8. Time-stamping

    The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping.















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7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

    Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].

7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]

7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]

7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]

7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]

7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]

7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]

7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]

7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension [OMITTED]

7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]

7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]

7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]


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8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

    <List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
    security of the administration of IP addresses and AS numbers. These
    are sufficient for the PKI systems.>

8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment

8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor

8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

8.4. Topics covered by assessment

8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency

8.6. Communication of results

































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9. Other Business And Legal Matters



    <The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
    your organization. Note that the manner in which you manage your
    business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with
    the way in which you manage business and legal matters for the
    allocation of RPKI resources.>



9.1. Fees

9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees

9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)

9.1.3. Refund policy

9.2. Financial responsibility

9.2.1. Insurance coverage

9.2.2. Other assets

9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

9.3. Confidentiality of business information

9.3.1. Scope of confidential information

9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information

9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information

9.4. Privacy of personal information

9.4.1. Privacy plan

9.4.2. Information treated as private

9.4.3. Information not deemed private

9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information

9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information



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9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process

9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances

9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)

9.6. Representations and warranties

9.6.1. CA representations and warranties

9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties

9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties

9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]

9.7. Disclaimers of warranties

9.8. Limitations of liability

9.9. Indemnities

9.10. Term and termination

9.10.1. Term

9.10.2. Termination

9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival

9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants

9.12. Amendments

9.12.1. Procedure for amendment

9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period

9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]

9.13. Dispute resolution provisions

9.14. Governing law

9.15. Compliance with applicable law

9.16. Miscellaneous provisions



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9.16.1. Entire agreement

9.16.2. Assignment

9.16.3. Severability

9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

9.16.5. Force Majeure

9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]







































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10. Security Considerations

    The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied
    in a certificate depends on several factors.  These factors can
    include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA)
    in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy,
    procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of
    the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the
    private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms
    and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
    warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a
    framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and
    physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration
    Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party
    cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate
    generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is
    done in a secure manner.  Specifically, Section 3 Identification and
    Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational
    Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational
    Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7
    Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and
    Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of
    the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
    relying party systems.

11. IANA Considerations

    None.

12. Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this
    document and Matt Houston for his help with the formatting.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

    [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
          Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

    [RFC3280]   Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet
          X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
          Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

    [RFCxxxx]   Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S. ,
          "Certificate Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in
          progress, February 2008.


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    [RFCyyyy]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
          X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress, November
          2007.

    [up/down]   Houston, G., Loomis, R., Ellacott, B.,  Austein, R., "A
          Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates," January
          2008.

13.2. Informative References

    [BGP4]   Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors),  A Border Gateway Protocol 4
          (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.

    [cps-business-pki]   <Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for
          this registry's business PKI -- to be filled in>

    [FIPS]   Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
          (FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
          Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
          Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.

    [operations-business-pki]  <Document or pointer to document
          describing the operations of this registry's business PKI --
          to be filled in>

    [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for
          obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
          Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.

Author's Addresses

    Stephen Kent
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA














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    Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
    Email: skent@bbn.com

    Derrick Kong
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA

    Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
    Email: dkong@bbn.com

    Karen Seo
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA

    Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
    Email: kseo@bbn.com


Intellectual Property Statement

    The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
    Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
    to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described
    in this document or the extent to which any license under such
    rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that
    it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights.
    Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC
    documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

    Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
    assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
    attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
    of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
    specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
    at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

    The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
    copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
    rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
    this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
    ipr@ietf.org.





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Disclaimer of Validity

    This document and the information contained herein are provided on
    an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
    REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE
    IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL
    WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY
    WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE
    ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS
    FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Copyright Statement

    Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

    This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
    contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
    retain all their rights.
































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