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Versions: (draft-reddy-tram-turn-third-party-authz) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 RFC 7635

TRAM                                                            T. Reddy
Internet-Draft                                                  P. Patil
Intended status: Standards Track                         R. Ravindranath
Expires: July 25, 2015                                             Cisco
                                                               J. Uberti
                                                                  Google
                                                        January 21, 2015


  Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) Extension for Third Party
                             Authorization
               draft-ietf-tram-turn-third-party-authz-07

Abstract

   This document proposes the use of OAuth to obtain and validate
   ephemeral tokens that can be used for Session Traversal Utilities for
   NAT (STUN) authentication.  The usage of ephemeral tokens ensure that
   access to a STUN server can be controlled even if the tokens are
   compromised.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 25, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Obtaining a Token Using OAuth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.1.1.  DSKPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.2.  HTTP interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.3.  Manual provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Forming a Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  STUN Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.1.  THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.2.  ACCESS-TOKEN  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Receiving a request with ACCESS-TOKEN attribute . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Changes to STUN Client  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  Usage with TURN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   12. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix A.  Sample tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [RFC5389] provides a
   mechanism to control access via "long-term" username/ password
   credentials that are provided as part of the STUN protocol.  It is
   expected that these credentials will be kept secret; if the
   credentials are discovered, the STUN server could be used by
   unauthorized users or applications.  However, in web applications,
   ensuring this secrecy is typically impossible.

   To address this problem and the ones described in
   [I-D.ietf-tram-auth-problems], this document proposes the use of
   third party authorization using OAuth for STUN.  Using OAuth, a
   client obtains an ephemeral token from an authorization server e.g.
   WebRTC server, and the token is presented to the STUN server instead
   of the traditional mechanism of presenting username/password




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   credentials.  The STUN server validates the authenticity of the token
   and provides required services.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   o  WebRTC Server: A web server that supports WebRTC
      [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview].

   o  Access Token: OAuth 2.0 access token.

   o  mac_key: The session key generated by the authorization server.
      This session key has a lifetime that corresponds to the lifetime
      of the access token, is generated by the authorization server and
      bound to the access token.

   o  kid: An ephemeral and unique key identifier.  The kid also allows
      the resource server to select the appropriate keying material for
      decryption.

3.  Solution Overview

   This specification uses the token type 'Assertion' (aka self-
   contained token) described in [RFC6819] where all the information
   necessary to authenticate the validity of the token is contained
   within the token itself.  This approach has the benefit of avoiding a
   protocol between the STUN server and the authorization server for
   token validation, thus reducing latency.  The exact mechanism used by
   a client to obtain a token from the OAuth authorization server is
   outside the scope of this document.  For example, a client could make
   an HTTP request to an authorization server to obtain a token that can
   be used to avail STUN services.  The STUN token is returned in JSON,
   along with other OAuth Parameters like token type, mac_key, kid,
   token lifetime etc.  The client is oblivious to the content of the
   token.  The token is embedded within a STUN request sent to the STUN
   server.  Once the STUN server has determined the token is valid, it's
   services are offered for a determined period of time.











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   +-------------------+                         +--------+  +---------+
   | .........  STUN   |                         |  STUN  |  |  WebRTC |
   | .WebRTC .  Client |                         |        |  |         |
   | .Client .         |                         | Server |  |  Server |
   | .........         |                         |        |  |         |
   +-------------------+                         +--------+  +---------+
     |       |           STUN request                    |         |
     |       |------------------------------------------>|         |
     |       |                                           |         |
     |       |         STUN error response               |         |
     |       |         (401 Unauthorized)                |         |
     |       |<------------------------------------------|         |
     |       |         THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION         |         |
     |       |                                           |         |
     |       |                                           |         |
     |       |      HTTP Request for token               |         |
     |------------------------------------------------------------>|
     |       |      HTTP Response with token parameters  |         |
     |<------------------------------------------------------------|
     |OAuth  |                                           |         |
      Attributes                                         |         |
     |------>|                                           |         |
     |       |    STUN request with ACCESS-TOKEN         |         |
     |       |------------------------------------------>|         |
     |       |                                           |         |
     |       |         STUN success response             |         |
     |       |<------------------------------------------|         |
     |       |             STUN Messages                 |         |
     |       |      ////// integrity protected //////    |         |
     |       |      ////// integrity protected //////    |         |
     |       |      ////// integrity protected //////    |         |

                 Figure 1: STUN Third Party Authorization

   Note : An implementation may choose to contact the WebRTC server to
   obtain a token even before it makes a STUN request, if it knows the
   server details before hand.  For example, once a client has learnt
   that a STUN server supports Third Party authorization from a WebRTC
   server, the client can obtain the token before making subsequent STUN
   requests.

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution] describes the interaction
   between the client and the authorization server.  For example, the
   client learns the STUN server name "stun1@example.com" from THIRD-
   PARTY-AUTHORIZATION attribute value and makes the following HTTP
   request for the access token using transport-layer security (with
   extra line breaks for display purposes only):




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        POST /o/oauth2/token HTTP/1.1
        Host: server.example.com
        Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
        aud=stun1@example.com
        timestamp=1361471629
        grant_type=implicit
        token_type=pop
        alg=HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-256-128

                             Figure 2: Request

   In the future STUNbis [I-D.ietf-tram-stunbis] will support hash
   agility and accomplish this agility by conveying the HMAC algorithms
   supported by the STUN server along with a STUN error message to the
   client.  The client then signals the intersection-set of algorithms
   supported by it and the STUN server to the authorization server in
   the 'alg' parameter defined in [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution].
   Authorization server selects an HMAC algorithm from the list of
   algorithms client had provided and determines length of the mac_key
   based on the selected HMAC algorithm.  Note that until STUN supports
   hash agility HMAC-SHA1 is the only valid hash algorithm that client
   can signal to the authorization server and vice-versa.

   If the client is authorized then the authorization server issues an
   access token.  An example of successful response:

        HTTP/1.1 200 OK
        Content-Type: application/json
        Cache-Control: no-store

        {
          "access_token":
   "U2FsdGVkX18qJK/kkWmRcnfHglrVTJSpS6yU32kmHmOrfGyI3m1gQj1jRPsr0uBb
   HctuycAgsfRX7nJW2BdukGyKMXSiNGNnBzigkAofP6+Z3vkJ1Q5pWbfSRroOkWBn",
          "token_type":"pop",
          "expires_in":1800,
          "kid":"22BIjxU93h/IgwEb",
          "mac_key":"v51N62OM65kyMvfTI08O"
          "alg":HMAC-SHA-256-128
        }

                            Figure 3: Response

   Access token and other attributes issued by the authorization server
   are explained in Section 6.2.  OAuth in [RFC6749] defines four grant
   types.  This specification uses the OAuth grant type "Implicit"
   explained in section 1.3.2 of [RFC6749] where the WebRTC client is




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   issued an access token directly.  The value of the scope parameter
   explained in section 3.3 of [RFC6749] MUST be 'stun' string.

4.  Obtaining a Token Using OAuth

   A STUN client should know the authentication capability of the STUN
   server before deciding to use third party authorization.  A STUN
   client initially makes a request without any authorization.  If the
   STUN server supports third party authorization, it will return an
   error message indicating that the client can authorize to the STUN
   server using OAuth access token.  The STUN server includes an ERROR-
   CODE attribute with a value of 401 (Unauthorized), a nonce value in a
   NONCE attribute and a SOFTWARE attribute that gives information about
   the STUN server's software.  The STUN servers also includes
   additional STUN attribute THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION signaling the
   STUN client that the STUN server supports third party authorization.

   Consider the following example that illustrates the use of OAuth to
   achieve third party authorization for TURN.  In this example, a
   resource owner i.e.  WebRTC server, authorizes a TURN client to
   access resources on a TURN server.

                 +----------------------+----------------------------+
                 |         OAuth        |            WebRTC          |
                 +======================+============================+
                 | Client               | WebRTC client              |
                 +----------------------+----------------------------+
                 | Resource owner       | WebRTC server              |
                 +----------------------+----------------------------+
                 | Authorization server | Authorization server       |
                 +----------------------+----------------------------+
                 | Resource server      | TURN Server                |
                 +----------------------+----------------------------+

         Figure 4: OAuth terminology mapped to WebRTC terminology

   Using the OAuth 2.0 authorization framework, a WebRTC client (third-
   party application) obtains limited access to a TURN (resource server)
   on behalf of the WebRTC server (resource owner or authorization
   server).  The WebRTC client requests access to resources controlled
   by the resource owner (WebRTC server) and hosted by the resource
   server (TURN server).  The WebRTC client obtains access token,
   lifetime, session key (in the mac_key parameter) and kid.  The TURN
   client conveys the access token and other OAuth parameters learnt
   from the authorization server to the resource server (TURN server).
   The TURN server obtains the session key from the access token.  The
   TURN server validates the token, computes the message integrity of




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   the request and takes appropriate action i.e permits the TURN client
   to create allocations.  This is shown in an abstract way in Figure 5.

                           +---------------+
                           |               +<******+
            +------------->| Authorization |       *
            |              | Server        |       *
            |   +----------|(WebRTC Server)|       *  AS-RS,
            |   |          |               |       *  AUTH keys
   (2)      |   |           +---------------+      *   (1)
   Access   |   |  (3)                             *
   Token    |   | Access Token                     *
   Request  |   |    +                             *
            |   | Session Key                      *
            |   |                                  *
            |   V                                  V
        +-------+---+                       +-+----=-----+
        |           |         (4)           |            |
        |           | TURN Request + Access |            |
        | WebRTC    | Token                 | TURN       |
        | Client    |---------------------->| Server     |
        | (Alice)   | Allocate Response (5) |            |
        |           |<----------------------|            |
        +-----------+                       +------------+

   User : Alice
   ****: Out-of-Band Long-Term Key Establishment

                          Figure 5: Interactions

4.1.  Key Establishment

   The authorization server shares a long-term secret (like asymmetric
   credentials) with the resource server for mutual authentication.  The
   STUN server and authorization server MUST establish a symmetric key
   (K), using an out of band mechanism.  Symmetric key MUST be chosen to
   ensure that the size of encrypted token is not large because usage of
   asymmetric keys will result in large encrypted tokens which may not
   fit into a single STUN message.  The AS-RS, AUTH keys will be derived
   from K.  AS-RS key is used for encrypting the self-contained token
   and message integrity of the encrypted token is calculated using the
   AUTH key.  The STUN and authorization servers MUST establish the
   symmetric key over an authenticated secure channel.  The
   establishment of symmetric key is outside the scope of this
   specification.  For example, implementations could use one of the
   following mechanisms to establish a symmetric key.





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4.1.1.  DSKPP

   The two servers could choose to use Dynamic Symmetric Key
   Provisioning Protocol (DSKPP) [RFC6063] to establish a symmetric key
   (K).  The encryption and MAC algorithms will be negotiated using the
   KeyProvClientHello, KeyProvServerHello messages.  A unique key
   identifier (referred to as KeyID) for the symmetric key is generated
   by the DSKPP server (i.e.  Authorization server) and signalled to the
   DSKPP client (i.e STUN server) which is equivalent to the kid defined
   in this specification.  The AS-RS, AUTH keys would be derived from
   the symmetric key using (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF)
   [RFC5869] and the default hash function MUST be SHA-256.  For example
   if the input symmetric key (K) is 32 octets length, encryption
   algorithm is AES_256_CBC and HMAC algorithm is HMAC-SHA-256-128 then
   the secondary keys AS-RS, AUTH are generated from the input key K as
   follows

   1.  HKDF-Extract(zero, K) -> PRK

   2.  HKDF-Expand(PRK, zero, 32) -> AS-RS key

   3.  HKDF-Expand(PRK, zero, 32) -> AUTH key

   If Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm
   defined in [RFC5116] is used then there is no need to generate the
   AUTH key.

4.1.2.  HTTP interactions

   The two servers could choose to use REST API to establish a symmetric
   key.  To retrieve a new symmetric key, the STUN server makes an HTTP
   GET request to the authorization server, specifying STUN as the
   service to allocate the symmetric keys for, and specifying the name
   of the STUN server.  The response is returned with content-type
   "application/json", and consists of a JSON object containing the
   symmetric key.















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   Request
   -------

   service - specifies the desired service (turn)
   name    -  STUN server name be associated with the key

   example: GET /?service=stun&name=turn1@example.com


   Response
   --------

   key - Long-term key (K)
   ttl - the duration for which the key is valid, in seconds.

   example:
   {
      "key" :
   "ESIzRFVmd4iZABEiM0RVZgKn6WjLaTC1FXAghRMVTzkBGNaaN496523WIISKerLi",
      "ttl" : 86400,
      "kid" :"22BIjxU93h/IgwEb"
      "enc" : A256CBC-HS512
     }

   The AS-RS, AUTH keys are derived from K using HKDF as discussed in
   Section 4.1.1.  Authorization server must also signal kid to the STUN
   server which will be used to select the appropriate keying material
   for decryption.  A256CBC-HS512 and other encryption algorithms are
   defined in [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms].  In this case AS-RS
   key length must be 256-bit, AUTH key length must be 256-bit (section
   2.6 of [RFC4868]).

4.1.3.  Manual provisioning

   STUN and authorization servers could be manually configured with a
   symmetric key (K) and kid.  Mandatory to support authenticated
   encryption algorithm MUST be AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512.

   Note : The mechanism specified in Section 4.1.3 is easy to implement
   and deploy compared to DSKPP, REST but lacks encryption and HMAC
   algorithm agility.

5.  Forming a Request

   When a STUN server responds that third party authorization is
   required, a STUN client re-attempts the request, this time including
   access token and kid values in ACCESS-TOKEN and USERNAME STUN
   attributes.  The STUN client includes a MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute



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   as the last attribute in the message over the contents of the STUN
   message.  The HMAC for the MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute is computed as
   described in section 15.4 of [RFC5389] where the mac_key is used as
   the input key for the HMAC computation.  The STUN client and server
   will use the mac_key to compute the message integrity and doesn't
   have to perform MD5 hash on the credentials.

6.  STUN Attributes

   The following new STUN attributes are introduced by this
   specification to accomplish third party authorization.

6.1.  THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION

   This attribute is used by the STUN server to inform the client that
   it supports third party authorization.  This attribute value contains
   the STUN server name.  The STUN server may have tie-up with multiple
   authorization servers and vice versa, so the client MUST provide the
   STUN server name to the authorization server so that it can select
   the appropriate keying material to generate the self-contained token.
   The THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION attribute is a comprehension-optional
   attribute (see Section 15 from [RFC5389]).  If the client is able to
   comprehend THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION it MUST ensure that third party
   authorization takes precedence over first party authentication
   (explained in section 10 of [RFC5389]).  If the client does not
   support or is not capable of doing third party authorization then it
   defaults to first party authentication.

6.2.  ACCESS-TOKEN

   The access token is issued by the authorization server.  OAuth does
   not impose any limitation on the length of the access token but if
   path MTU is unknown then STUN messages over IPv4 would need to be
   less than 548 bytes (Section 7.1 of [RFC5389]), access token length
   needs to be restricted to fit within the maximum STUN message size.
   Note that the self-contained token is opaque to the client and it
   MUST NOT examine the ticket.  The ACCESS-TOKEN attribute is a
   comprehension-required attribute (see Section 15 from [RFC5389]).

   The token is structured as follows:











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         struct {
             opaque {
                 uint16_t key_length;
                 opaque mac_key[key_length];
                 uint64_t timestamp;
                 uint32_t lifetime;
             } encrypted_block;
             opaque mac[mac_length];
         } token;

                   Figure 6: Self-contained token format

   Note: uintN_t means an unsigned integer of exactly N bits.  Single-
   byte entities containing uninterpreted data are of type opaque.  All
   values in the token are stored in network byte order.

   The fields are described below:

   key_length:  Length of the session key in octets.  Key length of
      160-bits MUST be supported (i.e only 160-bit key is used by HMAC-
      SHA-1 for message integrity of STUN message).  The key length
      facilitates the hash agility plan discussed in section 16.3 of
      [RFC5389].

   mac_key:  The session key generated by the authorization server.

   timestamp:  64-bit unsigned integer field containing a timestamp.
      The value indicates the time since January 1, 1970, 00:00 UTC, by
      using a fixed point format.  In this format, the integer number of
      seconds is contained in the first 48 bits of the field, and the
      remaining 16 bits indicate the number of 1/64K fractions of a
      second (Native format - Unix).

   lifetime:  The lifetime of the access token, in seconds.  For
      example, the value 3600 indicates one hour.  The lifetime value
      MUST be greater than or equal to the "expires_in" parameter
      defined in section 4.2.2 of [RFC6749], otherwise resource server
      could revoke the token but the client assumes that the token has
      not expired and would not refresh the token.

   encrypted_block:  The encrypted_block is encrypted using the
      symmetric long-term key established between the resource server
      and the authorization server.  Shown in Figure 5 as AS-RS key.

   mac:  The Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) is calculated
      with the AUTH key over the 'encrypted_block' and the STUN server
      name (N) conveyed in the THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION response.  This
      ensures that the client does not use the same token to gain



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      illegal access to other STUN servers provided by the same
      administrative domain i.e., when multiple STUN servers in a single
      administrative domain share the same symmetric key with an
      authorization server.  The length of the mac field is known to the
      STUN and authorization server based on the negotiated MAC
      algorithm.

   An example encryption process is illustrated below.  Here C, N denote
   Ciphertext and STUN server name respectively.

   o  C = AES_256_CBC(AS-RS, encrypted_block)

   o  mac = HMAC-SHA-256-128(AUTH, C | | N)

   Encryption is applied before message authentication on the sender
   side and conversely on the receiver side.  The entire token i.e., the
   'encrypted_block' and 'mac' is base64 encoded (see section 4 of
   [RFC4648]) and the resulting access token is signaled to the client.
   If AEAD algorithm is used then there is no need to explicitly compute
   HMAC, the associated data MUST be the STUN server name (N) and the
   mac field MUST carry the nonce.  The length of nonce MUST be 12
   octets.

7.  Receiving a request with ACCESS-TOKEN attribute

   The STUN server, on receiving a request with ACCESS-TOKEN attribute,
   performs checks listed in section 10.2.2 of [RFC5389] in addition to
   the following steps to verify that the access token is valid:

   o  STUN server selects the keying material based on kid signalled in
      the USERNAME attribute.

   o  It performs the verification of the token message integrity by
      calculating HMAC over the encrypted portion in the self-contained
      token and STUN server name using AUTH key and if the resulting
      value does not match the mac field in the self-contained token
      then it rejects the request with an error response 401
      (Unauthorized).  If AEAD algorithm is used then it has only a
      single output, either a plaintext or a special symbol FAIL that
      indicates that the inputs are not authentic.

   o  STUN server obtains the mac_key by retrieving the content of the
      access token (which requires decryption of the self-contained
      token using the AS-RS key).

   o  The STUN server verifies that no replay took place by performing
      the following check:




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      *  The access token is accepted if the timestamp field (TS) in the
         self-contained token is recent enough to the reception time of
         the STUN request (RDnew) using the following formula: Lifetime
         + Delta > abs(RDnew - TS).  The RECOMMENDED value for the
         allowed Delta is 5 seconds.  If the timestamp is NOT within the
         boundaries then the STUN server discards the request with error
         response 401 (Unauthorized).

   o  The STUN server uses the mac_key to compute the message integrity
      over the request and if the resulting value does not match the
      contents of the MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute then it rejects the
      request with an error response 401 (Unauthorized).

   o  If all the checks pass, the STUN server continues to process the
      request.  Any response generated by the server MUST include the
      MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute, computed using the mac_key.

8.  Changes to STUN Client

   o  A STUN response is discarded by the client if the value computed
      for message integrity using mac_key does not match the contents of
      the MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute.

   o  If the access token expires then the client MUST obtain a new
      token from the authorization server and use it for new STUN
      requests.

9.  Usage with TURN

   Traversal Using Relay NAT (TURN) [RFC5766] an extension to the STUN
   protocol is often used to improve the connectivity of P2P
   applications.  TURN ensures that a connection can be established even
   when one or both sides is incapable of a direct P2P connection.
   However, as a relay service, it imposes a nontrivial cost on the
   service provider.  Therefore, access to a TURN service is almost
   always access-controlled.  In order to achieve third party
   authorization, a resource owner e.g.  WebRTC server, authorizes a
   TURN client to access resources on the TURN server.













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   +-------------------+                         +--------+  +---------+
   | .........  TURN   |                         |  TURN  |  |  WebRTC |
   | .WebRTC .  Client |                         |        |  |         |
   | .Client .         |                         | Server |  |  Server |
   | .........         |                         |        |  |         |
   +-------------------+                         +--------+  +---------+
     |       |           Allocate request                |         |
     |       |------------------------------------------>|         |
     |       |                                           |         |
     |       |         Allocate error response           |         |
     |       |         (401 Unauthorized)                |         |
     |       |<------------------------------------------|         |
     |       |         THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION         |         |
     |       |                                           |         |
     |       |                                           |         |
     |       |      HTTP Request for token               |         |
     |------------------------------------------------------------>|
     |       |      HTTP Response with token parameters  |         |
     |<------------------------------------------------------------|
     |OAuth  |                                           |         |
      Attributes                                         |         |
     |------>|                                           |         |
     |       |    Allocate request ACCESS-TOKEN          |         |
     |       |------------------------------------------>|         |
     |       |                                           |         |
     |       |         Allocate success response         |         |
     |       |<------------------------------------------|         |
     |       |             TURN Messages                 |         |
     |       |      ////// integrity protected //////    |         |
     |       |      ////// integrity protected //////    |         |
     |       |      ////// integrity protected //////    |         |

                 Figure 7: TURN Third Party Authorization

   In the above figure, the client sends an Allocate request to the
   server without credentials.  Since the server requires that all
   requests be authenticated using OAuth, the server rejects the request
   with a 401 (Unauthorized) error code and STUN attribute THIRD-PARTY-
   AUTHORIZATION.  The WebRTC client obtains access token from the
   WebRTC server and then tries again, this time including access token.
   This time, the server validates the token, accepts the Allocate
   request and returns an Allocate success response containing (amongst
   other things) the relayed transport address assigned to the
   allocation.

   Changes specific to TURN are listed below:





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   o  The access token can be reused for multiple Allocate requests to
      the same TURN server.  The TURN client MUST include the ACCESS-
      TOKEN attribute only in Allocate and Refresh requests.  Since the
      access token is only valid for a specific period of time, the TURN
      server MUST cache it so that it need not to be provided in every
      request within an existing allocation.

   o  The lifetime provided by the TURN server in the Allocate and
      Refresh responses MUST be less than or equal to the lifetime of
      the token.  It is RECOMMENDED that the TURN server calculate the
      maximum allowed lifetime value using the formula:

        lifetime + Delta - abs(RDnew - TS)

   o  If the access token expires then the client MUST obtain a new
      token from the authorization server and use it for new
      allocations.  The client MUST use the new token to refresh
      existing allocations.  This way client has to maintain only one
      token per TURN server.

10.  Security Considerations

   When OAuth is used the interaction between the client and the
   authorization server requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a
   ciphersuite offering confidentiality protection.  The session key
   MUST NOT be transmitted in clear since this would completely destroy
   the security benefits of the proposed scheme.  If an attacker tries
   to replay message with ACCESS-TOKEN attribute then the server can
   detect that the transaction ID as used for an old request and thus
   prevent the replay attack.  The client may know some (but not all) of
   the token fields encrypted with a unknown secret key and the token
   can be subjected to known-plaintext attack, but AES is secure against
   this attack.

   Threat mitigation discussed in section 5 of
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture] and security considerations in
   [RFC5389] are to be taken into account.

11.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to add the following attributes to the STUN
   attribute registry [iana-stun],

   o  THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION

   o  ACCESS-TOKEN





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12.  Acknowledgements

   Authors would like to thank Dan Wing, Pal Martinsen, Oleg Moskalenko,
   Charles Eckel, Spencer Dawkins and Hannes Tschofenig for comments and
   review.  The authors would like to give special thanks to Brandon
   Williams for his help.

   Thanks to Oleg Moskalenko for providing ticket samples in the
   Appendix section.

13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.

   [RFC4868]  Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
              384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, May 2007.

   [RFC5116]  McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.

   [RFC5389]  Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing,
              "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389,
              October 2008.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
              6749, October 2012.

   [iana-stun]
              IANA, , "IANA: STUN Attributes", April 2011,
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/stun-parameters/stun-pa
              rameters.xml>.

13.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms]
              Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", draft-ietf-jose-
              json-web-algorithms-40 (work in progress), January 2015.








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   [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture]
              Hunt, P., Richer, J., Mills, W., Mishra, P., and H.
              Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Security
              Architecture", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-00 (work
              in progress), July 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution]
              Bradley, J., Hunt, P., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
              "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to
              Client Key Distribution", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-
              distribution-00 (work in progress), July 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview]
              Alvestrand, H., "Overview: Real Time Protocols for
              Browser-based Applications", draft-ietf-rtcweb-overview-13
              (work in progress), November 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-tram-auth-problems]
              Reddy, T., R, R., Perumal, M., and A. Yegin, "Problems
              with STUN long-term Authentication for TURN", draft-ietf-
              tram-auth-problems-05 (work in progress), August 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-tram-stunbis]
              Petit-Huguenin, M., Salgueiro, G., Rosenberg, J., Wing,
              D., Mahy, R., and P. Matthews, "Session Traversal
              Utilities for NAT (STUN)", draft-ietf-tram-stunbis-00
              (work in progress), November 2014.

   [RFC5766]  Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using
              Relays around NAT (TURN): Relay Extensions to Session
              Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5766, April 2010.

   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
              Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010.

   [RFC6063]  Doherty, A., Pei, M., Machani, S., and M. Nystrom,
              "Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol (DSKPP)", RFC
              6063, December 2010.

   [RFC6819]  Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
              Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
              January 2013.

Appendix A.  Sample tickets

  Input data (same for all samples below):

  //STUN SERVER NAME



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  server_name = "blackdow.carleon.gov";

  //Shared password between AS and RS
  long_term_password = "HGkj32KJGiuy098sdfaqbNjOiaz71923";

  //MAC key of the session (included in the token)
  mac_key = "ZksjpweoixXmvn67534m";

  //length of the MAC key
  mac_key_length  =  20;

  //The timestamp field in the token
  token_timestamp = 92470300704768;

  //The lifetime of the token
  token_lifetime = 3600;

  //nonce for AEAD when AEAD is used
  aead_nonce = "h4j3k2l2n4b5";

  Samples:

  1)
  hkdf hash function = SHA-256,
  token encryption algorithm = AES-256-CBC
  token auth algorithm = HMAC-SHA-256

  Result:
  AS_RS key (32 bytes) = \xd\x7e\x54\x5b\x7e\x15\xc9\x81\x8c\x81\x4b\x83
                         \xdc\x4e\xce\x24\x55\xde\x73\xe\xab\x8\x8a\x94
                         \xc4\x29\xab\x45\xfd\x61\xa\xb5

  AUTH key (32 bytes) = \xd\x7e\x54\x5b\x7e\x15\xc9\x81\x8c\x81\x4b\x83
                        \xdc\x4e\xce\x24\x55\xde\x73\xe\xab\x8\x8a\x94
                        \xc4\x29\xab\x45\xfd\x61\xa\xb5

  Encrypted token (80 bytes = 48+32) =

  \x1b\xb6\x4b\x4f\xbf\x99\x6d\x60\x55\xda\xf3\x9f\xa1\xed\x3\x73\x4e
  \x1c\x95\x64\x84\xc1\xeb\xc3\x63\x9b\x70\xe6\xb8\x21\x45\xe6\x45\xa0
  \x23\xaf\xc1\xee\x87\x91\x7b\xea\xb8\x4a\x7f\x80\xb2\x0\xa5\xad\x14
  \x97\x17\xf9\xbc\xfa\xa1\xc6\x2f\x4d\xfc\xaf\xc1\xc5\x11\xc5\x55\x7d
  \xb0\x35\x58\xcf\xc6\xce\x6e\x10\x7\xd1\x98\xbd

  2)

  hkdf hash function = SHA-256,
  token encryption algorithm = AEAD_AES_256_GCM



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  token auth algorithm = N/A

  Result:
  AS_RS key (32 bytes) = \xd\x7e\x54\x5b\x7e\x15\xc9\x81\x8c\x81\x4b\x83
                         \xdc\x4e\xce\x24\x55\xde\x73\xe\xab\x8\x8a\x94
                         \xc4\x29\xab\x45\xfd\x61\xa\xb5
  AUTH key = N/A

  Encrypted token (62 bytes = 34 + 16 + 12) =

  \xa8\x52\x90\x64\xc7\xd9\x3b\x6c\xe\x9\xe\xcf\x9e\x7d\x0\x70\x47\xe2
  \x99\x8d\xe3\x31\xe1\x39\x20\xed\x88\x90\x4\xd8\xcf\x82\x93\x3f\xc6\
  x4\xd1\xaa\xe6\xf5\x62\xea\x3c\x94\x45\x8\x3d\xfa\xe9\x5f\x68\x34\x6a
  \x33\x6b\x32\x6c\x32\x6e\x34\x62\x35

  3)

  hkdf hash function = SHA-1,
  token encryption algorithm = AES-128-CBC
  token auth algorithm = HMAC-SHA-256-128

  Result:
  AS_RS key (16 bytes) = \x8c\x48\x5f\x1e\x1\x3a\xc6\x50\x36\x70\x84\x37
                         \xa5\x4e\xd7\x70
  AUTH key (32 bytes) = \x8c\x48\x5f\x1e\x1\x3a\xc6\x50\x36\x70\x84\x37
                        \xa5\x4e\xd7\x70\x17\xcc\xcd\xa1\x7c\xd7\x8\x39
                        \xfa\xc8\xee\x14\xf9\x77\xb4\xcf

  Encrypted token (64 bytes = 48+16) =

  \x13\xcd\x17\x4a\xde\x54\xe1\xe6\x65\xe6\xbb\x3a\xb9\x4d\x1c\xf7\x3b
  \x60\x31\x8b\xc4\x7\x4b\x3b\x5f\x1c\xda\xf4\x60\x4\x7\x88\x8e\xc9\xc7
  \xd3\xf4\x71\x94\x87\x85\xd9\xad\xf7\x6a\xda\x77\x4e\x11\x13\x8d\x8e
  \xe8\x93\x9\x76\xa3\x85\x96\x1f\x5e\xd3\xc4\x55


                         Figure 8: Sample tickets

Authors' Addresses

   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli
   Sarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring Road
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560103
   India

   Email: tireddy@cisco.com



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   Prashanth Patil
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Bangalore
   India

   Email: praspati@cisco.com


   Ram Mohan Ravindranath
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Cessna Business Park,
   Kadabeesanahalli Village, Varthur Hobli,
   Sarjapur-Marathahalli Outer Ring Road
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560103
   India

   Email: rmohanr@cisco.com


   Justin Uberti
   Google
   747 6th Ave S
   Kirkland, WA
   98033
   USA

   Email: justin@uberti.name
























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