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Versions: (draft-ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light) 00 01

Network Working Group                                            T. King
Internet-Draft                                                   D. Kopp
Intended status: Standards Track                                  DE-CIX
Expires: July 20, 2017                                   A. Lambrianidis
                                                                  AMS-IX
                                                              A. Fenioux
                                                               France-IX
                                                        January 16, 2017


Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers
             draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-01

Abstract

   This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
   State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]
   to signal prefix origin validation results from a route-server to its
   peers.  Upon reception of prefix origin validation results peers can
   use this information in their local routing decision process.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all
   upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
   words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 20, 2017.






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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-
       Server to Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Local Routing Decision Process  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
           State Extended Community  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.3.  Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not
           Available at a Route-Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   RPKI-based prefix origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant
   operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt.  In order to
   boost acceptance and usage of prefix origin validation and ultimately
   increase the security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may
   provide RPKI-based prefix origin validation at the route-server
   [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server].  The result of this prefix origin
   validation is signaled to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin
   Validation State Extended Community as introduced in
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling].

   Peers receiving the prefix origin validation result from the route-
   server(s) can use this information in their local routing decision



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   process for acceptance, rejection, preference, or other traffic
   engineering purposes of a particular route.

2.  Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to
    Peers

   The BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community (as defined
   in [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]) is utilized for
   signaling prefix origin validation result from a route-server to
   peers.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] proposes an encoding of
   the prefix origin validation result [RFC6811] as follows:

                           +-------+-----------+
                           | Value | Meaning   |
                           +-------+-----------+
                           |   0   | Valid     |
                           |   1   | Not found |
                           |   2   | Invalid   |
                           +-------+-----------+

                                  Table 1

   This encoding is re-used.  Route-servers providing RPKI-based prefix
   origin validation set the validation state according to the prefix
   origin validation result (see [RFC6811]).

3.  Operational Recommendations

3.1.  Local Routing Decision Process

   A peer receiving prefix origin validation results from the route-
   server MAY use the information in its own local routing decision
   process.  The local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the
   rules as described in section 5 [RFC6811].

   A peer receiving a prefix origin validation result from the route-
   server MAY redistribute this information within its own AS.

3.2.  Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State
      Extended Community

   An IXP route-server receiving routes from its peers containing the
   BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the
   extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers.
   This is required regardless of whether the route-server is executing
   prefix origin validation or not.



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   Failure to do so would allow opportunistic peers to advertise routes
   tagged with arbitrary prefix origin validation results via a route-
   server, influencing maliciously the decision process of other route-
   server peers.

3.3.  Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not Available at
      a Route-Server

   In case information about the validity of a BGP prefix origin is not
   available at the route-server (e.g., error in the ROA cache, CPU
   overload) the route-server MUST NOT add the BGP Prefix Origin
   Validation State Extended Community to the route.

3.4.  Error Handling at Peers

   A route sent by a route-server SHOULD only contain none or one BGP
   Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community.

   A peer receiving a route from a route-server containing more than one
   BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community SHOULD only
   consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the
   validation result field and disregard the other values.  Values
   larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded.

4.  IANA Considerations

   None.

5.  Security Considerations

   All security considerations described in RFC RFC6811 [RFC6811] fully
   apply to this document.

   Additionally, threat agents polluting ROA cache server(s) run by IXPs
   can cause significant operational impact, since multiple route-server
   clients could be affected.  Peers should be vigilant as to the
   integrity and authenticity of the origin validation results, as they
   are provided by a third party, namely the IXP hosting both the route-
   server as well as any ROA cache server(s).

   Therefore, a route-server could be misused to spread malicious prefix
   origin validation results.  However, peers already trust route-server
   for the collection and redistribution of BGP routing information to
   other peers.

   Similar issues may arise due to inadvertent corruption of the ROA
   cache database.




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   To facilitate trust and help with peers establishing appropriate
   controls in mitigating the risks mentioned above, IXPs SHOULD provide
   out-of-band means for peers to ensure that the ROA validation process
   has not been compromised or corrupted.

   To countermeasure DDoS attacks, it is common practice to make use of
   blackholing services (see RFC 7999 [RFC7999]).  Peers are using
   blackholing to drop traffic, typically by announcing a more specific
   prefix, which is under attack.  If no ROA entry exists for the more
   specific prefix, its validation status would be "Invalid".  This
   might be undesirable, in which case it would be recommended for
   targeted peers to either create the appropriate ROA entry as
   necessary, or use adopted classification for such more specific
   prefixes.

   The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not
   pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route-
   servers and peers.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4360]  Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
              Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
              February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.

   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.

   [RFC7999]  King, T., Dietzel, C., Snijders, J., Doering, G., and G.
              Hankins, "BLACKHOLE Community", RFC 7999,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7999, October 2016,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7999>.

6.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]
              Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
              "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix-
              bgp-route-server-12 (work in progress), June 2016.



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   [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]
              Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
              Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
              Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07
              (work in progress), November 2015.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

Authors' Addresses

   Thomas King
   DE-CIX Management GmbH
   Lichtstrasse 43i
   Cologne  50825
   DE

   Email: thomas.king@de-cix.net


   Daniel Kopp
   DE-CIX Management GmbH
   Lichtstrasse 43i
   Cologne  50825
   DE

   Email: daniel.kopp@de-cix.net


   Aristidis Lambrianidis
   Amsterdam Internet Exchange
   Frederiksplein 42
   Amsterdam  1017 XN
   NL

   Email: aristidis.lambrianidis@ams-ix.net


   Arnaud Fenioux
   France-IX
   88 Avenue Des Ternes
   Paris  75017
   FR

   Email: afenioux@franceix.net





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