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Versions: (draft-rescorla-stir-fallback) 00 01 02 03 04 05

Network Working Group                                        E. Rescorla
Internet-Draft                                                   Mozilla
Intended status: Informational                               J. Peterson
Expires: January 9, 2020                                         Neustar
                                                            July 8, 2019


              STIR Out-of-Band Architecture and Use Cases
                         draft-ietf-stir-oob-05

Abstract

   The PASSporT format defines a token that can be carried by signaling
   protocols, including SIP, to cryptographically attest the identify of
   callers.  Not all telephone calls use Internet signaling protocols,
   however, and some calls use them for only part of their signaling
   path, or cannot reliably deliver SIP header fields end-to-end.  This
   document describes use cases that require the delivery of PASSporT
   objects outside of the signaling path, and defines architectures and
   semantics to provide this functionality.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Operating Environments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Dataflows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Case 1: VoIP to PSTN Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Case 2: Two Smart PSTN endpoints  . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.3.  Case 3: PSTN to VoIP Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.4.  Case 4: Gateway Out-of-band . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.5.  Case 5: Enterprise Call Center  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Storing and Retrieving PASSporTs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.1.  Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.2.  Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Solution Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.1.  Credentials and Phone Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.2.  Call Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.3.  Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.4.  Substitution Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.5.  Rate Control for CPS Storage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  Authentication and Verification Service Behavior for Out-of-
       Band  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.1.  Authentication Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.2.  Verification Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.3.  Gateway Placement Services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  Example HTTPS Interface to the CPS  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   10. CPS Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   11. Encryption Key Lookup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   15. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26

1.  Introduction

   The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] describes widespread problems
   enabled by impersonation in the telephone network, including illegal
   robocalling, voicemail hacking, and swatting.  As telephone services
   are increasingly migrating onto the Internet, and using Voice over IP
   (VoIP) protocols such as SIP [RFC3261], it is necessary for these
   protocols to support stronger identity mechanisms to prevent



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   impersonation.  For example, [RFC8224] defines a SIP Identity header
   field capable of carrying PASSporT [RFC8225] objects in SIP as a
   means to cryptographically attest that the originator of a telephone
   call is authorized to use the calling party number (or, for native
   SIP cases, SIP URI) associated with the originator of the call.

   Not all telephone calls use SIP today, however, and even those that
   do use SIP do not always carry SIP signaling end-to-end.  Xalls from
   telephone numbers still routinely traverse the Public Switched
   Telephone Network (PSTN) at some point.  Broadly, calls fall into one
   of three categories:

   1.  One or both of the endpoints is actually a PSTN endpoint.

   2.  Both of the endpoints are non-PSTN (SIP, Jingle, ...) but the
       call transits the PSTN at some point.

   3.  Non-PSTN calls which do not transit the PSTN at all (such as
       native SIP end-to-end calls).

   The first two categories represent the majority of telephone calls
   associated with problems like illegal robocalling: many robocalls
   today originate on the Internet but terminate at PSTN endpoints.
   However, the core network elements that operate the PSTN are legacy
   devices that are unlikely to be upgradable at this point to support
   an in-band authentication system.  As such, those devices largely
   cannot be modified to pass signatures originating on the Internet--or
   indeed any inband signaling data--intact.  Even if fields for
   tunneling arbitrary data can be found in traditional PSTN signaling,
   in some cases legacy elements would strip the signatures from those
   fields; in others, they might damage them to the point where they
   cannot be verified.  For those first two categories above, any in-
   band authentication scheme does not seem practical in the current
   environment.

   But while the core network of the PSTN remains fixed, the endpoints
   of the telephone network are becoming increasingly programmable and
   sophisticated.  Landline "plain old telephone service" deployments,
   especially in the developed world, are shrinking, and increasingly
   being replaced by three classes of intelligent devices: smart phones,
   IP PBXs, and terminal adapters.  All three are general purpose
   computers, and typically all three have Internet access as well as
   access to the PSTN; they may be used for residential, mobile, or
   enterprise telephone services.  Additionally, various kinds of
   gateways increasingly front for deployments of legacy PBX and PSTN
   switches.  All of this provides a potential avenue for building an
   authentication system that implements stronger identity while leaving
   PSTN systems intact.



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   This capability also provides an ideal transitional technology while
   in-band STIR adoption is ramping up.  It permits early adopters to
   use the technology even when intervening network elements are not yet
   STIR-aware, and through various kinds of gateways, it may allow
   providers with a significant PSTN investment to still secure their
   calls with STIR.

   This specification therefore builds on the PASSporT [RFC8225]
   mechanism and the work of [RFC8224] to define a way that a PASSporT
   object created in the originating network of a call can reach the
   terminating network even when it cannot be carried end-to-end in-band
   in the call signaling.  This relies on a new service defined in this
   document called a Call Placement Service (CPS) that permits the
   PASSporT object to be stored during call processing and retrieved for
   verification purposes.

   Potential implementors should note that this document merely defines
   the operating environments in which this out-of-band STIR mechanism
   is intended to operate.  It provides use cases, gives a broad
   description of the components and a potential solution architecture.
   To flesh out the storage and retrieval of PASSporTs in the CPS within
   this context, it includes a strawman protocol suitable for that
   purpose.  Deploying this framework would require additional
   specification outside the scope of the current document.

2.  Terminology

   TThe key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Operating Environments

   This section describes the environments in which the proposed out-of-
   band STIR mechanism is intended to operate.  In the simplest setting,
   Alice is calling Bob, and her call is routed through some set of
   gateways and/or the PSTN which do not support end-to-end delivery of
   STIR.  Both Alice and Bob have smart devices which can access the
   Internet (perhaps enterprise devices, or even end user ones), but
   they do not have a clear telephone signaling connection between them:
   Alice cannot inject any data into signaling which Bob can read, with
   the exception of the asserted destination and origination E.164
   numbers.  The calling party number might originate from her own
   device or from the network.  These numbers are effectively the only
   data that can be used for coordination between the endpoints.




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                                 +---------+
                                /           \
                            +---             +---+
       +----------+        /                      \        +----------+
       |          |       |        Gateways        |       |          |
       |   Alice  |<----->|         and/or         |<----->|    Bob   |
       | (caller) |       |          PSTN          |       | (callee) |
       +----------+        \                      /        +----------+
                            +---             +---+
                                \           /
                                 +---------+

   In a more complicated setting, Alice and/or Bob may not have a smart
   or programmable device, but instead just a traditional telephone.
   However, one or both of them are behind a STIR-aware gateway that can
   participate in out-of-band coordination, as shown below:

                                 +---------+
                                /           \
                            +---             +---+
      +----------+  +--+   /                      \   +--+  +----------+
      |          |  |  |  |        Gateways        |  |  |  |          |
      |   Alice  |<-|GW|->|         and/or         |<-|GW|->|    Bob   |
      | (caller) |  |  |  |          PSTN          |  |  |  | (callee) |
      +----------+  +--+   \                      /   +--+  +----------+
                            +---             +---+
                                \           /
                                 +---------+

   In such a case, Alice might have an analog (e.g., PSTN) connection to
   her gateway/ switch which is responsible for her identity.
   Similarly, the gateway would verify Alice's identity, generate the
   right calling party number information and provide that number to Bob
   using ordinary Plain Ol' Telephone Service (POTS) mechanisms.

4.  Dataflows

   Because in these operating environments endpoints cannot pass
   cryptographic information to one another directly through signaling,
   any solution must involve some rendezvous mechanism to allow
   endpoints to communicate.  We call this rendezvous service a "call
   placement service" (CPS), a service where a record of call placement,
   in this case a PASSporT, can be stored for future retrieval.  In
   principle this service could communicate any information, but
   minimally we expect it to include a full-form PASSporT that attests
   the caller, callee, and the time of the call.  The callee can use the
   existence of a PASSporT for a given incoming call as rough validation




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   of the asserted origin of that call.  (See Section 11 for limitations
   of this design.)

   This architecture does not mandate that any particular sort of entity
   operate a CPS, or mandate any means to discover a CPS.  A CPS could
   be run internally within a network, or made publicly available.  One
   or more CPSes could be run by a carrier, as repositories for
   PASSporTs for calls sent to its customers, or a CPS could be built-in
   to an enterprise PBX, or even a smartphone.  To the degree possible,
   it is here specified generically, as an idea that may have
   applicability to a variety of STIR deployments.

   There are roughly two plausible dataflow architectures for the CPS:

   1.  The callee registers with the CPS.  When the caller wishes to
       place a call to the callee, it sends the PASSporT to the CPS,
       which immediately forwards it to the callee, or,

   2.  The caller stores the PASSporT with the CPS at the time of call
       placement.  When the callee receives the call, it contacts the
       CPS and retrieves the PASSporT.

   While the first architecture is roughly isomorphic to current VoIP
   protocols, it shares their drawbacks.  Specifically, the callee must
   maintain a full-time connection to the CPS to serve as a notification
   channel.  This comes with the usual networking costs to the callee
   and is especially problematic for mobile endpoints.  Indeed, if the
   endpoints had the capabilities to implement such an architecture,
   they could surely just use SIP or some other protocol to set up a
   secure session; even if the media were going through the traditional
   PSTN, a "shadow" SIP session could convey the PASSporT.  Thus, we
   focus on the second architecture in which the PSTN incoming call
   serves as the notification channel and the callee can then contact
   the CPS to retrieve the PASSporT.  In specialized environments, for
   example a call center that receives a large volume of incoming calls
   that originated in the PSTN, the notification channel approach might
   be viable.

5.  Use Cases

   The following are the motivating use cases for this mechanism.  Bear
   in mind that just as in [RFC8224] there may be multiple Identity
   headers in a single SIP INVITE, so there may be multiple PASSporTs in
   this out-of-band mechanism associated with a single call.  For
   example, a SIP user agent might create a PASSporT for a call with an
   end user credential, and as the call exits the originating
   administrative domain the network authentication service might create




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   its own PASSporT for the same call.  As such, these use cases may
   overlap in the processing of a single call.

5.1.  Case 1: VoIP to PSTN Call

   A call originates in a SIP environment in a STIR-aware administrative
   domain.  The local authentication service for that administrative
   domain creates a PASSporT which is carried in band in the call per
   [RFC8224].  The call is routed out of the originating administrative
   domain and reaches a gateway to the PSTN.  Eventually, the call will
   terminate on a mobile smartphone that supports this out-of-band
   mechanism.

   In this use case, the originating authentication service can store
   the PASSporT with the appropriate CPS for the target telephone number
   as a fallback in case SIP signaling will not reach end-to-end.  When
   the destination mobile smartphone receives the call over the PSTN, it
   consults the CPS and discovers a PASSporT from the originating
   telephone number waiting for it.  It uses this PASSporT to verify the
   calling party number.

5.2.  Case 2: Two Smart PSTN endpoints

   A call originates with an enterprise PBX that has both Internet
   access and a built-in gateway to the PSTN, which communicates through
   traditional telephone signaling protocols.  The PBX immediately drops
   the call to the PSTN, but before it does, it provisions a PASSporT on
   the CPS associated with the target telephone number.

   After normal PSTN routing, the call lands on a smart mobile handset
   that supports the STIR out-of-band mechanism.  It queries the
   appropriate CPS over the Internet to determine if a call has been
   placed to it by a STIR-aware device.  It finds the PASSporT
   provisioned by the enterprise PBX and uses it to verify the calling
   party number.

5.3.  Case 3: PSTN to VoIP Call

   A call originates with an enterprise PBX that has both Internet
   access and a built-in gateway to the PSTN.  It will immediately drop
   the call to the PSTN, but before it does, it provisions a PASSporT
   with the CPS associated with the target telephone number.  However,
   it turns out that the call will eventually route through the PSTN to
   an Internet gateway, which will translate this into a SIP call and
   deliver it to an administrative domain with a STIR verification
   service.





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   In this case, there are two subcases for how the PASSporT might be
   retrieved.  In subcase 1, the Internet gateway that receives the call
   from the PSTN could query the appropriate CPS to determine if the
   original caller created and provisioned a PASSporT for this call.  If
   so, it can retrieve the PASSporT and, when it creates a SIP INVITE
   for this call, add a corresponding Identity header per [RFC8224].
   When the SIP INVITE reaches the destination administrative domain, it
   will be able to verify the PASSporT normally.  Note that to avoid
   discrepancies with the Date header field value, only full-form
   PASSporT should be used for this purpose.  In subcase 2, the gateway
   does not retrieve the PASSporT itself, but instead the verification
   service at the destination administrative domain does so.  Subcase 1
   would perhaps be valuable for deployments where the destination
   administrative domain supports in-band STIR but not out-of-band STIR.

5.4.  Case 4: Gateway Out-of-band

   A call originates in the SIP world in a STIR-aware administrative
   domain.  The local authentication service for that administrative
   domain creates a PASSporT which is carried in band in the call per
   [RFC8224].  The call is routed out of the originating administrative
   domain and eventually reaches a gateway to the PSTN.

   In this case, the originating authentication service does not support
   the out-of-band mechanism, so instead the gateway to the PSTN
   extracts the PASSporT from the SIP request and provisions it to the
   CPS.  (When the call reaches the gateway to the PSTN, the gateway
   might first check the CPS to see if a PASSporT object had already
   been provisioned for this call, and only provision a PASSporT if none
   is present).

   Ultimately, the call may terminate on the PSTN, or be routed back to
   a SIP environment.  In the former case, perhaps the destination
   endpoint queries the CPS to retrieve the PASSporT provisioned by the
   first gateway.  Or if the call ultimately returns to a SIP
   environment, it might be the gateway from the PSTN back to the
   Internet that retrieves the PASSporT from the CPS and attaches it to
   the new SIP INVITE it creates, or it might be the terminating
   administrative domain's verification service that checks the CPS when
   an INVITE arrives with no Identity header field.  Either way the
   PASSporT can survive the gap in SIP coverage caused by the PSTN leg
   of the call.

5.5.  Case 5: Enterprise Call Center

   A call originates from a mobile user, and a STIR authentication
   service operated by their carrier creates a PASSporT for the call.
   As the carrier forwards the call via SIP, it attaches the PASSporT to



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   the SIP call with an Identity header.  As a fallback in case the call
   will not go end-to-end over SIP, the carrier also stores the PASSporT
   in a CPS.

   The call is then routed over SIP for a time, before it transitions to
   the PSTN and ultimately is handled by a legacy PBX at a high-volume
   call center.  The call center supports the out-of-band service, and
   has a high-volume interface to a CPS to retrieve PASSporTs for
   incoming calls; agents at the call center use a general purpose
   computer to manage inbound calls and can receive STIR notifications
   through it.  When the PASSporT arrives at the CPS, it is sent through
   a subscription/notification interface to a system that can correlate
   incoming calls with valid PASSporTs.  The call center agent sees that
   a valid call from the originating number has arrived.

6.  Storing and Retrieving PASSporTs

   The use cases show a variety of entities accessing the CPS to store
   and retrieve PASSporTs.  The question of how the CPS authorizes the
   storage and retrieval of PASSporT is thus a key design decision in
   the architecture.  The STIR architecture assumes that service
   providers and in some cases end user devices will have credentials
   suitable for attesting authority over telephone numbers per
   [RFC8226].  These credentials provide the most obvious way that a CPS
   can authorize the storage and retrieval of PASSporTs.  However, as
   use cases 3, 4 and 5 in Section 5 show, it may sometimes make sense
   for the entity storing or retrieving PASSporTs to be an intermediary
   rather than a device associated with either the originating or
   terminating side of a call, and those intermediaries often would not
   have access to STIR credentials covering the telephone numbers in
   question.  Requiring authorization based on a credential to store
   PASSporTs is therefore undesirable, though potentially acceptable if
   sufficient steps are taken to mitigate any privacy risk of leaking
   data.

   It is an explicit design goal of this mechanism to minimize the
   potential privacy exposure of using a CPS.  Ideally, the out-of-band
   mechanism should not result in a worse privacy situation than in-band
   [RFC8224] STIR: for in-band, we might say that a SIP entity is
   authorized to receive a PASSporT if it is an intermediate or final
   target of the routing of a SIP request.  As the originator of a call
   cannot necessarily predict the routing path a call will follow, an
   out-of-band mechanism could conceivably even improve on the privacy
   story.

   Broadly, the architecture recommended here thus is one focused on
   permitting any entity to store encrypted PASSporTs at the CPS,
   indexed under the called number.  PASSporTs will be encrypted with an



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   encryption key signed by the public key associated with the called
   number, so these PASSporTs may safely be retrieved by any entity, as
   only holders of the corresponding private key will be able to decrypt
   the PASSporT.  This also prevents the CPS itself from learning the
   contents of PASSporTs, and thus metadata about calls in progress,
   which makes the CPS a less attractive target for pervasive monitoring
   (see [RFC7258]).  As a first step, transport-level security can
   provide confidentiality from eavesdroppers for both the storage and
   retrieval of PASSporTs.  To bolster the privacy story, prevent
   denial-of-service flooding of the CPS, and to complicate traffic
   analysis, a few additional mechanisms are also recommended below.

6.1.  Storage

   There are a few dimensions to authorizing the storage of PASSporTs.
   Encrypting PASSporTs prior to storage entails that a CPS has no way
   to tell if a PASSporT is valid; it simply conveys encrypted blocks
   that it cannot access itself, and can make no authorization decision
   based on the PASSporT contents.  There is certainly no prospect for
   the CPS to verify the PASSporTs itself.

   Note that this architecture requires clients that store PASSporTs to
   have access to an encryption key associated with the intended called
   party to be used to encrypt the PASSporT.  Discovering this key
   requires the existence of a key lookup service (see Section 11);
   depending on how the CPS is architected, however, some kind of key
   store or repository could be implemented adjacent to it, and perhaps
   even incorporated into its operation.  Key discovery is made more
   complicated by the fact that there can potentially be multiple
   entities that have authority over a telephone number: a carrier, a
   reseller, an enterprise, and an end user might all have credentials
   permitting them to attest that they are allowed to originate calls
   from a number, say.  PASSporTs for out-of-band use therefore might
   need to be encrypted with multiple keys in the hopes that one will be
   decipherable by the relying party.

   Again, the most obvious way to authorize storage is to require the
   originator to authenticate themselves to the CPS with their STIR
   credential.  However, since the call is indexed at the CPS under the
   called number, this can weaken the privacy story of the architecture,
   as it reveals to the CPS both the identity of the caller and the
   callee.  Moreover, it does not work for the gateway use cases
   described above; to support those use cases, we must effectively
   allow any entity to store PASSporTs at a CPS.  This does not degrade
   the anti-impersonation security of STIR, because entities who do not
   possess the necessary credentials to sign the PASSporT will not be
   able to create PASSporTs that will be treated as valid by verifiers.
   In this architecture, it does not matter whether the CPS received a



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   PASSporT from the authentication service that created it or from an
   intermediary gateway downstream in the routing path as in case 4
   above.  However, if literally anyone can store PASSporTs in the CPS,
   an attacker could easily flood the CPS with millions of bogus
   PASSporTs indexed under a calling number, and thereby prevent the
   called party from finding a valid PASSporT for an incoming call
   buried in a haystack of fake entries.

   The solution architecture must therefore include some sort of traffic
   control system to prevent flooding.  Preferably, this should not
   require authenticating the source, as this will reveal to the CPS
   both the source and destination of traffic.  A potential solution is
   discussed below in Section 7.5.

6.2.  Retrieval

   For retrieval of PASSporTs, this architecture assumes that clients
   will contact the CPS through some sort of polling or notification
   interface to receive all current PASSporTs for calls destined to a
   particular telephone number, or block of numbers.

   As PASSporTs stored at the CPS are encrypted with a key belonging to
   the intended destination, the CPS can safely allow anyone to download
   PASSporTs for a called number without much fear of compromising
   private information about calls in progress - provided that the CPS
   always returns at least one encrypted blob in response to a request,
   even if there was no call in progress.  Otherwise, entities could
   poll the CPS constantly, or eavesdrop on traffic, to learn whether or
   not calls were in progress.  The CPS MUST generate at least one
   unique and plausible encrypted response to all retrieval requests,
   and these dummy encrypted PASSporTs MUST NOT be repeated for later
   calls.

   Because the entity placing a call may discover multiple keys
   associated with the called party number, multiple valid PASSporTs may
   be stored in the CPS.  A particular called party who retrieves
   PASSporTs from the CPS may have access to only one of those keys.
   Thus, the presence of one or more PASSporTs that the called party
   cannot decrypt - which would be indistinguishable from the "dummy"
   PASSporTS created by the CPS when no calls are in progress - does not
   entail that there is no call in progress.  A retriever likely will
   need to decrypt all PASSporTs retrieved from the CPS, and may find
   only one that is valid.

   Note that in out-of-band call forwarding cases, special behavior is
   required to manage the relationship between PASSporTs using the
   diversion extension [I-D.ietf-stir-passport-divert].  The originating
   authentication service would encrypt the initial PASSporT with the



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   public encryption key of the intended destination, but once a call is
   forwarded, it may go to a destination that does not possess the
   corresponding private key and thus could not decrypt the original
   PASSporT.  This requires the retargeting entity to generated
   encrypted PASSporTs that show a secure chain of diversion: a
   retargeting storer SHOULD use the "div-o" PASSporT type, with its
   "opt" extension, as specified in [I-D.ietf-stir-passport-divert] in
   order to nest the original PASSporT within the encrypted diversion
   PASSporT.

7.  Solution Architecture

   In this section, we discuss a high-level architecture for providing
   the service described in the previous sections.  This discussion is
   deliberately sketchy, focusing on broad concepts and skipping over
   details.  The intent here is merely to provide an overall
   architecture, not an implementable specification.  A more concrete
   example of how this might be specified is given in Section 9.

7.1.  Credentials and Phone Numbers

   We start from the premise of the STIR problem statement [RFC7340]
   that phone numbers can be associated with credentials which can be
   used to attest ownership of numbers.  For purposes of exposition, we
   will assume that ownership is associated with the endpoint (e.g., a
   smartphone) but it might well be associated with a provider or
   gateway acting for the endpoint instead.  It might be the case that
   multiple entities are able to act for a given number, provided that
   they have the appropriate authority.  [RFC8226] describes a
   credential system suitable for this purpose; the question of how an
   entity is determined to have control of a given number is out of
   scope for the current document.

7.2.  Call Flow

   An overview of the basic calling and verification process is shown
   below.  In this diagram, we assume that Alice has the number
   +1.111.555.1111 and Bob has the number +2.222.555.2222.













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   Alice                    Call Placement Service                  Bob
   --------------------------------------------------------------------

   Store PASSporT for 2.222.555.2222 -->

   Call from 1.111.555.1111 ------------------------------------------>


                                    <-------------- Request PASSporT(s)
                                     for 2.222.555.2222

                                    Obtain Encrypted PASSporT -------->
                                       (2.222.555.2222, 1.111.555.1111)

                                              [Ring phone with callerid
                                                      = 1.111.555.1111]

   When Alice wishes to make a call to Bob, she contacts the CPS and
   stores an encrypted PASSporT on the CPS indexed under Bob's number.
   The CPS then awaits retrievals for that number.

   Once Alice has stored the PASSporT, she then places the call to Bob
   as usual.  At this point, Bob's phone would usually ring and display
   Alice's number (+1.111.555.1111), which is informed by the existing
   PSTN mechanisms for relaying a calling party number (i.e., the CIN
   field of the IAM).  Instead, Bob's phone transparently contacts the
   CPS and requests any current PASSporTs for calls to his number.  The
   CPS responds with any such PASSporTs (assuming they exist).  If such
   a PASSporT exists, and the verification service in Bob's phone
   decrypts it using his private key, validates it, then Bob's phone can
   present the calling party number information as valid.  Otherwise,
   the call is unverifiable.  Note that this does not necessarily mean
   that the call is bogus; because we expect incremental deployment,
   many legitimate calls will be unverifiable.

7.3.  Security Analysis

   The primary attack we seek to prevent is an attacker convincing the
   callee that a given call is from some other caller C.  There are two
   scenarios to be concerned with:

   1.  The attacker wishes to impersonate a target when no call from
       that target is in progress.

   2.  The attacker wishes to substitute himself for an existing call
       setup as described in Section 7.4.





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   If an attacker can inject fake PASSporT into the CPS or in the
   communication from the CPS to the callee, he can mount either attack.
   As PASSporTs should be digitally signed by an appropriate authority
   for the number and verified by the callee (see Section 7.1), this
   should not arise in ordinary operations.  For privacy and robustness
   reasons, using TLS [RFC8446] on the originating side when storing the
   PASSporT at the CPS is RECOMMENDED.

   The entire system depends on the security of the credential
   infrastructure.  If the authentication credentials for a given number
   are compromised, then an attacker can impersonate calls from that
   number.  However, that is no different from in-band [RFC8224] STIR.

   A secondary attack we must also prevent is denial-of-service against
   the CPS, which requires some form of rate control solution that will
   not degrade the privacy properties of the architecture.

7.4.  Substitution Attacks

   All that receipt of the PASSporT from the CPS proves to the called
   party is that Alice is trying to call Bob (or at least was as of very
   recently) - it does not prove that any particular incoming call is
   from Alice.  Consider the scenario in which we have a service which
   provides an automatic callback to a user-provided number.  In that
   case, the attacker can try to arrange for a false caller-id value, as
   shown below:

    Attacker            Callback Service           CPS               Bob
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
    Place call to Bob ---------->

                                Store PASSporT for
                                CS:Bob ------------->

    Call from CS (forged caller-id info)  ----------------------------->

                                Call from CS ------------------------> X


                                                   <-- Retrieve PASSporT
                                                              for CS:Bob

                           PASSporT for CS:Bob ------------------------>

                                            [Ring phone with callerid =
                                               111.555.1111]





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   In order to mount this attack, the attacker contacts the Callback
   Service (CS) and provides it with Bob's number.  This causes the CS
   to initiate a call to Bob. As before, the CS contacts the CPS to
   insert an appropriate PASSporT and then initiates a call to Bob.
   Because it is a valid CS injecting the PASSporT, none of the security
   checks mentioned above help.  However, the attacker simultaneously
   initiates a call to Bob using forged caller-id information
   corresponding to the CS.  If he wins the race with the CS, then Bob's
   phone will attempt to verify the attacker's call (and succeed since
   they are indistinguishable) and the CS's call will go to busy/voice
   mail/call waiting.  Note: in a SIP environment, the callee might
   notice that there were multiple INVITEs and thus detect this attack.

7.5.  Rate Control for CPS Storage

   In order to prevent the flooding of a CPS with bogus PASSporTs, we
   propose the use of "blind signatures" (see [RFC5636]).  A sender will
   initially authenticate to the CPS using its STIR credentials, and
   acquire a signed token from the CPS that will be presented later when
   storing a PASSporT.  The flow looks as follows:

       Sender                                 CPS

       Authenticate to CPS --------------------->
       Blinded(K_temp) ------------------------->
       <------------- Sign(K_cps, Blinded(K_temp))
       [Disconnect]


       Sign(K_cps, K_temp)
       Sign(K_temp, E(K_receiver, PASSporT)) --->

   At an initial time when no call is yet in progress, a potential
   client connects to the CPS, authenticates, and sends a blinded
   version of a freshly generated public key.  The CPS returns a signed
   version of that blinded key.  The sender can then unblind the key and
   gets a signature on K_temp from the CPS.

   Then later, when a client wants to store a PASSporT, it connects to
   the CPS anonymously (preferably over a network connection that cannot
   be correlated with the token acquisition) and sends both the signed
   K_temp and its own signature over the encrypted PASSporT.  The CPS
   verifies both signatures and if they verify, stores the encrypted
   passport (discarding the signatures).

   This design lets the CPS rate limit how many PASSporTs a given sender
   can store just by counting how many times K_temp appears; perhaps CPS
   policy might reject storage attempts and require acquisition of a new



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   K_temp after storing more than a certain number of PASSporTs indexed
   under the same destination number in a short interval.  This does not
   of course allow the CPS to tell when bogus data is being provisioned
   by an attacker, simply the rate at which data is being provisioned.
   Potentially, feedback mechanisms could be developed that would allow
   the called parties to tell the CPS when they are receiving unusual or
   bogus PASSporTs.

   This architecture also assumes that the CPS will age out PASSporTs.
   A CPS SHOULD NOT keep any stored PASSporT for no longer than a value
   that might be selected for the verification service policy for
   freshness of the "iat" value as described in [RFC8226].  Any
   reduction in this window makes substitution attacks (see Section 7.4)
   harder to mount, but making the window too small might conceivably
   age PASSporTs out while a heavily redirected call is still alerting.

8.  Authentication and Verification Service Behavior for Out-of-Band

   [RFC8224] defines an authentication service and a verification
   service as functions that act in the context of SIP requests and
   responses.  This specification thus provides a more generic
   description of authentication service and verification service
   behavior that might or might not involve any SIP transactions, but
   depends only on placing a request for communications from an
   originating identity to one or more destination identities.

8.1.  Authentication Service

   Out-of-band authentication services perform steps similar to those
   defined in [RFC8224] with some exceptions:

   Step 1: The authentication service MUST determine whether it is
   authoritative for the identity of the originator of the request, that
   is, the identity it will populate in the "orig" claim of the
   PASSporT.  It can do so only if it possesses the private key of one
   or more credentials that can be used to sign for that identity, be it
   a domain or a telephone number or something other identifier.  For
   example, the authentication service could hold the private key
   associated with a STIR certificate [RFC8225].

   Step 2: The authentication service MUST determine that the originator
   of communications can claim the originating identity.  This is a
   policy decision made by the authentication service that depends on
   its relationship to the originator.  For an out-of-band application
   built-in to the calling device, for example, this is the same check
   performed in Step 1: does the calling device hold a private key, one
   corresponding to a STIR certificate, that can sign for the
   originating identity?



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   Step 3: The authentication service MUST acquire the public encryption
   key of the destination, which will be used to encrypt the PASSporT
   (see Section 11).  It MUST also discover (see Section 10) the CPS
   associated with the destination.  The authentication service may
   already have the encryption key and destination CPS cached, or may
   need to query a service to acquire the key.  Note that per
   Section 7.5 the authentication service may also need to acquire a
   token for PASSporT storage from the CPS upon CPS discovery.  It is
   anticipated that the discovery mechanism (see Section 10) used to
   find the appropriate CPS will also find the proper key server for the
   public key of the destination.  In some cases, a destination may have
   multiple public encryption keys associated with it.  In that case,
   the authentication service MUST collect all of those keys.

   Step 4: The authentication service MUST create the PASSporT object.
   This includes acquiring the system time to populate the "iat" claim,
   and populating the "orig" and "dest" claims as described in
   [RFC8225].  The authentication service MUST then encrypt the
   PASSporT.  If in Step 3 the authentication service discovered
   multiple public keys for the destination, it MUST create one
   encrypted copy for each public key it discovered.

   Finally, the authentication service stores the encrypted PASSporT(s)
   at the CPS discovered in Step 3.  Only after that is completed should
   any call be initiated.  Note that a call might be initiated over SIP,
   and the authentication service would place the same PASSporT in the
   Identity header field value of the SIP request - though SIP would
   carry cleartext version rather than an encrypted version sent to the
   CPS.  In that case, out-of-band would serve as a fallback mechanism
   in case the request was not conveyed over SIP end-to-end.  Also, note
   that the authentication service MAY use a compact form of the
   PASSporT for a SIP request, whereas the version stored at the CPS
   MUST always be a full form PASSporT.

8.2.  Verification Service

   When a call arrives, an out-of-band verification service performs
   steps similar to those defined in [RFC8224] with some exceptions:

   Step 1: The verification service contacts the CPS and requests all
   current PASSporTs for its destination number; or alternatively it may
   receive PASSporTs through a push interface from the CPS in some
   deployments.  The verification service MUST then decrypt all
   PASSporTs using its private key.  Some PASSporTs may not be
   decryptable for any number of reasons: they may be intended for a
   different verification service, or they may be "dummy" values
   inserted by the CPS for privacy purposes.  The next few steps will




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   narrow down the set of PASSporTs that the verification service will
   examine from that initial decryptable set.

   Step 2: The verification service MUST determine if any "ppt"
   extensions in the PASSporTs are unsupported.  It takes only the set
   of supported PASSporTs and applies the next step to them.

   Step 3: The verification service MUST determine if there is an
   overlap between the calling party number number presented in call
   signaling and the "orig" field of any decrypted PASSporTs.  It takes
   the set of matching PASSporTs and applies the next step to them.

   Step 4: The verification service MUST determine if the credentials
   that signed each PASSporT are valid, and if the verification service
   trusts the CA that issued the credentials.  It takes the set of
   trusted PASSporTs to the next step.

   Step 5: The verification service MUST check the freshness of the
   "iat" claim of each PASSporT.  The exact interval of time that
   determines freshness is left to local policy.  It takes the set of
   fresh PASSporTs to the next step.

   Step 6: The verification service MUST check the validity of the
   signature over each PASSporT, as described in [RFC8225].

   Finally, the verification service will end up with one or more valid
   PASSporTs corresponding to the call it has received.  This document
   does not prescribe any particular treatment of calls that have valid
   PASSporTs associated with them.  The handling of the message after
   the verification process depends on how the verification service is
   implemented and on local policy.  However, it is anticipated that
   local policies could involve making different forwarding decisions in
   intermediary implementations, or changing how the user is alerted or
   how identity is rendered in UA implementations.

8.3.  Gateway Placement Services

   The STIR out-of-band mechanism also supports the presence of gateway
   placement services, which do not create PASSporTs themselves, but
   instead take PASSporTs out of signaling protocols and store them at a
   CPS before gatewaying to a protocol that cannot carry PASSporTs
   itself.  For example, a SIP gateway that sends calls to the PSTN
   could receive a call with an Identity header, extract a PASSporT from
   the Identity header, and store that PASSporT at a CPS.

   To place a PASSporT at a CPS, a gateway MUST perform Step 3 of
   Section 8.1 above: that is, it must discover the CPS and public key
   associated with the destination of the call, and may need to acquire



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   a PASSporT storage token (see Section 6.1).  Per Step 3 this may
   entail discovering several keys.  The gateway then collects the in-
   band PASSporT(s) from the in-band signaling, encrypts the
   PASSporT(s), and stores them at the CPS.

   A similar service could be performed by a gateway that retrieves
   PASSporTs from a CPS and inserts them into signaling protocols that
   support carrying PASSporTS in-band.  This behavior may be defined by
   future specifications.

9.  Example HTTPS Interface to the CPS

   As an rough example, we show a Call Placement Service implementation
   here which uses a REST API to store and retrieve objects at the CPS.
   The calling party stores the PASSporT at the CPS prior to initiating
   the call; the PASSporT is stored at a location at the CPS that
   corresponds to the called number.  Note that it is possible for
   multiple parties to be calling a number at the same time, and that
   for called numbers such as large call centers, many PASSporTs could
   legitimately be stored simultaneously, and it might prove difficult
   to correlate these with incoming calls.

   Assume that an authentication service has created the following
   PASSporT for a call to the telephone number 2.222.555.2222 (note that
   these are dummy values):

      eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
      ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9.eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJz
      aXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhdCI6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnI
      jp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0.rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1
      VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYsojNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w

   Through some discovery mechanism (see Section 10), the authentication
   service discovers the network location of a web service that acts as
   the CPS for 2.222.555.2222.  Through the same mechanism, we will say
   that it has also discovered one public encryption key for that
   destination.  It uses that encryption key to encrypt the PASSporT,
   resulting in the encrypted PASSporT:

      rlWuoTpvBvWSHmV1AvVfVaE5pPV6VaOup3Ajo3W0VvjvrQI1VwbvnUE0pUZ6Yl9w
      MKW0YzI4LJ1joTHho3WaY3Oup3Ajo3W0YzAypvW9rlWxMKA0Vwc7VaIlnFV6JlWm
      nKN6LJkcL2INMKuuoKOfMF5wo20vKK0fVzyuqPV6VwR0AQZlZQtmAQHvYPWipzyaV
      wc7VaEhVwbvZGVkAGH1AGRlZGVvsK0ed3cwG1ubEjnxRTwUPaJFjHafuq0-mW6S1
      IBtSJFwUOe8Dwcwyx-pcSLcSLfbwAPcGmB3DsCBypxTnF6uRpx7j

   Having concluded the numbered steps in Section 8.1, including
   acquiring any token (per Section 6.1) needed to store the PASSporT at




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   the CPS, the authentication service then stores the encrypted
   PASSporT:

      POST /cps/2.222.555.2222/ppts HTTP/1.1
      Host: cps.example.com
      Content-Type: application/passport

      rlWuoTpvBvWSHmV1AvVfVaE5pPV6VaOup3Ajo3W0VvjvrQI1VwbvnUE0pUZ6Yl9w
      MKW0YzI4LJ1joTHho3WaY3Oup3Ajo3W0YzAypvW9rlWxMKA0Vwc7VaIlnFV6JlWm
      nKN6LJkcL2INMKuuoKOfMF5wo20vKK0fVzyuqPV6VwR0AQZlZQtmAQHvYPWipzyaV
      wc7VaEhVwbvZGVkAGH1AGRlZGVvsK0ed3cwG1ubEjnxRTwUPaJFjHafuq0-mW6S1
      IBtSJFwUOe8Dwcwyx-pcSLcSLfbwAPcGmB3DsCBypxTnF6uRpx7j

   The web service assigns a new location for this encrypted PASSporT in
   the collection, returning a 201 OK with the location of
   /cps/2.222.222.2222/ppts/ppt1.  Now the authentication service can
   place the call, which may be signaled by various protocols.  Once the
   call arrives at the terminating side, a verification service contacts
   its CPS to ask for the set of incoming calls for its telephone number
   (2.222.222.2222).

      GET /cps/2.222.555.2222/ppts
      Host: cps.example.com

   This returns to the verification service a list of the PASSporTs
   currently in the collection, which currently consists of only
   /cps/2.222.222.2222/ppts/ppt1.  The verification service then sends a
   new GET for /cps/2.222.555.2222/ppts/ppt1/ which yields:

      HTTP/1.1 200 OK
      Content-Type: application/passport
      Link: <https://cps.example.com/cps/2.222.555.2222/ppts>

      rlWuoTpvBvWSHmV1AvVfVaE5pPV6VaOup3Ajo3W0VvjvrQI1VwbvnUE0pUZ6Yl9w
      MKW0YzI4LJ1joTHho3WaY3Oup3Ajo3W0YzAypvW9rlWxMKA0Vwc7VaIlnFV6JlWm
      nKN6LJkcL2INMKuuoKOfMF5wo20vKK0fVzyuqPV6VwR0AQZlZQtmAQHvYPWipzyaV
      wc7VaEhVwbvZGVkAGH1AGRlZGVvsK0ed3cwG1ubEjnxRTwUPaJFjHafuq0-mW6S1
      IBtSJFwUOe8Dwcwyx-pcSLcSLfbwAPcGmB3DsCBypxTnF6uRpx7j

   That concludes Step 1 of Section 8.2; the verification service then
   goes on to the next step, processing that PASSporT through its
   various checks.  A complete protocol description for CPS interactions
   is left to future work.








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10.  CPS Discovery

   In order for the two ends of the out-of-band dataflow to coordinate,
   they must agree on a way to discover a CPS and retrieve PASSporT
   objects from it based solely on the rendezvous information available:
   the calling party number and the called number.  Because the storage
   of PASSporTs in this architecture is indexed by the called party
   number, it makes sense to discover a CPS based on the called party
   number as well.  There are a number of potential service discovery
   mechanisms that could be used for this purpose.  The means of service
   discovery may vary by use case.

   Although the discussion above is written largely in terms of a single
   CPS, having a significant fraction of all telephone calls result in
   storing and retrieving PASSporTs at a single monolithic CPS has
   obvious scaling problems, and would as well allow the CPS to gather
   metadata about a very wide set of callers and callees.  These issues
   can be alleviated by operational models with a federated CPS; any
   service discovery mechanism for out-of-band STIR should enable
   federation of the CPS function.  Likely models include ones where a
   carrier operates one or more CPS instances on behalf of its
   customers, enterprises run a CPS instance on behalf of their PBX
   users, or where third-party service providers offer a CPS as a cloud
   service.

   Some service discovery possibilities under consideration include the
   following:

      If a credential lookup service is already available (see
      Section 11), the CPS location can also be recorded in the callee's
      credentials; an extension to [RFC8226] could for example provide a
      link to the location of the CPS where PASSporTs should be stored
      for a destination.

      There exist a number of common directory systems that might be
      used to translate telephone numbers into the URIs of a CPS.  ENUM
      [RFC6116] is commonly implemented, though no "golden root" central
      ENUM administration exists that could be easily reused today to
      help the endpoints discover a common CPS.  Other protocols
      associated with queries for telephone numbers, such as the TeRI
      [I-D.ietf-modern-teri] protocol, could also serve for this
      application.

      Another possibility is to use a single distributed service for
      this function.  VIPR [I-D.jennings-vipr-overview] proposed a
      RELOAD [RFC6940] usage for telephone numbers to help direct calls
      to enterprises on the Internet.  It would be possible to describe
      a similar RELOAD usage to identify the CPS where calls for a



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      particular telephone number should be stored.  One advantage that
      the STIR architecture has over VIPR is that it assumes a
      credential system that proves authority over telephone numbers;
      those credentials could be used to determine whether or not a CPS
      could legitimately claim to be the proper store for a given
      telephone number.

   This document does not prescribe any single way to do service
   discovery for a CPS; it is envisioned that initial deployments will
   provision the location of the CPS at the AS and VS.

11.  Encryption Key Lookup

   In order to encrypt a PASSporT (see Section 6.1), the caller needs
   access to the callee's public encryption key.  Note that because STIR
   uses ECDSA for signing PASSporTs, the public key used to verify
   PASSporTs is not suitable for this function, and thus the encryption
   key must be discovered separately.  This requires some sort of
   directory/lookup system.

   Some initial STIR deployments have fielded certificate repositories
   so that verification services can acquire the signing credentials for
   PASSporTs, which are linked through a URI in the "x5u" element of the
   PASSporT.  These certificate repositories could clearly be repurposed
   for allowing authentication services to download the public
   encryption key for the called party - provided they can be discovered
   by calling parties.  This document does not specify any particular
   discovery scheme, but instead offers some general guidance about
   potential approaches.

   It is a desirable property that the public encryption key for a given
   party be linked to their STIR credential.  We therefore propose that
   an ECDH [RFC7748] public-private key pair be generated for a subcert
   [I-D.ietf-tls-subcerts] of the STIR credential.  That subcert could
   be looked up along with the STIR credential of the called party.
   Further details of this subcert, and the exact lookup mechanism
   involved, are deferred for future protocol work.

   Obviously, if there is a single central database that the caller and
   callee each access in real time to download the other's keys, then
   this represents a real privacy risk, as the central key database
   learns about each call.  A number of mechanisms are potentially
   available to mitigate this:

      Have endpoints pre-fetch keys for potential counterparties (e.g.,
      their address book or the entire database).





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      Have caching servers in the user's network that proxy their
      fetches and thus conceal the relationship between the user and the
      keys they are fetching.

   Clearly, there is a privacy/timeliness tradeoff in that getting up-
   to-date knowledge about credential validity requires contacting the
   credential directory in real-time (e.g., via OCSP [RFC2560]).  This
   is somewhat mitigated for the caller's credentials in that he can get
   short-term credentials right before placing a call which only reveals
   his calling rate, but not who he is calling.  Alternately, the CPS
   can verify the caller's credentials via OCSP, though of course this
   requires the callee to trust the CPS's verification.  This approach
   does not work as well for the callee's credentials, but the risk
   there is more modest since an attacker would need to both have the
   callee's credentials and regularly poll the database for every
   potential caller.

   We consider the exact best point in the tradeoff space to be an open
   issue.

12.  Acknowledgments

   The ideas in this document come out of discussions with Richard
   Barnes and Cullen Jennings.  We'd also like to thank Russ Housley,
   Chris Wendt, Eric Burger, Mary Barnes, Ben Campbell, Jonathan
   Rosenberg and Robert Sparks for helpful suggestions.

13.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

14.  Security Considerations

   This entire document is about security, but the detailed security
   properties will vary depending on how the framework is applied and
   deployed.  General guidance for dealing with the most obvious
   security challenges posed by this framework is given in Section 7.3
   and Section 7.4, along proposed solutions for problems like denial-
   of-service attacks or traffic analysis against the CPS.

   Although there are considerable security challenges associated with
   widespread deployment of a public CPS, those must be weighed against
   the potential usefulness of a service that delivers a STIR assurance
   without requiring the passage of end-to-end SIP.







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15.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-modern-teri]
              Peterson, J., "An Architecture and Information Model for
              Telephone-Related Information (TeRI)", draft-ietf-modern-
              teri-00 (work in progress), July 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-stir-passport-divert]
              Peterson, J., "PASSporT Extension for Diverted Calls",
              draft-ietf-stir-passport-divert-05 (work in progress),
              February 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-subcerts]
              Barnes, R., Iyengar, S., Sullivan, N., and E. Rescorla,
              "Delegated Credentials for TLS", draft-ietf-tls-
              subcerts-03 (work in progress), February 2019.

   [I-D.jennings-vipr-overview]
              Barnes, M., Jennings, C., Rosenberg, J., and M. Petit-
              Huguenin, "Verification Involving PSTN Reachability:
              Requirements and Architecture Overview", draft-jennings-
              vipr-overview-06 (work in progress), December 2013.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2560]  Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
              Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
              Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2560>.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.

   [RFC5636]  Park, S., Park, H., Won, Y., Lee, J., and S. Kent,
              "Traceable Anonymous Certificate", RFC 5636,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5636, August 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5636>.







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   [RFC6116]  Bradner, S., Conroy, L., and K. Fujiwara, "The E.164 to
              Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI) Dynamic Delegation
              Discovery System (DDDS) Application (ENUM)", RFC 6116,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6116, March 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6116>.

   [RFC6940]  Jennings, C., Lowekamp, B., Ed., Rescorla, E., Baset, S.,
              and H. Schulzrinne, "REsource LOcation And Discovery
              (RELOAD) Base Protocol", RFC 6940, DOI 10.17487/RFC6940,
              January 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6940>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

   [RFC7340]  Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
              Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
              RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.

   [RFC7748]  Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
              for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8224]  Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
              "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224>.

   [RFC8225]  Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
              Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.

   [RFC8226]  Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
              Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.





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Authors' Addresses

   Eric Rescorla
   Mozilla

   Email: ekr@rtfm.com


   Jon Peterson
   Neustar, Inc.
   1800 Sutter St Suite 570
   Concord, CA  94520
   US

   Email: jon.peterson@team.neustar




































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