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TLS Working Group                                             Will Price
INTERNET-DRAFT                                            Michael Elkins
                                                Network Associates, Inc.
                                                        18 February 2002
draft-ietf-tls-openpgp-02.txt
                   Extensions to TLS for OpenPGP keys
Status of this Memo
   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.
   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Abstract
   This document builds upon the TLS Protocol Specification [TLS].  The
   extensions described herein are intended to apply to Version 1.0 of
   the TLS specification.
   The purpose of this document is to update the TLS protocol with
   extensions to support the certificates, public key algorithms,
   symmetric ciphers, hash algorithms, and trust model used by OpenPGP
   [OpenPGP].
   This document uses the same notation used in the TLS Protocol draft.
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
Certificate
   The X.509.v3 [X509] certificates recommended for use with TLS will

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Internet-Draft     Extensions to TLS for OpenPGP keys   18 February 2002
   not be used in conjunction with OpenPGP keys.  An implementation
   SHOULD be able to support both TLS with X509 and TLS with OpenPGP
   keys.  It is NOT REQUIRED that an implementation support both.  The
   "peer certificate" in the session state of TLS MAY refer to either
   X509 or OpenPGP.
   The contents of the Certificate (11) message sent from server to
   client and vice versa are determined by the Cipher Suite.  Many new
   Cipher Suites are defined in the Cipher Suites section of this
   document for use with OpenPGP keys.  All OpenPGP Cipher Suites
   REQUIRE a OpenPGP key in the Certificate messages.  A OpenPGP key
   appearing in the Certificate message will be sent in binary OpenPGP
   format.  The Certificate message includes a OpenPGP key where the
   X509 certificate would normally appear.  The option is also available
   to send a 64 bit OpenPGP Key ID instead of sending the entire key.
   The client will respond with a fatal alert no_certificate if the Key
   ID cannot be found.  If the key is not valid, expired, revoked, or
   corrupt, the appropriate fatal alert message is sent from section A.3
   of the TLS specification.  If a key is valid and neither expired nor
   revoked, it is accepted by the protocol.  A particular OpenPGP
   compatible TLS implementation MAY wish to allow users to designate
   certain keys specifically as Trusted Server Keys.  This is a local
   matter outside the scope of this document.
   enum {
        keyid (0), key (1), (255)
   } PGPKeyDescriptorType;
   opaque PGPKeyID<8>
   opaque PGPKey<1..2^24-1>
   struct {
        PGPKeyDescriptorType descriptorType;
        select (descriptorType) {
             case keyid: PGPKeyID;
             case key: PGPKey;
        }
   } Certificate;
Certificate Request
   The server is allowed to request a client certificate from the
   client.  The meaning of this message is essentially unchanged to
   allow OpenPGP keys.
   The rsa_sign and dss_sign certificate types may be requested in
   conjunction with OpenPGP keys.  The ClientCertificateType field is
   used identically to the TLS specification.  The subsequent
   DistinguishedName field is NOT included when using Cipher Suites

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   based on OpenPGP keys.
   The Client Certificate message is sent using the same formatting as
   the server Certificate message in response to the Certificate Request
   message.  If no OpenPGP key is available from the client, the
   no_certificate alert is returned.  The server MAY then respond with a
   fatal alert if appropriate.  This transaction follows the TLS
   specification.
Server Key Exchange
   When using ephemeral Diffie-Hellman, the Server Key Exchange message
   is sent to pass the Diffie-Hellman public value to the client.  The
   client and server then use this value to establish the shared secret.
   This is identical to the operation of standard TLS.
Certificate Verify
   The Certificate Verify message for OpenPGP key types is identical to
   the specification.  The signature is made using either DSS or RSA
   depending on the Cipher Suite.
Finished
   The Finished message for OpenPGP key types is identical to the
   description in the specification.
Cipher Suites
   Since TLS does not have a certificate type field, the Cipher Suites
   field is used to perform the same function.  A number of additional
   Cipher Suites are defined for use with OpenPGP keys.
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAST_CBC_SHA          = { 0x01, 0x01 };
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_DHE_DSS_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA          = { 0x01, 0x02 };
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA      = { 0x01, 0x03 };
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAST_CBC_RMD          = { 0x01, 0x04 };
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_DHE_DSS_WITH_IDEA_CBC_RMD          = { 0x01, 0x05 };
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_RMD      = { 0x01, 0x06 };
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAST_CBC_SHA          = { 0x01, 0x10 };
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_RSA_WITH_CAST_CBC_SHA              = { 0x01, 0x20 };
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA              = { 0x01, 0x21 };
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA          = { 0x01, 0x22 };
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_RSA_WITH_CAST_CBC_RMD              = { 0x01, 0x23 };
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_RMD              = { 0x01, 0x24 };
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_RMD          = { 0x01, 0x25 };
   CipherSuite TLS_PGP_DSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                  = { 0x01, 0xF0 };

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   Note:     The above numeric definitions for Cipher Suites have not
   yet been registered.
   All of the above Cipher Suites use either the CAST, IDEA, or
   TripleDES block ciphers in CBC mode.  The choice of hash is either
   SHA-1 or RIPEMD-160.  Use of any of these Cipher Suites REQUIRES an
   OpenPGP key in any Certificate and Client Certificate messages.  MD5
   MAY NOT be used with OpenPGP keys.  "Export" algorithms also MAY NOT
   be used with OpenPGP keys.
   To be considered compliant with support for OpenPGP in TLS, an
   implementation MUST support TLS_PGP_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.
References
   [TLS]     T. Dierks, and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
             RFC 2246, January 1999.
   [OpenPGP] J. Callas, L. Donnerhacke, H. Finney, R. Thayer,
             "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 2440, November 1998.
Authors
   Will Price <wprice@cyphers.net>
   Network Associates, Inc.
   Michael Elkins <michael_elkins@nai.com>
   Network Associates, Inc.







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