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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 draft-ietf-sidr-cps

Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                             Kong, D.
Internet Draft                                                  Seo, K.
Expires: May 2009                                              Kent, S.
Intended Status: Informational                         BBN Technologies
                                                          November 2008




                              Template for an
        Internet Registry's Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
                        for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
                      draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-04.txt


Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that
   any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is
   aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she
   becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of
   BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 31, 2009.

Abstract

   This document contains a template to be used for creating a
   Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
   (e.g., NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI).




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Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

Table of Contents


   Preface...........................................................8
   1. Introduction...................................................9
      1.1. Overview.................................................10
      1.2. Document name and identification.........................11
      1.3. PKI participants.........................................11
         1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11
         1.3.2. Registration authorities............................11
         1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12
         1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12
         1.3.5. Other participants..................................12
      1.4. Certificate usage........................................12
         1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12
         1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13
      1.5. Policy administration....................................13
         1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13
         1.5.2. Contact person......................................13
         1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13
         1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13
      1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................13
   2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15
      2.1. Repositories.............................................15
      2.2. Publication of certification information.................15
      2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15
      2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15
   3. Identification And Authentication.............................16
      3.1. Naming...................................................16
         3.1.1. Types of names......................................16
         3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................16
         3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............16
         3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........16
         3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................16
         3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.17
      3.2. Initial identity validation..............................17
         3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........17
         3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............17
         3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............17
         3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17
         3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................18
         3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................18


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      3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....18
         3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key18
         3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
         revocation.................................................18
      3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.18
   4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19
      4.1. Certificate Application..................................19
         4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19
         4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19
      4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19
         4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
         ...........................................................19
         4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...19
         4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20
      4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20
         4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20
         4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
         certificate................................................20
      4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20
         4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20
         4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20
      4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21
         4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21
         4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21
      4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21
         4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................21
         4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................22
         4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22
         4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
         ...........................................................22
         4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
         certificate................................................22
         4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22
         4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities [OMITTED].........................................22
      4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................22
         4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................22
         4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...23
         4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........23
         4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
         ...........................................................23
         4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
         certificate................................................23
         4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24
         4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities [OMITTED].........................................24
      4.8. Certificate modification.................................24
         4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24


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         4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24
         4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........25
         4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
         subscriber.................................................25
         4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
         ...........................................................25
         4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...25
         4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities [OMITTED].........................................25
      4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25
         4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25
         4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................26
         4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26
         4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26
         4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
         request....................................................26
         4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.26
         4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26
         4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26
         4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
         [OMITTED]..................................................27
         4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].27
         4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
         [OMITTED]..................................................27
         4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...27
         4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............27
         4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............27
         4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........27
         4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............27
      4.10. Certificate status services.............................27
         4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............27
         4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................27
         4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................27
      4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................27
      4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................27
         4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
         ...........................................................27
         4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
         practices [OMITTED]........................................27
   5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................28
      5.1. Physical controls........................................28
         5.1.1. Site location and construction......................28
         5.1.2. Physical access.....................................28
         5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................28
         5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................28
         5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................28
         5.1.6. Media storage.......................................28
         5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................28


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         5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................28
      5.2. Procedural controls......................................28
         5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................28
         5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................28
         5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....28
         5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................28
      5.3. Personnel controls.......................................28
         5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
         ...........................................................29
         5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................29
         5.3.3. Training requirements...............................29
         5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............29
         5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................29
         5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................29
         5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................29
         5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................29
      5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................29
         5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................29
         5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................29
         5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................29
         5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................30
         5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................30
         5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
         [OMITTED]..................................................30
         5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....30
         5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................30
      5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................30
         5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................30
         5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............30
         5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................30
         5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................30
         5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].30
         5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
         [OMITTED]..................................................30
         5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
         [OMITTED]..................................................30
      5.6. Key changeover...........................................30
      5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............31
         5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]31
         5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
         corrupted [OMITTED]........................................31
         5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..31
         5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
         [OMITTED]..................................................31
      5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................31
   6. Technical Security Controls...................................32
      6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................32
         6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................32


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         6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................32
         6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........32
         6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........32
         6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................33
         6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking33
         6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)33
      6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
      Controls......................................................33
         6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........33
         6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......33
         6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................33
         6.2.4. Private key backup..................................34
         6.2.5. Private key archival................................34
         6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
         module.....................................................34
         6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........34
         6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................34
         6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................34
         6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................34
         6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................34
      6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................35
         6.3.1. Public key archival.................................35
         6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
         periods....................................................35
      6.4. Activation data..........................................35
         6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........35
         6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................35
         6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................35
      6.5. Computer security controls...............................35
         6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....35
         6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................36
      6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................36
         6.6.1. System development controls.........................36
         6.6.2. Security management controls........................36
         6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................36
      6.7. Network security controls................................36
      6.8. Time-stamping............................................36
   7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................37
      Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr-
      res-certs-01].................................................37
      7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................37
         7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
         7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................37
         7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............37
         7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................37
         7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................37
         7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......37
         7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....37


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         7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....37
         7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
         Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................37
      7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................37
         7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
         7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............37
      7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................37
         7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
         7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................37
   8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................38
      8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................38
      8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................38
      8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............38
      8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................38
      8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................38
      8.6. Communication of results.................................38
   9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................39
      9.1. Fees.....................................................39
         9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................39
         9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............39
         9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................39
      9.2. Financial responsibility.................................39
         9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................39
         9.2.2. Other assets........................................39
         9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....39
      9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................39
         9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................39
         9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
         information................................................39
         9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..39
      9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................39
         9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................39
         9.4.2. Information treated as private......................39
         9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................39
         9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......39
         9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......39
         9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
         process....................................................40
         9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........40
      9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............40
      9.6. Representations and warranties...........................40
         9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................40
         9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........40
         9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........40
         9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
         [OMITTED]..................................................40
      9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................40
      9.8. Limitations of liability.................................40


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      9.9. Indemnities..............................................40
      9.10. Term and termination....................................40
         9.10.1. Term...............................................40
         9.10.2. Termination........................................40
         9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................40
      9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.40
      9.12. Amendments..............................................40
         9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................40
         9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................40
         9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
         [OMITTED]..................................................40
      9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................40
      9.14. Governing law...........................................40
      9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................40
      9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................40
         9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................41
         9.16.2. Assignment.........................................41
         9.16.3. Severability.......................................41
         9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).41
         9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................41
      9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................41
   10. Security Considerations......................................42
   11. IANA Considerations..........................................42
   12. Acknowledgments..............................................42
   13. References...................................................42
      13.1. Normative References....................................42
      13.2. Informative References..................................43
   Author's Addresses...............................................43
   Intellectual Property Statement..................................44
   Disclaimer of Validity...........................................45
   Copyright Statement..............................................45



Preface

   This document contains a template to be used for creating a
   Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
   (e.g., an NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI).  The user of this document should

     1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., "<Name of
        Registry> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource
        Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" with date, author, etc.

     2. delete this Preface




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     3. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
        brackets>

     4. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
        Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
        Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
        reference section with just the references in 13.2

     5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and
        additions above.

   Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
   number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
   CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
   retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections,
   in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme
   employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are
   included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
   sections are also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect
   in the Introduction below.  This information should be left in the
   CPS as an explanation to the user.

1. Introduction

   This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
   of Registry>.  It describes the practices employed by the <Name of
   Registry> Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address
   and Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI.   These practices are defined
   in accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP,
   [RFCxxxx]) of this PKI.

   The Resource PKI is aimed at supporting verifiable attestations
   about resource controls, e.g., for improved routing security. The
   goal is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS numbers
   to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this
   allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the
   holder of the associated private key has been allocated the
   resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique
   holder of these resources. The certificates and CRLs, in conjunction
   with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will provide
   critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., generation of
   route filters by ISPs.

   The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
   this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an
   address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
   contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
   certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity


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   to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
   an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of
   the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification
   of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
   to digitally sign data producing a signature that is verifiable
   using the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and
   validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI
   is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims
   related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on
   support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and
   CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
   this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.

   Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
   number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
   CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
   retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections,
   in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme
   employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are
   included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
   sections are also marked [OMITTED].

1.1. Overview

   This CPS describes:

     . Participants

     . Distribution of the certificates and CRLs

     . How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked

     . Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)

     . Key management

     . Audit procedures

     . Business and legal issues

   The PKI encompasses several types of certificates:

  . CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
     and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder

  . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying
     signatures of Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other
     (non-certificate/CRL) signed objects


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  . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
     support of access control for the repository system

1.2. Document name and identification

   The name of this document is "<Name of Registry>'s Certification
   Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
   (RPKI)".

1.3. PKI participants

   Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
   organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
   term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
   qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
   the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
   service from an LIR/ISP.  Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber"
   can refer both to LIRs/ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs,
   and other LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but
   which are subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term.
   Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to
   subscribers as organizations, even though some subscribers are
   individuals. When necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used
   to refer to an organization that receives network services from an
   LIR/ISP.

1.3.1. Certification authorities

   <Name of Registry> will operate two CAs for the RPKI: one is
   designated "offline" and the other is designated "production." The
   offline CA is the top level CA for the <Name of Registry> portion of
   the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation and recovery capability in
   case the production CA is compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus
   this CA issues certificates only to instances of the production CA
   and the CRLs it issues are used to revoke only a certificate issued
   to that CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to
   <Name of Registry> members, to which address space or AS numbers
   have been allocated.

1.3.2. Registration authorities

   There is no registration authority (RA) for either the offline or
   the production CA operating under this CPS. The former needs no RA
   capability because it issues certificates only to the production CA.
   The production CA relies upon certificates issued by the <Name of
   Registry> Business PKI (BPKI) (see Section 3.2.6) to identify
   individuals authorized to requests certificates under the RPKI.
   <Name of Registry> already establishes a business relationship with


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   each subscriber (<Name of Registry> member) and assumes
   responsibility for allocating and tracking the current allocation of
   address space and AS numbers. Since <Name of Registry> operates the
   BPKI CA, there is no distinct RA for the RPKI.

1.3.3. Subscribers

   Two types of organizations receive allocations of IP addresses and
   AS numbers from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense:
   network subscribers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
   <Additionally, this CA issues certificates to <Local/National>
   Registries (choose the right term for this RIR, if either applies)
   who, in turn, issue certificates to network subscribers or
   LIRs/ISPs.>

1.3.4. Relying parties

   Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS
   number current holdings are relying parties.  Thus, for example,
   entities that make use of address and AS number allocation
   certificates in support of improved routing security are relying
   parties. Registries are relying parties because they transfer
   resources between one another and thus will need to verify (cross)
   certificates issued in conjunction with such transfers.  This
   includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4]
   traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and subscribers who have received an
   allocation of address space from one ISP or from a registry, but
   want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP to originate routes to
   this space.

   To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access
   control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and
   ROA update packages -- they too act as relying parties.

1.3.5. Other participants

   <Name of Registry> will operate a repository that holds
   certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects, e.g., ROAs.

1.4. Certificate usage

1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses

   The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
   in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address
   space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to
   routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder
   of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure


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   fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to
   originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP
   proxy aggregation. Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the
   basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy.

   Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy
   could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g.,
   access control for the repository system. Such uses also are
   permitted under this policy.

1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses

   Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.

1.5. Policy administration

1.5.1. Organization administering the document

   This CPS is administered by <Name of Registry>

1.5.2. Contact person

   <Insert Registry contact info here>

1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

   Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
   is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
   numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
   public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the
   same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence
   they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.

1.5.4. CPS approval procedures

   Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
   is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
   numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
   public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the
   same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence
   they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.

1.6. Definitions and acronyms

   BPKI - Business PKI: A BPKI is used by an RIR to identify members to
         whom RPKI certificates can be issued.




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   CP -  Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that
         indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
         community and/or class of applications with common security
         requirements.

   CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
         specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
         in issuing certificates.

   ISP - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
         and selling Internet services to other organizations.

   LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
        network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of
        IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional
        (or National) Registry.

   NIR - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
         manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
         portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional
         Registry. These form an optional second tier in the tree
         scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation.

   RIR - Regional Internet Registry.  An RIR is an organization that
         manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
         specified geopolitical area.  At present, there are five RIRs:
         ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -
         Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AfriNIC
         (Africa).

   ROA - Route Origination Authorization.  This is a digitally signed
         object that identifies a network operator, identified by an
         AS, that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set
         of address blocks.
















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2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

   As per the CP, certificates and CRLs, will be made available for
   downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate
   this data for use in support of routing security.

   The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs, and
   other signed objects accessible via RSYNC at rpki.<Name of
   Registry>.net.

2.2. Publication of certification information

   <Name of Registry> will upload certificates and CRLs issued by it to
   a local repository system that operates as part of a world-wide
   distributed system of repositories.

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

   <Describe here your procedures for publication (via the repository)
   of the certificates and CRLs that you issue. If you choose to
   outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to provide this
   information for relying parties.>

   As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times
   and frequency:

   A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance.

   The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will publish its CRL prior to the
   nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
   the CA. Within 24 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish
   a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate.

2.4. Access controls on repositories

   Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must
   be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
   (certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally
   signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure
   that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
   does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of
   the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated.






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3. Identification And Authentication

3.1. Naming

3.1.1. Types of names

   The Subject of each certificate issued by this Registry is
   identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). For certificates
   issued to LIRs/ISPs and subscribers, the Subject will consist of a
   single CN attribute with a value generated by the issuer. For
   certificates issued to an NIR, the Subject will be the name of the
   NIR.

3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful

   The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
   relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP> RPKI CA.
   However, there is no guarantee that the subject name will be
   globally unique in this PKI.

   Note: The name of the holder of an address block or AS number need
   not to be "meaningful" in the conventional, human-readable sense,
   since certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization
   in support of routing security, not for identification

3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

   Although Subject names in certificates issued by this registry need
   not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a
   function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature
   is provided.

3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms

   None

3.1.5. Uniqueness of names

   <Name of Registry> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
   certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
   Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate
   certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor
   enforced through technical means.





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3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

   Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
   is no provision to recognize nor authenticate trademarks, service
   marks, etc.

3.2. Initial identity validation

3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key

   <Name of Registry> accepts certificate requests via the protocol
   described in [up/down]. This protocol makes use of the PKCS #10
   format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request format requires that
   the PKCS #10 request be signed using the (RSA) private key
   corresponding to the public key in the certificate request. This
   mechanism provides proof of possession by the requester.

3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity

   Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
   organizational identity of resource holders, with the exception of
   registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders in
   a fashion that preserves the accuracy of allocations as represented
   in <Name of Registry> records. Specifically, a BPKI certificate used
   to authenticate a certificate request serves as a link to the <Name
   of Registry> member database that maintains the resource allocation
   records. The certificate request is matched against the database
   record for the member in question, and an RPKI certificate is issued
   only if the resources requested are a subset of those held by the
   member.

3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity

   Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
   identity of a resource holder. However, <Name of Registry> maintains
   contact information for each resource holder in support of
   certificate renewal, re-key, or revocation, via the BPKI.

   The <Name of Registry> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates
   that are used to identify individuals who represent <Name of
   Registry> members that are address space (or AS number) holders.

3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

   No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
   under this certificate policy.




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3.2.5. Validation of authority

   Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6)
   has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate. Each
   certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI.

3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation

   The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
   other PKI. However, <Name of Registry> operates a BPKI [cps-
   business-pki] that is used to authenticate members and to enable
   them to manage their resource allocations. The Resource PKI relies
   on this BPKI to authenticate Subscribers who make certificate
   requests, revocation requests, etc.

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests

3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

   Routine re-key is effected via a Certificate Issuance Request
   message as described in [up/down]. This digitally signed CMS message
   is authenticated using a BPKI certificate associated with the
   requester.

3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

   Re-key after revocation is effected via a Certificate Issuance
   Request message as described in [up/down]. This digitally signed CMS
   message is authenticated using a BPKI certificate associated with
   the requester.

3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request

   An RPKI Subscriber makes an explicit revocation request using the
   protocol defined in [up/down]. Revocation requests in this protocol
   are digitally signed CMS messages, and are verified using a public
   key bound to an authorized representative via the <Name of Registry>
   BPKI.

   When a Subscriber requests an new resource allocation, an existing
   resource certificate issued to the subscriber is NOT revoked, so
   long as the set of resources allocated to the Subscriber did not
   "shrink," i.e., the new resources are a superset of the old resource
   set. However, if a new resource allocation results in "shrinkage" of
   the set of resources allocated to a Subscriber, this triggers an
   implicit revocation of the old resource certificate(s) associated
   with that Subscriber.



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4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application

   The following entities may submit a certificate application to this
   CA:

     o <Insert if appropriate: "Any NIR or LIR/ISP operating in the
        geopolitical region served by this registry">

     o Any entity that holds AS numbers or address space assigned by
        this registry

4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities

   <Name of Registry> members who are resource holders are enrolled in
   the <Name of Registry> BPKI via the process described in
   [operations-business-pki]. Only a member who holds a certificate
   issued under the BPKI is eligible to make an RPKI certificate
   request.

4.2. Certificate application processing

   <A/An Name of Registry> resource holder requests a certificate via a
   Certificate Issuance Request message [up/down], which is
   authenticated via the digital signature on the CMS envelope. The
   certificate used to authenticate the message is issued under the
   <Name of Registry> BPKI. <Name of Registry> processes the resource
   request as described in [up/down]. The Certificate Issuance Response
   message [up/down] either provides the certificate to the Subscriber,
   or provides a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled.

4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions

   The <Name of Registry> BPKI is used to identify <A/An Name of
   Registry> member representative applying for a certificate via a
   certificate issuance request in the up/down protocol. See the <Name
   of Registry> BPKI CPS for additional details [cp-business-pki].

4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

   The Certificate Issuance Response message [up/down] either provides
   the certificate to the Subscriber, or provides a response indicating
   why the request was not fulfilled. <Describe your practices for
   approval or rejection of applications and refer to documentation of
   existing business practices relevant to this process.  Note that


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   according to the CP, certificate applications will be approved based
   on the normal business practices of the entity operating the CA,
   based on the CA's records of address space and AS number holders.
   Also, each CA will verify that the requester holds the corresponding
   private key for the public key that will be bound to the certificate
   the CA issues to the requester.>

4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications

   <You may declare here your expected time frame for processing
   certificate applications.>

4.3. Certificate issuance

4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance

   A Subscriber generates a draft certificate using the PKCS #10
   format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This draft certificate is
   encapsulated in a CMS message, signed by the requester, and
   submitted as a Certificate Issuance Request as described in
   [up/down]. The CA verifies the request message as described in
   [up/down] and generates a Certificate Issuance Response message.
   That message either contains the requested certificate, or provides
   a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled.

4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

   A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a new certificate by the
   Certificate Issuance Response message.

4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]

4.4. Certificate acceptance

4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

   When a certificate is issued, the RPKI CA will place it in the
   repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate
   issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation
   of the certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
   repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3

4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA

   Certificates will be published in the Repository system within 1
   business day of being issued by this CA.



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4.5. Key pair and certificate usage

   A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.

4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage

   The certificates issued by this registry to resource holders are CA
   certificates. The private key associated with each of these
   certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
   CRLs. A subscriber will issue certificates to any organizations to
   which it allocates resources and one or more EE certificates for use
   in verifying signatures on ROAs signed by the subscriber. <If
   appropriate, add "Subscribers that are NIRs issue certificates to
   organizations to which they have allocated address space or AS
   numbers.  Subscribers that are LIRs issue certificates to
   organizations to which they have allocated address space.">
   Subscribers also will issue certificates to operators in support of
   repository access control.

4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage

   The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use
   RPKI EE certificates to verify ROAs and other signed objects, e.g.,
   in support of generating route filters.

4.6. Certificate renewal

4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal

   As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
   its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
   Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing its
   resource holding agreement, or may be explicit. If <Name of
   Registry> initiates the renewal process based on the certificate
   expiration date, then <Name of Registry> will notify the resource
   holder <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 weeks in
   advance of the expiration date", or the general policy, e.g., "in
   conjunction with notification of service expiration".>  The validity
   interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the
   previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1
   week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.

   Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
   previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
   compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
   Section 4.7 will apply.




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4.6.2. Who may request renewal

   The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the
   renewal process. For the case of the certificate holder, only an
   individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been
   issued may request renewal of an RPKI certificate. Each certificate
   issuance request is verified using the BPKI.

4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

   A Subscriber requests certificate renewal by sending a Certificate
   Issuance Request message [up/down].

4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a new certificate via
   the Certificate Issuance Response message, if the Subscriber
   initiated the renewal. If <Name of Registry> initiated the renewal
   process, the Subscriber is notified by the posting of the renewed
   certificate in the <Name of Registry> repository. A Subscriber can
   discover a certificate renewed by <Name of Registry> through use of
   the List message [up/down].

4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

   When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
   repository. A Subscriber is deemed to have accepted a certificate
   unless the subscriber explicitly requests revocation of the
   certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
   repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3.

4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

   <Name of Registry> will publish a renewal certificate in the <Name
   of Registry> RPKI repository within 1 business day after issuance of
   the renewed certificate.

4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]


4.7. Certificate re-key

4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key

   As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
   requested, based on:


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  (1) knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
     private key, or

  (2) the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
     key pair

   If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
   replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
   new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.

   If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
   certificate will be revoked.

   Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
   certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
   exceeds the validity period of the certificate.  This places
   additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.

4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key

   The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition,
   <Name of Registry> may initiate a re-key based on a verified
   compromise report. If the Subscriber (certificate Subject) requests
   the rekey, authentication is effected using the <Name of Registry>
   BPKI. <Describe how a compromise report received from other than a
   subscriber is verified.>

4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

   A Subscriber requests a re-key of a certificate by issuing a
   Certificate Issuance Request message in which the resources are ones
   that the Subscriber already holds, but a new public key is provided
   in the PKCS #10 portion of the request.

4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a re-keyed certificate
   via the Certificate Issuance Response message.

4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

   When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
   repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate
   issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation
   of the certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
   repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3.




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4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

   A re-keyed certificate will be published in the Repository system
   within 1 business day of being issued by this CA.

4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]


4.8. Certificate modification

4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification

   As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
   changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate.  A
   subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
   information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a
   result of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber. The
   request may be implicit, a side effect of the allocation of
   additional resources, or may be explicit.  A subscriber also may
   request that its existing set of resources be redistributed among
   multiple certificates. This example of certificate modification is
   effected through issuance of new certificates, and revocation of the
   previous certificates.

   If a subscriber is to be allocated address space or AS numbers in
   addition to a current allocation, and if the subscriber does not
   request that a new certificate be issued containing only these
   resources, then this is accomplished through a certificate
   modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new
   certificate is issued.  The new certificate will contain the same
   public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate,
   but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address
   space and AS allocations expanded. When previously allocated address
   space or AS numbers are to be removed from a certificate, then the
   old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting
   the new allocation) issued.

4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification

   The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the
   certificate modification process. If a certificate holder requests
   the modification, the request is authenticated using the <Name of
   Registry> BPKI, as described in [up/down]. <Name of Registry> will
   modify a certificate, and revoke the old certificate, if, for
   example, a Subscriber fails to renew membership in a timely fashion.




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4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests

   A certificate can be modified (other than for re-key) only by the
   addition or removal or resources. A Subscriber requests certificate
   modification by submitting a Certificate Issuance Request. If the
   request contains values for AS and/or (IPv4 or IPv6) address
   resource sets that the Subscriber already holds, but which are
   different from those in the currently issued certificates, the
   request is interpreted as a request for certificate modification.

4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber

   A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a modified certificate
   by the publication of the certificate in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
   repository system.

4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

   When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
   repository and notify the subscriber. A subject is deemed to have
   accepted the modified certificate unless the subject explicitly
   requests revocation of the certificate after publication in the
   <Name of Registry> RPKI repository system, as described in Section
   4.9.3.

4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

   A modified certificate will be published in the <Name of Registry>
   RPKI Repository system within 1 business day of being issued by this
   CA.

4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]


4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation

   As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
   Either <Name of Registry> or the subject may choose to end the
   relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
   revoke the certificate. If one or more of the resources bound to the
   public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
   subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation.  A certificate
   also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
   corresponding to the public key in the certificate.  Finally, a



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   certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by
   that certificate.

4.9.2. Who can request revocation

   The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may request a
   revocation. A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using the
   Certificate Revocation Request message described in [up/down].

4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request

   A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using the Certificate
   Revocation Request message described in [up/down]. The Certificate
   Revocation Response message confirms receipt of the revocation
   request by <Name of Registry>, and indicates that <Name of Registry>
   will include the revoked certificate in a CRL.

4.9.4. Revocation request grace period

   A Subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
   need for revocation has been identified.

4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

   <Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
   process a revocation request.>

4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

   As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
   checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
   certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.

4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency

   The <Name of Registry> RPKI production CA will publish CRLs
   approximately every 24 hours. The <Name of Registry> RPKI offline CA
   will publish CRLs on a monthly basis. Each CRL will carry a
   nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be published at or
   before that time.  <Name of Registry> will set the
   nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the
   next scheduled CRL will be issued.

4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs

   A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay
   after generation.



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4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]

4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]

4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]

4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]

4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]

4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]

4.10. Certificate status services

   <Name of Registry> does not support OCSP. <Name of Registry> issues
   CRLs.

4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]

4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]

4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]

4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]

4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]

4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]

4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
[OMITTED]















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5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls



5.1. Physical controls

   <As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
   certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used
   in the management of address space and AS number allocation.>

5.1.1. Site location and construction

5.1.2. Physical access

5.1.3. Power and air conditioning

5.1.4. Water exposures

5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection

5.1.6. Media storage

5.1.7. Waste disposal

5.1.8. Off-site backup

5.2. Procedural controls

   <As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
   employ for certificate management.  These should be commensurate to
   those used in the management of address space and AS number
   allocation.>

5.2.1. Trusted roles

5.2.2. Number of persons required per task

5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role

5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties

5.3. Personnel controls

   <As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
   employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
   should be commensurate to those used in the management of address
   space and AS number allocation.>



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5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

5.3.2. Background check procedures

5.3.3. Training requirements

5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements

5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence

5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions

5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements

5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel

5.4. Audit logging procedures

5.4.1. Types of events recorded

   Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
   certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records will
   include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
   content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:

   Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

   Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests,
   certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications)

   Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

   Posting of any material to a repository

   Any attempts to change or delete audit data

   <List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>

5.4.2. Frequency of processing log

   <Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>

5.4.3. Retention period for audit log

   <Describe your polices for retention of audit logs.>





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5.4.4. Protection of audit log

   <Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>

5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures

   <Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>

5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]

5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]

5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments

   <Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
   already applied) to the PKI subsystems.  This should include whether
   such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
   perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>

5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]

5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]

5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]

5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]

5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]

5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]

5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]

5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]

5.6. Key changeover

   The <Name of Registry> CA certificate will contain a validity period
   that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA
   certificate.  To support this, <Name of Registry> will create a new
   signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate
   containing the public key of the pair, <specify here the minimum
   amount of lead time, e.g.,  "a minimum of 6 months"> in advance of
   the scheduled change of the current signature key pair.






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5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]

5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
[OMITTED]

5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]

5.8. CA or RA termination

   <Describe the fallback policy for management of your CA's IP address
   space and AS number allocations in case of its own termination.>



































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6. Technical Security Controls

   This section describes the security controls used by <Name of
   Registry>.

6.1. Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1. Key pair generation

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key
   pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for network subscribers.  In
   most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the
   subscriber, i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of
   address space or AS numbers.  However, your procedures may include
   one for generating key pairs on behalf of your subscribers if they
   so request. (This might be done for subscribers who do not have the
   ability to perform key generation in a secure fashion or who want a
   registry to provide backup for the subscriber private key.) Since
   the keys used in this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes,
   generation of key pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the
   security of the PKI. >

6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber

   <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation
   services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys
   are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this
   is not applicable.>

6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

   Subscribers deliver public keys to the <Name of Registry> RPKI CA by
   use of the up/down protocol as described in [up/down].

6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

   CA public keys for all entities other than RIRs are contained in
   certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates plus
   certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address space
   or AS numbers will be published via a repository system. Relying
   parties will download these certificates from this system. Public
   key values and associated data for the trust anchors (RIRs) will be
   distributed out of band, e.g., embedded in path validation software
   that will be made available to the Internet community.






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6.1.5. Key sizes

   For the <Name of Registry> offline CA'sand production CA's
   certificates, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For subscriber
   certificates, the RSA keys will be <insert key size -- e.g., 2048 or
   1024 bits. If NIR key size is larger than LIR/ISP/subscriber key
   size, describe each independently.>

6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

   The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent
   (e) F4 (65,537).

   <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
   insert here text specifying that the subscriber is responsible for
   performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that
   <Name of Registry> is not responsible for performing such checks for
   subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking
   the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>

6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

   The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280.
   For <Name of Registry>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and
   cRLSign bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including
   digitalSignature) will be set FALSE, and the extension will be
   marked critical.

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
     Controls

6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls

   The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA employs a cryptographic module
   evaluated under FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS].

6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

   There will be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m>
   multi-person control.

6.2.3. Private key escrow

   No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.






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6.2.4. Private key backup

   <Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
   The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
   done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
   the original private key.  (2) At least one copy should be kept at
   an off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>

6.2.5. Private key archival

   See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4

6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

   The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s offline CA and production
   CA will be generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1.
   The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted
   form for backup and/or transfer to a new module.

6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module

   The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s CA will be stored in the
   cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in
   accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the
   module. (See [FIPS])

6.2.8. Method of activating private key

   <Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
   key.>

6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key

   The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
   unattended.  After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
   procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module
   will be stored securely when not in use.

6.2.10. Method of destroying private key

   <Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key,
   e.g., when it is superseded.  This will depend on the particular
   module.>

6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating

   The cryptographic module used by the <Name of Registry> production
   CA will be certified FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS].


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6.3. Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1. Public key archival

   Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
   to archive public keys.

6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

   The <Name of Registry> CA's key pair will have a validity interval
   of <insert number of years - Registry key pairs and certificates
   should have long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the
   disruption caused by key changeover for top tier CAs.>

6.4. Activation data

6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation

   <Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>

6.4.2. Activation data protection

   Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by
   <Describe your procedures here>.

6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data

   <Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
   activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None.">

6.5. Computer security controls

6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement

   <Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
   support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
   capabilities, etc.  These requirements should be commensurate with
   those used for the computers used for managing allocation of IP
   addresses and AS numbers.>











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6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]

6.6. Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1. System development controls

   <Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the
   PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology
   (TSDM) Level 2.>

6.6.2. Security management controls

   <Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
   software and equipment employed by the CA.  These security measures
   should be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the
   CAs for managing and allocating RPKI resources.>

6.6.3. Life cycle security controls

   <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI
   functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated.
   This should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
   equipment for the management and allocation of IP address space and
   AS numbers is handled. >

6.7. Network security controls

   <Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
   operation.  These should be commensurate with the network security
   controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation of
   IP addresses and AS numbers.>

6.8. Time-stamping

   The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping.















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7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

   Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].

7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]

7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]

7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]

7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]

7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]

7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]

7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]

7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension [OMITTED]

7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]

7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]

7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]


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8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

   <List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
   security of the administration of IP addresses and AS numbers. These
   are sufficient for the PKI systems.>

8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment

8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor

8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

8.4. Topics covered by assessment

8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency

8.6. Communication of results

































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9. Other Business And Legal Matters



   <The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
   your organization. Note that the manner in which you manage your
   business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with
   the way in which you manage business and legal matters for the
   allocation of RPKI resources.>



9.1. Fees

9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees

9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)

9.1.3. Refund policy

9.2. Financial responsibility

9.2.1. Insurance coverage

9.2.2. Other assets

9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

9.3. Confidentiality of business information

9.3.1. Scope of confidential information

9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information

9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information

9.4. Privacy of personal information

9.4.1. Privacy plan

9.4.2. Information treated as private

9.4.3. Information not deemed private

9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information

9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information



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9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process

9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances

9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)

9.6. Representations and warranties

9.6.1. CA representations and warranties

9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties

9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties

9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]

9.7. Disclaimers of warranties

9.8. Limitations of liability

9.9. Indemnities

9.10. Term and termination

9.10.1. Term

9.10.2. Termination

9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival

9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants

9.12. Amendments

9.12.1. Procedure for amendment

9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period

9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]

9.13. Dispute resolution provisions

9.14. Governing law

9.15. Compliance with applicable law

9.16. Miscellaneous provisions



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9.16.1. Entire agreement

9.16.2. Assignment

9.16.3. Severability

9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

9.16.5. Force Majeure

9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]







































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10. Security Considerations

   The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied
   in a certificate depends on several factors.  These factors can
   include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA)
   in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy,
   procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of
   the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the
   private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms
   and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
   warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a
   framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and
   physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration
   Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party
   cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate
   generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is
   done in a secure manner.  Specifically, Section 3 Identification and
   Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational
   Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational
   Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7
   Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and
   Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of
   the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
   relying party systems.

11. IANA Considerations

   None.

12. Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this
   document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

   [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
         Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3280]   Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet
         X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
         Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFCxxxx]   Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate
         Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in progress.



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   [RFCyyyy]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
         X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress.

   [up/down]   Houston, G., Loomis, R., Ellacott, B.,  Austein, R., "A
         Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates", work in
         progress.

13.2. Informative References

   [BGP4]   Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors),  A Border Gateway Protocol 4
         (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.

   [cps-business-pki]   <Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for
         this registry's business PKI -- to be filled in>

   [FIPS]   Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
         (FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
         Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
         Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.

   [operations-business-pki]  <Document or pointer to document
         describing the operations of this registry's business PKI --
         to be filled in>

   [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for
         obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
         Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.

Author's Addresses

   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA















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   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
   Email: skent@bbn.com

   Derrick Kong
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
   Email: dkong@bbn.com

   Karen Seo
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
   Email: kseo@bbn.com


Intellectual Property Statement

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
   to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described
   in this document or the extent to which any license under such
   rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that
   it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights.
   Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC
   documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
   of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
   at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
   ipr@ietf.org.





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Disclaimer of Validity

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on
   an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
   REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE
   IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL
   WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY
   WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE
   ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS
   FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.
































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