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Network Working Group                                            W. Eddy
Internet-Draft                                                   Verizon
Intended status: Experimental                                    L. Wood
Expires: March 20, 2008                                    Cisco Systems
                                                              W. Ivancic
                                                                    NASA
                                                      September 17, 2007


             Checksum Ciphersuites for the Bundle Protocol
                  draft-irtf-dtnrg-bundle-checksum-00

Status of this Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 20, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).











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Abstract

   The Delay-Tolerant Networking Bundle Protocol includes a custody
   transfer mechanism to provide acknowledgements of receipt for
   particular bundles.  No checksum is included in the basic DTN Bundle
   Protocol, however, so it is not possible to verify that bundles have
   been either forwarded or passed through various convergence layers
   without errors having been introduced.  This document remedies the
   situation by defining ciphersuites for use within the Bundle Security
   Protocol's Payload Security Block to provide error-detection
   functions regardless of an implementation's support for other, more
   heavy-weight, security-providing ciphersuites.  This creates the
   checksum service needed for error-free reliability, but does so at
   the expense of divorcing security concerns from the few new
   ciphersuite definitions.  This document lengthily discusses the pros
   and cons of this approach and the discussion points that combined to
   drive this design.


































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Table of Contents

   1.  Motivations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Use of the Payload Security Block  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.1.  Differences from Intended Use of the Payload Security
           Block  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3.  INSECURE Ciphersuites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.1.  Generation and Processing Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   Appendix A.  Mandatory BSP Elements Needed to Implement
                Error-Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     A.1.  Mutable Canonicalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     A.2.  PSB Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 24































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1.  Motivations

   Reliable transmission of information is a well-known problem for all
   protocol layers.  Error-detection and correction capabilities are
   frequently found in lower layers, but are also present in many
   higher-layer protocols in order to detect residual bit errors and
   bugs that introduce errors.  For example, IPv4 verifies a simple
   header checksum before processing inbound packets, even when running
   over a data link like Ethernet that already performs a stronger CRC.
   TCP and UDP segments further include a checksum covering their
   contents as well as some IP header fields.  What may seem like
   paranoia is actually not unfounded, as errors in received data or
   packet corruption are known to creep into networking systems from
   many causes other than channel noise [SP00].  Although coding of data
   on the channel can reduce the impact of channel noise, end-to-end
   checksums are understood to be necessary for applications requiring
   certainty that the data received is error-free [SGHP98].

   The Delay/Disruption-Tolerant Networking (DTN) architecture [RFC4838]
   is founded on an overlay of Bundle Agents (BAs).  These Bundle Agents
   forward data units called bundles via the Bundle Protocol
   [I-D.irtf-dtnrg-bundle-spec].  Bundles may be lost or errored both
   during transmission between BAs, or within a BA itself.  Bundles
   belonging to applications that are not tolerant of lost data have a
   "custody transfer" flag that requests reliable transmission between
   bundle agents.  The notion of reliability used in the basic custody
   transfer mechanism does not take the integrity of bundles into
   account, but acknowledges a bundle's receipt and transfers its
   custody without verifying its internal data integrity.  It is assumed
   that the "convergence layer adapters" that connect BAs to each other
   will detect and correct errors before presenting bundle data to the
   BAs themselves.  This may be adequate in many cases, but is not
   always sufficient, and the insufficiency is encapsulated in the well-
   known end-to-end principle [SRC84].  It is possible (and even
   statistically likely) that either transmission errors will go
   unnoticed, or unchecked errors will be introduced within a BA's
   memory, storage, or forwarding systems.

   For example, the UDP convergence-layer adapter that has been
   popularly implemented in DTN stacks uses UDP's usual 16-bit one's-
   complement checksum (the same algorithm used for IPv4 headers and TCP
   segments) to validate incoming datagrams.  This checksum is computed
   by summing 16-bit values within a packet.  If two strings are swapped
   in position within the packet, the checksum can remain unchanged even
   though the datagram is now different from the original, and clearly
   errored.  The proposed TCP-based convergence layer
   [I-D.irtf-dtnrg-tcp-clayer] relies on the same checksum algorithm.
   This checksum algorithm is considered weak, and in more recent



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   transport protocols has been reconsidered; for instance, SCTP uses
   the CRC-32c algorithm instead [RFC3309].

   Within the context of DTN, even stronger convergence-layer adapter
   error detection is not sufficient.  Errors within a BA's device
   drivers, errors due to memory issues within the BA's host, e.g.
   radiation-induced soft errors, or errors introduced from file-system
   corruption cannot be detected by convergence layer adapters, as these
   errors occur in gaps between successive phases of forwarding and
   convergence-layer processing.  End-to-end computation and
   verification of checksums is required to ensure integrity of DTN
   bundles forwarded across a system composed of BAs and convergence
   layer adapters [SRC84].

   Within this document, we describe a use of the Bundle Security
   Protocol (BSP) [I-D.irtf-dtnrg-bundle-security] in order to provide
   the desired error-detection service by defining suitable BSP
   ciphersuites.  The design decisions for doing this are painstakingly
   explained in Section 2.  It should be clearly understood by readers,
   implementers, and users that we are not using the BSP in a way that
   provides any level of security, which we explain fully in
   Section 2.1.  The guarantee that we attempt to provide is that
   specific blocks within a received bundle are highly likely to have
   been propagated across the overlay without errors, under the
   assumptions of no malicious activity within or between Bundle Agents
   and no capability to inject forged bundles.  The actual format and
   use of this error-detection mechanism based on the BSP and
   requirements for support are described in Section 3.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.  [RFC2119]



















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2.  Use of the Payload Security Block

   The BSP defines three types of blocks:

   o  the Bundle Authentication Block (BAB),

   o  the Payload Security Block (PSB),

   o  the Confidentiality Block (CB).

   Algorithms applied within each of these blocks could be pressed into
   use to detect errors introduced in bundle contents.  However, based
   on the different design goals motivating these three block types, the
   PSB is the only candidate that is truly suitable for supporting the
   type of checksum fields needed to yield end-to-end reliability of
   received bundles.

   The BAB is intended to operate along a single hop within a DTN
   overlay network, and due to the issues discussed in the previous
   section, even an end-to-end chain of hops using the BAB over each hop
   is not sufficient for ensuring reliability.

   The CB is primarily concerned with the operation of privacy
   transforms over a bundle's contents, which are intended to
   significantly alter and disguise the protected data while in transit,
   rather than simply performing consistency checks over untransformed
   data.

   The PSB is intended to be used end-to-end; that is, by two endpoints,
   rather than hop-by-hop at each intermediate point.  The PSB is
   intended to be used with sets of cryptographic algorithms
   (ciphersuites) that provide Message Authentication Codes (MACs) or
   signatures over bundle or block contents.  MAC and signature
   algorithms are security constructions that may allow verification of
   a legitimate sender (authentication), detection of in-transit
   tampering (integrity), and proof of a particular sender (non-
   repudiation).  As a consequence of the integrity goal, which is based
   on the assumption of an adversary that can alter messages in-flight,
   MACs and signatures can also be effective at detecting errors that
   occur without the presence of an attacker and in the absence of any
   malicious intent (e.g. due to bit errors within transmission media,
   file system corruption, etc.).  Since the PSB uses the BSP's mutable
   canonicalization and covers the Primary Bundle Block, the EIDs and
   other data influencing forwarding and delivery of payloads are also
   protected by the MACs or signatures in addition to the payload data.

   The error-detecting and rejecting capabilities of a MAC or signature
   are similar to those of more-simple checksum algorithms that are



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   intended only for error-detection.  In fact, several popular MAC and
   signature constructions use checksums as primary components.  For
   instance, the MD5 hash (checksum) algorithm [RFC1321] is used within
   the HMAC-MD5 keyed-hash MAC construction [RFC2104].  Computationally,
   for large messages, the efficiency of a security construction
   providing integrity is similar to that of a simple checksum, although
   for short messages, it may be much worse.  For instance, HMAC
   requires multiple applications of the underlying hash function, with
   the final one being over a very short input, but if the message
   itself fits within a single block, this results in twice the overhead
   compared to a simple checksum.  Thus, assuming large bundles in
   relation to the block size of typical hash functions, the PSB can
   provide end-to-end error-detection capability for bundles from the
   standpoints of both reasonable effectiveness and reasonable
   computational cost.

2.1.  Differences from Intended Use of the Payload Security Block

   The main difference between any simple error-detecting checksum and a
   security construction designed for integrity is that the security
   construction requires keying material.  Key management is recognized
   as an outstanding problem within the DTNRG
   [I-D.irtf-dtnrg-sec-overview] and thought to be quite difficult
   [I-D.farrell-dtnrg-km].  Key management in well-connected systems
   like the Internet is difficult itself, without the additional
   complications of a DTN networking environment.  However, if using a
   keyed security construction for simple error-detection, the secrecy
   of the key is unimportant, and a feasible approach is to specify a
   hard-coded key that all nodes use in the error-detection mechanism
   (e.g. the NULL ciphersuite in LTP's authentication extension is one
   example [I-D.irtf-dtnrg-ltp-extensions]).  Using this approach,
   existing keyed ciphersuites defined for the PSB could be used with
   NULL keys to provide an error-detection mechanism, without requiring
   a key management mechanism.  However, this key-based method reuses a
   security mechanism for error detection, which it is not designed for.
   As there the Bundle Protocol has no separate outer error detection
   wrapping this security payload, if a private key is used, then third-
   party nodes that do not possess that key cannot determine the
   reliability of the content, and would be unable to prevent further
   forwarding of errored bundles.

   The only PSB ciphersuite included in the BSP to date is PSB-RSA-
   SHA256, which creates and verifies signatures of bundles using RSA
   asymmetric-key operations over a SHA-256 hash of the bundle.  The
   length of the SHA-256 output is excessive for providing simple error-
   detection on all but extremely large bundles and the overhead of SHA-
   256 and RSA computations are also detrimental.  It would also require
   some small change in either security block metadata bits or the block



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   type field to signal that the special (unsecure) NULL key pair for
   error-detection only was to be used with PSB-RSA-SHA256.  But the
   biggest problem with PSB-RSA-SHA256 is the bulk of code needed to
   support the RSA operations, which include bignum math and modular
   arithmetic libraries.  Since error-detection and rejection is a vital
   and absolutely essential component of reliable networking protocols,
   and much of the purpose of the DTN architecture is to enable
   internetworking of devices with limited resources, e.g. motes), it
   would be burdensome to require all Bundle Protocol implementations to
   include RSA code.  Furthermore, RSA was historically patent-
   encumbered, and this is very typical of modern asymmetric-key
   cryptography techniques in general, so although the RSA patents have
   expired, we are hesitant to require implementation of asymmetric-key
   techniques unless needed for security purposes.

   The BAB-HMAC ciphersuite that uses SHA1 [RFC3174] within the HMAC
   construction (HMAC-SHA1) has been specified as mandatory for BSP
   support.  Even though the BAB is not appropriate for end-to-end
   error-detection, it is certain that BSP implementations will include
   HMAC-SHA1 routines, and that creating another ciphersuite for PSB-
   HMAC (which does not exist in the base BSP specification) would
   impose very little additional code.  Partial support for the BSP's
   elements (at least the PSB's format and mutable canonicalization)
   could be made mandatory in the Bundle Protocol along with support for
   the PSB-HMAC ciphersuite with NULL keys while retaining as optional
   all of the other components of the BSP (BAB, CB, and other
   ciphersuites).  This path seems to be desirable in that it allows re-
   use of existing code along with re-use of existing specifications,
   but does not significantly burden lightweight implementations or
   deployments unconcerned with overlay-layer security.  This approach
   is followed in Section 3 within this document.

   Our previous proposal to add checksumming to bundles defined a new
   block type for carrying error-detecting checksums computed over the
   bundle payload.  This was motivated by the fact that some deployments
   on limited hardware within closed networks will not desire to run
   heavyweight security protocols nor include the full BSP and its
   mandatory ciphersuites within their code footprints.  Another
   motivation was the desire to avoid creating a false sense of security
   by using a mechanism labelled the Bundle _Security_ Protocol with
   either a ciphersuite or NULL key that provides absolutely no security
   services.  For instance, if an implementation allowed this to be
   configured using the same mechanisms or policy directive
   configuration files, formats, etc. that are normally used to
   configure BSP mechanisms providing real security, then a
   misconfiguration or misunderstanding could have a negative security
   impact to an operational system.




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   In order to allay these concerns, it was decided to define simple
   error-detection ciphersuites with the string "INSECURE" in their
   mnemonics and draw a line as to which portions of the BSP security
   framework become mandatory and which remain optional.  This allows
   implementation of error-detection capabilities either with or without
   the majority of the BSP, and with reduced potential for misleading
   users with regards to security.

   Implementations that provide both the full BSP and simple error-
   detection ciphersuites MUST subjectively ensure that their
   configuration by users is sufficiently dissimilar from the normal BSP
   configuration.  Implementations MUST NOT implement the "INSECURE"
   ciphersuites in such a way that leads to their being construed as
   security mechanisms in logging output or configuration directives.





































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3.  INSECURE Ciphersuites

   Any PSB ciphersuite providing only integrity checking for error-
   detection and is unkeyed MUST contain the string "INSECURE" in its
   mnemonic.  PSBs that use these ciphersuites are otherwise
   indistinguishable from PSBs used to implement security services.
   PSB-HMAC is keyed, and so does not use "INSECURE" in its name.  When
   used with a secret key, PSB-HMAC is useful for security, although
   this is not the case when it is used with a NULL key, we assume that
   the presence of a NULL key in the configuration significantly alerts
   users to the fact that it is not providing security.

   To provide the desired functionality, three new ciphersuites are
   defined in this document (PSB-HMAC used with either real or NULL
   keys, PSB-INSECURE-MD5, and PSB-INSECURE-CRC32).  The motivations
   behind defining all three of these ciphersuites are outlined below in
   the more detailed description of each ciphersuite.  All of the
   ciphersuites defined here use the mutable canonicalization algorithm
   that is defined in the BSP and compute their checksums over the
   canonical forms of bundles.  Since error-detection support is
   mandatory, this means that the minimal BSP elements that all Bundle
   Protocol implementations MUST support include:

   1.  Mutable Canonicalization - fully described in Appendix A.1 of
       this document.

   2.  PSB wire-format - fully described in Appendix A.2 of this
       document.

   3.  PSB-HMAC ciphersuite with NULL key definition, PSB-INSECURE-MD5
       and PSB-INSECURE-CRC32 ciphersuite

   The new ciphersuites are identified by the following ciphersuite IDs
   within the abstract security block:

   o  0x04 - PSB-HMAC

   o  0x05 - PSB-INSECURE-MD5

   o  0x06 - PSB-INSECURE-CRC32

   PSB-HMAC is defined to use the same HMAC-SHA1 construction as the
   BSP's BAB-HMAC ciphersuite, and can thus leverage existing code.
   Three ciphersuite parameters are needed, all of which are SDNVs.  The
   first SDNV is a key identifier.  A zero value in the key identifier
   field of a PSB using the PSB-HMAC ciphersuite indicates that the
   algorithm is keyed with the special NULL key.  The NULL key used here
   is defined to be 0xc37b 7e64 9258 4340 bed1 2207 8089 4115 5068 f738,



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   the same fixed NULL key used with LTP's NULL ciphersuite.  The later
   two EIDs are offsets describing the protected bits of the bundle,
   identical to the offset and length parameters describe in the BSP's
   PSB-RSA-SHA256 ciphersuite.  The first identifies the first covered
   octet and the second identifies the last covered octet.

   PSB-HMAC creates a 10-octet security result and should provide
   adequate error-detection capabilities for large bundles of at least
   several gigabytes in size.  Its advantage lies in that the NULL-keyed
   version can be implemented very nearly for free within existing BSP
   codebases, and support for HMAC-SHA1 is known to only require around
   200 lines of portable C code for implementations that do not already
   contain BSP support.

   The existence of the PSB-INSECURE-MD5 ciphersuite is motivated by the
   fact that an MD5 checksum can be computed on the order of twice as
   fast as a SHA1 checksum over the same data, as demonstrated by
   benchmarking activities, yet still yields robust error-detection over
   fairly large inputs.  This may be desirable in environments that have
   only limited computational resources to expend on bundle generation
   or processing.  For instance, the authors have implemented generation
   of bundles of up to several hundred megabytes in size, onboard an
   imaging satellite solid-state data recorder using only a 200 MHz
   processor.  The PSB-INSECURE-MD5 parameters consist of two SDNVs, an
   offset and length, that convey the covered portion of the bundle, in
   an identical way to the corresponding PSB-HMAC and PSB-RSA-SHA256
   parameters.

   The security result included with the PSB-INSECURE-MD5 ciphersuite is
   a full 16-octet MD5 output.  The longer security result than PSB-HMAC
   may provide better error-detection for very large bundles, in
   addition to being faster to compute.  For small bundles, the lack of
   the HMAC construction's second application of the hash function also
   improves efficiency in PSB-INSECURE-MD5 compared to PSB-HMAC.
   Implementations of MD5 are known to require only around 200 lines of
   portable C code and are widely available as open-source and within
   the MD5 RFC [RFC1321].

   The PSB-INSECURE-CRC32 ciphersuite is intended for small bundles, and
   MUST only be used on bundles whose payload length is less than 65535
   bytes.  The parameters included with this ciphersuite are identical
   to those used with PSB-INSECURE-MD5.  The security result is computed
   using the CRC-32c algorithm, identically to that defined for use with
   SCTP [RFC3309].  The security result is always a 4-octet quantity
   when PSB-INSECURE-CRC32 is used.  The advantage of this checksum is
   that it implies a lower header overhead to on-wire or in-memory
   bundles with small payloads in comparison to the length of the PSB-
   HMAC and PSB-INSECURE-MD5 security results.  This may be highly



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   desirable in environments where small messaging bundles are normal
   and only bandwidth-limited links are available.  The CRC-32c
   algorithm is known to be implementable in only several dozen lines of
   portable C code.

3.1.  Generation and Processing Rules

   Since the INSECURE ciphersuites and NULL-keyed PSB-HMAC use the same
   block type code and format as the more secure uses of PSB, they
   inherit the existing generation and processing rules of the PSB.
   This is good from a security standpoint in two respects:

   1.  The existing PSB processing rules consider interaction with any
       BABs that might be added to a bundle and prevent interactions
       that would cause wrongful failure of MACs, signatures, and
       checksums.

   2.  The PSB and CB processing rules remove the possibility of a MAC,
       signature, or checksum revealing information about the private
       contents of the CB via the ordering of the applied security/
       error-detection transforms.  This is discussed within the CB-RSA-
       AES128-PAYLOAD-PSB ciphersuite definition in the BSP
       specification.

   Although the BSP was intended as an optional suite of extensions to
   the Bundle Protocol, and only needed in cases where certain security
   services are desired at the bundle layer, a subset of its components
   is always needed to implement the PSB-based error-detection
   mechanism.  These MUST always be supported in any implementation of
   the Bundle Protocol, since error-detection must be an essential
   property of the Bundle Protocol.  To be very clear. error-free
   delivery does not require mandatory implementation of the full BSP
   and accompanying security ciphersuites, only the PSB block format,
   and the mutable canonicalization rules.  These two portions of the
   BSP are fully described in teh BSP specification
   [I-D.irtf-dtnrg-bundle-security] with some commentary regarding their
   use for error-detection in Appendix A of this document.

   When applications request custody transfer, the generated bundles
   MUST use an unkeyed or NULL-keyed PSB ciphersuite defined in this
   document between the source and destination bundle agents.  For other
   bundles, not requiring custody transfer, an unkeyed or NULL-keyed PSB
   ciphersuite SHOULD be used.

   Checking of unkeyed or NULL-keyed PSBs at intermediate bundle agents
   SHOULD be performed, when possible, and an agent which fails to match
   the PSB security result within a bundle SHOULD immediately discard
   the bundle.  This limits the wasted resources involved in propagating



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   known-errored data.  A future version of the Bundle Protocol might
   include a bundle processing flag that signals that errored-delivery
   is acceptable to a receiving application.  However, the current
   version does not define such a flag.  A future version of the Bundle
   Protocol specification might also define an administrative record
   that signals when a bundle has been dropped due to a corruption event
   detected via an unkeyed or NULL-keyed PSB check; this has not been
   defined in the current Bundle Protocol.











































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4.  Security Considerations

   This document has attempted to assuage any security concerns that
   would result from applying non-security-providing algorithms within a
   mechanism intended for security.  This is accomplished through
   semantic overloading of the PSB, reusing its structure to hold a
   simple checksum when it is not intended to provide security services.

   The potential leakage of information if checksums are not covered by
   some BSP confidentiality transform that is applied later in the
   transmission path is eliminated by the fact that the existing PSB
   block type code is used, and the BSP itself already contains rules
   for ensuring that confidentiality transforms applied by the CB
   protect the security result fields within PSB instances.

   This design decision to reuse a security block for error-detection
   may seem bizarre to both security and networking experts unfamiliar
   with the travails of the IRTF DTN research group.  However, this
   decision was necessitated by the late addition of checksum support to
   the Bundle Protocol.  By the time this work was recognized as needed
   by the group, the Bundle Protocol itself was in final review phases
   and had been implemented multiple times.  The Bundle Security
   Protocol was also no longer malleable enough to ensure compatibility
   with checksum support, as it had obtained a level of relative
   stability in its specification and there were existing implementation
   efforts based on these which could have required modification in
   order to not pass checksums carried in a non-BSP block as unprotected
   after performing a confidentiality transform of the payload.

   Ideally, the error-detection functions would be implemented within
   the basic networking portions of the Bundle Protocol, and not as a
   subset of the security framework, however the horse was too far out
   of the gate for the current definition of the Bundle Protocol to be
   affected.  Since at this time, the Bundle Protocol has only been
   proposed as Experimental with some disclaimers, this situation is
   temporarily palatable.  It is well-understood that future revisions
   of the Bundle Protocol need to include appropriate checksums within
   the basic format of each block.  In order to limit overhead, shorter
   checksums, e.g.  CRC-16, could be used for small blocks, with longer
   checksums, e.g.  MD5, reserved for large payload blocks.  This would
   allow checksums to cover and provide confident processing of even
   blocks with mutable fields, and retain efficient updating in-network
   as a mutable field changes, without the recomputation also covering
   large unchanging payload blocks.  This might also constrain the
   damage caused by errors to the functions provided by an individual
   block, rather than affecting the whole bundle and causing the whole
   bundle to be discarded, although the overall value of this is
   currently unknown.



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   The need to conserve limited network resources by detecting and
   avoiding further propagating errored bundles in-transit means that
   Bundle Agents SHOULD always validate checksums of in-flight bundles,
   even if the Agents are not the ultimate destination.  This opens the
   door for a potential denial-of-service attack on DTN Bundle Agents by
   forcing them to expend computational cycles on bundles with large
   payloads.  In this case, the attacker would also have to send these
   bundles over some link towards the target Bundle Agent, which will
   often be more constrained in bandwidth or availability than the
   Bundle Agent is in compuational cycles, so this threat may be
   unrealistic, or better combatted through access-control on links.  If
   this threat does turn out to be realistic in some set of
   circumstances, intermediary validation of PSBs was intentionally left
   as a SHOULD-level activity rather than a MUST, and could be
   dynamically disabled at some threshold of CPU use.

   Using the same protocol mechanism to provide (1) error-detection
   without security claims, (2) error-detection using a security
   protocol insecurely-keyed with a known NULL key, and (3) actual
   security protection using the same protocol but with secret keys, any
   of which can defined and used in the same "Payload Security Block",
   is confusing at best, and not a good clean-sheet approach to helping
   ensure secure configurations, interoperable implementations, or
   efficient handling of errored bundles.

   The normal method for handling error detection with security is to
   cover the encrypted payload with an outer error-detecting checksum.
   Use of a private key without a separate outer error-detecting
   checksum prevents determination of the bundle's fidelity by any in-
   path forwarding nodes lacking the key.  This discourages
   interoperability between parties that do not share keys.  Use of a
   NULL key is inferior to separately handling the security concerns of
   sender-authentication and integrity-protection from that of error-
   checking as it opens the door to private keys that prevent standalone
   error-detection, and should be discouraged.  Also, the NULL key
   cannot provide error-detection needed for the mutable parts of the
   bundle.  Providing any error detection for the mutable parts of the
   bundle has not been done here, and reliance on the fidelity of
   mutable payloads should be avoided for this reason.












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5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no considerations for IANA.
















































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6.  Acknowledgements

   Some of the work on this document was performed at NASA's Glenn
   Research Center under funding from the Earth Science Technology
   Office (ESTO) and the Space Communications Architecture Working Group
   (SCAWG).

   Discussion in the DTNRG and particular suggestions from
   (alphabetically) Mike Demmer, Stephen Farrell, Darren Long, Peter
   Lovell, and Susan Symington guided the genesis of this document and
   were crucial to adding error-detection capabilities to the Bundle
   Protocol within the limitations of the existing pre-established
   security framework.






































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7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.irtf-dtnrg-bundle-security]
              Symington, S., "Bundle Security Protocol Specification",
              draft-irtf-dtnrg-bundle-security-03 (work in progress),
              April 2007.

   [I-D.irtf-dtnrg-bundle-spec]
              Scott, K. and S. Burleigh, "Bundle Protocol
              Specification", draft-irtf-dtnrg-bundle-spec-10 (work in
              progress), July 2007.

   [RFC1321]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
              April 1992.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3174]  Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
              (SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.

   [RFC3309]  Stone, J., Stewart, R., and D. Otis, "Stream Control
              Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Checksum Change", RFC 3309,
              September 2002.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.farrell-dtnrg-km]
              Farrell, S., "DTN Key Management Requirements",
              draft-farrell-dtnrg-km-00 (work in progress), June 2007.

   [I-D.irtf-dtnrg-ltp-extensions]
              Farrell, S., "Licklider Transmission Protocol -
              Extensions", draft-irtf-dtnrg-ltp-extensions-05 (work in
              progress), April 2007.

   [I-D.irtf-dtnrg-sec-overview]
              Farrell, S., "Delay-Tolerant Networking Security
              Overview", draft-irtf-dtnrg-sec-overview-03 (work in
              progress), July 2007.

   [I-D.irtf-dtnrg-tcp-clayer]



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              Demmer, M. and J. Ott, "Delay Tolerant Networking TCP
              Convergence Layer Protocol",
              draft-irtf-dtnrg-tcp-clayer-00 (work in progress),
              July 2007.

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              September 1981.

   [RFC0793]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
              RFC 793, September 1981.

   [RFC1662]  Simpson, W., "PPP in HDLC-like Framing", STD 51, RFC 1662,
              July 1994.

   [RFC1810]  Touch, J., "Report on MD5 Performance", RFC 1810,
              June 1995.

   [RFC4838]  Cerf, V., Burleigh, S., Hooke, A., Torgerson, L., Durst,
              R., Scott, K., Fall, K., and H. Weiss, "Delay-Tolerant
              Networking Architecture", RFC 4838, April 2007.

   [SGHP98]   Stone, J., Greenwald, M., Hughes, J., and C. Partridge,
              "Performance of checksums and CRCs over real data", IEEE
              Transactions on Networks vol. 6 issue 5, pp. 529-543.

   [SP00]     Stone, J. and C. Partridge, "When the CRC and TCP Checksum
              Disagree", Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM 2000,
              September 2000.

   [SRC84]    Saltzer, J., Reed, D., and D. Clark, "End-to-end Arguments
              in System Design", ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 2
              (4), November 1984.



















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Appendix A.  Mandatory BSP Elements Needed to Implement Error-Detection

   This document makes some BSP components mandatory to Bundle Protocol
   implementations, while the BSP was previously entirely optional.  The
   appendix discusses these elements in greater detail, and highlights
   some further drawbacks of basing error detection and protocol
   reliability upon them.

A.1.  Mutable Canonicalization

   While impressively named, the mutable canonicalization proceedure is
   actually quite simple to understand.  The requirement for mutable
   canonicalization stems from the Bundle Protocol's forwarding design
   that allows several "mutable" fields (e.g. the "dictionary",
   custodian, and some flags and length fields), to change in-transit at
   intermediate nodes.  In order for the checksum, MAC, or signature
   computed and placed in the security result of a sent PSB to match the
   result computed over the received bundle, the sender and receiver
   need to leave mutable fields out of these computations.  The format
   of a bundle that is input to the PSB algorithms thus differs from its
   wire-format, and is called its "mutable canonicalization".

   Using mutable canonicalization implies either using an incrementally-
   updatable checksum algorithm and feeding many small pieces of data to
   it, or entirely rewriting a bundle block-by-block based on mutable
   canonicalization rules before feeding it to the checksum function.
   (The mutable fields still require protection against errors; a hop-
   by-hop checksum over only the mutable fields could be used to provide
   this.  Hop-by-hop checksum coverage could be provided by a
   convergence layer, but this would likely cover the entire bundle or
   fragment.  Some proposed convergence layers do not provide any form
   of checksum to compensate for this oversight in bundle design.)

   Several problems are known to plague mutable canonicalization:

   1.  The Bundle Protocol specification describes the bundle processing
       control flags as a single variable-length SDNV whose bits are
       sub-divided in-order by function into "SRR" (Status Report
       Request), "COS" (Class of Service), and "General".  The BSP's
       mutable canonicalization description shows three separate fields,
       with only slightly differing names, but in totally opposite
       order: "Proc.  Flags", "COS Flags", and "SRR Flags", instead of
       one single SDNV, yet has text that describes operating on these
       as a single 64-bit value and applying a fixed-length mask to
       them.  This is unclear at best, and feared to be uninteroperable
       in implementations.





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   2.  Many bits within the bundle processing control flags are masked
       out (i.e. forced to zero within) the mutable canonicalization
       format.  This includes all of the reserved class of service (COS)
       bits that are highly likely to be needed to overcome the
       limitation of having only three defined priority levels in the
       Bundle Specification (compare to DiffServ, CLNP's priority field,
       Aeronautical Mobile Radio Service message priorities, or
       mechanisms in other networking stacks that provide many more
       bits).  This means that these bits, and any other bundle
       processing control bits, will be unprotected by the end-to-end
       checksum and may change in-transit, potentially causing mis-
       treatment or mal-delivery of bundles.

   3.  The existing "bundle is a fragment" bit is unprotected in mutable
       canonicalization.  Errors in this bit itself can probably be
       caught through other means, such as careful length and bound
       checking in processing the rest of the bundle.

   4.  The entire mutable canonicalization procedure of parsing and re-
       formatting bundles in order to perform a checksum validation is
       significantly more complex than is typical in most existing
       protocols that are designed to be capable of simply computing a
       validation over a frame either without modifications [RFC1662],
       with only a small fixed-length and position field masked
       [RFC0791], or with only a simple fixed-size pseudoheader
       [RFC0793].  The significant additional complexity of mutable
       canonicalization prevents high performance in forwarding nodes
       that follow the guideline of verifying unkeyed or NULL-keyed
       PSBs.

A.2.  PSB Format

   PSBs follow the format of the abstract security block, defined in the
   BSP specification [I-D.irtf-dtnrg-bundle-security], with a block type
   code that identifies them as PSBs.  Some of the processing rules for
   PSBs that make the PSB less than ideal for error-detection purposes
   include:

   1.  If a CB is placed into a bundle that already has a PSB, then
       another CB is created that hides the PSB.  This means that for
       end-to-end error-detection PSBs, any in-network security proxies
       that add CB blocks also prevent the checksum in the PSB from
       being verifiable before the CB's security destination recovers
       the cleartext PSB.  If the CB security destination is never
       reached, the bundle cannot be checked for errors.  Errored
       bundles will consume resources between these two security
       gateways, since the errors cannot be detected and the bundles
       discarded en route.  The RSA signature of such an errored bundle



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       will only fail at the security destination, and the bundle will
       only be discarded at that end point, but there may be significant
       resources expended in delivering the useless bundle to that
       point.

   2.  A previously-generated PSB's security result cannot be retained
       outside a CB in the clear, because an observer could correlate
       the value to some known probable plaintext payload value.  It
       might be better to reverse the order of operations and always
       generate rewritten PSB ciphersuite checksums after generating CBs
       that encrypt the payload, so that the PSB security result covers
       the CB's encrypted form of the payload rather than the
       unencrypted form, and uses the same security destination as the
       CB.  Upon reaching this security destination, another PSB
       destined for the receiver, covering the payload revealed at the
       security destination, could be generated.  Requiring this would
       allow detection of errored bundles between CB security source and
       CB security destination, but would involve adding another
       instruction to the CB generation process within the BSP.  This
       assumes no errors are introduced during the decryption process of
       the CB, as such errors would go undetected.  If bundles pass
       through nested security domains, this could compound the error
       rate.

   There seems to be both benefits and drawbacks to any approach to PSB
   and CB interaction that doesn't involve layering multiple PSBs that
   can be pushed and popped off of a bundle at various security sources
   and destinations.  By some reasonable metrics, the BSP-prescribed
   interaction that we have attempted to build on and fix here may be
   among the least desirable of known methods for error-detection.





















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Authors' Addresses

   Wesley M. Eddy
   Verizon Federal Network Systems
   NASA Glenn Research Center
   21000 Brookpark Rd, MS 54-5
   Cleveland, OH  44135
   United States of America

   Phone: +1-216-433-6682
   Email: weddy@grc.nasa.gov


   Lloyd Wood
   Cisco Systems
   11 New Square Park, Bedfont Lakes
   Feltham, Middlesex  TW14 8HA
   United Kingdom

   Phone: +44-20-8824-4236
   Email: lwood@cisco.com


   Will Ivancic
   NASA Glenn Research Center
   21000 Brookpark Road
   Cleveland, Ohio  44135
   USA

   Phone: +1-216-433-3494
   Fax:   +1-216-433-8705
   Email: William.D.Ivancic@nasa.gov



















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Full Copyright Statement

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