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Versions: (draft-ymbk-sidrops-rpki-rov-timing) 00

Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                  Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                            J. Borkenhagen
Expires: November 27, 2020                                          AT&T
                                                          T. Bruijnzeels
                                                              NLnet Labs
                                                             J. Snijders
                                                                     NTT
                                                            May 26, 2020


Timing Parameters in the RPKI based Route Origin Validation Supply Chain
                 draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rov-timing-00

Abstract

   This document explores, and makes recommendations for, timing of
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure publication of ROV data, their
   propagation, and their use in Relying Parties and routers.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 27, 2020.







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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Related Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Certification Authority Publishing  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Relying Party Fetching  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Router Updating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Effect on Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Alternative Technologies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   This document explores, and makes recommendations for, timing of
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) publication of ROV data,
   their propagation, and their use in Relying Parties (RP), caches and
   routers.

   The RPKI supply chain from CAs to reach routers has a structure as
   follows:

   Cerification Authorities:  The authoritative data of the RPKI are
      published by a distributed set of Certification Authorities (CAs)
      at the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs (see [RFC6481]).






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   Publication Points:  The CAs publish their authoritative data in
      publicly accessible repositories which have a Publication Point
      (PP) for each CA.

   Relying Parties:  Relying Parties are a local (to the routers) set of
      one or more collected and verified caches of RPKI data which are
      collected from the PPs.

      Currently RPs can pull from other RPs, thereby creating a somewhat
      complex topology.

   Routers:  Validating routers fetch data from local RP caches using
      the RPKI to Router Protocol, [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis].  Routers
      are clients of the caches.  Validating routers MUST have a trust
      relationship with, and a trusted transport channel to, any RP(s)
      they use.  [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis] specifies mechanisms for the
      router to assure itself of the authenticity of the cache(s) and to
      authenticate itself to cache(s).

   As Resource Public Key Infrastructure based Route Origin Validation
   (ROV) becomes deployed in the Internet, the quality of the routing
   control plane, and hence timely and accurate delivery of packets in
   the data plane, increasingly depend on prompt and accurate
   propagation of the RPKI data from the originating Certification
   Authorities (CAs), to Relying Parties (RPs), to Border Gateway
   Protocol (BGP) speaking routers.

   Origin Validation based on stale ROAs allows accidental or
   intentional mis-origination; announcement of a prefix by an AS which
   does not have the authority to do so.  While delays in ROA
   propagation to ROV in routers can cause loss of good traffic.
   Therefore minimizing propagation time of data from CAs to routers is
   critical.

   Before the data can start on the CA to router supply chain, the
   resource holder (operator) MUST create or delete the relevant ROA(s)
   through the CA's operational interface(s).  The operator is
   responsible for anticipating their future needs for ROAs, be aware of
   the propagation time from creating ROAs to effect on routing, and
   SHOULD create, delete, or modify ROAs sufficiently in advance of any
   needs in the routing system.

   There are questions of how frequently a CA publishes, how often an RP
   pulls, and how often routers pull from their RP(s).  Overall, the
   router(s) SHOULD react within an hour of ROA publication.

   For CAs publishing to PPs, a few seconds to a minute seems easily
   achieved with reasonable software.  See Section 3.



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   Relying Party validating caches periodically retrieve data from CA
   publication points.  RPs using rsync to poll publication points every
   ten minutes would be a burden today, given the load it would put on
   publication services, cf. one notorious repository which is
   structured against specification.  RPs using RRDP impose no such
   load.  As the infrastructure moves from rsync to RRDP
   [I-D.sidrops-bruijnzeels-deprecate-rsync], RRDP is designed for very
   frequent polling as long as Relying Parties use the "If-Modified-
   Since" header and there is a caching infrastructure.  For rsync, an
   hour would be the longest acceptable window.  See Section 4.

   For the BGP speaking router(s) pulling from the RP(s), five minutes
   to an hour is a wide window.  But, the RPKI-Rtr protocol does have
   the Serial Notify PDU, the equivalent of DNS Notify, where the cache
   tells the router that it has new data.  See Section 5.

   We discuss each of these in detail below.

2.  Related Work

   It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI
   [RFC6480], RPKI Manifests [RFC6486], Route Origin Authorizations
   (ROAs), [RFC6482], the RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)
   [RFC8182], The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router
   Protocol [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis], RPKI-based Prefix Validation,
   [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications, [RFC8481].

3.  Certification Authority Publishing

   A principal constraint on publication timing is ensuring the CRL and
   Manifest ([RFC6486]) are atomically correct with respect to the other
   repository data.  With rsync, the directory must be atomically
   correct before it becomes current.  RRDP ([RFC8182]) is similar, the
   directory must be atomically correct before it is published.

4.  Relying Party Fetching

   rsync puts a load on RPKI publication point servers.  Therefore
   relying party caches have been discouraged from fetching more
   frequently than on the order of an hour.  Times as long as a day were
   even suggested.  We conclude that RPs using rsync SHOULD pull from CA
   publication points once an hour.

   With RRDP ([RFC8182]), such constraints are no longer relevant.
   [RFC8182] makes clear that polling as frequently as once a second is
   acceptable iff Relying Parties use the "If-Modified-Since" header and
   there is caching.  In such circumstances, the RRDP polling interval
   MUST be no more than ten minutes.  We strongly recommend the



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   migration from rsync to RRDP in
   [I-D.sidrops-bruijnzeels-deprecate-rsync].

   A number of timers are embedded in the X.509 RPKI data which should
   also be considered.  E.g., CRL publication commitments, expiration of
   EE certificates pointing to Manifests, and the Manifests themselves.
   Some CA operators commonly indicate new CRL information should be
   available in the next 24 hours.  These 24-hour sliding timers,
   combined with fetching RPKI data once a day, cause needless
   brittleness in the face of transient network issues between the CA
   and RP.

5.  Router Updating

   The rate of change of ROA data is estimated to remain small, on the
   order of a few ROAs a minute, but with bursts.  Therefore, the
   routers may update from the (presumed local) relying party cache(s)
   quite frequently.  Note that [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis] recommends a
   polling interval of one hour.  This timing is conservative because
   caches can send a Serial Notify PDU to tell routers when there are
   new data to be fetched.

   A router SHOULD respond with a Serial Query when it receives a Serial
   Notify from a cache.  If a router can not respond appropriately to a
   Serial Notify, then it MUST send a periodic Serial Query no less
   frequently than once an hour.

6.  Effect on Routing

   Once a router has received an End of Data PDU from a cache, the
   effect on Route Origin Validation MUST be a matter of seconds to a
   minute.  The router MAY allow incoming VRPs to affect Origin
   Validation as they arrive instead of waiting for the End of Data PDU.
   See [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis] for some cautions regarding the
   arrival sequence of VRPs.

7.  Alternative Technologies

   Should the supply chain include components or technologies other than
   those in IETF documents, the end effect SHOULD be the same; the
   router(s) SHOULD react to invalid AS origins within the same overall
   time constraint, an hour at most from ROA creation at the CA
   publication point to effect in the router.








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8.  Security Considerations

   Despite common misconceptions and marketing, Route Origin Validation
   is not a security protocol.  It is intended to catch operational
   errors, and is easily gamed and attacked.

   If an attacker can add, delete, or modify RPKI data, either in
   repositories or in flight, they can affect routing and thereby steer
   or damage traffic.  The RPKI system design does much to deter these
   attacks.  But the 'last mile' from the cache to the router uses
   transport, as opposed to object, security and is vulnerable.  This is
   discussed in [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis].

   Similarly, if an attacker can delay prompt propagation of RPKI data
   on the supply chain described in this document, they can affect
   routing, and therefore traffic flow, to their advantage.

9.  IANA Considerations

   None

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis]
              Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 2",
              draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-00 (work in progress), March
              2020.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.






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   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

   [RFC6486]  Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
              "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.

   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8182]  Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., and R. Austein,
              "The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)", RFC 8182,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8182, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8182>.

   [RFC8481]  Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
              on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.sidrops-bruijnzeels-deprecate-rsync]
              Bruijnzeels, T., Bush, R., and G. Michaelson, "Resource
              Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Repository Requirements",
              draft-sidrops-bruijnzeels-deprecate-rsync-01 (work in
              progress), April 2020.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to thank Massimiliano Stucchi.







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Authors' Addresses

   Randy Bush
   Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
   5147 Crystal Springs
   Bainbridge Island, Washington  98110
   United States of America

   Email: randy@psg.com


   Jay Borkenhagen
   AT&T
   200 Laurel Avenue South
   Middletown, NJ  07748
   United States of America

   Email: jayb@att.com


   Tim Bruijnzeels
   NLnet Labs

   Email: tim@nlnetlabs.nl
   URI:   https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/


   Job Snijders
   NTT Ltd.
   Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
   Amsterdam  1065 SZ
   The Netherlands

   Email: job@ntt.net

















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