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Versions: (draft-peterson-sipbrandy-rtpsec) 00 01 02 03

Network Working Group                                        J. Peterson
Internet-Draft                                                   Neustar
Intended status: Best Current Practice                       E. Rescorla
Expires: May 3, 2018                                           R. Barnes
                                                                 Mozilla
                                                              R. Housley
                                                                Vigilsec
                                                        October 30, 2017


        Best Practices for Securing RTP Media Signaled with SIP
                   draft-ietf-sipbrandy-rtpsec-03.txt

Abstract

   Although the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) includes a suite of
   security services that has been expanded by numerous specifications
   over the years, there is no single place that explains how to use SIP
   to establish confidential media sessions.  Additionally, existing
   mechanisms have some feature gaps that need to be identified and
   resolved in order for them to address the pervasive monitoring threat
   model.  This specification describes best practices for negotiating
   confidential media with SIP, including both comprehensive protection
   solutions which bind the media to SIP-layer identities as well as
   opportunistic security solutions.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.




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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Security at the SIP and SDP layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Comprehensive Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Opportunistic Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  STIR Profile for Endpoint Authentication and Verification
       Services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Anonymous Communications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Connected Identity Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.4.  Authorization Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Media Security Protocols  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Relayed Media and Conferencing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  ICE and Connected Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Best Current Practices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   12. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] includes a suite of
   security services, ranging from Digest authentication for
   authenticating entities with a shared secret, to TLS for transport
   security, to S/MIME (optionally) for body security.  SIP is
   frequently used to establish media sessions, in particular audio or
   audiovisual sessions, which have their own security mechanisms
   available, such as Secure RTP [RFC3711].  However, the practices
   needed to bind security at the media layer to security at the SIP
   layer, to provide an assurance that protection is in place all the
   way up the stack, rely on a great many external security mechanisms
   and practices, and require a central point of documentation to
   explain their optimal use as a best practice.




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   Revelations about widespread pervasive monitoring of the Internet
   have led to a reevaluation of the threat model for Internet
   communications [RFC7258].  In order to maximize the use of security
   features, especially of media confidentiality, opportunistic measures
   must often serve as a stopgap when a full suite of services cannot be
   negotiated all the way up the stack.  This document explains the
   limitations that may inhibit the use of comprehensive protection, and
   provides recommendations for which external security mechanisms
   implementers should use to negotiate secure media with SIP.  It
   moreover gives a gap analysis of the limitations of existing
   solutions, and specifies solutions to address them.

   Various specifications that user agents must implement to support
   media confidentiality are given in the sections below; a summary of
   the best current practices appears in Section 8.

2.  Terminology

   In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
   "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT
   RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as
   described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] and RFC 6919 [RFC6919].

3.  Security at the SIP and SDP layer

   There are two approaches to providing confidentiality for media
   sessions set up with SIP: comprehensive protection and opportunistic
   security (as defined in [RFC7435]).

3.1.  Comprehensive Protection

   Comprehensive protection for media sessions established by SIP
   requires the interaction of three protocols: SIP, the Session
   Description Protocol (SDP), and the Real-time Protocol, in particular
   its secure profile SRTP.  Broadly, it is the responsibility of SIP to
   provide integrity protection for the media keying attributes conveyed
   by SDP, and those attributes will in turn identify the keys used by
   endpoints in the RTP media session(s) that SDP negotiates.  In that
   way, once SIP and SDP have exchanged the necessary information to
   initiate a session, media endpoints will have a strong assurance that
   the keys they exchange have not been tampered with by third parties,
   and that end-to-end confidentiality is available.

   Our current target mechanism for establishing the identity of the
   endpoints of a SIP session is the use of STIR
   [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis].  The STIR Identity header has been
   designed to prevent a class of impersonation attacks that are
   commonly used in robocalling, voicemail hacking, and related threats.



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   STIR generates a signature over certain features of SIP requests,
   including header field values that contain an identity for the
   originator of the request, such as the From header field or P-
   Asserted-Identity field, and also over the media keys in SDP if they
   are present.  As currently defined, STIR only provides a signature
   over the "a=fingerprint" attribute, which is a key fingerprint
   utilized by DTLS-SRTP [RFC5763]; consequently, STIR only offers
   comprehensive protection for SIP sessions, in concert with SDP and
   SRTP, when DTLS-SRTP is the media security service.  The underlying
   PASSporT [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] object used by STIR is extensible,
   however, and it would be possible to provide signatures over other
   SDP attributes that contain alternate keying material.  A profile for
   using STIR to provide media confidentiality is given in Section 4.

3.2.  Opportunistic Security

   Work is already underway on defining approaches to opportunistic
   media security for SIP in [I-D.johnston-dispatch-osrtp], which builds
   on the prior efforts of [I-D.kaplan-mmusic-best-effort-srtp].  The
   major protocol change proposed by that draft is to signal the use of
   opportunistic encryption by negotiating the AVP profile in SDP,
   rather than the SAVP profile (as specified in [RFC3711]) that would
   ordinarily be used when negotiating SRTP.

   Opportunistic encryption approaches typically have no integrity
   protection for the keying material in SDP.  Sending SIP over TLS hop-
   by-hop between user agents and any intermediaries will reduce the
   prospect that active attackers can alter keys for session requests on
   the wire.  However, opportunistic confidentiality for media will
   prevent passive attacks of the form most common in the threat of
   pervasive monitoring.

4.  STIR Profile for Endpoint Authentication and Verification Services

   STIR [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] defines the Identity header field for
   SIP, which provides a cryptographic attestation of the source of
   communications.  This profile assumes that a STIR verification
   service will act in concert with an SRTP media endpoint to ensure
   that the key fingerprints, as given in SDP, match the keys exchanged
   to establish DTLS-SRTP.  To satisfy this condition, the verification
   service function would in this case be implemented in the SIP UAS,
   which would be composed with the media endpoint.  If the STIR
   authentication service or verification service functions are
   implemented at an intermediary rather than an endpoint, this
   introduces the possibility that the intermediary could act as a man
   in the middle, altering key fingerprints.  As this attack is not in
   STIR's core threat model, which focuses on impersonation rather than
   man-in-the-middle attacks, STIR offers no specific protections



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   against such interference.  The SIPBRANDY deployment profile of STIR
   for media confidentiality thus shifts these responsibilities to the
   endpoints rather than the intermediaries.

   In order to be compliant with best practices for SIP media
   confidentiality with comprehensive protection, user agent
   implementations MUST implement both the authentication service and
   verification service roles described in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis].
   STIR authentication services MUST signal their compliance with this
   specification by adding the "msec" header element defined in this
   specification to the PASSporT header.  Implementations MUST provide
   key fingerprints in SDP and the appropriate signatures over them per
   [I-D.ietf-stir-passport].

   When generating either an offer or an answer, compliant
   implementations MUST include an "a=fingerprint" attribute containing
   the fingerprint of an appropriate key (see Section 4.1).

4.1.  Credentials

   In order to implement the authentication service function in the user
   agent, SIP endpoints must acquire the credentials needed to sign for
   their own identity.  That identity is typically carried in the From
   header field of a SIP request, and either contains a greenfield SIP
   URI (e.g. "sip:alice@example.com") or a telephone number, which can
   appear in a variety of ways (e.g.
   "sip:+17004561212@example.com;user=phone").
   [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 8 contains guidance for separating
   the two, and determining what sort of credential is needed to sign
   for each.

   To date, few commercial certificate authorities issue certificates
   for SIP URIs or telephone numbers; though work is ongoing on systems
   for this purpose (such as [I-D.peterson-acme-telephone]) it is not
   mature enough to be recommended as a best practice.  This is one
   reason why the STIR standard is architected to permit intermediaries
   to act as an authentication service on behalf of an entire domain,
   just as in SIP an proxy server can provide domain-level SIP service.
   While certificate authorities that offered proof-of-possession
   certificates similar to those used in the email world could be
   offered for SIP, either for greenfield identifiers or for telephone
   numbers, this specification does not require their use.

   For users who do not possess such certificates, DTLS-SRTP [RFC5763]
   permits the use of self-signed keys.  This profile of STIR for media
   confidentiality therefore relaxes the authority requirements of
   [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] to allow the use of self-signed keys for
   authentication services that are composed with user agents, by



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   generating a certificate (per the guidance of
   [I-D.ietf-stir-certificates]) with a subject corresponding to the
   user's identity.  Such a credential could be used for trust on first
   use (see [RFC7435]) by relying parties.  Note that relying parties
   SHOULD NOT use certificate revocation mechanisms or real-time
   certificate verification systems for self-signed certificates as they
   will not increase confidence in the certificate.

   Users who wish to remain anonymous can instead generate self-signed
   certificates as described in Section 4.2.

   Generally speaking, without access to out-of-band information about
   which certificates were issued to whom, it will be very difficult for
   relying parties to ascertain whether or not the signer of a SIP
   request is genuinely an "endpoint."  Even the term "endpoint" is a
   problematic one, as SIP user agents can be composed in a variety of
   architectures and may not be devices under direct user control.
   While it is possible that techniques based on certificate
   transparency [RFC6962] or similar practices could help user agents to
   recognize one another's certificates, those operational systems will
   need to ramp up with the certificate authorities that issue
   credentials to end user devices going forward.

4.2.  Anonymous Communications

   In some cases, the identity of the initiator of a SIP session may be
   withheld due to user or provider policy.  Per the recommendations of
   [RFC3323], this may involve using an identity such as
   "anonymous@anonymous.invalid" in the identity fields of a SIP
   request.  [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] does not currently permit
   authentication services to sign for requests that supply this
   identity.  It does however permit signing for valid domains, such as
   "anonymous@example.com," as a way of implementation an anonymization
   service as specified in [RFC3323].

   Even for anonymous sessions, providing media confidentiality and
   partial SDP integrity is still desirable.  This specification
   RECOMMENDS using one-time self-signed certificates for anonymous
   communications, with a subjectAltName of
   "sip:anonymous@anonymous.invalid".  After a session is terminated,
   the certificate should be discarded, and a new one, with new keying
   material, should be generated before each future anonymous call.  As
   with self-signed certificates, relying parties SHOULD NOT use
   certificate revocation mechanisms or real-time certificate
   verification systems for anonymous certificates as they will not
   increase confidence in the certificate.





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   Note that when using one-time anonymous self-signed certificates, any
   man in the middle could strip the Identity header and replace it with
   one signed by its own one-time certificate, changing the "mkey"
   parameters of PASSporT and any "a=fingerprint" attributes in SDP as
   it chooses.  This signature only provides protection against non-
   Identity aware entities that might modify SDP without altering the
   PASSporT conveyed in the Identity header.

4.3.  Connected Identity Usage

   STIR [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides integrity protection for the
   SDP bodies of SIP requests, but not SIP responses.  When a session is
   established, therefore, any SDP body carried by a 200 class response
   in the backwards direction will not be protected by an authentication
   service and cannot be verified.  Thus, sending a secured SDP body in
   the backwards direction will require an extra RTT, typically a
   request sent in the backwards direction.

   The problem of providing "Connected Identity" for the original
   RFC4474 was explored in [RFC4916], which uses a provisional or mid-
   dialog UPDATE request in the backwards direction to convey an
   Identity header for the recipient of an INVITE.  The procedures in
   that specification are largely compatible with the revision of the
   Identity header in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis].  However, the
   following updates to [RFC4916] are required:

      The UPDATE carrying signed SDP with a fingerprint in the backwards
      direction MUST be sent during dialog establishment, following the
      receipt of a PRACK after a provisional 1xx response.

      For use with this STIR Profile for media confidentiality, the UAS
      that responds to the INVITE request MUST act as an authentication
      service for the UPDATE sent in the backwards direction.

      The text in RFC4916 Section 4.4.1 regarding the receipt at a UAC
      of error codes 428, 436, 437 and 438 in response to a mid-dialog
      request RECOMMENDS treating the dialog as terminated.
      [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] allows the retransmission of requests
      with repairable error conditions (see section 6.1.1) in a way that
      can override that SHOULD in RFC4916.  In particular, an
      authentication service MAY retry a mid-dialog as
      [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] allows rather than treating the dialog
      as terminated, though note that only one such retry is permitted.

      The examples in RFC4916 are based on the original RFC4474, and
      will not match signatures using [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis].





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   Future work may be done to revise RFC4916 for STIR; that work should
   take into account any impacts on the profile described in this
   document.  The use of RFC4916 has some further interactions with ICE;
   see Section 7.

4.4.  Authorization Decisions

   [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] grants STIR verification services a great
   deal of latitude when making authorization decisions based on the
   presence of the Identity header field.  It is largely a matter of
   local policy whether an endpoint rejects a call based on absence of
   an Identity header field, or even the presence of a header that fails
   an integrity check against the request.

   For this profile, however, a compliant verification service that
   receives a dialog-forming SIP request containing an Identity header
   with a PASSporT type of "msec", after validating the request per the
   steps described in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 6.2, MUST
   reject the request if there is any failure in that validation process
   with the appropriate status code per Section 6.2.2.  If the request
   is valid, then if a terminating user accepts the request, it MUST
   then follow the steps in Section 4.3 to act as an authentication
   service and send a signed request with the "msec" PASSPorT type in
   its Identity header as well, in order to enable end-to-end
   bidirectional confidentiality.

   For the purposes of this profile, the "msec" PASSporT type can be
   used by authentication services in one of two ways: as a mandatory
   request for media security, or as a merely opportunistic request for
   media security.  As any verification service that receives an
   Identity header in a SIP request with an unrecognized PASSporT type
   will simply ignore that Identity header, an authentication service
   will know whether or not the terminating side supports "msec" based
   on whether or not its user agent receives a signed request in the
   backwards direction per Section 4.3.  If no such requests are
   received, the UA may do one or two things: shut down the dialog, if
   the policy of the UA requires that "msec" be supported by the
   terminating side for this dialog; or, if policy permits, allow the
   dialog to continue without media security.

5.  Media Security Protocols

   As there are several ways to negotiate media security with SDP, any
   of which might be used with either opportunistic or comprehensive
   protection, further guidance to implementers is needed.  In
   [I-D.johnston-dispatch-osrtp], opportunistic approaches considered
   include DTLS-SRTP, security descriptions [RFC4568], and ZRTP
   [RFC6189].



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   DTLS-SRTP is the only Standards Track Internet protocol for media
   security.  For that reason, this specification REQUIRES support for
   DTLS-SRTP.

   The "mkey" claim of PASSporT provides integrity protection for
   "a=fingerprint" attributes in SDP, including cases where multiple
   "a=fingerprint" attributes appear in the same SDP.

6.  Relayed Media and Conferencing

   Providing end-to-end media confidentiality for SIP is complicated by
   the presence of many forms of media relays.  While many media relays
   merely proxy media to a destination, others present themselves as
   media endpoints and terminate security associations before re-
   originating media to its destination.

   Centralized conference bridges are one type of entity that typically
   terminates a media session in order to mux media from multiple
   sources and then to re-originate the muxed media to conference
   participants.  In many such implementations, only hop-by-hop media
   confidentiality is possible.  Work is ongoing to specify a means to
   encrypt both the hop-by-hop media between a user agent and a
   centralized server as well as the end-to-end media between user
   agents, but is not sufficiently mature at this time to make a
   recommendation for a best practice here.  Those protocols are
   expected to identify their own best practice recommendations as they
   mature.

   Another class of entities that might relay SIP media are back-to-back
   user agents (B2BUAs).  If a B2BUA follows the guidance in [RFC7879],
   it may be possible for those devices to act as media relays while
   still permitting end-to-end confidentiality between user agents.

   Ultimately, if an endpoint can decrypt media it receives, then that
   endpoint can forward the decrypted media without the knowledge or
   consent of the media's originator.  No media confidentiality
   mechanism can protect against these sorts of relayed disclosures, or
   trusted entities that can decrypt media and then record a copy to be
   sent elsewhere (see [RFC7245]).

7.  ICE and Connected Identity

   Providing confidentiality for media with comprehensive protection
   requires careful timing of when media streams should be sent and when
   a user interface should signify that confidentiality is in place.

   In order to best enable end-to-end connectivity between user agents,
   and to avoid media relays as much as possible, implementations of



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   this specification must support ICE [I-D.ietf-ice-rfc5245bis].  To
   speed up call establishment, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations
   support trickle ICE [I-D.ietf-mmusic-trickle-ice-sip].

   Note that in the comprehensive protection case, the use of Connected
   Identity [RFC4916] with ICE entails that the answer containing the
   key fingerprints, and thus the STIR signature, will come in an UPDATE
   sent in the backwards direction a provisional response and
   acknowledgment (PRACK), rather than in any earlier SDP body.  Only at
   such a time as that UPDATE is received will the media keys be
   considered exchanged in this case.

   Similarly, in order to prevent, or at least mitigate, the denial-of-
   service attack envisioned in [RFC5245] Section 18.5.1, this
   specification incorporates best practices for ensuring that
   recipients of media flows have consented to receive such flows.
   Implementations of this specification MUST implement the STUN usage
   for consent freshness defined in [RFC7675].

8.  Best Current Practices

   The following are the best practices for SIP user agents to provide
   media confidentiality for SIP sessions.

   Implementations MUST support the STIR endpoint profile given in
   Section 4, and signal that in PASSporT with the "msec" header
   element.

   Implementations MUST follow the authorization decision behavior in
   Section 4.4.

   Implementations MUST support DTLS-SRTP for key-management, as
   described in Section 5.

   Implementations MUST support the ICE, and the STUN consent freshness
   mechanism, as specified in Section 7.



9.  Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank Adam Roach, Andrew Hutton, and Ben Campbell
   for contributions to this problem statement and framework.








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10.  IANA Considerations

   This specification defines a new values for the PASSporT Type
   registry called "msec," and the IANA is requested to add that to the
   registry with a value pointing to [RFCThis].

11.  Security Considerations

   This document describes the security features that provide media
   sessions established with SIP with confidentiality, integrity, and
   authentication.

12.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-ice-rfc5245bis]
              Keranen, A., Holmberg, C., and J. Rosenberg, "Interactive
              Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for Network
              Address Translator (NAT) Traversal", draft-ietf-ice-
              rfc5245bis-14 (work in progress), October 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-mmusic-trickle-ice-sip]
              Ivov, E., Stach, T., Marocco, E., and C. Holmberg, "A
              Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) usage for Trickle ICE",
              draft-ietf-mmusic-trickle-ice-sip-10 (work in progress),
              October 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-stir-certificates]
              Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
              Credentials: Certificates", draft-ietf-stir-
              certificates-14 (work in progress), May 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-stir-passport]
              Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "Personal Assertion Token
              (PASSporT)", draft-ietf-stir-passport-11 (work in
              progress), February 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]
              Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
              "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-16
              (work in progress), February 2017.

   [I-D.johnston-dispatch-osrtp]
              Johnston, A., Ph.D., D., Hutton, A., Liess, L., and T.
              Stach, "An Opportunistic Approach for Secure Real-time
              Transport Protocol (OSRTP)", draft-johnston-dispatch-
              osrtp-02 (work in progress), February 2016.




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   [I-D.kaplan-mmusic-best-effort-srtp]
              Audet, F. and H. Kaplan, "Session Description Protocol
              (SDP) Offer/Answer Negotiation For Best-Effort Secure
              Real-Time Transport Protocol", draft-kaplan-mmusic-best-
              effort-srtp-01 (work in progress), October 2006.

   [I-D.peterson-acme-telephone]
              Peterson, J. and R. Barnes, "ACME Identifiers and
              Challenges for Telephone Numbers", draft-peterson-acme-
              telephone-00 (work in progress), October 2016.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.

   [RFC3264]  Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
              with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3264, June 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264>.

   [RFC3323]  Peterson, J., "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3323,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3323, November 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3323>.

   [RFC3711]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
              Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
              RFC 3711, DOI 10.17487/RFC3711, March 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711>.

   [RFC4568]  Andreasen, F., Baugher, M., and D. Wing, "Session
              Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media
              Streams", RFC 4568, DOI 10.17487/RFC4568, July 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4568>.

   [RFC4916]  Elwell, J., "Connected Identity in the Session Initiation
              Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4916, DOI 10.17487/RFC4916, June
              2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4916>.






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   [RFC5124]  Ott, J. and E. Carrara, "Extended Secure RTP Profile for
              Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP)-Based Feedback
              (RTP/SAVPF)", RFC 5124, DOI 10.17487/RFC5124, February
              2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5124>.

   [RFC5245]  Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
              (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT)
              Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5245, April 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5245>.

   [RFC5763]  Fischl, J., Tschofenig, H., and E. Rescorla, "Framework
              for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
              (SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer
              Security (DTLS)", RFC 5763, DOI 10.17487/RFC5763, May
              2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5763>.

   [RFC6189]  Zimmermann, P., Johnston, A., Ed., and J. Callas, "ZRTP:
              Media Path Key Agreement for Unicast Secure RTP",
              RFC 6189, DOI 10.17487/RFC6189, April 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6189>.

   [RFC6919]  Barnes, R., Kent, S., and E. Rescorla, "Further Key Words
              for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 6919,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6919, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6919>.

   [RFC6962]  Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
              Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962>.

   [RFC7245]  Hutton, A., Ed., Portman, L., Ed., Jain, R., and K. Rehor,
              "An Architecture for Media Recording Using the Session
              Initiation Protocol", RFC 7245, DOI 10.17487/RFC7245, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7245>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

   [RFC7435]  Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
              Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
              December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.

   [RFC7675]  Perumal, M., Wing, D., Ravindranath, R., Reddy, T., and M.
              Thomson, "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) Usage
              for Consent Freshness", RFC 7675, DOI 10.17487/RFC7675,
              October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7675>.



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   [RFC7879]  Ravindranath, R., Reddy, T., Salgueiro, G., Pascual, V.,
              and P. Ravindran, "DTLS-SRTP Handling in SIP Back-to-Back
              User Agents", RFC 7879, DOI 10.17487/RFC7879, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7879>.

Authors' Addresses

   Jon Peterson
   Neustar, Inc.
   1800 Sutter St Suite 570
   Concord, CA  94520
   US

   Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz


   Eric Rescorla
   Mozilla

   Email: ekr@rtfm.com


   Richard Barnes
   Mozilla

   Email: rlb@ipv.sx


   Russ Housley
   Vigilsec

   Email: housley@vigilsec.com



















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