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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 RFC 5275

SMIME Working Group                                           S. Turner
Internet Draft                                                     IECA
Document: draft-ietf-smime-symkeydist-04.txt             April 30, 2001
Expires:  October 30, 2001


                   S/MIME Symmetric Key Distribution


Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1].

   This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.

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Abstract

   This document describes a mechanism to manage (i.e., setup,
   distribute, and rekey) keys used with symmetric cryptographic
   algorithms. Also defined herein is a mechanism to organize users
   into groups to support distribution of encrypted content using
   symmetric cryptographic algorithms. The mechanism uses the
   Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protocol [2] and Certificate
   Management Message over CMS (CMC) protocol [3] to manage the
   symmetric keys. Any member of the group can then later use this
   distributed shared key to decrypt other CMS encrypted objects with
   the symmetric key. This mechanism has been developed to support
   S/MIME Mail List Agents (MLAs).





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Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [4].

   1. INTRODUCTION....................................................3
   1.1 APPLICABILITY TO E-MAIL........................................4
   1.2 APPLICABILITY TO REPOSITORIES..................................4
   3. PROTOCOL INTERACTIONS...........................................6
   3.1 CONTROL ATTRIBUTES.............................................7
   3.1.1 GL USE KEK...................................................8
   3.1.2 DELETE GL...................................................12
   3.1.3 ADD GL MEMBER...............................................12
   3.1.4 DELETE GL MEMBER............................................13
   3.1.5 REKEY GL....................................................14
   3.1.6 ADD GL OWNER................................................15
   3.1.7 REMOVE GL OWNER.............................................15
   3.1.8 GL KEY COMPROMISE...........................................15
   3.1.9 GL KEY REFRESH..............................................16
   3.1.10 GLA QUERY REQUEST AND RESPONSE.............................16
   3.1.10.1 GLA QUERY REQUEST........................................16
   3.1.10.2 GLA QUERY RESPONSE.......................................17
   3.1.10.3 REQUEST AND RESPONSE TYPES...............................17
   3.1.12 PROVIDE CERT...............................................17
   3.1.13 UPDATE CERT................................................18
   3.1.14 GL KEY.....................................................19
   3.2 USE OF CMC, CMS, AND PKIX.....................................21
   3.2.1 PROTECTION LAYERS...........................................21
   3.2.1.1 MINIMUM PROTECTION........................................21
   3.2.1.2 ADDITIONAL PROTECTION.....................................21
   3.2.2 COMBINING REQUESTS AND RESPONSES............................22
   3.2.3 GLA GENERATED MESSAGES......................................23
   3.2.4 CMC CONTROL ATTRIBUTES......................................24
   3.2.4.1 USING CMCSTATUSINFOEX.....................................24
   3.2.4.2 USING TRANSACTIONID.......................................27
   3.2.4.3 USING NONCES..............................................27
   3.2.4.4 CMC ATTRIBUTE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS........................27
   3.2.5 RESUBMITTED GL MEMBER MESSAGES..............................28
   3.2.6 PKIX........................................................28
   4 ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGES.........................................28
   4.1 ASSIGN KEK TO GL..............................................28
   4.2 DELETE GL FROM GLA............................................31
   4.3 ADD MEMBERS TO GL.............................................33
   4.3.1 GLO INITIATED ADDITIONS.....................................34
   4.3.2 PROSPECTIVE MEMBER INITIATED ADDITIONS......................40
   4.4 DELETE MEMBERS FROM GL........................................42
   4.4.1 GLO INITIATED DELETIONS.....................................43
   4.4.2 MEMBER INITIATED DELETIONS..................................47
   4.5 REQUEST REKEY OF GL...........................................48
   4.5.1 GLO INITIATED REKEY REQUESTS................................49
   4.5.2 GLA INITIATED REKEY REQUESTS................................52

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   4.6 CHANGE GLO....................................................52
   4.7 INDICATE KEK COMPROMISE.......................................55
   4.7.1 GL MEMBER INITIATED KEK COMPROMISE MESSAGE..................55
   4.7.2 GLO INITIATED KEK COMPROMISE MESSAGE........................56
   4.8 REQUEST KEK REFRESH...........................................57
   4.9 GLA QUERY REQUEST AND RESPONSE................................58
   4.10 UPDATE MEMBER CERTIFICATE....................................60
   4.10.1 GLO AND GLA INITIATED UPDATE MEMBER CERTIFICATE............60
   4.10.2 GL MEMBER INITIATED UPDATE MEMBER CERTIFICATE..............62
   5 DISTRIBUTION MESSAGE............................................63
   5.1 DISTRIBUTION PROCESS..........................................64
   6 ALGORITHMS......................................................65
   6.1 KEK GENERATION ALGORITHM......................................65
   6.2 SHARED KEK WRAP ALGORITHM.....................................65
   6.3 SHARED KEK ALGORITHM..........................................65
   7 TRANSPORT.......................................................65
   8 USING THE GROUP KEY.............................................65
   9 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS.........................................66
   10 REFERENCES.....................................................66
   11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...............................................67
   12 AUTHOR'S ADDRESSES.............................................67


1. Introduction

   With the ever-expanding use of secure electronic communications
   (e.g., S/MIME [2]), users require a mechanism to distribute
   encrypted data to multiple recipients (i.e., a group of users).
   There are essentially two ways to encrypt the data for recipients:
   using asymmetric algorithms with public key certificates (PKCs) or
   symmetric algorithms with symmetric keys.

   With asymmetric algorithms, the originator forms an originator-
   determined content-encryption key (CEK) and encrypts the content,
   using a symmetric algorithm. Then, using an asymmetric algorithm and
   the recipient's PKCs, the originator generates per-recipient
   information that either (a) encrypts the CEK for a particular
   recipient (ktri ReipientInfo CHOICE), or (b) transfers sufficient
   parameters to enable a particular recipient to independently
   generate the same KEK (kari RecipientInfo CHOICE). If the group is
   large, the amount of per-recipient information required may take
   quite some time to generate, not to mention the time required to
   collect and validate the PKCs for each of the recipients. Each
   recipient identifies their per-recipient information and uses the
   private key associated with the public key of their PKC to decrypt
   the CEK and hence gain access to the encrypted content.

   With symmetric algorithms, the origination process is the same as
   with asymmetric algorithms except for what encrypts the CEK. Instead
   of using PKCs, the originator uses a previously distributed secret
   key-encryption key (KEK) to encrypt the CEK (kekri RecipientInfo
   CHOICE). Only one copy of the encrypted CEK is required because all

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   the recipients already have the shared KEK needed to decrypt the CEK
   and hence gain access to the encrypted content.

   The security provided by the shared KEK is only as good as the sum
   of the techniques employed by each member of the group to keep the
   KEK secret from nonmembers. These techniques are beyond the scope of
   this document. Only the members of the list and the key manager
   should have the KEK in order to maintain the secrecy of the group.
   Access control to the information protected by the KEK is determined
   by the entity that encrypts the information, as all members of the
   group have access. If the entity that is performing the encryption
   wants to ensure some subset of the group does not gain access to the
   information either a different KEK should be used (shared with this
   smaller group) or asymmetric algorithms should be used.


1.1 Applicability to E-mail

   One primary audience for this distribution mechanism is e-mail.
   Distribution lists sometimes referred to as mail lists, have been
   defined to support distribution of messages to recipients subscribed
   to the mail list. There are two models for how the mail list can be
   used. If the originator is a member of the mail list, the originator
   sends messages encrypted with the shared KEK to the mail list (e.g.,
   listserv or majordomo) and the message is distributed to the mail
   list members. If the originator is not a member of the mail list
   (does not have the shared KEK), the originator sends the message
   (encrypted for the MLA) to the mail list agent (MLA) and the MLA
   then forms the shared KEK needed to encrypt the message. In either
   case the recipients of the mail list use the previously distributed-
   shared KEK to decrypt the message.


1.2 Applicability to Repositories

   Objects can also be distributed via a repository (e.g., Light Weight
   Directory Protocol (LDAP) servers, X.500 Directory System Agents
   (DSAs), Web-based servers). If an object is stored in a repository
   encrypted with a symmetric key algorithm, any one with the shared
   KEK and access to that object can then decrypt that object. The
   encrypted object and the encrypted, shared KEK can be stored in the
   repository.











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   2. Architecture

   Figure 1 depicts the architecture to support symmetric key
   distribution. The Group List Agent (GLA) supports two distinct
   functions with two different agents:

     - The Key Management Agent (KMA) which is responsible for
       generating the shared KEKs.

     - The Group Management Agent (GMA) which is responsible for
       managing the Group List (GL) to which the shared KEKs are
       distributed.

     +----------------------------------------------+
     |              Group List Agent                |    +-------+
     | +------------+    + -----------------------+ |    | Group |
     | |    Key     |    | Group Management Agent | |<-->| List  |
     | | Management |<-->|     +------------+     | |    | Owner |
     | |   Agent    |    |     | Group List |     | |    +-------+
     | +------------+    |     +------------+     | |
     |                   |       /  |  \          | |
     |                   +------------------------+ |
     +----------------------------------------------+
                              /     |      \
                 +----------+ +---------+ +----------+
                 | Member 1 | |   ...   | | Member n |
                 +----------+ +---------+ +----------+

          Figure 1 - Key Distribution Architecture


   A GLA may support multiple KMAs. A GLA in general supports only one
   GMA, but the GMA may support multiple GLs. Multiple KMAs may support
   a GMA in the same fashion as GLAs support multiple KMAs. Assigning a
   particular KMA to a GL is beyond the scope of this document.

   Modeling real world GL implementations shows that there are very
   restrictive GLs, where a human determines GL membership, and very
   open GLs, where there are no restrictions on GL membership. To
   support this spectrum, the mechanism described herein supports both
   managed (i.e., where access control is applied) and unmanaged (i.e.,
   where no access control is applied) GLs. The access control
   mechanism for managed lists is beyond the scope of this document.

   In either case, the GL must initially be constructed by an entity
   hereafter called the Group List Owner (GLO). There may be multiple
   entities who 'own' the GL and who are allowed to make changes the
   GLÆs properties or membership. The GLO determines if the GL will be
   managed or unmanaged and is the only entity that may delete the GL.
   GLO(s) may or may not be GL members. GLO(s) may also setup lists
   that are closed, where the GLO solely determines GL membership.


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   Though Figure 1 depicts the GLA as encompassing both the KMA and GMA
   functions, the two functions could be supported by the same entity
   or they could be supported by two different entities. If two
   entities are used, they could be located on one or two platforms.
   There is however a close relationship between the KMA and GMA
   functions. If the GMA stores all information pertaining to the GLs
   and the KMA merely generates keys, a corrupted GMA could cause
   havoc. To protect against a corrupted GMA, the KMA would be forced
   to double check the requests it receives to ensure the GMA did not
   tamper with them. These duplicative checks blur the functionality of
   the two components together. For this reason, the interactions
   between the KMA and GMA are beyond the scope of this document.
   Proprietary mechanisms may be used to separate the functions by
   strengthening the trust relationship between the two entities.
   Henceforth, the distinction between the two agents is omitted; the
   term GLA will be used to address both functions. It should be noted
   that corrupt GLA can always cause havoc.


3. Protocol Interactions

   There are existing mechanisms (e.g., listserv and majordomo) to
   support managing GLs; however, this document does not address
   securing these mechanisms, as they are not standardized. Instead, it
   defines protocol interactions, as depicted in Figure 2, used by the
   GL members, GLA, and GLO(s) to manage GLs and distribute shared
   KEKs. The interactions have been divided into administration
   messages and distribution messages. The administrative messages are
   the request and response messages needed to setup the GL, delete the
   GL, add members to the GL, delete members of the GL, and request a
   group rekey, etc. The distribution messages are the messages that
   distribute the shared KEKs. The following sections describe the
   ASN.1 for both the administration and distribution messages. Section
   4 describes how to use the administration messages and section 5
   describes how to use the distribution messages.

                    +-----+                   +----------+
                    | GLO | <---+      +----> | Member 1 |
                    +-----+     |      |      +----------+
                                |      |
                 +-----+ <------+      |      +----------+
                 | GLA | <-------------+----> |   ...    |
                 +-----+               |      +----------+
                                       |
                                       |      +----------+
                                       +----> | Member n |
                                              +----------+

                      Figure 2 - Protocol Interactions




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3.1 Control Attributes

   The messages are based on including control attributes in CMC's
   PKIData for requests and CMC's ResponseBody for responses. The
   content-types PKIData and PKIResponse are then encapsulated in CMS's
   SignedData or EnvelopedData, or a combination of the two (see
   section 3.2). The following are the control attributes defined in
   this document:

         Control
        Attribute          OID          Syntax
   -------------------  ----------- -----------------
    glUseKEK            id-skd 1    GLUseKEK
    glDelete            id-skd 2    GeneralName
    glAddMember         id-skd 3    GLAddMember
    glDeleteMember      id-skd 4    GLDeleteMember
    glRekey             id-skd 5    GLRekey
    glAddOwner          id-skd 6    GLOwnerAdministration
    glRemoveOwner       id-skd 7    GLOwnerAdministration
    glkCompromise       id-skd 8    GeneralName
    glkRefresh          id-skd 9    GLKRefresh
    glaQueryRequest     id-skd 11   GLAQueryRequest
    glaQueryResponse    id-skd 12   GLAQueryResponse
    glProvideCert       id-skd 13   GLManageCert
    glUpdateCert        id-skd 14   GLManageCert
    glKey               id-skd 15   GLKey

   In the following conformance tables, the column headings have the
   following meanings: O for originate, R for receive, and F for
   forward. There are three types of implementations: GLOs, GLAs, and
   GL members. The GLO is an optional component hence all GLO O and R
   messages are optional and GLA F messages are optional. The first
   table includes messages that MUST be implemented in order to be
   considered conformant to this document. The second table includes
   messages that MAY be implemented in order to be considered
   conformant to this document. Note that ô-ô mean not applicable.

                             Required
          Implementation Requirement       |  Control
     GLO   |        GLA        | GL Member | Attribute
    O  R   |  O      R      F  |  O    R   |
   ------- | ----------------- | --------- | ----------
   MAY  -  | MUST    -     MAY |  -   MUST | glProvideCert
   MAY MAY |  -     MUST   MAY | MUST  -   | glUpdateCert
    -   -  | MUST    -      -  |  -   MUST | glKey








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                             Optional
           Implementation Requirement      |  Control
     GLO   |        GLA        | GL Member | Attribute
    O   R  |  O      R      F  |  O    R   |
   ------- | ----------------- | --------- | ----------
   MAY  -  |  -     MAY     -  |  -    -   | glUseKEK
   MAY  -  |  -     MAY     -  |  -    -   | glDelete
   MAY MAY |  -     MUST   MAY | MUST  -   | glAddMember
   MAY MAY |  -     MUST   MAY | MUST  -   | glDeleteMember
   MAY  -  |  -     MAY     -  |  -    -   | glRekey
   MAY  -  |  -     MAY     -  |  -    -   | glAddOwner
   MAY  -  |  -     MAY     -  |  -    -   | glRemoveOwner
   MAY MAY |  -     MUST   MAY | MUST  -   | glkCompromise
   MAY  -  |  -     MUST    -  | MUST  -   | glkRefresh
   MAY  -  |  -     SHOULD  -  | MAY   -   | glaQueryRequest
    -  MAY | SHOULD  -      -  |  -   MAY  | glaQueryResponse

   glaQueryResponse, and gloResponse are responses and go into the
   PKIResponse content-type, all other control attributes are included
   in requests and go into the PKIData content-type. The exception is
   glUpdateCert which may be included in either PKIData or PKIResponse.

   Success and failure messages use CMC (see paragraph 3.2.4).


3.1.1 GL USE KEK

   The GLO uses glUseKEK to request that a shared KEK be assigned to a
   GL. glUseKEK messages MUST be signed by the GLO. The glUseKEK
   control attribute shall have the syntax GLUseKEK:

   GLUseKEK ::= SEQUENCE {
     glInfo                GLInfo,
     glOwnerInfo           SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GLOwnerInfo,
     glAdministration      GLAdministration DEFAULT 1,
     glKeyAttributes       GLKeyAttributes OPTIONAL }

   GLInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName     GeneralName,
     glAddress  GeneralName }

   GLOwnerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
     glOwnerName     GeneralName,
     glOwnerAddress  GeneralName,
     certificate     Certificates OPTIONAL }








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   Certificates ::= SEQUENCE {
      pKC                [0] Certificate OPTIONAL,
                                  -- See PKIX [5]
      aC                 [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1.. MAX) OF
                             AttributeCertificate OPTIONAL,
                                  -- See ACPROF [6]
      certificationPath  [2] CertificateSet OPTIONAL }
                                  -- From CMS [2]

   -- CertificateSet and CertificateChoices are included only
   -- for illustrative purposes as they are imported from CMS [2].

   CertificateSet ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateChoices

   CertificateChoices ::= CHOICE {
     certificate              Certificate,
                                   -- See PKIX [5]
     extendedCertificate  [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate,
                                   -- Obsolete
     attrCert             [1] IMPLICIT AttributeCertificate }
                                   -- See ACPROF [6]

   GLAdministration ::= INTEGER {
     unmanaged  (0),
     managed    (1),
     closed     (2) }

   GLKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
     rekeyControlledByGLO       [0] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
     recipientsNotMutuallyAware [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
     duration                   [2] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
     generationCounter          [3] INTEGER DEFAULT 2,
     requestedAlgorithm         [4] AlgorithmIdentifier
                                 DEFAULT id-alg-CMS3DESwrap }


   The fields in GLUseKEK have the following meaning:

     - glInfo indicates the GLÆs name in glName and the GLÆs address in
       glAddress. In some instances the glName and glAddress may be the
       same, but this is not always the case. Both the name and address
       MUST be unique for a given GLA.

     - glOwnerInfo indicates:

       - glOwnerName indicates the GL ownerÆs name.

       - glOwnerAddress indicates the GL ownerÆs address. One of the
         names in glOwnerName MUST match one of the names in the
         certificate used to sign this SignedData.PKIData creating the
         GL (i.e., the immediate signer).


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       - certificates MAY be included. It contains the following three
       fields:

         - certificates.pKC includes the GLO's encryption certificate
           that will be used to at least initially encrypt the shared
           KEK for that member. If the message is generated by a GLO
           and they are adding another GLO (i.e., the name in one of
           the certificates used to sign this message does not match
           the name in glOwnerName), the pKC for the other GLO MUST be
           included. Else, the pKC MAY be included.

         - certificates.aC MAY be included to convey any attribute
           certificate associated with the GLOÆs encryption certificate
           included in certificates.pKC.

         - certificates.certificationPath MAY also be included to
           convey the certification path corresponding to the GLO's
           encryption and any non-GLO attribute certificates are placed
           in attrCert. The certification path is optional because it
           may already be included elsewhere in the message (e.g., in
           the outer CMS layer).

     - glAdministration indicates how the GL should be administered.
       The default is for the list to be managed. Three values are
       supported for glAdministration:

       - Unmanaged - When the GLO sets glAdministration to unmanaged,
         they are allowing prospective members to request being added
         and deleted from the GL without GLO intervention.

       - Managed - When the GLO sets glAdministration to managed, they
         are allowing prospective members to request being added to and
         deleted from the GL, but the request is redirected by the GLA
         to GLO for review. The GLO makes the determination as to
         whether to honor the request.

       - Closed - When the GLO sets glAdministration to closed, they
         are not allowing prospective members to request being added to
         or deleted from the GL. The GLA will only accept glAddMember
         and glDeleteMember requests from the GLO.

     - glKeyAttributes indicates the attributes the GLO wants the GLA
       to assign to the shared KEK. If this field is omitted, GL rekeys
       will be controlled by the GLA, the recipients are allowed to
       know about one another, the algorithm will Triple-DES (see
       paragrpah 7), the shared KEK will be valid for a calendar month
       (i.e., first of the month until the last day of the month), and
       two shared KEKs will be distributed initially. The fields in
       glKeyAttributes have the following meaning:

       - rekeyControlledByGLO indicates whether the GL rekey messages
         will be generated by the GLO or by the GLA. The default is for

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         the GLA to control rekeys. If GL rekey is controlled by the
         GLA, the GL will continue to be rekeyed until the GLO deletes
         the GL or changes the GL rekey to be GLO controlled.

       - recipientsNotMutuallyAware indicates that the GLO wants the
         GLA to distribute the shared KEK individually for each of the
         GL members (i.e., a separate glKey message is sent to each
         recipient). The default is for separate glKey message to not
         be required.

         NOTE: This supports lists where one member does not know the
         identities of the other members. For example, a list is
         configured granting submit permissions to only one member. All
         other members are 'listening.' The security policy of the list
         does not allow the members to know who else is on the list. If
         a glKey is constructed for all of the GL members, information
         about each of the members may be derived from the information
         in RecipientInfos. To make sure the glkey message does not
         divulge information about the other recipients, a separate
         glKey message would be sent to each GL member.

       - duration indicates the length of time (in days) during which
         the shared KEK is considered valid. The value zero (0)
         indicates that the shared KEK is valid for a calendar month at
         UTC Zulu time zone. For example if the duration is zero (0),
         if the GL shared KEK is requested on July 24, the first key
         will be valid until the end of July and the next key will be
         valid for the entire month of August. If the value is not zero
         (0), the shared KEK will be valid for the number of days
         indicated by the value. For example, if the value of duration
         is seven (7) and the shared KEK is requested on Monday but not
         generated until Tuesday (2359); the shared KEKs will be valid
         from Tuesday (2359) to Tuesday (2359). The exact time of the
         day is determined when the key is generated.

       - generationCounter indicates the number of keys the GLO wants
         the GLA to distribute. To ensure uninterrupted function of the
         GL two (2) shared KEKs at a minimum MUST be initially
         distributed. The second shared KEK is distributed with the
         first shared KEK, so that when the first shared KEK is no
         longer valid the second key can be used. If the GLA controls
         rekey then it also indicates the number of shared KEKs the GLO
         wants outstanding at any one time. See sections 4.5 and 5 for
         more on rekey.

       - requestedAlgorithm indicates the algorithm and any parameters
         the GLO wants the GLA to use with the shared KEK. The
         parameters are conveyed via the SMIMECapabilities attribute
         see MSG [7]. See section 6 for more on algorithms.




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3.1.2 Delete GL

   GLOs use glDelete to request that a GL be deleted from the GLA. The
   glDelete control attribute shall have the syntax GeneralName. The
   name of the GL to be deleted is included in GeneralName. The
   glDelete message MUST be signed by the GLO.


3.1.3 Add GL Member

   GLOs use glAddMember to request addition of new members and
   prospective GL members use glAddMember to request being added to the
   GL. The glAddMember message MUST be signed by either the GLO or the
   prospective GL member. The glAddMember control attribute shall have
   the syntax GLAddMember:

   GLAddMember ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName    GeneralName,
     glMember  GLMember }

   GLMember ::= SEQUENCE {
     glMemberName     GeneralName,
     glMemberAddress  GeneralName OPTIONAL,
     certificates     Certificates OPTIONAL }

   Certificates ::= SEQUENCE {
      pKC                [0] Certificate OPTIONAL,
                                  -- See PKIX [5]
      aC                 [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1.. MAX) OF
                             AttributeCertificate OPTIONAL,
                                  -- See ACPROF [6]
      certificationPath  [2] CertificateSet OPTIONAL }
                                  -- From CMS [2]

   -- CertificateSet and CertificateChoices are included only
   -- for illustrative purposes as they are imported from CMS [2].

   CertificateSet ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateChoices

   CertificateChoices ::= CHOICE {
     certificate              Certificate,
                                   -- See X.509
     extendedCertificate  [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate,
                                   -- Obsolete
     attrCert             [1] IMPLICIT AttributeCertificate }
                                   -- See X.509 and X9.57


   The fields in GLAddMembers have the following meaning:

     - glName indicates the name of the GL to which the member should
       be added.

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     - glMember indicates the particulars for the GL member. Both of
       the following fields must be unique for a given GL:

       - glMemberName indicates the name of the GL member.

       - glMemberAddress indicates the GL memberÆs address. It MUST be
          included.

         Note: In some instances the glMemberName and glMemberAddress
        may be the same, but this is not always the case.

       - certificates MUST be included. It contains the following three
          fields:

         - certificates.pKC includes the member's encryption
           certificate that will be used to at least initially encrypt
           the shared KEK for that member. If the message is generated
           by a prospective GL member, the pKC MUST be included. If the
           message is generated by a GLO, the pKC SHOULD be included.

         - certificates.aC MAY be included to convey any attribute
           certificate associated with the memberÆs encryption
           certificate.

         - certificates.certificationPath MAY also be included to
           convey the certification path corresponding to the member's
           encryption and any non-member attribute certificates are
           placed in attrCert. The certification path is optional
           because it may already be included elsewhere in the message
           (e.g., in the outer CMS layer).


3.1.4 Delete GL Member

   GLOs use glDeleteMember to request deletion of GL members and GL
   members use glDeleteMember to request being removed from the GL. The
   glDeleteMember message MUST be signed by either the GLO or the
   prospective GL member. The glDeleteMember control attribute shall
   have the syntax GLDeleteMember:

   GLDeleteMember ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName            GeneralName,
     glMemberToDelete  GeneralName }


   The fields in GLDeleteMembers have the following meaning:

     - glName indicates the name of the GL from which the member should
       be removed.

     - glMemberToDelete indicates the name of the member to be deleted.

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3.1.5 Rekey GL

   GLOs use the glRekey to request a GL rekey. The glRekey message MUST
   be signed by the GLO. The glRekey control attribute shall have the
   syntax GLRekey:

   GLRekey ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName              GeneralName,
     glAdministration    GLAdministration OPTIONAL,
     glNewKeyAttributes  GLNewKeyAttributes OPTIONAL,
     glRekeyAllGLKeys    BOOLEAN OPTIONAL }

   GLNewKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
     rekeyControlledByGLO       [0] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
     recipientsNotMutuallyAware [1] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
     duration                   [2] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
     generationCounter          [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
     requestedAlgorithm         [4] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL }


   The fields in GLRekey have the following meaning:

     - glName indicates the name of the GL to be rekeyed.

     - glAdministration indicates if there is any change to how the GL
       should be administered. See section 3.1.1 for the three options.
       This field is only included if there is a change from the
       previously registered administered.

     - glNewKeyAttributes indicates whether the rekey of the GLO is
       controlled by the GLA or GL, what algorithm and parameters the
       GLO wishes to use, the duration of the key, and how many
       outstanding keys should be issued. The field is only included if
       there is a change from the previously registered
       glKeyAttributes.

     - glRekeyAllGLKeys indicates whether the GLO wants all of the
       outstanding GLÆs shared KEKs rekeyed. If it is set to TRUE then
       all outstanding KEKs MUST be issued. If it is set to FALSE then
       all outstanding KEKs need not be resissued.











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3.1.6 Add GL Owner

   GLOs use the glAddOwner to request that a new GLO be allowed to
   administer the GL. The glAddOwner message MUST be signed a
   registered GLO. The glAddOwner control attribute shall have the
   syntax GLOwnerAdministration:

   GLOwnerAdministration ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName       GeneralName,
     glOwnerInfo  GLOwnerInfo }

   The fields in GLAddOwners have the following meaning:

     - glName indicates the name of the GL to which the new GLO should
       be associated.

     - glOwnerInfo indicates the name, address, and certificates of the
       new GLO. As this message includes names of new GLOs, the
       certificates.pKC MUST be included and it MUST include the new
       GLOÆs encryption certificate.


3.1.7 Remove GL Owner

   GLOs use the glRemoveOwner to request that a GLO be disassociated
   with the GL. The glRemoveOwner message MUST be signed by a
   registered GLO. The glRemoveOwner control attribute shall have the
   syntax GLOwnerAdministration:

   GLOwnerAdministration ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName       GeneralName,
     glOwnerInfo  GLOwnerInfo }

   The fields in GLRemoveOwners have the following meaning:

     - glName indicates the name of the GL to which the GLO should be
       disassociated.

     - glOwnerInfo indicates the name and address of the GLO to be
       removed. The certificates field SHOULD be omitted, as it will be
       ignored.


3.1.8 GL Key Compromise

   GL members and GLOs use glkCompromise to indicate that the shared
   KEK possessed has been compromised. The glKeyCompromise control
   attribute shall have the syntax GeneralName. The name of the GL to
   which the compromised key is associated with is included in
   GeneralName. This message is always redirected by the GLA to the GLO
   for further action. The glkCompromise MUST NOT be included in an
   EnvelopedData generated with the compromised shared KEK.

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3.1.9 GL Key Refresh

   GL members use the glkRefresh to request that the shared KEK be
   redistributed to them. The glkRefresh control attribute shall have
   the syntax GLKRefresh.

   GLKRefresh ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName  GeneralName,
     dates   SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Date }

   Date ::= SEQUENCE {
     start GeneralizedTime,
     end   GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }


   The fields in GLKRefresh have the following meaning:

     - glName indicates the name of the GL for which the GL member
       wants shared KEKs.

     - dates indicates a date range for keys the GL member wants. The
       start field indicates the first date the GL member wants and the
       end field indicates the last date. The end date MAY be omitted
       to indicate the GL member wants all keys from the specified
       start date to the current date. It should be noted that a
       procedural mechanism will be needed to restrict users from
       accessing messages that they are not allowed to access.


3.1.10 GLA Query Request and Response

   There are situations where GLOs and GL members may need to determine
   some information from the GLA about the GL. GLOs and GL members use
   the glaQueryRequest, defined in paragraph 3.1.10.1, to request
   information and GLAs use the glaQueryResponse, defined in paragraph
   3.1.10.2, to return the requested information. Paragraph 3.1.10.3
   includes one request and response type and value; others may be
   defined in additional documents.


3.1.10.1 GLA Query Request

   GLOs and GL members use the glaQueryRequest to ascertain information
   about the GLA. The glaQueryRequest control attribute shall have the
   syntax GLAQueryRequest:

   GLAQueryRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
     glaRequestType   OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
     glaRequestValue  ANY DEFINED BY glaRequestType }


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3.1.10.2 GLA Query Response

   GLAÆs return the glaQueryResponse after receiving a GLAQueryRequest.
   The glaQueryResponse MUST be signed by a GLA. The glaQueryResponse
   control attribute shall have the syntax GLAQueryResponse:

   GLAQueryResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
     glaResponseType   OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
     glaResponseValue  ANY DEFINED BY glaResponseType }


3.1.10.3 Request and Response Types

   Request and Responses are reqistered as a pair under the following
   object identifier arc:

   id-cmc-glaRR OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 99 }

   This document defines one request/response pair for GL members and
   GLOÆs to query the GLA as to which algorithm it supports.  The
   following object identifier is included in the glaQueryType field:

   id-cmc-gla-skdAlgRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::={ id-cmc-glaRR 1 }

   There is no glaQueryValue for thie query.

   If the GLA supports GLAQueryRequest and GLAQueryResponse messages,
   the GLA may return the following oid in the glaQueryType field:

   id-cmc-gla-skdAlgResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc-glaRR 2 }

   The glaQueryValue has the form of the smimeCapabilities attributes
   as defined in MsgSpec [7].


3.1.12 Provide Cert

   GLAs and GLOs use glProvideCert to request that a GL member provide
   an updated or new encryption certificate. The glProvideCert message
   MUST be signed by either GLA or GLO. If the GL memberÆs PKC has been
   revoked, the GLO or GLA MUST NOT use it to generate the
   EnvelopedData that encapsulates the glProvideCert request. The
   glProvideCert control attribute shall have the syntax GLManageCert:

   GLManageCert ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName    GeneralName,
     glMember  GLMember }





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   The fields in GLManageCert have the following meaning:

     - glName indicates the name of the GL to which the GL memberÆs new
       certificate should be associated.

     - glMember indicates particulars for the GL member:

       - glMemberName indicates the GL memberÆs name.

       - glMemberAddress indicates the GL memberÆs address. It MAY be
         omitted.

       - certificates SHOULD be omitted.


3.1.13 Update Cert

   GL members and GLOs use glUpdateCert to provide a new certificate
   for the GL. GL members may generate a glUpdateCert unsolicited or as
   a result of a glProvideCert message. GL members MUST sign the
   glUpdateCert. If the GL memberÆs encryption certificate has been
   revoked, the GL member MUST NOT use it to generate the EnvelopedData
   that encapsulates the glUpdateCert request or response. The
   glUpdateCert control attribute shall have the syntax GLManageCert:

   GLManageCert ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName    GeneralName,
     glMember  GLMember }


   The fields in GLManageCert have the following meaning:

     - glName indicates the name of the GL to which the GL memberÆs new
       certificate should be associated.

     - glMember indicates the particulars for the GL member:

       - glMemberName indicates the GL memberÆs name

       - glMemberAddress indicates the GL memberÆs address. It MAY be
         omitted.

       - certificates MAY be omitted if the GLManageCert message is
         sent to request the GL members certificate; else it MUST be
         included. It includes the following three fields:

         - certificates.pKC includes the member's encryption
           certificate that will be used to encrypt the shared KEK for
           that member.




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         - certificates.aC MAY be included to convey any attribute
           certificate associated with the memberÆs encryption
           certificate.

         - certificates.certificationPath MAY also be included to
           convey the certification path corresponding to the member's
           encryption and attribute certificates. The certification
           path is optional because it may already be included
           elsewhere in the message (e.g., in the outer CMS layer).


3.1.14 GL Key

   The GLA uses glKey to distribute the shared KEK. The glKey message
   MUST be signed by the GLA. The glKey control attribute shall have
   the syntax GLKey:

   GLKey ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName        GeneralName,
     glIdentifier  KEKIdentifier,   -- See CMS [2]
     glkWrapped    RecipientInfos,      -- See CMS [2]
     glkAlgorithm  AlgorithmIdentifier,
     glkNotBefore  GeneralizedTime,
     glkNotAfter   GeneralizedTime }

   -- KEKIdentifier is included only for illustrative purposes as
   -- it is imported from CMS [2].

   KEKIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
     keyIdentifier OCTET STRING,
     date GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
     other OtherKeyAttribute OPTIONAL }


   The fields in GLKey have the following meaning:

     - glName is the name of the GL.

     - glIdentifier is the key identifier of the shared KEK. See
       paragraph 6.2.3 of CMS [2] for a description of the subfields.

     - glkWrapped is the GL's wrapped shared KEK. The RecipientInfos
       shall be generated as specified in section 6.2 of CMS [2]. The
       ktri RecipientInfo choice MUST be supported. The key in the
       EncryptedKey field (i.e., the distributed shared KEK) MUST be
       generated according to the section concerning random number
       generation in the security considerations of CMS [2].

     - glkAlgorithm identifies the algorithm the shared KEK is used
       with. Since no encrypted data content is being conveyed at this
       point, the parameters encoded with the algorithm should be the


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       structure defined for SMIMECapabilities rather than encrypted
       content.

     - glkNotBefore indicates the date at which the shared KEK is
       considered valid. GeneralizedTime values MUST be expressed UTC
       (Zulu) and MUST include seconds (i.e., times are
       YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero.
       GeneralizedTime values MUST NOT include fractional seconds.

     - glkNotAfter indicates the date after which the shared KEK is
       considered invalid. GeneralizedTime values MUST be expressed UTC
       (Zulu) and MUST include seconds (i.e., times are
       YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero.
       GeneralizedTime values MUST NOT include fractional seconds.

   If the glKey message is in response to a glUseKEK message:

     - The GLA MUST generate separate glKey messages for each recipient
       if glUseKEK.glKeyAttributes.recipientsNotMutuallyAware is set to
       FALSE. For each recipient you want to generate a message that
       contains that recipientÆs key (i.e., one message with one
       attribute).

     - The GLA MUST generate X number of glKey messages, where X is the
       value in glUseKEK.glKeyAttributes.generationCounter.

   If the glKey message is in response to a glRekey message:

     - The GLA MUST generate separate glKey messages for each recipient
       if glRekey.glNewKeyAttributes.recipientsNotMutuallyAware is set
       to FALSE.

     - The GLA MUST generate X number of glKey messages, where X is the
       value in glUseKEK.glKeyAttributes.generationCounter.

     - The GLA MUST generate X number of glKey messages, where X is the
       number of outstanding shared KEKs for the GL if glRekeyAllGLKeys
       is set to TRUE.

   If the glKey message was not in response to a glRekey or glUseKEK
   (e.g., where the GLA controls rekey):

     - The GLA MUST generate separate glKey messages for each recipient
       if glUseKEK.glNewKeyAttributes.recipientsNotMutuallyAware that
       set up the GL was set to FALSE.

     - The GLA MAY generate X glKey messages prior to the duration on
       the last outstanding shared KEK expiring, where X is the
       generationCounter minus one (1). Other distribution mechanisms
       may also be supported to support this functionality.



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3.2 Use of CMC, CMS, and PKIX

   The following sections outline the use of CMC, CMS, and PKIX.


3.2.1 Protection Layers

   The following sections outline the protection required for the
   control attributes defined herein.


3.2.1.1 Minimum Protection

   At a minimum, a SignedData MUST protect each request and response
   encapsulated in PKIData and PKIResponse. The following is a
   depiction of the minimum wrappings:

     Minimum Protection
     ------------------
     SignedData
      PKIData or PKIResponse
       controlSequence


   Prior to taking any action on any request or response SignedData(s)
   MUST be processed according to CMS [2].


3.2.1.2 Additional Protection

   An additional EnvelopedData MAY also be used to provide
   confidentiality of the request and response. An additional
   SignedData MAY also be added to provide authentication and integrity
   of the encapsulated EnvelopedData. The following is a depiction of
   the optional additional wrappings:

     Confidentiality Protection     A&I of Confidentiality Protection
     --------------------------     ---------------------------------
     EnvelopedData                  SignedData
      SignedData                     EnvelopedData
       PKIData or PKIResponse         SignedData
        controlSequence                PKIData or PKIResponse
                                        controlSequence


   If an incoming message was encrypted, the confidentiality of the
   message MUST be preserved. All EnvelopedData objects MUST be
   processed as specified in CMS [2]. If a SignedData is added over an
   EnvelopedData, a ContentHints attribute SHOULD be added. See
   paragraph 2.9 of Extended Security Services for S/MIME [8].



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   If the GLO or GL member applies confidentiality to a request, the
   EnvelopedData MUST be encrypted for the GLA. If the GLA is to
   forward the GL member request to the GLO, the GLA decrypts the
   EnvelopedData, strips the confidentiality layer off, and applies its
   own confidentiality layer for the GLO.


3.2.2 Combining Requests and Responses

   Multiple requests and response corresponding to a GL MAY be included
   in one PKIData.controlSequence or PKIResponse.controlSequence.
   Requests and responses for multiple GLs MAY be combined in one
   PKIData or PKIResponse by using PKIData.cmsSequence and
   PKIResponse.cmsSequence. A separate cmsSequence MUST be used for
   different GLs (i.e., requests corresponding to two different GLs are
   included in different cmsSequences). The following is a diagram
   depicting multiple requests and responses combined in one PKIData
   and PKIResponse:

         Multiple Request and Response
     Request                        Response
     -------                        --------
     SignedData                      SignedData
      PKIData                         PKIResponse
       cmsSequence                     cmsSequence
        SignedData                      SignedData
         PKIData                         PKIResponse
          controlSequence                 controlSequence
           One or more requests          One or more responses
           corresponding to one GL.        corresponding to one GL.
        SignedData                      SignedData
         PKIData                         PKIResponse
          controlSequence                 controlSequence
           One or more requests          One or more responses
           corresponding to another GL.   corresponding to another GL.


















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   When applying confidentiality to multiple requests and responses,
   all of the requests/response MAY be included in one EnvelopedData.
   The following is a depiction:

       Confidentiality of Multiple Requests and Responses
     Wrapped Together
     ----------------
     EnvelopedData
      SignedData
       PKIData
        cmsSequence
         SignedData
          PKIResponse
           controlSequence
            One or more requests
            corresponding to one GL.
         SignedData
          PKIData
           controlSequence
            One or more requests
            corresponding to one GL.


   Certain combinations of requests in one PKIData.controlSequence and
   one PKIResponse.controlSequence are not allowed. The invalid
   combinations listed here MUST NOT be generated:

        Invalid Combinations
     ---------------------------
     glUseKEK   & glDeleteMember
     glUseKEK   & glRekey
     glUseKEK   & glDelete
     glDelete   & glAddMember
     glDelete   & glDeleteMember
     glDelete   & glRekey
     glDelete   & glAddOwner
     glDelete   & glRemoveOwner


   To avoid unnecessary errors, certain requests and responses should
   be processed prior to others. The following is the priority of
   message processing, if not listed it is an implementation decision
   as to which to process first: glUseKEK before glAddMember, glRekey
   before glAddMember, and glDeleteMember before glRekey. It should be
   noted that there is a priority but it does not imply an order.


3.2.3 GLA Generated Messages

   When the GLA generates a success or fail message, it generates one
   for each request. Likewise, when the GLA generates a failure message
   it generates one for each request. SKDFailInfo values of

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   unsupportedDuration, unsupportedDeliveryMethod,
   unsupportedAlgorithm, noGLONameMatch, nameAlreadyInUse,
   alreadyAnOwner, notAnOwner are not returned to GL members.

   If GLKeyAttributes.recipientsNotMutuallyAware is set to FALSE, a
   separate PKIResponse.cMCStatusInfoEx, PKIResponse.cMCStatusInfoEx,
   and PKIData.glKey MUST be generated for each recipient.  It is valid
   to send one message with multiple attributes to the same recipient.

   If the GL has multiple GLOs, the GLA MUST send cMCStatusInfoEx
   messages to the requesting GLO. The mechanism to determine which GLO
   made the request is beyond the scope of this document.

   If a GL is managed and the GLA receives a glAddMember,
   glDeleteMember, or glkCompromise message, the GLA redirects the
   request to the GLO for review. An additional, SignedData MUST be
   applied to the redirected request as follows:

     GLA Forwarded Requests
     ----------------------
     SignedData
      PKIData
        cmsSequence
          PKIData
            controlSequence


3.2.4 CMC Control Attributes

   Certain control attributes defined in CMC [3] are allowed; they are
   as follows: cMCStatusInfoEx transactionId, senderNonce,
   recipientNonce, and queryPending.


3.2.4.1 Using cMCStatusInfoEx

   cMCStatusInfoEx is used by GLAs to indicate to GLOs and GL members
   that a request was unsuccessful. Two classes of failure codes are
   used within this document. Errors from the CMCFailInfo list, found
   in section 5.1.4 of CMC, are encoded as defined in CMC. Error codes
   defined in this document are encoded using the ExtendedFailInfo
   field of the cmcStatusInfoEx structure. If the same failure code
   applies to multiple commands, a single cmcStatusInfoEx structure can
   be used with multiple items in cMCStatusInfoEx.bodyList. The GLA may
   also return other pertinent information in statusString. The
   SKDFailInfo object identifier and value is:

   id-cet-skdFailInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
   identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) cet(15) skdFailInfo(1) }



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   SKDFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
     unspecified           (0),
     closedGL              (1),
     unsupportedDuration   (2),
     noGLACertificate      (3),
     invalidCert           (4),
     unsupportedAlgorithm  (5),
     noGLONameMatch        (6),
     invalidGLName         (7),
     nameAlreadyInUse      (8),
     noSpam                (9),
     deniedAccess          (10),
     alreadyAMember        (11),
     notAMember            (12),
     alreadyAnOwner        (13),
     notAnOwner            (14) }

   The values have the following meaning:

     - unspecified indicates that the GLA is unable or unwilling to
       perform the requested action and does not want to indicate why.

     - closedGL indicates that members can only be added or deleted by
       the GLO.

     - unsupportedDuration indicates the GLA does not support
       generating keys that are valid for the requested duration.

     - noGLACertificate indicates that the GLA does not have a valid
       certificate.

     - invalidCert indicates the member's encryption certificate was
       not verifiable (i.e., signature did not validate, certificateÆs
       serial number present on a CRL, etc.).

     - unsupportedAlgorithm indicates the GLA does not support the
       requested algorithm.

     - noGLONameMatch indicates that one of the names in the
       certificate used to sign a request does not match the name of a
       registered GLO.

     - invalidGLName indicates the GLA does not support the glName
       present in the request.

     - nameAlreadyInUse indicates the glName is already assigned on the
       GLA.

     - noSpam indicates the prospective GL member did not sign the
       request (i.e., if the name in glMember.glMemberName does not
       match one of the names in the certificate used to sign the
       request).

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     - alreadyAMember indicates the prospective GL member is already a
       GL member.

     - notAMember indicates the prospective non-GL member is not a GL
       member.

     - alreadyAnOwner indicates the prospective GLO is already a GLO.

     - notAnOwner indicates the prospective non-GLO is not a GLO.

   cMCStatusInfoEx is used by GLAs to indicate to GLOs and GL members
   that a request was successfully completed. If the request was
   successful, the GLA returns a cMCStatusInfoEx response with
   cMCStatus.success and optionally other pertinent information in
   stutsString.

   When the GL is managed and the GLO has reviewed GL member initiated
   glAddMember, glDeleteMember, and glkComrpomise requests, the GLO
   uses cMCStatusInfoEx to indicate the success or failure of the
   request. If the request is allowed, cMCStatus.success is returned
   and statusString is optionally returned to convey additional
   information. If the request is denied, cMCStatus.failed is returned
   and statusString is optionally returned to convey additional
   information. Additionally, the appropriate SKDFailInfo can be
   included in cMCStatusInfoEx.extendedFailInfo.

   cMCStatusInfoEx is used by GLOs, GLAs, and GL members to indicate
   that signature verification failed. If the signature failed to
   verify over any control attibute except a cMCStatusInfoEx, a
   cMCStatusInfoEx control attribute MUST be returned indicating
   cMCStatus.failed and otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck. If the
   signature over the outermost PKIData failed, the bodyList value is
   zero (0). If the signature over any other PKIData failed the
   bodyList value is the bodyPartId value from the request or response.

   cMCStatusInfoEx is also used by GLOs and GLAs to indicate that a
   request could not be performed immediately. If the request could not
   be processed immediately by the GLA or GLO, the cMCStatusInfoEx
   control attribute MUST be returned indicating cMCStatus.pending and
   otherInfo.pendInfo. When requests are redirected to the GLO for
   approval (for managed lists), the GLA MUST NOT return a
   cMCStatusInfoEx indicating query pending.

   cMCStatusInfoEx is also used by GLAs to indicate that a
   glaQueryRequest is not supported. If the glaQueryRequest is not
   supported, the cMCStatusInfoEx control attribute MUST be returned
   indicating cMCStatus.noSupport and statusString is optionally
   returned to convey additional information.




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3.2.4.2 Using transactionId

   transactionId MAY be included by GLOs, GLAs, or GL members to
   identify a given transaction. All subsequent requests and responses
   related to the original request MUST include the same transactionId
   control attribute. If GL members include a transactionId and the
   request is redirected to the GLO, the GLA MAY include an additional
   transactionId in the outer PKIData. If the GLA included an
   additional transactionId in the outer PKIData, when the GLO
   generates a cMCStatusInfoEx response it generates one for the GLA
   with the GLAÆs transactionId and one for the GL member with the GL
   memberÆs transactionId.


3.2.4.3 Using nonces

   The use of nonces (see section 5.6 of [3]) can be used to provide
   application-level replay prevention.  If the originating message
   includes a senderNonce, the response to the message MUST include the
   received senderNonce value as the recipientNonce and a new value as
   the senderNonce value in the response.

   If a GLA aggratates multiple messages together or forwards a message
   to a GLO, the GLA can optionally generate a new nonce value and
   include that in the wrapping message. When the response comes back
   from the GLO, the GLA builds a response to the originator(s) of the
   message(s) and deals with each of the nonce values from the
   originating messages.


3.2.4.4 CMC Attribute Support Requirements

   The following are the implementation requirements for CMC control
   attributes for an implementation be considered conformant to this
   specification:

                             Required
          Implementation Requirement     |  Control
      GLO    |      GLA      | GL Member | Attribute
    O    R   |  O    R    F  |  O    R   |
   --------- | ------------- | --------- | ----------
   MUST MUST | MUST MUST  -  | MUST MUST | cMCStatusinfoEx
   MAY  MAY  | MAY  MAY   -  | MAY  MAY  | transactionId
   MAY  MAY  | MAY  MAY   -  | MAY  MAY  | senderNonce
   MAY  MAY  | MAY  MAY   -  | MAY  MAY  | recepientNonce
   MUST MUST | MUST MUST  -  | MUST MUST | SKDFailInfo






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3.2.5 Resubmitted GL Member Messages

   When the GL is managed, the GLA forwards the GL member requests to
   the GLO for GLO approval by creating a new request message
   containing the GL member request(s) as a cmsSequence item.  If the
   GLO approves the request it can either add a new layer of wrapping
   and send it back to the GLA or create a new message sends it to the
   GLA. (Note in this case there are now 3 layers of PKIData messages
   with appropriate signing layers.)


3.2.6 PKIX

   Signatures, certificates, and CRLs are verified according to PKIX
   [5].

   Name matching is performed according to PKIX [5].

   All distinguished name forms must follow the UTF8String convention
   noted in PKIX [5].

   A certificate per-GL would be issued to the GLA.

   GL policy may mandate that the GL memberÆs address be included in
   the GL memberÆs certificate.


4 Administrative Messages

   There are a number of administrative messages that must be performed
   to manage a GL. The following sections describe each of messages'
   request and response combinations in detail. The procedures defined
   in this section are not prescriptive.

4.1 Assign KEK To GL

   Prior to generating a group key, a GL MUST be setup and a shared KEK
   assigned to the GL. Figure 3 depicts the protocol interactions to
   setup and assign a shared KEK. Note that error messages are not
   depicted in Figure 3.

                 +-----+   1    2  +-----+
                 | GLA | <-------> | GLO |
                 +-----+           +-----+

                Figure 3 - Create Group List


   The process is as follows:

     1 - The GLO is the entity responsible for requesting the creation
         of the GL. The GLO sends a

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         SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glUseKEK request to the GLA
         (1 in Figure 3). The GLO MUST include: glName, glAddress,
         glOwnerName, glOwnerAddress, and glAdministration. The GLO MAY
         also include their preferences for the shared KEK in
         glKeyAttributes by indicating whether the GLO controls the
         rekey in rekeyControlledByGLO, whether separate glKey messages
         should be sent to each recipient in
         recipientsNotMutuallyAware, the requested algorithm to be used
         with the shared KEK in requestedAlgorithm, the duration of the
         shared KEK, and how many shared KEKs should be initially
         distributed in generationCounter.

     1.a - If the GLO knows of members to be added to the GL, the
           glAddMember request(s) MAY be included in the same
           controlSequence as the glUseKEK request (see section 3.2.2).
           The GLO MUST indicate the same glName in the glAddMember
           request as in glUseKEK.glInfo.glName. Further glAddMember
           procedures are covered in section 4.3.

     1.b - The GLO MAY optionally apply confidentiality to the request
           by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData
           (see section 3.2.1.2).

     1.c - The GLO MAY also optionally apply another SignedData over
           the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the request, the GLA verifies the signature on
         the inner most SignedData.PKIData. If an additional SignedData
         and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the request (see sections
         3.2.1.2 and 3.2.2), the GLA MUST verify the outer signature(s)
         and/or decrypt the outer layer(S) prior to verifying the
         signature on the inner most SignedData.

     2.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GLA MUST return a
           cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     2.b û Else if the signatures do verify but the GLA does not have a
           valid certificate, the GLA MUST return a cMCStatusInfoEx
           with cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
           noValidGLACertificate. Instead of immediately returning the
           error code, the GLA MAY attempt to get a certificate,
           possibly using CMC [3].

     2.c - Else the signatures do verify and the GLA does have a valid
           certificate, the GLA MUST check that one of the names in the
           certificate used to sign the request matches one of the
           names in glUseKEK.glOwnerInfo.glOwnerName.

     2.c.1 - If the names do not match, the GLA MUST return a response
             indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with cMCStatus.failed and

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             otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
             noGLONameMatch.

     2.c.2 - Else names do all match, the GLA MUST check that the
             glName and glAddress is not already in use. The GLA MUST
             also check any glAddMember included within the
             controlSequence with this glUseKEK. Further processing of
             the glAddMember is covered in section 4.3.

     2.c.2.a - If the glName is already in use the GLA MUST return a
               response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
               cMCStatus.failed and
               otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
               nameAlreadyInUse.

     2.c.2.b - Else the requestedAlgorithm is not supported, the GLA
               MUST return a response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
               cMCStatus.failed and
               otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
               unsupportedAlgorithm.

     2.c.2.c - Else the duration is not supportable, determining this
               is beyond the scope of this document, the GLA MUST
               return a response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
               cMCStatus.failed and
               otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
               unsupportedDuration.

     2.c.2.d - Else the GL is not supportable for other reasons, which
               the GLA does not wish to disclose, the GLA MUST return a
               response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
               cMCStatus.failed and
               otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
               unspecified.

     2.c.2.e - Else the glName is not already in use, the duration is
               supportable, and the requestedAlgorithm is supported,
               the GLA MUST return a cMCStatusInfoEx indicating
               cMCStatus.success (2 in Figure 3). The GLA also takes
               administrative actions, which are beyond the scope of
               this document, to store the glName, glAddress,
               glKeyAttributes, glOwnerName, and glOwnerAddress. The
               GLA also sends a glKey message as described in section
               5.

     2.c.2.e.1 - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to the response by
                 encapsulating the SignedData.PKIResponse in an
                 EnvelopedData if the request was encapsulated in an
                 EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2.c.2.e.2 - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another SignedData
                 over the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

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     3 - Upon receipt of the cMCStatusInfoEx responses, the GLO
         verifies the GLA's signature(s). If an additional SignedData
         and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the response (see section
         3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLO MUST verify the outer signature
         and/or decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the
         signature on the inner most SignedData.

     3.a - Else the signatures do verify, the GLO MUST check that one
           of the names in the certificate used to sign the response
           matches the name of the GL.

     3.a.1 û If the GLÆs name does not match the name present in the
             certificate used to sign the message, the GLO should not
             believe the response.

     3.a.2 û Else the GLÆs name does match the name present in the
             certificate and:

     3.a.2.a - If the signatures do verify and the response was
               cMCStatusInfoEx indicating cMCStatus.success, the GLO
               has successfully created the GL.

     3.a.2.b - Else the signatures do verify and the response was
               cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.failed for any reason, the GLO
               MAY reattempt to create the GL using the information
               provided in the response. The GLO may also use the
               glaQueryRequest to determine the algorithms and other
               characteristics supported by the GLA (see section 4.9).


4.2 Delete GL From GLA

   From time to time, there are instances when a GL is no longer
   needed. In this case the GLO must delete the GL. Figure 4 depicts
   that protocol interactions to delete a GL.

                  +-----+   1    2  +-----+
                  | GLA | <-------> | GLO |
                  +-----+           +-----+

                 Figure 4 - Delete Group List


   The process is as follows:

     1 - The GLO is the entity responsible for requesting the deletion
         of the GL. The GLO sends a
         SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glDelete request to the GLA
         (1 in Figure 4). The name of the GL to be deleted MUST be
         included in GeneralName.


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     1.a - The GLO MAY optionally apply confidentiality to the request
           by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData
           (see section 3.2.1.2).

     1.b - The GLO MAY also optionally apply another SignedData over
           the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the request the GLA verifies the signature on
         the inner most SignedData.PKIData. If an additional SignedData
         and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the request (see section
         3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLA MUST verify the outer signature
         and/or decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the
         signature on the inner most SignedData.

     2.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GLA MUST return a
           cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     2.b - Else the signatures do verify, the GLA MUST make sure the GL
           is supported by checking the GLÆs Name matches a glName
           stored on the GLA.

     2.b.1 - If the glName is not supported by the GLA, the GLA MUST
             return a response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
             cMCStatus.failed and
             otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
             invalidGLName.

     2.b.2 - Else the glName is supported by the GLA, the GLA MUST
             ensure a registered GLO signed the glDelete request by
             checking if one of the names present in the digital
             signature certificate used to sign the glDelete request
             matches a registered GLO.

     2.b.2.a - If the names do not match, the GLA MUST return a
               response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
               cMCStatus.failed and
               otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
               noGLONameMatch.

     2.b.2.b - Else the names do match but the GL is not deletable for
               other reasons, which the GLA does not wish to disclose,
               the GLA MUST return a response indicating
               cMCStatusInfoEx with cMCStatus.failed and
               otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
               unspecified. Actions beyond the scope of this document
               must then be taken to delete the GL from the GLA.

     2.b.2.c - Else the names do match, the GLA MUST return a
               cMCStatusInfoEx indicating cMCStatus.success (2 in
               Figure 4). The GLA MUST not accept further requests for


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               member additions, member deletions, or group rekeys for
               this GL.

     2.b.2.c.1 - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to the response by
                 encapsulating the SignedData.PKIResponse in an
                 EnvelopedData if the request was encapsulated in an
                 EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2.b.2.c.2 - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another SignedData
                 over the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     3 - Upon receipt of the cMCStatusInfoEx response, the GLO verifies
         the GLA's signature(s). If an additional SignedData and/or
         EnvelopedData encapsulates the response (see section 3.2.1.2
         or 3.2.2), the GLO MUST verify the outer signature and/or
         decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the signature on
         the inner most SignedData.

     3.a - Else the signatures do verify, the GLO MUST check that one
           of the names in the certificate used to sign the response
           matches the name of the GL.

     3.a.1 û If the GLÆs name does not match the name present in the
             certificate used to sign the message, the GLO should not
             believe the response.

     3.a.2 û Else the GLÆs name does match the name present in the
             certificate and:

     3.a.2.a - If the signatures do verify and the response was
               cMCStatusInfoEx indicating cMCStatus.success, the GLO
               has successfully deleted the GL.

     3.a.2.b - Else the signatures do verify and the response was
               cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.failed for any reason, the GLO
               MAY reattempt to delete the GL using the information
               provided in the response.


4.3 Add Members To GL

   To add members to GLs, either the GLO or prospective members use the
   glAddMember request. The GLA processes GLO and prospective GL member
   requests differently though. GLOs can submit the request at any time
   to add members to the GL, and the GLA, once it has verified the
   request came from a registered GLO, should process it. If a
   prospective member sends the request, the GLA needs to determine how
   the GL is administered. When the GLO initially configured the GL,
   they set the GL to be unmanaged, managed, or closed (see section
   3.1.1). In the unmanaged case, the GLA merely processes the memberÆs
   request. For the managed case, the GLA forwards the requests from
   the prospective members to the GLO for review. Where there are

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   multiple GLOs for a GL, which GLO the request is forwarded to is
   beyond the scope of this document. The GLO reviews the request and
   either rejects it or submits a reformed request to the GLA. In the
   closed case, the GLA will not accept requests from prospective
   members. The following sections describe the processing for the
   GLO(s), GLA, and prospective GL members depending on where the
   glAddMeber request originated, either from a GLO or from prospective
   members. Figure 5 depicts the protocol interactions for the three
   options. Note that the error messages are not depicted.

                +-----+  2,B{A}              3  +----------+
                | GLO | <--------+    +-------> | Member 1 |
                +-----+          |    |         +----------+
                         1       |    |
                +-----+ <--------+    |      3  +----------+
                | GLA |  A            +-------> |   ...    |
                +-----+ <-------------+         +----------+
                                      |
                                      |      3  +----------+
                                      +-------> | Member n |
                                                +----------+

                   Figure 5 - Member Addition

   An important decision that needs to be made on a group by group
   basis is whether to rekey the group every time a new member is
   added. Typically, unmanaged GLs should not be rekeyed when a new
   member is added, as the overhead associated with rekeying the group
   becomes prohibitive, as the group becomes large. However, managed
   and closed GLs MAY be rekeyed to maintain the secrecy of the group.
   An option to rekeying managed or closed GLs when a member is added
   is to generate a new GL with a different group key. Group rekeying
   is discussed in sections 4.5 and 5.


4.3.1 GLO Initiated Additions

   The process for GLO initiated glAddMember requests is as follows:

     1 - The GLO collects the pertinent information for the member(s)
         to be added (this may be done through an out of bands means).
         The GLO then sends a SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence with a
         separate glAddMember request for each member to the GLA (1 in
         Figure 5). The GLO MUST include: the GL name in glName, the
         member's name in glMember.glMemberName, the memberÆs address
         in glMember.glMemberAddress, and the member's encryption
         certificate in glMember.certificates.pKC. The GLO MAY also
         include any attribute certificates associated with the
         memberÆs encryption certificate in glMember.certificates.aC,
         and the certification path associated with the memberÆs
         encryption and attribute certificates in
         glMember.certificates.certificationPath.

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     1.a - The GLO MAY optionally apply confidentiality to the request
           by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData
           (see section 3.2.1.2).

     1.b - The GLO MAY also optionally apply another SignedData over
           the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the request, the GLA verifies the signature on
         the inner most SignedData.PKIData. If an additional SignedData
         and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the request (see section
         3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLA MUST verify the outer signature
         and/or decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the
         signature on the inner most SignedData.

     2.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GLA MUST return a
           cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     2.b - Else the signatures do verify, the glAddMember request is
           included in a controlSequence with the glUseKEK request, and
           the processing in section 4.1 item 2.e is successfully
           completed the GLA MUST return a cMCStatusInfoEx indicating
           cMCStatus.success (2 in Figure 5).

     2.b.1 - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to the response by
             encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData
             if the request was encapsulated in an EnvelopedData (see
             section 3.2.1.2).

     2.b.2 - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another SignedData over
             the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2.c - Else the signatures do verify and the GLAddMember request is
           not included in a controlSequence with the GLCreate request,
           the GLA MUST make sure the GL is supported by checking that
           the glName matches a glName stored on the GLA.

     2.c.1 - If the glName is not supported by the GLA, the GLA MUST
             return a response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
             cMCStatus.failed and
             otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
             invalidGLName.

     2.c.2 - Else the glName is supported by the GLA, the GLA MUST
             check to see if the glMemberName is present on the GL.

     2.c.2.a - If the glMemberName is present on the GL, the GLA MUST
               return a response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
               cMCStatus.failed and
               otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
               alreadyAMember.

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     2.c.2.b - Else the glMemberName is not present on the GL, the GLA
               MUST check how the GL is administered.

     2.c.2.b.1 - If the GL is closed, the GLA MUST check that a
                 registered GLO signed the request by checking that one
                 of the names in the digital signature certificate used
                 to sign the request matches a registered GLO.

     2.c.2.b.1.a - If the names do not match, the GLA MUST return a
                   response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
                   cMCStatus.failed and
                   otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
                   noGLONameMatch.

     2.c.2.b.1.b - Else the names do match, the GLA MUST verify the
                   member's encryption certificate.

     2.c.2.b.1.b.1 - If the member's encryption certificate does not
                     verify, the GLA MAY return a response indicating
                     cMCStatusInfoEx with cMCStatus.failed and
                     otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
                     invalidCert to the GLO. If the GLA does not return
                     a cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.failed response, the
                     GLA MUST issue a glProvideCert request (see
                     section 4.10).

     2.c.2.b.1.b.2 - Else the member's certificate does verify, the GLA
                     MUST return a cMCStatusInfoEx indicating
                     cMCStatus.success (2 in Figure 5). The GLA also
                     takes administrative actions, which are beyond the
                     scope of this document, to add the member to the
                     GL stored on the GLA. The GLA MUST also distribute
                     the shared KEK to the member via the mechanism
                     described in section 5.

     2.c.2.b.1.b.2.a - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to the
                       response by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData
                       in an EnvelopedData if the request was
                       encapsulated in an EnvelopedData (see section
                       3.2.1.2).

     2.c.2.b.1.b.2.b - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another
                       SignedData over the EnvelopedData (see section
                       3.2.1.2).

     2.c.2.b.2 - Else the GL is managed, the GLA MUST check that either
                 a registered GLO or the prospective member signed the
                 request. For GLOs, one of the names in the certificate
                 used to sign the request MUST match a registered GLO.
                 For the prospective member, the name in


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                 glMember.glMemberName MUST match one of the names in
                 the certificate used to sign the request.

     2.c.2.b.2.a - If the signer is neither a registered GLO nor the
                   prospective GL member, the GLA MUST return a
                   response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
                   cMCStatus.failed and
                   otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
                   noSpam.

     2.c.2.b.2.b - Else the signer is a registered GLO, the GLA MUST
                   verify the member's encryption certificate.

     2.c.2.b.2.b.1 - If the member's certificate does not verify, the
                     GLA MAY return a response indicating
                     cMCStatusInfoEx with cMCStatus.failed and
                     otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
                     invalidCert. If the GLA does not return a
                     cMCStatus.failed response, the GLA MUST issue a
                     glProvideCert request (see section 4.10).

     2.c.2.b.2.b.2 - Else the member's certificate does verify, the GLA
                     MUST return a cMCStatusInfoEx indicating
                     cMCStatus.success to the GLO (2 in Figure 5). The
                     GLA also takes administrative actions, which are
                     beyond the scope of this document, to add the
                     member to the GL stored on the GLA. The GLA MUST
                     also distribute the shared KEK to the member via
                     the mechanism described in section 5. The GL
                     policy may mandate that the GL memberÆs address be
                     included in the GL memberÆs certificate.

     2.c.2.b.2.b.2.a - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to the
                       response by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData
                       in an EnvelopedData if the request was
                       encapsulated in an EnvelopedData (see section
                       3.2.1.2).

     2.c.2.b.2.b.2.b - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another
                       SignedData over the EnvelopedData (see section
                       3.2.1.2).

     2.c.2.b.2.c - Else the signer is the prospective member, the GLA
                   MUST forward the glAddMember request (see section
                   3.2.3) to a registered GLO (B{A} in Figure 5). If
                   there is more than one registered GLO, the GLO to
                   which the request is forwarded to is beyond the
                   scope of this document. Further processing of the
                   forwarded request by GLOs is addressed in 3 of
                   section 4.3.2.



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     2.c.2.b.2.c.1 - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to the
                     forwarded request by encapsulating the
                     SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData if the
                     original request was encapsulated in an
                     EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2.c.2.b.2.c.2 - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another
                     SignedData over the EnvelopedData (see section
                     3.2.1.2).

     2.c.2.b.3 - Else the GL is unmanaged, the GLA MUST check that
                 either a registered GLO or the prospective member
                 signed the request. For GLOs, one of the names in the
                 certificate used to sign the request MUST match the
                 name of a registered GLO. For the prospective member,
                 the name in glMember.glMemberName MUST match one of
                 the names in the certificate used to sign the request.

     2.c.2.b.3.a - If the signer is neither a registered GLO nor the
                   prospective member, the GLA MUST return a response
                   indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with cMCStatus.failed and
                   otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
                   noSpam.

     2.c.2.b.3.b - Else the signer is either a registered GLO or the
                   prospective member, the GLA MUST verify the member's
                   encryption certificate.

     2.c.2.b.3.b.1 - If the member's certificate does not verify, the
                     GLA MAY return a response indicating
                     cMCStatusInfoEx with cMCStatus.failed and
                     otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
                     invalidCert to either the GLO or the prospective
                     member depending on where the request originated.
                     If the GLA does not return a cMCStatus.failed
                     response, the GLA MUST issue a glProvideCert
                     request (see section 4.10) to either the GLO or
                     prospective member depending on where the request
                     originated.

     2.c.2.b.3.b.2 - Else the member's certificate does verify, the GLA
                     MUST return a cMCStatusInfoEx indicating
                     cMCStatus.success to the GLO (2 in Figure 5) if
                     the GLO signed the request and to the GL member (3
                     in Figure 5) if the GL member signed the request.
                     The GLA also takes administrative actions, which
                     are beyond the scope of this document, to add the
                     member to the GL stored on the GLA. The GLA MUST
                     also distribute the shared KEK to the member via
                     the mechanism described in section 5.



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     2.c.2.b.3.b.2.a - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to the
                       response by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData
                       in an EnvelopedData if the request was
                       encapsulated in an EnvelopedData (see section
                       3.2.1.2).

     2.c.2.b.3.b.2.b - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another
                       SignedData over the EnvelopedData (see section
                       3.2.1.2).

     3 - Upon receipt of the cMCStatusInfoEx response, the GLO verifies
         the GLA's signature(s). If an additional SignedData and/or
         EnvelopedData encapsulates the response (see section 3.2.1.2
         or 3.2.2), the GLO MUST verify the outer signature and/or
         decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the signature on
         the inner most SignedData.

     3.a - Else the signatures do verify, the GLO MUST check that one
           of the names in the certificate used to sign the response
           matches the name of the GL.

     3.a.1 û If the GLÆs name does not match the name present in the
             certificate used to sign the message, the GLO should not
             believe the response.

     3.a.2 û Else the GLÆs name does match the name present in the
             certificate and:

     3.a.2.a - If the signatures do verify and the response is
               cMCStatusInfoEx indicating cMCStatus.success, the GLA
               has added the member to the GL. If member was added to a
               managed list and the original request was signed by the
               member, the GLO MUST send a
               cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.success to the GL member.

     3.a.2.b - Else the GLO received a cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.failed
               for any reason, the GLO MAY reattempt to add the member
               to the GL using the information provided in the
               response.

     4 - Upon receipt of the cMCStatusInfoEx response, the prospective
         member verifies the GLA's signatures or GLOÆs signatures. If
         an additional SignedData and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the
         response (see section 3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLO MUST verify
         the outer signature and/or decrypt the outer layer prior to
         verifying the signature on the inner most SignedData.

     4.a - Else the signatures do verify, the GL member MUST check that
           one of the names in the certificate used to sign the
           response matches the name of the GL.



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     4.a.1 û If the GLÆs name does not match the name present in the
             certificate used to sign the message, the GL member should
             not believe the response.

     4.a.2 û Else the GLÆs name does match the name present in the
             certificate and:

     4.a.2.a - If the signatures do verify, the prospective member has
               been added to the GL.

     4.a.2.b - Else the prospective member received a
               cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.failed, for any reason, the
               prospective member MAY reattempt to add themselves to
               the GL using the information provided in the response.


4.3.2 Prospective Member Initiated Additions

   The process for prospective member initiated glAddMember requests is
   as follows:

     1 - The prospective GL member sends a
         SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glAddMember request to the
         GLA (A in Figure 5). The prospective GL member MUST include:
         the GL name in glName, their name in glMember.glMemberName,
         their address in glMember.glMemberAddress, and their
         encryption certificate in glMember.certificates.pKC. The
         prospective GL member MAY also include any attribute
         certificates associated with their encryption certificate in
         glMember.certificates.aC, and the certification path
         associated with their encryption and attribute certificates in
         glMember.certificates.certificationPath.

     1.a - The prospective GL member MAY optionally apply
           confidentiality to the request by encapsulating the
           SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData (see section
           3.2.1.2).

     1.b - The prospective GL member MAY also optionally apply another
           SignedData over the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the request, the GLA verifies the request as
         per 2 in section 4.3.1.

     3 - Upon receipt of the forwarded request, the GLO verifies the
         prospective GL memberÆs signature on the inner most
         SignedData.PKIData and the GLAÆs signature on the outer layer.
         If an EnvelopedData encapsulates the inner most layer (see
         section 3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLO MUST decrypt the outer
         layer prior to verifying the signature on the inner most
         SignedData.


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         Note: For cases where the GL is closed and either a) a
         prospective member sends directly to the GLO or b) the GLA has
         mistakenly forwarded the request to the GLO, the GLO should
         first determine whether to honor the request.

     3.a - Else the signatures do verify, the GLO MUST check to make
           sure one of the names in the certificate used to sign the
           request matches the name in glMember.glMemberName.

     3.a.1 - If the names do not match, the GLO MAY send a
             SignedData.PKIResponse.controlSequence message back to the
             prospective member with cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.failed
             indicating why the prospective member was denied in
             cMCStausInfo.statusString. This stops people from adding
             people to GLs without their permission.

     3.a.2 - Else the names do match, the GLO determines whether the
             prospective member is allowed to be added. The mechanism
             is beyond the scope of this document; however, the GLO
             should check to see that the glMember.glMemberName is not
             already on the GL.

     3.a.2.a - If the GLO determines the prospective member is not
               allowed to join the GL, the GLO MAY return a
               SignedData.PKIResponse.controlSequence message back to
               the prospective member with
               cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCtatus.failed indicating why the
               prospective member was denied in cMCStatus.statusString.

     3.a.2.b - Else GLO determines the prospective member is allowed to
               join the GL, the GLO MUST verify the member's encryption
               certificate.

     3.a.2.b.1 - If the member's certificate does not verify, the GLO
                 MAY return a SignedData.PKIResponse.controlSequence
                 back to the prospective member with
                 cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCtatus.failed indicating that the
                 memberÆs encryption certificate did not verify in
                 cMCStatus.statusString. If the GLO does not return a
                 cMCStatusInfoEx response, the GLO MUST send a
                 SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glProvideCert
                 message to the prospective member requesting a new
                 encryption certificate (see section 4.10).

     3.a.2.b.2 - Else the member's certificate does verify, the GLO
                 resubmits the glAddMember request (see section 3.2.5)
                 to the GLA (1 in Figure 5).

     3.a.2.b.2.a - The GLO MUST apply confidentiality to the new
                   GLAddMember request by encapsulating the
                   SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData if the


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                   initial request was encapsulated in an EnvelopedData
                   (see section 3.2.1.2).

     3.a.2.b.2.b - The GLO MAY also optionally apply another SignedData
                   over the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     4 - Processing continues as in 2 of section 4.3.1.


4.4 Delete Members From GL

   To delete members from GLs, either the GLO or prospective non-
   members use the glDeleteMember request. The GLA processes GLO and
   prospective non-GL member requests differently. The GLO can submit
   the request at any time to delete members from the GL, and the GLA,
   once it has verified the request came from a registered GLO, should
   delete the member. If a prospective member sends the request, the
   GLA needs to determine how the GL is administered. When the GLO
   initially configured the GL, they set the GL to be unmanaged,
   managed, or closed (see section 3.1.1). In the unmanaged case, the
   GLA merely processes the memberÆs request. For the managed case, the
   GLA forwards the requests from the prospective members to the GLO
   for review. Where there are multiple GLOs for a GL, which GLO the
   request is forwarded to is beyond the scope of this document. The
   GLO reviews the request and either rejects it or submits a reformed
   request to the GLA. In the closed case, the GLA will not accept
   requests from prospective members. The following sections describe
   the processing for the GLO(s), GLA, and GL members depending on
   where the request originated, either from a GLO or from prospective
   non-members. Figure 6 depicts the protocol interactions for the
   three options. Note that the error messages are not depicted.

                +-----+  2,B{A}              3  +----------+
                | GLO | <--------+    +-------> | Member 1 |
                +-----+          |    |         +----------+
                         1       |    |
                +-----+ <--------+    |      3  +----------+
                | GLA |  A            +-------> |   ...    |
                +-----+ <-------------+         +----------+
                                      |
                                      |      3  +----------+
                                      +-------> | Member n |
                                                +----------+

                   Figure 6 - Member Deletion

   If the member is not removed from the GL, they will continue to
   receive and be able to decrypt data protected with the shared KEK
   and will continue to receive rekeys. For unmanaged lists, there is
   no point to a group rekey because there is no guarantee that the
   member requesting to be removed has not already added themselves
   back on the GL under a different name. For managed and closed GLs,

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   the GLO MUST take steps to ensure the member being deleted is not on
   the GL twice. After ensuring this, managed and closed GLs MUST be
   rekeyed to maintain the secrecy of the group. If the GLO is sure the
   member has been deleted the group rekey mechanism MUST be used to
   distribute the new key (see sections 4.5 and 5).


4.4.1 GLO Initiated Deletions

   The process for GLO initiated glDeleteMember requests is as follows:

     1 - The GLO collects the pertinent information for the member(s)
         to be deleted (this MAY be done through an out of bands
         means). The GLO then sends a
         SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence with a separate
         glDeleteMember request for each member to the GLA (1 in Figure
         6). The GLO MUST include: the GL name in glName and the
         member's name in glMemberToDelete. If the GL from which the
         member is being deleted in a closed or managed GL, the GLO
         MUST also generate a glRekey request and include it with the
         glDeletemember request (see section 4.5).

     1.a - The GLO MAY optionally apply confidentiality to the request
           by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData
           (see section 3.2.1.2).

     1.b - The GLO MAY also optionally apply another SignedData over
           the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the request, the GLA verifies the signature on
         the inner most SignedData.PKIData. If an additional SignedData
         and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the request (see section
         3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLA MUST verify the outer signature
         and/or decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the
         signature on the inner most SignedData.

     2.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GLA MUST return a
           cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     2.b - Else the signatures do verify, the GLA MUST make sure the GL
           is supported by the GLA by checking that the glName matches
           a glName stored on the GLA.

     2.b.1 - If the glName is not supported by the GLA, the GLA MUST
             return a response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
             cMCStatus.failed and
             otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
             invalidGLName.

     2.b.2 - Else the glName is supported by the GLA, the GLA MUST
             check to see if the glMemberName is present on the GL.

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     2.b.2.a - If the glMemberName is not present on the GL, the GLA
               MUST return a response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
               cMCStatus.failed and
               otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
               notAMember.

     2.b.2.b - Else the glMemberName is already on the GL, the GLA MUST
               check how the GL is administered.

     2.b.2.b.1 - If the GL is closed, the GLA MUST check that the
                 registered GLO signed the request by checking that one
                 of the names in the digital signature certificate used
                 to sign the request matches the registered GLO.

     2.b.2.b.1.a - If the names do not match, the GLA MUST return a
                   response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
                   cMCStatus.failed and
                   otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
                   closedGL.

     2.b.2.b.1.b - Else the names do match, the GLA MUST return a
                   cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.success (2 in Figure 5).
                   The GLA also takes administrative actions, which are
                   beyond the scope of this document, to delete the
                   member with the GL stored on the GLA. Note that he
                   GL MUST also be rekeyed as described in section 5.

     2.b.2.b.1.b.1 - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to the response
                     by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an
                     EnvelopedData if the request was encapsulated in
                     an EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2.b.2.b.1.b.2 - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another
                     SignedData over the EnvelopedData (see section
                     3.2.1.2).

     2.b.2.b.2 - Else the GL is managed, the GLA MUST check that either
                 a registered GLO or the prospective member signed the
                 request. For GLOs, one of the names in the certificate
                 used to sign the request MUST match a registered GLO.
                 For the prospective member, the name in
                 glMember.glMemberName MUST match one of the names in
                 the certificate used to sign the request.

     2.b.2.b.2.a - If the signer is neither a registered GLO nor the
                   prospective GL member, the GLA MUST return a
                   response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
                   cMCStatus.failed and
                   otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
                   noSpam.


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     2.b.2.b.2.b - Else the signer is a registered GLO, the GLA MUST
                   return a cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.success (2 in
                   Figure 6). The GLA also takes administrative
                   actions, which are beyond the scope of this
                   document, to delete the member with the GL stored on
                   the GLA. Note that the GL will also be rekeyed as
                   described in section 5.

     2.b.2.b.2.b.1 - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to the response
                     by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an
                     EnvelopedData if the request was encapsulated in
                     an EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2.b.2.b.2.b.2 - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another
                     SignedData over the EnvelopedData (see section
                     3.2.1.2).

     2.b.2.b.2.c - Else the signer is the prospective member, the GLA
                   forwards the glDeleteMember request (see section
                   3.2.3) to the GLO (B{A} in Figure 6). If there is
                   more than one registered GLO, the GLO to which the
                   request is forwarded to is beyond the scope of this
                   document. Further processing of the forwarded
                   request by GLOs is addressed in 3 of section 4.4.2.

     2.b.2.b.2.c.1 - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to the
                     forwarded request by encapsulating the
                     SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData if the
                     request was encapsulated in an EnvelopedData (see
                     section 3.2.1.2).

     2.b.2.b.2.c.2 - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another
                     SignedData over the EnvelopedData (see section
                     3.2.1.2).

     2.b.2.b.3 - Else the GL is unmanaged, the GLA MUST check that
                 either a registered GLO or the prospective member
                 signed the request. For GLOs, one of the names in the
                 certificate used to sign the request MUST match the
                 name of a registered GLO. For the prospective member,
                 the name in glMember.glMemberName MUST match one of
                 the names in the certificate used to sign the request.

     2.b.2.b.3.a - If the signer is neither the GLO nor the prospective
                   member, the GLA MUST return a response indicating
                   cMCStatusInfoEx with cMCStatus.failed and
                   otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
                   noSpam.

     2.b.2.b.3.b - Else the signer is either a registered GLO or the
                   member, the GLA MUST return a
                   cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.success to the GLO (2 in

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                   Figure 6) if the GLO signed the request and to the
                   GL member (3 in Figure 6) if the GL member signed
                   the request. The GLA also takes administrative
                   actions, which are beyond the scope of this
                   document, to delete the member with the GL stored on
                   the GLA.

     2.b.2.b.3.b.1 - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to the response
                     by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an
                     EnvelopedData if the request was encapsulated in
                     an EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2.b.2.b.3.b.2 - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another
                     SignedData over the EnvelopedData (see section
                     3.2.1.2).

     3 - Upon receipt of the cMCStatusInfoEx response, the GLO verifies
         the GLA's signatures. If an additional SignedData and/or
         EnvelopedData encapsulates the response (see section 3.2.1.2
         or 3.2.2), the GLO MUST verify the outer signature and/or
         decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the signature on
         the inner most SignedData.

     3.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GLO MUST return a
           response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     3.b - Else the signatures do verify, the GLO MUST check that one
           of the names in the certificate used to sign the response
           matches the name of the GL.

     3.b.1 û If the GLÆs name does not match the name present in the
             certificate used to sign the message, the GLO should not
             believe the response.

     3.b.2 û Else the GLÆs name does match the name present in the
             certificate and:

     3.b.2.a - If the signatures do verify and the response is
               cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.success, the GLO has deleted
               the member from the GL. If member was deleted from a
               managed list and the original request was signed by the
               member, the GLO MUST send a
               cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.success to the GL member.

     3.b.2.b - Else the GLO received a cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.failed
               for any reason, the GLO may reattempt to delete the
               member from the GL using the information provided in the
               response.

     4 - Upon receipt of the cMCStatusInfoEx response, the prospective
         member verifies the GLA's signature(s) or GLOÆs signature(s).

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         If an additional SignedData and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates
         the response (see section 3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLO MUST
         verify the outer signature and/or decrypt the outer layer
         prior to verifying the signature on the inner most SignedData.

     4.a - Else the signatures do verify, the GL member MUST check that
           one of the names in the certificate used to sign the
           response matches the name of the GL.

     4.a.1 û If the GLÆs name does not match the name present in the
             certificate used to sign the message, the GL member should
             not believe the response.

     4.a.2 û Else the GLÆs name does match the name present in the
             certificate and:

     4.a.2.a - If the signature(s) does(do) verify, the prospective
               member has been deleted from the GL.

     4.a.2.b - Else the prospective member received a
               cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.failed for any reason, the
               prospective member MAY reattempt to delete themselves
               from the GL using the information provided in the
               response.


4.4.2 Member Initiated Deletions

   The process for prospective non-member initiated glDeleteMember
   requests is as follows:

     1 - The prospective non-GL member sends a
         SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glDeleteMember request to
         the GLA (A in Figure 6). The prospective non-GL member MUST
         include: the GL name in glName and their name in
         glMemberToDelete.

     1.a - The prospective non-GL member MAY optionally apply
           confidentiality to the request by encapsulating the
           SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData (see section
           3.2.1.2).

     1.b - The prospective non-GL member MAY also optionally apply
           another SignedData over the EnvelopedData (see section
           3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the request, the GLA verifies the request as
         per 2 in section 4.4.1.

     3 - Upon receipt of the forwarded request, the GLO verifies the
         prospective non-memberÆs signature on the inner most
         SignedData.PKIData and the GLAÆs signature on the outer layer.

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         If an EnvelopedData encapsulates the inner most layer (see
         section 3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLO MUST decrypt the outer
         layer prior to verifying the signature on the inner most
         SignedData.

         Note: For cases where the GL is closed and either a) a
         prospective member sends directly to the GLO or b) the GLA has
         mistakenly forwarded the request to the GLO, the GLO should
         first determine whether to honor the request.

     3.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GLO MUST return a
           cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     3.b - Else the signatures do verify, the GLO MUST check to make
           sure one of the names in the certificates used to sign the
           request matches the name in glMemberToDelete.

     3.b.1 - If the names do not match, the GLO MAY send a
             SignedData.PKIResponse.controlSequence message back to the
             prospective member with cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCtatus.failed
             indicating why the prospective member was denied in
             cMCStatusInfoEx.statusString. This stops people from
             adding people to GLs without their permission.

     3.b.2 - Else the names do match, the GLO resubmits the
             glDeleteMember request (see section 3.2.5) to the GLA (1
             in Figure 6). The GLO MUST make sure the glMemberName is
             already on the GL. The GLO MUST also generate a glRekey
             request and include it with the GLDeleteMember request
             (see section 4.5).

     3.b.2.a - The GLO MUST apply confidentiality to the new
               GLDeleteMember request by encapsulating the
               SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData if the initial
               request was encapsulated in an EnvelopedData (see
               section 3.2.1.2).

     3.b.2.b - The GLO MAY also optionally apply another SignedData
               over the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     4 - Further processing is as in 2 of section 4.4.1.


4.5 Request Rekey Of GL

   From time to time the GL will need to be rekeyed. Some situations
   are as follows:

     - When a member is removed from a closed or managed GL. In this
       case, the PKIData.controlSequence containing the glDeleteMember
       should contain a glRekey request.

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     - Depending on policy, when a member is removed from an unmanaged
       GL. If the policy is to rekey the GL, the
       PKIData.controlSequence containing the glDeleteMember could also
       contain a glRekey request or an out of bands means could be used
       to tell the GLA to rekey the GL. Rekeying of unmanaged GLs when
       members are deleted is not advised.

     - When the current shared KEK has been compromised.

     - When the current shared KEK is about to expire.

       - If the GLO controls the GL rekey, the GLA should not assume
         that a new shared KEK should be distributed, but instead wait
         for the glRekey message.

       - If the GLA controls the GL rekey, the GLA should initiate a
         glKey message as specified in section 5.

   If the generationCounter (see section 3.1.1) is set to a value
   greater than one (1) and the GLO controls the GL rekey, the GLO may
   generate a glRekey any time before the last shared KEK has expired.
   To be on the safe side, the GLO should request a rekey one (1)
   duration before the last shared KEK expires.

   The GLA and GLO are the only entities allowed to initiate a GL
   rekey. The GLO indicated whether they are going control rekeys or
   whether the GLA is going to control rekeys when the assigned the
   shared KEK to GL (see section 3.1.1). The GLO MAY initiate a GL
   rekey at any time. The GLA MAY be configured to automatically rekey
   the GL prior to the expiration of the shared KEK (the length of time
   before the expiration is an implementation decision). The GLA can
   also automatically rekey GLÆs that have been compromised, but this
   is covered in section 5. Figure 7 depicts the protocol interactions
   to request a GL rekey. Note that error messages are not depicted.

                  +-----+  1   2,A  +-----+
                  | GLA | <-------> | GLO |
                  +-----+           +-----+

                     Figure 7 - GL Rekey Request


4.5.1 GLO Initiated Rekey Requests

   The process for GLO initiated glRekey requests is as follows:

     1 - The GLO sends a SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glRekey
         request to the GLA (1 in Figure 7). The GLO MUST include the
         glName. If glAdministration and glKeyNewAttributes are omitted
         then there is no change from the previously registered GL
         values for these fields. If the GLO wants to force a rekey for

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         all outstanding shared KEKs it includes the glRekeyAllGLKeys
         set to TRUE.

     1.a - The GLO MAY optionally apply confidentiality to the request
           by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData
           (see section 3.2.1.2).

     1.b - The GLO MAY also optionally apply another SignedData over
           the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the request, the GLA verifies the signature on
         the inner most SignedData.PKIData. If an additional SignedData
         and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the request (see section
         3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLA MUST verify the outer signature
         and/or decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the
         signature on the inner most SignedData.

     2.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GLA MUST return a
           cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     2.b - Else the signatures do verify, the GLA MUST make sure the GL
           is supported by the GLA by checking that the glName matches
           a glName stored on the GLA.

     2.b.1 - If the glName present does not match a GL stored on the
             GLA, the GLA MUST return a response indicating
             cMCStatusInfoEx with cMCStatus.failed and
             otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
             invalidGLName.

     2.b.2 - Else the glName present does match a GL stored on the GLA,
             the GLA MUST check that a registered GLO signed the
             request by checking that one of the names in the
             certificate used to sign the request is a registered GLO.

     2.b.2.a - If the names do not match, the GLA MUST return a
               response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
               cMCStatus.failed and
               otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
               noGLONameMatch.

     2.b.2.b - Else the names do match, the GLA MUST check the
               glNewKeyAttribute values.

     2.b.2.b.1 - If the new value for requestedAlgorithm is not
                 supported, the GLA MUST return a response indicating
                 cMCStatusInfoEx with cMCStatus.failed and
                 otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
                 unsupportedAlgorithm



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     2.b.2.b.2 - Else the new value duration is not supportable,
                 determining this is beyond the scope this document,
                 the GLA MUST return a response indicating
                 cMCStatusInfoEx with cMCStatus.failed and
                 otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
                 unsupportedDuration.

     2.b.2.b.3 - Else the GL is not supportable for other reasons,
                 which the GLA does not wish to disclose, the GLA MUST
                 return a response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
                 cMCStatus.failed and
                 otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
                 unspecified.

     2.b.2.b.4 - Else the new requestedAlgorithm and duration are
                 supportable or the glNewKeyAttributes was omitted, the
                 GLA MUST return a cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.success (2
                 in Figure 7). The GLA also uses the glKey message to
                 distribute the rekey shared KEK (see section 5).

     2.b.2.b.4.a - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to response by
                   encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an
                   EnvelopedData if the request was encapsulated in an
                   EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2.b.2.b.4.b - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another SignedData
                   over the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     3 - Upon receipt of the cMCStatusInfoEx response, the GLO verifies
         the GLA's signature(s). If an additional SignedData and/or
         EnvelopedData encapsulates the forwarded response (see section
         3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLO MUST verify the outer signature
         and/or decrypt the forwarded response prior to verifying the
         signature on the inner most SignedData.

     3.a - Else the signatures do verify, the GLO MUST check that one
           of the names in the certificate used to sign the response
           matches the name of the GL.

     3.a.1 û If the GLÆs name does not match the name present in the
             certificate used to sign the message, the GLO should not
             believe the response.

     3.a.2 û Else the GLÆs name does match the name present in the
             certificate and:

     3.a.2.a - If the signatures verifies and the response is
               cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.success, the GLO has
               successfully rekeyed the GL.




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     3.a.2.b - Else the GLO received a cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.failed
               for any reason, the GLO may reattempt to rekey the GL
               using the information provided in the response.


4.5.2 GLA Initiated Rekey Requests

   If the GLA is in charge of rekeying the GL the GLA will
   automatically issue a glKey message (see section 5). In addition the
   GLA will generate a cMCStatusInfoEx to indicate to the GL that a
   successful rekey has occurred. The process for GLA initiated rekey
   is as follows:

     1 - The GLA MUST generate for all GLOs a
         SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.s
         uccess (A in Figure 7).

     1.a - The GLA MAY optionally apply confidentiality to the request
           by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData
           (see section 3.2.1.2).

     1.b - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another SignedData over
           the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.success
         response, the GLO verifies the GLA's signature(s). If an
         additional SignedData and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the
         forwarded response (see section 3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLO
         MUST verify the outer signature and/or decrypt the outer layer
         prior to verifying the signature on the inner most SignedData.

     2.a - Else the signatures do verify, the GLO MUST check that one
           of the names in the certificate used to sign the response
           matches the name of the GL.

     2.a.1 û If the GLÆs name does not match the name present in the
             certificate used to sign the message, the GLO should not
             believe the response.

     2.a.2 û Else the GLÆs name does match the name present in the
             certificate and and the response is
             cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.success, the GLO knows the GLA
             has successfully rekeyed the GL.


4.6 Change GLO

   Management of managed and closed GLs can become difficult for one
   GLO if the GL membership grows large. To support distributing the
   workload, GLAs support having GLs be managed by multiple GLOs. The
   glAddOwner and glRemoveOwner messages are designed to support adding
   and removing registered GLOs. Figure 8 depicts the protocol

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   interactions to send glAddOwner and glRemoveOwner messages and the
   resulting response messages.


                      +-----+   1    2  +-----+
                      | GLA | <-------> | GLO |
                      +-----+           +-----+

                 Figure 8 - GLO Add & Delete Owners

   The process for glAddOwner and glDeleteOwner is as follows:

     1 - The GLO sends a SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glAddOwner
         or glRemoveOwner request to the GLA (1 in Figure 8). The GLO
         MUST include: the GL name in glName, the GLOÆs name in
         glOwnerName, and the GLOÆs address in glOwnerAddress.

     1.a - The GLO MAY optionally apply confidentiality to the request
           by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData
           (see section 3.2.1.2).

     1.b - The GLO MAY also optionally apply another SignedData over
           the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the glAddOwner or glRemoveOwner request, the
         GLA verifies the GLO's signature(s). If an additional
         SignedData and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the request (see
         section 3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLA MUST verify the outer
         signature and/or decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying
         the signature on the inner most SignedData.

     2.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GLA MUST return a
           cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     2.b - Else the signatures do verify, the GLA MUST make sure the GL
           is supported by checking that the glName matches a glName
           stored on the GLA.

     2.b.1 - If the glName is not supported by the GLA, the GLA MUST
             return a response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
             cMCStatus.failed and
             otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
             invalidGLName.

     2.b.2 - Else the glName is supported by the GLA, the GLA MUST
             ensure a registered GLO signed the glAddOwner or
             glRemoveOwner request by checking that one of the names
             present in the digital signature certificate used to sign
             the glAddOwner or glDeleteOwner request matches the name
             of a registered GLO.


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     2.b.2.a - If the names do not match, the GLA MUST return a
               response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
               cMCStatus.failed and
               otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
               noGLONameMatch.

     2.b.2.b - Else the names do match, the GLA MUST return a
               cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.success (2 in Figure 4). The
               GLA MUST also take administrative actions to associate
               the new glOwnerName with the GL in the case of
               glAddOwner or to disassociate the old glOwnerName with
               the GL in the cased of glRemoveOwner.

     2.b.2.b.1 - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to the response by
                 encapsulating the SignedData.PKIResponse in an
                 EnvelopedData if the request was encapsulated in an
                 EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2.b.2.b.2 - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another SignedData
                 over the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     3 - Upon receipt of the cMCStatusInfoEx response, the GLO verifies
         the GLA's signature(s). If an additional SignedData and/or
         EnvelopedData encapsulates the response (see section 3.2.1.2
         or 3.2.2), the GLO MUST verify the outer signature and/or
         decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the signature on
         the inner most SignedData.

     3.a - Else the signatures do verify, the GLO MUST check that one
           of the names in the certificate used to sign the response
           matches the name of the GL.

     3.a.1 û If the GLÆs name does not match the name present in the
             certificate used to sign the message, the GLO should not
             believe the response.

     3.a.2 û Else the GLÆs name does match the name present in the
             certificate and:

     3.a.2.a - If the signatures do verify and the response was
               cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.success, the GLO has
               successfully added or removed the GLO.

     3.a.2.b - Else the signatures do verify and the response was
               cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.failed for any reason, the GLO
               MAY reattempt to add or delete the GLO using the
               information provided in the response.






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4.7 Indicate KEK Compromise

   The will be times when the shared KEK is compromised. GL members and
   GLOs use glkCompromise to tell the GLA that the shared KEK has been
   compromised. Figure 9 depicts the protocol interactions for GL Key
   Compromise.

                +-----+  2{1}                  4  +----------+
                | GLO | <----------+    +-------> | Member 1 |
                +-----+  5,3{1}    |    |         +----------+
                +-----+ <----------+    |      4  +----------+
                | GLA |  1              +-------> |   ...    |
                +-----+ <---------------+         +----------+
                                        |      4  +----------+
                                        +-------> | Member n |
                                                  +----------+

                   Figure 9 - GL Key Compromise

4.7.1 GL Member Initiated KEK Compromise Message

   The process for GL member initiated glkCompromise messages is as
   follows:

     1 - The GL member sends a
         SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glkCompromise request to
         the GLA (1 in Figure 9). The GL member MUST include the GLÆs
         name in GeneralName.

     1.a - The GL member MAY optionally apply confidentiality to the
           request by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an
           EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2). The glkCompromise MUST
           NOT be included in an EnvelopedData generated with the
           compromised shared KEK.

     1.b - The GL member MAY also optionally apply another SignedData
           over the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the glkCompromise request, the GLA verifies
         the GL member's signature(s). If an additional SignedData
         and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the request (see section
         3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLA MUST verify the outer signature
         and/or decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the
         signature on the inner most SignedData.

     2.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GLA MUST return a
           cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     2.b - Else the signatures do verify, the GLA MUST make sure the GL
           is supported by checking  that the indicated GL name matches
           a glName stored on the GLA.

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     2.b.1 - If the glName is not supported by the GLA, the GLA MUST
             return a response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
             cMCStatus.failed and
             otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
             invalidGLName.

     2.b.2 - Else the glName is supported by the GLA, the GLA MUST
             check who signed the request. For GLOs, one of the names
             in the certificate used to sign the request MUST match a
             registered GLO. For the prospective member, the name in
             glMember.glMemberName MUST match one of the names in the
             certificate used to sign the request.

     2.b.2.a - If the GLO signed the request, the GLA MUST generate a
               glKey message as described in section 5 to rekey the GL
               (4 in Figure 9).

     2.b.2.b - Else anyone else signed the request, the GLA MUST
               forward the glkCompromise message (see section 3.2.3) to
               the GLO (2{1} in Figure 9). If there is more than one
               GLO, to which GLO the request is forwarded is beyond the
               scope of this document. Further processing by the GLO is
               discussed in section 4.7.2.


4.7.2 GLO Initiated KEK Compromise Message

   The process for GLO initiated glkCompromise messages is as follows:

     1 - The GLO either:

     1.a - Generates the glkCompromise message itself by sending a
           SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glkCompromise request to
           the GLA (5 in Figure 9). The GLO MUST include the name of
           the GL in GeneralName.

     1.a.1 - The GLO MAY optionally apply confidentiality to the
             request by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an
             EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2). The glkCompromise
             MUST NOT be included in an EnvelopedData generated with
             the compromised shared KEK.

     1.a.2 - The GLO MAY also optionally apply another SignedData over
             the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     1.b - Verifies the GLAÆs and GL memberÆs signatures on the
           forwarded glkCompromise message. If an additional SignedData
           and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the request (see section
           3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLO MUST verify the outer signature
           and/or decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the
           signature on the inner most SignedData.

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     1.b.1 - If the signatures do not verify, the GLO MUST return a
             cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
             otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     1.b.1.a - If the signatures do verify, the GLO MUST check the
               names in the certificate match the name of the signer
               (i.e., the name in the certificate used to sign the GL
               memberÆs request is the GL member).

     1.b.1.a.1 û If either name does not match, the GLO should not
                 trust the signer and it should not forward the message
                 to the GLA.

     1.b.1.a.2 û Else the names do match, the signatures do verify, the
                 GLO MUST determine whether to forward the
                 glkCompromise message back to the GLA (3{1} in Figure
                 9). Further processing by the GLA is in 2 of section
                 4.7.1. The GLO MAY also return a response to the
                 prospective member with
                 cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCtatus.success indicating that the
                 glkCompromise message was successfully received.


4.8 Request KEK Refresh

   There will be times when GL members have misplaced their shared KEK.
   The shared KEK is not compromised and a rekey of the entire GL is
   not necessary. GL members use the glkRefresh message to request that
   the shared KEK(s) be redistributed to them. Figure 10 depicts the
   protocol interactions for GL Key Refresh.

                      +-----+   1       2   +----------+
                      | GLA | <-----------> |  Member  |
                      +-----+               +----------+

                         Figure 10 - GL KEK Refresh


   The process for glkRefresh is as follows:

     1 - The GL member sends a
         SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glkRefresh request to the
         GLA (1 in Figure 10). The GL member MUST include name of the
         GL in GeneralName.

     1.a - The GL member MAY optionally apply confidentiality to the
           request by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an
           EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     1.b - The GL member MAY also optionally apply another SignedData
           over the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

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     2 - Upon receipt of the glkRefresh request, the GLA verifies the
         GL member's signature(s). If an additional SignedData and/or
         EnvelopedData encapsulates the request (see section 3.2.1.2 or
         3.2.2), the GLA MUST verify the outer signature and/or decrypt
         the outer layer prior to verifying the signature on the inner
         most SignedData.

     2.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GLA MUST return a
           cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     2.b - Else the signatures do verify, the GLA MUST make sure the GL
           is supported by checking that the GLÆs GeneralName matches a
           glName stored on the GLA.

     2.b.1 - If the GLÆs name is not supported by the GLA, the GLA MUST
             return a response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
             cMCStatus.failed and
             otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of
             invalidGLName.

     2.b.2 - Else the glName is supported by the GLA, the GLA MUST
             ensure the GL member is on the GL.

     2.b.2.a - If the glMemberName is not present on the GL, the GLA
               MUST return a response indicating cMCStatusInfoEx with
               cMCStatus.failed and
               otherInfo.extendedFailInfo.SKDFailInfo value of noSpam.

     2.b.2.b - Else the glMemberName is present on the GL, the GLA MUST
               return a cMCStatusInfoEx.cMCStatus.success and a glKey
               message (2 in Figure 10) as described in section 5.


4.9 GLA Query Request and Response

   There will be certain times when a GLO is having trouble setting up
   a GL because they do not know the algorithm(s) or some other
   characteristic that the GLA supports. There may also be times when
   prospective GL members or GL members need to know something about
   the GLA (these requests are not defined in the document). The
   glaQueryRequest and glaQueryResponse message have been defined to
   support determining this information. Figure 11 depicts the protocol
   interactions for glaQueryRequest and glaQueryResponse.

                      +-----+   1    2  +------------------+
                      | GLA | <-------> | GLO or GL Member |
                      +-----+           +------------------+

                Figure 11 - GLA Query Request & Response


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   The process for glaQueryRequest and glaQueryResponse is as follows:

     1 - The GLO, GL member, or prospective GL member sends a
         SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glaQueryRequest request to
         the GLA (1 in Figure 11). The GLO, GL member, or prospective
         GL member indicates the information they are interested in
         receiving from the GLA.

     1.a - The GLO, GL member, or prospective GL member MAY optionally
           apply confidentiality to the request by encapsulating the
           SignedData.PKIData in an EnvelopedData (see section
           3.2.1.2).

     1.b - The GLO, GL member, or prospective GL member MAY also
           optionally apply another SignedData over the EnvelopedData
           (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the glaQueryRequest, the GLA determines if it
         accepts glaQueryRequest messages.

     2.a - If the GLA does not accept glaQueryRequest messages, the GLA
           MUST return a cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating
           cMCStatus.noSupport and any other information in
           statusString.

     2.b - Else the GLA does accept GLAQueryRequests, the GLA MUST
           verify the GLO's, GL memberÆs, or prospective GL memberÆs
           signature(s). If an additional SignedData and/or
           EnvelopedData encapsulates the request (see section 3.2.1.2
           or 3.2.2), the GLA MUST verify the outer signature and/or
           decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the signature on
           the inner most SignedData.

     2.b.1 - If the signatures do not verify, the GLA MUST return a
             cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
             otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     2.b.2 - Else the signatures do verify, the GLA MUST return a
             glaQueryResponse (2 in Figure 11) with the correct
             response if the glaRequestType is supported or return a
             cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.noSupport if
             the glaRequestType is not supported.

     2.b.2.a - The GLA MUST apply confidentiality to the response by
               encapsulating the SignedData.PKIResponse in an
               EnvelopedData if the request was encapsulated in an
               EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2.b.2.b - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another SignedData
               over the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).


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     3 - Upon receipt of the glaQueryResponse, the GLO, GL member, or
         prospective GL member verifies the GLA's signature(s). If an
         additional SignedData and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the
         response (see section 3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GLO, GL member,
         or prospective GL member MUST verify the outer signature
         and/or decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the
         signature on the inner most SignedData.

     3.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GLO, GL member, or
           prospective GL member MUST return a cMCStatusInfoEx response
           indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     3.b - Else the signatures do verify, the GLO, GL member, or
           prospective GL member MUST check that one of the names in
           the certificate used to sign the response matches the name
           of the GL.

     3.b.1 û If the GLÆs name does not match the name present in the
             certificate used to sign the message, the GLO should not
             believe the response.

     3.b.2 - Else the GLÆs name does match the name present in the
           certificate and the response was glaQueryResponse, the GLO,
           GL member, or prospective GL member may use the information
           contained therein.


4.10 Update Member Certificate

   When the GLO generates a glAddMember request, when the GLA generates
   a glKey message, or when the GLA processes a glAddMember there may
   be instances when GL memberÆs certificate has expired or is invalid.
   In these instances the GLO or GLA may request that the GL member
   provide a new certificate to avoid the GLA from being unable to
   generate a glKey message for the GL member. There may also be times
   when the GL member knows their certificate is about to expire or has
   been revoked and they will not be able to receive GL rekeys.

4.10.1 GLO and GLA Initiated Update Member Certificate

   The process for GLO initiated glUpdateCert is as follows:

     1 - The GLO or GLA sends a
         SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glProvideCert request to
         the GL member. The GLO or GLA indicates the GL name in glName
         and the GL memberÆs name in glMemberName.

     1.a - The GLO or GLA MAY optionally apply confidentiality to the
           request by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an
           EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2). If the GL memberÆs PKC
           has been revoked, the GLO or GLA MUST NOT use it to generate

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           the EnvelopedData that encapsulates the glProvideCert
           request.

     1.b - The GLO or GLA MAY also optionally apply another SignedData
           over the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the glProvideCert message, the GL member
         verifies the GLOÆs or GLAÆs signature(s). If an additional
         SignedData and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the response (see
         section 3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GL member MUST verify the outer
         signature and/or decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying
         the signature on the inner most SignedData.

     2.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GL member MUST return a
           cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     2.b - Else the signatures do verify, the GL member generates a
           Signed.PKIResponse.controlSequence.glUpdateCert that MUST
           include the GL name in glName, the member's name in
           glMember.glMemberName, their encryption certificate in
           glMember.certificates.pKC. The GL member MAY also include
           any attribute certificates associated with their encryption
           certificate in glMember.certificates.aC, and the
           certification path associated with their encryption and
           attribute certificates in
           glMember.certificates.certificationPath.

     2.a - The GL member MAY optionally apply confidentiality to the
           request by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIResponse in an
           EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2). If the GL memberÆs PKC
           has been revoked, the GL member MUST NOT use it to generate
           the EnvelopedData that encapsulates the glProvideCert
           request.

     2.b - The GL member MAY also optionally apply another SignedData
           over the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     3 - Upon receipt of the glUpdateCert message, the GLO or GLA
         verifies the GL memberÆs signature(s). If an additional
         SignedData and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the response (see
         section 3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GL member MUST verify the outer
         signature and/or decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying
         the signature on the inner most SignedData.

     3.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GLO or GLA MUST return
           a cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     3.b - Else the signatures do verify, the GLO or GLA MUST verify
           the memberÆs encryption certificate.


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     3.b.1 - If the memberÆs encryption certificate does not verify,
             the GLO MAY return either another glProvideCert request or
             a cMCStatusInfoEx with cMCStatus.failed and the reason why
             in cMCStatus.statusString. glProvideCert should be
             returned only a certain number of times because if the GL
             member does not have a valid certificate they will never
             be able to return one.

     3.b.2 - Else the memberÆs encryption certificate does not verify,
             the GLA MAY return another glProvideCert request to the GL
             member or a cMCStatusInfoEx with cMCStatus.failed and the
             reason why in cMCStatus.statusString to the GLO.
             glProvideCert should be returned only a certain number of
             times because if the GL member does not have a valid
             certificate they will never be able to return one.

     3.b.3 - Else the memberÆs encryption certificate does verify, the
             GLO or GLA will use it in subsequent glAddMember requests
             and glKey messages associated with the GL member.


4.10.2 GL Member Initiated Update Member Certificate

   The process for an unsolicited GL member glUpdateCert is as follows:

     1 - The GL member sends a
         Signed.PKIData.controlSequence.glUpdateCert that MUST include
         the GL name in glName, the member's name in
         glMember.glMemberName, their encryption certificate in
         glMember.certificates.pKC. The GL member MAY also include any
         attribute certificates associated with their encryption
         certificate in glMember.certificates.aC, and the certification
         path associated with their encryption and attribute
         certificates in glMember.certificates.certificationPath.

     1.a - The GL member MAY optionally apply confidentiality to the
           request by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in an
           EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2). If the GL memberÆs PKC
           has been revoked, the GLO or GLA MUST NOT use it to generate
           the EnvelopedData that encapsulates the glProvideCert
           request.

     1.b - The GL member MAY also optionally apply another SignedData
           over the EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the glUpdateCert message, the GLA verifies the
         GL memberÆs signature(s). If an additional SignedData and/or
         EnvelopedData encapsulates the response (see section 3.2.1.2
         or 3.2.2), the GLA MUST verify the outer signature and/or
         decrypt the outer layer prior to verifying the signature on
         the inner most SignedData.


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     2.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GLA MUST return a
           cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     2.b - Else the signatures do verify, the GLA MUST verify the
           memberÆs encryption certificate.

     2.b.1 - If the memberÆs encryption certificate does not verify,
             the GLA MAY return another glProvideCert request to the GL
             member or a cMCStatusInfoEx with cMCStatus.failed and the
             reason why in cMCStatus.statusString to the GLO.
             glProvideCert should be returned only a certain number of
             times because if the GL member does not have a valid
             certificate they will never be able to return one.

     2.b.2 - Else the memberÆs encryption certificate does verify, the
             GLA will use it in subsequent glAddMember requests and
             glKey messages associated with the GL member. The GLA MUST
             also forward the glUpdateCert message to the GLO.


5 Distribution Message

   The GLA uses the glKey message to distribute new, shared KEK(s)
   after receiving glAddMember, glDeleteMember (for closed and managed
   GLs), glRekey, glkCompromise, or glkRefresh requests and returning a
   cMCStatusInfoEx response for the respective request. Figure 12
   depicts the protocol interactions to send out glKey messages. The
   procedures defined in this section MUST be implemented.

                                        1   +----------+
                                  +-------> | Member 1 |
                                  |         +----------+
                      +-----+     |     1   +----------+
                      | GLA | ----+-------> |   ...    |
                      +-----+     |         +----------+
                                  |     1   +----------+
                                  +-------> | Member n |
                                            +----------+

                   Figure 12 - GL Key Distribution


   If the GL was setup with GLKeyAttributes.recipientsNotMutuallyAware
   set to FALSE, a separate glKey message MUST be sent to each GL
   member so as to not divulge information about the other GL members.

   When the glKey message is generated as a result of a:

     - glAddMember request,
     - glkComrpomise indication,
     - glkRefresh request,

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     - glDeleteMember request with the GLÆs glAdministration set to
       managed or closed,
     - glRekey request with generationCounter set to zero (0)

   The GLA MUST use either the kari (see section 12.3.2 of CMS [2]) or
   ktri (see section 12.3.1 of CMS [2]) choice in
   glKey.glkWrapped.RecipientInfo to ensure only the intended
   recipients receive the shared KEK. The GLA MUST support the ktri
   choice.

   When the glKey message is generated as a result of a glRekey request
   with generationCounter greater than zero (0) or when the GLA
   controls rekeys, the GLA MAY use the kari, ktri, or kekri (see
   section 12.3.3 of CMS [2]) in glKey.glkWrapped.RecipientInfo to
   ensure only the intended recipients receive the shared KEK. The GLA
   MUST support the RecipientInfo.ktri choice.


5.1 Distribution Process

   When a glKey message is generated the process is as follows:

     1 - The GLA MUST send a SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glKey
         to each member by including: glName, glIdentifier, glkWrapped,
         glkAlgorithm, glkNotBefore, and glkNotAfter. If the GLA can
         not generate a glKey message for the GL member because the GL
         memberÆs PKC has expired or is invalid, the GLA MAY send a
         glUpdateCert to the GL member requesting a new certificate be
         provided (see section 4.10). The number of glKey messages
         generated for the GL is described in section 3.1.16.

     1.a - The GLA MAY optionally apply another confidentiality layer
           to the message by encapsulating the SignedData.PKIData in
           another EnvelopedData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     1.b - The GLA MAY also optionally apply another SignedData over
           the EnvelopedData.SignedData.PKIData (see section 3.2.1.2).

     2 - Upon receipt of the glKey message, the GL members MUST verify
         the signature over the inner most SignedData.PKIData. If an
         additional SignedData and/or EnvelopedData encapsulates the
         message (see section 3.2.1.2 or 3.2.2), the GL Member MUST
         verify the outer signature and/or decrypt the outer layer
         prior to verifying the signature on the
         SignedData.PKIData.controlSequence.glKey.

     2.a - If the signatures do not verify, the GL member MUST return a
           cMCStatusInfoEx response indicating cMCStatus.failed and
           otherInfo.failInfo.badMessageCheck.

     2.b - Else the signatures do verify, the GL member process the
           RecipientInfos according to CMS [2]. Once unwrapped the GL

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           member should store the shared KEK in a safe place. When
           stored, the glName, glIdentifier, and shared KEK should be
           associated.  Additionally, the GL member MUST return a
           cMCStatusInfoEx indicating cMCStatus.success to tell the GLA
           the key received.


6 Algorithms

   This section lists the algorithms that must be implemented.
   Additional algorithms that should be implemented are also included.


6.1 KEK Generation Algorithm

   The shared KEK MUST be generated according to the security
   considerations section in AlgSpec [9].


6.2 Shared KEK Wrap Algorithm

   In the mechanisms described in sections 5, the shared KEK being
   distributed in glkWrapped MUST be protected by a key of equal or
   greater length (i.e., if a RC2 128-bit key is being distributed a
   key of 128-bits or greater must be used to protect the key).

   The algorithm object identifiers included in glkWrapped are as
   specified in AlgSpec [9].


6.3 Shared KEK Algorithm

   The shared KEK distributed and indicated in glkAlgorithm MUST
   support the symmetric key-encryption algorithms as specified in
   section AlgSpec [9].


7 Transport

   SMTP [10] MUST be supported. All other transport mechanisms MAY be
   supported.


8 Using the Group Key

   This document was written with three specific scenarios in mind. Two
   to support mail list agents and one for general message
   distribution. Scenario 1 depicts the originator sending a public key
   (PK) protected message to a MLA who then uses the shared KEK (S) to
   redistribute the message to the members of the list. Scenario 2
   depicts the originator sending a shared KEK protected message to a
   MLA who then redistributes the message to the members of the list

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   (the MLA only adds additional recipients). Scenario 3 shows an
   originator sending a shared KEK protected message to a group of
   recipients without using the MLA.

                     +---->                   +---->       +---->
      PK   +-----+ S |         S    +-----+ S |         S  |
     ----> | MLA | --+---->   ----> | MLA | --+---->   ----+---->
           +-----+   |              +-----+   |            |
                     +---->                   +---->       +---->

         Scenario 1               Scenario 2           Scenario 3


9 Security Considerations

   Only have GLOs that are trusted.

   Need to rekey closed and managed GLs if a member is deleted.

   GL members have to store some kind of information about who
   distributed the shared KEK to them so that they can make sure
   subsequent rekeys are originated from the same entity.

   Need to make sure you donÆt make the key size too small and duration
   long because people will have more time to attack the key.

   Need to make sure you donÆt make the generationCounter to large
   because people can attack the last key. If there are 14 keys
   outstanding each with a yearÆs duration attackers might be able
   determine the 14th key.

   Assume that two or more parties have a shared KEK, and the shared
   KEK is used to encrypt a second KEK for confidential distribution to
   those parties.  The second KEK might be used to encrypt a third KEK;
   the third KEK might be used to encrypt a fourth KEK; and so on.  If
   any of the KEKs in such a chain is compromised, all of the
   subordinate KEKs in the chain MUST also be considered compromised.


10 References


   1  Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP
      9, RFC 2026, October 1996.

   2  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax," draft-ietf-smime-
      rfc2630bis-00.txt, April 2001.

   3  Myers, M., Liu, X., Schaad, J., Weinsten, J., "Certificate
      Management Message over CMS," draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-00.txt,
      April 2001.


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   4  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
      Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   5  Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
      Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL Profile", draft-
      ietf-pkix-new-part1-06.txt, 8 March 2001.

   6  Farrell, S., Housley, R., ôAn Internet Attribute Certificate
      Profile for Authorizationö, draft-ietf-pkix-acx.509prof-06.txt,
      10 January 2001.

   7  Ramsdale, B., "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification," TBD.

   8  Hoffman, P., ôExtended Security Services for S/MIMEö, RFC 2634,
      June 1999.

   9  Housley, R., ôCryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithmsö,
      draft-ietf-smime-cmsalg-00.txt, Apil 2001.

   10  Postel, j., "Simple Mail Transport Protocol," RFC 821, August
      1982.




11 Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Russ Housley and Jim Schaad for providing much of the
   background and review required to write this draft.


12 Author's Addresses

   Sean Turner
   IECA, Inc.
   9010 Edgepark Road
   Vienna, VA 22182
   Phone: +1.703.628.3180
   Email: turners@ieca.com












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   Annex A: ASN.1 Module

   SMIMESymmetricKeyDistribution
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
   smime(16) modules(0) symkeydist(12) }

   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS All --
   -- The types and values defined in this module are exported for use
   -- in the other ASN.1 modules.  Other applications may use them for
   -- their own purposes.

   IMPORTS

   -- PKIX Part 1 - Implicit
      GeneralName
        FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
             internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
             id-pkix1-implicit(19)}

   -- PKIX Part 1 - Explicit
      AlgorithmIdentifier, Certificate
        FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
             internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
             id-pkix1-explicit(18) }

   -- Cryptographic Message Syntax
      RecipientInfos, id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, KEKIdentifier,
      CertificateSet
        FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
          rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms(1)}

   -- Attribute Certificate Profile
      AttributeCertificate FROM
         PKIXAttributeCertificate { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
         dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
         id-mod(0) id-mod-attribute-cert(12)};

   -- This defines the GL symmetric key distribution object identifier
   -- arc.

   id-skd OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
   rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) skd(8) }

   -- This defines the GL Use KEK control attribute

   id-skd-glUseKEK OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 1}




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   GLUseKEK ::= SEQUENCE {
     glInfo                GLInfo,
     glOwnerInfo           SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GLOwnerInfo,
     glAdministration      GLAdministration DEFAULT 1,
     glKeyAttributes       GLKeyAttributes OPTIONAL }

   GLInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName     GeneralName,
     glAddress  GeneralName }

   GLOwnerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
     glOwnerName     GeneralName,
     glOwnerAddress  GeneralName,
     certificates    Certificates OPTIONAL }

   GLAdministration ::= INTEGER {
     unmanaged  (0),
     managed    (1),
     closed     (2) }

   GLKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
     rekeyControlledByGLO       [0] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
     recipientsNotMutuallyAware [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
     duration                   [2] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
     generationCounter          [3] INTEGER DEFAULT 2,
     requestedAlgorithm         [4] AlgorithmIdentifier
                                 DEFAULT id-alg-CMS3DESwrap }

   -- This defines the Delete GL control attribute.
   -- It has the simple type GeneralName.

   id-skd-glDelete OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 2}

   -- This defines the Add GL Member control attribute

   id-skd-glAddMember OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 3}

   GLAddMember ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName    GeneralName,
     glMember  GLMember }

   GLMember ::= SEQUENCE {
     glMemberName     GeneralName,
     glMemberAddress  GeneralName OPTIONAL,
     certificates     Certificates OPTIONAL }








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   Certificates ::= SEQUENCE {
      pKC                [0] Certificate OPTIONAL,
                                  -- See PKIX [5]
      aC                 [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1.. MAX) OF
                             AttributeCertificate OPTIONAL,
                                  -- See ACPROF [6]
      certificationPath  [2] CertificateSet OPTIONAL }
                                  -- From CMS [2]

   -- This defines the Delete GL Member control attribute

   id-skd-glDeleteMember OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 4}

   GLDeleteMember ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName            GeneralName,
     glMemberToDelete  GeneralName }

   -- This defines the Delete GL Member control attribute

   id-skd-glRekey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 5}

   GLRekey ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName              GeneralName,
     glAdministration    GLAdministration OPTIONAL,
     glNewKeyAttributes  GLNewKeyAttributes OPTIONAL,
     glRekeyAllGLKeys    BOOLEAN OPTIONAL }

   GLNewKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
     rekeyControlledByGLO       [0] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
     recipientsNotMutuallyAware [1] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
     duration                   [2] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
     generationCounter          [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
     requestedAlgorithm         [4] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL }

   -- This defines the Add and Delete GL Owner control attributes

   id-skd-glAddOwner OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 6}
   id-skd-glRemoveOwner OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 7}

   GLOwnerAdministration ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName       GeneralName,
     glOwnerInfo  GLOwnerInfo }

   -- This defines the GL Key Compromise control attribute.
   -- It has the simple type GeneralName.

   id-skd-glKeyCompromise OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 8}

   -- This defines the GL Key Refresh control attribute.

   id-skd-glkRefresh OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 9}


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   GLKRefresh ::= SEQUENCE {
      glName  GeneralName,
      dates   SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Date }

   Date ::= SEQUENCE {
     start GeneralizedTime,
     end   GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }

   -- This defines the GLA Query Request control attribute.

   id-skd-glaQueryRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 11}

   GLAQueryRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
     glaRequestType   OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
     glaRequestValue  ANY DEFINED BY glaRequestType }


   -- This defines the GLA Query Response control attribute.

   id-skd-glaQueryResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 12}

   GLAQueryResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
     glaResponseType   OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
     glaResponseValue  ANY DEFINED BY glaResponseType }

   -- This defines the GLA Request/Response (glaRR) arc for
   -- glaRequestType/glaResponseType.

   id-cmc-glaRR OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-
   organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
   cmc(7) glaRR(99) }

   -- This defines the Algorithm Request

   id-cmc-gla-skdAlgRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc-glaRR 1 }

   -- This defines the Algorithm Response

   id-cmc-gla-skdAlgResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc-glaRR 2 }

   -- Note that the response for algorithmSupported request is the
   -- smimeCapabilities attribute as defined in MsgSpec [7].

   -- This defines the control attribute to request an updated
   -- certificate to the GLA.

   id-skd-glProvideCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 13}

   GLManageCert ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName    GeneralName,
     glMember  GLMember }


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   -- This defines the control attribute to return an updated
   -- certificate to the GLA. It has the type GLManageCert.

   id-skd-glManageCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 14}

   -- This defines the control attribute to distribute the GL shared
   -- KEK.

   id-skd-glKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-skd 15}

   GLKey ::= SEQUENCE {
     glName        GeneralName,
     glIdentifier  KEKIdentifier,  -- See CMS [2]
     glkWrapped    RecipientInfos,      -- See CMS [2]
     glkAlgorithm  AlgorithmIdentifier,
     glkNotBefore  GeneralizedTime,
     glkNotAfter   GeneralizedTime }

   -- This defines the CMC error types

   id-cet-skdFailInfo  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
   identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) cet(15) skdFailInfo(1) }

   SKDFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
     unspecified           (0),
     closedGL              (1),
     unsupportedDuration   (2),
     noGLACertificate      (3),
     invalidCert           (4),
     unsupportedAlgorithm  (5),
     noGLONameMatch        (6),
     invalidGLName         (7),
     nameAlreadyInUse      (8),
     noSpam                (9),
     deniedAccess          (10),
     alreadyAMember        (11),
     notAMember            (12),
     alreadyAnOwner        (13),
     notAnOwner            (14) }


   END -- SMIMESymmetricKeyDistribution

   September 2, 2001








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