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INTERNET-DRAFT                                           Donald Eastlake
Intended status: Proposed Standard                             Futurewei
                                                           Dacheng Zhang
                                                                  Huawei
Expires: December 26, 2019                                 June 27, 2019

            Simple Group Keying Protocol TRILL Use Protfiles
               <draft-ietf-trill-link-gk-profiles-03.txt>


Abstract

   This document specifies use profiles for the application of the
   simple group keying protocol (SGKP) to multi-destination TRILL
   Extended RBridge Channel message security (RFC 7978) and TRILL over
   IP packet security (draft-ietf-trill-over-ip).


Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent
   to the authors or the TRILL working group mailing list:
   trill@ietf.org.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html. The list of Internet-Draft
   Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.














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Table of Contents

      1. Introduction............................................3
      1.1  Terminology and Acronyms..............................3

      2. DTLS: Extended RBridge Channel Group Keyed Security.....5
      2.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages..................5
      2.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data.......6

      3. TRILL Over IP Group Keyed Security......................7
      3.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages..................7
      3.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data.......8

      4. Security Considerations.................................9

      5. IANA Considerations....................................10
      5.1 Group Keying RBridge Channel Protocol Numbers.........10
      5.2 Group Secured Extended RBridge Channel SType..........10

      Normative References......................................11
      Informative References....................................12

      Acknowledgements..........................................13
      Authors' Addresses........................................14




























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1. Introduction

   This document specifies use profiles for the application of the
   simple group keying protocol (SGKP) [SGKPrfc] to the use of DTLS
   [RFC6347] formatted TRILL [RFC6325] [RFC7780] Extended RBridge
   Channel message security [RFC7178] [RFC7978] and to the use of IPsec
   formatted TRILL over IP [TRILLoverIP]. It is anticipated that there
   will be other uses for this group keying protocol.



1.1  Terminology and Acronyms

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] [RFC8174]
   when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

   This document uses terminology and acronyms defined in [RFC6325] and
   [RFC7178].  Some of these are repeated below for convenience along
   with additional new terms and acronyms.

      Data Label - VLAN or FGL.

      DTLS - Datagram Transport Level Security [RFC6347].

      FGL - Fine Grained Label [RFC7172].

      GKd - A distinguished station in a group that is in charge of
         which group keying (Section 2) is in use.

      GKs - Stations in a group other than GKd (Section 2).

      HKDF - Hash based Key Derivation Function [RFC5869].

      IS-IS - Intermediate System to Intermediate System [RFC7176].

      keying material - The set of a Key ID, a secret key, and a cypher
         suite.

      PDU - Protocol Data Unit.

      QoS - Quality of Service.

      RBridge - An alternative term for a TRILL switch.

      SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm [RFC6234].

      TRILL - Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links or Tunneled
         Routing in the Link Layer.


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      TRILL switch - A device that implements the TRILL protocol
         [RFC6325] [RFC7780], sometimes referred to as an RBridge.


















































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2. DTLS: Extended RBridge Channel Group Keyed Security

   This section specifies a profile of the simple group keying protocol
   (SGKP) defined in [SGKPrfc]. This profile provides shared secret
   keying to secure multi-destination Extended RBridge Channel messages
   [RFC7978] as described in Setction 2.2.

   For this SKGP use profile, a group is identified by TRILL Data Label
   (VLAN or FGL [RFC7172]) and consists of the data reachable [RFC7780]
   RBridges with interest in that Data Label. GKd is the RBridge in the
   group that, of those group members supporting the Group Keying
   Protocol, is the highest priority to be a TRILL distribution tree
   root as specified in Section 4.5 of [RFC6325]. If not all members of
   the group support the Group Keying Protocol, then there are two cases
   of destinations for multi-destination Channel Tunnel RBridge Channel
   messages:

   (1) If the sender and at least two other group members support the
       Group Keying Protocol, it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured
       multi-destination RBridge Channel message to cover the group and
       serially unicast to the group members not supporting the Group
       Keying Protocol.
   (2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the
       group members using pairwise security.



2.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages

   Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge
   Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see Section 5.1)
   RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or
   Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [RFC7978].

   The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as
   follows:

      Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the
            network manager chooses to use a lower priority after
            determining that such lower priority group keying messages
            will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be
            used as it may cause interference with the establishment and
            maintenance of adjacency.

      Use Type = 1

      KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [RFC5310] key ID.

      CypherSuiteLng = 2, CypherSuite is the cypher suite used in
            groupcast extended RBridge Channel data messages for the


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            corresponding KeyID2. This is a DTLS [RFC6347] cypher suite.

      KeyID2 Length = 1, KeyID2 is the index under which a group key is
            set. Group keys are, in effect, indexed by this KeyID2 and
            the nickname of the GKd as used in the Ingress Nickname
            field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying messages.



2.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data

   Protected Extended RBridge Channel [RFC7978] messages are multicast
   (M bit set to one in the TRILL Header) and set the SType field to a
   new value TBD2 for "Group Secured" (see Section 5.2). Since there
   could be multiple group keys distribued and enabled for use, data is
   formatted as two bytes of Key ID followed by data formatted as TLS
   1.3 [RFC8446] application_data using the cyphersuite and keying
   material stored under the Key ID. Such a message on the wire looks
   like the following:

         +---------------------------+
         |  Link Header              |
         +---------------------------+
         |  TRILL Header             |
         +---------------------------+
         |  RBridge Channel Header   |
         |   snd Extension           |
         +---------------------------+
         |  RBridge Channel Payload  |
         |  +----------------------+ |
         |  | 2-byte Key ID        | |
         |  +----------------------+ |
         |  | DTLS formatted       | |
         |  | application data     | |
         |  +----------------------+ |
         +---------------------------+
         |  Link Trailer             |
         +---------------------------+














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3. TRILL Over IP Group Keyed Security

   This SGKP usage profile provides shared secret keying to secure TRILL
   over IP messages [TRILLoverIP].  The keys put in place by the group
   keying protocol are available for use as IPSEC keys.

   For this use profile, a group is identified by an IP multicast
   address and consists of the RBridges adjacent [RFC7177] to the sender
   reachable with that multicast address over a TRILL over IP link. GKd
   is the RBridge in the group that, of those group members supporting
   the Group Keying Protocol, has the highest priority to be a TRILL
   distribution tree root as specified in Section 4.5 of [RFC6325]. If
   not all members of the group support the Group Keying Protocol, then
   there are two cases for multi-destination TRILL over IP messages:

   (1) If the sender and at least two other group members support SGKP,
       it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured IPSEC message to cover
       the group and serially unicast to the group members not
       supporting the Group Keying Protocol.
   (2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the
       group members using pairwise security.



3.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages

   Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge
   Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see Section 5.1)
   RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or
   Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [RFC7978].

   The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as
   follows:

      Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the
            network manager chooses to use a lower priority after
            determining that such lower priority group keying messages
            will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be
            used as it may cause interference with the establishment and
            maintenance of adjacency.

      Use Type = 2

      KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [RFC5310] key ID.

      CypherSuiteLng = variable, CypherSuite is an IKEv2 crypto
            algorithm "proposal" [RFC7296].

      KeyID2 Length = 4, KeyID2 is the IPsec multicast SA. It is the
            index under which a group key is set. Group keys are indexed


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            by this KeyID2 and the nickname of the GKd as used in the
            Ingress Nickname field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying
            messages.



3.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data

   Multi-destination TRILL over IP data packets are formatted as
   multicast IPsec ESP tunnel mode [RFC4303] packets. The key and crpto
   algorithms in use are indicated by the multicast SA.









































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4. Security Considerations

   See [SGKPrfc] for Simple Group Keying Protocol security
   considerations.

   See [RFC7978] for Extended RBridge Channel security considerations.

   See [RFC7457] in connection with TLS and DTLS security
   considerations.

   See [TRILLoverIP] for TRILL over IP secrity considerations.

   See [RFC4303] for IPsec ESP security considerations.







































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5. IANA Considerations

   This section gives IANA Considerations.



5.1 Group Keying RBridge Channel Protocol Numbers

   IANA is requested to assign TBD1 as the TRILL RBridge Channel
   protocol number, from the range assigned by Standards Action, for use
   when the "Group Keying" protocol is transmitted over Extended RBridge
   Channel messages.

   The added RBridge Channel protocols registry entry on the TRILL
   Parameters web page is as follows:

         Protocol  Description       Reference
         --------  --------------    ------------------
           TBD1    Group Keying      Section 2 of [this document]



5.2 Group Secured Extended RBridge Channel SType

   IANA is requested to assign TBD2 as the Group Secured SType in the
   "Extended RBridge Channel Security Types Subregistry" on the TRILL
   Parameters web page as follows:

         SType  Description    Reference
         -----  -------------  ----------
          TBD2  Group Secured  Section 2.2 of [this document]





















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Normative References

   [RFC2119] - BBradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
         Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119,
         March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4303] - Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
         4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005, <https://www.rfc-
         editor.org/info/rfc4303>.

   [RFC5310] - Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R.,
         and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication", RFC
         5310, DOI 10.17487/RFC5310, February 2009, <http://www.rfc-
         editor.org/info/rfc5310>.

   [RFC5869] - Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-
         Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010,
         <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.

   [RFC6325] - Perlman, R., Eastlake 3rd, D., Dutt, D., Gai, S., and A.
         Ghanwani, "Routing Bridges (RBridges): Base Protocol
         Specification", RFC 6325, DOI 10.17487/RFC6325, July 2011,
         <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6325>.

   [RFC6347] - Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
         Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012, <http://www.rfc-
         editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC7172] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Zhang, M., Agarwal, P., Perlman, R.,
         and D. Dutt, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links
         (TRILL): Fine-Grained Labeling", RFC 7172, DOI
         10.17487/RFC7172, May 2014, <http://www.rfc-
         editor.org/info/rfc7172>.

   [RFC7176] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Senevirathne, T., Ghanwani, A., Dutt,
         D., and A. Banerjee, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of
         Links (TRILL) Use of IS-IS", RFC 7176, May 2014,
         <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7176>.

   [RFC7177] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Perlman, R., Ghanwani, A., Yang, H.,
         and V. Manral, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links
         (TRILL): Adjacency", RFC 7177, DOI 10.17487/RFC7177, May 2014,
         <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7177>.

   [RFC7178] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Manral, V., Li, Y., Aldrin, S., and D.
         Ward, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL):
         RBridge Channel Support", RFC 7178, DOI 10.17487/RFC7178, May
         2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7178>.

  [RFC7296] - Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.


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         Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
         STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October 2014,
         <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.

   [RFC7780] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Zhang, M., Perlman, R., Banerjee, A.,
         Ghanwani, A., and S. Gupta, "Transparent Interconnection of
         Lots of Links (TRILL): Clarifications, Corrections, and
         Updates", RFC 7780, DOI 10.17487/RFC7780, February 2016,
         <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7780>.

   [RFC7978] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Umair, M., and Y. Li, "Transparent
         Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL): RBridge Channel
         Header Extension", RFC 7978, DOI 10.17487/RFC7978, September
         2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7978>.

   [RFC8174] - Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
         2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May
         2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446] - Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
         Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August
         2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [TRILLoverIP] - M. Cullen, D. Eastlake, M. Zhang, D. Zhang,
         "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL) over IP",
         draft-ietf-trill-over-ip, work in progress.

   [SGKPrfc] - D. Eastlake, D. Zhang, "Simple Group Keying Protocol
         (SGKP)", draft-ietf-trill-group-keying, work in progress.



Informative References

   [RFC6234] - Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash
         Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI
         10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, <http://www.rfc-
         editor.org/info/rfc6234>.

   [RFC7457] - Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing
         Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
         TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, February 2015, <http://www.rfc-
         editor.org/info/rfc7457>.









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Acknowledgements

   The contributions of the following are hereby gratefully
   acknowledged:

         TBD














































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Authors' Addresses

      Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd
      Futurewei Technologies
      1424 Pro Shop Court
      Davenport, FL 33896 USA

      Phone: +1-508-333-2270
      EMail: d3e3e3@gmail.com


      Dacheng Zhang
      Huawei Technologies

      Email: dacheng.zhang@huawei.com





































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