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Versions: (draft-popov-tokbind-negotiation) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 RFC 8472

Internet Engineering Task Force                            A. Popov, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                               M. Nystroem
Intended status: Standards Track                         Microsoft Corp.
Expires: March 13, 2016                                       D. Balfanz
                                                              A. Langley
                                                             Google Inc.
                                                      September 10, 2015


  Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol
                              Negotiation
                   draft-ietf-tokbind-negotiation-00

Abstract

   This document specifies a Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246]
   extension for the negotiation of Token Binding protocol
   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol] version and key parameters.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 13, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Token Binding Negotiation Client Hello Extension  . . . . . .   2
   3.  Token Binding Negotiation Server Hello Extension  . . . . . .   3
   4.  Negotiating Token Binding Protocol Version and Key Parameters   4
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.1.  Downgrade Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.2.  Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   In order to use the Token Binding protocol
   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol], the client and server need to agree on
   the Token Binding protocol version and the parameters (signature and
   hash algorithm, length) of the Token Binding key.  This document
   specifies a new TLS extension to accomplish this negotiation without
   introducing additional network round-trips.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Token Binding Negotiation Client Hello Extension

   The client uses the "token_binding" TLS extension to indicate the
   highest supported Token Binding protocol version and key parameters.

   enum {
       token_binding(TBD), (65535)
   } ExtensionType;

   The "extension_data" field of this extension contains a
   "TokenBindingParameters" value.





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struct {
    uint8 major;
    uint8 minor;
} ProtocolVersion;

enum {
    rsa2048_pkcs1.5_sha256(0), rsa2048_pss_sha256(1), ecdsap256_sha256(2), (255)
} TokenBindingKeyParameters;

struct {
    ProtocolVersion token_binding_version;
    TokenBindingKeyParameters key_parameters_list<1..2^8-1>
} TokenBindingParameters;

   "token_binding_version" indicates the version of the Token Binding
   protocol the client wishes to use during this connection.  This
   SHOULD be the latest (highest valued) version supported by the
   client.  [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol] describes version {1, 0} of the
   protocol.  Prototype implementations of Token Binding drafts can
   indicate support of a specific draft version, e.g. {0, 1} or {0, 2}.

   "key_parameters_list" contains the list of identifiers of the Token
   Binding key parameters supported by the client, in descending order
   of preference.

3.  Token Binding Negotiation Server Hello Extension

   The server uses the "token_binding" TLS extension to indicate support
   for the Token Binding protocol and to select the protocol version and
   key parameters.

   The server that supports Token Binding and receives a client hello
   message containing the "token_binding" extension, will include the
   "token_binding" extension in the server hello if all of the following
   conditions are satisfied:

   1.  The server supports the Token Binding protocol version offered by
       the client or a lower version.

   2.  The server finds acceptable Token Binding key parameters on the
       client's list.

   3.  The server is also negotiating Extended Master Secret TLS
       extension [I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash] (see security
       considerations section below for more details).

   The server will ignore any key parameters that it does not recognize.
   The "extension_data" field of the "token_binding" extension is



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   structured the same as described above for the client
   "extension_data".

   "token_binding_version" contains the lower of the Token Binding
   protocol version offered by the client in the "token_binding"
   extension and the highest version supported by the server.

   "key_parameters_list" contains exactly one Token Binding key
   parameters identifier selected by the server from the client's list.

4.  Negotiating Token Binding Protocol Version and Key Parameters

   It is expected that a server will have a list of Token Binding key
   parameters identifiers that it supports, in preference order.  The
   server MUST only select an identifier that the client offered.  The
   server SHOULD select the most highly preferred key parameters
   identifier it supports which is also advertised by the client.  In
   the event that the server supports none of the key parameters that
   the client advertises, then the server MUST NOT include
   "token_binding" extension in the server hello.

   The client receiving the "token_binding" extension MUST terminate the
   handshake with a fatal "unsupported_extension" alert if any of the
   following conditions are true:

   1.  The client did not include the "token_binding" extension in the
       client hello.

   2.  "token_binding_version" is higher than the Token Binding protocol
       version advertised by the client.

   3.  "key_parameters_list" includes more than one Token Binding key
       parameters identifier.

   4.  "key_parameters_list" includes an identifier that was not
       advertised by the client.

   5.  Extended Master Secret [I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash] is not
       negotiated (see security considerations section below for more
       details).

   If the "token_binding" extension is included in the server hello and
   the client supports the Token Binding protocol version selected by
   the server, it means that the version and key parameters have been
   negotiated between the client and the server and SHALL be definitive
   for the TLS connection.  In this case, the client MUST use the
   negotiated key parameters in the "provided_token_binding" as
   described in [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol].



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   If the client does not support the Token Binding protocol version
   selected by the server, then the connection proceeds without Token
   Binding.

   Please note that the Token Binding protocol version and key
   parameters are negotiated for each TLS connection, which means that
   the client and server include their "token_binding" extensions both
   in the full TLS handshake that establishes a new TLS session and in
   the subsequent abbreviated TLS handshakes that resume the TLS
   session.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines a new TLS extension "token_binding", which
   needs to be added to the IANA "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   Extensions" registry.

   This document establishes a registry for identifiers of Token Binding
   key parameters entitled "Token Binding Key Parameters" under the
   "Token Binding Protocol" heading.

   Entries in this registry require the following fields:

   o  Value: The octet value that identifies a set of Token Binding key
      parameters (0-255).

   o  Description: The description of the Token Binding key parameters.

   o  Specification: A reference to a specification that defines the
      Token Binding key parameters.

   This registry operates under the "Expert Review" policy as defined in
   [RFC5226].  The designated expert is advised to encourage the
   inclusion of a reference to a permanent and readily available
   specification that enables the creation of interoperable
   implementations using the identified set of Token Binding key
   parameters.

   An initial set of registrations for this registry follows:

      Value: 0

      Description: rsa2048_pkcs1.5_sha256

      Specification: this document

      Value: 1




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      Description: rsa2048_pss_sha256

      Specification: this document

      Value: 2

      Description: ecdsap256_sha256

      Specification: this document

6.  Security Considerations

6.1.  Downgrade Attacks

   The Token Binding protocol version and key parameters are negotiated
   via "token_binding" extension within the TLS handshake.  TLS prevents
   active attackers from modifying the messages of the TLS handshake,
   therefore it is not possible for the attacker to remove or modify the
   "token_binding" extension.  The signature and hash algorithms and key
   length used in the TokenBinding of type "provided_token_binding" MUST
   match the parameters negotiated via "token_binding" extension.

6.2.  Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS

   The Token Binding protocol relies on the TLS Exporters [RFC5705] to
   associate a TLS connection with a Token Binding.  The triple
   handshake attack [TRIPLE-HS] is a known TLS protocol vulnerability
   allowing the attacker to synchronize exported keying material between
   TLS connections.  The attacker can then successfully replay bound
   tokens.  For this reason, the Token Binding protocol MUST NOT be
   negotiated unless the Extended Master Secret TLS extension
   [I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash] has also been negotiated.

7.  Acknowledgements

   This document incorporates comments and suggestions offered by Eric
   Rescorla, Gabriel Montenegro, Martin Thomson, Vinod Anupam, Bill Cox,
   Nick Harper and others.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol]
              Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., and A. Langley, "The
              Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0", draft-ietf-tokbind-
              protocol-01 (work in progress), May 2015.




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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC5705]  Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
              March 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash]
              Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A., Langley,
              A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session
              Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension", draft-ietf-
              tls-session-hash-06 (work in progress), July 2015.

   [TRIPLE-HS]
              Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti,
              A., and P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters:
              Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS. IEEE
              Symposium on Security and Privacy", 2014.

Authors' Addresses

   Andrei Popov (editor)
   Microsoft Corp.
   USA

   Email: andreipo@microsoft.com


   Magnus Nystroem
   Microsoft Corp.
   USA

   Email: mnystrom@microsoft.com




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   Dirk Balfanz
   Google Inc.
   USA

   Email: balfanz@google.com


   Adam Langley
   Google Inc.
   USA

   Email: agl@google.com







































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