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Versions: (draft-ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 draft-ietf-sidrops-rtr-keying

Network Working Group                                          S. Turner
Internet-Draft                                                IECA, Inc.
Intended status: BCP                                            K. Patel
Expires: November 15, 2012                                 Cisco Systems
                                                                 R. Bush
                                         Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
                                                            May 14, 2012


                        Router Keying for BGPsec
                     draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-00

Abstract

   BGPsec-speaking routers must be provisioned with private keys and the
   corresponding public key must be published in the global Resource
   PKI.  This document describes two ways of doing so, router-driven and
   operator-driven.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 15, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Router-Generated Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   4.  Operator-Generated Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   5.  Provisioning a New Router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   6.  Other Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

































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1.  Introduction

   BGPsec-speaking routers must be provisioned with private keys and the
   corresponding public key must be published in the global RPKI
   (Resource Public Key Infrastructure).  Note that the public key is
   published in the RPKI in the form of a certificate
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles].  This document describes two
   methods for generating the necessary public/private key-pair: router-
   driven and operator-driven.

   In the router-driven method, the router generates its own public/
   private key-pair, uses the private key to sign a certification
   request [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] (a PKCS#10 - includes the
   public key), and sends the certification request to the RPKI CA
   (Certification Authority).  The CA returns a PKCS#7, which includes
   the certified public key in the form of a certificate, to the router
   and the CA also publishes the certificate in the RPKI.

   The router-driven model mirrors the model used by most PKI
   subscribers.  In many cases, the private key never leaves trusted
   storage (e.g., HSM (Hardware Security Model)).  This is by design and
   supports CPs (Certification Policies), often times for human
   subscribers, that require the private key only ever be controlled by
   the subscriber to ensure that no one can impersonate the subscriber.
   For non-humans, this model does not always work.  For example, when
   an operator wants to support hot-swappable routers the same private
   key needs to be installed in the soon-to-be online router that was
   installed in the soon-to-be offline router.  This motivated the
   operator-driven model.

   In the operator-driven model, the operator generates the private/
   public key-pair and sends it to the router in a PKCS#8 [RFC5958].

   In both cases, the key pair is for algorithms defined in
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs].  The first version specifies ECDSA on
   the P-256 curve.


2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   It is assumed that the reader understands BGPsec, see
   [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview], [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-protocol], the
   RPKI, see [RFC6480], and [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles].




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3.  Router-Generated Keys

   For router-generated keys, the public/private keys are made by the
   router, a PKCS#10 is made by the router, and signed by the private
   key, and is transferred to the RPKI CA.  The CA returns a PKCS#7, the
   operator transfers the PKCS#7 to the router, and the router picks the
   certificate out of the PKCS#7.  Even if the operator can not get the
   private key off the router this still provides a linkage between a
   private key and a router.


4.  Operator-Generated Keys

   For operator-generated keys, the public/private keys are made by the
   operator with their RPKI management software.  The private key pair
   MUST be as specified in [RFC5915], which supports ECDSA keys.  That
   format MUST then be inserted to a PKCS#8 [RFC5958] along with the
   certificate.  If the operator wants to ship the keys around they can
   use the .p8 file extension and optional PEM encoding also from
   [RFC5958].

   EDITOR NOTE: One thing we should consider is whether the certificate
   needs to returned to the router like in the router-generated keys
   method.  PKCS#8 supports including the certificate so it's not a big
   deal to add it if we do.


5.  Provisioning a New Router

   When commissioning a new router, the operator may use either of the
   above methods.

   Using the Router-Generated Keys method, see Section 3, the operator
   decides on the AS number and the BGP RouterID of the router, logs on
   to the new router using the craft port, ssh, etc., and requests that
   the router generate a public/private key-pair and generate and sign
   (with the private key) a PKCS#10 request.  The operator then off-
   loads the PKCS#10 request and uploads the request to their RPKI
   software management tools.  The tools create and publish the RPKI
   Router-Key object for the public key, and return the PKCS#7.  The
   operator uploads the PKCS#7 to the router which then extracts its
   certificate.

   The router MAY use the PKCS#7 as an indicator that the certificate
   request was actually processed, and SHOULD verify that the issued
   certificate actually corresponds to the private key the router holds.

   Using the Operator-Generated Key method, see Section 4, the operator



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   decides on the AS number and the BGP RouterID of the new router and
   uses their RPKI software management tools to generate the public/
   private key-pair and publish the public key in the RPKI.  The tools
   also produce the PKCS#8 object which the operator then uploads into
   the new router via the craft port, ssh, NetConf, etc.  The router
   installs the PKCS#8 and installs the public/private key-pair.

   The router SHOULD verify that the issued certificate actually
   corresponds to the private key in the PKCS#8, i.e. the PKCS#8 is
   self-consistent.


6.  Other Use Cases

   Current router code generates private keys for uses such as ssh, but
   the private keys may not be seen or off-loaded via CLI or any other
   means.  While this is good security, it creates difficulties when a
   routing engine or whole router must be replaced in the field and all
   software which accesses the router must be updated with the new keys.
   Also, the initial contact with a new routing engine requires trust in
   the public key presented on first contact.

   To allow operators to quickly replace routers without requiring
   update and distribution of the corresponding public keys in the RPKI,
   routers SHOULD allow the private BGPsec key to be off-loaded via the
   CLI, NetConf (see [RFC6470]), SNMP, etc.  This lets the operator
   upload the old private key via the mechanism used for Operator-
   Generated Keys, see Section 4.


7.  Security Considerations

   Operator-generated keys could be intercepted in transport and the
   recipient router would have no way of knowing a substitution had been
   made by a monkey in the middle.  Hence transport security is strongly
   advised.


8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA Considerations.


9.  References







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9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5915]  Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key
              Structure", RFC 5915, June 2010.

   [RFC5958]  Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
              August 2010.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
              Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature
              Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-02 (work in
              progress), March 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
              Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
              BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
              and Certification Requests",
              draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03 (work in progress),
              April 2012.

   [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview]
              Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
              draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress),
              March 2011.

   [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-protocol]
              Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification",
              draft-lepinski-bgpsec-protocol-00 (work in progress),
              March 2011.

   [RFC6470]  Bierman, A., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)
              Base Notifications", RFC 6470, February 2012.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.











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Authors' Addresses

   Sean Turner
   IECA, Inc.
   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
   Fairfax, Virginia  22031
   US

   Email: turners@ieca.com


   Keyur Patel
   Cisco Systems
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   US

   Email: keyupate@cisco.com


   Randy Bush
   Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
   5147 Crystal Springs
   Bainbridge Island, Washington  98110
   US

   Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
   Email: randy@psg.com























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