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Versions: (draft-fu-softwire-map-mib) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 RFC 8389

Internet Engineering Task Force                                    Y. Fu
Internet-Draft                                                     CNNIC
Intended status: Standards Track                                S. Jiang
Expires: December 19, 2016                                        B. Liu
                                            Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
                                                                 J. Dong
                                                                 Y. Chen
                                                     Tsinghua University
                                                           June 17, 2016


                Definitions of Managed Objects for MAP-E
                     draft-ietf-softwire-map-mib-06

Abstract

   This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB)
   for using with network management protocols in the Internet
   community.  In particular, it defines managed objects for MAP
   encapsulation (MAP-E) mode.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 19, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  The Internet-Standard Management Framework  . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Structure of the MIB Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     4.1.  The mapMIBObjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       4.1.1.  The mapRule Subtree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       4.1.2.  The mapSecurityCheck Subtree  . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     4.2.  The mapMIBConformance Subtree . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   MAP [RFC7597] is a stateless mechanism for running IPv4 over
   IPv6-only infrastructure.  In particular, it includes two mode,
   translation mode or encapsulation mode.  For the encapsulation mode,
   it provides an automatic tunnelling mechanism for providing IPv4
   connectivity service to end users over a service provider's IPv6
   network

   This document defines a portion of the Management Information Base
   (MIB) for use with network management protocols in the Internet
   community.  This MIB module would be used for monitoring the devices
   in the MAP scenario, especially, for the encapsulation mode.

2.  The Internet-Standard Management Framework

   For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current
   Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to section 7 of
   [RFC3410].

   Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
   the Management Information Base or MIB.  MIB objects are generally
   accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
   Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the



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   Structure of Management Information (SMI).  This memo specifies a MIB
   module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in
   [RFC2578], [RFC2579] and [RFC2580].

3.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

4.  Structure of the MIB Module

   The MAP-E MIB provides a way to configure and monitor the MAP devices
   in MAP encapsulation mode through SNMP.

   MAP-E MIB is configurable on a per-interface basis.  It depends on
   several parts of the IF-MIB[RFC2863].

4.1.  The mapMIBObjects

4.1.1.  The mapRule Subtree

   The mapRule subtree describes managed objects used for managing the
   multiple mapping rules in the MAP encapsulation mode.

   According to the MAP specification[RFC7597], the mapping rules are
   divided into two categories, which are Basic Mapping Rule (BMR), and
   Forwarding Mapping Rule (FMR).

4.1.2.  The mapSecurityCheck Subtree

   The mapSecurityCheck subtree is to statistic the number of invalid
   packets that have been identified.  There are two kind of invalid
   packets which are defined in the MAP specification [RFC7597]as below.

   - The BR MUST perform a validation of the consistency of the source
   IPv6 address and source port number for the packet using BMR.

   - The Customer Edge (CE) SHOULD check that MAP received packets'
   transport-layer destination port number is in the range configured by
   MAP for the CE.

4.2.  The mapMIBConformance Subtree

   The mapMIBConformance subtree provides conformance information of MIB
   objects.




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5.  Definitions

     MAP-E-MIB DEFINITIONS  ::=  BEGIN

      IMPORTS
         MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, mib-2,
         Integer32, Unsigned32, Counter64
            FROM SNMPv2-SMI
         ifIndex
            FROM IF-MIB
         InetAddressType, InetAddress,
         InetAddressPrefixLength
            FROM INET-ADDRESS-MIB
         OBJECT-GROUP, MODULE-COMPLIANCE
            FROM SNMPv2-CONF;

      mapMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
      LAST-UPDATED "201606170000Z"
      ORGANIZATION
         "IETF Softwire Working Group"
      CONTACT-INFO
         "Yu Fu
          CNNIC
          No.4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
          Beijing, P.R. China 100190
          EMail: fuyu@cnnic.cn

          Sheng Jiang
          Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
          Huawei Building, 156 Beiqing Rd., Hai-Dian District
          Beijing, P.R. China 100095
          EMail: jiangsheng@huawei.com

          Bing Liu
          Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
          Huawei Building, 156 Beiqing Rd., Hai-Dian District
          Beijing, P.R. China 100095
          EMail: leo.liubing@huawei.com

          Jiang Dong
          Tsinghua University
          Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
          Beijing  100084
          P.R. China
          Email: knight.dongjiang@gmail.com

          Yuchi Chen
          Tsinghua University



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          Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
          Beijing  100084
          P.R. China
          Email: chenycmx@gmail.com"

      DESCRIPTION
         "The MIB module is defined for management of objects in the
         MAP-E BRs or CEs."
      REVISION    "201606170000Z"
      DESCRIPTION
        "Initial version. Published as RFC xxxx."
      --RFC Ed.: RFC-edtitor pls fill in xxxx
       ::=  {  mib-2 xxx  }
      --xxx to be replaced withIANA-assigned value

      mapMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {mapMIB 1}

      mapRule   OBJECT IDENTIFIER
         ::=  { mapMIBObjects 1 }

      mapSecurityCheck   OBJECT IDENTIFIER
         ::=  { mapMIBObjects 2 }

      mapRuleTable OBJECT-TYPE
         SYNTAX     SEQUENCE OF MapRuleEntry
         MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
         STATUS     current
         DESCRIPTION
            "The (conceptual) table containing rule Information of
             specific mapping rule. It can also be used for row
             creation."
         ::=  { mapRule 1 }

      mapRuleEntry OBJECT-TYPE
         SYNTAX     MapRuleEntry
         MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
         STATUS     current
         DESCRIPTION
            "Each entry in this table contains the information on a
             particular mapping rule."
             INDEX   { mapRuleID }
         ::=  { mapRuleTable 1 }

      MapRuleEntry  ::=
         SEQUENCE {
          mapRuleID                   Integer32,
          mapRuleIPv6PrefixType       InetAddressType,
          mapRuleIPv6Prefix           InetAddress,



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          mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen        InetAddressPrefixLength,
          mapRuleIPv4PrefixType       InetAddressType,
          mapRuleIPv4Prefix           InetAddress,
          mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen        InetAddressPrefixLength,
          mapRuleBRIPv6Address        InetAddress,
          mapRulePSID                 Integer32,
          mapRulePSIDLen              Integer32,
          mapRuleOffset               Unsigned32,
          mapRuleEALen                Integer32,
          mapRuleType                 Integer32
      }

      mapRuleID OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)
          MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
          STATUS current
          DESCRIPTION
             "An identifier used to distinguish the multiple mapping
              rule which is unique with each CE in the same BR."
          ::= { mapRuleEntry 1 }

      mapRuleIPv6PrefixType OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     InetAddressType
          MAX-ACCESS read-only
          STATUS     current
          DESCRIPTION
              "This object MUST be set to the value of ipv6(2) to
               present the IPv6 address.It describes the
               address type of the mapRuleIPv6Prefix and
               mapRuleBRIPv6Address."
          REFERENCE
               "ipv6(2): RFC 4001."
          ::= { mapRuleEntry 2 }

      mapRuleIPv6Prefix OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     InetAddress(SIZE (0..16))
          MAX-ACCESS read-only
          STATUS     current
          DESCRIPTION
             "The IPv6 prefix defined in mapping rule which will be
              assigned to CE. The address type is given by
              mapRuleIPv6PrefixType."
          ::= { mapRuleEntry 3 }

      mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     InetAddressPrefixLength
          MAX-ACCESS read-only
          STATUS     current



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          DESCRIPTION
             "The length of the IPv6 prefix defined in the mapping rule.
              As a parameter for mapping rule, it will be also assigned
              to CE."
          ::= { mapRuleEntry 4 }

      mapRuleIPv4PrefixType OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     InetAddressType
          MAX-ACCESS read-only
          STATUS     current
          DESCRIPTION
             "This object MUST be set to the value of ipv4(1) to
              present the public IPv4 address. It describes the
              address type of the mapRuleIPv4Prefix."
          REFERENCE
               "ipv4(1): RFC 4001."
          ::= { mapRuleEntry 5 }

      mapRuleIPv4Prefix OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     InetAddress(SIZE (0..4))
          MAX-ACCESS read-only
          STATUS     current
          DESCRIPTION
             " The IPv4 prefix defined in mapping rule which will be
               assigned to CE. The address type is given by
               mapRuleIPv4PrefixType."
          ::= { mapRuleEntry 6 }

      mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     InetAddressPrefixLength
          MAX-ACCESS read-only
          STATUS     current
          DESCRIPTION
             "The length of the IPv4 prefix defined in the mapping
              rule. As a parameter for mapping rule, it will be also
              assigned to CE."
          ::= { mapRuleEntry 7 }

      mapRuleBRIPv6Address OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     InetAddress(SIZE (0..16))
          MAX-ACCESS read-only
          STATUS     current
          DESCRIPTION
             "The IPv6 address of the BR which will be
              conveyed to CE. The address type is given by
              mapRuleIPv6PrefixType."
          ::= { mapRuleEntry 8 }




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       mapRulePSID  OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     Integer32
          MAX-ACCESS read-only
          STATUS     current
          DESCRIPTION
             "The PSID value algorithmically identifies a set of
              ports assigned to a CE."
          REFERENCE
               "PSID: section 3 of RFC 7597."
          ::= { mapRuleEntry 9 }

      mapRulePSIDLen  OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     Integer32
          MAX-ACCESS read-only
          STATUS     current
          DESCRIPTION
             "The bit length value of the number of significant bits in
              the PSID field. When it is set to 0, the PSID
              field is to be ignored."
          ::= { mapRuleEntry 10 }

      mapRuleOffset OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     Unsigned32(0..15)
          MAX-ACCESS read-only
          STATUS     current
          DESCRIPTION
             "Bit length value of the number of significant bits in
              the PSID field. When it is set to 0, the PSID
              field is to be ignored."
          ::= { mapRuleEntry 11 }

      mapRuleEALen OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     Integer32
          MAX-ACCESS read-only
          STATUS     current
          DESCRIPTION
             "The length of the Embedded-Address (EA) defined in
              mapping rule which will be assigned to CE."
         REFERENCE
               "EA: section 3 of RFC 7597."
          ::= { mapRuleEntry 12 }

      mapRuleType OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     Integer32
          MAX-ACCESS read-only
          STATUS     current
          DESCRIPTION
             "The type of the mapping rule. A value of 0 means it



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              is a BMR; a non-zero value means it is a FMR."
         REFERENCE
               "BMR, FMR: section 5 of RFC 7597."
          ::= { mapRuleEntry 13 }

      mapSecurityCheckTable OBJECT-TYPE
         SYNTAX     SEQUENCE OF MapSecurityCheckEntry
         MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
         STATUS     current
         DESCRIPTION
            "The (conceptual) table containing information on
             MAP security checks. This table can be used to statistic
             the number of invalid packets that been identified"
         ::=  { mapSecurityCheck 1 }

      mapSecurityCheckEntry OBJECT-TYPE
         SYNTAX     MapSecurityCheckEntry
         MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
         STATUS     current
         DESCRIPTION
            "Each entry in this table contains the information on a
             particular MAP SecurityCheck."
             INDEX   { ifIndex }
         ::=  { mapSecurityCheckTable 1 }

      MapSecurityCheckEntry  ::=
         SEQUENCE {
          mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4       Counter64,
          mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6       Counter64
      }

      mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4 OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     Counter64
          MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
          STATUS     current
          DESCRIPTION
             "The CE SHOULD check that MAP received packets'
              transport-layer destination port number is in the range
              configured by MAP for the CE. So this object indicate
              the number of the invalid IPv4 packets received by the
              MAP."
          ::= { mapSecurityCheckEntry 1 }

      mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6 OBJECT-TYPE
          SYNTAX     Counter64
          MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify
          STATUS     current
          DESCRIPTION



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             "The BR MUST perform a validation of the consistency of
              the source IPv6 address and source port number for the
              packet using BMR. So this object indicate the number of
              the invalid IPv6 packets received by the BR."
          ::= { mapSecurityCheckEntry 2 }

      -- Conformance Information
      mapMIBConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {mapMIB 2}
      mapMIBCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mapMIBConformance 1 }
      mapMIBGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mapMIBConformance 2 }

      -- compliance statements
      mapMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
         STATUS current
         DESCRIPTION
            " Describes the minimal requirements for conformance
              to the MAP-E MIB."
         MODULE -- this module
             MANDATORY-GROUPS { mapMIBRuleGroup , mapMIBSecurityGroup }
        ::= { mapMIBCompliances 1 }

      -- Units of Conformance
      mapMIBRuleGroup OBJECT-GROUP
         OBJECTS {
                 mapRuleIPv6PrefixType,
                 mapRuleIPv6Prefix,
                 mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen,
                 mapRuleIPv4PrefixType,
                 mapRuleIPv4Prefix,
                 mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen,
                 mapRuleBRIPv6Address,
                 mapRulePSID,
                 mapRulePSIDLen,
                 mapRuleOffset,
                 mapRuleEALen,
                 mapRuleType  }
         STATUS current
         DESCRIPTION
            " The collection of this objects are used to give the
             information of mapping rules in MAP-E."
         ::= { mapMIBGroups 1 }

     mapMIBSecurityGroup OBJECT-GROUP
        OBJECTS {
           mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4,
           mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6 }
       STATUS current
       DESCRIPTION



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       " The collection of this objects are used to give the
       information on MAP security checks."
       ::= { mapMIBGroups 2 }

       END


6.  IANA Considerations

   The MIB module in this document uses the following IANA-assigned
   OBJECT IDENTIFIER values recorded in the SMI Numbers registry:

         Descriptor        OBJECT IDENTIFIER value
         ----------        -----------------------
         MAP-E-MIB          { mib-2 XXX }

7.  Security Considerations

   There are no management objects defined in this MIB module that have
   a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create.  So, if this
   MIB module is implemented correctly, then there is no risk that an
   intruder can alter or create any management objects of this MIB
   module via direct SNMP SET operations.

   Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects with a
   MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or
   vulnerable in some network environments.  It is thus important to
   control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly
   to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over
   the network via SNMP.  These are the objects and their sensitivity/
   vulnerability:

      mapRuleIPv6PrefixType

      mapRuleIPv6Prefix

      mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen

      mapRuleIPv4PrefixType

      mapRuleIPv4Prefix

      mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen

      mapRuleBRIPv6Address

      mapRulePSID




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      mapRulePSIDLen

      mapRuleOffset

      mapRuleEALen

      mapRuleType

   SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
   Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec),
   even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is
   allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects
   in this MIB module.

   Implementations SHOULD provide the security features described by the
   SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410]), and implementations claiming
   compliance to the SNMPv3 standard MUST include full support for
   authentication and privacy via the User-based Security Model (USM)
   [RFC3414] with the AES cipher algorithm [RFC3826].  Implementations
   MAY also provide support for the Transport Security Model (TSM)
   [RFC5591] in combination with a secure transport such as SSH
   [RFC5592] or TLS/DTLS [RFC6353].

   Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT
   RECOMMENDED.  Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to
   enable cryptographic security.  It is then a customer/operator
   responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an
   instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to
   the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate
   rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them.

8.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank for valuable comments from David
   Harrington, Mark Townsley, Shishio Tsuchiya, Yong Cui and Suresh
   Krishnan.

   This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629].

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.




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   [RFC2578]  McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
              Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of Management Information
              Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2578, April 1999,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2578>.

   [RFC2580]  McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
              Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Conformance Statements for SMIv2",
              STD 58, RFC 2580, DOI 10.17487/RFC2580, April 1999,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2580>.

   [RFC2863]  McCloghrie, K. and F. Kastenholz, "The Interfaces Group
              MIB", RFC 2863, DOI 10.17487/RFC2863, June 2000,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2863>.

   [RFC4001]  Daniele, M., Haberman, B., Routhier, S., and J.
              Schoenwaelder, "Textual Conventions for Internet Network
              Addresses", RFC 4001, DOI 10.17487/RFC4001, February 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4001>.

   [RFC7597]  Troan, O., Ed., Dec, W., Li, X., Bao, C., Matsushima, S.,
              Murakami, T., and T. Taylor, Ed., "Mapping of Address and
              Port with Encapsulation (MAP-E)", RFC 7597,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7597, July 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7597>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2579]  McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
              Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions for SMIv2",
              STD 58, RFC 2579, DOI 10.17487/RFC2579, April 1999,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2579>.

   [RFC2629]  Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2629, June 1999,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2629>.

   [RFC3410]  Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart,
              "Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet-
              Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3410, December 2002,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3410>.

   [RFC3414]  Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model
              (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
              Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3414, December 2002,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3414>.



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   [RFC3826]  Blumenthal, U., Maino, F., and K. McCloghrie, "The
              Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher Algorithm in the
              SNMP User-based Security Model", RFC 3826,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3826, June 2004,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3826>.

   [RFC5591]  Harrington, D. and W. Hardaker, "Transport Security Model
              for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
              STD 78, RFC 5591, DOI 10.17487/RFC5591, June 2009,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5591>.

   [RFC5592]  Harrington, D., Salowey, J., and W. Hardaker, "Secure
              Shell Transport Model for the Simple Network Management
              Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 5592, DOI 10.17487/RFC5592, June
              2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5592>.

   [RFC6353]  Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
              Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
              STD 78, RFC 6353, DOI 10.17487/RFC6353, July 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6353>.

Authors' Addresses

   Yu Fu
   CNNIC
   No.4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
   Beijing 100190
   P.R. China

   Email: fuyu@cnnic.cn


   Sheng Jiang
   Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
   Q14, Huawei Campus, No.156 Beiqing Road
   Hai-Dian District, Beijing, 100095
   P.R. China

   Email: jiangsheng@huawei.com


   Bing Liu
   Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
   Q14, Huawei Campus, No.156 Beiqing Road
   Hai-Dian District, Beijing, 100095
   P.R. China

   Email: leo.liubing@huawei.com



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   Jiang Dong
   Tsinghua University
   Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
   Beijing  100084
   P.R. China

   Email: knight.dongjiang@gmail.com


   Yuchi Chen
   Tsinghua University
   Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
   Beijing  100084
   P.R. China

   Email: flashfoxmx@gmail.com



































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