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Versions: (draft-dseomn-sidr-slurm) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 RFC 8416

SIDR                                                               D. Ma
Internet-Draft                                                      ZDNS
Intended status: Standards Track                           D. Mandelberg
Expires: August 10, 2018                                    Unaffiliated
                                                          T. Bruijnzeels
                                                                RIPE NCC
                                                        February 6, 2018


   Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
                        draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-06

Abstract

   The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
   authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
   Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
   resources.  Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
   (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
   assertions.  In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to
   validate the path of a BGP route.  However, ISPs may want to
   establish a local view of the RPKI to control its own network while
   making use of RPKI data.  The mechanisms described in this document
   provide a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a local,
   customized view of the RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data
   as needed.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 10, 2018.








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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  RPKI RPs with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  SLURM File and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Use of JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  SLURM File Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  SLURM Target  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Validation Output Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.4.1.  Validated ROA Prefix Filters  . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.4.2.  BGPsec Assertion Filters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.5.  Locally Added Assertions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.5.1.  ROA Prefix Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.5.2.  BGPSec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.6.  Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . .  11
   4.  SLURM File Configuration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.1.  SLURM File Atomicity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.2.  Multiple SLURM Files  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.1.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.2.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
   authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
   Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
   resources.  For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)



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   addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482]
   to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
   block.  Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to
   validate BGP routes.  (Validation of the origin of a route is
   described in [RFC6811], and validation of the path of a route is
   described in [RFC8205].)

   However, an RPKI relying party may want to override some of the
   information expressed via putative TAs and the certificates
   downloaded from the RPKI repository system.  For instances, [RFC6491]
   recommends the creation of ROAs that would invalidate public routes
   for reserved and unallocated address space, yet some ISPs might like
   to use BGP and the RPKI with private address space ([RFC1918],
   [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]).
   Local use of private address space and/or AS numbers is consistent
   with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot be verified by the
   global RPKI.  This motivates creation of mechanisms that enable a
   network operator to publish a variant of RPKI hierarchy (for its own
   use and that of its customers) at its discretion.  Additionally, a
   network operator might wish to make use of a local override
   capability to protect routes from adverse actions [RFC8211], until
   the results of such actions have been addressed.  The mechanisms
   developed to provide this capability to network operators are hereby
   called Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the
   RPKI (SLURM).

   SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by
   generating sets of assertions.  For Origin Validation [RFC6811], an
   assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS
   number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1
   [RFC8210].  For BGPsec [RFC8205], an assertion is a tuple of {AS
   number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki-
   rtr version 1.  (For the remainder of this document, these assertions
   are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions,
   respectively.)

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  RPKI RPs with SLURM

   SLURM provides a simple way to enable RPs to establish a local,
   customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository data if
   needed.  To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes from
   consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI that



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   are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec
   assertions.

   In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data
   it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol.  The rpki-rtr
   protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions
   it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in
   assertions (Serial Query).  The mechanisms specified in this document
   are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both
   the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query.  Relying
   party software may modify other forms of output in comparable ways,
   but that is outside the scope of this document.

   +--------------+   +---------------------------+   +------------+
   |              |   |                           |   |            |
   | Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation |
   |              |   |                           |   |            |
   +--------------+   +---------------------------+   +-----+------+
                                                            |
          +-------------------------------------------------+
          |
   +------v-------+   +------------+   +----------+   +-------------+
   |              |   |            |   |          |   |             |
   |    SLURM     +--->   SLURM    +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers|
   |   Filters    |   | Assertions |   |          |   |             |
   +--------------+   +------------+   +----------+   +-------------+

           Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the Relying Party Stack

3.  SLURM File and Mechanisms

3.1.  Use of JSON

   This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC8259]format.  JSON
   members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM Files.
   Relying Parties MUST consider any deviations from the specification
   an error.  Future additions to the specifications in this document
   MUST use an incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member.

3.2.  SLURM File Overview

   A SLURM file consists of:

   o  A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1

   o  A slurmTarget element (Section 3.3) consisting of:





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      *  Zero or more target elements.  In this version of SLURM, there
         are two types of values for the target: ASN or FQDN.  If more
         than one target line is present, all targets must be acceptable
         to the RP.

   o  Validation Output Filters (Section 3.4), consisting of:

      *  An array of zero or more Prefix Filters, described in
         Section 3.4.1

      *  An array of zero or more BGPSec Filters, described in
         Section 3.4.2

   o  Locally Added Assertions (Section 3.5), consisting of:

      *  An array of zero or more Prefix Assertions, described in
         Section 3.5.1

      *  An array of zero or more BGPSec Assertions, described in
         Section 3.5.2

   In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both
   Validation Output Filters and Locally Added Assertions.  In this
   case, the resulting assertions MUST be the same as if output
   filtering were performed before locally adding assertions.  I.e.,
   locally added assertions MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.

   The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM
   file that has no filters or assertions:


   {
     "slurmVersion": 1,
     "slurmTarget": [],
     "validationOutputFilters": {
       "prefixFilters": [],
       "bgpsecFilters": []
     },
     "locallyAddedAssertions": {
       "prefixAssertions": [],
       "bgpsecAssertions": []
     }
   }


                             Empty SLURM File





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3.3.  SLURM Target

   A SLURM filer MUST specify a "slurmTarget" element that identifies
   the environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be used.  The
   "slurmTarget" element MAY have an empty array as its value, which
   means "applies to all".  The meaning of the "slurmTarget" element, if
   present, is determined by the user.  If a "slurmTarget" element is
   present, a relying party SHOULD verify that the target is an
   acceptable value, and reject this SLURM file if the "slurmTarget"
   element is not acceptable.  Each "slurmTarget" element contains
   merely one "asn" or one "hostname".  An explanatory "comment" MAY be
   included in each "slurmTarget" element so that it can be shown to
   users of the RP software.

   For instance, a large ISP may want some of its ASes to establish a
   local view of RPKI while the others not.  Accordingly, this ISP needs
   to make its RPs aware of this distinction for different BGP speakers
   by adding ASN(s) to SLURM file target.  Such a target value is an ASN
   expressed in number.


     "slurmTarget": [
       {
         "asn": 65536
         "comment": "This file is intended for BGP speakers in AS 65536"
       }
     ]


                           slurmTarget example 1

   Also, for instance, an organization may share one trusted third-party
   SLURM file source.  For the local control, or in the case of
   Emergency Response Team Coordination, the SLURM file source may
   generate a SLURM file that is to be applied to only one specific RP.
   This file can take advantage of the "target" element to restrict the
   ASes that will accept and use the file.  Accordingly, the SLURM file
   source needs to indicate which RP(s) should make use of the file by
   adding the domain name(s) of the RP(s) to the SLURM file target.
   Such a target value is a server name expressed in FQDN.











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   "slurmTarget": [
     {
       "hostname": "rpki.example.com"
       "comment": "This file is intended for RP server rpki.example.com"
     }
   ]


                           slurmTarget example 2

3.4.  Validation Output Filters

3.4.1.  Validated ROA Prefix Filters

   The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters
   (Prefix Filters in short).  Each Prefix Filter can contain either an
   IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an AS number.  It is RECOMMENDED that an
   explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter, so that it
   can be shown to users of the RP software.

   Any Validated ROA Prefix (VRP, [RFC6811]) that matches any configured
   Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output.

   A Validated ROA Prefix is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if
   one of the following cases applies:

   1.  If the Prefix Filter contains an IPv4 or IPv6 Prefix only, the
       VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP Prefix is equal
       to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter.

   2.  If Prefix Filter contains an AS number only, the VRP is
       considered to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix
       Filter ASN.

   3.  If Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix AND an AS
       Number, the VRP is considered to match if the VRP Prefix is equal
       to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter AND the VRP ASN matches the
       Prefix Filter ASN

   The following JSON structure represents an array of "prefixFilters"
   with an element for each use case listed above:










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     "prefixFilters": [
       {
         "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
         "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
       },
       {
         "asn": 64496,
         "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
       },
       {
         "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
         "asn": 64497,
         "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
       }
     ]


                          prefixFilters examples

3.4.2.  BGPsec Assertion Filters

   The RP can configure zero or more BGPSec Assertion Filters (BGPSec
   Filters in short).  Each BGPSec Filter can contain an AS number and/
   or a Router SKI.

   The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
   certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and
   [RFC6487].  This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the
   ASN.1 tag or length fields.

   Furthermore it is RECOMMENDED that an explanatory comment is included
   with each BGPSec Filter, so that it can be shown to users of the RP
   software.

   Any BGPSec Assertion that matches any configured BGPSec Filter MUST
   be removed from the RPs output.

   A BGPSec Assertion is considered to match with a BGPSec Filter if one
   of the following cases applies:

   1.  If the BGPSec Filter contains an AS number only, a BGPSec
       Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the
       Filter ASN.

   2.  If the BGPSec Filter contains a Router SKI only, a BGPSec
       Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI
       matches the Filter Router SKI.




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   3.  If the BGPSec Filter contains both an AS number AND a Router SKI,
       then a BGPSec Assertion is considered to match if both the
       Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI
       matches the Filter Router SKI.

   The following JSON structure represents an array of "bgpsecFilters"
   with an element for each use case listed above:


     "bgpsecFilters": [
       {
         "asn": 64496,
         "comment": "All keys for ASN"
       },
       {
         "routerSKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
         "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
       },
       {
         "asn": 64497,
         "routerSKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
         "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
       }
     ]


                          bgpsecFilters examples

3.5.  Locally Added Assertions

3.5.1.  ROA Prefix Assertions

   Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty)
   array of ROA Prefix Assertions.  This array is added to the RP's
   output.

   Each ROA Prefix Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, an AS
   number, optionally a MaxLength and optionally a comment that can be
   shown to users of the RP software.

   The following JSON structure represents an array of
   "prefixAssertions" with an element for each use case listed above:









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     "prefixAssertions": [
       {
         "asn": 64496,
         "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
         "comment": "My other important route"
       },
       {
         "asn": 64496,
         "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
         "maxPrefixLength": 48,
         "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
       }
     ]


                         prefixAssertions examples

3.5.2.  BGPSec Assertions

   Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty)
   array of BGPSec Assertions.  This array is added to the RP's output.

   Each BGPSec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Router SKI, the
   Router Public Key, and optionally a comment that can be shown to
   users of the RP software.

   The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
   certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and
   [RFC6487].  This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the
   ASN.1 tag or length fields.

   The Router Public Key is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
   public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in [RFC8208].
   This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo,
   including the ASN.1 tag and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo
   SEQUENCE.

   The following JSON structure represents an array of
   "bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above:












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     "bgpsecAssertions": [
       {
         "asn": 64496,
         "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
         "SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
         "publicKey": "<some base64 public key>"
       }
     ]


                         prefixAssertions examples

3.6.  Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions

   The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file
   that uses all the elements described in the previous sections:


     {
       "slurmVersion": 1,
       "slurmTarget":[
         {
           "asn":65536
         },
         {
           "hostname":"rpki.example.com"
         }
       ],
       "validationOutputFilters": {
         "prefixFilters": [
           {
             "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
             "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
           },
           {
             "asn": 64496,
             "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
           },
           {
             "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
             "asn": 64497,
             "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
           }
         ],
         "bgpsecFilters": [
           {
             "asn": 64496,
             "comment": "All keys for ASN"



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           },
           {
             "routerSKI": "Zm9v",
             "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
           },
           {
             "asn": 64497,
             "routerSKI": "YmFy",
             "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
           }
         ]
       },
       "locallyAddedAssertions": {
         "prefixAssertions": [
           {
             "asn": 64496,
             "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
             "comment": "My other important route"
           },
           {
             "asn": 64496,
             "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
             "maxPrefixLength": 48,
             "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
           }
         ],
         "bgpsecAssertions": [
           {
             "asn": 64496,
             "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
             "SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
             "publicKey": "<some base64 public key>"
           }
         ]
       }
     }


                              Full SLURM File

4.  SLURM File Configuration

4.1.  SLURM File Atomicity

   To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
   That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as
   if SLURM file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM
   configuration.  For an example of why this is required, consider the



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   case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS
   numbers.  Both routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions.
   If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown
   state [RFC6811].  If both additions occur then both routes would be
   in the valid state.  However, if one addition occurs and the other
   does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid.

4.2.  Multiple SLURM Files

   An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM
   files.  In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output
   Filters and Locally Added Assertions are the respective unions of the
   inputs from each file.  The envisioned typical use case for multiple
   files is when the files have distinct scopes.  For instance,
   operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to
   frame routing decisions.  As such, they probably deliver SLURM files
   to this RP respectively.  Before an RP configures SLURM files from
   different sources it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict
   among the INR assertions in these SLURM files.  To do so, the RP MUST
   check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the INR
   assertions and report errors to the sources that created these SLURM
   files in question.

   If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM
   files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error
   report in the following cases:



      1.  There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation
          assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM
          files Y,Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any
          <prefixAssertions> or <prefixFilters> in file Y and X is
          contained by any prefix in any <prefixAssertions> or
          <prefixFilters> in file Z.

      2.  There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there
          exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X
          is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in file Y
          and X is used in any <bgpsecAssertions> or <bgpsecFilters> in
          file Z.

5.  IANA Considerations

   None






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6.  Security considerations

   The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
   with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving
   autonomy in address space and ASN management.  These mechanisms are
   applied only locally; they do not influence how other network
   operators interpret RPKI data.  Nonetheless, care should be taken in
   how these mechanisms are employed.  Note that it also is possible to
   use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-private INRs,
   e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed.  For example,
   a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a network
   operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action.  Network
   operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use extreme
   caution.

   The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an
   RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a
   security function.  An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the
   assertions made in that file.  Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP
   can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP.  It could
   declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice
   versa.  As a result, an RP must carefully consider the security
   implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is
   provided by a third party.

   Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and
   integrity of any SLURM file that it uses.  Initially, the SLURM file
   may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM
   file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity
   of the updated SLURM file.  Yet the mechanism to update SLURM file to
   guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this
   document.

7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
   detailed reviews of this document.  Thanks go to Wei Wang for the
   idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful
   reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their editorial assistance.

8.  References

8.1.  Informative References

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
              and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
              BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.



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   [RFC1930]  Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
              selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
              BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>.

   [RFC4193]  Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
              Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.

   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

   [RFC6491]  Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
              Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",
              RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>.

   [RFC6598]  Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
              M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
              Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April
              2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>.

   [RFC6996]  Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
              Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July
              2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>.

   [RFC8211]  Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification
              Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource
              Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8211>.

8.2.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.







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   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

   [RFC6810]  Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.

   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.

   [RFC8205]  Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
              Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
              2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.

   [RFC8208]  Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
              Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8208>.

   [RFC8209]  Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
              BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
              and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>.

   [RFC8210]  Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
              RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.

   [RFC8259]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.

Authors' Addresses










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Internet-Draft       RPKI Local Resource Management        February 2018


   Di Ma
   ZDNS
   4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun
   Haidian, Beijing  100190
   China

   Email: madi@zdns.cn


   David Mandelberg
   Unaffiliated

   Email: david@mandelberg.org
   URI:   https://david.mandelberg.org


   Tim Bruijnzeels
   RIPE NCC
   Stationsplein 11
   Amsterdam  1012 AB
   Netherlands

   Email: tim@ripe.net




























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