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Versions: 00 01 02 draft-ietf-v6ops-tunnel-security-concerns
IPv6 Operations Working Group J. Hoagland
Internet-Draft Symantec
Expires: August 28, 2008 S. Krishnan
Ericsson
February 25, 2008
Teredo Security Concerns
draft-ietf-v6ops-teredo-security-concerns-02
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract
Additional security concerns with Teredo are documented, beyond what
is in RFC 4380. This is based on an independent analysis of Teredo's
security implications. The primary intent of this document is to
raise the awareness regarding the security issues in Teredo as
deployed today.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Teredo Bypasses Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Teredo Bypasses Network Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. IPv6 Ingress and Egress Filtering Bypass . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Source Routing After the Teredo Client . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Challenges in Inspecting and Filtering Content of Teredo
Data Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Inefficiency of Selective Network Filtering of All
Teredo Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Problems with deep packet inspection of Teredo data
packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Increased Exposure Due to Teredo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Teredo NAT Holes Increase Attack Surface . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Unusually High Exposure of a NAT Hole . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Teredo Bubble Facility Widens Hole in Restricted NAT . . . 11
5. Teredo Address Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. Feasibility of Guessing Teredo Addresses . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. Profiling Targets Based on Teredo Address . . . . . . . . 12
6. Additional Security Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Attacks Facilitated By Changing Teredo Server Setting . . 14
6.2. RFC 4380 Implies That Teredo Improves Security . . . . . . 16
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 20
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1. Introduction
An independent analysis of Teredo's security implications was
conducted by Symantec[TEREDOSEC], based on the Teredo specification
([RFC4380]). This analysis uncovered some security concerns
associated with Teredo which are not documented in the Teredo
specification. This document discloses these additional concerns and
includes any recommendations where relevant. This Internet Draft is
also influenced to an extent by an examination of the Teredo
implementation on Microsoft Windows Vista [WVNASA].
The primary intent of this document is to provide information that
can be used in any updated Teredo specification. Secondarily, this
document can help improve security in Teredo as deployed (including
those that implement Teredo, security providers, and network security
administrators) become aware of any valid security concerns.
2. Teredo Bypasses Security
2.1. Teredo Bypasses Network Security
2.1.1. Problem
IPv6 traffic tunneled with Teredo will not receive the intended level
of inspection or policy application by network-based security
devices, unless the devices are specifically Teredo aware and
capable. This reduces defense in depth and may cause security gaps.
This applies to all network-located devices and to end-host based
firewalls whose existing hooking mechanism(s) would not show them the
IP packet stream after the Teredo client does decapsulation.
2.1.2. Discussion
Evasion by tunneling is often a problem for network-based security
devices such as firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention
systems, and router controls. The vendor of such devices must add
support for detunneling for each new protocol. There is typically a
significant lag between when the vendor recognizes that a tunnel will
be used (or will be remotely usable) to a significant degree and when
the detunneling can be implemented in a product update, the update
tested and released, and the customer begins using the update. Late
changes in the protocol specification or in the way it is implemented
can cause additional delays. This becomes a significant security
concern when a delay in applied coverage is occurring frequently.
Specifically for Teredo, a Teredo-unaware network security device
would inspect or regulate the IPv4 and the IPv4-based UDP layer as
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normal for IPv4, but it would not recognize that there is an
additional IP layer contained inside the UDP payload that it needs to
apply the same controls as it would to a native packet. (Of course,
if the device discards the packet due to something in the IPv4 or UDP
header, such as referring to an unknown protocol, the Teredo packet
is no longer a concern.) Teredo also only recently reached RFC
status (February 2006), is widely applicable, requires no support
from the local or organizational network, and looks ready to be
widely used. Furthermore the tunnel created by the Teredo client is
open-ended and allows bidirectional traffic.
Network security controls being not applied must be a concern to
those that set them up, since those controls are supposed to
adequately regulate all traffic. If network controls are being
bypassed due to the use of IPv6 via Teredo, the burden of controls
shifts to the Teredo client host. Since security administrators may
not have full control over all the nodes on their network, they
sometimes prefer to implement security controls on the network.
One implication of the security control bypass is that defense in
depth has been reduced, perhaps down to zero unless a 'local
firewall' is in use, as recommended as a mitigation in RFC 4380.
However, even if there are host-based security controls that
recognize Teredo, security administrators may not have configured
them with full security control parity, even if all controls that
were maintained by the network are available on the host. Thus there
may be gaps in desired coverage.
Compounding this is that, unlike what would be the case for native
IPv6, some network administrators will not even be aware that their
hosts are globally addressable; for example, they may not be
expecting this for hosts with RFC-1918 [RFC1918] addresses behind a
NAT. In addition, Section 3.2 discusses how it may not be efficient
to find all Teredo traffic for network devices to examine.
2.1.3. Recommendations
Of course security administrators should disable Teredo functionality
unless their network-based security controls adequately recognize the
tunneled traffic (unless they consider it an acceptable risk).
However, there may be an awareness gap. Thus, due to the possible
negative security consequences, we recommend that explicit user
action be required to enable a Teredo client for the first time, at
least for the time being. When Teredo is being enabled or when it is
going to be used for the first time, perhaps there should be a
descriptive warning about the possible evasion that will occur. In
addition, Teredo client functionality should be easy to disable on
the host and through a central management facility if one is
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provided.
RFC 4380 requires that Teredo be an IPv6 provider of last resort. To
minimize security exposure due to Teredo, we recommend that Teredo
also be an IP provider of last resort. Specifically, we suggest that
when both IPv4- and IPv6-based access to a remote host is available,
that the IPv4-based access be used in preference to IPv6 access that
needs to use Teredo. This should also promote greater efficiency and
reliability.
We specifically note that we could find no pre-existing mechanism for
Teredo to use that could automate its functionality being disabled
unless all network-based security controls were aware of it. A
separate type of consent request packet would be needed. (Such a
consent request service could have application beyond Teredo.)
2.2. IPv6 Ingress and Egress Filtering Bypass
2.2.1. Problem
IPv6 addresses inside Teredo tunnels are not subject to ingress and
egress filtering, unless extraordinary measures are taken.
2.2.2. Discussion
Ingress filtering (sanity-checking incoming destination addresses)
and egress filtering (sanity-checking outgoing source addresses) are
done to mitigate attacks and to make it easier to identify the source
of a packet and are considered to be a good practice. This is most
naturally (and in the general case, by requirement) done at network
boundaries. Teredo-tunneled IPv6 traffic bypassing this network
control is a specific case of Section Section 2.1, but is
illustrative.
2.2.3. Recommendations
The recommendations in Section 2.1.3 can help here. For this problem
specifically, there are two locations in which ingress and egress
filtering could be restored.
Network based: network-based devices (e.g. routers) could be updated
to find all Teredo packets and to apply ingress and egress
controls equally to Teredo tunneled IPv6-addresses.
Teredo client based: Teredo clients could make an effort to conduct
ingress and egress filtering. However, there are at least two
problems inherent in attempting to do address filtering from this
vantage point: knowing the network addresses to filter (drop the
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packets of) and knowing whether a peer is from the same network.
The network addresses to filter could be approximated from
enumerating the addresses on the network interface the Teredo
client is using; at least the /64 of global unicast addresses can
be assumed to be in use on the network. Router Solicitations
[RFC2461] could also be made.
Peers known to be local due to the Teredo local discovery
procedure can be excluded from filtering, but the scope of that
knowledge is limited to a broadcast domain, whereas ingress and
egress filtering generally applies to a larger scope.
2.3. Source Routing After the Teredo Client
2.3.1. Problem
If the encapsulated IPv6 packet specifies source routing beyond the
recipient Teredo client, the host may forward the IPv6 packet to the
specified next hop. This may be unexpected and contrary to
administrator wishes and may have bypassed network-based source
routing controls.
2.3.2. Discussion
A detailed discussion of issues related to source routing can be
found in [RFC5095]
2.3.3. Recommendations
Teredo clients should by default discard tunneled IPv6 packets that
specify additional routing, though they may also allow the user to
configure what source routing types are allowed. All pre-existing
source routing controls should be upgraded to apply these controls to
Teredo tunneled IPv6 packets as well.
3. Challenges in Inspecting and Filtering Content of Teredo Data
Packets
3.1. Inefficiency of Selective Network Filtering of All Teredo Packets
3.1.1. Problem
There is no mechanism to both efficiently and immediately filter all
Teredo packets. This limits the ability to prevent Teredo use on a
network.
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3.1.2. Discussion
Given concerns about Teredo security or a network's lack of
preparedness for Teredo, a network administrator may wish to simply
block all Teredo use. He or she may wish to do so using network
controls; this could be either due to not having confidence in the
ability to disable it on all hosts attached to the network or due to
wanting an extra layer of prevention.
One simple method to do that is easy to employ is to block outbound
packets to UDP port 3544. This prevents a Teredo client from
connecting to its server and completing qualification. Thus it can
be assured that a host trying to establish a new Teredo address will
be prevented from using Teredo tunneling. However, existing Teredo
clients will not be affected, at least not immediately. In addition,
if the blocking is applied on the outside of client's NAT, the NAT
will retain the port mapping for the client and the client may or may
not continue to use its Teredo address. It is not known if blocking
all outbound port 3544 will interfere with non-Teredo traffic.
The other approach is to find all packets to block in the same way as
would be done for inspecting all packets (Section 3.2). However,
this faces the difficulties in terms of efficiency of filtering as
was present there.
3.1.3. Recommendations
Teredo is NOT RECOMMENDED as a solution for managed networks.
Administrators of such networks may wish to filter all Teredo traffic
at the boundaries of their networks. It is sufficient to filter out
the Teredo connection requests to stop further Teredo traffic. The
easiest mechanism for this would be to filter out incoming traffic
with source port 3544 and outgoing traffic with destination port
3544.
3.2. Problems with deep packet inspection of Teredo data packets
3.2.1. Problem
There is no efficient mechanism for network-based devices to inspect
the contents of Teredo data packets, the way they can for native IPv6
packets. This makes it difficult to apply the same controls as they
do to native IPv6.
3.2.2. Discussion
The only well known port that Teredo traffic uses is UDP 3544 and RFC
4380 only requires that to be used for the Teredo server service
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port. The client and relay components can use any port they wish.
The implication of this is that network-based devices that wish to
passively inspect (and perhaps selectively apply policy to) all
encapsulated Teredo-based traffic must inspect all UDP packets (or at
least all UDP packets not part of a session that is known not to be
Teredo). This is inefficient (more so that say 6to4), especially
considering that a heuristic must then be applied to determine if a
packet is indeed Teredo. This may be too slow to make use of in
practice, especially if it means that all UDP packets must be taken
off of the device's "fast path".
One heuristic that can be used on UDP packets to determine if they
are Teredo-related or not is as follows:
1. The packet is not Teredo if it is not UDP over IPv4.
2. Set T to the UDP payload offset.
3. Set E to the end of the packet plus one.
4. If E-T < 40 (the length of an IPv6 base header), the packet is
not Teredo.
5. If the octets starting with T are 0x0001 (an indication of
authentication data), T= T+13 plus the lengths of the client
identifier and the authentication value, assuming T is the start
of authentication data.
6. If E-T < 40, the packet is not Teredo.
7. If the octets starting with T are 0x0000 (an indication of
origin encapsulation), T= T+8.
8. If E-T < 40, the packet is not Teredo.
9. If the octets starting with T is 0x0000 or 0x0001, loop back to
step 5.
10. If the most significant nibble of the octet at T is not 6, the
packet is not Teredo.
11. Assuming T is the start of an IPv6 header, set L to the value of
the payload length field, S to the start of the source address,
and D to the start of the destination address.
12. If E-T != L+40, the packet is not Teredo.
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13. If neither S nor D start with 0x20010000 (the Teredo prefix),
the packet is not Teredo.
14. The packet is assumed to be Teredo, with the IPv6 header
starting at T.
This is similar to the packet reception checks in [RFC4380]. The
loop is present due to the possibility that some Teredo component
will accept a Teredo packet even if the authentication and origin
encapsulation are reversed or repeated and that either an attacker or
an evasive user will use that to evade inspection. It is possible
that non-Teredo packets will match as Teredo using this heuristic (in
which case additional heuristics can be added), but Teredo packets
should not escape inspection, absent implementation bugs.
It is not possible to monitor Teredo setup on specific ports to know
to expect that Teredo traffic will appear on certain ports later
since in some cases there are no Teredo setup packets (e.g., when a
Teredo client is sending a packet to another Teredo client that is
not behind a restricted NAT).
3.2.3. Recommendations
As illustrated above, it is very clear that inspecting the contents
of Teredo data packets is highly complex and impractical. For this
reason, if a network wishes to monitor IPv6 traffic, Teredo is NOT
RECOMMENDED as a transition solution. As an alternative, the network
may provide native IPv6 connectivity or a managed network solution
like ISATAP [RFC4214]
4. Increased Exposure Due to Teredo
4.1. Teredo NAT Holes Increase Attack Surface
4.1.1. Problem
The opening created in a NAT due to a Teredo client increases its
Internet attack surface area. If vulnerabilities are present, this
increased exposure can be used by attackers and their programs.
4.1.2. Discussion
When a Teredo client is active, a mapped port is maintained on the
NAT through which Internet hosts can send packets and perhaps
establish connections. The following sequence is intended to sketch
out the processing on the Teredo client host that can be reached
through this; the actual processing for a given host may be somewhat
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different.
1. IPv4 host firewall processing
2. IPv4 processing by stack
3. UDP processing by stack
4. Teredo client processing
5. IPv6 host firewall processing
6. IPv6 processing by stack
7. various upper layer processing may follow
The firewall (and other security) processing may or may not be
present, but if it is, some of the IPv6 processing may be filtered.
(By the virtue of the Teredo client being active, we can infer that
the IPv4 firewall is unlikely to do any filtering for this.) Any of
this processing may expose vulnerabilities an attacker can exploit;
similarly these may expose information to an attacker. Thus, even if
firewall filtering is in place (as is prudent) and filters all
incoming packets, the exposed area is non-trivial.
The exposed area is even larger than if a native IPv6 Internet
connection was in place, due to the processing that takes place
before IPv6 is reached. It is also larger than for a native IPv4
connection due to the UDP, Teredo, and IPv6 processing.
One possibility is that a layer 3 targeted worm makes use of a
vulnerability in the exposed processing. While the main benefit to
worms from Teredo is targeting at layer 3 reaching the end host, even
a throughly firewalled host could be subject to a worm that spreads
with a single UDP packet if the right remote code vulnerability is
present; such worms can spread quickly as evidenced by Slammer.
4.1.3. Recommendations
This problem seems inherent in Teredo being active on a host, so the
solution seems to be to minimize Teredo use.
For example, it can be active only when it is really needed and only
for as long as needed. So, the Teredo interface can be initially not
configured and only used when it is entirely the last resort. The
interface should then be deactivated again as soon as possible. Note
however that the hole will remain in the NAT for some amount of time
after this, so some processing of incoming packets is inevitable
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(unless the client's IPv4 address is changed).
4.2. Unusually High Exposure of a NAT Hole
4.2.1. Problem
Attackers are more likely to know about a Teredo client's NAT hole
than a typical hole in the NAT. If they know about the hole, they
could try to use it.
4.2.2. Discussion
There are at least three reasons why an attacker is more likely to
learn of the Teredo client's exposed port than a typical NAT exposed
port:
1. The NAT mapping is typically held open longer and kept more
stable than would otherwise be the case. This increases the
chance of it being discovered.
2. The external IP address and port is contained in the client's
Teredo address. While the Teredo protocol itself only
distributes this address on packets, peers and even network
components such as Teredo relays may record the Teredo address
in, for example, log files; the address may even make its way
onto, for example, peer-to-peer host advertisements.
3. The Teredo protocol contains more messages that are exchanged and
with more parties than is typical, offering more chance for
visibility into the port and address in use. All Teredo protocol
packets contain the client's external address and port.
4.2.3. Recommendations
The recommendations from Section 4.1 seem to apply here as well:
minimize Teredo use.
4.3. Teredo Bubble Facility Widens Hole in Restricted NAT
4.3.1. Problem
The bubble facility offered by clients and their servers to relays
essentially turns a restricted NAT into an unrestricted one, for all
Teredo client service ports. This eliminates NAT filtering for such
ports and may eliminate the need for an attacker to spoof an address.
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4.3.2. Discussion
Restricted NATs and port restricted NATs [RFC3489] limit the source
of incoming packets to just those that are a previous destination.
This poses a problem for Teredo, so [RFC4380] provides a facility for
relays, upon request, to become a previous destination. This works
by a "bubble" packet sent to the server, passed to the client, and
then sent by the client (through the NAT) to the originator.
However, any host on the Internet can use this facility, not just
relays, since any host can serve as a host-only relay.
This removes any NAT-based barrier to attackers sending packets in
through the client's service port. In particular, an attacker would
no longer need to either be an actual previous destination or to
forge its addresses as a previous destination. When forging, the
attacker would have had to learn of a previous destination and then
would face more challenges in seeing any returned traffic.
There may be equivalent functionality in other protocols to provide
this service.
4.3.3. Recommendations
This facility is necessary for Teredo to operate, at least in its
current form. Minimizing Teredo use (see Section 4.1.3) would lower
the attacker opportunity related to this exposure.
5. Teredo Address Concerns
5.1. Feasibility of Guessing Teredo Addresses
5.1.1. Problem
It may be feasible guess Teredo addresses, either when looking for a
specific Teredo client or when looking for an arbitrary Teredo
client. This is in contrast to native IPv6 address in general. A
companion document [TEREDOUP] provides a possible solution for this
problem.
5.2. Profiling Targets Based on Teredo Address
5.2.1. Problem
An attacker encountering a Teredo address has the opportunity to
infer certain relevant pieces of information that can be used to
profile the host before sending any packets. This can reduce the
attacker's footprint and increase the attacker's efficiency.
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5.2.2. Discussion
The Teredo address reveals some information about the nature of the
client. The information is reasonably reliable, even if some of it
is not tied to the Teredo protocol specification.
o That a host has a Teredo address at all means that there is a
Teredo client implementation available for that platform. It
probably also means that it was installed by default and also that
the hosts default rules for using it made it susceptible to being
in use. For example, as of this writing, seeing a Teredo address
strongly suggests that the host it is on is running Windows Vista.
o The server field in the Teredo address also suggests some
information. Teredo client software most often get to the end
user, installed, and configured using some degree of automation.
It seems likely that the majority of the time the Teredo server
that results from the initial configuration will go unchanged from
the initial setting. Moreover, the server that is configured for
use may be associated with particular means of installation, which
often suggests the platform. For example, if the server field in
the Teredo address is one of the IPv4 addressees that
teredo.ipv6.microsoft.com resolves to, that suggests that the host
is running Windows.
o The external IPv4 address in a Teredo address can of course be
readily associated with a particular organization or at least an
ISP.
o It is also possible that external client port numbers may be more
often associated with particular client software or the operating
system it is running on. The usefulness of this is reduced by the
different NAT port number assignment behaviors, though the net
result of this composition can not be determined without study.
The platform, Teredo client software, or organization information can
be used by an attacker to target attacks more carefully. For
example, an attacker may decide to use an address if it corresponds
to an organization they want to penetrate. (That example would not
be unique to Teredo addresses, but shows that Teredo reveals the same
information.) An attacker or worm might also decide to use a Teredo
address only if it looks to be associated with Windows or a certain
version of Windows. (This does not seem to have a strong analogue in
native IPv4 or IPv6 addresses.)
The cone bit tells the attacker whether a bubble is needed to proceed
a connection. It may also have some value in terms of profiling to
the extent that it reveals the security posture of the network. If
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the cone bit is set, the attacker may decide it is fruitful to port
scan the embedded external IPv4 address and others associated with
the same organization, looking for open ports.
5.2.3. Recommendations
If installation programs randomized the server setting, that would
reduce the extent to which they can be profiled. Similarly,
administrators can chose to change the default setting to reduce the
degree to which they can be profiled ahead of time.
Randomizing the Teredo client port in use would mitigate any
profiling that can be done based on the external port, especially if
multiple different Teredo clients did this. Further discussion on
randomizing ports can be found at [PORTRAND].
A companion document [TEREDOUP] provides a possible solution for
avoiding the disclosure of the network's security posture
6. Additional Security Concerns
6.1. Attacks Facilitated By Changing Teredo Server Setting
6.1.1. Problem
Malware or a malicious user could change a Teredo client's server
setting. This would allow them to at least monitor peer IPv6
addresses and at worst pretend to represent the remote peer.
6.1.2. Discussion
[RFC4380] documents that the Teredo server must be a trusted entity.
However, it may be possible for malware or a malicious user to
quietly change the Teredo client's server setting and have the user
be unaware their trust has been misplaced for an indefinite period of
time.
A client's server is involved in the Direct IPv6 Connectivity Test
and in the bubble procedure, so it has good visibility into the
client's IPv6 peers. If the server were switched to one that records
this information and makes it available to third parties (e.g.,
advertisers, competitors, spouses, etc.) then sensitive information
is being disclosed, especially if the client's host prefers Teredo
over native IPv4. This is not technically difficult to set up,
especially given the availability of open source Teredo server
implementations. Assuming the server provides good service, the user
would not have reason to suspect the change.
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Full interception of IPv6 traffic could also be arranged (including
pharming) which would allow any number of deception or monitoring
attacks including phishing. We illustrate this with an example
phishing attack scenario.
1. A phisher stands up a malicious Teredo server (or tampers with a
legitimate one). This server, for the most part, provides
correct service.
2. Some malware reaches a victim host by some means and switches the
host's Teredo server setting to reference the above server
(either by IPv4 address or by hostname).
3. A user on the victim host types their bank's URL into his/her
browser.
4. The bank's hostname resolves to both IPv6 and IPv4 addresses and
the IPv6 address is selected for the socket connection.
(Alternately, it just resolves to IPv6.)
5. The host is behind an IPv4 NAT so no native IPv6 or ISATAP
connection is possible, so the Teredo interface is used.
6. The Teredo client uses the server for help in connecting to the
the bank's IPv6 address. It asks the server to pass along an
IPv6 ping so it can determine what Teredo relay to use in sending
packets to the bank's IPv6 address and so it knows what relay to
trust packets from for the peer.
7. The malicious server recognizes the IPv6 address as belonging to
a bank that it wants to phish against, so it sends an
encapsulated ping reply to the client. This is made to look like
a legitimate reply sent via a Teredo relay; however the relay it
is supposedly returned from is actually a phishing site. This
site could even be on the same host as the malicious Teredo
server.
8. The rest works pretty much like any normal phishing transaction,
except that the phishing host acts as local Teredo relay, since
the victim host thinks it is communicating via a Teredo relay
with the bank's IPv6 address.
This pharming type attack is not entirely novel, switching DNS server
settings to a malicious DNS server could have similar effect.
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6.1.3. Recommendations
The scope of the attack can be reduced by limiting Teredo use in
general but especially in preferring native IPv4 to Teredo-tunneled
IPv6; this is because it is reasonable to expect that banks and
similar web sites will continue to be accessible over IPv4 for as
long as a significant fraction of their customers are still behind
IPv4 NATs.
In general, anti-phishing and anti-fraud provisions should help with
aspects of this, as well as software that specifically monitors for
Teredo server changes.
On the host, it should require an appropriate level of privilege in
order to change the Teredo server setting and we recommend that the
user be prompted when the Teredo server setting has been changed.
Making it easy to see the current Teredo server setting (e.g., not
requiring privilege for this) should help detection of changes.
6.2. RFC 4380 Implies That Teredo Improves Security
6.2.1. Problem
The Security Considerations section of RFC 4380 states that it can be
argued that Teredo improves security. The above sections argue to
the contrary. This misleading or inaccurate claim can be taken out
of context and used to downplay Teredo security implications.
6.2.2. Discussion
The "Security Considerations" section of [RFC4380] begins with:
"The main objective of Teredo is to provide nodes located behind a
NAT with a globally routable IPv6 address. The Teredo nodes can
use IP security (IPsec) services ... without the configuration
restrictions still present in 'Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the
IKE' [RFC3947]. As such, we can argue that the service has a
positive effect on network security. However, the security
analysis must also envisage the negative effects of the Teredo
services..."
We agree that Teredo improves the ability to use IPsec in traversing
a NAT and the security properties that it provides are a benefit in
certain cases, specifically when the alternate session directly
involves NAT translation, IPsec is desired to be used, and
circumstances allow IPsec to be used. In this case the nice security
properties IPsec can provide have been allowed by Teredo. However,
IPsec does not solve all security problems.
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It is hoped that by this point the reader will agree that Teredo
introduces security risk and does not improve security overall.
Hence we feel the sentence that "the service has a positive effect on
network security" goes too far in stating its point, even considering
the following sentence which may somewhat reduce the pointedness of
the claim. Someone may not recognize the full security impact of
Teredo after reading the sentence.
6.2.3. Recommendations
We recommend that no claims regarding a positive security impact from
Teredo be made, unless the scope of such a claim is immediately
clear. We also recommend that the security concerns identified in
this document be included in an updated Teredo standard document,
except to the extent that the Teredo protocol has been improved to
mitigate them.
7. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Remi Denis-Courmont, Dave Thaler,
Fred Templin, Jordi Palet Martinez, James Woodyatt and Christian
Huitema for reviewing earlier versions of the document and providing
comments to make this document better. The authors would also like
to thank Alfred Hines for a carefully review of the document.
8. Security Considerations
This document identified security concerns with Teredo that were not
included in RFC 4380.
9. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA considerations from this document.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC2461] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor
Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461,
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December 1998.
[RFC3489] Rosenberg, J., Weinberger, J., Huitema, C., and R. Mahy,
"STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
Through Network Address Translators (NATs)", RFC 3489,
March 2003.
[RFC4214] Templin, F., Gleeson, T., Talwar, M., and D. Thaler,
"Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol
(ISATAP)", RFC 4214, October 2005.
[RFC4380] Huitema, C., "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through
Network Address Translations (NATs)", RFC 4380,
February 2006.
10.2. Informative References
[PORTRAND]
Larsen, M. and F. Gont, "Port Randomization",
draft-ietf-tsvwg-port-randomization-00 (work in progress),
December 2007.
[RFC5095] Abley, J., Savola, P., and G. Neville-Neil, "Deprecation
of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6", RFC 5095,
December 2007.
[TEREDOSEC]
Hoagland, J., "The Teredo Protocol: Tunneling Past Network
Security and Other Security Implications", November 2006,
<http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/
Teredo_Security.pdf>.
[TEREDOUP]
Krishnan, S. and J. Hoagland, "Teredo Security Updates",
draft-krishnan-v6ops-teredo-update-00 (work in progress),
November 2007.
[WVNASA] Hoagland, J., Conover, M., Newsham, T., and O. Whitehouse,
"Windows Vista Network Surface Analysis", March 2007,
<http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/
Vista_Network_Attack_Surface_RTM.pdf>.
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Authors' Addresses
James Hoagland
Symantec Corporation
350 Ellis St.
Mountain View, CA 94043
US
Email: Jim_Hoagland@symantec.com
URI: http://symantec.com/
Suresh Krishnan
Ericsson
8400 Decarie Blvd.
Town of Mount Royal, QC
Canada
Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871
Email: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com
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