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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 RFC 7146

Storage Maintenance (storm)                                     D. Black
Internet-Draft                                                       EMC
Updates: 3720, 3723, 3821, 3822, 4018, 4172, 4173, 4174, 5040, P. Koning
Intended status: Standards Track                                    Dell
Expires: December 09, 2013                                 June 07, 2013


           IP Storage: IPsec Requirements Update for IPsec v3
                  draft-ietf-storm-ipsec-ips-update-01

Abstract

   RFC 3723 includes requirements for IPsec usage with IP Storage
   protocols (e.g., iSCSI) based on IPsec v2 (RFC 2401 and related
   RFCs).  This document updates those requirements to IPsec v3 (RFC
   4301 and related RFCs) and updates implementation requirements to
   reflect developments in cryptography since RFC 3723 was published.

   [RFC Editor: The "Updates:" list above has been truncated by xml2rfc.
   The complete list is - Updates: 3720, 3723, 3821, 3822, 4018, 4172,
   4173, 4174, 5040, 5041, 5042, 5043, 5044, 5045, 5046, 5047, 5048 (if
   approved) ]

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 09, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Updated RFCs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  ESP  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Data Origin Authentication and Data Integrity Transforms    4
     2.2.  Confidentiality Transform Requirements  . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  IKEv1 and IKEv2 Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Authentication Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  D-H Group and PRF Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   RFC 3723 [RFC3723] includes requirements for use of IPsec with IP
   Storage protocols (e.g., iSCSI) based on IPsec v2 (RFC 2401 [RFC2401]
   and related RFCs).  This document updates those requirements to
   include IPsec v3 (RFC 4301[RFC4301] and related RFCs) to reflect
   developments since RFC 3723 was published.  IP storage protocols can
   be expected to operate at high data rates (multiple Gigabits/second);
   the requirements in this document are strongly influenced by that
   expectation, and hence may not be appropriate for use of IPsec with
   other protocols that do not operate at high data rates.

   In addition to the IPsec v2 requirements in RFC 3723, IPsec v3, as
   specified in [RFC4301] and related RFCs (e.g., IKEv2 [RFC5996]),
   SHOULD be implemented for use of IPsec with IP storage protocols.
   Retention of the mandatory requirement for IPsec v2 provides
   interoperability with existing implementations, and the strong
   recommendation for IPsec v3 encourages implementers to move forward
   to that newer version of IPsec.







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   Cryptographic developments since the publication of RFC 3723
   necessitate changes to the encryption transform requirements for
   IPsec v2, as explained further in Section 2.2; these updated
   requirements also apply to IPsec v3.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

1.2.  Updated RFCs

   The requirements for IPsec usage with IP storage in RFC 3723 are used
   by a number of protocols.  For that reason, beyond updating RFC 3723,
   this document also updates the IPsec requirements for each protocol
   specification that uses RFC 3723, i.e., the following RFCs in
   addition to RFC 3723:

   o  [RFC3720] "Internet Small Computer Systems Interface (iSCSI)"

   o  [RFC3821] "Fibre Channel Over TCP/IP (FCIP)"

   o  [RFC3822] "Finding Fibre Channel over TCP/IP (FCIP) Entities Using
      Service Location Protocol version 2 (SLPv2)"

   o  [RFC4018] "Finding Internet Small Computer Systems Interface
      (iSCSI) Targets and Name Servers by Using Service Location
      Protocol version 2 (SLPv2)"

   o  [RFC4172] "iFCP - A Protocol for Internet Fibre Channel Storage
      Networking"

   o  [RFC4173] "Bootstrapping Clients using the Internet Small Computer
      System Interface (iSCSI) Protocol"

   o  [RFC4174] "The IPv4 Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
      Option for the Internet Storage Name Service"

   o  [RFC5040] "A Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol Specification"

   o  [RFC5041] "Direct Data Placement over Reliable Transports"

   o  [RFC5042] "Direct Data Placement Protocol (DDP) / Remote Direct
      Memory Access Protocol (RDMAP) Security"

   o  [RFC5043] "Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Direct Data
      Placement (DDP) Adaptation"



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   o  [RFC5044] "Marker PDU Aligned Framing for TCP Specification"

   o  [RFC5045] "Applicability of Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol
      (RDMA) and Direct Data Placement (DDP)"

   o  [RFC5046] "Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI)
      Extensions for Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA)"

   o  [RFC5047] "DA: Datamover Architecture for the Internet Small
      Computer System Interface (iSCSI)"

   o  [RFC5048] "Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI)
      Corrections and Clarifications"

   [RFC3721] and [RFC5387] are not updated by this document, as their
   usage of RFC 3723 does not encompass its IPsec requirements.

   In addition, these updated requirements apply to the new
   specifications for iSCSI ([I-D.ietf-storm-iscsi-cons]) and iSER (
   [I-D.ietf-storm-iser]).

2.  ESP Requirements

   RFC 3723 requires that implementations MUST support IPsec ESPv2
   [RFC2406] in tunnel mode as part of IPsec v2 to provide security for
   both control packets and data packets, and that when ESPv2 is
   utilized, per-packet data origin authentication, integrity and replay
   protection MUST be provided.

   This document modifies RFC 3723 to require that implementations
   SHOULD also support IPsec ESPv3 [RFC4303] in tunnel mode as part of
   IPsec v3 to provide security for both control packets and data
   packets; per-packet data origin authentication, integrity and replay
   protection MUST be provided when ESPv3 is utilized.

   In addition, at the high speeds at which IP storage protocols are
   expected to operate, a single IPsec SA could rapidly cycle through
   the ESP 32-bit sequence number space.  In view of this,
   implementations that are capable of operating at speeds of 1 gigabit/
   second or higher and that implements both IKEv2 [RFC5996] and ESPv3
   [RFC4303] MUST also implement extended (64-bit) sequence numbers for
   ESPv3 and SHOULD use ESPv3 extended sequence numbers for all security
   associations that protect IP storage protocol connections.

2.1.  Data Origin Authentication and Data Integrity Transforms

   RFC 3723 requires that:




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   o  HMAC-SHA1 MUST be implemented [RFC2404], and

   o  AES CBC MAC with XCBC extensions SHOULD be implemented [RFC3566].

   This document clarifies key sizes for the AES CBC MAC with XCBC
   extensions; 128-bit AES keys MUST be supported, and other key sizes
   MAY be supported.  This document also adds a requirement for IPsec
   v3:

   o  Implementations that support IKEv2 [RFC5996] SHOULD also implement
      AES GMAC [RFC4543] with 128-bit AES keys; other AES key sizes MAY
      be supported.

   The rationale for the added requirement is that GMAC is more amenable
   to hardware implementations that may be preferable for the high data
   rates at which IP storage protocols can be expected to operate.

2.2.  Confidentiality Transform Requirements

   RFC 3723 requires that:

   o  3DES in CBC mode [RFC2451], [triple-des-spec] MUST be supported,
      and

   o  AES in Counter mode [RFC3686], SHOULD be supported.

   The 3DES-CBC requirement matched the basic encryption
   interoperability requirement for IPsec v2.  At the time of RFC 3723's
   publication, AES Counter mode was the encryption transform that was
   most amenable to hardware implementation, as hardware implementation
   may be preferable for the high data rates at which IP storage
   protocols can be expected to operate.

   This document changes both of these requirements based on
   cryptographic developments since the publication of RFC 3723.  The
   requirement for 3DES CBC has become problematic due to 3DES's 64 bit
   block size, i.e., the core cipher encrypts or decrypts 64 bits at a
   time.  Security weaknesses in encryption start to appear as the
   amount of data encrypted under a single key approaches the birthday
   bound of 32GB (gigabytes) for a cipher with a 64-bit block size
   [triple-des-birthday].  It is prudent to rekey well before that bound
   is reached, and 32GB or some significant fraction thereof is less
   than the amount of data that an IP Storage protocol may transfer in a
   single session.  This may entail rather frequent rekeying, e.g., to
   obtain an order of magnitude (10x) safety margin by rekeying after
   3GB on a multi-gigabit/sec link.  In contrast, AES has a 128 bit
   block size, which results in an astronomical birthdaya bound (2^69
   bytes).  AES CBC is the primary mandatory-to-implement cryptographic



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   transform for interoperability, and hence is the appropriate
   replacement for 3DES CBC.

   AES Counter mode is no longer the encryption transform that is most
   amenable to hardware implementation.  That characterization now
   applies to AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [RFC4106], which provides
   both encryption and integrity protection in a single cryptographic
   mechanism (in contrast, neither of the RFC 3723 integrity transforms
   are well suited for hardware implementation, as they do not pipeline
   well).  AES GCM is also capable of providing confidentiality
   protection for the IKEv2 key exchange protocol, but not the IKEv1
   protocol [RFC5282], and therefore the new AES GCM "SHOULD"
   requirement is based on presence of support for IKEv2.

   For the reasons described in the preceding paragraphs, the
   confidentiality transform requirements in RFC 3723 are replaced by
   the following:

   o  3DES in CBC mode MAY be implemented,

   o  AES in Counter mode MAY be implemented,

   o  AES in CBC mode MUST be implemented with 128-bit keys; other key
      sizes MAY be supported, and

   o  Implementations that support IKEv2 SHOULD also implement AES GCM
      with 128-bit keys; other key sizes may be supported.

   In addition, NULL encryption [RFC2410] MUST be implemented to enable
   use of SAs that provide data origin authentication and data
   integrity, but not confidentiality.  Other transforms MAY be
   implemented in addition to those listed above.

3.  IKEv1 and IKEv2 Requirements

   Note: to avoid ambiguity, the original IKE protocol [RFC2409] is
   referred to as "IKEv1" in this document.

   This document adds requirements for IKEv2 usage with IP Storage
   protocols and makes the following two changes to the IKEv1
   requirements in RFC 3723:

   o  When DH groups are used, a DH group of at least 2048 bits SHOULD
      be offered as a part of all proposals to create IPsec Security
      Associations.  Use of 1024 bit DH groups with 3DES CBC and HMAC-
      SHA1 is no longer recommended.





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   o  The requirement to use UDP port 500 is removed in order to allow
      NAT traversal [RFC3947].

   There are no other changes to RFC 3723's IKEv1 requirements, but many
   of them are restated in this document in order to provide context for
   the new IKEv2 requirements.

   RFC 3723 requires that IKEv1 [RFC2409] be supported for peer
   authentication, negotiation of security associations, and key
   management, using the IPsec DOI [RFC2407], and further requires that
   manual keying not be used since it does not provide the rekeying
   support necessary for operation at high data rates.  This document
   adds a requirement that IKEv2 [RFC5996] SHOULD be supported for peer
   authentication, negotiation of security associations, and key
   management.  The manual keying prohibition in RFC 3723 is extended to
   IKEv2; manual keying MUST NOT be used with any version of IPsec for
   use with IP storage protocols.

   RFC 3723's requirements for IKEv1 mode implementation and usage are
   unchanged; this document does not extend those requirements to IKEv2
   because IKEv2 does not have modes.

   When IPsec is used, the receipt of an IKEv1 Phase 2 delete message or
   an IKEv2 INFORMATIONAL exchange that deletes the SA SHOULD NOT be
   interpreted as a reason for tearing down the IP storage connection
   (e.g., TCP-based).  If additional traffic is sent, a new SA will be
   created to protect that traffic.

   The method used to determine whether an IP storage protocol
   connection should be established using IPsec is regarded as an issue
   of IPsec policy administration, and thus is not defined in this
   document.  The method used by an implementation that supports both
   IPsec v2 and v3 to determine which versions of IPsec are supported by
   the an IP storage peer is also regarded as an issue of IPsec policy
   administration, and thus is also not defined in this document.  If
   both IPsec v2 and v3 are supported by both endpoints of an IP storage
   connection, use of IPsec v3 is recommended.

3.1.  Authentication Requirements

   The authentication requirements for IKEv1 are unchanged by this
   document, but are restated here for context along with the
   authentication requirements for IKEv2:








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   a.  Peer authentication using a pre-shared cryptographic key MUST be
       supported.  Certificate-based peer authentication using digital
       signatures MAY be supported.  For IKEv1 ([RFC2409]), peer
       authentication using the public key encryption methods outlined
       in sections 5.2 and 5.3 of [RFC2409] SHOULD NOT be used.

   b.  When digital signatures are used for authentication, all IKEv1
       and IKEv2 negotiators SHOULD use Certificate Request Payload(s)
       to specify the certificate authority, and SHOULD check the
       pertinent Certificate Revocation List (CRL) before accepting a
       PKI certificate for use in authentication.

   c.  IKEv1 implementations MUST support Main Mode and SHOULD support
       Aggressive Mode.  Main Mode with pre-shared key authentication
       method SHOULD NOT be used when either the initiator or the target
       uses dynamically assigned IP addresses.  While in many cases pre-
       shared keys offer good security, situations in which dynamically
       assigned addresses are used force the use of a group pre-shared
       key, which creates vulnerability to a man-in-the-middle attack.
       These requirements do not apply to IKEv2 because it has no modes.

   d.  In the IKEv1 Phase 2 Quick Mode, exchanges for creating the Phase
       2 SA, the Identification Payload MUST be present.  This
       requirement does not apply to IKEv2 because it has no modes.

   e.  The following identification type requirements apply to IKEv1.
       ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_IPV6_ADDR (if the protocol stack supports IPv6)
       and ID_FQDN Identification Types MUST be supported; ID_USER_FQDN
       SHOULD be supported.  The IP Subnet, IP Address Range,
       ID_DER_ASN1_DN, and ID_DER_ASN1_GN Identification Types SHOULD
       NOT be used.  The ID_KEY_ID Identification Type MUST NOT be used.

   f.  If IKEv2 is supported, the following identification requirements
       apply.  ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_IPV6_ADDR (if the protocol stack
       supports IPv6) and ID_FQDN Identification Types MUST be
       supported; ID_RFC822_ADDR SHOULD be supported.  The
       ID_DER_ASN1_DN, and ID_DER_ASN1_GN Identification Types SHOULD
       NOT be used.  The ID_KEY_ID Identification Type MUST NOT be used.

   The reasons for the identification requirements in items e and f
   above are:

   o  IP Subnet and IP Address Range are too broad to usefully identify
      an iSCSI endpoint.

   o  The _DN and _GN types are X.500 identities; it is usually better
      to use an identity from subjectAltName in a PKI certificate.




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   o  ID_KEY_ID is an opaque identifier that is not interoperable among
      different IPsec implementations as specified.  Heterogeneity in
      some IP storage implementations can be expected (e.g., iSCSI
      initiator vs. iSCSI target implementations), and hence
      heterogeneity among IPsec implementations for IP storage is
      important.

3.2.  D-H Group and PRF Requirements

   This document does not change the support requirements for Diffe-
   Hellman (D-H) groups and Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs).  See
   [RFC4109] for IKEv1 requirements and [RFC4307] for IKEv2
   requirements.  Implementors are advised to check for subsequent RFCs
   that update either of these RFCs, as such updates may change these
   requirements.

   When DH groups are used, a DH group of at least 2048 bits SHOULD be
   offered as a part of all proposals to create IPsec Security
   Associations for both IKEv1 and IKEv2.

   RFC 3723 requires that that the IKEv1 Quick Mode key exchange that
   provides perfect forward secrecy MUST be implemented.  This document
   extends that requirement to IKEv2; the CREATE_CHILD_SA key exchange
   that provides perfect forward secrecy MUST be implemented for use of
   IPsec with IP Storage protocols.

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document includes no request to IANA.

5.  Security Considerations

   This entire document is about security.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-storm-iscsi-cons]
              Chadalapaka, M., Satran, J., Meth, K., and D. Black,
              "iSCSI Protocol (Consolidated)", draft-ietf-storm-iscsi-
              cons-08 (work in progress), January 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-storm-iser]
              Ko, M. and A. Nezhinsky, "iSCSI Extensions for RDMA
              Specification", draft-ietf-storm-iser-14 (work in
              progress), June 2013.




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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2401]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [RFC2404]  Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within
              ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.

   [RFC2406]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
              Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.

   [RFC2407]  Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of
              Interpretation for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.

   [RFC2409]  Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
              (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [RFC2410]  Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and
              Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, November 1998.

   [RFC2451]  Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher
              Algorithms", RFC 2451, November 1998.

   [RFC3566]  Frankel, S. and H. Herbert, "The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm
              and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 3566, September 2003.

   [RFC3686]  Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
              Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
              (ESP)", RFC 3686, January 2004.

   [RFC3720]  Satran, J., Meth, K., Sapuntzakis, C., Chadalapaka, M.,
              and E. Zeidner, "Internet Small Computer Systems Interface
              (iSCSI)", RFC 3720, April 2004.

   [RFC3723]  Aboba, B., Tseng, J., Walker, J., Rangan, V., and F.
              Travostino, "Securing Block Storage Protocols over IP",
              RFC 3723, April 2004.

   [RFC3821]  Rajagopal, M., Rodriguez, E., and R. Weber, "Fibre Channel
              Over TCP/IP (FCIP)", RFC 3821, July 2004.

   [RFC3822]  Peterson, D., "Finding Fibre Channel over TCP/IP (FCIP)
              Entities Using Service Location Protocol version 2
              (SLPv2)", RFC 3822, July 2004.






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   [RFC3947]  Kivinen, T., Swander, B., Huttunen, A., and V. Volpe,
              "Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE", RFC 3947,
              January 2005.

   [RFC4018]  Bakke, M., Hufferd, J., Voruganti, K., Krueger, M., and T.
              Sperry, "Finding Internet Small Computer Systems Interface
              (iSCSI) Targets and Name Servers by Using Service Location
              Protocol version 2 (SLPv2)", RFC 4018, April 2005.

   [RFC4106]  Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
              (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
              4106, June 2005.

   [RFC4109]  Hoffman, P., "Algorithms for Internet Key Exchange version
              1 (IKEv1)", RFC 4109, May 2005.

   [RFC4172]  Monia, C., Mullendore, R., Travostino, F., Jeong, W., and
              M. Edwards, "iFCP - A Protocol for Internet Fibre Channel
              Storage Networking", RFC 4172, September 2005.

   [RFC4173]  Sarkar, P., Missimer, D., and C. Sapuntzakis,
              "Bootstrapping Clients using the Internet Small Computer
              System Interface (iSCSI) Protocol", RFC 4173, September
              2005.

   [RFC4174]  Monia, C., Tseng, J., and K. Gibbons, "The IPv4 Dynamic
              Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Option for the Internet
              Storage Name Service", RFC 4174, September 2005.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
              4303, December 2005.

   [RFC4307]  Schiller, J., "Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the
              Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 4307,
              December 2005.

   [RFC4543]  McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message
              Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", RFC 4543,
              May 2006.

   [RFC5040]  Recio, R., Metzler, B., Culley, P., Hilland, J., and D.
              Garcia, "A Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol
              Specification", RFC 5040, October 2007.





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   [RFC5041]  Shah, H., Pinkerton, J., Recio, R., and P. Culley, "Direct
              Data Placement over Reliable Transports", RFC 5041,
              October 2007.

   [RFC5042]  Pinkerton, J. and E. Deleganes, "Direct Data Placement
              Protocol (DDP) / Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol
              (RDMAP) Security", RFC 5042, October 2007.

   [RFC5043]  Bestler, C. and R. Stewart, "Stream Control Transmission
              Protocol (SCTP) Direct Data Placement (DDP) Adaptation",
              RFC 5043, October 2007.

   [RFC5044]  Culley, P., Elzur, U., Recio, R., Bailey, S., and J.
              Carrier, "Marker PDU Aligned Framing for TCP
              Specification", RFC 5044, October 2007.

   [RFC5048]  Chadalapaka, M., "Internet Small Computer System Interface
              (iSCSI) Corrections and Clarifications", RFC 5048, October
              2007.

   [RFC5282]  Black, D. and D. McGrew, "Using Authenticated Encryption
              Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key
              Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 5282, August
              2008.

   [RFC5996]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
              "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC
              5996, September 2010.

   [triple-des-birthday]
              McGrew, D., "Impossible plaintext cryptanalysis and
              probable-plaintext collision attacks of 64-bit block
              cipher modes (Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/
              623)", November 2012, <http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/623>.

   [triple-des-spec]
              American Bankers Association, ., "American National
              Standard for Financial Services X9.52-1998 - Triple Data
              Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation", July 1998.

6.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3721]  Bakke, M., Hafner, J., Hufferd, J., Voruganti, K., and M.
              Krueger, "Internet Small Computer Systems Interface
              (iSCSI) Naming and Discovery", RFC 3721, April 2004.






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   [RFC5045]  Bestler, C. and L. Coene, "Applicability of Remote Direct
              Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and Direct Data Placement
              (DDP)", RFC 5045, October 2007.

   [RFC5046]  Ko, M., Chadalapaka, M., Hufferd, J., Elzur, U., Shah, H.,
              and P. Thaler, "Internet Small Computer System Interface
              (iSCSI) Extensions for Remote Direct Memory Access
              (RDMA)", RFC 5046, October 2007.

   [RFC5047]  Chadalapaka, M., Hufferd, J., Satran, J., and H. Shah,
              "DA: Datamover Architecture for the Internet Small
              Computer System Interface (iSCSI)", RFC 5047, October
              2007.

   [RFC5387]  Touch, J., Black, D., and Y. Wang, "Problem and
              Applicability Statement for Better-Than-Nothing Security
              (BTNS)", RFC 5387, November 2008.

Appendix A.  Contributors

   The original authors of RFC 3723 were: Bernard Aboba, Joshua Tseng,
   Jesse Walker, Venkat Rangan and Franco Travostino.  Comments from
   Yaron Sheffer have improved this document and are gratefully
   acknowledged.

Appendix B.  Change Log

   This section should be removed before this document is published as
   an RFC

   Changes from -00 to -01:

   o  Make it clearer that RFC 3723's encryption transform
      implementation requirements are being changed.

   o  State that D-H group and PRF implementation requirements are
      unchanged and provide references to RFCs where they can be found
      (new section 3.2).

   o  Add requirements for perfect forward secrecy implementation (also
      in 3.2).

   o  Use the correct GMAC reference.

   o  Many other editorial changes.

Authors' Addresses




Black & Koning          Expires December 09, 2013              [Page 13]


Internet-Draft                                                 June 2013


   David Black
   EMC
   176 South Street
   Hopkinton, MA  01748
   US

   Phone: +1 508 293-7953
   Email: david.black@emc.com


   Paul Koning
   Dell
   300 Innovative Way
   Nashua, NH  03062
   US

   Phone: +1 603 249-7703
   Email: paul_koning@Dell.com

































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