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Versions: (draft-ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 draft-ietf-sidrops-rtr-keying

Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                             IIJ Lab / Dragon Research Lab
Intended status: Standards Track                               S. Turner
Expires: December 17, 2016                                    IECA, Inc.
                                                                K. Patel
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                           June 15, 2016


                        Router Keying for BGPsec
                     draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-12

Abstract

   BGPsec-speaking routers are provisioned with private keys in order to
   sign BGPsec announcements.  The corresponding public keys are
   published in the global Resource Public Key Infrastructure, enabling
   verification of BGPsec messages.  This document describes two methods
   of generating the public-private key-pairs: router-driven and
   operator-driven.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
   appear in all upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed
   case as English words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 5, 2016.






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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
   2.  Management / Router Communication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Exchanging Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Set-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.  PKCS#10 Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     5.1.  Router-Generated Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     5.2.  Operator-Generated Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   6.  Installing Signed Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   7.  Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     7.1.  Key Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     7.2.  Key Roll-Over  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     7.3.  Key Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     7.4.  Router Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   10.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     10.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     10.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Appendix A.  Management/Router Channel Security  . . . . . . . . . 12
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13


1.  Introduction

   BGPsec-speaking routers are provisioned with private keys, which
   allow them to digitally sign BGPsec announcements.  To verify the
   signature, the public key, in the form of a certificate [I-D.ietf-
   sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles], is published in the Resource Public Key



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   Infrastructure (RPKI).  This document describes provisioning of
   BGPsec-speaking routers with the appropriate public- private key-
   pairs.  There are two sub-methods, router-driven and operator-driven.

   These two sub-methods differ in where the keys are generated: on the
   router in the router-driven method, and elsewhere in the operator-
   driven method.  Routers are required to support at least one of the
   methods in order to work in various deployment environments.  Some
   routers may not allow the private key to be off-loaded while others
   may.  While off-loading private keys would ease swapping of routing
   engines, exposure of private keys is a well known security risk.

   In the operator-driven method, the operator generates the private/
   public key-pair and sends it to the router, perhaps in a PKCS#8
   package [RFC5958].

   In the router-driven method, the router generates its own public/
   private key-pair, uses the private key to sign a PKCS#10
   certification request [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles], which
   includes the public key), and returns the certification request to
   the operator to be forwarded to the RPKI Certification Authority
   (CA).  The CA returns a PKCS#7, which includes the certified public
   key in the form of a certificate, to the operator for loading into
   the router; and the CA also publishes the certificate in the RPKI.

   The router-driven model mirrors the model used by traditional PKI
   subscribers; the private key never leaves trusted storage (e.g.,
   Hardware Security Module).  This is by design and supports classic
   PKI Certification Policies for (often human) subscribers which
   require the private key only ever be controlled by the subscriber to
   ensure that no one can impersonate the subscriber.  For non-humans,
   this model does not always work.  For example, when an operator wants
   to support hot-swappable routers the same private key needs to be
   installed in the soon-to-be online router that was used by the the
   soon-to-be offline router.  This motivated the operator-driven model.

   The remainder of this document describes how operators can use the
   two methods to provision new and existing routers.

   Useful References: [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview] gives an overview
   of the BGPsec protocol, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] gives the
   gritty details, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] specifies the
   format for the PKCS #10 request, and [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
   specifies the algorithms used to generate the signature.

   Useful Formats: Formats for the objects used by routers are:

   Private keys see [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] concerning local storage



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       and Section 6 concerning PKCS#8 for operator-generated keys.

   Public key certificates see [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]

   Certificate Status Request (CSR) see [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-
       profiles] concerning the PKCS#10 requests and PKCS#7 responses.

2.  Management / Router Communication

   Operators are free to use either the router-driven or operator-driven
   method as supported by the platform.  Regardless of the method
   chosen, operators first establish a secure communication channel
   between the management system and the router.  How this channel is
   established is router-specific and is beyond scope of this document.
   Though other configuration mechanisms might be used, e.g.  NetConf
   (see [RFC6470]); for simplicity, in this document, the communication
   channel between the management platform and the router is assumed to
   be an SSH-protected CLI.  See Appendix A for security considerations
   for this channel.

3.  Exchanging Certificates

   The operator management station can exchange certificate requests and
   certificates with routers and with the RPKI CA infrastructure using
   the application/pkcs10 media type [RFC5967] and application/
   pkcs7-mime [RFC5751], respectively, and may use FTP or HTTP per
   [RFC2585], or the Enrollment over Secure Transport [RFC7030].

4.  Set-Up

   To start, the operator uses the communication channel to install the
   appropriate RPKI Trust Anchor' Certificate (TA Cert) in the router.
   This will later enable the router to validate the router certificate
   returned in the PKCS#7.

   The operator also configures the Autonomous System (AS) number to be
   used in the generated router certificate.  This may be the sole AS
   configured on the router, or an operator choice if the router is
   configured with multiple ASs.

   The operator configures or extracts from the router the BGP RouterID
   to be used in the generated certificate.  In the case where the
   operator has chosen not to use unique per-router certificates, a
   RouterID of 0 may be used.

5.  PKCS#10 Generation

   The private key, and hence the PKCS#10 request may be generated by



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   the router or by the operator.

5.1.  Router-Generated Keys

   In the router-generated method, once the protected session is
   established and the initial Set-Up (Section 4) performed, the
   operator issues a command or commands for the router to generate the
   public/private key pair, to generate the PKCS#10 request, and to sign
   the PKCS#10 with the private key.  Once generated, the PKCS#10 is
   returned to the operator over the protected channel.

   If a router was to communicate directly with a CA to have the CA
   certify the PKCS#10, there would be no way for the CA to authenticate
   the router.  As the operator knows the authenticity of the router,
   the operator must mediate the communication with the CA.

   The operator adds the chosen AS number and the RouterID to send to
   the RPKI CA for the CA to certify.

5.2.  Operator-Generated Keys

   In the operator-generated method, the operator generates the public/
   private key pair on a management station and installs the private key
   into the router over the protected channel.  Beware that experience
   has shown that copy and paste from a management station to a router
   can be unreliable for long texts.

   Alternatively, the private key may be encapsulated in a PKCS #8
   [RFC5958], the PKCS#8 is further encapsulated in Cryptographic
   Message Syntax (CMS) SignedData [RFC5652], and signed by the AS's End
   Entity (EE) certificate.

   The router SHOULD verify the signature of the encapsulated PKCS#8 to
   ensure the returned private key did in fact come from the operator,
   but this requires that the operator also provision via the CLI or
   include in the SignedData the RPKI CA certificate and relevant AS's
   EE certificate(s).  The router should inform the operator whether or
   not the signature validates to a trust anchor; this notification
   mechanism is out of scope.

   The operator then creates and signs the PKCS#10 with the private key,
   and adds the chosen AS number and RouterID to be sent to the RPKI CA
   for the CA to certify.

6.  Installing Signed Keys

   The operator uses RPKI management tools to communicate with the
   global RPKI system to have the appropriate CA validate the PKCS#10



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   request, sign the key in the PKCS#10 and generated PKCS#7 response,
   as well as publishing the certificate in the Global RPKI.  External
   network connectivity may be needed if the certificate is to be
   published in the Global RPKI.

   After the CA certifies the key, it does two things:

   1.  Publishes the certificate in the Global RPKI.  The CA must have
       connectivity to the relevant publication point, which in turn
       must have external network connectivity as it is part of the
       Global RPKI.

   2.  Returns the certificate to the operator's management station,
       packaged in a PKCS#7, using the corresponding method by which it
       received the certificate request.  It SHOULD include the
       certificate chain below the TA Certificate so that the router can
       validate the router certificate.

   In the operator-generated method, the operator SHOULD extract the
   certificate from the PKCS#7, and verify that the private key it holds
   corresponds to the returned public key.

   In the operator-generated method, the operator has already installed
   the private key in the router (see Section 5.2).

   The operator provisions the PKCS#7 into the router over the secure
   channel.

   The router SHOULD extract the certificate from the PKCS#7 and verify
   that the private key corresponds to the returned public key.  The
   router SHOULD inform the operator whether it successfully received
   the certificate and whether or not the keys correspond; the mechanism
   is out of scope.

   The router SHOULD also verify that the returned certificate validates
   back to the installed TA Certificate, i.e., the entire chain from the
   installed TA Certificate through subordinate CAs to the BGPsec
   certificate validate.  To perform this verification the CA
   certificate chain needs to be returned along with the router's
   certificate in the PKCS#7.  The router SHOULD inform the operator
   whether or not the signature validates to a trust anchor; this
   notification mechanism is out of scope.

   Note: The signature on the PKCS#8 and Certificate need not be made by
   the same entity.  Signing the PKCS#8, permits more advanced
   configurations where the entity that generates the keys is not the
   direct CA.




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   Even if the operator cannot extract the private key from the router,
   this signature still provides a linkage between a private key and a
   router.  That is the server can verify the proof of possession (POP),
   as required by [RFC6484].

7.  Key Management

   An operator's responsibilities do not end after key generation, key
   provisioning, certificate issuance, and certificate distribution.
   They persist for as long as the operator wishes to operate the
   BGPsec-speaking router.

7.1.  Key Validity

   It is critical that a BGPsec speaking router ensures that it is
   signing with a valid certificate at all times.  To this end, the
   operator needs to ensure the router always has a non-expired
   certificate.  I.e. the key used to sign BGPsec announcements always
   has an associated certificate whose expiry time is after the current
   time.

   Ensuring this is not terribly difficult but requires that either:

   1.  The router has a mechanism to notify the operator that the
       certificate has an impending expiration, and/or

   2.  The operator notes the expiry time of the certificate and uses a
       calendaring program to remind them of the expiry time, and/or

   3.  The RPKI CA warns the operator of pending expiration, and/or

   4.  Use some other kind of automated process to search for and track
       the expiry times of router certificates.

   It is advisable that expiration warnings happen well in advance of
   the actual expiry time.

   Regardless of the technique used to track router certificate expiry
   times, it is advisable to notify additional operators in the same
   organization as the expiry time approaches thereby ensuring that the
   forgetfulness of one operator does not affect the entire
   organization.

   Depending on inter-operator relationship, it may be helpful to notify
   a peer operator that one or more of their certificates are about to
   expire.

7.2.  Key Roll-Over



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   Routers that support multiple private keys also greatly increase the
   chance that routers can continuously speak BGPsec because the new
   private key and certificate can be obtained and distributed prior to
   expiration of the operational key.  Obviously, the router needs to
   know when to start using the new key.  Once the new key is being
   used, having the already distributed certificate ensures continuous
   operation.

   Whether the certificate is re-keyed (i.e., different key in the
   certificate with a new expiry time) or renewed (i.e., the same key in
   the certificate with a new expiry time) depends on the key's lifetime
   and operational use.  Arguably, re-keying the router's BGPsec
   certificate every time the certificate expires is more secure than
   renewal because it limits the private key's exposure.  However, if
   the key is not compromised the certificate could be renewed as many
   times as allowed by the operator's security policy.  Routers that
   support only one key can use renewal to ensure continuous operation,
   assuming the certificate is renewed and distributed well in advance
   of the operational certificate's expiry time.

7.3.  Key Revocation

   Certain unfortunate circumstances may occur causing a need to revoke
   a router's BGPsec certificate.  When this occurs, the operator needs
   to use the RPKI CA system to revoke the certificate by placing the
   router's BGPsec certificate on the Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
   as well as re-keying the router's certificate.

   When an active router key is to be revoked, the process of requesting
   the CA to revoke, the process of the CA actually revoking the
   router's certificate, and then the process of re-keying/renewing the
   router's certificate, (possibly distributing a new key and
   certificate to the router), and distributing the status takes time
   during which the operator must decide how they wish to maintain
   continuity of operations, with or without the compromised private
   key, or whether they wish to bring the router offline to address the
   compromise.

   Keeping the router operational and BGPsec-speaking is the ideal goal,
   but if operational practices do not allow this then reconfiguring the
   router to disabling BGPsec is likely preferred to bringing the router
   offline.

   Routers which support more than one private key, where one is
   operational and other(s) are soon-to-be-operational, facilitate
   revocation events because the operator can configure the router to
   make a soon-to-be-operational key operational, request revocation of
   the compromised key, and then make a next generation soon-to-be-



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   operational key, all hopefully without needing to take offline or
   reboot the router.  For routers which support only one operational
   key, the operators should create or install the new private key, and
   then request revocation of the compromised private key.

7.4.  Router Replacement

   Currently routers often generate private keys for uses such as SSH,
   and the private keys may not be seen or off-loaded from the router.
   While this is good security, it creates difficulties when a routing
   engine or whole router must be replaced in the field and all software
   which accesses the router must be updated with the new keys.  Also,
   any network based initial contact with a new routing engine requires
   trust in the public key presented on first contact.

   To allow operators to quickly replace routers without requiring
   update and distribution of the corresponding public keys in the RPKI,
   routers SHOULD allow the private BGPsec key to be off-loaded via a
   protected session, e.g.  SSH, NetConf (see [RFC6470]), SNMP, etc.
   This lets the operator upload the old private key via the mechanism
   used for operator-generated keys, see Section 5.2.

8.  Security Considerations

   The router's manual will describe whether the router supports one,
   the other, or both of the key generation options discussed in the
   earlier sections of this draft as well as other important security-
   related information (e.g., how to SSH to the router).  After
   familiarizing one's self with the capabilities of the router,
   operators are encouraged to ensure that the router is patched with
   the latest software updates available from the manufacturer.

   This document defines no protocols so in some sense introduces no new
   security considerations.  However, it relies on many others and the
   security considerations in the referenced documents should be
   consulted; notably, those document listed in Section 1 should be
   consulted first.  PKI-relying protocols, of which BGPsec is one, have
   many issues to consider so many in fact entire books have been
   written to address them; so listing all PKI-related security
   considerations is neither useful nor helpful; regardless, some boot-
   strapping-related issues are listed here that are worth repeating:

   Public-Private key pair generation:  Mistakes here are for all
      practical purposes catastrophic because PKIs rely on the pairing
      of a difficult to generate public-private key pair with a signer;
      all key pairs MUST be generated from a good source of non-
      deterministic random input [RFC4086].




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   Private key protection at rest:  Mistakes here are for all practical
      purposes catastrophic because disclosure of the private key allows
      another entity to masquerade as (i.e., impersonate) the signer;
      all private keys MUST be protected when at rest in a secure
      fashion.  Obviously, how each router protects private keys is
      implementation specific.  Likewise, the local storage format for
      the private key is just that, a local matter.

   Private key protection in transit:  Mistakes here are for all
      practical purposes catastrophic because disclosure of the private
      key allows another entity to masquerade as (i.e., impersonate) the
      signer; transport security is therefore strongly RECOMMENDED.  The
      level of security provided by the transport layer's security
      mechanism SHOULD be commensurate with the strength of the BGPsec
      key; there's no point in spending time and energy to generate an
      excellent public-private key pair and then transmit the private
      key in the clear or with a known-to-be-broken algorithm, as it
      just undermines trust that the private key has been kept private.
      Additionally, operators SHOULD ensure the transport security
      mechanism is up to date, in order to addresses all known
      implementation bugs.

   SSH key management is known, in some cases, to be lax
   [I-D.ylonen-sshkeybcp]; employees that no longer need access to
   routers SHOULD be removed the router to ensure only those authorized
   have access to a router.

   Though the CA's certificate is installed on the router and used to
   verify that the returned certificate is in fact signed by the CA, the
   revocation status of the CA's certificate is rarely checked as the
   router may not have global connectivity or CRL-aware software.  The
   operator MUST ensure that installed CA certificate is valid.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA Considerations.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
              Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature
              Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs (work in
              progress), March 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
              Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for



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              BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
              and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-
              profiles (work in progress), October 2012.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [RFC4253]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, January 2006.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
              RFC 5652, September 2009.

   [RFC5958]  Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, August
              2010.

10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
              Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
              draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview (work in progress), May
              2012.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
              Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", draft-ietf-
              sidr-bgpsec-protocol (work in progress), February 2013.

   [I-D.ylonen-sshkeybcp]
              Ylonen, T. and G. Kent, "Managing SSH Keys for Automated
              Access - Current Recommended Practice", draft-ylonen-
              sshkeybcp (work in progress), April 2013.

   [RFC2585]  Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP",
              RFC 2585, May 1999.

   [RFC3766]  Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For
              Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86,
              RFC 3766, April 2004.

   [RFC5480]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.

   [RFC5647]  Igoe, K. and J. Solinas, "AES Galois Counter Mode for the



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              Secure Shell Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 5647, August
              2009.

   [RFC5656]  Stebila, D. and J. Green, "Elliptic Curve Algorithm
              Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer",
              RFC 5656, December 2009.

   [RFC5751]  Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
              Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
              Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.

   [RFC5967]  Turner, S., "The application/pkcs10 Media Type", RFC 5967,
              August 2010.

   [RFC6187]  Igoe, K. and D. Stebila, "X.509v3 Certificates for Secure
              Shell Authentication", RFC 6187, March 2011.

   [RFC6470]  Bierman, A., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)
              Base Notifications", RFC 6470, February 2012.

   [RFC6484]  Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
              Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012.

   [RFC6668]  Bider, D. and M. Baushke, "SHA-2 Data Integrity
              Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
              Protocol", RFC 6668, July 2012.

   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

Appendix A.  Management/Router Channel Security

   Encryption, integrity, authentication, and key exchange algorithms
   used by the secure communication channel SHOULD be of equal or
   greater strength than the BGPsec keys they protect, which for the
   algorithm specified in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] is 128-bit; see
   [RFC5480] and by reference [SP800-57] for information about this
   strength claim as well as [RFC3766] for "how to determine the length
   of an asymmetric key as a function of a symmetric key strength
   requirement."  In other words, for the encryption algorithm, do not
   use export grade crypto (40-56 bits of security), do not use Triple
   DES (112 bits of security).  Suggested minimum algorithms would be
   AES-128: aes128-cbc [RFC4253] and AEAD_AES_128_GCM [RFC5647] for
   encryption, hmac-sha2-256 [RFC6668] or AESAD_AES_128_GCM [RFC5647]
   for integrity, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 [RFC5656] for authentication, and



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Internet-Draft          Router Keying for BGPsec           June 15, 2016


   ecdh-sha2-nistp256 [RFC5656] for key exchange.

   Some routers support the use of public key certificates and SSH.  The
   certificates used for the SSH session are different than the
   certificates used for BGPsec.  The certificates used with SSH should
   also enable a level of security commensurate with BGPsec keys;
   x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 [RFC6187] could be used for
   authentication.

Authors' Addresses

   Randy Bush
   IIJ / Dragon Research Labs
   5147 Crystal Springs
   Bainbridge Island, Washington  98110
   US

   Email: randy@psg.com


   Sean Turner
   sn3rd

   Email: sean@sn3rd.com


   Keyur Patel
   Cisco Systems
   170 W. Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email: keyupate@cisco.com


















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