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Network Working Group                                          A. Bittau
Internet-Draft                                                  D. Boneh
Intended status: Experimental                                  D. Giffin
Expires: January 9, 2017                             Stanford University
                                                              M. Handley
                                               University College London
                                                             D. Mazieres
                                                     Stanford University
                                                                E. Smith
                                                       Kestrel Institute
                                                            July 8, 2016


                 TCP-ENO: Encryption Negotiation Option
                      draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno-03

Abstract

   Despite growing adoption of TLS [RFC5246], a significant fraction of
   TCP traffic on the Internet remains unencrypted.  The persistence of
   unencrypted traffic can be attributed to at least two factors.
   First, some legacy protocols lack a signaling mechanism (such as a
   "STARTTLS" command) by which to convey support for encryption, making
   incremental deployment impossible.  Second, legacy applications
   themselves cannot always be upgraded, requiring a way to implement
   encryption transparently entirely within the transport layer.  The
   TCP Encryption Negotiation Option (TCP-ENO) addresses both of these
   problems through a new TCP option kind providing out-of-band, fully
   backward-compatible negotiation of encryption.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2017.





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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Design goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  TCP-ENO specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  ENO option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  General suboptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  TCP-ENO roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.4.  Specifying suboption data length  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.5.  The negotiated spec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.6.  TCP-ENO handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.7.  Negotiation transcript  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  Requirements for encryption specs . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.1.  Session IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   6.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Design rationale  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.1.  Future developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.2.  Handshake robustness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.3.  Suboption data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.4.  Passive role bit  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.5.  Option kind sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   8.  Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   9.  Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25





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1.  Requirements language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Introduction

   Many applications and protocols running on top of TCP today do not
   encrypt traffic.  This failure to encrypt lowers the bar for certain
   attacks, harming both user privacy and system security.
   Counteracting the problem demands a minimally intrusive, backward-
   compatible mechanism for incrementally deploying encryption.  The TCP
   Encryption Negotiation Option (TCP-ENO) specified in this document
   provides such a mechanism.

   Introducing TCP options, extending operating system interfaces to
   support TCP-level encryption, and extending applications to take
   advantage of TCP-level encryption all require effort.  To the
   greatest extent possible, the effort invested in realizing TCP-level
   encryption today needs to remain applicable in the future should the
   need arise to change encryption strategies.  To this end, it is
   useful to consider two questions separately:

   1.  How to negotiate the use of encryption at the TCP layer, and

   2.  How to perform encryption at the TCP layer.

   This document addresses question 1 with a new TCP option, ENO.  TCP-
   ENO provides a framework in which two endpoints can agree on one
   among multiple possible TCP encryption _specs_.  For future
   compatibility, encryption specs can vary widely in terms of wire
   format, use of TCP option space, and integration with the TCP header
   and segmentation.  However, ENO abstracts these differences to ensure
   the introduction of new encryption specs can be transparent to
   applications taking advantage of TCP-level encryption.

   Question 2 is addressed by one or more companion documents describing
   encryption specs.  While current specs enable TCP-level traffic
   encryption today, TCP-ENO ensures that the effort invested to deploy
   today's specs will additionally benefit future specs.

2.1.  Design goals

   TCP-ENO was designed to achieve the following goals:

   1.  Enable endpoints to negotiate the use of a separately specified
       TCP encryption _spec_.



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   2.  Transparently fall back to unencrypted TCP when not supported by
       both endpoints.

   3.  Provide out-of-band signaling through which applications can
       better take advantage of TCP-level encryption (for instance, by
       improving authentication mechanisms in the presence of TCP-level
       encryption).

   4.  Provide a standard negotiation transcript through which specs can
       defend against tampering with TCP-ENO.

   5.  Make parsimonious use of TCP option space.

   6.  Define roles for the two ends of a TCP connection, so as to name
       each end of a connection for encryption or authentication
       purposes even following a symmetric simultaneous open.

3.  Terminology

   We define the following terms, which are used throughout this
   document:

   SYN segment
      A TCP segment in which the SYN flag is set

   ACK segment
      A TCP segment in which the ACK flag is set (which includes most
      segments other than an initial SYN segment)

   non-SYN segment
      A TCP segment in which the SYN flag is clear

   SYN-only segment
      A TCP segment in which the SYN flag is set but the ACK flag is
      clear

   SYN-ACK segment
      A TCP segment in which the SYN and ACK flags are both set

   Active opener
      A host that initiates a connection by sending a SYN-only segment.
      With the BSD socket API, this occurs when an application calls
      "connect".  In client-server configurations, active openers are
      typically clients.

   Passive opener
      A host that does not send a SYN-only segment, but responds to one
      with a SYN-ACK segment.  With the BSD socket API, passive openers



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      call "listen" and "accept", rather than "connect".  In client-
      server configurations, passive openers are typically servers.

   Simultaneous open
      The act of symmetrically establishing a TCP connection between two
      active openers (both of which call "connect" with BSD sockets).
      Each host of a simultaneous open sends both a SYN-only and a SYN-
      ACK segment.  Simultaneous open is less common than asymmetric
      open, but can be used for NAT traversal by peer-to-peer
      applications [RFC5382].

   Encryption spec
      A separate document specifying an approach to encrypting TCP
      traffic in conjunction with TCP-ENO.

   Spec identifier
      A unique 7-bit value in the range 0x20-0x7f that IANA has assigned
      to an encryption spec.

   Negotiated [encryption] spec
      The single encryption spec governing a TCP connection, as
      determined by the protocol specified in this document.

4.  TCP-ENO specification

   TCP-ENO extends TCP connection establishment to enable encryption
   opportunistically.  It uses a new TCP option kind to negotiate one
   among multiple possible encryption specs--separate documents
   describing how to do actual traffic encryption.  The negotiation
   involves hosts exchanging sets of supported specs, where each spec is
   represented by a _suboption_ within a larger TCP option in the
   offering host's SYN segment.

   If TCP-ENO succeeds, it yields the following information:

   o  A negotiated encryption spec, represented by a unique 7-bit spec
      identifier,

   o  A few extra bytes of suboption data from each host, if needed by
      the spec,

   o  A negotiation transcript with which to mitigate attacks on the
      negotiation itself,

   o  Role assignments designating one endpoint "host A" and the other
      endpoint "host B", and





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   o  A few bits indicating whether or not the application at each end
      knows it is using TCP-ENO.

   If TCP-ENO fails, encryption is disabled and the connection falls
   back to traditional unencrypted TCP.

   The remainder of this section provides the normative description of
   the TCP ENO option and handshake protocol.

4.1.  ENO option

   TCP-ENO employs an option in the TCP header [RFC0793].  There are two
   equivalent kinds of ENO option, shown in Figure 1.  Section 10
   specifies which of the two kinds is permissible and/or preferred.

   byte    0     1     2             N+1   (N+2 bytes total)
        +-----+-----+-----+--....--+-----+
        |Kind=|Len= |                    |
        | TBD | N+2 | contents (N bytes) |
        +-----+-----+-----+--....--+-----+

   byte    0     1     2     3     4             N+3   (N+4 bytes total)
        +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+--....--+-----+
        |Kind=|Len= |   ExID    |                    |
        | 253 | N+4 | 69  | 78  | contents (N bytes) |
        +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+--....--+-----+

             Figure 1: Two equivalent kinds of TCP-ENO option

   The contents of an ENO option can take one of two forms.  A SYN form,
   illustrated in Figure 2, appears only in SYN segments.  A non-SYN
   form, illustrated in Figure 3, appears only in non-SYN segments.  The
   SYN form of ENO acts as a container for one or more suboptions,
   labeled "Opt_0", "Opt_1", ... in Figure 2.  The non-SYN form, by its
   presence, acts as a one-bit acknowledgment, with the actual contents
   ignored by ENO.  Particular encryption specs MAY assign additional
   meaning to the contents of non-SYN ENO options.  When a negotiated
   spec does not assign such meaning, the contents of a non-SYN ENO
   option SHOULD be zero bytes.












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   byte    0     1     2     3                     ... N+1
        +-----+-----+-----+-----+--...--+-----+----...----+
        |Kind=|Len= |Opt_0|Opt_1|       |Opt_i|   Opt_i   |
        | TBD | N+2 |     |     |       |     |   data    |
        +-----+-----+-----+-----+--...--+-----+----...----+

   byte    0     1     2     3     4     5                     ... N+3
        +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+--...--+-----+----...----+
        |Kind=|Len= |   ExID    |Opt_0|Opt_1|       |Opt_i|   Opt_i   |
        | 253 | N+4 | 69  | 78  |     |     |       |     |   data    |
        +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+--...--+-----+----...----+

                         Figure 2: SYN form of ENO

                byte   0     1     2     N+1
                    +-----+-----+-----...----+
                    |Kind=|Len= |  ignored   |
                    | TBD | N+2 | by TCP-ENO |
                    +-----+-----+-----...----+

                byte   0     1     2     3     4     N+3
                    +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----...----+
                    |Kind=|Len= |   ExID    |  ignored   |
                    | 253 | N+4 | 69  | 78  | by TCP-ENO |
                    +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----...----+

              Figure 3: Non-SYN form of ENO, where N MAY be 0

   Every suboption starts with a byte of the form illustrated in
   Figure 4.  The high bit "v", when set, introduces suboptions with
   variable-length data.  When "v = 0", the byte itself constitutes the
   entirety of the suboption.  The 7-bit value "cs" expresses one of:

   o  Global configuration data (discussed in Section 4.2),

   o  Suboption data length for the next suboption (discussed in
      Section 4.4), or

   o  An offer to use a particular encryption spec detailed in a
      separate document.











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    bit   7   6   5   4   3   2   1   0
        +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
        | v |            cs             |
        +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

        v  - non-zero for use with variable-length suboption data
        cs - global configuration option or encryption spec identifier

                Figure 4: Format of initial suboption byte

   Table 1 summarizes the meaning of initial suboption bytes.  Values of
   "cs" greater than or equal to 0x20 are spec identifiers, while those
   below 0x20 are shared between general suboptions and length bytes.
   When "v = 0", the initial suboption byte constitutes the entirety of
   the suboption and all information is expressed by the 7-bit value
   "cs", which can be a spec identifier or general suboption.  When "v =
   1", it indicates a suboption with one or more bytes of suboption
   data.  Only spec identifiers may have suboption data, not general
   suboptions.  Hence, bytes with "v = 1" and "cs < 0x20" are not
   general suboptions but rather length fields governing the length of
   the next suboption.  In the absence of a length field, a spec
   identifier suboption with "v = 1" has suboption data extending to the
   end of the TCP option.

      +-----------+---+--------------------------------------------+
      | cs        | v | Meaning                                    |
      +-----------+---+--------------------------------------------+
      | 0x00-0x1f | 0 | General suboption (Section 4.2)            |
      | 0x00-0x1f | 1 | Length field (Section 4.4)                 |
      | 0x20-0x7f | 0 | Encryption spec without suboption data     |
      | 0x20-0x7f | 1 | Encryption spec followed by suboption data |
      +-----------+---+--------------------------------------------+

                  Table 1: Initial suboption byte values

   A SYN segment MUST contain at most one ENO TCP option.  If a SYN
   segment contains more than one ENO option, the receiver MUST behave
   as though the segment contained no ENO options and disable
   encryption.  An encryption spec MAY define the use of multiple ENO
   options in a non-SYN segment.  For non-SYN segments, ENO itself only
   distinguishes between the presence or absence of ENO options;
   multiple ENO options are interpreted the same as one.

4.2.  General suboptions

   Suboptions 0x00-0x1f are used for general conditions that apply
   regardless of the negotiated encryption spec.  A TCP SYN segment MUST
   include at most one ENO suboption in this range.  A receiver MUST



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   ignore all but the first suboption in this range so as to anticipate
   future revisions of ENO that assign new meaning to bits in subsequent
   general suboptions.  The value of a general suboption byte is
   interpreted as a bitmask, illustrated in Figure 5.

               bit   7   6   5   4   3   2   1   0
                   +---+---+---+-------+---+---+---+
                   | 0 | 0 | 0 |  zz   | m | a | b |
                   +---+---+---+-------+---+---+---+

                   b   - Passive role bit
                   a   - Application-aware bit
                   m   - Middleware signaling bit
                   zz  - Zero bits (reserved for future use)

                Figure 5: Format of the general option byte

   The fields of the bitmask are interpreted as follows:

   b
      The passive role bit MUST be 1 for all passive openers.  For
      active openers, it MUST default to 0, but implementations SHOULD
      provide an API through which an application can set "b = 1" before
      calling "connect".  (Manual configuration of "b" is necessary for
      simultaneous open.)

   a
      The application-aware bit "a" is an out-of-band signal indicating
      that the application on the sending host is aware of TCP-ENO and
      has been extended to alter its behavior in the presence of
      encrypted TCP.  Implementations MUST set this bit to 0 by default,
      and SHOULD provide an API through which applications can change
      the value of the bit as well as examine the value of the bit sent
      by the remote host.  Implementations SHOULD furthermore support a
      _mandatory_ application-aware mode in which TCP-ENO is
      automatically disabled if the remote host does not set "a = 1".

   m
      The middleware bit "m" functions similarly to the application-
      aware bit "a", but is available to middleware shared by multiple
      applications, some of which might have an independent use for the
      "a" bit.  When set, the bit indicates a desire to engage in some
      endpoint authentication protocol before turning the connection
      over to the application.  Implementations MUST set this bit to 0
      by default and SHOULD provide an API through which software can
      change the value.  Unlike the application-aware bit "a", no
      mandatory mode is needed for the middleware bit.  Middleware using
      the "m" bit SHOULD employ length fields and unique identifiers to



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      allow the "m" bit to be multiplexed across authentication schemes,
      but the mechanism for doing so is outside the scope of this
      document.

   zz
      The "zz" bits are reserved for future revisions of TCP-ENO.  They
      MUST be set to zero in sent segments and MUST be ignored in
      received segments.

   A SYN segment without an explicit general suboption has an implicit
   general suboption of 0x00.  Because passive openers MUST always set
   "b = 1", they cannot rely on this implicit 0x00 byte and MUST include
   an explicit general suboption in the ENO options of their SYN-ACK
   segments.

4.3.  TCP-ENO roles

   TCP-ENO uses abstract roles to distinguish the two ends of a TCP
   connection.  These roles are determined by the "b" bit in the general
   suboption.  The host that sent an implicit or explicit suboption with
   "b = 0" plays the "A" role.  The host that sent "b = 1" plays the "B"
   role.

   If both sides of a connection set "b = 1" (which can happen if the
   active opener misconfigures "b" before calling "connect"), or both
   sides set "b = 0" (which can happen with simultaneous open), then
   TCP-ENO MUST be disabled and the connection MUST fall back to
   unencrypted TCP.

   Encryption specs SHOULD refer to TCP-ENO's A and B roles to specify
   asymmetric behavior by the two hosts.  For the remainder of this
   document, we will use the terms "host A" and "host B" to designate
   the hosts with A and B roles, respectively, in a connection.

4.4.  Specifying suboption data length

   An encryption spec MAY optionally specify the use of one or more
   bytes of suboption data.  The presence of such data is indicated by
   setting "v = 1" in the initial suboption byte (see Figure 4).  By
   default, suboption data extends to the end of the TCP option.  Hence,
   if only one suboption requires data, the most compact way to encode
   it is to place it last in the ENO option, after all one-byte
   suboptions.  As an example, in Figure 2, the last suboption, "Opt_i",
   has suboption data and thus requires "v = 1"; however, the suboption
   data length can be inferred from the total length of the TCP option.

   When a suboption with data is not last in an ENO option, the sender
   MUST explicitly specify the suboption data length for the receiver to



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   know where the next suboption starts.  The sender does so by
   preceding the suboption with a length field.  There are two kinds of
   length field: length bytes specifying up to 32 bytes of suboption
   data, and length words specifying up to 256 bytes.

   Figure 6 shows the format of a length byte.  It encodes a 5-bit value
   "nnnnn".  Adding one to "nnnnn" yields the length of the suboption
   data not including the length byte and initial spec identifier byte.
   Hence, a length byte can designate a suboption carrying anywhere from
   1 to 32 bytes of suboption data (inclusive).

               bit   7   6   5   4   3   2   1   0
                   +---+---+---+-------------------+
                   | 1   0   0         nnnnn       |
                   +---+---+---+-------------------+

                   nnnnn - 5-bit value encoding (length - 1)

                     Figure 6: Format of a length byte

   A suboption preceded by a length byte or word MUST be a spec
   identifier ("cs >= 0x20") and MUST have "v = 1".  Figure 7 shows an
   example of such a suboption.

       byte    0      1       2      nnnnn+2  (nnnnn+3 bytes total)
            +------+------+-------...-------+
            |length| spec | suboption data  |
            | byte |ident.| (nnnnn+1 bytes) |
            +------+------+-------...-------+

            length byte     - specifies nnnnn
            spec identifier - MUST have v = 1 and cs >= 0x20
            suboption data  - length specified by nnnnn+1

                   Figure 7: Suboption with length byte

   If an octet of the form shown in Figure 6 (with the high three bits
   100) is followed by an octet in which the high bit is clear (meaning
   "v = 0"), then the two octets together form a length word, as shown
   in Figure 8.  The length word encodes an 8-bit value corresponding to
   one less than the suboption data length.  As with length bytes, the
   octet following a length word MUST be a spec identifier suboption and
   MUST have "v = 1".








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   bit   15  14  13  12  11  10  9   8   7   6   5   4   3   2   1   0
       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
       | 1   0   0       zzzz      | m | 0 |            nnnnnnn        |
       +---+---+---+-------------------+---+---------------------------+

       nnnnnnn - 7 least significant bits of 8-bit value (length - 1)
       m       - Most significant bit of 8-bit value (length - 1)
       zzzz    - Bits that MUST be zero (reserved for future use)

                     Figure 8: Format of a length word

   The "zzzz" bits in a length word MUST be set to 0 by a sender.

   A receiver MUST ignore an ENO option in a SYN segment and MUST
   disable encryption if any of the following holds of the ENO option:

   1.  A length field indicates that a suboption would extend beyond the
       end of the ENO TCP option,

   2.  The "zzzz" bits in a length word are not 0,

   3.  A length byte is immediately followed by an octet in the range
       0x80-0x9f (indicating another length field with no intervening
       spec identifier suboption), or

   4.  A length word is immediately followed by an octet in the range
       0x00-0x9f.

4.5.  The negotiated spec

   A spec identifier "cs" is _valid_ for a connection when:

   1.  Each side has sent a suboption for "cs" in its SYN-form ENO
       option,

   2.  Any suboption data in these "cs" suboptions is valid according to
       the spec and satisfies any runtime constraints, and

   3.  If one host sends multiple suboptions with "cs", then such
       repetition is well-defined by the encryption spec.

   The _negotiated encryption spec_ is the last valid spec identifier in
   host B's SYN-form ENO option.  This definition means host B specifies
   suboptions in order of increasing priority, while host A does not
   influence spec priority.

   A passive opener (which is always host B) sees the remote host's SYN
   segment before constructing its own SYN-ACK.  Hence, a passive opener



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   SHOULD include only one spec identifier in SYN-ACK segments and
   SHOULD ensure this spec identifier is valid.  However, simultaneous
   open or implementation considerations can prevent host B from
   offering only one encryption spec.

4.6.  TCP-ENO handshake

   A host employing TCP-ENO for a connection MUST include an ENO option
   in every TCP segment sent until either encryption is disabled or the
   host receives a non-SYN segment.

   A host MUST disable encryption, refrain from sending any further ENO
   options, and fall back to unencrypted TCP if any of the following
   occurs:

   1.  Any segment it receives up to and including the first received
       ACK segment does not contain a ENO option (or contains an ill-
       formed SYN-form ENO option),

   2.  The SYN segment it receives does not contain a valid spec
       identifier, or

   3.  It receives a SYN segment with an incompatible general suboption.
       (Specifically, incompatible means the two hosts set the same "b"
       value or the connection is in mandatory application-aware mode
       and the remote host set "a = 0".)

   Hosts MUST NOT alter SYN-form ENO options in retransmitted segments,
   or between the SYN and SYN-ACK segments of a simultaneous open, with
   two exceptions for an active opener.  First, an active opener MAY
   unilaterally disable ENO (and thus remove the ENO option) between
   retransmissions of a SYN-only segment.  (Such removal could be useful
   if middleboxes are dropping segments with the ENO option.)  Second,
   an active opener performing simultaneous open MAY include no TCP-ENO
   option in its SYN-ACK if the received SYN caused it to disable
   encryption according to the above rules (for instance because role
   negotiation failed).

   Once a host has both sent and received an ACK segment containing an
   ENO option, encryption MUST be enabled.  Once encryption is enabled,
   hosts MUST follow the encryption protocol of the negotiated spec and
   MUST NOT present raw TCP payload data to the application.  In
   particular, data segments MUST NOT contain plaintext application
   data, but rather ciphertext, key negotiation parameters, or other
   messages as determined by the negotiated spec.






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4.7.  Negotiation transcript

   To defend against attacks on encryption negotiation itself,
   encryption specs need a way to reference a transcript of TCP-ENO's
   negotiation.  In particular, an encryption spec MUST with high
   probability fail to reach key agreement between two honest endpoints
   if the spec's selection resulted from tampering with the contents of
   SYN-form ENO options.  (Of course, in the absence of endpoint
   authentication, two honest endpoints can still each end up talking to
   a man-in-the-middle attacker rather than to each other.)

   TCP-ENO defines its negotiation transcript as a packed data structure
   consisting of two TCP-ENO options exactly as they appeared in the TCP
   header (including the TCP option kind, TCP option length byte, and,
   for option kind 253, the bytes 69 and 78 as illustrated in Figure 1).
   The transcript is constructed from the following, in order:

   1.  The TCP-ENO option in host A's SYN segment, including the kind
       and length bytes.

   2.  The TCP-ENO option in host B's SYN segment, including the kind
       and length bytes.

   Note that because the ENO options in the transcript contain length
   bytes as specified by TCP, the transcript unambiguously delimits A's
   and B's ENO options.

5.  Requirements for encryption specs

   TCP-ENO affords spec authors a large amount of design flexibility.
   However, to abstract spec differences away from applications requires
   fitting them all into a coherent framework.  As such, any encryption
   spec claiming an ENO spec identifier MUST satisfy the following
   normative list of properties.

   o  Specs MUST protect TCP data streams with authenticated encryption.

   o  Specs MUST define a session ID whose value identifies the TCP
      connection and, with overwhelming probability, is unique over all
      time if either host correctly obeys the spec.  Section 5.1
      describes the requirements of the session ID in more detail.

   o  Specs MUST NOT permit the negotiation of any encryption algorithms
      with significantly less than 128-bit security.

   o  Specs MUST NOT allow the negotiation of null cipher suites, even
      for debugging purposes.  (Implementations MAY support debugging
      modes that allow applications to extract their own session keys.)



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   o  Specs MUST NOT depend on long-lived secrets for data
      confidentiality, as implementations SHOULD provide forward secrecy
      some bounded, short time after the close of a TCP connection.

   o  Specs MUST protect and authenticate the end-of-file marker
      traditionally conveyed by TCP's FIN flag when the remote
      application calls "close" or "shutdown".  However, end-of-file MAY
      be conveyed though a mechanism other than TCP FIN.  Moreover,
      specs MAY permit attacks that cause TCP connections to abort, but
      such an abort MUST raise an error that is distinct from an end-of-
      file condition.

   o  Specs MAY disallow the use of TCP urgent data by applications, but
      MUST NOT allow attackers to manipulate the URG flag and urgent
      pointer in ways that are visible to applications.

5.1.  Session IDs

   Each spec MUST define a session ID that uniquely identifies each
   encrypted TCP connection and that is computable by both endpoints of
   the connection.  Implementations SHOULD expose the session ID to
   applications via an API extension.  Applications that are aware of
   TCP-ENO SHOULD authenticate the TCP endpoints by incorporating the
   values of the session ID and TCP-ENO role (A or B) into higher-layer
   authentication mechanisms.

   In order to avoid replay attacks and prevent authenticated session
   IDs from being used out of context, session IDs MUST be unique over
   all time with high probability.  This uniqueness property MUST hold
   even if one end of a connection maliciously manipulates the protocol
   in an effort to create duplicate session IDs.  In other words, it
   MUST be infeasible for a host, even by deviating from the encryption
   spec, to establish two TCP connections with the same session ID to
   remote hosts obeying the spec.

   To prevent session IDs from being confused across specs, all session
   IDs begin with the negotiated spec identifier--that is, the last
   valid spec identifier in host B's SYN segment.  If the "v" bit was 1
   in host B's SYN segment, then it is also 1 in the session ID.
   However, only the first byte is included, not the suboption data.
   Figure 9 shows the resulting format.  This format is designed for
   spec authors to compute unique identifiers; it is not intended for
   application authors to pick apart session IDs.  Applications SHOULD
   treat session IDs as monolithic opaque values and SHOULD NOT discard
   the first byte to shorten identifiers.






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                 byte    0     1     2        N-1    N
                      +-----+------------...------------+
                      | sub-| collision-resistant hash  |
                      | opt | of connection information |
                      +-----+------------...------------+

                     Figure 9: Format of a session ID

   Though specs retain considerable flexibility in their definitions of
   the session ID, all session IDs MUST meet the following normative
   list of requirements:

   o  The session ID MUST be at least 33 bytes (including the one-byte
      suboption), though specs may choose longer session IDs.

   o  The session ID MUST depend in a collision-resistant way on all of
      the following (meaning it is computationally infeasible to produce
      collisions of the session ID derivation function unless all of the
      following quantities are identical):

      *  Fresh data contributed by both sides of the connection,

      *  Any public keys, public Diffie-Hellman parameters, or other
         public asymmetric cryptographic parameters that are employed by
         the encryption spec and have corresponding private data that is
         known by only one side of the connection, and

      *  The negotiation transcript specified in Section 4.7.

   o  Unless and until applications disclose information about the
      session ID, all but the first byte MUST be computationally
      indistinguishable from random bytes to a network eavesdropper.

   o  Applications MAY chose to make session IDs public.  Therefore,
      specs MUST NOT place any confidential data in the session ID (such
      as data permitting the derivation of session keys).

6.  Examples

   This subsection illustrates the TCP-ENO handshake with a few non-
   normative examples.

          (1) A -> B:  SYN      ENO<X,Y>
          (2) B -> A:  SYN-ACK  ENO<b=1,Y>
          (3) A -> B:  ACK      ENO<>
          [rest of connection encrypted according to spec for Y]

    Figure 10: Three-way handshake with successful TCP-ENO negotiation



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   Figure 10 shows a three-way handshake with a successful TCP-ENO
   negotiation.  The two sides agree to follow the encryption spec
   identified by suboption Y.

                (1) A -> B:  SYN      ENO<X,Y>
                (2) B -> A:  SYN-ACK
                (3) A -> B:  ACK
                [rest of connection unencrypted legacy TCP]

      Figure 11: Three-way handshake with failed TCP-ENO negotiation

   Figure 11 shows a failed TCP-ENO negotiation.  The active opener (A)
   indicates support for specs corresponding to suboptions X and Y.
   Unfortunately, at this point one of several things occurs:

   1.  The passive opener (B) does not support TCP-ENO,

   2.  B supports TCP-ENO, but supports neither of specs X and Y, and so
       does not reply with an ENO option,

   3.  B supports TCP-ENO, but has the connection configured in
       mandatory application-aware mode and thus disables ENO because
       A's SYN segment does not set the application-aware bit, or

   4.  The network stripped the ENO option out of A's SYN segment, so B
       did not receive it.

   Whichever of the above applies, the connection transparently falls
   back to unencrypted TCP.

       (1) A -> B:  SYN      ENO<X,Y>
       (2) B -> A:  SYN-ACK  ENO<b=1,X> [ENO stripped by middlebox]
       (3) A -> B:  ACK
       [rest of connection unencrypted legacy TCP]

    Figure 12: Failed TCP-ENO negotiation because of network filtering

   Figure 12 Shows another handshake with a failed encryption
   negotiation.  In this case, the passive opener B receives an ENO
   option from A and replies.  However, the reverse network path from B
   to A strips ENO options.  Hence, A does not receive an ENO option
   from B, disables ENO, and does not include a non-SYN form ENO option
   when ACKing the other host's SYN segment.  The lack of ENO in A's ACK
   segment signals to B that the connection will not be encrypted.  At
   this point, the two hosts proceed with an unencrypted TCP connection.






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          (1) A -> B:  SYN      ENO<Y,X>
          (2) B -> A:  SYN      ENO<b=1,X,Y,Z>
          (3) A -> B:  SYN-ACK  ENO<Y,X>
          (4) B -> A:  SYN-ACK  ENO<b=1,X,Y,Z>
          [rest of connection encrypted according to spec for Y]

     Figure 13: Simultaneous open with successful TCP-ENO negotiation

   Figure 13 shows a successful TCP-ENO negotiation with simultaneous
   open.  Here the first four segments MUST contain a SYN-form ENO
   option, as each side sends both a SYN-only and a SYN-ACK segment.
   The ENO option in each host's SYN-ACK is identical to the ENO option
   in its SYN-only segment, as otherwise connection establishment could
   not recover from the loss of a SYN segment.  The last valid spec in
   host B's ENO option is Y, so Y is the negotiated spec.

7.  Design rationale

   This section describes some of the design rationale behind TCP-ENO.

7.1.  Future developments

   TCP-ENO is designed to capitalize on future developments that could
   alter trade-offs and change the best approach to TCP-level encryption
   (beyond introducing new cipher suites).  By way of example, we
   discuss a few such possible developments.

   Various proposals exist to increase option space in TCP [I-D.ietf-tcp
   m-tcp-edo][I-D.briscoe-tcpm-inspace-mode-tcpbis][I-D.touch-tcpm-tcp-s
   yn-ext-opt].  If SYN segments gain large options, it becomes possible
   to fit public keys or Diffie-Hellman parameters into SYN segments.
   Future encryption specs can take advantage of this by performing key
   agreement directly within suboption data, both simplifying protocols
   and reducing the number of round trips required for connection setup.

   New revisions to socket interfaces [RFC3493] could involve library
   calls that simultaneously have access to hostname information and an
   underlying TCP connection.  Such an API enables the possibility of
   authenticating servers transparently to the application, particularly
   in conjunction with technologies such as DANE [RFC6394].  The
   middleware bit "m" allows such authentication to be slipped
   underneath legacy applications--if both sides set the "m" bit, then
   before turning the socket over to the application, the two endpoints
   engage in a server authentication protocol.  Over time, the
   consequences of failed or missing authentication can gradually be
   increased from issuing log messages to aborting the connection if
   some as yet unspecified DNS record indicates authentication is
   mandatory.  Through shared library updates, such authentication can



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   potentially be added transparently to legacy applications without
   recompilation.

   TLS can currently only be added to legacy applications whose
   protocols accommodate a STARTTLS command or equivalent.  TCP-ENO,
   because it provides out-of-band signaling, opens the possibility of
   future TLS revisions being generically applicable to any TCP
   application.

7.2.  Handshake robustness

   Incremental deployment of TCP-ENO depends critically on failure cases
   devolving to unencrypted TCP rather than causing the entire TCP
   connection to fail.

   Because a network path may drop ENO options in one direction only, a
   host must know not just that the peer supports encryption, but that
   the peer has received an ENO option.  To this end, ENO disables
   encryption unless it receives an ACK segment bearing an ENO option.
   To stay robust in the face of dropped segments, hosts must continue
   to include non-SYN form ENO options in segments until such point as
   they have received a non-SYN segment from the other side.

   One particularly pernicious middlebox behavior found in the wild is
   load balancers that echo unknown TCP options found in SYN segments
   back to an active opener.  The passive role bit "b" in general
   suboptions ensures encryption will always be disabled under such
   circumstances, as sending back a verbatim copy of an active opener's
   SYN-form ENO option always causes role negotiation to fail.

7.3.  Suboption data

   Encryption specs can employ suboption data for session caching,
   cipher suite negotiation, or other purposes.  However, TCP currently
   limits total option space consumed by all options to only 40 bytes,
   making it impractical to have many suboptions with data.  For this
   reason, ENO optimizes the case of a single suboption with data by
   inferring the length of the last suboption from the TCP option
   length.  Doing so saves one byte.

7.4.  Passive role bit

   TCP-ENO, associated encryption specs, and applications all have
   asymmetries that require an unambiguous way to identify one of the
   two connection endpoints.  As an example, Section 4.7 specifies that
   host A's ENO option comes before host B's in the negotiation
   transcript.  As another example, an application might need to
   authenticate one end of a TCP connection with a digital signature.



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   To ensure the signed message cannot not be interpreted out of context
   to authenticate the other end, the signed message would need to
   include both the session ID and the local role, A or B.

   A normal TCP three-way handshake involves one active and one passive
   opener.  This asymmetry is captured by the default configuration of
   the "b" bit in the general suboption.  With simultaneous open, both
   hosts are active openers, so TCP-ENO requires that one host manually
   configure "b = 1".  An alternate design might automatically break the
   symmetry to avoid this need for manual configuration.  However, all
   such designs we considered either lacked robustness or consumed
   precious bytes of SYN option space even in the absence of
   simultaneous open.  (One complicating factor is that TCP does not
   know it is participating in a simultaneous open until after it has
   sent a SYN segment.  Moreover, with packet loss, one host might never
   learn it has participated in a simultaneous open.)

7.5.  Option kind sharing

   This draft does not specify the use of ENO options beyond the first
   few segments of a connection.  Moreover, it does not specify the
   content of ENO options in non-SYN segments, only their presence.  As
   a result, any use of option kind TBD (or option kind 253 with ExID
   0x454E) after the SYN exchange does not conflict with this document.
   Because in addition ENO guarantees at most one negotiated spec per
   connection, encryption specs will not conflict with one another or
   ENO if they use ENO's option kind for out-of-band signaling in non-
   SYN segments.

8.  Experiments

   This document has experimental status because TCP-ENO's viability
   depends on middlebox behavior that can only be determined _a
   posteriori_.  Specifically, we must determine to what extent
   middleboxes will permit the use of TCP-ENO.  Once TCP-ENO is
   deployed, we will be in a better position to gather data on two types
   of failure:

   1.  Middleboxes downgrading TCP-ENO connections to unencrypted TCP.
       This can happen if middleboxes strip unknown TCP options or if
       they terminate TCP connections and relay data back and forth.

   2.  Middleboxes causing TCP-ENO connections to fail completely.  This
       can happen if applications perform deep packet inspection and
       start dropping segments that unexpectedly contain ciphertext.

   The first type of failure is tolerable since TCP-ENO is designed for
   incremental deployment anyway.  The second type of failure is more



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   problematic, and, if prevalent, will require the development of
   techniques to avoid and recover from such failures.

9.  Security considerations

   An obvious use case for TCP-ENO is opportunistic encryption--that is,
   encrypting some connections, but only where supported and without any
   kind of endpoint authentication.  Opportunistic encryption protects
   against undetectable large-scale eavesdropping.  However, it does not
   protect against detectable large-scale eavesdropping (for instance,
   if ISPs terminate TCP connections and proxy them, or simply downgrade
   connections to unencrypted).  Moreover, opportunistic encryption
   emphatically does not protect against targeted attacks that employ
   trivial spoofing to redirect a specific high-value connection to a
   man-in-the-middle attacker.

   Achieving stronger security with TCP-ENO requires verifying session
   IDs.  Any application relying on ENO for communications security MUST
   incorporate session IDs into its endpoint authentication.  By way of
   example, an authentication mechanism based on keyed digests (such
   Digest Access Authentication [RFC7616]) can be extended to include
   the role and session ID in the input of the keyed digest.  Where
   necessary for backwards compatibility, applications SHOULD use the
   application-aware bit to negotiate the inclusion of session IDs in
   authentication.

   Because TCP-ENO enables multiple different encryption specs to
   coexist, security could potentially be only as strong as the weakest
   available spec.  In particular, if session IDs do not depend on the
   TCP-ENO transcript in a strong way, an attacker can undetectably
   tamper with ENO options to force negotiation of a deprecated and
   vulnerable spec.  To avoid such problems, specs SHOULD compute
   session IDs using only well-studied and conservative hash functions.
   That way, even if other parts of a spec are vulnerable, it is still
   intractable for an attacker to induce identical session IDs at both
   ends after tampering with ENO contents in SYN segments.

   Implementations MUST NOT send ENO options unless they have access to
   an adequate source of randomness [RFC4086].  Without secret
   unpredictable data at both ends of a connection, it is impossible for
   encryption specs to achieve confidentiality and forward secrecy.
   Because systems typically have very little entropy on bootup,
   implementations might need to disable TCP-ENO until after system
   initialization.

   With a regular three-way handshake (meaning no simultaneous open),
   the non-SYN form ENO option in an active opener's first ACK segment
   MAY contain N > 0 bytes of spec-specific data, as shown in Figure 3.



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   Such data is not part of the TCP-ENO negotiation transcript, and
   hence MUST be separately authenticated by the encryption spec.

10.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines a new TCP option kind for TCP-ENO, assigned a
   value of TBD from the TCP option space.  This value is defined as:

     +------+--------+----------------------------------+-----------+
     | Kind | Length | Meaning                          | Reference |
     +------+--------+----------------------------------+-----------+
     | TBD  | N      | Encryption Negotiation (TCP-ENO) | [RFC-TBD] |
     +------+--------+----------------------------------+-----------+

                          TCP Option Kind Numbers

   Early implementations of TCP-ENO made unauthorized use of TCP option
   kind 69.  However, implementations MUST NOT make use of option kind
   numbers not assigned by IANA.  More recent implementations used
   experimental option 253 per [RFC6994] with 16-bit ExID 0x454E, and
   SHOULD migrate to option TBD by default.

   This document defines a 7-bit "cs" field in the range of 0x20-0x7f
   for which IANA shall maintain a new sub-registry entitled "TCP-ENO
   encryption spec identifiers" under the "Transmission Control Protocol
   (TCP) Parameters" registry.  The description of this registry should
   be interpreted with respect to the terminology defined in [RFC5226].

   The intention is for IANA to grant registration requests for spec
   identifiers in anticipation of a published RFC.  Hence, a
   Specification is Required.  However, to allow for implementation
   experience, identifiers should be allocated prior to the RFC being
   approved for publication.  A Designated Expert appointed by the IESG
   area director shall approve allocations once it seems more likely
   than not that an RFC will eventually be published.  The Designated
   Expert shall post a request to the TCPINC WG mailing list (or a
   successor designated by the Area Director) for comment and review,
   including an Internet-Draft.  Before a period of 30 days has passed,
   the Designated Expert will either approve or deny the registration
   request and publish a notice of the decision to the TCPINC WG mailing
   list or its successor, as well as informing IANA.  A denial notice
   must be justified by an explanation, and in the cases where it is
   possible, concrete suggestions on how the request can be modified so
   as to become acceptable should be provided.

   The initial values of the TCP-ENO encryption spec identifier registry
   are shown in Table 2.




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    +-------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
    | Value | Meaning                   | Reference                  |
    +-------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
    | 0x20  | Experimental Use          |                            |
    | 0x21  | TCPCRYPT_ECDHE_P256       | [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt] |
    | 0x22  | TCPCRYPT_ECDHE_P521       | [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt] |
    | 0x23  | TCPCRYPT_ECDHE_Curve25519 | [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt] |
    | 0x24  | TCPCRYPT_ECDHE_Curve448   | [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt] |
    | 0x30  | TCP-Use-TLS               | [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-use-tls]  |
    +-------+---------------------------+----------------------------+

                                  Table 2

   Figure: TCP-ENO Spec identifiers

11.  Acknowledgments

   We are grateful for contributions, help, discussions, and feedback
   from the TCPINC working group, including Marcelo Bagnulo, David
   Black, Bob Briscoe, Jana Iyengar, Tero Kivinen, Mirja Kuhlewind, Yoav
   Nir, Christoph Paasch, Eric Rescorla, and Kyle Rose.  This work was
   funded by DARPA CRASH and the Stanford Secure Internet of Things
   Project.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0793]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
              RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.





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   [RFC6994]  Touch, J., "Shared Use of Experimental TCP Options",
              RFC 6994, DOI 10.17487/RFC6994, August 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6994>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.briscoe-tcpm-inspace-mode-tcpbis]
              Briscoe, B., "Inner Space for all TCP Options (Kitchen
              Sink Draft - to be Split Up)", draft-briscoe-tcpm-inspace-
              mode-tcpbis-00 (work in progress), March 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt]
              Bittau, A., Boneh, D., Giffin, D., Hamburg, M., Handley,
              M., Mazieres, D., Slack, Q., and E. Smith, "Cryptographic
              protection of TCP Streams (tcpcrypt)", draft-ietf-tcpinc-
              tcpcrypt-01 (work in progress), February 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-use-tls]
              Rescorla, E., "Using TLS to Protect TCP Streams", draft-
              ietf-tcpinc-use-tls-01 (work in progress), May 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-tcpm-tcp-edo]
              Touch, J. and W. Eddy, "TCP Extended Data Offset Option",
              draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-edo-06 (work in progress), June 2016.

   [I-D.touch-tcpm-tcp-syn-ext-opt]
              Touch, J. and T. Faber, "TCP SYN Extended Option Space
              Using an Out-of-Band Segment", draft-touch-tcpm-tcp-syn-
              ext-opt-04 (work in progress), April 2016.

   [RFC3493]  Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., McCann, J., and W.
              Stevens, "Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6",
              RFC 3493, DOI 10.17487/RFC3493, February 2003,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3493>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC5382]  Guha, S., Ed., Biswas, K., Ford, B., Sivakumar, S., and P.
              Srisuresh, "NAT Behavioral Requirements for TCP", BCP 142,
              RFC 5382, DOI 10.17487/RFC5382, October 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5382>.







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   [RFC6394]  Barnes, R., "Use Cases and Requirements for DNS-Based
              Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)", RFC 6394,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6394, October 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6394>.

   [RFC7616]  Shekh-Yusef, R., Ed., Ahrens, D., and S. Bremer, "HTTP
              Digest Access Authentication", RFC 7616,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7616, September 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7616>.

Authors' Addresses

   Andrea Bittau
   Stanford University
   353 Serra Mall, Room 288
   Stanford, CA  94305
   US

   Email: bittau@cs.stanford.edu


   Dan Boneh
   Stanford University
   353 Serra Mall, Room 475
   Stanford, CA  94305
   US

   Email: dabo@cs.stanford.edu


   Daniel B. Giffin
   Stanford University
   353 Serra Mall, Room 288
   Stanford, CA  94305
   US

   Email: dbg@scs.stanford.edu


   Mark Handley
   University College London
   Gower St.
   London  WC1E 6BT
   UK

   Email: M.Handley@cs.ucl.ac.uk





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   David Mazieres
   Stanford University
   353 Serra Mall, Room 290
   Stanford, CA  94305
   US

   Email: dm@uun.org


   Eric W. Smith
   Kestrel Institute
   3260 Hillview Avenue
   Palo Alto, CA  94304
   US

   Email: eric.smith@kestrel.edu



































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