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Versions: (draft-linus-trans-gossip) 00 01 02 03 04

TRANS                                                        L. Nordberg
Internet-Draft                                                  NORDUnet
Intended status: Experimental                                 D. Gillmor
Expires: February 29, 2016                                          ACLU
                                                               T. Ritter

                                                         August 28, 2015


                            Gossiping in CT
                       draft-ietf-trans-gossip-00

Abstract

   This document describes three gossiping mechanisms for Certificate
   Transparency (CT) [RFC6962]: SCT Feedback, STH Pollination and
   Trusted Auditor Relationship.

   SCT Feedback enables HTTPS clients to share Signed Certificate
   Timestamps (SCTs) (Section 3.2 of [RFC6962]) with CT auditors in a
   privacy-preserving manner by sending SCTs to originating HTTPS
   servers which in turn share them with CT auditors.

   In STH Pollination, HTTPS clients use HTTPS servers as pools sharing
   Signed Tree Heads (STHs) (Section 3.5 of [RFC6962]) with other
   connecting clients in the hope that STHs will find their way to
   auditors and monitors.

   HTTPS clients in a Trusted Auditor Relationship share SCTs and STHs
   with trusted auditors or monitors directly, with expectations of
   privacy sensitive data being handled according to whatever privacy
   policy is agreed on between client and trusted party.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."




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   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 29, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology and data flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Who gossips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  What to gossip about and how  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  SCT Feedback  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       5.1.1.  HTTPS client to server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       5.1.2.  HTTPS server to auditors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.1.3.  SCT Feedback data format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  STH pollination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.2.1.  HTTPS client STH and Inclusion Proof Fetching . . . .  10
       5.2.2.  Auditor and Monitor Action  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       5.2.3.  STH Pollination data format . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.3.  Trusted Auditor Stream  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       5.3.1.  Trusted Auditor data format . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.1.  Privacy considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       6.1.1.  Privacy and SCTs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       6.1.2.  Privacy in SCT Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       6.1.3.  Privacy for HTTPS clients requesting STHs . . . . . .  13
       6.1.4.  Privacy in STH Pollination  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.1.5.  Trusted Auditors for HTTPS Clients  . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.1.6.  HTTPS Clients as Auditors . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.  IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   9.  ChangeLog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     9.1.  Changes between -01 and -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     9.2.  Changes between -00 and -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16



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     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   The purpose of the protocols in this document is to detect
   misbehavior by CT logs.  In particular, CT logs can misbehave either
   by rewriting history or by presenting a "split view" of their
   operations, also known as a partitioning attack [THREAT-ANALYSIS].
   CT provides mechanisms for detection of these misbehaviors, but only
   if the community dependent on the log knows what to do with them.  In
   order for the community to effectively detect log misbehavior, it
   needs a well-defined way to "gossip" about the activity of the logs
   that makes use of the available mechanisms.

   One of the major challenges of any gossip protocol is limiting damage
   to user privacy.  The goal of CT gossip is to publish and distribute
   information about the logs and their operations, but not to leak any
   additional information about the operation of any of the other
   particpants.  Privacy of consumers of log information (in particular,
   of web browsers and other TLS clients) should not be damaged by
   gossip.

   This document presents three different, complementary mechanisms for
   non-log players in the CT ecosystem to exchange information about
   logs in a manner that preserves the privacy of the non-log players
   involved.  They should provide protective benefits for the system as
   a whole even if their adoption is not universal.

2.  Overview

   Public append-only untrusted logs have to be monitored for
   consistency, i.e., that they should never rewrite history.
   Additionally, monitors and other log clients need to exchange
   information about monitored logs in order to be able to detect a
   partitioning attack.

   A partitioning attack is when a log serves different views of the log
   to different clients.  Each client would be able to verify the
   append-only nature of the log while in the extreme case being the
   only client seeing this particular view.

   Gossiping about what's known about logs helps solve the problem of
   detecting malicious or compromised logs mounting such a partitioning
   attack.  We want some side of the partitioned tree, and ideally both
   sides, to see the other side.




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   Disseminating known information about a log poses a potential threat
   to the privacy of end users.  Some data of interest (e.g.  SCTs) are
   linkable to specific log entries and thereby to specific sites, which
   makes them privacy-sensitive.  Gossip about this data has to take
   privacy considerations into account in order not to leak associations
   between users of the log (e.g., web browsers) and certificate holders
   (e.g., web sites).  Even sharing STHs (which do not link to specific
   log entries) can be problematic - user tracking by fingerprinting
   through rare STHs is one potential attack.

   However, there is no loss in privacy if a client sends SCTs for a
   given site to the site corresponding to the SCT, because the site's
   access logs would already indicate that the client is accessing that
   site.  In this way a site can accumulate records of SCTs that have
   been issued by various logs for that site, providing a consolidated
   repository of SCTs which can be queried by auditors.

   Sharing an STH is considered reasonably safe from a privacy
   perspective as long as the same STH is shared by a large number of
   other clients.  This "safety in numbers" is achieved by requiring
   gossip only for STHs of a certain "freshness" and limiting the
   frequency by which logs can issue STHs.

3.  Terminology and data flow

   This document relies on terminology and data structures defined in
   [RFC6962], including STH, SCT, Version, LogID, SCT timestamp,
   CtExtensions, SCT signature, Merkle Tree Hash.

   The following picture shows how certificates, SCTs and STHs flow
   through a CT system with SCT Feedback and STH Pollination.  It does
   not show what goes in the Trusted Auditor Relationship stream.



















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      +- Cert ---- +----------+
      |            |    CA    | ----------+
      |   + SCT -> +----------+           |
      v   |                           Cert [& SCT]
   +----------+                           |
   |   Log    | ---------- SCT -----------+
   +----------+                           v
     |  ^                          +----------+
     |  |          SCT & Certs --- | Website  |
     |  |[1]           |           +----------+
     |  |[2]          STH            ^     |
     |  |[3]           v             |     |
     |  |          +----------+      |     |
     |  +--------> | Auditor  |      |  HTTPS traffic
     |             +----------+      |     |
     |             /                 |    SCT
     |            /            SCT & Certs |
   Log entries   /                   |     |
     |          /                   STH   STH
     v         /[4]                  |     |
   +----------+                      |     v
   | Monitor  |                    +----------+
   +----------+                    | Browser  |
                                   +----------+

   #   Auditor                        Log
   [1] |--- get-sth ------------------->|
       |<-- STH ------------------------|
   [2] |--- leaf hash + tree size ----->|
       |<-- index + inclusion proof --->|
   [3] |--- tree size 1 + tree size 2 ->|
       |<-- consistency proof ----------|
   [4] SCT, cert and STH among multiple Auditors and Monitors

4.  Who gossips

   o  HTTPS clients and servers (SCT Feedback and STH Pollination)

   o  HTTPS servers and CT auditors (SCT Feedback)

   o  CT auditors and monitors (Trusted Auditor Relationship)

   Additionally, some HTTPS clients may engage with an auditor who they
   trust with their privacy:

   o  HTTPS clients and CT auditors (Trusted Auditor Relationship)





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5.  What to gossip about and how

   There are three separate gossip streams:

   o  SCT Feedback, transporting SCTs and certificate chains from HTTPS
      clients to CT auditors/monitors via HTTPS servers.

   o  STH Pollination, HTTPS clients and CT auditors/monitors using
      HTTPS servers as STH pools for exchanging STHs.

   o  Trusted Auditor Stream, HTTPS clients communicating directly with
      trusted CT auditors/monitors sharing SCTs, certificate chains and
      STHs.

5.1.  SCT Feedback

   The goal of SCT Feedback is for clients to share SCTs and certificate
   chains with CT auditors and monitors in a privacy-preserving manner.

   HTTPS clients store SCTs and certificate chains they see and later
   send them to the originating HTTPS server by posting them to a .well-
   known URL.  This is described in Section 5.1.1.  Note that clients
   send the same SCTs and chains to servers multiple times with the
   assumption that a potential man-in-the-middle attack eventually will
   cease so that an honest server will receive collected malicious SCTs
   and certificate chains.

   HTTPS servers store SCTs and certificate chains received from clients
   and later share them with CT auditors by either posting them or
   making them available on a .well-known URL.  This is described in
   Section 5.1.2.

5.1.1.  HTTPS client to server

   An HTTPS client connects to an HTTPS server for a particular domain.
   The client receives a set of SCTs as part of the TLS handshake.  The
   client MUST discard SCTs that are not signed by a known log and
   SHOULD store the remaining SCTs together with the corresponding
   certificate chain for later use in feedback.

   When the client later reconnects to any HTTPS server for the same
   domain it again receives a set of SCTs.  The client MUST add new SCTs
   from known logs to its store of SCTs for the server.  The client MUST
   send to the server the ones in the store that are for that server and
   were not received from that server.






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   [ TODO: fix the above paragraph - it is vague and confusing.  maybe
   an example including a client caching at most one SCT per host+log
   would clarify ]

   Note that the SCT store also contains SCTs received in certificates.

   The client MUST NOT send the same set of SCTs to the same server more
   often than TBD.  [benl: "sent to the server" only really counts if
   the server presented a valid SCT in the handshake and the certificate
   is known to be unrevoked (which will be hard for a MitM to sustain)]
   [TODO: expand on rate/resource limiting motivation]

   An SCT MUST NOT be sent to any other HTTPS server than one serving
   the domain that the certificate signed by the SCT refers to.  This
   would lead to two types of privacy leaks.  First, the server
   receiving the SCT would learn about other sites visited by the HTTPS
   client.  Secondly, auditors or monitors receiving SCTs from the HTTPS
   server would learn information about the other HTTPS servers visited
   by its clients.

   If the HTTPS client has configuration options for not sending cookies
   to third parties, SCTs MUST be treated as cookies with respect to
   this setting.  [TODO: expand on why - local storage cleanup; more?]

   SCTs and corresponding certificates are POSTed to the originating
   HTTPS server at the well-known URL:

   https://<domain>/.well-known/ct/v1/sct-feedback

   The data sent in the POST is defined in Section 5.1.3.

   HTTPS servers perform a number of sanity checks on SCTs from clients
   before storing them:

   1.  if a bit-wise compare of an SCT plus chain matches a pair already
       in the store, this SCT and chain pair MAY be discarded

   2.  if the SCT can't be verified to be a valid SCT for the
       accompanying leaf cert, issued by a known log, the SCT SHOULD be
       discarded

   3.  if the leaf cert is not for a domain that the server is
       authoritative for, the SCT MUST be discarded

   Check number 1 is for detecting duplicates.  It's important to note
   that the check must be on pairs of SCT and chain in order to catch
   different chains accompanied by the same SCT.  [XXX why is this
   important?]



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   Check number 2 is to prevent spamming attacks where an adversary can
   fill up the store prior to attacking a client, or a denial of service
   attack on the server's storage space.

   Check number 3 is to help malfunctioning clients from leaking which
   sites they visit and additionally to prevent spamming attacks.

   Note that an HTTPS server MAY perform a certificate chain validation
   on a submitted certificate chain, and if it matches a trust root
   configured on the server (but is otherwise unknown to the server),
   the HTTPS server MAY store the certificate chain and MAY choose to
   store any submitted SCTs even if they are unable to be verified.  The
   risk of spamming and denial of service can be mitigated by
   configuring the server with all known acceptable certificates (or
   certificate hashes).

5.1.2.  HTTPS server to auditors

   HTTPS servers receiving SCTs from clients SHOULD share SCTs and
   certificate chains with CT auditors by either providing the well-
   known URL:

   https://<domain>/.well-known/ct/v1/collected-sct-feedback

   or by HTTPS POSTing them to a number of preconfigured auditors.  This
   allows an HTTPS server to choose between an active push model or a
   passive pull model.

   The data received in a GET of the well-known URL or sent in the POST
   is defined in Section 5.1.3.

   HTTPS servers SHOULD share all SCTs and accompanying certificate
   chains they see that pass the checks in Section 5.1.1.

   HTTPS servers MUST NOT share any other data that they may learn from
   the submission of SCT Feedback by HTTPS clients.

   Auditors SHOULD provide the following URL accepting HTTPS POSTing of
   SCT feedback data:

   https://<auditor>/ct/v1/sct-feedback

   Auditors SHOULD regularly poll HTTPS servers at the well-known
   collected-sct-feedback URL.  The frequency of the polling and how to
   determine which domains to poll is outside the scope of this
   document.  However, the selection MUST NOT be influenced by potential
   HTTPS clients connecting directly to the auditor, as it would reveal
   private information provided by the clients.



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5.1.3.  SCT Feedback data format

   The data shared between HTTPS clients and servers as well as between
   HTTPS servers and CT auditors/monitors is a JSON object [RFC7159]
   with the following content:

   o  sct_feedback: An array of objects consisting of

      *  x509_chain: An array of base64-encoded X.509 certificates.  The
         first element is the end-entity certificate, the second chains
         to the first and so on.

      *  sct_data: An array of objects consisting of the base64
         representation of the binary SCT data as defined in [RFC6962]
         Section 3.2.

   The 'x509_chain' element MUST contain the leaf certificate and the
   full chain to a known root.

5.2.  STH pollination

   The goal of sharing Signed Tree Heads (STHs) through pollination is
   to share STHs between HTTPS clients, CT auditors, and monitors in a
   privacy-preserving manner.

   HTTPS servers supporting the protocol act as STH pools.  HTTPS
   clients and others in the possesion of STHs should pollinate STH
   pools by sending STHs to them, and retrieving new STHs to send to new
   servers.  CT auditors and monitors should retrieve STHs from pools by
   downloading STHs from them.

   STH Pollination is carried out by sending STHs to HTTPS servers
   supporting the protocol, and retrieving new STHs.  In the case of
   HTTPS clients, STHs are sent in an already established TLS session.
   This makes it hard for an attacker to disrupt STH gossiping without
   also disturbing ordinary secure browsing (https://).

   STHs are sent by POSTing them to the .well-known URL:

   https://<domain>/.well-known/ct/v1/sth-pollination

   The data sent in the POST is defined in Section 5.2.3.

   The response contains zero or more STHs in the same format, described
   in Section 5.2.3.

   An HTTPS client may acquire STHs by several methods:




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   o  in replies to pollination POSTs;

   o  asking its supported logs for the current STH directly or
      indirectly;

   o  via some other (currently unspecified) mechanism.

   HTTPS clients (who have STHs), CT auditors, and monitors SHOULD
   pollinate STH pools with STHs.  Which STHs to send and how often
   pollination should happen is regarded as policy and out of scope for
   this document with exception of certain privacy concerns.

   An HTTPS client could be tracked by giving it a unique or rare STH.
   To address this concern, we place restrictions on different
   components of the system to ensure an STH will not be rare.

   o  Logs cannot issue STHs too frequently.  This is restricted to 1
      per hour.

   o  HTTPS clients silently ignore STHs which are not fresh.

   An STH is considered fresh iff its timestamp is less than 14 days in
   the past.  Given a maximum STH issuance rate of one per hour, an
   attacker has 336 unique STHs per log for tracking.

   When multiplied by the number of logs that a client accepts STHs for,
   this number of unique STHs grow and the negative privacy implications
   grow with it.  It's important that this is taken into account when
   logs are chosen for default settings in HTTPS clients.

   [TBD urge HTTPS clients to store STHs retrieved in responses?]

   [TBD share inclusion proofs and consistency proofs too?]

5.2.1.  HTTPS client STH and Inclusion Proof Fetching

   An HTTPS client retrieves SCTs from an HTTPS server, and must obtain
   an inclusion proof to an STH in order to verify the promise made by
   the SCT.  This retrieval mechanism reveals the client's browsing
   habits when the client requests the proof diretly from the log.  To
   mitigate this risk, an HTTPS client MUST retrieve the proof in a
   manner that disguises the client from the log.

   Additionally, for this inclusion proof to be acceptable to the
   client, the inclusion proof MUST reference a STH that is within the
   acceptable freshness interval.





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   Depending on the client's DNS provider, DNS may provide an
   appropriate intermediate layer that obfuscates the linkability
   between the user of the client and the request for inclusion (while
   at the same time providing a caching layer for oft-requested
   inclusion proofs.)

   Also Tor.

5.2.2.  Auditor and Monitor Action

   Auditors and Monitors participate in STH pollination by retrieving
   STHs from HTTPS servers.  They verify that the STH is valid by
   checking the signature, and requesting a consistency proof from the
   STH to the most recent STH.

   After retrieving the consistency proof to the most recent STH, they
   SHOULD pollinate this new STH among participating HTTPS Servers.  In
   this way, as STHs "age out" and are no longer fresh, their "lineage"
   continues to be tracked in the system.

5.2.3.  STH Pollination data format

   The data sent from HTTPS clients and CT monitors and auditors to
   HTTPS servers is a JSON object [RFC7159] with the following content:

   o  sths - an array of 0 or more fresh STH objects [XXX recently
      collected] from the log associated with log_id.  Each of these
      objects consists of

      *  sth_version: Version as defined in [RFC6962] Section 3.2, as a
         number.  The version of the protocol to which the sth_gossip
         object conforms.

      *  tree_size: The size of the tree, in entries, as a number.

      *  timestamp: The timestamp of the STH as defined in [RFC6962]
         Section 3.2, as a number.

      *  sha256_root_hash: The Merkle Tree Hash of the tree as defined
         in [RFC6962] Section 2.1, as a base64 encoded string.

      *  tree_head_signature: A TreeHeadSignature as defined in
         [RFC6962] Section 3.5 for the above data, as a base64 encoded
         string.

      *  log_id: LogID as defined in [RFC6962] Section 3.2, as a base64
         encoded string.




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   [XXX An STH is considered recently collected iff TBD.]

5.3.  Trusted Auditor Stream

   HTTPS clients MAY send SCTs and cert chains, as well as STHs,
   directly to auditors.  Note that there are privacy implications in
   doing so, these are outlined in Section 6.1.1 and Section 6.1.5.

   The most natural trusted auditor arrangement arguably is a web
   browser that is "logged in to" a provider of various internet
   services.  Another equivalent arrangement is a trusted party like a
   corporation to which an employee is connected through a VPN or by
   other similar means.  A third might be individuals or smaller groups
   of people running their own services.  In such a setting, retrieving
   STHs and inclusion proofs from that third party in order to validate
   SCTs could be considered reasonable from a privacy perspective.  The
   HTTPS client does its own auditing and might additionally share SCTs
   and STHs with the trusted party to contribute to herd immunity.
   Here, the ordinary [RFC6962] protocol is sufficient for the client to
   do the auditing while SCT Feedback and STH Pollination can be used in
   whole or in parts for the gossip part.

   Another well established trusted party arrangement on the internet
   today is the relation between internet users and their providers of
   DNS resolver services.  DNS resolvers are typically provided by the
   internet service provider (ISP) used, which by the nature of name
   resolving already know a great deal about which sites their users
   visit.  As mentioned in Section XXX, in order for HTTPS clients to be
   able to retrieve inclusion proofs for certificates in a privacy
   preserving manner, logs could expose a DNS interface in addition to
   the ordinary HTTPS interface.  An informal writeup of such a protocol
   can be found at XXX.

5.3.1.  Trusted Auditor data format

   [TBD specify something here or leave this for others?]

6.  Security considerations

6.1.  Privacy considerations

   The most sensitive relationships in the CT ecosystem are the
   relationships between HTTPS clients and HTTPS servers.  Client-server
   relationships can be aggregated into a network graph with potentially
   serious implications for correlative de-anonymisation of clients and
   relationship-mapping or clustering of servers or of clients.





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6.1.1.  Privacy and SCTs

   An SCT contains information that links it to a particular web site.
   Because the client-server relationship is sensitive, gossip between
   clients and servers about unrelated SCTs is risky.  Therefore, a
   client with an SCT for a given server should transmit that
   information in only two channels: to a server associated with the SCT
   itself; and to a trusted CT auditor, if one exists.

6.1.2.  Privacy in SCT Feedback

   SCTs introduce yet another mechanism for HTTPS servers to store state
   on an HTTPS client, and potentially track users.  HTTPS clients which
   allow users to clear history or cookies associated with an origin
   MUST clear stored SCTs associated with the origin as well.

   Auditors should treat all SCTs as sensitive data.  SCTs received
   directly from an HTTPS client are especially sensitive, because the
   auditor is a trusted by the client to not reveal their associations
   with servers.  Auditors MUST NOT share such SCTs in any way,
   including sending them to an external log, without first mixing them
   with multiple other SCTs learned through submissions from multiple
   other clients.  The details of mixing SCTs are TBD.

   There is a possible fingerprinting attack where a log issues a unique
   SCT for targeted log client(s).  A colluding log and HTTPS server
   operator could therefore be a threat to the privacy of an HTTPS
   client.  Given all the other opportunities for HTTPS servers to
   fingerprint clients - TLS session tickets, HPKP and HSTS headers,
   HTTP Cookies, etc. - this is acceptable.

   The fingerprinting attack described above could be avoided by
   requiring that logs i) MUST return the same SCT for a given cert
   chain ([RFC6962] Section 3) and ii) use a deterministic signature
   scheme when signing the SCT ([RFC6962] Section 2.1.4).

   There is another similar fingerprinting attack where an HTTPS server
   tracks a client by using a variation of cert chains.  The risk for
   this attack is accepted on the same grounds as the unique SCT attack
   described above.  [XXX any mitigations possible here?]

6.1.3.  Privacy for HTTPS clients requesting STHs

   An HTTPS client that does not act as an auditor should only request
   an STH from a CT log that it accepts SCTs from.  An HTTPS client
   should regularly [XXX how regularly?  This has operational
   implications for log operators] request an STH from all logs it is
   willing to accept, even if it has seen no SCTs from that log.



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6.1.4.  Privacy in STH Pollination

   An STH linked to an HTTPS client may indicate the following about
   that client:

   o  that the client gossips;

   o  that the client been using CT at least until the time that the
      timestamp and the tree size indicate;

   o  that the client is talking, possibly indirectly, to the log
      indicated by the tree hash;

   o  which software and software version is being used.

   There is a possible fingerprinting attack where a log issues a unique
   STH for a targeted log auditor or HTTPS client.  This is similar to
   the fingerprinting attack described in Section 6.1.2, but it is
   mitigated by the following factors:

   o  the relationship between auditors and logs is not sensitive in the
      way that the relationship between HTTPS clients and HTTPS servers
      is;

   o  because auditors regularly exchange STHs with each other, the re-
      appearance of a targeted STH from some auditor does not imply that
      the auditor was the original one targeted by the log;

   o  an HTTPS client's relationship to a log is not sensitive in the
      way that its relationship to an HTTPS server is.  As long as the
      client does not query the log for anything other than individual
      STHs, the client should not leak anything else to the log itself.
      However, a log and an HTTPS server which are collaborating could
      use this technique to fingerprint a targeted HTTPS client.

   Note that an HTTPS client in the configuration described in this
   document doesn't make direct use of the STH itself.  Its fetching of
   the STH and reporting via STH Pollination provides a benefit to the
   CT ecosystem as a whole by providing oversight on logs, but the HTTPS
   client itself will not necessarily derive direct benefit.

6.1.5.  Trusted Auditors for HTTPS Clients

   Some HTTPS clients may choose to use a trusted auditor.  This trust
   relationship leaks a certain amount of information from the client to
   the auditor.  In particular, it is likely to identify the web sites
   that the client has visited to the auditor.  Some clients may already
   share this information to a third party, for example, when using a



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   server to synchronize browser history across devices in a server-
   visible way, or when doing DNS lookups through a trusted DNS
   resolver.  For clients with such a relationship already established,
   sending SCT Feedback to the same organization does not appear to leak
   any additional information to the trusted third party.

   Clients who wish to contact an auditor without associating their
   identities with their SCT Feedback may wish to use an anonymizing
   network like Tor to submit SCT Feedback to the auditor.  Auditors
   SHOULD accept SCT Feedback that arrives over such anonymizing
   networks.

   Clients sending feedback to an auditor may prefer to reduce the
   temporal granularity of the history leakage to the auditor by caching
   and delaying their SCT Feedback reports.  This strategy is only as
   effective as the granularity of the timestamps embedded in the SCTs
   and STHs.

6.1.6.  HTTPS Clients as Auditors

   Some HTTPS Clients may choose to act as Auditors themselves.  A
   Client taking on this role needs to consider the following:

   o  an Auditing HTTPS Client potentially leaks their history to the
      logs that they query.  Querying the log through a cache or a proxy
      with many other users may avoid this leakage, but may leak
      information to the cache or proxy, in the same way that an non-
      Auditing HTTPS Client leaks information to a trusted Auditor.

   o  an effective Auditor needs a strategy about what to do in the
      event that it discovers misbehavior from a log.  Misbehavior from
      a log involves the log being unable to provide either (a) a
      consistency proof between two valid STHs or (b) an inclusion proof
      for a certificate to an STH any time after the log's MMD has
      elapsed from the issuance of the SCT.  The log's inability to
      provide either proof will not be externally cryptographically-
      verifiable, as it may be indistinguishable from a network error.

7.  IANA considerations

   TBD

8.  Contributors

   The authors would like to thank the following contributors for
   valuable suggestions: Al Cutter, Ben Laurie, Benjamin Kaduk, Karen
   Seo, Magnus Ahltorp, Yan Zhu.




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9.  ChangeLog

9.1.  Changes between -01 and -02

   o  STH Pollination defined.

   o  Trusted Auditor Relationship defined.

   o  Overview section rewritten.

   o  Data flow picture added.

   o  Section on privacy considerations expanded.

9.2.  Changes between -00 and -01

   o  Add the SCT feedback mechanism: Clients send SCTs to originating
      web server which shares them with auditors.

   o  Stop assuming that clients see STHs.

   o  Don't use HTTP headers but instead .well-known URL's - avoid that
      battle.

   o  Stop referring to trans-gossip and trans-gossip-transport-https -
      too complicated.

   o  Remove all protocols but HTTPS in order to simplify - let's come
      back and add more later.

   o  Add more reasoning about privacy.

   o  Do specify data formats.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC6962]  Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
              Transparency", RFC 6962, June 2013.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014.








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10.2.  Informative References

   [THREAT-ANALYSIS]
              Kent, S., "Threat Analysis for Certificate Transparency",
              2015, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-trans-
              threat-analysis/>.

Authors' Addresses

   Linus Nordberg
   NORDUnet

   Email: linus@nordu.net


   Daniel Kahn Gillmor
   ACLU

   Email: dkg@fifthhorseman.net


   Tom Ritter

   Email: tom@ritter.vg



























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