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Network Working Group                                         F. Günther
Internet-Draft                                                ETH Zurich
Intended status: Informational                                M. Thomson
Expires: 24 March 2021                                           Mozilla
                                                               C.A. Wood
                                                              Cloudflare
                                                       20 September 2020


                    Usage Limits on AEAD Algorithms
                     draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits-01

Abstract

   An Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm
   provides confidentiality and integrity.  Excessive use of the same
   key can give an attacker advantages in breaking these properties.
   This document provides simple guidance for users of common AEAD
   functions about how to limit the use of keys in order to bound the
   advantage given to an attacker.  It considers limits in both single-
   and multi-user settings.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/chris-wood/draft-wood-cfrg-aead-limits
   (https://github.com/chris-wood/draft-wood-cfrg-aead-limits).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 March 2021.





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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Calculating Limits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Single-User AEAD Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM . . . . . . . . . .   7
       5.1.1.  Confidentiality Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       5.1.2.  Integrity Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.3.  AEAD_AES_128_CCM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.3.1.  Confidentiality Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.3.2.  Integrity Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.4.  AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Multi-User AEAD Limits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.1.  AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM . . . . . . . . . .  10
       6.1.1.  Authenticated Encryption Security Limit . . . . . . .  10
       6.1.2.  Confidentiality Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       6.1.3.  Integrity Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.2.  AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305, AEAD_AES_128_CCM, and
           AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       6.2.1.  AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       6.2.2.  AEAD_AES_128_CCM and AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14







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1.  Introduction

   An Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm
   provides confidentiality and integrity.  [RFC5116] specifies an AEAD
   as a function with four inputs - secret key, nonce, plaintext, and
   optional associated data - that produces ciphertext output and error
   code indicating success or failure.  The ciphertext is typically
   composed of the encrypted plaintext bytes and an authentication tag.

   The generic AEAD interface does not describe usage limits.  Each AEAD
   algorithm does describe limits on its inputs, but these are
   formulated as strict functional limits, such as the maximum length of
   inputs, which are determined by the properties of the underlying AEAD
   composition.  Degradation of the security of the AEAD as a single key
   is used multiple times is not given a thorough treatment.

   These limits might also be influenced by the number of "users" of a
   given key.  In the traditional setting, there is one key shared
   between two parties.  Any limits on the maximum length of inputs or
   encryption operations apply to that single key.  The attacker's goal
   is to break security (confidentiality or integrity) of that specific
   key.  However, in practice, there are often many users with
   independent keys.  The "multi-user" security setting hence considers
   an attacker's advantage in breaking security of any of these many
   keys, further assuming the attacker may have done some offline work
   to help break security.  As a result, AEAD algorithm limits may
   depend on offline work and the number of users.  However, given that
   a multi-user attacker does not target any specific user, acceptable
   advantages may differ from that of the single-user setting.

   The number of times a single pair of key and nonce can be used might
   also be relevant to security.  For some algorithms, such as
   AEAD_AES_128_GCM or AEAD_AES_256_GCM, this limit is 1 and using the
   same pair of key and nonce has serious consequences for both
   confidentiality and integrity; see [NonceDisrespecting].  Nonce-reuse
   resistant algorithms like AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV can tolerate a limited
   amount of nonce reuse.

   It is good practice to have limits on how many times the same key (or
   pair of key and nonce) are used.  Setting a limit based on some
   measurable property of the usage, such as number of protected
   messages or amount of data transferred, ensures that it is easy to
   apply limits.  This might require the application of simplifying
   assumptions.  For example, TLS 1.3 specifies limits on the number of
   records that can be protected, using the simplifying assumption that
   records are the same size; see Section 5.5 of [TLS].





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   Currently, AEAD limits and usage requirements are scattered among
   peer-reviewed papers, standards documents, and other RFCs.
   Determining the correct limits for a given setting is challenging as
   papers do not use consistent labels or conventions, and rarely apply
   any simplifications that might aid in reaching a simple limit.

   The intent of this document is to collate all relevant information
   about the proper usage and limits of AEAD algorithms in one place.
   This may serve as a standard reference when considering which AEAD
   algorithm to use, and how to use it.

2.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Notation

   This document defines limitations in part using the quantities below.





























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      +========+====================================================+
      | Symbol | Description                                        |
      +========+====================================================+
      |      n | AEAD block length (in bits)                        |
      +--------+----------------------------------------------------+
      |      k | AEAD key length (in bits)                          |
      +--------+----------------------------------------------------+
      |      r | AEAD nonce length (in bits)                        |
      +--------+----------------------------------------------------+
      |      t | Size of the authentication tag (in bits)           |
      +--------+----------------------------------------------------+
      |      l | Length of each message (in blocks)                 |
      +--------+----------------------------------------------------+
      |      s | Total plaintext length in all messages (in blocks) |
      +--------+----------------------------------------------------+
      |      q | Number of protected messages (AEAD encryption      |
      |        | invocations)                                       |
      +--------+----------------------------------------------------+
      |      v | Number of attacker forgery attempts (failed AEAD   |
      |        | decryption invocations)                            |
      +--------+----------------------------------------------------+
      |      p | Adversary attack probability                       |
      +--------+----------------------------------------------------+
      |      o | Offline adversary work (in number of encryption    |
      |        | and decryption queries; multi-user setting only)   |
      +--------+----------------------------------------------------+
      |      u | Number of users or keys (multi-user setting only)  |
      +--------+----------------------------------------------------+
      |      B | Maximum number of blocks encrypted by any user or  |
      |        | key (multi-user setting only)                      |
      +--------+----------------------------------------------------+

                                  Table 1

   For each AEAD algorithm, we define the (passive) confidentiality and
   (active) integrity advantage roughly as the advantage an attacker has
   in breaking the corresponding classical security property for the
   algorithm.  Moreover, we define the combined authenticated encryption
   advantage guaranteeing both confidentiality and integrity against an
   active attacker.  Specifically:

   *  Confidentiality advantage (CA): The probability of a passive
      attacker succeeding in breaking the confidentiality properties
      (IND-CPA) of the AEAD scheme.  In this document, the definition of
      confidentiality advantage roughly is the probability that an
      attacker successfully distinguishes the ciphertext outputs of the
      AEAD scheme from the outputs of a random function.




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   *  Integrity advantage (IA): The probability of a active attacker
      succeeding in breaking the integrity properties (INT-CTXT) of the
      AEAD scheme.  In this document, the definition of integrity
      advantage roughly is the probability that an attacker is able to
      forge a ciphertext that will be accepted as valid.

   *  Authenticated Encryption advantage (AEA): The probability of a
      active attacker succeeding in breaking the authenticated-
      encryption properties of the AEAD scheme.  In this document, the
      definition of authenticated encryption advantage roughly is the
      probability that an attacker successfully distinguishes the
      ciphertext outputs of the AEAD scheme from the outputs of a random
      function or is able to forge a ciphertext that will be accepted as
      valid.

   See [AEComposition], [AEAD] for the formal definitions of and
   relations between passive confidentiality (IND-CPA), ciphertext
   integrity (INT-CTXT), and authenticated encryption security (AE).
   The authenticated encryption advantage subsumes, and can be derived
   as the combination of, both CA and IA:

   CA <= AEA
   IA <= AEA
   AEA <= CA + IA

   Each application requires an individual determination of limits in
   order to keep CA and IA sufficiently small.  For instance, TLS aims
   to keep CA below 2^-60 and IA below 2^-57 (in the single-user
   setting).  See [TLS], Section 5.5.

4.  Calculating Limits

   Once upper bounds on CA, IA, or AEA are determined, this document
   defines a process for determining three overall operational limits:

   *  Confidentiality limit (CL): The number of messages an application
      can encrypt before giving the adversary a confidentiality
      advantage higher than CA.

   *  Integrity limit (IL): The number ciphertexts an application can
      decrypt, either successfully or not, before giving the adversary
      an integrity advantage higher than IA.

   *  Authenticated encryption limit (AEL): The combined number of
      messages and number of ciphertexts an application can encrypt or
      decrypt before giving the adversary an authenticated encryption
      advantage higher than AEA.




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   When limits are expressed as a number of messages an application can
   encrypt or decrypt, this requires assumptions about the size of
   messages and any authenticated additional data (AAD).  Limits can
   instead be expressed in terms of the number of bytes, or blocks, of
   plaintext and maybe AAD in total.  To aid in translating between
   message-based and byte/block-based limits, a formulation of limits
   that includes a maximum message size (l) and the AEAD schemes' block
   length in bits (n) is provided.

   All limits are based on the total number of messages, either the
   number of protected messages (q) or the number of forgery attempts
   (v); which correspond to CL and IL respectively.

   Limits are then derived from those bounds using a target attacker
   probability.  For example, given an integrity advantage of "IA = v *
   (8l / 2^106)" and a targeted maximum attacker success probability of
   "IA = p", the algorithm remains secure, i.e., the adversary's
   advantage does not exceed the targeted probability of success,
   provided that "v <= (p * 2^106) / 8l".  In turn, this implies that "v
   <= (p * 2^103) / l" is the corresponding limit.

5.  Single-User AEAD Limits

   This section summarizes the confidentiality and integrity bounds and
   limits for modern AEAD algorithms used in IETF protocols, including:
   AEAD_AES_128_GCM [RFC5116], AEAD_AES_256_GCM [RFC5116],
   AEAD_AES_128_CCM [RFC5116], AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 [RFC8439],
   AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 [RFC6655].

   The CL and IL values bound the total number of encryption and forgery
   queries (q and v).  Alongside each value, we also specify these
   bounds.

5.1.  AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM

   The CL and IL values for AES-GCM are derived in [AEBounds] and
   summarized below.  For this AEAD, n = 128 and t = 128 [GCM].  In this
   example, the length s is the sum of AAD and plaintext, as described
   in [GCMProofs].

5.1.1.  Confidentiality Limit

   CA <= ((s + q + 1)^2) / 2^129

   This implies the following usage limit:

   q + s <= p^(1/2) * 2^(129/2) - 1




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   Which, for a message-based protocol with "s <= q * l", if we assume
   that every packet is size "l", produces the limit:

   q <= (p^(1/2) * 2^(129/2) - 1) / (l + 1)

5.1.2.  Integrity Limit

   IA <= 2 * (v * (l + 1)) / 2^128

   This implies the following limit:

   v <= (p * 2^127) / (l + 1)

5.2.  AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305

   The only known analysis for AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305
   [ChaCha20Poly1305Bounds] combines the confidentiality and integrity
   limits into a single expression, covered below:

   CA <= v * ((8 * l) / 2^106)
   IA <= v * ((8 * l) / 2^106)

   This advantage is a tight reduction based on the underlying Poly1305
   PRF [Poly1305].  It implies the following limit:

   v <= (p * 2^103) / l

5.3.  AEAD_AES_128_CCM

   The CL and IL values for AEAD_AES_128_CCM are derived from
   [CCM-ANALYSIS] and specified in the QUIC-TLS mapping specification
   [I-D.ietf-quic-tls].  This analysis uses the total number of
   underlying block cipher operations to derive its bound.  For CCM,
   this number is the sum of: the length of the associated data in
   blocks, the length of the ciphertext in blocks, the length of the
   plaintext in blocks, plus 1.

   In the following limits, this is simplified to a value of twice the
   length of the packet in blocks, i.e., 2l represents the effective
   length, in number of block cipher operations, of a message with l
   blocks.  This simplification is based on the observation that common
   applications of this AEAD carry only a small amount of associated
   data compared to ciphertext.  For example, QUIC has 1 to 3 blocks of
   AAD.

   For this AEAD, n = 128 and t = 128.





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5.3.1.  Confidentiality Limit

   CA <= (2l * q)^2 / 2^n
      <= (2l * q)^2 / 2^128

   This implies the following limit:

   q <= sqrt((p * 2^126) / l^2)

5.3.2.  Integrity Limit

   IA <= v / 2^t + (2l * (v + q))^2 / 2^n
      <= v / 2^128 + (2l * (v + q))^2 / 2^128

   This implies the following limit:

   v + (2l * (v + q))^2 <= p * 2^128

   In a setting where "v" or "q" is sufficiently large, "v" is
   negligible compared to "(2l * (v + q))^2", so this this can be
   simplified to:

   v + q <= p^(1/2) * 2^63 / l

5.4.  AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8

   The analysis in [CCM-ANALYSIS] also applies to this AEAD, but the
   reduced tag length of 64 bits changes the integrity limit calculation
   considerably.

   IA <= v / 2^t + (2l * (v + q))^2 / 2^n
      <= v / 2^64 + (2l * (v + q))^2 / 2^128

   This results in reducing the limit on "v" by a factor of 2^64.

   v * 2^64 + (2l * (v + q))^2 <= p * 2^128

6.  Multi-User AEAD Limits

   In the multi-user setting, each user is assumed to have an
   independent and identically distributed key, though nonces may be re-
   used across users with some very small probability.  The success
   probability in attacking one of these many independent user keys can
   be generically bounded by the success probability of attacking a
   single user multiplied by the number of users present [MUSecurity],
   [GCM-MU].  Absent concrete multi-user bounds, this means the attacker
   advantage in the multi-user setting is the product of the single-user
   advantage and the number of users.



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   This section summarizes the confidentiality and integrity bounds and
   limits for the same algorithms as in Section 5 for the multi-user
   setting.  The CL and IL values bound the total number of encryption
   and forgery queries (q and v).  Alongside each value, we also specify
   these bounds.

6.1.  AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM

   Concrete multi-user bounds for AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM
   exist due to [GCM-MU2].  AES-GCM without nonce randomization is also
   discussed in [GCM-MU2], though this section does not include those
   results as they do not apply to protocols such as TLS 1.3 [RFC8446].

   For this AEAD, n = 128, t = 128, and r = 96; the key length is k =
   128 or k = 256.

6.1.1.  Authenticated Encryption Security Limit

   AEA <= ((q+v)*l*B / 2^127) + (1 / 2^48)

   This implies the following limit:

   q + v <= (p * 2^127 - 2^79) / (l * B)

6.1.2.  Confidentiality Limit

   The confidentiality advantage is essentially dominated by the same
   terms as the AE advantage:

   CA <= (q*l*B / 2^127) + (1 / 2^48)

   This implies the following limit:

   q <= (p * 2^127 - 2^79) / (l * B)

6.1.3.  Integrity Limit

   There is currently no dedicated integrity multi-user bound available
   for AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM.  The AE limit can be used
   to derive an integrity limit as

   IA <= AEA <= (q+v)*l*B / 2^127 + 1/2^48

   This implies the following limit:

   q + v <= (p * 2^127 - 2^79) / (l * B)





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6.2.  AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305, AEAD_AES_128_CCM, and AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8

   There are currently no concrete multi-user bounds for
   AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305, AEAD_AES_128_CCM, or AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8.
   Thus, to account for the additional factor "u", i.e., the number of
   users, each "p" term in the confidentiality and integrity limits is
   replaced with "p / u".

6.2.1.  AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305

   The combined confidentiality and integrity limit for
   AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is as follows.

   v <= ((p / u) * 2^106) / 8l
     <= (p * 2^103) / (l * u)

6.2.2.  AEAD_AES_128_CCM and AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8

   The integrity limit for AEAD_AES_128_CCM is as follows.

   v + q <= (p / u)^(1/2) * 2^63 / l

   Likewise, the integrity limit for AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 is as follows.

   v * 2^64 + (2l * (v + q))^2 <= (p / u) * 2^128

7.  Security Considerations

   Many of the formulae in this document depend on simplifying
   assumptions that are not universally applicable.  When using this
   document to set limits, it is necessary to validate all these
   assumptions for the setting in which the limits might apply.  In most
   cases, the goal is to use assumptions that result in setting a more
   conservative limit, but this is not always the case.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not make any request of IANA.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [AEAD]     Rogaway, P., "Authenticated-Encryption with Associated-
              Data", September 2002,
              <https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/musu.pdf>.





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   [AEBounds] Luykx, A. and K. Paterson, "Limits on Authenticated
              Encryption Use in TLS", 8 March 2016,
              <http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/TLS-AEbounds.pdf>.

   [AEComposition]
              Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated Encryption:
              Relations among notions and analysis of the generic
              composition paradigm", July 2007,
              <http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/oem.pdf>.

   [CCM-ANALYSIS]
              Jonsson, J., "On the Security of CTR + CBC-MAC",
              DOI 10.1007/3-540-36492-7_7, Selected Areas in
              Cryptography pp. 76-93, 2003,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36492-7_7>.

   [ChaCha20Poly1305Bounds]
              Procter, G., "A Security Analysis of the Composition of
              ChaCha20 and Poly1305", 11 August 2014,
              <https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/613.pdf>.

   [GCM]      Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
              Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC",
              NIST Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007.

   [GCM-MU]   Bellare, M. and B. Tackmann, "The Multi-User Security of
              Authenticated Encryption: AES-GCM in TLS 1.3", 27 November
              2017, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/564.pdf>.

   [GCM-MU2]  Hoang, V.T., Tessaro, S., and A. Thiruvengadam, "The
              Multi-user Security of GCM, Revisited: Tight Bounds for
              Nonce Randomization", 15 October 2018,
              <https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/993.pdf>.

   [GCMProofs]
              Iwata, T., Ohashi, K., and K. Minematsu, "Breaking and
              Repairing GCM Security Proofs", 1 August 2012,
              <https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/438.pdf>.

   [MUSecurity]
              Bellare, M., Boldyreva, A., and S. Micali, "Public-Key
              Encryption in a Multi-user Setting: Security Proofs and
              Improvements", May 2000,
              <https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/musu.pdf>.







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   [Poly1305] Bernstein, D., "The Poly1305-AES Message-Authentication
              Code", DOI 10.1007/11502760_3, Fast Software
              Encryption pp. 32-49, 2005,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/11502760_3>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5116]  McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.

   [RFC6655]  McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
              Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6655>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8439]  Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF
              Protocols", RFC 8439, DOI 10.17487/RFC8439, June 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8439>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-quic-tls]
              Thomson, M. and S. Turner, "Using TLS to Secure QUIC",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-quic-tls-30,
              9 September 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
              draft-ietf-quic-tls-30.txt>.

   [NonceDisrespecting]
              Bock, H., Zauner, A., Devlin, S., Somorovsky, J., and P.
              Jovanovic, "Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries -- Practical
              Forgery Attacks on GCM in TLS", 17 May 2016,
              <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/475.pdf>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [TLS]      Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.



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Internet-Draft                 AEAD Limits                September 2020


Authors' Addresses

   Felix Günther
   ETH Zurich

   Email: mail@felixguenther.info


   Martin Thomson
   Mozilla

   Email: mt@lowentropy.net


   Christopher A. Wood
   Cloudflare

   Email: caw@heapingbits.net

































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