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Versions: (draft-pmohapat-sidr-origin-validation-signaling) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 RFC 8097

SIDR                                                        P. Mohapatra
Internet-Draft                                          Sproute Networks
Intended status: Standards Track                                K. Patel
Expires: May 13, 2016                                              Cisco
                                                              J. Scudder
                                                        Juniper Networks
                                                                 D. Ward
                                                                   Cisco
                                                                 R. Bush
                                         Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
                                                       November 10, 2015


         BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community
             draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-06

Abstract

   As part of the origination AS validation process, it can be desirable
   to automatically consider the validation state of routes in the BGP
   decision process.  The purpose of this document is to provide a
   specification for doing so.  The document also defines a new BGP
   opaque extended community to carry the validation state inside an
   autonomous system to influence the decision process of the IBGP
   speakers.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 13, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.




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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Origin Validation State Extended Community  . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   As part of the origination AS validation process, it can be desirable
   to automatically consider the validation state of routes in the BGP
   decision process.  The purpose of this document is to provide a
   specification for doing so.  The document defines a new BGP opaque
   extended community to carry the validation state inside an autonomous
   system to influence the decision process of the IBGP speakers.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Origin Validation State Extended Community

   The origin validation state extended community is an opaque extended
   community [RFC4360]  with the following encoding:










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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |       0x43    |      TBD      |             Reserved          |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                    Reserved                   |validationstate|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   The value of the high-order octet of the extended Type Field is 0x43,
   which indicates it is non-transitive.  The value of the low-order
   octet of the extended type field as assigned by IANA is 0x00.  The
   last octet of the extended community encodes the route's validation
   state [RFC6811].  It can assume the following values:

                     +-------+-----------------------------+
                     | Value | Meaning                     |
                     +-------+-----------------------------+
                     |   0   | Lookup result = "valid"     |
                     |   1   | Lookup result = "not found" |
                     |   2   | Lookup result = "invalid"   |
                     +-------+-----------------------------+

   If the router is configured to support the extensions defined in this
   draft, it SHOULD attach the origin validation state extended
   community to BGP UPDATE messages sent to IBGP peers by mapping the
   computed validation state in the last octet of the extended
   community.  Similarly on the receiving IBGP speakers, the validation
   state of an IBGP route SHOULD be derived directly from the last octet
   of the extended community, if present.

   An implementation SHOULD NOT send more than one instance of the
   origin validation state extended community.  However, if more than
   one instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all
   instances other than the one with the numerically-greatest value.  If
   the value received is greater than the largest specified value (2),
   the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar to attribute discard
   [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community and logging the error
   for further analysis.

   By default, implementations SHOULD drop the origin validation state
   extended community if received from an EBGP peer, without further
   processing it.  However an implementation MAY be configured to accept
   the community when warranted, for example when the EBGP session is to
   a neighbor AS under control of the same administration.  Similarly,
   an implementation SHOULD NOT send the community to EBGP peers but MAY
   be configured to do so if warranted.




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3.  Deployment Considerations

   In deployment scenarios where not all the speakers in an autonomous
   system are upgraded to support the extensions defined in this
   document, it is necessary to define policies that match on the origin
   validation extended community and set another BGP attribute [RFC6811]
   that influences the best path selection the same way as what would
   have been enabled by an implementation of this extension.

4.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable review and
   suggestions from Wesley George, Roque Gagliano and Bruno Decraene on
   this document.

5.  IANA Considerations

   IANA has assigned a value 0x00 from the "BGP Opaque Extended
   Community" type registry in the non-transitive range, which is called
   "BGP Origin Validation State Extended Community".

6.  Security Considerations

   This document introduces no new security concerns beyond what is
   described in [RFC6811].

7.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

   [RFC4360]  Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
              Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
              February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.

   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.





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   [RFC7606]  Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
              Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
              RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.

Authors' Addresses

   Pradosh Mohapatra
   Sproute Networks

   Email: mpradosh@yahoo.com


   Keyur Patel
   Cisco
   170 W. Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95124

   Email: keyupate@cisco.com


   John Scudder
   Juniper Networks
   1194 N. Mathilda Ave
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089

   Email: jgs@juniper.net


   Dave Ward
   Cisco
   170 W. Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95124

   Email: dward@cisco.com


   Randy Bush
   Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
   5147 Crystal Springs
   Bainbridge Island, Washington  98110

   Email: randy@psg.com








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