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Versions: (draft-rosenberg-sipping-consent-framework) 00 01 02 03 04 05

SIPPING                                                     J. Rosenberg
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Expires: April 8, 2006                                 G. Camarillo, Ed.
                                                                Ericsson
                                                               D. Willis
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                         October 5, 2005


 A Framework for Consent-Based Communications in the Session Initiation
                             Protocol (SIP)
              draft-ietf-sipping-consent-framework-03.txt

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 8, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

   The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) supports communications across
   many media types, including real-time audio, video, text, instant
   messaging, and presence.  In its current form, it allows session
   invitations, instant messages, and other requests to be delivered



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   from one party to another without requiring explicit consent of the
   recipient.  Without such consent, it is possible for SIP to be used
   for malicious purposes, including spam and denial-of-service attacks.
   This document identifies a framework for consent-based communications
   in SIP.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Relays and Translations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1   Consenting Manipulations on a Relay's Transaction Logic  .  5
   4.  Permission Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Overview of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     5.1   Amplification Avoidance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.2   Request for Permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.3   Permission Document Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     5.4   Permission Requested Notification  . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.5   Permission Upload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       5.5.1   SIP Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       5.5.2   Return Routability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.6   Permission Granted Notification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   6.  Permission Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.  Request-contained URI Lists  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   8.  Registrations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   10.   Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   11.   References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     11.1  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     11.2  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 20



















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1.  Introduction

   The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [1] supports communications
   across many media types, including real-time audio, video, text,
   instant messaging and presence.  This communication is established by
   the transmission of various SIP requests (such as INVITE and MESSAGE
   [3]) from an initiator to the recipient, with whom communication is
   desired.  Although a recipient of such a SIP request can reject the
   request, and therefore decline the session, a SIP network will
   deliver a SIP request to the recipient without their explicit
   consent.

   Receipt of these requests without explicit consent can cause a number
   of problems in SIP networks.  These include spam and DoS (Denial of
   Service) attacks.  These problems are described in more detail in a
   companion requirements document [11].

   This specification defines a basic framework for adding consent-based
   communication to SIP.

2.  Definitions

   Recipient URI: The request-URI of an outgoing request sent by an
      entity (e.g., a user agent or a proxy).  The sending of such
      request may have been the result of a translation operation.

   Target URI: The request-URI of an incoming request that arrives to an
      entity (e.g., a proxy) that will perform a translation operation.

   Translation operation: Operation by which an entity (e.g., a proxy)
      translates the request URI of an incoming request (i.e., the
      target URI) into one or more URIs (i.e., recipient URIs) which are
      used as the request URIs of one or more outgoing requests.

3.  Relays and Translations

   A relay is defined as any SIP server, be it a proxy, B2BUA (Back-to-
   Back User Agent), or some hybrid, which receives a request and
   translates the request URI into one or more next hop URIs to which it
   then delivers a request.  The request URI of the incoming request is
   referred to as 'target URI' and the destination URI of the outgoing
   requests is referred to as 'recipient URIs', as shown in Figure 1.









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                       +---------------+
                       |               |  recipient URI
                       |               |---------------->
           target URI  |  Translation  |
        -------------->|   Operation   |  recipient URI
                       |               |---------------->
                       |               |
                       +---------------+

                      Figure 1: Translation operation

   Thus, an essential aspect of a relay is that of translation.  When a
   relay receives a request, it translates the request URI into one or
   more additional URIs.  Or, more generally, it can create outgoing
   requests to one or more additional URIs.  The translation operation
   is what creates the consent problem.

   Additionally, since the translation operation can result in more than
   one URI, it is also the source of amplification.  Servers that do not
   perform translations, such as outbound proxy servers, do not cause
   amplification.

   Since the translation operation is based on local policy or local
   data (such as registrations), it is the vehicle by which a request is
   delivered directly to an endpoint, when it would not otherwise be
   possible to.  In other words, if a spammer has the address of a user,
   'user@example.com', it cannot deliver a MESSAGE request to the UA
   (User Agent) of that user without having access to the registration
   data that maps 'user@example.com' to the user agent on which that
   user is present.  Thus, it is the usage of this registration data,
   and more generally, the translation logic, which must be authorized
   in order to prevent undesired communications.

   The reference architecture is shown in Figure 2.  In this
   architecture, a user agent client (UAC) wishes to send a message to a
   URI representing a resource in the domain 'example.com'
   (resource@example.com).  This request may pass through a local
   outbound proxy (not shown), but eventually arrives at a server
   authoritative for the domain 'example.com'.  This server, which acts
   as a relay, performs a translation operation, translating the target
   URI into one or more recipient URIs, which may or may not belong to
   the domain 'example.com'.  This relay may be, for instance, a proxy
   server or a URI-list service [13].








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                                   +-------+
                                   |       |
                                  >|  UAS  |
              +-------------+    / |       |
              | Translation |   /  +-------+
              |    Rules    |  /
              +-------------+ /
                     |       /
                     V      /
   +-----+       +-------+ /       +-------+
   |     |       |       |/        |       |
   | UAC |------>| Relay |-------->| Proxy |
   |     |       |       |\        |       |
   +-----+       +-------+ \       +-------+
                            \
                             \       [...]
                              \
                               \
                                \  +-------+
                                 \ |       |
                                  >| B2BUA |
                                   |       |
                                   +-------+

                 Figure 2: Relay performing a translation


3.1  Consenting Manipulations on a Relay's Transaction Logic

   This framework aims to ensure that any particular Relay only performs
   translations towards destinations that have given permission to the
   Relay to perform such a translation.  Consequently, when the
   translation logic of a relay is manipulated (e.g., a new recipient
   URI is added), the relay needs to obtain permission from the new
   recipient in order to install the new translation logic.  Relays ask
   recipients for permission using CONSENT requests.

   For example, the relay hosting the URI-list service at
   'friends@example.com' performs a translation from that URI to a set
   of recipient URIs.  When the administrator of that URI-list service
   adds 'bob@example.org' as a new recipient URI, the Relay sends a
   CONSENT request to 'bob@example.org' asking whether or not it is OK
   to perform the translation from 'friends@example.com' to
   'bob@example.org' (CONSENT requests carry in their message bodies a
   permission document that describes the translation for which
   permissions are being requested).  If the answer is positive, the new
   translation logic is installed at the relay.  That is, the new
   recipient URI is added.



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   Note that the mechanism to be used to manipulate the translation
   logic of a particular relay depends on the relay.  Two possible
   mechanisms to manipulate translation logic are XCAP [7] and REGISTER
   requests.

4.  Permission Servers

   When a CONSENT request sent by a relay arrives to the recipient URI
   to which it was sent, the receiving user can give or deny the
   permission needed to perform the translation.  Nevertheless, users
   are not on-line all the time and, so, sometimes are not able to
   receive CONSENT requests.

   This issue is also found in presence, where a user's status is
   reported by a presence server instead of by the user's user agents,
   which can go on and off-line.  Similarly, we define permission
   servers, which are a key element of this framework.  Permission
   servers are network elements that act as SIP user agents and handle
   CONSENT requests for a user.

   Permission servers inform users about new CONSENT requests using the
   'grant-permission' event package.  Figure Figure 3 illustrates this
   point.

   The user associated with the recipient URI for which the relay will
   ask for permission subscribes [2] (1) to the 'grant-permission' event
   package at the permission server.  This event package models the
   state of all pending CONSENT requests for a particular resource.
   When a new CONSENT request (3) arrives to the permission server, a
   NOTIFY (5) is sent to the user.  This informs them that permission is
   needed for a particular sender.  The NOTIFY contains a description of
   the translation for which permissions are being requested.

      There is a strong similarity between the 'winfo' event template-
      package [6] and the 'grant-permission' event package.  Indeed, the
      grant-permission package is effectively a superset of watcherinfo.
      Once in place, presentities could use the grant-permission event
      package for presence in addition to all other services for which
      opt-in is being provided.












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           Relay          B's Permission             B
                              Server
             |                   |(1) SUBSCRIBE      |
             |                   |Event: grant-permission
             |                   |<------------------|
             |                   |(2) 200 OK         |
             |                   |------------------>|
             |(3) CONSENT B@example                  |
             |------------------>|                   |
             |(4) 202 Accepted   |                   |
             |<------------------|                   |
             |                   |(5) NOTIFY         |
             |                   |------------------>|
             |                   |(6) 200 OK         |
             |                   |<------------------|

                   Figure 3: Permission server operation


5.  Overview of Operations

   This section provides an overview of this framework using an example
   of the prototypical call flow.  The elements described in previous
   sections (i.e., relays, translations, and permission servers) play an
   essential role in this call flow.

   Figure Figure 4 shows the complete process to add a recipient URI
   ('B@example.com') to the translation logic of a relay.  The call flow
   starts with user B subscribing to the permission server using the
   'grant-permission' event package.  User B will be informed about the
   arrival of CONSENT requests addressed to 'B@example.com'.

   User A attempts to add 'B@example.com' as a new recipient URI to the
   translation logic of the relay (3).  User A uses XCAP [7] and the XML
   (Extensible Markup Language) format for representing resource lists
   [8] to perform this addition.  Since the relay does not have
   permission from 'B@example.com' to perform translations towards that
   URI, the relay places 'B@example.com' in the 'Permission Pending'
   state and informs user A (4).












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       A@example.com        Relay       B's Permission    B@example.com
                                            Server
             |                |                |(1) SUBSCRIBE   |
             |                |                |Event: grant-permission
             |                |                |<---------------|
             |                |                |(2) 200 OK      |
             |                |                |--------------->|
             |(3) Add Recipient B@example.com  |                |
             |--------------->|                |                |
             |(4) Permission Pending           |                |
             |<---------------|                |                |
             |(5) REFER       |                |                |
             |Refer-To: B@example.com?method=CONSENT            |
             |--------------->|                |                |
             |(6) 200 OK      |                |                |
             |<---------------|                |                |
             |(7) SUBSCRIBE   |                |                |
             |Event: wait-permission           |                |
             |--------------->|                |                |
             |(8) 200 OK      |                |                |
             |<---------------|                |                |
             |                |(9) CONSENT B@example            |
             |                |Permission-Upload: uri-up        |
             |                |Permission Document              |
             |                |--------------->|                |
             |                |(10) 202 Accepted                |
             |                |<---------------|                |
             |                |                |(11) NOTIFY     |
             |                |                |uri-up          |
             |                |                |Permission Document
             |                |                |--------------->|
             |                |                |(12) 200 OK     |
             |                |                |<---------------|
             |                |(13) PUBLISH uri-up              |
             |                |Permission Document              |
             |                |<--------------------------------|
             |                |(14) 200 OK     |                |
             |                |-------------------------------->|
             |(15) NOTIFY     |                |                |
             |<---------------|                |                |
             |(16) 200 OK     |                |                |
             |--------------->|                |                |

                     Figure 4: Prototypical call flow







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5.1  Amplification Avoidance

   Once 'B@example.com' is in the 'Permission Pending' state, the relay
   needs to ask user B for permission by sending a CONSENT request to
   'B@example.com'.  However, the relay needs to ensure that it is not
   used as an amplifier to launch amplification attacks.

   In such an attack, the attacker would add a large number of recipient
   URIs to the translation logic of a relay.  The relay would then send
   a CONSENT request to each of those URIs.  The bandwidth generated by
   the relay would be much higher than the bandwidth used by the
   attacker to add those URIs to the translation logic of the relay.

   This framework uses a credit-based authorization mechanism to avoid
   the attack just described.  It requires users adding new recipient
   URIs to a translation to generate an amount of bandwidth that is
   comparable to the bandwidth the relay will generate when sending
   CONSENT requests towards those recipient URIs.  This requirement is
   met by having users generate REFER requests [4] towards the relay.
   Each REFER request triggers the sending of a CONSENT request by the
   relay.

   So, the relay sends user A the URI (4) where user A needs to send a
   REFER request.  User A generates such a REFER request (5) and sends
   it to the relay.  User A uses the 'norefersub' extension [5], which
   supreses the implicit subscription that is associated with REFER
   transactions.  This is because user A is not interested in the result
   of the CONSENT transaction, but in whether or not user B will
   authorize the translation by providing the requested permission.

   The relay provides a URI (4) where user A can subscribe to obtain
   information on whether or not user B provides the requested
   permission.  User A subscribes to that URI using the 'wait-
   permission' event package (6).

5.2  Request for Permission

   On receiving the REFER request (5), the relay generates a CONSENT
   request (9) towards 'B@example.com'.  This CONSENT request carries a
   permission document, which describes the translation that needs to be
   authorized, and a URI where to upload the permission for that
   translation.  User B will authorize the translation by uploading the
   permission document received in the CONSENT request into this URI.

   When the permission document is uploaded to the URI provided by the
   relay (13), the relay needs to make sure that the permission document
   received was generated by user B and not by an attacker.  The relay
   can use two methods to authenticate the permission document: SIP



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   identity or a return routability test.  Both methods are described in
   Section 5.5.  Relays using a return routability test to perform this
   authentication need to send the CONSENT request to a 'sips' URI.

5.3  Permission Document Structure

   A permission document is the XML representation of a permission.  A
   permission document contains several pieces of data:

   Identity of the Sender: A URI representing the identity of the sender
      for whom permissions are granted.

   Identity of the Original Recipient: A URI representing the identity
      of the original recipient, which is used as the input for the
      translation operation.  This is also called the target URI.

   Identity of the Final Recipient: A URI representing the result of the
      translation.  The permission grants ability for the sender to send
      requests to the target URI, and for a relay receiving those
      requests to forward them to this URI.  This is also called the
      recipient URI.

   Operations Permitted: A set of specific methods or qualifiers for
      which the permission applies.  For example, the permission may
      only grant relaying for INVITE requests and not for MESSAGE
      requests.

   Signature: A digital signature over the rest of the permission,
      signed by an entity that can identify itself as the recipient URI.
      The signature is not always present.

   Permission documents may contain wildcards.  For example, a
   permission document may authorize any relay to forward INVITE
   requests coming from a particular sender to a particular recipient.
   Such a permission document would apply to any target URI.  That is,
   the field containing the identity of the original recipient would
   match any URI.

   The permission document in the CONSENT request (9) sent by the relay
   contains the following values:

   Identity of the Sender: Any.

   Identity of the Original Recipient: friends@example.com







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   Identity of the Final Recipient: B@example.com

   Operations Permitted: INVITE

5.4  Permission Requested Notification

   On receiving the CONSENT request (9), B's permission server sends a
   NOTIFY request (11) to user B, who had previously subscribed to the
   grant-permission event package (1).  This NOTIFY request contains,
   the permission document, which describes the translation that needs
   to be authorized, and a URI where to upload the permission for that
   translation.  Both the permission document and the URI to upload the
   permission are copied from the CONSENT request (9) into the NOTIFY
   request (11).

5.5  Permission Upload

   On receiving the NOTIFY request (11), user B authorizes the
   translation described in the permission document received by
   uploading this permission document to the relay.  User B uses a
   PUBLISH request (13) to upload the permission document to URI
   received in the NOTIFY request.

   When the permission document is uploaded to the URI provided by the
   relay (13), the relay needs to make sure that the permission document
   received was generated by user B and not by an attacker.  The relay
   can use two methods to authenticate the permission document: SIP
   identity or a return routability test.

5.5.1  SIP Identity

   The SIP identity mechanism can be used to authenticate the sender of
   the PUBLISH request uploading the permission document.  The relay
   checks that the originator of the PUBLISH request is the owner of the
   recipient URI in the permission document.  Otherwise, the permission
   document is discarded.

5.5.2  Return Routability

   SIP identity provides a good authentication mechanism for this type
   of scenario.  Nevertheless, SIP identity is not widely available on
   the public Internet yet.  That is why an authentication mechanism
   that can already be used at this point is needed.

   Return routability tests do not provide the same level of security as
   SIP identity, but they provide a good-enough security level in
   architectures where the SIP identity mechanism is not available



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   (e.g., the current Internet).  The relay generates an unguessable URI
   (e.g., with a long and random-looking user part) and places it in the
   CONSENT request (9).  The recipient needs to upload the permission
   document to that URI.

   Relays using a return routability test to perform this authentication
   need to send the CONSENT request to a SIPS URI.  This ensures that
   attackers do not get access to the (unguessable) URI.  Thus, the only
   user able to upload the permission document to the (unguessable) URI
   is the receiver of the CONSENT request.

   Relays can transition from return routability tests to SIP identity
   by simply requiring the use of SIP identity for incoming PUBLISH
   requests.  That is, such a relay would reject PUBLISH requests that
   did not use SIP identity.

5.6  Permission Granted Notification

   On receiving the PUBLISH request (13), the relay sends a NOTIFY
   request (15) to inform user A that the permission for the translation
   has been received that the translation logic at the relay has been
   updated.  That is, 'B@example.com' has been added as a recipient URI.

6.  Permission Revocation

   At any time, if a client wants to revoke any permission, it uses the
   same URI as before to upload, using a PUBLISH request, a new
   permission document that does not authorize the translation at the
   relay any longer.  If a client loses this URI for some reason, it
   needs to wait until it receives a new request product of the
   translation.  Such request which will contain a Permission-Upload
   header field and may contain a Permission-Used header field.

   The client uses the URI in the Permission-Upload header field to
   upload the new permission document.  The Permission-Used header field
   contains a URI (e.g., an HTTP URI) where the permission document the
   relay has for the translation can be obtained.

   When permission document authorization is based on a return
   routability test, requests with a Permission-Upload header field need
   to be sent to a SIPS URI.

7.  Request-contained URI Lists

   In the scenarios described so far, a user adds recipient URIs to the
   translation logic of a relay.  However, the relay does not perform
   translations towards those URIs until permissions are obtained.




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   URI-list services using request-contained URI lists are a special
   case because the selection of recipient URIs is performed at the same
   time as the communication attempt.  A user places a set of recipient
   URIs in a request and sends it to a relay so that the relay sends a
   similar request to all those recipient URIs.

   This type of URI-list services maintain a list of recipient URIs from
   which permission have been received.  This list is manipulated in the
   same way as described in Section 5 and represents the set of URIs
   that will be accepted if a request containing a URI-list arrives to
   the relay.  Additionally, Figure 5 shows another way to add entries
   to that list.

   If the relay receives a request that contains URIs for which the
   relay does not have permission, the relay ignores those URIs (i.e.,
   does not send any request to them) and informs the user with a 470
   (Consent Needed) response.  Such a response contains a Consent-Needed
   header field with the URIs for which there is no permission, as shown
   in Figure 5.  Additionally, the response also contains a Call-Info
   header field with two entries.  The first entry is the URI where the
   user needs to send the REFER request that will trigger the relay to
   send a CONSENT request to those URIs.  The value of the purpose
   parameter for this entry is 'trigger-permission-request'.  The second
   entry is the URI where the user can subscribe in order to be informed
   on whether or not the relay receives permission from user B. The
   value of the purpose parameter for this entry is 'wait-permission'.

   The rest of the process is similar to the one described in Section 5.
   Note, however, that for simplicity, Figure 5 does not show the split
   between user B's permission server and user agent.





















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       A@example.com           Relay           B@example.com
             |(1) INVITE         |                   |
             |B@example.com      |                   |
             |C@example.com      |                   |
             |------------------>|                   |
             |(2) 470 Consent Needed                 |
             |Consent-Needed: B@example.com          |
             |Call-Info: 123@Relay;purpose=trigger-permission-request
             |Call-Info: 456@Relay;purpose=wait-permission
             |<------------------|                   |
             |(3) ACK            |                   |
             |------------------>|                   |
             |(4) SUBSCRIBE 456@Relay                |
             |Event: wait-permission                 |
             |------------------>|                   |
             |(5) 200 OK         |                   |
             |<------------------|                   |
             |(6) REFER 123@Relay|                   |
             |Refer-To: B@example.com?method=CONSENT |
             |------------------>|                   |
             |(7) 200 OK         |                   |
             |<------------------|                   |
             |                   |(8) CONSENT B@example
             |                   |Permission-Upload: uri-up-relay
             |                   |Permission Document|
             |                   |------------------>|
             |                   |(9) 202 Accepted   |
             |                   |<------------------|
             |                   |(10) PUBLISH uri-up-relay
             |                   |Permission Document|
             |                   |<------------------|
             |                   |(11) 200 OK        |
             |                   |------------------>|
             |(12) NOTIFY        |                   |
             |<------------------|                   |
             |(13) 200 OK        |                   |
             |------------------>|                   |

               Figure 5: INVITE with a URI list in its body


8.  Registrations

   Registrations are a special type of translations.  The user
   registering has a trust relationship with the registrar in its home
   domain.  This is not the case when a user gives any type of
   permissions to a relay in a different domain.




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   Traditionally, REGISTER transactions have performed two operations at
   the same time: setting up a translation and authorizing the use of
   that translation.  For example, a user registering its current
   contact URI is giving permission to the registrar to forward traffic
   sent to the user's AoR (Address of Records) to the registered contact
   URI.  This works fine when the entity registering is the same as the
   one that will be receiving traffic at a later point (e.g., over the
   same connection as the registration).  However, this schema creates
   some potential attacks which relate to third-party registrations.

   An attacker binds, via a registration, his or her AoR with the
   contact URI of a victim.  Now, the victim will receive unsolicited
   traffic that was originally addressed to the attacker.

   The process of authorizing a registration is shown in Figure 6.  User
   A performs a third-party registration (1) and receives a 200 (OK)
   response (2) with a Consent-Needed header field.  This header field
   contains the URI for which there is no permission.  That is, the URI
   the user is attempting to register.  Additionally, the response also
   contains a Call-Info header field with the URI where the user needs
   to send the REFER request that will trigger the registrar to send a
   CONSENT request to the URI being registered.  The purpose parameter
   for this entry in the Call-Info header field is 'trigger-permission-
   request'.

   The user sends a REFER request (3) to the URI received in the Call-
   Info header field.  In order to know whether or not the registrar
   receives the permission needed, the user subscribes (5) to the 'reg-
   event' event package.  The rest of the process is similar to the one
   described in Section 5.





















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      A@example.com         Registrar      a@ws123.example.com
            |(1) REGISTER       |                   |
            |Contact: a@ws123.example.com           |
            |Supported: consent-reg                 |
            |------------------>|                   |
            |(2) 200 OK         |                   |
            |Required: consent-reg                  |
            |Consent-Needed: a@ws123.example.com    |
            |Call-Info: 123@Registrar;purpose=trigger-permission-request
            |<------------------|                   |
            |(3) SUBSCRIBE      |                   |
            |Event: reg-event   |                   |
            |------------------>|                   |
            |(4) 200 OK         |                   |
            |<------------------|                   |
            |(5) REFER 123@Registrar                |
            |Refer-To: a@ws123.example.com?method=CONSENT
            |------------------>|                   |
            |(6) 200 OK         |                   |
            |<------------------|                   |
            |                   |(7) CONSENT a@ws123.example
            |                   |Permission-Upload: uri-up
            |                   |Permission Document|
            |                   |------------------>|
            |                   |(8) 202 Accepted   |
            |                   |<------------------|
            |                   |(9) PUBLISH uri-up |
            |                   |Permission Document|
            |                   |<------------------|
            |                   |(10) 200 OK        |
            |                   |------------------>|
            |(11) NOTIFY        |                   |
            |<------------------|                   |
            |(12) 200 OK        |                   |
            |------------------>|                   |

                          Figure 6: Registration

   Permission documents used to authorize registrations are very
   general.  For example, one such document may authorize the registrar
   to forward any request from any sender to a particular recipient URI.
   This is the type of granularity that this framework intends to
   provide for registrations.  Users who want to define how incoming
   requests are treated with a finer granularity (e.g., requests from
   user A should only be accepted between 9:00 and 11:00) should use
   other mechanisms such as CPL.





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9.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not require the IANA to take any actions.

10.  Security Considerations

   TBD.

   Editor's note: we have to avoid that attackers provide permissions
   for translations that apply to other users (e.g., allow everyone to
   send traffic to a victim) and that attackers provide permissions for
   a translation that apply to them but routes to a victim (e.g., 3rd
   party registration that binds attacker@relay to victim@somewhere).
   For the former we need authentication (e.g., SIP identity) and for
   the latter we relay on the routing infrastructure to route CONSENTs
   to the same place the traffic will be sent to once permissions are
   obtained (i.e., a return routability test).

11.  References

11.1  Normative References

   [1]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
        Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
        Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.

   [2]  Roach, A., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-Specific Event
        Notification", RFC 3265, June 2002.

   [3]  Campbell, B., Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Huitema, C., and
        D. Gurle, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension for
        Instant Messaging", RFC 3428, December 2002.

   [4]  Sparks, R., "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Refer
        Method", RFC 3515, April 2003.

   [5]  Levin, O., "Suppression of Session Initiation Protocol REFER
        Method Implicit  Subscription",
        draft-ietf-sip-refer-with-norefersub-02 (work in progress),
        July 2005.

11.2  Informative References

   [6]   Rosenberg, J., "A Watcher Information Event Template-Package
         for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3857,
         August 2004.

   [7]   Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)



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         Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)",
         draft-ietf-simple-xcap-07 (work in progress), June 2005.

   [8]   Rosenberg, J., "Extensible Markup Language (XML) Formats for
         Representing Resource Lists",
         draft-ietf-simple-xcap-list-usage-05 (work in progress),
         February 2005.

   [9]   Schulzrinne, H., "A Document Format for Expressing Privacy
         Preferences", draft-ietf-geopriv-common-policy-05 (work in
         progress), July 2005.

   [10]  Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for Authenticated
         Identity Management in the Session Initiation  Protocol (SIP)",
         draft-ietf-sip-identity-05 (work in progress), May 2005.

   [11]  Rosenberg, J., "Requirements for Consent-Based Communications
         in the Session Initiation  Protocol (SIP)",
         draft-ietf-sipping-consent-reqs-01 (work in progress),
         July 2005.

   [12]  Rosenberg, J., "Presence Authorization Rules",
         draft-ietf-simple-presence-rules-03 (work in progress),
         July 2005.

   [13]  Camarillo, G. and A. Roach, "Requirements and Framework for
         Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)Uniform  Resource Identifier
         (URI)-List Services", draft-ietf-sipping-uri-services-03 (work
         in progress), April 2005.


Authors' Addresses

   Jonathan Rosenberg
   Cisco Systems
   600 Lanidex Plaza
   Parsippany, NJ  07054
   US

   Phone: +1 973 952-5000
   Email: jdrosen@cisco.com
   URI:   http://www.jdrosen.net









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   Gonzalo Camarillo (editor)
   Ericsson
   Hirsalantie 11
   Jorvas  02420
   Finland

   Email: Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com


   Dean Willis
   Cisco Systems
   2200 E. Pres. George Bush Turnpike
   Richardson, TX  75082
   USA

   Email: dean.willis@softarmor.com



































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