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Versions: (draft-nharper-0-rtt-token-binding) 00 01 02

Token Binding Working Group                                    N. Harper
Internet-Draft                                               Google Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                           June 28, 2017
Expires: December 30, 2017


              Token Binding for 0-RTT TLS 1.3 Connections
                    draft-ietf-tokbind-tls13-0rtt-02

Abstract

   This document describes how Token Binding can be used in the 0-RTT
   data of a TLS 1.3 connection.  This involves a new TLS extension to
   negotiate and indicate the use of Token Binding in 0-RTT data.  A
   TokenBindingMessage sent in 0-RTT data has different security
   properties than one sent after the TLS handshake has finished, which
   this document also describes.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 30, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of




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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  TokenBinding Signature Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Selecting Which Exporter Secret to Use  . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Indicating Use of 0-RTT Token Binding . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Token Binding Negotiation TLS Extension . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Client Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  Server Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Not Implementing Token Binding on 0-RTT Connections . . .   6
     4.2.  Adding Support for Token Binding on 0-RTT Connections . .   7
     4.3.  Implementation Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Proof of Possession of Token Binding Key  . . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  Exporter Replayability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.3.  Replay Mitigations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.3.1.  Server Mitigations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.3.2.  Client Mitigations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.4.  Early Data Ticket Age Window  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   Token Binding ([I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol]) cryptographically binds
   security tokens (e.g.  HTTP cookies, OAuth tokens) to the TLS layer
   on which they are presented.  It does so by signing an [RFC5705]
   exporter value from the TLS connection.  TLS 1.3 introduces a new
   mode that allows a client to send application data on its first
   flight.  If this 0-RTT data contains a security token, then a client
   using Token Binding would want to prove possession of its Token
   Binding private key so that the server can verify the binding.  The
   [RFC5705]-style exporter provided by TLS 1.3 cannot be run until the
   handshake has finished.  TLS 1.3 also provides an exporter that can
   be used with 0-RTT data, but it requires that the application
   explicitly specify that use.  This document specifies how to use the
   early_exporter_secret with Token Binding in TLS 1.3 0-RTT data.

   Using Token Binding in 0-RTT data involves two main changes to Token
   Binding.  The first is the use of a new TLS extension



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   "early_token_binding" to indicate whether a TLS session ticket can be
   used with Token Binding in 0-RTT data, and to indicate whether an
   attempted 0-RTT connection is using Token Binding in 0-RTT data.  The
   second change is one that applies only if Token Binding in 0-RTT data
   is in use, which changes the definition of the TokenBinding.signature
   field to use TLS 1.3's early_exporter_secret.

   If a client does not send any 0-RTT data, or if the server rejects
   the client's 0-RTT data, then the client MUST use the 1-RTT exporter,
   as defined in [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol].

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  TokenBinding Signature Definition

   In [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol], the signature field of the
   TokenBinding struct is defined to be the signature of a
   concatentation that includes the EKM value.  Depending on the
   circumstances, the exporter value in section 7.3.3 of
   [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] is computed using either exporter_secret or
   early_exporter_secret as the Secret.

   When early_exporter_secret is used as the Secret, the client MUST
   indicate this use so the server knows which secret to use in
   signature verification.  This indication is done through a new Token
   Binding extension, "early_exporter" (with extension type TBD).  This
   extension always has 0-length data, so the full Extension struct is
   the bytes {0xTBD, 0x00, 0x00}. The early_exporter extension MUST be
   present in every TokenBinding struct where the exporter that is
   signed uses the early_exporter_secret, and it MUST NOT be present in
   any other TokenBinding structs.

2.1.  Selecting Which Exporter Secret to Use

   A client which is not sending any 0-RTT data on a connection MUST use
   the exporter defined in [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] (using exporter_secret
   as the Secret) for all TokenBindingMessages on that connection so
   that it is compatible with [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol].

   When a client sends a TokenBindingMessage in 0-RTT data, it must use
   the early_exporter_secret.  If the server accepts the 0-RTT data, the
   client must continue to use the early_exporter_secret for the rest of
   the connection.  If the server rejects 0-RTT data, the client must
   use the exporter_secret.



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3.  Negotiation

3.1.  Indicating Use of 0-RTT Token Binding

   The TLS extension "early_token_binding" (extension type TBD) is used
   in the TLS ClientHello and EncryptedExtensions to indicate use of
   0-RTT Token Binding on the current connection.  It is also used in a
   NewSessionTicket message to indicate that 0-RTT Token Binding may be
   used on a connection resumed with that ticket.  In all cases, the
   "extension_data" field of this extension is empty, so the entire
   encoding of this extension is 0xTBD 0xTBD 0x00 0x00.

3.2.  Token Binding Negotiation TLS Extension

   In TLS 1.3, the "token_binding" extension is sent by a server in
   EncryptedExtensions, whereas in previous versions of TLS this
   extension was sent in the ServerHello message.  On a 1-RTT connection
   (whether it be a new connection or resumption), no application data
   is sent in either direction before the "token_binding" TLS extension
   in the EncryptedExtensions, and the choice of Token Binding version
   and key parameter is up to the server based on what the client sent
   and what the server's preferences are, following the same processing
   rules as in [I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation].

3.3.  Client Processing Rules

   A client that supports Token Binding in 0-RTT data and receives a
   NewSessionTicket containing the "early_token_binding" extension must
   store with the ticket the Token Binding version and key parameter of
   the connection in which the ticket was issued.

   A client that wishes to send a Token Binding message in 0-RTT data
   may only do so if the TLS connection in which the 0-RTT data is being
   sent is being resumed from a ticket which included the
   "early_token_binding" extension.  Assuming the ticket included this
   extension, the client sends a ClientHello containing the
   "token_binding" extension, "early_data" extension, and
   "early_token_binding" extensions.  The client must include in its
   "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension psk_dhe_ke.

   The contents of the "token_binding" extension SHOULD be the same as
   they would be on a connection without "early_token_binding" to allow
   for the client and server to negotiate new Token Binding parameters
   if the early data is rejected.  The Token Binding message sent in the
   0-RTT data MUST be sent assuming that the same Token Binding version
   and key parameter from the connection where the ticket was received
   will also be negotiated on this connection.  If the server includes
   the "early_data" extension in EncryptedExtensions in response to a



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   ClientHello with "early_token_binding", but the server does not
   include "early_token_binding" in EncryptedExtensions, or if the
   server's "token_binding" extension does not match the values of the
   connection where the ticket was received, then the client MUST
   terminate the TLS connection with an illegal_parameter alert.

   It is valid for a client to send a ClientHello that contains both the
   "early_data" and "token_binding" extensions, but without the
   "early_token_binding" extension.  This combination means that the
   client is attempting to resume a connection and is sending early
   data, but the client is not using Token Binding on this resumed
   connection (if the server accepts the early data).  The presence of
   the "token_binding" extension is so the client can negotiate the use
   of Token Binding for this connection if the server rejects early
   data.

3.4.  Server Processing Rules

   When a server issues a NewSessionTicket on a connection where Token
   Binding was negotiated, and the NewSessionTicket includes an
   "early_data" extension indicating that the ticket may be used to send
   0-RTT data, the server may also include the "early_token_binding"
   extension in the NewSessionTicket to indicate that this ticket can be
   used for a future connection with Token Binding in 0-RTT data.  If
   the server includes the "early_token_binding" extension in the
   NewSessionTicket, the server MUST store with the ticket the Token
   Binding version and key parameter used for the connection in which
   the ticket was issued.  The "early_token_binding" extension can
   appear in a NewSessionTicket message only if the "early_data"
   extension also appears in that message.

   If a server receives a ClientHello with the "early_token_binding"
   extension and supports Token Binding in 0-RTT data, it MUST perform
   the following checks:

   o  If either the "early_data" or "token_binding" extensions are
      missing from the ClientHello, terminate the TLS connection with an
      illegal_parameter alert.

   o  If the ticket used for resumption is missing either of the
      "early_data" or "early_token_binding" extensions, reject the early
      data.

   o  Process the "token_binding" extension as if it were received on a
      1-RTT connection and compute the Token Binding version and key
      parameter to use.  If either of these values do not match the
      values that were negotiated on the connection where the ticket
      used for resumption was sent, reject the early data.



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   o  Perform any other checks to decide whether to accept early data.
      If the server chooses to accept early data, include in
      EncryptedExtensions the "early_data" extension,
      "early_token_binding" extension, and "token_binding" extension
      with the same version and key parameter from the previous
      connection.

   If a server accepts early data on a connection where
   "early_token_binding" was offered, it MUST use PSK with (EC)DHE key
   establishment.

   The "early_token_binding" extension must be present in
   EncryptedExtensions exactly when both "early_data" and
   "token_binding" are present.  A server that receives a ClientHello
   with "early_token_binding" cannot reject Token Binding and also
   accept early data at the same time.  Said server may reject early
   data but still negotiate Token Binding.

   A server might receive a ClientHello that includes both the
   "early_data" and "token_binding" extensions, but no
   "early_token_binding" extension.  In this case, the server has three
   options:

   1.  Accept early data and continue the connection with no Token
       Binding,

   2.  Reject early data and negotiate the use of Token Binding for this
       connection, or

   3.  Reject early data and do not negotiate Token Binding for this
       connection.

   The behavior for the "token_binding" extension in 0-RTT is similar to
   that of ALPN and SNI: the client predicts the result of the
   negotiation, and if the actual negotiation differs, the server
   rejects the early data.

4.  Implementation Considerations

4.1.  Not Implementing Token Binding on 0-RTT Connections

   This spec has been designed so that both clients and servers can
   support Token Binding on some connections and 0-RTT data on other
   connections without needing to support Token Binding on 0-RTT
   connections.

   A client that wishes to support both without supporting Token Binding
   on 0-RTT connections can function by completely ignoring the



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   "early_token_binding" TLS extension.  When resuming a connection with
   early data, the client can still advertise support for Token Binding,
   providing the server the opportunity to accept early data (without
   Token Binding) or to reject early data and negotiate Token Binding.
   By always including the "token_binding" extension in its ClientHello,
   the client can prioritize Token Binding over 0-RTT.

   A server can support both Token Binding and 0-RTT data without
   supporting Token Binding on 0-RTT connections by never minting
   NewSessionTickets containing the "early_token_binding" extension.
   Such a server that never mints NewSessionTickets with
   "early_token_binding" can ignore that extension in a ClientHello as
   it would only appear if the client is not spec compliant.  On
   connections where a server negotiates Token Binding, the server
   SHOULD NOT include the "early_data" extension in a NewSessionTicket.

4.2.  Adding Support for Token Binding on 0-RTT Connections

   A server that supports early data but not Token Binding may wish to
   add support for Token Binding (and Token Binding on 0-RTT
   connections) at a later time.  For a client to learn that a server
   supports Token Binding, the server must reject early data to send the
   "token_binding" extension.

4.3.  Implementation Challenges

   The client has to be able to modify the message it sends in 0-RTT
   data if the 0-RTT data gets rejected and needs to be retransmitted in
   1-RTT data.  Even if the Token Binding integration with 0-RTT were
   modified so that Token Binding never caused a 0-RTT reject that
   required rewriting a request, the client still has to handle the
   server rejecting the 0-RTT data for other reasons.

   HTTP2 allows for requests to different domains to share the same TLS
   connection if the SAN of the cert covers those domains.  If
   one.example.com supports 0-RTT and Token Binding, but two.example.com
   only supports Token Binding as defined in
   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol], those servers cannot share a cert and
   use HTTP2.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines a new TLS extension "early_token_binding" with
   code point TBD which needs to be added to IANA's TLS "ExtensionType
   Values" registry.






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   This document defines a new Token Binding extension "early_exporter",
   which needs to be added to the IANA "Token Binding Extensions"
   registry.

6.  Security Considerations

   Token Binding messages that use the 0-RTT exporter have weaker
   security properties than with the [RFC5705] exporter.  If either
   party of a connection using Token Binding does not wish to use 0-RTT
   token bindings, they can do so: a client can choose to never send
   0-RTT data on a connection where it uses token binding, and a server
   can choose to reject any 0-RTT data sent on a connection that
   negotiated token binding.

   0-RTT data in TLS 1.3 has weaker security properties than other kinds
   of TLS data.  Specifically, TLS 1.3 does not guarantee non-
   replayability of data between connections.  Token Binding has similar
   replayability issues when in 0-RTT data, but preventing replay of
   Token Binding and preventing replay of 0-RTT data are two separate
   problems.  Token Binding is not designed to prevent replay of 0-RTT
   data, although solutions for preventing the replay of Token Binding
   might also be applicable to 0-RTT data.

6.1.  Proof of Possession of Token Binding Key

   When a Token Binding signature is generated using the exporter with
   early_exporter_secret, the value being signed is under the client's
   control.  An attacker with temporary access to the Token Binding
   private key can generate Token Binding signatures for as many future
   connections as it has NewSessionTickets for.  An attacker can
   construct these to be usable at any time in the future up until the
   NewSessionTicket's expiration.  Section 4.6.1 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
   requires that a NewSessionTicket be valid for a maximum of 7 days.

   Unlike in [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol], where the proof of possession
   of the Token Binding key proves that the client had possession at the
   time the TLS handshake finished, 0-RTT Token Binding only proves that
   the client had possession of the Token Binding key at some point
   after receiving the NewSessionTicket used for that connection.

6.2.  Exporter Replayability

   The exporter specified in [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol] is chosen so
   that a client and server have the same exporter value only if they
   are on the same TLS connection.  This prevents an attacker who can
   read the plaintext of a TokenBindingMessage sent on that connection
   from replaying that message on another connection (without also
   having the token binding private key).  The 0-RTT exporter only



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   covers the ClientHello and the PSK of the connection, so it does not
   provide this guarantee.

   An attacker with possession of the PSK secret and a transcript of the
   ClientHello and early data sent by a client under that PSK can
   extract the TokenBindingMessage, create a new connection to the
   server (using the same ClientHello and PSK), and send different
   application data with the same TokenBindingMessage.  Note that the
   ClientHello contains public values for the (EC)DHE key agreement that
   is used as part of deriving the traffic keys for the TLS connection,
   so if the attacker does not also have the corresponding private
   values, they will not be able to read the server's response or send a
   valid Finished message in the handshake for this TLS connection.
   Nevertheless, by that point the server has already processed the
   attacker's message with the replayed TokenBindingMessage.

   This sort of replayability of a TokenBindingMessage is different than
   the replayability caveat of 0-RTT application data in TLS 1.3.  A
   network observer can replay 0-RTT data from TLS 1.3 without knowing
   any secrets of the client or server, but the application data that is
   replayed is untouched.  This replay is done by a more powerful
   attacker who is able to view the plaintext and then spoof a
   connection with the same parameters so that the replayed
   TokenBindingMessage still validates when sent with different
   application data.

6.3.  Replay Mitigations

   This section presents multiple ways that a client or server can
   mitigate the replay of a TokenBinding while still using Token Binding
   with 0-RTT data.  Note that even with replay mitigations, 0-RTT Token
   Binding is vulnerable to other attacks.

6.3.1.  Server Mitigations

   If a server uses a session cache instead of stateless tickets, it can
   enforce that a PSK generated for resumption can only be used once.
   If an attacker tries to replay 0-RTT data (with a
   TokenBindingMessage), the server will reject it because the PSK was
   already used.

   Preventing all replay of 0-RTT data is not necessary to prevent
   replay of a TokenBinding.  A server could implement a mechanism to
   prevent a particular TokenBinding from being presented on more than
   one connection.  In cases where a server's TLS termination and
   application layer processing happen in different locations, this
   option might be easier to implement, especially when not all requests
   have bound tokens.  This processing can also take advantage of the



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   structure of the bound token, e.g. a token that identifies which user
   is making a request could shard its store of which TokenBindings have
   been seen based on the user ID.

   A server can prevent some, but not all, 0-RTT data replay with a
   tight time window for the ticket age that it will accept.  See
   Section 6.4 for more details.

6.3.2.  Client Mitigations

   A client cannot prevent a sufficiently motivated attacker from
   replaying a TokenBinding, but it can make it so difficult to replay
   the TokenBinding that it is easier for the attacker to steal the
   Token Binding key directly.  If the client secures the resumption
   secret with the same level of protection as the Token Binding key,
   then the client has made it not worth the effort of the attacker to
   attempt to replay a TokenBinding.  Ideally the resumption secret (and
   Token Binding key) are protected strongly and virtually non-
   exportable.

6.4.  Early Data Ticket Age Window

   When an attacker with control of the PSK secret replays a
   TokenBindingMessage, it has to use the same ClientHello that the
   client used.  The ClientHello includes an "obfuscated_ticket_age" in
   its EarlyDataIndication extension, which the server can use to narrow
   the window in which that ClientHello will be accepted.  Even if a PSK
   is valid for a week, the server will only accept that particular
   ClientHello for a smaller time window based on the ticket age.  A
   server should make their acceptance window for this value as small as
   practical to limit an attacker's ability to replay a ClientHello and
   send new application data with the stolen TokenBindingMessage.

7.  Acknowledgements

   The author would like to thank David Benjamin, Steven Valdez, Bill
   Cox, and Andrei Popov for their feedback and suggestions.

8.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
              Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20 (work in progress),
              April 2017.







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   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation]
              Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., and A. Langley,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token
              Binding Protocol Negotiation", draft-ietf-tokbind-
              negotiation-08 (work in progress), April 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol]
              Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., Langley, A., and J.
              Hodges, "The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0", draft-
              ietf-tokbind-protocol-14 (work in progress), April 2017.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5705]  Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
              March 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.

Author's Address

   Nick Harper
   Google Inc.

   Email: nharper@google.com

























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