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Versions: (draft-tbruijnzeels-sidr-validation-local-cache) 00 01 02 03 draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-tree-validation

SIDR                                                        O. Muravskiy
Internet-Draft                                            T. Bruijnzeels
Intended status: Informational                                  RIPE NCC
Expires: January 9, 2017                                    July 8, 2016


        RPKI Certificate Tree Validation by a Relying Party Tool
                draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-tree-validation-01

Abstract

   This document describes the approach to validate the content of the
   RPKI certificate tree, as used by the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator.  This
   approach is independent of a particular object retrieval mechanism.
   This allows it to be used with repositories available over the rsync
   protocol, the RPKI Repository Delta Protocol, and repositories that
   use a mix of both.

   This algorithm does not rely on content of repository directories,
   but uses the Authority Key Identifier (AKI) field of a manifest and a
   certificate revocation list (CRL) objects to discover manifest and
   CRL objects issued by a particular Certificate Authority (CA).  It
   further uses the hashes of manifest entries to discover other objects
   issued by the CA.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.





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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  General Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Hash comparisons  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Manifest entries versus repository content  . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Top-down Validation of a Single Trust Anchor Certificate Tree   4
     3.1.  Fetching the Trust Anchor Certificate Using the Trust
           Anchor Locator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.1.  Finding the most recent valid manifest and CRL  . . .   6
       3.2.2.  Manifest entries validation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Object Store Cleanup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Remote Objects Fetcher  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Fetcher Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.1.  Fetch repository objects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.2.  Fetch single repository object  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Local Object Store  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Store Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.1.  Store Repository Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.2.  Get objects by hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.3.  Get certificate objects by URI  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.4.  Get manifest objects by AKI . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.5.  Delete objects for a URI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.6.  Delete outdated objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.7.  Update object's validation time . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12








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1.  Introduction

   In order to use information published in RPKI repositories, Relying
   Parties (RP) need to retrieve and validate the content of
   certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects.  To validate a
   particular object, one must ensure that all certificates in the
   certificate chain up to the Trust Anchor (TA) are valid.  Therefore
   the validation of a certificate tree is usually performed top-down,
   starting from the TA certificate and descending down the certificate
   chain, validating every encountered certificate and its products.
   The result of this process is a list of all encountered RPKI objects
   with a validity status attached to each of them.  These results may
   later be used by a Relying Party in taking routing decisions, etc.

   Traditionally RPKI data is made available to RPs through the
   repositories [RFC6481] accessible over rsync protocol.  Relying
   parties are advised to keep a local copy of repository data, and
   perform regular updates of this copy from the repository (Section 5
   of [RFC6481]).  The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-delta-protocol] introduces another method to fetch
   repository data and keep the local copy up to date with the
   repository.

   This document describes how the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator discovers
   RPKI objects to download, builds certificate paths, and validates
   RPKI objects, independently from what repository access protocol is
   used.  To achieve this, it puts downloaded RPKI objects in an object
   store, where objects could be found by their URI, hash of their
   content, value of the object's AKI field, or combination of these.
   It also keeps track of download and validation time for every object,
   to perform cleanups of the local copy.

2.  General Considerations

2.1.  Hash comparisons

   This algorithm relies on the properties of the file hash algorithm
   (defined in [RFC6485]) to compute the hash of repository objects.  It
   assumes that any two objects for which the hash value is the same,
   are identical.

   The hash comparison is used when matching objects in the repository
   with entries on the manifest, and when looking up objects in the
   object store (Section 5).







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2.2.  Manifest entries versus repository content

   There are several possible ways of discovering products of a CA
   certificate: one could use all objects located in a repository
   directory designated as a publication point for a CA, or only objects
   mentioned on the manifest located at that publication point (see
   Section 6 of [RFC6486]), or use all objects whose AKI field matches
   the SKI field of a CA certificate.

   Since the current set of RPKI standards requires use of the manifest
   [RFC6486] to describe the content of a publication point, this
   implementation requires a consistency between the publication point
   content and manifest content.  Therefore it will not use in the
   validation process objects that are found in the publication point
   but do not match any of the entries of that publication point's
   manifest (see Section 3.2.2).  It will also issue warnings for all
   found mismatches, so that the responsible operators could be made
   aware of inconsistencies and fix them.

3.  Top-down Validation of a Single Trust Anchor Certificate Tree

   1.  The validation of a Trust Anchor (TA) certificate tree starts
       from its TA certificate.  To retrieve the TA certificate, a Trust
       Anchor Locator (TAL) object is used, as described in Section 3.1.

   2.  If the TA certificate is retrieved, it is validated according to
       the Section 7 of [RFC6487] and Section 2.2 of [RFC7730].

   3.  If the TA certificate is valid, then all its subordinate objects
       are validated as described in Section 3.2.  Otherwise the
       validation of certificate tree is aborted and an error is issued.

   4.  For all repository objects that were validated during this
       validation run, their validation timestamp is updated in an
       object store (see Section 5.1.7).

   5.  Outdated objects are removed from the store as described in
       Section 3.3.  This completes the validation of the TA certificate
       tree.

3.1.  Fetching the Trust Anchor Certificate Using the Trust Anchor
      Locator

   The following steps are performed in order to fetch the Trust Anchor
   Certificate:

   1.  (Optional) If the Trust Anchor Locator contains a "prefetch.uris"
       field, pass the URIs contained in that field to the fetcher (see



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       Section 4.1.1).  (This field is a non-standard extension to the
       TAL format.  It helps fetching non-hierarchical rsync
       repositories more efficiently.)

   2.  Extract the TA certificate URI from the TAL's URI section (see
       Section 2.1 of [RFC7730]) and pass it to the object fetcher
       (Section 4.1.2).

   3.  Retrieve from the object store (see Section 5.1.3) all
       certificate objects, for which the URI matches the URI extracted
       from the TAL in the previous step, and the public key matches the
       subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the TAL (see Section 2.1 of
       [RFC7730]).

   4.  If no, or more than one such objects are found, issue an error
       and abort certificate tree validation process with an error.
       Otherwise, use the single found object as the Trust Anchor
       certificate.

3.2.  Resource Certificate Validation

   The following steps describe the validation of a single resource
   certificate:

   1.  If both the caRepository (Section 4.8.8.1 of [RFC6487]), and the
       id-ad-rpkiNotify (Section 3.5 of [I-D.ietf-sidr-delta-protocol])
       SIA pointers are present in the given resource certificate, use a
       local policy to determine which pointer to use.  Extract the URI
       from the selected pointer and pass it to the object fetcher (see
       Section 4.1.1).

   2.  For a given resource certificate, find its manifest and
       certificate revocation list (CRL), using the procedure described
       in Section 3.2.1.  If no such manifest and CRL could be found,
       stop validation of this certificate, consider it invalid, and
       issue an error.

   3.  Compare the URI found in the given resource certificate's id-ad-
       rpkiManifest field (Section 4.8.8.1 of [RFC6487]) with the URI of
       the manifest found in the previous step.  If they are different,
       issue a warning.

   4.  Perform manifest entries discovery and validation as described in
       Section 3.2.2.

   5.  Validate all resource certificate objects found on the manifest,
       using the CRL object found on the manifest, according to
       Section 7 of [RFC6487].



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   6.  Validate all ROA objects found on the manifest, using the CRL
       object found on the manifest, according to the Section 4 of
       [RFC6482].

   7.  Validate all Ghostbusters Record objects found on the manifest,
       using the CRL object found on the manifest, according to the
       Section 7 of [RFC6493].

   8.  For every valid resource certificate object found on the
       manifest, apply the procedure described in this section
       (Section 3.2), recursively, provided that this resource
       certificate (identified by its SKI) has not yet been validated
       during current repository validation run.

3.2.1.  Finding the most recent valid manifest and CRL

   1.  Fetch from the store (see Section 5.1.4) all objects of type
       manifest, whose certificate's AKI field matches the SKI of the
       current CA certificate.  If no such objects are found, stop
       processing current resource certificate and issue an error.

   2.  Find among found objects the manifest object with the highest
       manifestNumber field (Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6486]), for which all
       following conditions are met:

       *  There is only one entry in the manifest for which the store
          contains exactly one object of type CRL, whose hash matches
          the hash of the entry.

       *  The manifest's certificate AKI equals the above CRL's AKI.

       *  The above CRL is a valid object according to Section 6.3 of
          [RFC5280].

       *  The manifest is a valid object according to Section 4.4 of
          [RFC6486], using the CRL found above.

   3.  If there is an object that matches above criteria, consider this
       object to be the valid manifest, and the CRL found at the
       previous step - the valid CRL for the current CA certificate's
       publication point.

   4.  Report an error for every other manifest with a number higher
       than the number of the valid manifest.







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3.2.2.  Manifest entries validation

   For every entry in the manifest object:

   1.  Construct an entry's URI by appending the entry name to the
       current CA's publication point URI.

   2.  Get all objects from the store whose hash attribute equals
       entry's hash (see Section 5.1.2).

   3.  If no such objects are found, issue an error for this manifest
       entry and progress to the next entry.  This case indicates that
       the repository does not have an object at the location listed in
       the manifest, or that the object's hash does not match the hash
       listed in the manifest.

   4.  For every found object, compare its URI with the URI of the
       manifest entry.

       *  For every object with non-matching URI issue a warning.  This
          case indicates that the object from the manifest entry is
          found at a different location in a (possibly different)
          repository.

       *  If no objects with matching URI found, issue a warning.  This
          case indicates that there is no object found in the repository
          at the location listed in the manifest entry (but there is at
          least one matching object found at a different location).

   5.  Use all found objects for further validation.

3.3.  Object Store Cleanup

   At the end of the TA tree validation the store cleanup is performed:

   1.  Given all objects that were encountered during the current
       validation run, remove from the store (Section 5.1.6) all objects
       whose URI attribute matches the URI of one of the encountered
       objects, but the content's hash is different.  This removes from
       the store objects that were replaced in the repository by their
       newer versions at the same URIs.

   2.  Remove from the store all objects that were last encountered
       during validation long time ago (as specified by the local
       policy).  This removes objects that do not appear on any valid
       manifest anymore (but possibly still published in a repository).





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   3.  Remove from the store all objects that were downloaded recently
       (as specified by the local policy), but have never been used in a
       validation process.  This removes objects that have never
       appeared on any valid manifest.

   Shortening the time interval used in step 2 will free disk space used
   by the store, to the expense of downloading removed objects again if
   they are still published in the repository.

   Extending the time interval used in step 3 will prevent repeated
   downloads of repository objects, with the risk that such objects, if
   created massively by mistake or adversely, will fill up local disk
   space, if they are not cleaned up promptly.

4.  Remote Objects Fetcher

   The fetcher is responsible for downloading objects from remote
   repositories (described in Section 3 of [RFC6481]) using rsync
   protocol ([rsync]), or RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)
   ([I-D.ietf-sidr-delta-protocol]).

4.1.  Fetcher Operations

   For every successfully visited URI the fetcher keeps track of the
   last time it happened.

4.1.1.  Fetch repository objects

   This operation receives one parameter - a URI.  For rsync protocol
   this URI points to a directory in a remote repository.  For RRDP
   repository it points to the repository's notification file.

   The fetcher performs following steps:

   1.  If data associated with the URI has been downloaded recently (as
       specified by the local policy), skip following steps.

   2.  Download the remote objects using the URI provided (for an rsync
       repository use a recursive mode).

   3.  For every new object that is downloaded, try to parse it as an
       object of specific RPKI type (certificate, manifest, CRL, ROA,
       Ghostbusters record), based on the object's filename extension
       (.cer, .mft, .crl, .roa, and .gbr, respectively), and perform
       basic RPKI object validation (excluding resource certification
       path validation), as specified in [RFC6487] and [RFC6488].





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   4.  Put every downloaded valid object in the object store
       (Section 5.1.1).

   The time interval used in the step 1 should be chosen based on the
   acceptable delay in receiving repository updates.

4.1.2.  Fetch single repository object

   This operation receives one parameter - a URI that points to an
   object in a repository.

   The fetcher performs following operations:

   1.  If data associated with the URI has been downloaded recently (as
       specified by the local policy), skip all following steps.

   2.  Download the remote object using the URI provided.

   3.  Try to parse the downloaded object as an object of a specific
       RPKI type (certificate, manifest, CRL, ROA, Ghostbusters record),
       based on the object's filename extension (.cer, .mft, .crl, .roa,
       and .gbr, respectively), and perform basic RPKI object validation
       (excluding resource certification path validation), as specified
       in [RFC6487] and [RFC6488].

   4.  If the downloaded object is not valid, issue an error and skip
       further steps.

   5.  Delete all objects from the object store (Section 5.1.5) whose
       URI matches the URI given.

   6.  Put the validated object in the object store (Section 5.1.1).

5.  Local Object Store

5.1.  Store Operations

5.1.1.  Store Repository Object

   Put given object in the store, along with its type, URI, hash, and
   AKI, if there is no record with the same hash and URI fields.

5.1.2.  Get objects by hash

   Retrieve all objects from the store whose hash attribute matches the
   given hash.





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5.1.3.  Get certificate objects by URI

   Retrieve from the store all objects of type certificate, whose URI
   attribute matches the given URI.

5.1.4.  Get manifest objects by AKI

   Retrieve from the store all objects of type manifest, whose AKI
   attribute matches the given AKI.

5.1.5.  Delete objects for a URI

   For a given URI, delete all objects in the store with matching URI
   attribute.

5.1.6.  Delete outdated objects

   For a given URI and a list of hashes, delete all objects in the store
   with matching URI, whose hash attribute is not in the given list of
   hashes.

5.1.7.  Update object's validation time

   For all objects in the store whose hash attribute matches the given
   hash, set the last validation time attribute to the given timestamp.

6.  Acknowledgements

   This document describes the algorithm as it is implemented by the
   software development team at the RIPE NCC.  The authors would also
   like to acknowledge contributions by Carlos Martinez, Andy Newton,
   and Rob Austein.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

8.  Security Considerations

   This implementation will not detect possible hash collisions in the
   hashes of repository objects (calculated using the file hash
   algorithm specified in [RFC6485]), and considers objects with same
   hash values as identical.

   This algorithm uses the content of a manifest object to discover
   other objects issued by a specified CA.  It verifies that the
   manifest is located in the publication point designated in the CA
   Certificate.  However, if there are other (not listed in the



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   manifest) objects located in that publication point directory, they
   will be ignored, even if their content is correct and they are issued
   by the same CA as the manifest.

   In contrast, objects whose content hash matches the hash listed in
   the manifest, but that are not located in the publication directory
   listed in their CA certificate, will be used in the validation
   process (although a warning will be issued in that case).

   The store cleanup procedure described in Section 3.3 tries to
   minimise removal and subsequent re-fetch of objects that are
   published in a repository but not used in the validation.  Once such
   objects are removed from the remote repository, they will be
   discarded from the local object store after a period of time
   specified by a local policy.  By generating an excessive amount of
   syntactically valid RPKI objects, a man-in-the-middle attack between
   a validating tool and a repository could force an implementation to
   fetch and store those objects in the object store before they are
   validated and discarded, leading to an out-of-memory or out-of-disk-
   space conditions, and, subsequently, a denial of service.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.

   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

   [RFC6485]  Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
              Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
              RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6485>.






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   [RFC6486]  Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
              "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.

   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

   [RFC6488]  Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
              Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.

   [RFC6493]  Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
              Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, DOI 10.17487/RFC6493,
              February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6493>.

   [RFC7730]  Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent,
              "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor
              Locator", RFC 7730, DOI 10.17487/RFC7730, January 2016,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7730>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-delta-protocol]
              Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., Austein, R.,
              and D. Mandelberg, "RPKI Repository Delta Protocol",
              draft-ietf-sidr-delta-protocol-02 (work in progress),
              March 2016.

   [rsync]    "Rsync home page", <https://rsync.samba.org>.

Authors' Addresses

   Oleg Muravskiy
   RIPE NCC

   Email: oleg@ripe.net


   Tim Bruijnzeels
   RIPE NCC

   Email: tim@ripe.net





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