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Versions: (draft-kucherawy-spfbis-experiment) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 RFC 6686

SPFBIS Working Group                                        M. Kucherawy
Internet-Draft                                                 Cloudmark
Intended status: Informational                            April 18, 2012
Expires: October 20, 2012

               Resolution of The SPF/Sender-ID Experiment


   In 2006 the IETF published a suite of protocol documents comprising
   SPF and Sender-ID, two proposed email authentication protocols.
   Because of interoperability concerns created by simultaneous use of
   the two protocols by a receiver, and some concerns with Sender-ID and
   compatibility with existing standards, the IESG required them to have
   Experimental status and invited the community to observe their
   deployments for a period of time, hoping convergence would be
   possible later.

   After six years, sufficient experience and evidence have been
   collected that the experiment thus created can be considered
   concluded, and a single protocol can be advanced.  This memo presents
   those findings.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 20, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal

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   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Evidence of Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  DNS Resource Record Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.2.  Implementations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.3.  The SUBMITTER SMTP Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Evidence of Differences  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   8.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   Appendix A.  Experiences Developing SPF  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

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1.  Introduction

   In April 2006, the IETF published the [SPF] and Sender-ID email
   authentication protocols, the latter consisting of three documents
   ([SUBMITTER], [SENDER-ID], and [PRA]).  Both of these enable one to
   publish via the Domain Name System a policy declaring which mail
   servers were authorized to send email on behalf of a specific domain
   name.  The two protocols made use of this policy statement and some
   specific (but different) logic to evaluate whether or not the email
   client sending or relaying a message was authorized to do so.

   Due to the absence of consensus behind one or the other, and because
   Sender-ID supported use of the same policy statement defined by SPF,
   the IESG at the time was concerned that an implementation of
   Sender-ID might erroneously apply that statement to a message and,
   depending on selected recipient actions, could improperly interfere
   with message delivery.  As a result, the IESG required the
   publication of all of these documents as Experimental, and requested
   that the community observe deployment and operation of the protocols
   over a period of two years from publication in order to determine a
   reasonable path forward.  (For further details about the IESG's
   concern, see the IESG Note prepended to all of those documents.)

   Accordingly, this memo resolves the experiment by presenting evidence
   regarding both deployment and comparative effect of the two
   protocols.  At the end it presents conclusions based on the data

   It is important to note that this memo makes no direct technical
   comparison of the two protocols in terms of correctness, weaknesses,
   or use case coverage.  The email community at large has already done
   that.  Rather, the analysis presented here merely observes what has
   been deployed and supported in the time since the protocols were
   published, and draws conclusions based on those observations.

2.  Evidence of Deployment

   This section presents the collected research done to determine what
   parts of the two protocol suites are in general use, as well as
   related issues like DNS support.

2.1.  DNS Resource Record Types

   Two large-scale DNS surveys were run that looked for the two
   supported kinds of resource records (RR) that can contain SPF policy

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   DNS Survey #1

     | Domains queried  | 1,000,000 |   -   |
     | TXT replies      |   397,511 | 39.8% |
     | SPF replies      |     6,627 | <0.1% |
     | SPF+TXT replies  |     6,603 | <0.1% |
     | spf2.0/* replies |     5,291 | <0.1% |

   TXT replies are DNS RRtype 16; SPF replies are DNS RRtype 99.  The
   "spf2.0/*" replies are those replies whose payload started with the
   string "spf2.0/", which are express requests for Sender-ID

   DNS Survey #2

     | Domains queried  |   259,918 |   -   |
     | TXT replies      |   142,640 | 54.9% |
     | SPF replies      |     2,727 |  1.0% |
     | SPF+TXT replies  |     2,554 | <0.1% |
     | spf2.0/* replies |     6,972 |  2.7% |

   During this second survey, some domains were observed to provide
   immediate answers for type 16 queries, but would time out waiting for
   replies to type 99 queries.  For example, it was observed that 4,179
   (over 1.6%) distinct domains in the survey returned a result of some
   kind (a record or an error) for the TXT query in time N, while the
   SPF query ultimately failed after at least time 4N.

   DNS Survey #3

     | Domains queried  |   100,000 |   -   |
     | TXT replies      |    46,221 | 46.2% |
     | SPF replies      |       954 | <0.1% |
     | SPF+TXT replies  |     1,383 |  1.4% |

   A survey was done of queries for type 16 and type 99 records by
   observing nameserver logs.  Only a few queries were ever received for
   type 99 records, and those almost exclusively came from one large
   email service provider that queried for both types.  The vast
   majority of other querying agents only ever requested type 16.

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2.2.  Implementations

   It is likely impossible to determine from a survey which MTAs (Mail
   Transfer Agents) have SPF and/or Sender-ID checking enabled at
   message ingress since it does not appear, for example, in the reply
   to the EHLO command from extended [SMTP].  We therefore rely on
   evidence found via web searches, and observed the following:

   o  A web site [SID-IMPL] dedicated to highlighting Sender-ID
      implementations last updated in late 2007 listed 13 commercial
      implementations, which we assume means they implement the PRA
      checks.  At least one of them is known no longer to be supported
      by its vendor.  There were no free open source implementations

   o  The [OPENSPF] web site maintains a list of known implementations
      of SPF.  At the time of this memo's writing it listed six
      libraries, 22 MTAs with built-in SPF implementations, and numerous
      patches for MTAs and mail clients.  The set included a mix of
      commercial and free open source implementations.

2.3.  The SUBMITTER SMTP Extension

   In a review of numerous MTAs in current or recent use, two
   (Santronics WinServer and McAfee MxLogic) were found to contain
   implementations of the SMTP SUBMITTER extension as part of the MTA
   service, which could act as an enabler to Sender-ID.

   An unknown number of clients implement SUBMITTER.  Although there is
   substantial activity showing its use in MTA logs, it is not possible
   to determine whether they are multiple instances of the same client,
   or separate client implementations.

   An active survey was done of a large number of running and publicly
   reachable MTAs.  Fewer than 4.5% of these advertised the SUBMITTER
   extension.  Based on the SMTP banner presented upon connection, the
   entire set of SUBMITTER-enabled MTAs consisted of the two found
   during the review (above) and a third whose identity could not be
   positively determined.

   The vast majority of the MTAs advertising SUBMITTER were different
   instances of one MTA.  That MTA was a mail filtering service, which
   reports that about 11% of all observed SMTP sessions involve clients
   that make use of SUBMITTER.

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3.  Evidence of Differences

   Separate surveys compared the cases where the PRA (used by Sender-ID)
   and the RFC5321.MailFrom address (used by SPF) differed.  The results
   of these tests showed that at least 50% of the time the two addresses
   were the same, but beyond that the percentage varied substantially
   from one sampling location to the next due to the nature of the mail
   streams they each receive.

   Despite this, one set of specific data collected by a working group
   contributor shows that in more than 95% of cases, Sender-ID and SPF
   reach the same conclusion about a message, meaning either both
   protocols return a "pass" result or both return a "fail" result.  The
   data set yielding this response could not further characterize the
   cases in which the answers differed.

4.  Analysis

   Given the six years that have passed since the publication of the
   experimental RFCs, and the evidence reported in the earlier sections
   of this document, the following analysis appears to be supported:

   1.  There has not been substantial adoption of the type 99 (SPF) DNS
       resource record.  In all large-scale surveys performed for this
       work, less than 2% of responding domains published type 99
       records, and almost no clients requested them.

   2.  Of the records retrieved, fewer than 3% requested processing of
       messages using the PRA algorithm, which was an essential part of

   3.  Although the two mechanisms often used different email addresses
       as the subject being evaluated, no data collected showed any
       substantial operational benefit (e.g., cheaper processing,
       improved accuracy) to using Sender-ID over SPF.

   4.  A review of known implementations shows significant support for
       both protocols, though there were more implementations in support
       of SPF than of Sender-ID.  Further, the SPF implementations
       showed better upkeep and current interest than the Sender-ID

   5.  A survey of running MTAs shows fewer than 5% of them advertised
       the SUBMITTER extension, which is a Sender-ID enabler.  Only
       three implementations of it were found.

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   6.  Although they may be marginal, there remain obstacles to
       deployment of protocols that use DNS RRtypes other than the most
       common ones, including firewalls and DNS servers that block or
       discard requests for unknown types.  Further, few if any web-
       based DNS configuration tools offer support for type 99 records.

5.  Conclusions

   It is standard procedure within the IETF to document as standard
   those protocols and practices that have come into sufficient common
   use as to become part of the basic infrastructure.

   In light of the this and the analysis in the previous section, the
   working group recommends to the IESG the following:

   1.  The experiment comprising the series of RFCs defining the
       SUBMITTER SMTP extension, the Sender-ID mechanism, the Purported
       Responsible address algorithm, and SPF, should be considered

   2.  The absence of significant adoption of the type 99 DNS resource
       record, the [SUBMITTER] extension, [SENDER-ID], and [PRA],
       indicates that they are de facto obsolete.

   3.  Continued widespread use of [SPF] indicates it is worthy of
       consideration for the Standards Track.

   Appendix A is offered as a cautionary review of problems that
   affected the process of developing SPF and Sender-ID in terms of
   their use of the DNS.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This memo presents no actions for IANA.  [RFC Editor: Please remove
   this section prior to publication.]

7.  Security Considerations

   This memo contains information for the community, akin to an
   implementation report, and does not introduce any new security
   concerns.  Its implications could, in fact, resolve some.

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8.  Informative References

   [OPENSPF]  "Sender Policy Framework: Project Overview",

   [PRA]      Lyon, J., "Purported Responsible Address in E-Mail
              Messages", RFC 4407, April 2006.

              Lyon, J. and M. Wong, "Sender ID: Authenticating E-Mail",
              RFC 4406, April 2006.

              "Sender ID Framework Industry Support and Solutions",
              October 2007, <http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/safety/

   [SMTP]     Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              October 2008.

   [SPF]      Wong, M. and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
              for Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail, Version 1",
              RFC 4408, April 2006.

              Allman, E. and H. Katz, "SMTP Service Extension for
              Indicating the Responsible Submitter of an E-Mail
              Message", RFC 4405, April 2006.

Appendix A.  Experiences Developing SPF

   SPF was originally developed by a community of interested developers
   outside the IETF, with the intent of bringing it to the IETF for
   standardization after it had become relatively mature and ready for
   the rigors of the RFC publication process.

   At the time of SPF's initial development, the prospect of getting a
   DNS resource record (RR) type allocated for SPF was not seriously
   considered, partly because doing so had high barriers to entry.  As a
   result, at the time it was brought to the IETF for development and
   publication, there was already a substantial and growing installed
   base that had SPF running using TXT RRs.  Eventually the application
   was made for the new RR type as a result of pressure from the DNS
   experts in the community, who insisted upon doing so as the preferred
   path toward using the DNS for storing such things as policy data.

   Later, after type 99 was assigned (long after IESG approval of the

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   document, in fact), a plan was put into place to effect a gradual
   transition to using type 99 instead of using type 16.  This plan
   failed to take effect for four primary reasons:

   1.  there was hesitation to make the transition because existing
       nameservers (and, in fact, DNS-aware firewalls) would drop or
       reject requests for unknown RR types (see Section 2 for evidence
       of this), which means successful rollout of a new RR type is
       contingent upon widespread adoption of updated nameservers and
       resolver functions;

   2.  many DNS provisioning tools (e.g., web interfaces to controlling
       DNS zone data) were, and still are, typically lethargic about
       adding support for new RR types;

   3.  the substantial deployed base was already using type 16, and it
       was working just fine, leading to inertia;

   4.  [SPF] itself included a faulty transition plan, likely because of
       the late addition of a requirement to develop one: It said a
       server SHOULD publish both types and MUST publish at least one,
       while a client can query either or both, which means both can
       claim to be fully compliant while failing utterly to

   It is likely that this will happen again if the bar to creating new
   RR types even for experimental development purposes is not lowered,
   and handling of unknown RR types in software becomes generally more
   graceful.  Also important in this regard is encouragement of support
   for new RR types in DNS record provisioning tools.

   There are DNS experts within the community that will undoubtedly
   point to DNS servers and firewalls that mistreat queries for unknown
   RR types, and claim they are broken, as a way of answering this
   concern.  This is undoubtedly correct, but the reality is that they
   are among us and likely will be for some time, and this needs to be
   considered as new protocols and IETF procedures are developed.

Appendix B.  Acknowledgments

   The following provided operational data that contributed to the
   evidence presented above:

   Cisco:  contributed data about observed Sender-ID and SPF records in
      the DNS for a large number of domains

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   Hotmail:  contributed data about the difference between
      RFC5321.MailFrom and RFC5322.From domains across large mail
      volumes, and a survey of DNS queries observed in response to
      outgoing mail traffic

   John Levine:  conducted a survey of DNS server logs to evaluate SPF-
      related query traffic

   McAfee:  provided details about their SUBMITTER implementation and
      usage statistics

   Santronics:  contributed data about the use of the SUBMITTER
      extension in aggregate SMTP client traffic

   The Trusted Domain Project:  contributed data about the difference
      between Sender-ID and SPF results, conducted one of the two
      detailed TXT/SPF record surveys including collecting timing data,
      and conducted the MTA SUBMITTER survey

   The author would also like to thank the following for their
   contributions to the development of the text in this memo: Dave
   Crocker, Scott Kitterman, Barry Leiba, John Leslie, John Levine,
   Hector Santos, and Alessandro Vesely.

Author's Address

   Murray S. Kucherawy
   128 King St., 2nd Floor
   San Francisco, CA  94107

   Phone: +1 415 946 3800
   Email: msk@cloudmark.com

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