[Docs] [txt|pdf|html] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]
Versions: (draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests) 00
01 02 03 04 05
Network Working Group T. Pauly
Internet-Draft Apple Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track D. Schinazi
Expires: 26 October 2020 Google LLC
C.A. Wood
Cloudflare
24 April 2020
TLS Ticket Requests
draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequests-05
Abstract
TLS session tickets enable stateless connection resumption for
clients without server-side, per-client state. Servers vend an
arbitrary number of session tickets to clients, at their discretion,
upon connection establishment. Clients store and use tickets when
resuming future connections. This document describes a mechanism by
which clients can specify the desired number of tickets needed for
future connections. This extension aims to provide a means for
servers to determine the number of tickets to generate in order to
reduce ticket waste, while simultaneously priming clients for future
connection attempts.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 October 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Pauly, et al. Expires 26 October 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft TLS Ticket Requests April 2020
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Ticket Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
As as described in [RFC8446], TLS servers vend clients an arbitrary
number of session tickets at their own discretion in NewSessionTicket
messages. There are at least three limitations with this design.
First, servers vend some (often hard-coded) number of tickets per
connection. Some server implementations return a different default
number of tickets for session resumption than for the initial full
handshake that created the session. No static choice, whether fixed,
or resumption-dependent is ideal for all situations.
Second, clients do not have a way of expressing their desired number
of tickets, which can impact future connection establishment. For
example, clients can open multiple TLS connections to the same server
for HTTP, or race TLS connections across different network
interfaces. The latter is especially useful in transport systems
that implement Happy Eyeballs [RFC8305]. Since clients control
connection concurrency and resumption, a standard mechanism for
requesting more than one ticket is desirable.
Third, all tickets in the client's possession ultimately derive from
some initial full handshake. Especially when the client was
initially authenticated with a client certificate, that session may
Pauly, et al. Expires 26 October 2020 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft TLS Ticket Requests April 2020
need to be refreshed from time to time. Consequently, a server may
periodically force a full handshake even when the client presents a
valid ticket. When that happens, it is possible that any other
tickets derived from the same original session are equally invalid.
A client avoids a full handshake on subsequent connections if it
replaces all stored tickets with fresh ones obtained from the just
performed full handshake. The number of tickets the server should
vend for a full handshake may therefore need to be larger than the
number for routine resumption.
This document specifies a new TLS extension - "ticket_request" - that
can be used by clients to express their desired number of session
tickets. Servers can use this extension as a hint of the number of
NewSessionTicket messages to vend. This extension is only applicable
to TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13], and future
versions thereof.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals,
as shown here.
2. Use Cases
The ability to request one or more tickets is useful for a variety of
purposes:
* Parallel HTTP connections: To minimize ticket reuse while still
improving performance, it may be useful to use multiple, distinct
tickets when opening parallel connections. Clients must therefore
bound the number of parallel connections they initiate by the
number of tickets in their possession, or risk ticket re-use.
* Connection racing: Happy Eyeballs V2 [RFC8305] describes
techniques for performing connection racing. The Transport
Services Architecture implementation from [TAPS] also describes
how connections can race across interfaces and address families.
In such cases, clients may use more than one ticket while racing
connection attempts in order to establish one successful
connection. Having multiple tickets equips clients with enough
tickets to initiate connection racing while avoiding ticket re-use
and ensuring that their cache of tickets does not empty during
such races. Moreover, as some servers may implement single-use
tickets, distinct tickets prevent premature ticket invalidation by
racing.
Pauly, et al. Expires 26 October 2020 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft TLS Ticket Requests April 2020
* Connection priming: In some systems, connections can be primed or
bootstrapped by a centralized service or daemon for faster
connection establishment. Requesting tickets on demand allows
such services to vend tickets to clients to use for accelerated
handshakes with early data. (Note that if early data is not
needed by these connections, this method SHOULD NOT be used.
Fresh handshakes SHOULD be performed instead.)
* Less ticket waste: Currently, TLS servers use application-
specific, and often implementation-specific, logic to determine
how many tickets to issue. By moving the burden of ticket count
to clients, servers do not generate wasteful tickets. As an
example, clients might only request one ticket during resumption.
Moreover, as ticket generation might involve expensive
computation, e.g., public key cryptographic operations, avoiding
waste is desirable.
* Decline resumption: Clients can indicate they have no intention of
resuming connections by sending a ticket request with count of
zero.
3. Ticket Requests
As discussed in Section 1, clients may want different numbers of
tickets for fresh or resumed handshakes. Clients may indicate to
servers their desired number of tickets for a single connection, in
the case of a full handshake or resumption, via the following
"ticket_request" extension:
enum {
ticket_request(TBD), (65535)
} ExtensionType;
Clients MAY send this extension in ClientHello. It contains the
following structure:
struct {
uint8 new_session_count;
uint8 resumption_count;
} ClientTicketRequest;
new_session_count The number of tickets desired by the client when
the server chooses to negotiate a fresh session (full handshake).
resumption_count The number of tickets desired by the client when
the server is willing to resume using the presented ticket.
Pauly, et al. Expires 26 October 2020 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft TLS Ticket Requests April 2020
A client starting a fresh connection SHOULD set new_session_count to
the desired number of session tickets and resumption_count to 0.
Once a client's ticket cache is primed, a resumption_count of 1 is a
good choice that allows the server to replace each ticket with a
fresh ticket, without over-provisioning the client with excess
tickets. However, clients which race multiple connections and place
a separate ticket in each will ultimately end up with just the
tickets from a single resumed session. In that case, clients can
send a resumption_count equal to the number of sessions they are
attempting in parallel. (Clients which send a resumption_count less
than the number of parallel connection attempts might end up with
zero tickets.)
When a client presenting a previously obtained ticket finds that the
server nevertheless negotiates a fresh session, the client SHOULD
assume that any other tickets associated with the same session as the
presented ticket are also no longer valid for resumption. This
includes tickets obtained during the initial full handshake and all
tickets subsequently obtained as part of subsequent resumptions.
Requesting more than one ticket in cases when servers select a full
handshake helps keep the session cache primed.
Servers SHOULD NOT send more tickets than requested for the handshake
type selected by the server (resumption or full handshake).
Moreover, servers SHOULD place a limit on the number of tickets they
are willing to send, whether for full handshakes or resumptions, to
save resources. Therefore, the number of NewSessionTicket messages
sent will typically be the minimum of the server's self-imposed limit
and the number requested. Servers MAY send additional tickets, up to
the same limit, if the tickets that are originally sent are somehow
invalidated.
A server which supports and uses a client "ticket_request" extension
MUST also send the "ticket_request" extension in the
EncryptedExtensions message. It contains the following structure:
struct {
uint8 expected_count;
} ServerTicketRequestHint;
expected_count The number of tickets the server expects to send in
this connection.
Servers MUST NOT send the "ticket_request" extension in ServerHello
or HelloRetryRequest messages. A client MUST abort the connection
with an "illegal_parameter" alert if the "ticket_request" extension
is present in either of these messages.
Pauly, et al. Expires 26 October 2020 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft TLS Ticket Requests April 2020
If a client receives a HelloRetryRequest, the presence (or absence)
of the "ticket_request" extension MUST be maintained in the second
ClientHello message. Moreover, if this extension is present, a
client MUST NOT change the value of ClientTicketRequest in the second
ClientHello message.
4. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to Create an entry, ticket_request(TBD), in the
existing registry for ExtensionType (defined in [RFC8446]), with "TLS
1.3" column values being set to "CH, EE", and "Recommended" column
being set to "Yes".
5. Performance Considerations
Servers can send tickets in NewSessionTicket messages any time after
the server Finished message (see [RFC8446]; Section 4.6.1). A server
which chooses to send a large number of tickets to a client can
potentially harm application performance if the tickets are sent
before application data. For example, if the transport connection
has a constrained congestion window, ticket messages could delay
sending application data. To avoid this, servers should prioritize
sending application data over tickets when possible.
6. Security Considerations
Ticket re-use is a security and privacy concern. Moreover, clients
must take care when pooling tickets as a means of avoiding or
amortizing handshake costs. If servers do not rotate session ticket
encryption keys frequently, clients may be encouraged to obtain and
use tickets beyond common lifetime windows of, e.g., 24 hours.
Despite ticket lifetime hints provided by servers, clients SHOULD
dispose of pooled tickets after some reasonable amount of time that
mimics the ticket rotation period.
In some cases, a server may send NewSessionTicket messages
immediately upon sending the server Finished message rather than
waiting for the client Finished. If the server has not verified the
client's ownership of its IP address, e.g., with the TLS Cookie
extension (see [RFC8446]; Section 4.2.2), an attacker may take
advantage of this behavior to create an amplification attack
proportional to the count value toward a target by performing a key
exchange over UDP with spoofed packets. Servers SHOULD limit the
number of NewSessionTicket messages they send until they have
verified the client's ownership of its IP address.
Servers that do not enforce a limit on the number of NewSessionTicket
messages sent in response to a "ticket_request" extension could leave
Pauly, et al. Expires 26 October 2020 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft TLS Ticket Requests April 2020
themselves open to DoS attacks, especially if ticket creation is
expensive.
7. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank David Benjamin, Eric Rescorla, Nick
Sullivan, Martin Thomson, Hubert Kario, and other members of the TLS
Working Group for discussions on earlier versions of this draft.
Viktor Dukhovni contributed text allowing clients to send multiple
counts in a ticket request.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-
dtls13-37, 9 March 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-
drafts/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-37.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC8305] Schinazi, D. and T. Pauly, "Happy Eyeballs Version 2:
Better Connectivity Using Concurrency", RFC 8305,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8305, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8305>.
[TAPS] Brunstrom, A., Pauly, T., Enghardt, T., Grinnemo, K.,
Jones, T., Tiesel, P., Perkins, C., and M. Welzl,
"Implementing Interfaces to Transport Services", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-taps-impl-06, 9 March
2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-
taps-impl-06.txt>.
Pauly, et al. Expires 26 October 2020 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft TLS Ticket Requests April 2020
Authors' Addresses
Tommy Pauly
Apple Inc.
One Apple Park Way
Cupertino, California 95014,
United States of America
Email: tpauly@apple.com
David Schinazi
Google LLC
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, California 94043,
United States of America
Email: dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com
Christopher A. Wood
Cloudflare
101 Townsend St
San Francisco,
United States of America
Email: caw@heapingbits.net
Pauly, et al. Expires 26 October 2020 [Page 8]
Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129d, available from
https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/