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Versions: (draft-thomson-webpush-vapid) 00 01 02 03 04

Network Working Group                                         M. Thomson
Internet-Draft                                                   Mozilla
Intended status: Standards Track                             P. Beverloo
Expires: June 25, 2017                                            Google
                                                       December 22, 2016


        Voluntary Application Server Identification for Web Push
                      draft-ietf-webpush-vapid-02

Abstract

   An application server can voluntarily identify itself to a push
   service using the described technique.  This identification
   information can be used by the push service to attribute requests
   that are made by the same application server to a single entity.
   This can used to reduce the secrecy for push subscription URLs by
   being able to restrict subscriptions to a specific application
   server.  An application server is further able to include additional
   information that the operator of a push service can use to contact
   the operator of the application server.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 25, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents



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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Voluntary Identification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Application Server Self-Identification  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Application Server Contact Information  . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Additional Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Vapid Authentication Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Token Parameter (t) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Public Key Parameter (k)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Subscription Restriction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Creating a Restricted Push Subscription . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Using Restricted Subscriptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.1.  Vapid Authentication Scheme Parameters  . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   The Web Push protocol [I-D.ietf-webpush-protocol] describes how an
   application server is able to request that a push service deliver a
   push message to a user agent.

   As a consequence of the expected deployment architecture, there is no
   basis for an application server to be known to a push service prior
   to requesting delivery of a push message.  Requiring that the push
   service be able to authenticate application servers places an
   unwanted constraint on the interactions between user agents and
   application servers, who are the ultimate users of a push service.
   That constraint would also degrade the privacy-preserving properties
   the protocol provides.  For these reasons,
   [I-D.ietf-webpush-protocol] does not define a mandatory system for
   authentication of application servers.





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   An unfortunate consequence of this design is that a push service is
   exposed to a greater risk of denial of service attack.  While
   requests from application servers can be indirectly attributed to
   user agents, this is not always efficient or even sufficient.
   Providing more information about the application server directly to a
   push service allows the push service to better distinguish between
   legitimate and bogus requests.

   Additionally, this design also relies on endpoint secrecy as any
   application server in possession of the endpoint is able to send
   messages, albeit without payloads.  In situations where usage of a
   subscription can be limited to a single application server, the
   ability to associate a subscription with the application server could
   reduce the impact of a data leak.

1.1.  Voluntary Identification

   This document describes a system whereby an application server can
   volunteer information about itself to a push service.  At a minimum,
   this provides a stable identity for the application server, though
   this could also include contact information, such as an email
   address.

   A consistent identity can be used by a push service to establish
   behavioral expectations for an application server.  Significant
   deviations from an established norm can then be used to trigger
   exception handling procedures.

   Voluntarily-provided contact information can be used to contact an
   application server operator in the case of exceptional situations.

   Experience with push service deployment has shown that software
   errors or unusual circumstances can cause large increases in push
   message volume.  Contacting the operator of the application server
   has proven to be valuable.

   Even in the absence of usable contact information, an application
   server that has a well-established reputation might be given
   preference over an unidentified application server when choosing
   whether to discard a push message.

1.2.  Notational Conventions

   The words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", and "MAY" are used in this
   document.  It's not shouting, when they are capitalized, they have
   the special meaning described in [RFC2119].





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   The terms "push message", "push service", "push subscription",
   "application server", and "user agent" are used as defined in
   [I-D.ietf-webpush-protocol].

2.  Application Server Self-Identification

   Application servers that wish to self-identify generate and maintain
   a signing key pair.  This key pair MUST be usable with elliptic curve
   digital signature (ECDSA) over the P-256 curve [FIPS186].  Use of
   this key when sending push messages establishes an identity for the
   application server that is consistent across multiple messages.

   When requesting delivery of a push message, the application includes
   a JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519], signed using its signing key.  The
   token includes a number of claims as follows:

   o  An "aud" (Audience) claim in the token MUST include the unicode
      serialization of the origin (Section 6.1 of [RFC6454]) of the push
      resource URL.  This binds the token to a specific push service.
      This ensures that the token is reusable for all push resource URLs
      that share the same origin.

   o  An "exp" (Expiry) claim MUST be included with the time after which
      the token expires.  This limits the time that a token over which a
      token is valid.  An "exp" claim MUST NOT be more than 24 hours
      from the time of the request.

   This JWT is included in an Authorization header field, using an auth-
   scheme of "vapid".  A push service MAY reject a request with a 403
   (Forbidden) status code [RFC7235] if the JWT signature or its claims
   are invalid.

   The JWT MUST use a JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515].  The signature
   MUST use ECDSA on the NIST P-256 curve [FIPS186] which is identified
   as "ES256" [RFC7518].

2.1.  Application Server Contact Information

   If the application server wishes to provide contact details it MAY
   include a "sub" (Subject) claim in the JWT.  The "sub" claim SHOULD
   include a contact URI for the application server as either a
   "mailto:" (email) [RFC6068] or an "https:" [RFC2818] URI.

2.2.  Additional Claims

   An application server MAY include additional claims using public or
   private names (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of [RFC7519]).  Since the JWT




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   is in a header field, the size of additional claims SHOULD be kept as
   small as possible.

2.3.  Example

   An application server requests the delivery of a push message as
   described in [I-D.ietf-webpush-protocol].  If the application server
   wishes to self-identify, it includes an Authorization header field
   with credentials that use the "vapid" authentication scheme
   (Section 3).

   POST /p/JzLQ3raZJfFBR0aqvOMsLrt54w4rJUsV HTTP/1.1
   Host: push.example.net
   TTL: 30
   Content-Length: 136
   Content-Encoding: aes128gcm
   Authorization: vapid
      t=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3
        B1c2guZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQiLCJleHAiOjE0NTM1MjM3NjgsInN1YiI6Im1ha
        Wx0bzpwdXNoQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0.i3CYb7t4xfxCDquptFOepC9GAu_H
        LGkMlMuCGSK2rpiUfnK9ojFwDXb1JrErtmysazNjjvW2L9OkSSHzvoD1oA,
      k=BA1Hxzyi1RUM1b5wjxsn7nGxAszw2u61m164i3MrAIxHF6YK5h4SDYic-dR
        uU_RCPCfA5aq9ojSwk5Y2EmClBPs

   { encrypted push message }

            Figure 1: Requesting Push Message Delivery with JWT

   Note that the example header fields in this document include extra
   line wrapping to meet formatting constraints.

   The "t" parameter of the Authorization header field contains a JWT;
   the "k" parameter includes the base64url-encoded key that signed that
   token.  The JWT input values and the JWK [RFC7517] corresponding to
   the signing key are shown in Figure 2 with additional whitespace
   added for readability purposes.  This JWT would be valid until
   2016-01-21T01:53:25Z [RFC3339].

   JWT header = { "typ": "JWT", "alg": "ES256" }
   JWT body = { "aud": "https://push.example.net",
                "exp": 1453341205,
                "sub": "mailto:push@example.com" }
   JWK = { "crv":"P-256",
           "kty":"EC",
           "x":"DUfHPKLVFQzVvnCPGyfucbECzPDa7rWbXriLcysAjEc",
           "y":"F6YK5h4SDYic-dRuU_RCPCfA5aq9ojSwk5Y2EmClBPs" }

                     Figure 2: Decoded Example Values



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3.  Vapid Authentication Scheme

   A new "vapid" HTTP authentication scheme [RFC7235] is defined.  This
   authentication scheme carries a signed JWT, as described in
   Section 2, plus the key that signed that JWT.

   This authentication scheme is for origin-server authentication only.
   Therefore, this authentication scheme MUST NOT be used with the
   Proxy-Authenticate or Proxy-Authorization header fields.

   This authentication scheme does not require a challenge.  Clients are
   able to generate the Authorization header field without any
   additional information from a server.  Therefore, a challenge for
   this authentication scheme MUST NOT be sent in a WWW-Authenticate
   header field.

   Two parameters are defined for this authentication scheme: "t" and
   "k".  All unknown or unsupported parameters to "vapid" authentication
   credentials MUST be ignored.  The "realm" parameter is ignored for
   this authentication scheme.

   This authentication scheme is intended for use by an application
   server when using the Web Push protocol [I-D.ietf-webpush-protocol],
   but it could be used in other contexts if applicable.

3.1.  Token Parameter (t)

   The "t" parameter of the "vapid" authentication scheme carries a JWT
   as described in Section 2.

3.2.  Public Key Parameter (k)

   In order for the push service to be able to validate the JWT, it
   needs to learn the public key of the application server.  A "k"
   parameter is defined for the "vapid" authentication scheme to carry
   this information.

   The "k" parameter includes an elliptic curve digital signature
   algorithm (ECDSA) public key [FIPS186] in uncompressed form [X9.62]
   that is encoded using base64url encoding [RFC7515].

   Note:  X9.62 encoding is used over JWK [RFC7517] for two reasons.  A
      JWK does not have a canonical form, so X9.62 encoding makes it
      easier for the push service to handle comparison of keys from
      different sources.  Secondarily, the X9.62 encoding is also
      considerably smaller.





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   Some implementations permit the same P-256 key to be used for signing
   and key exchange.  An application server MUST select a different
   private key for the key exchange [I-D.ietf-webpush-encryption] and
   signing the authentication token.  Though a push service is not
   obligated to check either parameter for every push message, a push
   service SHOULD reject push messages that have identical values for
   these parameters with a 400 (Bad Request) status code.

4.  Subscription Restriction

   The public key of the application server serves as a stable
   identifier for the server.  This key can be used to restrict a push
   subscription to a specific application server.

   Subscription restriction reduces the reliance on endpoint secrecy by
   requiring proof of possession to be demonstrated by an application
   server when requesting delivery of a push message.  This provides an
   additional level of protection against leaking of the details of the
   push subscription.

4.1.  Creating a Restricted Push Subscription

   The user agent includes the public key of the application server when
   requesting the creation of a push subscription.  This restricts use
   of the resulting subscription to application servers that are able to
   provide proof of possession for the corresponding private key.

   The public key is then added to the request to create a push
   subscription.  The push subscription request is extended to include a
   body.  The body of the request is a JSON object as described in
   [RFC7159].  A "vapid" member is added to this JSON object, containing
   the public key on the P-256 curve, encoded in the uncompressed form
   [X9.62] and base64url encoded [RFC7515].  The MIME media type of the
   body is set to "application/json".

   The example in Figure 3 shows a restriction to the key used in
   Figure 1.  Extra whitespace is added to to meet formatting
   constraints.

   POST /subscribe/ HTTP/1.1
   Host: push.example.net
   Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8
   Content-Length: 104

   { "vapid": "BA1Hxzyi1RUM1b5wjxsn7nGxAszw2u61m164i3MrAIxH
               F6YK5h4SDYic-dRuU_RCPCfA5aq9ojSwk5Y2EmClBPs" }

                    Figure 3: Example Subscribe Request



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   An application might use the Web Push API [API] to provide the user
   agent with a public key.

4.2.  Using Restricted Subscriptions

   When a push subscription has been associated with an application
   server, the request for push message delivery MUST include proof of
   possession for the associated private key that was used when creating
   the push subscription.

   A push service MUST reject a message that omits mandatory credentials
   with a 401 (Unauthorized) status code.  A push service MAY reject a
   message that includes invalid credentials with a 403 (Forbidden)
   status code.  Credentials are invalid if:

   o  either the authentication token or public key are not included in
      the request,

   o  the signature on the JWT cannot be successfully verified using the
      included public key,

   o  the current time is later than the time identified in the "exp"
      (Expiry) claim or more than 24 hours before the expiry time,

   o  the origin of the push resource is not included in the "aud"
      (Audience) claim, or

   o  the public key used to sign the JWT doesn't match the one that was
      included in the creation of the push subscription.

   A push service MUST NOT forward the JWT or public key to the user
   agent when delivering the push message.

5.  Security Considerations

   This authentication scheme is vulnerable to replay attacks if an
   attacker can acquire a valid JWT.  Applying narrow limits to the
   period over which a replayable token can be reused limits the
   potential value of a stolen token to an attacker and can increase the
   difficulty of stealing a token.

   An application server might offer falsified contact information.  A
   push service operator therefore cannot use the presence of
   unvalidated contact information as input to any security-critical
   decision-making process.

   Validation of a signature on the JWT requires a non-trivial amount of
   computation.  For something that might be used to identify legitimate



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   requests under denial of service attack conditions, this is not
   ideal.  Application servers are therefore encouraged to reuse tokens,
   which permits the push service to cache the results of signature
   validation.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document registers the "vapid" authentication scheme in the
   "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme Registry"
   established in [RFC7235].

   Authentication Scheme Name:  vapid

   Pointer to specification text:  Section 3 of this document

   Notes:  This scheme is origin-server only and does not define a
      challenge.

6.1.  Vapid Authentication Scheme Parameters

   This creates a "Vapid Authentication Scheme Parameters" registry for
   parameters to the "vapid" authentication scheme.  This registry is
   under the "WebPush Parameters" grouping.  The registry operates on
   the "Specification Required" policy [RFC5226].

   Registrations MUST include the following information:

   Parameter Name:  A name for the parameter, which conforms to the
      "token" grammar [RFC7230]

   Purpose (optional):  A brief identifying the purpose of the
      parameter.

   Specification:  A link to the specification that defines the format
      and semantics of the parameter.

   This registry initially contains the following entries:

   +---------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
   | Parameter     | Purpose                 | Specification           |
   | Name          |                         |                         |
   +---------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
   | t             | JWT authentication      | [[RFC-to-be]], Section  |
   |               | token                   | 3.1                     |
   |               |                         |                         |
   | k             | ECDSA signing key       | [[RFC-to-be]], Section  |
   |               |                         | 3.2                     |
   +---------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+



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7.  Acknowledgements

   This document would have been much worse than it currently is if not
   for the contributions of Benjamin Bangert, JR Conlin, Chris Karlof,
   Costin Manolache, and others.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [FIPS186]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
              "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST PUB 186-4 , July
              2013.

   [I-D.ietf-webpush-protocol]
              Thomson, M., Damaggio, E., and B. Raymor, "Generic Event
              Delivery Using HTTP Push", draft-ietf-webpush-protocol-12
              (work in progress), October 2016.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.

   [RFC6068]  Duerst, M., Masinter, L., and J. Zawinski, "The 'mailto'
              URI Scheme", RFC 6068, DOI 10.17487/RFC6068, October 2010,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6068>.

   [RFC6454]  Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.







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   [RFC7230]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

   [RFC7235]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7518]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [X9.62]    ANSI, "Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services
              Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
              (ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62 , 1998.

8.2.  Informative References

   [API]      van Ouwerkerk, M. and M. Thomson, "Web Push API", 2015,
              <https://w3c.github.io/push-api/>.

   [I-D.ietf-webpush-encryption]
              Thomson, M., "Message Encryption for Web Push", draft-
              ietf-webpush-encryption-06 (work in progress), October
              2016.

   [RFC3339]  Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
              Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.








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Authors' Addresses

   Martin Thomson
   Mozilla

   Email: martin.thomson@gmail.com


   Peter Beverloo
   Google

   Email: beverloo@google.com







































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